International Affairs

VOLUME 59 NUMBER 1 WINTER 1982/83

Published quarterly for the RIIA by Butterworths

International Affairs

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International Affairs is published quarterly (in January, April, July and October) for the Royal Institute of International Affairs by Butterworth Scientific Limited, Westbury House, Bury Street, PO Box 63, Guildford GU2 5BH, England. Telephone: 0483-31261. Telex: 859556 Scitec G.

For the publishers:

Director, Journals Division: A. A. Smailes
Managing Editor: R. Nath
Assistant Editor: Mrs A. Williamson

Annual Subscription Rates 1983

All subscription orders and inquiries should be sent to MAGSUB (Subscription Services) Ltd, Oakfield House, Perrymount Road, Haywards Heath RH16 3DH, England, clearly stating the title of the journal and the period of the subscription. (Telephone: 0444-459188).

UK: £14. Overseas: £20. These annu include postage, packing and delivery surface mail. Subscribers in the USA, Canada and Japan receive airspeeded for quicker delivery at no extra cost.

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Volume 59

1983

Published quarterly for
The Royal Institute of International Affairs
by
Butterworths

Number 1—Winter 1982/83

Number 2—Spring 1983

Put at its most simple, British foreign policy is determined by what the British public wants and by what they are prepared to pay for, within the limits of what is objectively possible to achieve. Governments have from time to time used each of these three elements as mere pretexts for inertia—the public doesn't want it—we can't afford it—it can't be done. In the half-light of conjecture that shrouds so much of diplomatic activity, small obstacles can cast gigantic shadows. But it is for governments to lead, not to follow: whether you can afford something depends partly on how much you want it. And for a government which is prepared to act decisively in the knowledge that it is doing what is right, the boundaries of the possible can quite often recede dramatically. The independence of Zimbabwe is a case in point.

Our foreign policy must reflect too our recognition that most of our interests are shared interests—that foreign policy is not a game in which what one country gains another country must lose. Britain's postwar foreign policy, based firmly on membership of NATO, of the EC and of the Commonwealth has reflected a recognition that both security and prosperity are, as Sir Francis Bacon said of money: 'like muck, not good except it be spread'.

The twin foundations of our foreign policy are the Atlantic Alliance and the European Community. People sometimes suggest that there is a choice to be made between these two, and that Britain has not yet resolved the dilemma of whether she belongs to Europe or to the Atlantic. There is no dilemma. Our prosperity rests on a whole-hearted commitment to making a success of the Community and we consider that increasing the political weight of Europe in the world by the further development of political cooperation among the Ten is an essential complement to this. But while a strong, cohesive and prosperous Europe is indispensable to our security, I cannot foresee a time when it will be able to guarantee it unaided. Even if we were not linked to the United States by ties of history, language, beliefs and values, we could not defend ourselves without them, or they themselves without us.

But I do not regard Britain as simply a regional power which should concentrate on a few areas of clear economic and political concern to us and avoid involvement in other issues where our interests do not appear to be so directly engaged. This would be to turn our back on our history and our traditions, to take an unnecessarily shortsighted and narrow view of national interest, and to waste the assets built up by our long years of action on the world stage. We are obviously not a superpower, but we are a world power; and it is not in any sense an anachronism or an anomaly that we are one of the five permanent members of the Security Council.

The Commonwealth embodies our international approach. I have no sympathy with the sophisticated sneer that it is an organization of peripheral importance, an occasionally useful but often embarrassing legacy of empire. On the contrary, it is a grouping of great value both to us and to international cooperation more widely. The insight offered by the diversity of the Commonwealth into a wide range of attitudes is unique. But more than that, we are inextricably linked to the countries which make up the Commonwealth—by history, language, culture, and individual bonds. I intend to build on that and make the best use of it, not let it rust away with time.

And the Commonwealth is only part of the network of close relations we enjoy throughout the Third World. On the formal multilateral level, relations between so-called North and South are not always easy: that is hardly surprising. But on a

bilateral level we have over many years cultivated close friendships with a wide variety of countries in every part of the world. That is good for our trade, for our security (as the support we were given over the Falklands showed), and for our influence in the world. But it is also good for the wider cause of international economic and political stability.

Two invaluable assets for this task are our aid programme and our Diplomatic Service. In the last two or three years our overseas aid programme has been constrained by the financial disciplines which are essential to our national economic recovery. But it is still, at over £1 billion, one of the largest in the world. It is also one of the most effective in the real help it brings to the poorest countries, wherever they may be.

On the diplomatic side too our representation remains world-wide. I have no doubt that this is right. The resources involved are relatively tiny and I simply do not believe that the cheese-paring which would be involved in reducing our representation would make political, economic or financial sense. Foreign policy is an area where small amounts of money applied sensibly can produce dividends and, equally important, avert disasters. Such things cannot simply be reduced to a balance-sheet of profit and loss drawn up in advance.

In sum, I do not believe that the right reaction to the uncertainty and instability of the international scene, coupled with our financial restraints here, is simply to pull in our horns. That would be the political equivalent of protectionism. Interdependence may be an overworked word, but if it means anything it means that we cannot remain immune to events in any part of the world. Within the limits of our resources and our abilities, let us influence those events if we can.

I have said something of the framework in which our foreign policy is made. I should like to go on to say something of the tasks, or opportunities, against which it must measure itself.

First, East–West relations. It is not always easy to bring home to an electorate which has for the most part no personal experience either of war or of tyranny what it means to have, a few hundred miles away, a huge military machine pointed at the heart of Europe, in the hands of a government answerable to nobody but itself, dedicated to the destruction of everything that Western democracy stands for, and utterly without scruple about using force to advance its interests wherever it judges the gain likely to exceed the cost. The Russians themselves have pressed the lesson home at regular intervals—Hungary in 1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968, Afghanistan in 1980, Poland in 1981. They have chosen in many parts of the world to identify their interests with instability and chaos, where we identify ours only with stability and peace. All this is seen and understood by people in this country and elsewhere in the West. But this does not absolve governments from their duty to make every possible effort to ensure that their publics understand what is being done to defend them and why it has to be done. The united will of our people to be free, and to make the sacrifices necessary to defend that freedom, is the foundation of security: without it tanks and aircraft are no more than scrap metal.

But our relations with the East cannot be confined to a mere balance of terror. We need a strategy for their management, a strategy which aims in the long run at putting those relations on a more stable and constructive basis. It is very much a question of finding the right balance. The West must be sufficiently strong and determined for the Soviet Union never to be tempted directly to expand its power and influence over us. At the same time we need to demonstrate to the Soviet

Union that provided she can exercise proper restraint in her international behaviour, the West poses no physical threat to her and she can safely concentrate a far greater proportion of her efforts and her resources on grappling with her own formidable internal problems. In the fullness of time we must hope to build an atmosphere of confidence in which the Soviet Union can come to see the maintenance of her tutelage over Eastern Europe not as indispensable to her security, but as an unnatural and unnecessary burden. Dialogue is an important element in this process. By exposing the leaders of these countries to our views we can seek to dispel their misconceptions.

Meanwhile there is a vital need for realistic, balanced and verifiable measures of arms control. We need them as a beginning to the creation of that atmosphere of confidence to which I have referred; we need them to reduce the accumulated destructive power of the world's arsenals; and we need them to cut down the awesome costs of deterrence. But there are no short cuts to arms control. Measures which do not carry the absolute certainty of undiminished security for both sides would do far more harm than good.

The confrontation between East and West is not, however, a purely military one. It is also an active war of ideas, in which there can be no truce, and which we can only win. Important as I believe the principle of free enterprise to be, this conflict is not primarily one between different systems of economic organization. Its essence lies in the conflict between pluralist democracy and totalitarian oligarchy—between liberty and its opposite. How do we fight this war? Partly by promoting in this country, and in the West in general, an active appreciation of our liberties and the institutions on which they rest. President Reagan spoke eloquently about this here in London last June. And partly, too, by refusing to acquiesce by our silence in the denial of these same liberties to millions of fellow-Europeans to our East. We must, with other Western countries, go on demanding the full implementation of the Helsinki Final Act, and challenging the Soviet Union and its allies to show whether communism dares to coexist with even the most elementary human rights.

It is not so very difficult for the Western Alliance to agree to general objectives for East–West relations. It is often much harder to work out a coherent strategy and apply it effectively. The Allies now face a series of difficult questions about the basis of their economic relations with the Soviet Union. How far should these economic relations be subordinated to overall strategic objectives? Should we consciously seek to manage these relations in such a way as to deny the Soviet Union the financial as well as the technological means of building up its military capability? And should we aim to control the flow of trade in order to convey signals of disapproval in relation to specific acts of the Soviet government? These questions are going to occupy all of us a good deal in the months ahead, and I shall not try to answer them in detail now. All I would say is that I of course recognize that trade with the Soviet Union has strategic implications which must not be neglected. COCOM exists, to disprove Lenin's claim that we would sell the Kremlin the rope to hang us with. But in general I believe that we should be willing, within the limits of commercial and political prudence, to trade with the Soviet Union wherever such trade benefits us at least as much as it does the Russians.

If the Soviet Union dominates the political and military aspects of Britain's foreign policy, then undoubtedly the economic aspect is dominated by the problems of the world economy. A nation like ourselves which depends on trade in both goods and services cannot help but be disturbed by the current economic situation

and in particular by the stagnation of world trade in 1981 and the vertiginous growth in international debt.

In the 1960s and 1970s, several countries experienced balance of payments problems calling for rescheduling of external debt; but the number of countries involved in any one year was small and the amounts involved quite minor in relation to total international capital flow. In the last two years, however, the situation has become much worse. Not only have the difficulties in low income countries been aggravated by the surge of oil prices in 1979–80 and the stagnation in commodity prices, largely caused by the world recession, but a group of middle income countries who had hitherto managed to retain the confidence of commercial banks suddenly began to find themselves incapable of attracting the volume of credit necessary to service their debts and maintain the growth of their economies.

It is important not to be too apocalyptic. The banks, though showing anxiety, are putting rescue arrangements together in a rapid and orderly manner. Interest rates are beginning to come down and thus ease immediate debt service problems. The task is to put together an adequate package of measures to tide us over until the world economy revives. We must not assume that such a revival is round the corner, but neither must we be panicked into adopting the kind of reflationary measures which would only fuel inflation just at a time when that particular problem may be becoming manageable. Nor must we be stampeded by the size of the recession in the developed world, and the consequence this is having for employment at home, into a wholesale protectionism which would, if such a tendency gathered strength, deal a fatal blow to the chances for a return to a self-sustaining growth.

In all of this we act as a member of the European Community, one of the three principal actors on the international economic scene. The Community is not just a diplomatic arrangement which happened to suit the particular economic and political circumstances of the 1950s and 1960s. I believe that it represents a unique blend of political aspirations, combined with economic and social commonsense. I want to see it build on its achievements and develop further, not only in size—though I hope we will make rapid progress in admitting Spain and Portugal—but in the expansion of its policies.

In particular, I should like to see greater priority given to regional and social policies. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the Common Agricultural Policy, it cannot be sensible that agriculture should absorb such a disproportionate share of Community spending. This becomes even more true when you consider the urban problems faced by all members of the Community and aggravated by the recession. In my view we need an altogether more concerted approach to the mounting problems of unemployment, industrial restructuring and urban decay. I would like to see fresh efforts made to build on the agreed basic principles for the development of an energy strategy. It is high time, for instance, that we had a clear policy on coal. We have not yet achieved a full common market, and we need to make progress here by removing restrictions on the provision of services. We need freer competition in other areas, too, from transport and air services to insurance.

But I see little prospect of substantial progress in evolving new policies until we can remove the distortion to this country's disadvantage at the very basis of the Community's financial operations. The recent unpopularity of the Community in this country is regrettable and dangerous. If allowed to persist indefinitely it could gravely affect our ability to contribute to what remains the most imaginative

development in postwar Europe. But if we are to promote a more successful Community and make a success of our membership then we must begin by achieving a lasting solution to the problems of the budget—a solution which is fair and seen to be fair by the people of Britain and all member states. It is just not acceptable that we should go on paying so much and receiving so little in return. The government intends to persevere and build on the progress that has already been made.

Since I spent so much time earlier this year on the Falklands, perhaps I might say something about their future. Our policy is simple. It is based on certain fundamental principles and on the logic of recent events. Aggression must not be allowed to pay. Self-determination has become part of the accepted canon of international principle and practice; and we will respect it.

I shall not address here the other difficult international challenges, old and new, which face us. I hope it is clear from what I have already said that I do not believe we should stand aside from them, no matter how intractable they may seem. Of course we must set priorities and we must recognize the limit of what we can achieve: there are few more ridiculous sights than a country pretending to wield more influence than it in practice has. But international problems are not resolved by refusal to play any role in helping to solve them. Britain has a distinctive part to play, working wherever possible with others and through groups of countries which carry more weight collectively than their individual members on their own.

There is no shortage of challenges for the foreign policy makers in the months and years ahead. But I am not pessimistic about the future or about the part Britain, as a power with world-wide responsibilities and influence, has to play in that future. My confidence is founded on the assets with which we are equipped to face these challenges. They are worth recapitulating: membership of a successful Alliance and an effective military capability of our own; membership of the Community with the political and economic weight which it carries in the world; membership of the Commonwealth and close relations with many countries in the Third World; long experience and expertise in international affairs and a wide measure of resulting international goodwill; a language which is widely spoken and history, traditions and culture which are widely respected; a world-wide diplomatic representation—and, if I may say so, an outstandingly good one; and an effective overseas aid programme. Few, if any, countries have so many resources to draw on. I count myself fortunate that in this job I can call on these assets. I intend to use them all to the full, to see that Britain continues to make a realistic and constructive contribution to international life, and to the search for peace, stability and prosperity.

The Soviet Union and the Israeli action in Lebanon

Galia Golan*

The Soviet Union may have some questions to answer from its friends and allies in the Middle East at the close of the current crisis in Lebanon. Given the massive material and political support Moscow has accorded both Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization in the past, it is possible that they, or at least groups amongst their supporters and the public at large, expected something more than the virtual inaction of the Soviet Union. An understanding of this inaction, however, lies with the understanding of the nature of Soviet commitment to Syria and the PLO and where this commitment fits into Soviet priorities.

When Israeli forces moved into Lebanon, the primary Soviet consideration was that there should not be a general war between Israel and Syria. The reasons for this were numerous: Moscow was fearful of the threat to Damascus itself and to the shaky regime of Assad; it was concerned that the Israeli blow and these threats would be such as to prompt the Syrians to demand direct Soviet military intervention and that an all-out war, similar to previous wars in the region, would develop with the risk of superpower involvement and confrontation. Accordingly, Moscow has always drawn a distinction in the Arab–Israeli context between terrorist actions or battles of attrition, and all-out wars, opposing the latter because of the concern over superpower confrontation. In the present war, these Soviet preferences presumably caused little difficulty between Moscow and Damascus in as much as the Syrians themselves apparently were not interested in all-out war with Israel. Thus it was not a case of Syria pressing to fight and Moscow holding it back, but, perhaps, Syrian pressure on Moscow, possibly from the beginning of hostilities, to press Washington to restrain Israel. The USSR may have been restrained on this score by their general concern over their relations with the United States at this time of important arms talks.

There have been rumours that the Syrians were dissatisfied with Moscow's general reticence during the hostilities and in some circles, presumably the military, there was apparently much grumbling over the poor performance of Soviet weapons systems.[1] While Libyan and Palestinian leaders openly indicated their disappointment that Moscow did not send Syria concrete assistance, such as a contingent of combat troops, the Syrians themselves, at least publicly, couched their demands in political terms.[2] They spoke of raising Soviet–Syrian relations to a still higher plane

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1. *International Herald Tribune*, 21 June 1982; Qatar News Agency, 24 June 1982.

2. UP, 7 July 1982; AFP, 15 July 1982; Damascus radio, 19 June 1982. According to the Egyptian *al-Mussawar*, Qadhafi appealed to Assad on 6 June to send his troops into battle. A few hours later, according to the PLO representative in Cairo, Sa'id Kamal, Qadhafi received a message from Moscow not to get the Soviet Union involved. The Libyan Premier, Jalloud, made a brief stop in Moscow on 11 June, possibly with a similar appeal, but he did not meet with any Soviet leaders and was given little or no media coverage (*Pravda*, 12 June 1982).

of some sort of 'strategic alliance', wording explicitly chosen to convey their demand for what they considered to be the open, all-out American support for Israel as presumably delineated by the US–Israeli strategic alliance.[3]

Moscow did indeed use diplomatic pressure early in the war, conveying to Washington its concern over the Israeli–Syrian clashes.[4] This message, sent from Mr Brezhnev to President Reagan apparently on 9 June, probably resembled the official Soviet government statement issued five days later.[5] The noteworthy point was that although Brezhnev underlined Moscow's concern by referring to its interest in a conflict located in close proximity to its southern border, he did not include anything which might be construed as an ultimatum or operative steps should the demand for a halt to hostilities and Israeli withdrawal be ignored. The Soviet Union did send a limited number of ships (reportedly five) to reinforce their Mediterranean fleet.[6] But this second step was designed to give a certain amount of force to the diplomatic step and to signal Soviet support to its allies in the area. It was, however, a basically symbolic act, limited in scope, so as not to alarm the United States, and entirely in keeping with standard Soviet procedures. It meant that the fleet was to an extent prepared should the hostilities spread and require further symbolic gestures of a military nature. It was natural that the diplomatic and symbolic naval moves of the Soviet Union would be followed by Soviet willingness quickly to make good Syrian losses of equipment.[7] This was not implemented, however, with any particular haste or ostentation such as the dramatic airlifts of the Yom Kippur War. Nonetheless, it could be said that Moscow had fulfilled its commitment to Syria, albeit with little or no risk to itself. The dispatch of a high ranking Soviet Air Force official (deputy commander of the Soviet air defence forces, General Yorasov), was not part of these gestures—if Moscow wanted to signal its intention of guaranteeing Syria's air defences, it would have done so more blatantly and officially. Rather, this visit was most likely connected with Moscow's concern over and interest in the Israeli destruction of the Soviet–Syrian SAM systems in Lebanon. Indeed, one of the important signs of Soviet reticence during the war was the conspicuous lack of any high level exchange of visits, despite rumours that Assad had made a secret trip to Moscow.[8] While the Soviet media reported Syrian references to a 'strategic alliance', they did so without any comment or particular attention, giving no indication whatsoever of any Soviet intention of pursuing this idea.[9] And, as might have been expected, they answered criticism of Soviet equipment with downright denials—claiming massive Syrian victories in the air and on the ground—and with clear hints that 'efficiency' on the part of the users of this equipment would have helped.[10]

Moscow's greatest concern being the possibility of all-out Israeli–Syrian war and the attendant need for Soviet intervention, the Soviet media made little or no mention of Syrian involvement in the fighting in Lebanon until this danger had virtually passed (with Israel's declaration of a ceasefire on the Syrian front on 12 June). No mention whatsoever was made at this time of the Soviet–Syrian Friendship

3. Declaration of the National Progressive Front, *International Herald Tribune*, 21 June 1982.
4. *International Herald Tribune*, 11 June 1982.
5. Tass, 14 June 1982.
6. *New York Herald Tribune*, 16 June 1982.
7. Later the Soviets apparently supplied improved equipment.
8. Saudi Arabia News Agency, 29 June 1982.
9. *Pravda*, 22 June 1982.
10. Tass, 30 June, 1, 2 and 3 July 1982; *Pravda*, 4 July 1982; Soviet television, 3 July 1982.

and Mutual Assistance Treaty, lest the connection be drawn and Soviet involvement demanded. Although it did not say so directly, the USSR seemed to be limiting its commitment quite clearly to Syria proper—even its later efforts to defend the performance of Soviet weapons stated proudly that no Israeli planes had penetrated Syrian airspace.[11]

It must be remembered that the Soviet Union has demonstrated a remarkable lack of interest in the Syrian presence in Lebanon, beyond its specific concern that this presence might trigger an all-out war with Israel. When Syria invaded Lebanon in 1976, the Soviets very directly demonstrated their disapproval. They not only condemned the move verbally, but even suspended arms shipments to Syria for a period of time. The reason for this opposition was not, as some claimed at the time, because the Syrians were fighting the PLO and Moscow preferred its commitment to an ostensibly left-wing liberation movement over its commitment to an Arab state. In fact this was patently not true—Moscow did not then and does not now prefer relations with movements (or even communist parties) over relations with established governments willing to satisfy Soviet interests. Moscow's opposition to the Syrian invasion was prompted not by love of the Palestinians but by opposition to the Syrians—specifically, opposition to territorial or political aggrandisement of Syria, which might strengthen Assad's then stubborn independence *vis-à-vis* Moscow. Moreover, the Syrian–Lebanese venture threatened not only to embolden Assad further, but could and did lead to a community of Syrian–American interests and Syrian–American contracts. Finally, the Syrian move, and the entire crisis, contained the ever-present threat of a new Arab–Israeli war. Therefore, Moscow supported and urged a ceasefire, even though it was the anti-Soviet, pro-American and pro-Egyptian Saudi Arabia that was most instrumental in negotiating the ceasefire. The Soviet Union wanted an end to the anomalous situation of two of its clients, the PLO and Syria, fighting each other, an end to the potential Syrian–American link, and an end to the immediate threat of Syrian–Israeli war.

All of this is important to an understanding of the present situation, particularly the Soviet–PLO relationship. Soviet opposition to the Syrians in 1976 was not motivated by and therefore did not entail Soviet support for the PLO. On the contrary, because of its interests in a ceasefire and its concern over war with Israel, Moscow was most reticent in its aid to the Palestinians. This in turn caused a large degree of disgruntlement and criticism within the PLO regarding the Soviet Union. Fatah's number two man, Abu Iyad, was most explicit and vehement in his criticism, and it has been said that the reason Arafat did not make his customary visit or visits to the Soviet Union in 1976 was because of his anger over the Soviet refusal to supply him with the assistance and types of arms he demanded. Indeed, this problem has persisted right up to the present. No matter what type of equipment or arms the Soviets eventually supplied, the PLO always demanded still more sophisticated or advanced weaponry. Again, it has been said that Arafat's failure to visit the Soviet Union between 1979 and 1981 was due to his dissatisfaction over Moscow's refusal to supply him with SAM batteries, although arms were just one point of dispute between them at the time.

The underlying reason for this Soviet reluctance is the fact that Soviet support for the PLO, late in developing, has been and remains purely tactical. The Soviets were long totally indifferent to the Palestinian problem as anything beyond a refugee

11. Tass, 3 July 1982.

issue; their support emerged, belatedly, as a function of their regional interests, when Arab states—mainly Moscow's major ally, Egypt—began in the late 1960s to play the Palestinian card, placing it in the centre of their conflict with Israel. When Egypt defected from Moscow, in essence in 1972, the Soviet Union began direct arms supplies to the PLO, stepping up its support over the years as it became clear that only the PLO and Syria would serve as the means of its entry into the confrontation area. Following the Yom Kippur War, the global factor became more prominently linked with the Palestinian issue, that is to say, the Soviet attitude towards the Palestinians was increasingly determined by its competition with the United States in the region, qualitative increments in Soviet support often appearing in response to American successes. The most blatant example of this type of instrumentality was the official Soviet recognition of the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people immediately after the Camp David talks in the autumn of 1978. Given the tactical nature of Soviet interest, it was and is not surprising that Moscow is no more willing—indeed, it is *less* willing—to risk all-out war for the Palestinians than it is for its more interesting ally, Syria. When in 1970 King Hussein was dealing the Palestinians an even more serious blow than Israel is now, the Soviet Union not only did nothing to help, it actually put pressure on the Syrians to halt their intervention into Jordan so as to avoid the war that Israel (backed by the United States) was then threatening. Similarly, as we have seen, no Soviet help was forthcoming when the Syrian army devastated Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon in 1976. And on a diplomatic level, when Moscow saw that the PLO was liable seriously to jeopardize more important Soviet interests, namely the reconvening of multilateral negotiations under Soviet co-sponsorship at Geneva in 1977, the Soviets blithely dropped their support for full and equal PLO representation, conceding that Palestinian participation be left for a 'later stage' of the planned conference.

Another characteristic of the Soviet–PLO relationship, one perhaps connected with its purely instrumental, tactical nature, is the independence of both sides. If Moscow is not willing to acquiesce in all of the PLO's demands, it has also not been able to demand or achieve significant control over the organization. The PLO has jealously guarded its independence, juggling its allegiances and pursuing its policies even when they have found little approval in Moscow. It must be remembered that it is mainly Saudi Arabia that provides the money for Fatah purchases of Soviet and other arms; if the PLO is dependent upon any outside factor, it would be upon Saudi Arabia more than any other state.

There are, in fact, many disagreements between the Soviet Union and the various units of the PLO. To combat this and gain a measure of control, the Soviets have created their own Palestinian organizations, beginning with al-Ansar, which was disbanded in 1972, the Palestine National Front on the West Bank, which disintegrated in the late 1970s, and most lately the Palestine Communist Party, founded in 1981. All of these Soviet-sponsored formations have been rejected by the PLO, the communists, for example, failing in their attempt to gain two seats in the PLO executive in the spring of 1981. Substantively, this failure is due to the communist position of co-existence with Israel, mutual recognition and a Palestinian state limited to the West Bank, as well as their emphasis on a political rather than military (including terrorist) solution. Operationally, this failure is a sign of the PLO's and specifically Arafat's desire to maintain independence.

The direct approach having failed, Moscow would, in theory at least, be best off with the Marxist organizations, the PFLP of George Habash and the PDFLP of Nayif Hawatmeh. While Hawatmeh has indeed drawn very close to the Soviet Union and its positions over the years, Habash's relationship with Moscow has been marked by periodic criticism and open hostility. Habash bitterly opposed Moscow's more moderate line on the Arab–Israeli conflict, namely, the Soviet demand for a political, not a military, solution, its opposition to international terror, its support for recognition of the State of Israel and the limitation of Palestinian demands to a 'mini-state' on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was only after Camp David and, later, Habash's support for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan that relations began to improve—apparently through the mediation of Cuba. While this did not entail any basic Soviet concessions on the main points of Moscow's positions, it did occasion Soviet support and training for Habash's people, clearly including those engaged in terrorism; and it led to a complete reversal in Habash's previously hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union.

Deepening relations with the PFLP and the PDFLP notwithstanding, Moscow's main interest in the PLO is by necessity the far larger and dominant Fatah. Ideologically, Arafat and the Fatah are not Moscow's best choice. As a basically 'bourgeois' group by Soviet standards, heavily influenced by Muslim roots and closely allied with Saudi Arabia, the Fatah does not hold much promise for the Soviet Union in the future. Specific differences have erupted over Arafat's attitude to the Islamic world, including Afghanistan, and over steps which Moscow fears might lead the PLO to the Americans, such as the PLO–Jordanian rapprochement (at the expense of the communists on the West Bank and in favour of traditional Muslim forces) or strong links with the West Europeans. Yet Fatah is the key organization in the PLO and Moscow has had no choice but to cultivate it. Moreover, Arafat's moderation, in relation to other elements of the PLO, has brought him closer to the Soviet position on the Arab–Israeli conflict, particularly on the issue of political means and a negotiated settlement. This is not to say that Arafat is willing to do Moscow's bidding or that he wholly accepts Moscow's position; nor does it mean that there are not many contradictions and conflicts in the relationship. But the Soviet Union has had little choice but to support this dominant and, in Moscow's eyes, more realistic group. For Moscow's entire position has been based on what it calls 'realism', that is, that anything but a political solution recognizing Israel and limiting Palestinian demands is unrealistic because anything else, specifically an effort to eliminate Israel, will lead to war and to superpower confrontation.

It is this 'realism' which accounts for the Soviet inaction on behalf of the PLO in the present conflict. Early in the war, Moscow used two separate channels to make the limits of its support understood to the PLO. In response to what PLO radio termed a call by Arafat to Moscow to 'help stop the Israeli aggression', the PLO representative in Moscow, Muhammed ash-Sha'ir, issued a statement on 8 June that the Soviet Union would continue to send military supplies to the Palestinians, but would send no troops, adding that no troops had been requested.[12] None of the above appeared in the Soviet version of the Sha'ir statement,[13] but this Soviet position was presumably also conveyed to PLO political department chief

12. WAFA, 9 June 1982.
13. See, for example, *Pravda*, 9 June 1982, Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic, 9 June 1982.

Kaddumi in his talk with Gromyko at the UN the next day. Almost immediately, Abu Iyad, a critic of the Soviet Union in the past, publicly expressed the PLO's disappointment with the USSR, saying that from 'the first hour, we wanted the Soviet position to be more radical, but our Soviet brothers have their own way of acting'.[14] Soviet sensitivity to such criticism, of which this was only the beginning, was one of the factors prompting the Soviet government statement of 14 June. Although its wording was to some degree the public expression of the note sent to Reagan a few days earlier (primarily from concern over Israeli–Syrian fighting), the tone and timing were clearly designed to restore the ceasefire lest Israel take Beirut; but its warning to Israel lacked the strong threat expressed at critical times in previous Arab–Israeli wars. (Indeed, the PLO representative in the Persian Gulf was to make just this point, critical of Moscow, several days later.[15]) On the critical point of actual Soviet assistance to the Palestinians (or Syrians) the statement was vague, even defensive. It said only that 'The Soviet Union takes the side of the Arabs, not in words, but in deeds. It is working to bring about the withdrawal of the aggressor from Lebanon.'[16] The 'deeds' referred to were limited to diplomatic action, although Soviet propaganda broadcasts implied, by reference to past cases, that this also meant Moscow's role in the creation of Arab military strength.[17] Even this, however, said nothing of the present, prompting increasingly explicit Palestinian criticism over the following weeks. Moscow's ally, Hawatmeh, calling on the Soviets to use 'all possible means including military power', complained that Moscow was satisfying itself with diplomatic and political pressures, the effect of which was 'limited if not zero'.[18] The Soviet Union was apparently no more forthcoming in the letter Brezhnev sent to Arafat sometime in the last week of June, for Abu Iyad said of the letter that it 'contains pretty words, but they have no basis on the ground.'[19] Abu Iyad had already termed Soviet 'inactivity' as inexplicable.[20] While Arafat refrained from public criticism of this type, relations between him and the Soviet ambassador in Beirut became quite strained, even to the point that Arafat reportedly refused for some weeks to meet with the Soviets. Prior to his early July visit to Moscow, as part of the Arab League delegations designated to visit all the permanent members of the Security Council, Kaddumi is quoted as planning to ask the Soviets for 'drastic action', saying that condemning Israel was not sufficient.[21] According to Arab sources, quoted in the West, Gromyko told Kaddumi (and the accompanying Moroccan and Kuwaiti Foreign Ministers) that Soviet military aid in the form of troops or combat ships was out of the question, refusing to change the Soviet position or increase its role in Lebanon in any way.[22] The Soviets offered little else in answer to the Palestinians' demands

14. Radio Monte Carlo, 11 June 1982.
15. Qatar News Agency, 28 June 1982.
16. Tass, 14 June 1982.
17. Moscow radio in Arabic, 16 June 1982.
18. Reuter, 26 June 1982, AFP, 26 June 1982. For still stronger criticism by Hawatmeh, see AFP, 15 July 1982. The only PLO official to visit Moscow in June was the Hawatmeh organization's Yasir abd-Rabbu, a member of the PLO Executive. The Soviet media carried only his words of praise for the Soviet Union (*e.g.* Moscow radio in Arabic, 28 June 1982). There were reports of a high-level Palestinian delegation meeting with the Soviets in Moscow and in Damascus (AFP, 18 June, Radio Damascus, 19 June 1982 respectively).
19. Radio Monte Carlo, 26 June 1982.
20. *Le Monde*, 22 June 1982.
21. Kuwait News Agency and *al-Siyassah*, 4 July 1982.
22. *International Herald Tribune*, 7 July 1982.

and criticism aside from protestations of how much the Soviet Union was doing, minimization of the Palestinians' losses (meaning that their own arms and training, like those of the Syrians, were well provided by Moscow), and the more frequent argument, employed implicitly and later explicitly, that the Arab states were supposed to be the Palestinians' greatest defenders. Citing help from its own allies, South Yemen and Syria, and its potential ally, Iran, the Soviet Union has predictably tried to shift the criticism to the Arab world, citing its lack of unity and failure to act.[23]

While criticism of the Soviet Union has come from almost every quarter of the PLO, particularly Fatah, the one surprising exception is George Habash. Once the most outspoken critic of Moscow, Habash's silence today can only be an indication of how far Soviet–PFLP relations did indeed progress after Camp David, and the degree of cooperation Habash apparently hopes to maintain with the Soviet Union in the future. While Habash's silence regarding Moscow during the war may not in fact be significant, it is a strong possibility that one of the outcomes of the summer's conflict will be a strengthening of the radical wing of the PLO, as opposed to Arafat. Arafat will have still greater difficulty in arguing that he was right to press for the political approach, the road of international pressures and state alliances, the option of negotiations and implied compromise in view of the Israeli government's choice of the military option. Moreover, the dispersion of the Palestinian organizations, with the radicals concentrated mainly in Syria, makes it all the more difficult for Arafat to exercise control.[24] The likelihood of the radicalization of the PLO, and its probable return to terrorism as its only means of operating, has already been perceived by the Soviet Union,[25] but it is not necessarily a positive development in Soviet eyes. There is a wide gap between Moscow's position and that of the radicals, not only on the issue of international terrorism, but on the whole spectrum of questions related to an Arab–Israeli settlement—including the very idea of a settlement. Gromyko, in his press conference of 22 June, reiterated this position, underlining the point of greatest conflict between Moscow and the radical Palestinians: Moscow's recognition of Israel's right to exist.[26]

By the same token, one of the themes of Soviet propaganda during the war, as well as of Brezhnev's *Pravda* interview in July, was that armed force could not solve the Middle East crisis; only a political settlement would do. While this line was employed primarily to criticize Israel's use of force, it could also have been directed against the radicals in the PLO.[27] *Pravda*, for example, carefully omitted a remark by the PLO Moscow representative in a press conference to the effect that PLO forces would be kept in Beirut to defend against future Israeli and right-wing assaults.[28] Moreover, there was much reporting in the Soviet media, and present also in Brezhnev's interview, of Israeli peace forces. Some of this reporting, and Brezhnev's comments, referred to this as a new and promising phenomena for the possibility of a peaceful settlement.[29]

23. *Sovetskaya Rosiya*, 10 June 1982, Soviet television, 11 June 1982 (Primakov), Moscow radio in Arabic, 2 July 1982, Tass, 24, 25 June, 1 and 2 July 1982, Moscow domestic radio, 4 July 1982.

24. Arafat's success in overruling the radicals' decision to reject outright the Reagan plan, on the eve of the Fez summit, was a sign that Arafat was still managing to control decisions at least minimally.

25. See, for example, *Pravda*'s political commentator Demchenko on Moscow domestic radio, 4 July 1982.

26. *Pravda*, 23 June 1982.

27. for example, *Pravda*, 24, 27 July 1982.

28. Tanjug, 30 July 1982; *Pravda*, 31 July 1982.

29. *Pravda*, 21 July 1982.

The radicalization of the PLO is but one problem Moscow may have to face. A more serious problem may be that the Americans will emerge the winner from the whole conflict. This in fact was one of the major Soviet concerns after the beginning of the war and probably the major concern once the Syrian–Israeli hostilities virtually ceased and the period of negotiations set in. From its first announcements of the war, the Soviet Union sought to make it clear to the Arab world that the United States was as much to blame and as deeply involved as the Israeli attackers themselves. Moscow sought to exploit the conflict to hamper the United States both by drawing a straight line between Camp David, the US–Israeli 'strategic alliance' and the present crisis, and by encouraging the Arab states to employ the oil weapon against America. Thus, as early as 8 June, the Soviet Union called on the Arab states to help the Palestinians; this appeal was not a call for Arab military aid, but rather for the safer, but more effective—from the Soviet point of view—use of the oil weapon.[30] Beneath this perhaps far-fetched hope of achieving an active—and significant—anti-American policy from the Arab states, which might even unite the more reactionary Arab states like Saudi Arabia with the more radical ones, the Soviet Union was most likely intent upon limiting American exploitation of the crisis to improve its position further. The prominence of this global calculation in Soviet thinking was most apparent in the warning sent by Brezhnev to Reagan on 8 July.[31] For weeks the PLO had been surrounded and bombarded in West Beirut, there had been the daily threat of Israeli occupation and destruction of the PLO strongholds in the city. Yet during all this time the Soviet Union did little or nothing, choosing to respond only when a new element appeared: the possibility of US forces being sent to Lebanon to assist in the evacuation of the PLO. The Soviet warning was couched mainly in terms of preventing an Israeli move on West Beirut, and it was relatively milder than the 14 June statement in that it omitted any reference to the proximity of the area to the Soviet Union. But it was quite clear in its opposition to any importation of US forces into the area, a step which the Soviet Union undoubtedly saw as a serious change in the superpower *status quo* in the area, reminiscent of the days of powerful American intervention in the Middle East (for example, Lebanon in 1958) to prop up the regimes of its choice against the threat of pro-Soviet moves elsewhere in the area. The 8 July warning did not even mention Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, an omission designed perhaps to lower the price necessary for American agreement to desist from sending troops, a move obviously considered more threatening to Soviet interests than the continued presence of the Israeli army in Lebanon.

The American troop threat apparently mitigated by their limitation in a temporary multilateral supervisory force, the problem of American victory remained. The Americans could succeed in working out a solution to the PLO presence in Beirut, and even achieve a *modus operandi* with the organization, whereas, having no diplomatic relations with Israel and no patron–client relationship with Lebanon, the Soviets would have no way of challenging the American-conducted negotiations. According to a Saudi source, the Soviet Union refused a Palestinian request to send a Soviet negotiator on the grounds that the absence of Soviet–Israeli relations would be an obstacle to the success of such an effort.[32] Presumably the Soviet Union had

30. Radio Peace and Progress in Arabic, 8 June 1982.
31. Tass, 8 July 1982.
32. *Al-Riyad*, 13 July 1982.

been encouraging the Palestinians and the Syrians, or anyone else approached as a potential host for the PLO, to resist a settlement. It probably would have hoped thereby to prevent an American-mediated solution, as well as to demonstrate that the Americans, after all, could offer the Arabs nothing. At best, then, the negotiations could be shifted to the UN or a multinational forum which would include the Soviet Union, a suggestion which was raised by the Soviet Union late in July in Brezhnev's interview in Pravda.[33] When, however, Israeli preparedness to take West Beirut became more than apparent, and tensions on the Eastern (Israel–Syria) front, Syria and others suddenly changed their positions regarding a Palestinian evacuation. The sudden change, which included South Yemen's agreement to receive Palestinians, strongly suggests Soviet intervention, presumably because the Soviets became convinced that Israel had reached the limits of its patience and war was about to break out again in full force. The problem of American victory remained, however, and the postwar Arafat–Hussein meetings accentuated the possibility that the moderate wing of the PLO—the Soviet-preferred Fatah—might find its way to the Americans, leaving Moscow with the radical wing of a split PLO, and thus few prospects for playing a significant role in peace negotiations.

There is always the possibility too that the conflict in Lebanon strengthened those persons or forces in Moscow which were opposed to massive Soviet involvement with the Palestinians or in this area at all. It has been argued over the years that elements of the Soviet military opposed such involvement on the grounds that it was too risky, that the Arab clients were too unstable and uncertain, and that war, including confrontation with the United States, or at the very least, loss of modern Soviet equipment, would be the result. Others were said to have opposed supporting non-Marxist groups, believing the investment to be worthless over the long run, while others may in fact have pressed for greater support, as part of the Soviet–Chinese competition amongst the national liberation movements. Conversely, there were those who preferred only state-to-state relations as the cornerstone of Soviet policy, no matter how progressive or Marxist the non-ruling client group.

For a period in June and particularly July, there were indeed signs of what may have been differences of opinion or perhaps an ongoing debate. For example, in addition to the almost total[34] absence of commentaries in *Pravda* in July, the formula for a Middle East statement, as published in the Soviet media, failed to make the customary call for 'Palestinian self-determination up to and including the creation of a Palestinian state.'[35] Similarly, there would appear to have been some confusion, if not differences of opinion, over the idea of an international conference on the Middle East. On 20 June, Central Committee expert Shishlin spoke positively of such a conference, but, in response, journalist Bovin remarked that it was not now the time for it.[36] The debate, if there was indeed one, was apparently closed by Brezhnev's 21 July *Pravda* interview, in which he spoke emphatically of the need for a Palestinian state and the desirability of a conference. Following this, the media fell obediently into line. Yet the whole period was characterized by the

33. *Pravda*, 21 July 1982.

34. The only commentary was one by A. Petrov, according to widespread speculation a pseudonym for the Central Committee.

35. For example, *Pravda*, 18 July 1982, *Pravda* editorial, 6 July 1982, *Pravda*, 4 July 1982.

36. Moscow radio, 20 June 1982.

phenomenon of moderate articles (regarding Israel, for example) almost side by side with virulent anti-Israel attacks; some commentaries suggested the possibility of peaceful settlement, others spoke only of Israel's aggressive intentions.[37]

Discrepancies were also notable with regard to the United States. For many years there has been some evidence of persons or groups favouring détente as distinct from those who seek every opportunity to denigrate the possibility of détente with the United States. In the summer, there actually were discrepancies between the standard Soviet line and the comments of some individuals. For example, *Izvestia*'s Middle East expert Bovin sought at least three times to dissociate the United States from responsibility for the Israeli invasion.[38] In an interview with another Soviet Middle East expert, Evgeniy Primakov, journalist Igor Belyaev also expressed the sentiment that the United States might not be entirely pleased with Israel's actions, although Primakov—usually one to express the moderate side of the Soviet line—was consistently anti-American.[39] Bovin's name has been connected in the past with that of Communist Party First Secretary Andropov, and it has been suggested that the discrepancies noted above are part of a power struggle due to Andropov's ascendancy as a result of Suslov's death last winter. While it is most difficult to determine if this is indeed the case, the above discrepancies within the media notwithstanding, Soviet behaviour during the Lebanese crisis did not reflect any significant changes in policy. While the crisis may have triggered a debate and some rethinking, or contributed to a debate already in progress, the Soviet–PLO relationship and Soviet behaviour towards the PLO have been both clear and consistent over the years. Soviet behaviour in this crisis was indeed totally consistent with and the logical consequence of the policies pursued by the Brezhnev regime over the past ten years, if not longer. These policies have led to certain contradictions in Soviet–Arab relations—not only with the PLO but also with Syria, and before, with Egypt. These contradictions revolve around Moscow's willingness to provide arms and all-out support for the Arabs' position, while being unwilling to approve of wars and risk intervention which might endanger Moscow's primary interest of avoiding military confrontation with the United States. It is these contradictions which render Soviet–Arab relations so vulnerable, as evidenced by the summer's conflict.

37. See *The Soviet Union and the Middle East*, Soviet and East European Research Center, Hebrew University, 1982, Vol. VII, No. 7, pp. 2–9.

38. Soviet television, 8 June 1982, Moscow radio, 20 June 1982, Soviet television, 31 July 1982.

39. *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 7 July 1982. For the opposite view, see, for example, the interview by Central Committee International Department first deputy chairman Zagladin, Prague radio, 30 July 1982. Zagladin, who appears to have been representing the hard line, received a PLO Executive Committee delegation on 11 August 1982.

The Soviet view of current disagreements between the United States and Western Europe

KENNETH PRIDHAM*

'Is it the correct policy to use discord between [the imperialists] to make it more difficult for them to unite against us? . . . of course it is the correct policy.'

It is not necessary to be a major political thinker (the above is a quotation from Lenin's works[1]) to see that it is usually good tactics to try to divide your adversaries. The first thing to be said about the Soviet Union's attitude to differences between the Western allies is that it will exploit them to the hilt (unless there are good reasons against doing so) on grounds of general principle. To inflame such differences up to a certain point has been a continuous thread in Soviet policy since the war. Some Western observers would go much further than this and see in the current attempts to exploit divisions a single-minded drive to break up the Western Alliance and to 'Finlandize' western Europe, especially the Federal Republic of Germany;[2] and they would see the 'Peace Movement' as being exploited if not directed by the Soviet Union with considerable success to this end.

There will no doubt always be disagreements to exploit between two such entities as the United States and Western Europe, divided as they are by geography, relative military strength, and political and historical traditions. At present divisions are as acute as they have been for a decade. There is the argument about the modernization of NATO's theatre nuclear force and the installation in Europe of cruise and Pershing missiles; there is the differing view of what détente has achieved and might achieve; there is East–West trade; there is the worry on the European side about American intentions towards negotiations with the USSR about strategic nuclear weapons. And more recently there is the disagreement about how to react to events in Poland. It is thus not surprising to see Soviet commentators arguing to Europeans that in pressing for installation of cruise and Pershing missiles the Americans are working to Europeanize a nuclear conflict; reminding the West Germans that détente has meant much to them in terms of intra-German relations and movement of Germans from the East; reminding the British and others that to curtail trade with Eastern Europe means loss of jobs at home; and suggesting that the Americans, reckless of the risks in an escalating arms race, are not interested in negotiating on strategic weapons except from a position of superiority.

At first sight these arguments seem designed to sow seeds of discord and loosen transatlantic ties. No doubt there is a mixture of motive but, as this paper will attempt to show, in these matters which concern the Soviet Union so directly and

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1. Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 31, p. 370.

2. For example, C. L. Sulzberger, *New York Herald Tribune*, 3 May 1980: 'The primordial goal of Moscow's long-range foreign policy is to break up NATO by splitting the European allies away from the US and Canada'.

vitally it is most probable that such arguments are employed primarily because they seem to the Russians the ones most likely to help secure their immediate objectives, not because they tend to encourage mutual irritation and suspicion between the United States and Western Europe—though if they do so it provides a useful bonus. Thus it is more likely that the Soviet Union argues that American restrictions on East–West trade damage Europe because they want the trade and think this is the best way of securing it, than because they think it is a good thing to persuade Europeans that American policies are putting them out of work, though it may incidentally so persuade them; it is more likely that they suggest that to install cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe will lead to European nuclear war because that seems the best way of preventing installation of the missiles rather than because it is a good thing in itself to persuade the Europeans that the Americans consider them expendable. Indeed, in arguing in this way the USSR, in a sense, is not so much trying to divide the Western allies as to unite them in particular policies favourable to itself.

In matters of less direct concern to the USSR (*e.g.* the European–American disputes of the early 1970s), the reverse might be true and the prime objective simply to sow discord. And while in the current major areas of disagreement between the United States and Western Europe the alignment, broadly speaking, is one of European doves versus American hawks, this need not always be so. There have been times when the Soviet Union seemed more concerned over, say, 'German revanchists' than over the policies of the United States, and when the Anglo-Americans have seemed the doves.

The Soviet Union must have a general view of the relationship between the United States and Western Europe. Broadly this seems to be that the relationship is one of unequal rivalry, which will gradually intensify until the 'inevitable collapse' of the capitalist system occurs. In Soviet publications it is argued that the United States needs to control Western Europe, which it regards as a serious competitor in commercial and other fields; that détente and economic crisis have led to even greater rivalry, but at the same time the United States must maintain unity in the Western camp. There is thus a built-in conflict between the necessity to bully the Europeans in order to keep them under control and to conciliate them in order to maintain unity; one of the few things which genuinely unite Europeans and Americans is the threat to their comfort from the Third World and it was noticeable how well they combined against the developing countries over oil prices. Moscow regards the relationship as uneasy rather than unnatural, full of potential areas of conflict to be exploited at the right time in the right way.

Any study of Soviet policy is hampered by the scarcity of information about how the policy is made. We tend in the West to think of the Soviet Union as having clear-cut objectives arrived at without much dissent. But we do not know with what sort of arguments the alternatives are set out or how wide are the options presented to the top decision-makers. Churchill had the clear impression that even Stalin had to reckon with forces of dissent, and the same must be true of his successors. Some observers note a greater access by academic specialists to the decision-making process, while others see a continuing compartmentalism in Soviet official thought. Even in the West it is not unheard of for officials to be chary of putting to their highest authority proposals which they know will be unwelcome. In the Soviet system, with the risks attendant on unorthodoxy much higher and the boundaries of orthodoxy narrower, it is reasonable to assume that the arguments

are deployed with a great deal of circumspection. But that different options are discussed, that different people hold different views, that conclusions and objectives are not always clear-cut—in short that Soviet policy is a good deal less 'monolithic' than we sometimes suppose—it is impossible to disbelieve.

Against this background, this paper considers some of the wider problems of Soviet policy towards Western Europe in its relationship to the United States. First and foremost, do the Russians want a complete American military withdrawal from Europe? If so, would they then want a 'Finlandized' Europe or a communist one? Meanwhile, would they prefer a strong united Europe or a weak divided one? How interested are they in present conditions in securing left-wing governments in Western Europe?

From the postwar years to détente: Soviet priorities in Western Europe

In the immediate postwar years, as the cold war developed, the Stalinist Soviet Union made no secret of its desire to see the United States get out of Europe. Those were the years of the Strident 'US—Go Home' campaigns. But the result—or more exactly the result of the ruthless stalinization of Eastern Europe and the Berlin crisis of 1948—was the evaporation of the fund of popular goodwill towards the USSR in Western Europe and the establishment of NATO. In the post-Stalin era the crude campaign against the presence of American forces in Europe was dropped and has not since been revived. No doubt it was seen by Stalin's heirs as unsubtle and ineffective, if not counterproductive: and then the emphasis had to shift to preventing the re-arming of West Germany. In place of the old campaign we have seen from time to time a proposal to dissolve simultaneously both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. The result would be that troops stationed on foreign soil by virtue of one or other of the pacts would have to withdraw: but it would be much easier for the USSR to negotiate new agreements (or update old ones) outside the Warsaw Pact with the East European countries for the stationing of Soviet troops on their territories than it would be for the United States to act comparably in Western Europe. Even this proposal now appears infrequently. It featured in the Warsaw Pact Political Committee's communiqué of November 1978, and again in its Foreign Ministries communiqué of December 1981, but on both occasions was placed right at the end as if thrown in for good measure. Can we then conclude that the Russians are no longer interested in an American withdrawal from Europe?

There is an interesting passage in Roy Medvedev's book *Let History Judge* in which he discusses whether Stalin was to blame for the failure of Western Europe to go communist in 1944–5. He concludes that although Stalin made errors in these years (he is particularly critical of Stalin's refusal to help the Greek communists against British forces) he could not have secured Western Europe for communism at that time. Only if the Red Army had liberated Western Europe (which would, he says, have happened if Hitler had not declared war against the United States) would communist regimes have emerged there. To some extent all this is the Soviet counterpart of musings in the West about what would have happened if Eisenhower had pushed on to Berlin or if the Yalta agreement had been different. But it is sobering to note that a dedicated and courageous anti-Stalinist, though of course a Marxist, should speak with such apparent regret of the failure to communise (which at that period meant stalinize) Western Europe.

Whatever the basic feelings about a US military presence in Europe, other matters took priority in the light of the obvious failure of the direct campaign to remove it: the resurgence of Germany, unrest in Eastern Europe, internal political and economic difficulties (including the leadership succession), China, Cuba, the arms race. Moreover, the presence of US troops and the existence of NATO at least permitted the postponement of some agonizing decisions about the future of Germany. Accordingly, as détente burgeoned the Soviet Union had developed a different preoccupation in its European policy.

The beginning of détente is usually dated to 1969 when the SALT talks began and Willy Brandt took power in West Germany, though its roots can be traced back a good deal further. The Partial Test Ban Treaty was concluded in 1963 and Khrushchev was believed to be contemplating genuine measures of disarmament before his fall in 1964. But then, in an atmosphere clouded by the Vietnam war, his successors embarked on a massive programme of nuclear and other armament to secure at least approximate equality with the United States, for which a determination never again to be so humiliated as in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 probably provided the driving motive. By about 1968–9 they had achieved something like parity.

During the same period a number of other things were happening. The Soviet rift with China deepened and the United States and China began exploring a guarded rapprochement which gave the Russians an uncomfortable feeling of encirclement. The armament effort exacerbated economic problems which, compounded by the Soviet population's hunger for consumer goods, could lead to unrest and instability within the Soviet Union itself. Such problems might perhaps be solved by important alterations to the system, but changes in the economic system might spill over into the political sphere and undermine the basis of the regime. So might not a better way of improving the economic situation be to embark on a programme of increased trade with the West? Furthermore, the fact that Soviet rearmament had reached an approximate parity with the United States meant that it would no longer be a case of negotiating from a position of weakness; and the Soviet regime, like the West, realized that the nuclear weapons available to both sides had already reached the stage of 'mutual assured destruction' though they did not formally endorse the concept. Even in 1963 they had admitted that 'the nuclear bomb does not adhere to the class principle'.

On the Western side events were moving in the same direction. There were strong pressures within the United States for initiatives and flexibility towards the Soviet Union. Henry Kissinger believed in drawing the USSR into a web of mutally useful agreements. In the Federal Republic of Germany the government of Willy Brandt was moving away from its old policy of refusing to recognize the DDR at any price to a completely new *Ostpolitik* of recognizing the status quo in Eastern Europe in exchange for trade, the release of ethnic Germans from the Soviet Union and a suitable agreement to secure the status of West Berlin. Given the Soviet obsessions with Germany and with the security of Eastern Europe, this was a development of enormous interest and importance to the Soviet Union. In short, 'détente' was an idea whose time had come, than which the political scientists tell us nothing is more powerful.

There is evidence that in this new situation the Soviet Union was at first uncertain what its priorities were. Did it want most of all to secure Western recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe, or did it want to exploit Brandt's *Ostpolitik* to

draw West Germany and the rest of Europe away from Western institutions and Western influence as a step towards pushing the Americans out of Europe? Kissinger's memoirs show US concern at the latter possibility.[3] But in fact the United States, together with Britain and France, could exercise crucial leverage. The West German government could not secure parliamentary approval of the treaties with the Soviet Union involving recognition of the DDR without an agreement on West Berlin. An agreement on West Berlin in its turn had to involve the three Western occupying powers who thus secured a voice and an influence in the whole process. It was therefore very difficult to exclude the United States from the solution of this major European problem. Had the Soviet priority been to push the United States out of Europe they might have dropped the *Ostpolitik* negotiations or adopted some other new tactic. But they did not do so, which suggests that their overriding priority at that time (the basic agreements covering Berlin and the German recognition of the 1945 frontiers were in force by the end of 1972) was to secure formal acceptance of the status quo in Eastern Europe, especially of course that part of it concerning the territory of the former German Reich.

The aims of excluding the United States from Western Europe and securing recognition of the status quo in Eastern Europe again came into conflict at the time of the discussions leading up to the European Conference on Security. For some time the Russians seemed to be trying to make the Conference a purely European affair. Only in 1970, after the Western Alliance had made it clear that without US participation there would be no conference, did they envisage the United States as well as Canada taking part. It looks as if Soviet policy was in a fairly fluid state at that time. On the one hand there may have been those who, reluctant to shed old attitudes, suggested that the USSR could have its cake and eat it—could obtain endorsement of the 1945 boundaries in Europe and still somehow prise Western Europe loose from the United States—to which it could have been replied that a Western recognition of those boundaries would not be much use if it did not include the strongest Western power and that therefore a European Security Conference without the United States would be a nonsense. No doubt this argument was reinforced by a growing perception of the need to move closer to the United States. (The proposal by the US Senator Mansfield for a substantial withdrawal of American troops from Europe might have provided another Soviet opportunity; wittingly or unwittingly Mr Brezhnev helped to defeat it by a speech in May 1971 suggesting mutual troop reductions in Europe. This enabled the US administration to argue successfully to Congress that there was no point in a unilateral reduction.) At all events these developments showed clearly what may have been true even earlier, that the Soviet Union had altered its order of priorities *vis-à-vis* Western Europe. It might still have as its ultimate objective the removal of US troops and influence, but it decided that in the situation as it then existed it was better to go for what was on offer—the legitimation of the European boundaries of 1945—rather than strive after what in the current atmosphere was pretty clearly unattainable.

As détente gathered force the Soviet policy must have seemed increasingly right. The enormous success in getting West Germany to recognize the East European status quo was crowned by the Helsinki Agreements of 1975 in which the United States and the other major countries concerned did so too. SALT I was negotiated

3. Henry Kissinger, *The White House Years* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1979) p. 529.

in 1972 and a web of other agreements, economic and political, were made with the United States. True, the Americans remained firmly in Europe, but might not their presence be a stabilizing factor? There were fears in 1972–3 that France, the United Kingdom and Germany might come together in some kind of nuclear power concentration. The thought of a German finger on any kind of nuclear trigger had long been a Soviet nightmare and American presence and control effectively prevented that. The extent of the Soviet–American cooperation is evidenced by European complaints at the time of a 'condominium' by the two superpowers.

The decay of détente: ideology

Then the fruit began to turn sour. To the dismay of the Soviet Union the US administration could not prevent passage of the Jackson Amendment withholding m.f.n. treatment and American credits from those countries denying free emigration; the removal of President Nixon in 1974 after what seemed in Moscow no more than a little local difficulty engendered doubts about the continuity of American policy; and Western support for Soviet and East European dissidents aroused indignation among Moscow hardliners. To the West the actions of the Soviet Union and its allies in Africa (notably the Cuban military intervention in Angola in late 1975 and the Cuban-backed communist takeover in Ethiopia in 1978) and for a while in Portugal (where a communist takeover seemed possible after the overthrow of the Caetano regime in 1974) together with its ceaseless propaganda, seemed the clearest possible breach of détente and suggested that the USSR was only interested in the selective variety. Into this now clouded arena there followed Soviet development of SS20 missiles alongside further build-up of other military forces, the US failure to ratify SALT II, the NATO counter-decision to install new cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe, Afghanistan and then Poland.

Of all these various impediments to good relations, what one may call the two ideological ones ought to have been foreseen. The USSR ought to have known that having gained at Helsinki its major objective in the form of acceptance of the 1945 boundaries in Europe, it could not expect an easy ride on the *quid pro quo*: human rights. For their part the Western nations could hardly claim that they were kept in ignorance of what the Russians meant by détente. In endless Soviet statements it was spelled out. To quote one of the clearest: 'They [the socialist states] do not conceal that they are waging an active ideological struggle and propaganda to achieve the ultimate triumph of the Marxist–Leninist world outlook. . . . Such a stand has nothing in common with subversion and ideological sabotage.'[4] Peaceful coexistence could not mean sealing the status of capitalist states (though socialist states were sealed by the Brezhnev doctrine) and if such states began to evolve towards socialism naturally the Soviet Union would help them. But—so the argument ran—it would not do so with subversion and sabotage, as the West tried to do in socialist states. Certain types of war, however, were 'just' and others 'unjust'.

There has been much argument about how far the Soviet Union is motivated by ideological as opposed to national considerations. On the one hand it is said that the imperatives of the Marxist–Leninist doctrines require communists everywhere to work for world revolution and the triumph of communism; that this, whatever tactical moves apparently to the contrary may be undertaken, is what the Soviet

4. Y. Kashlev, *International Affairs* (Moscow), January 1979, p. 58.

Union is bent on and that therefore no permanent accommodation with it is possible.[5] At the other extreme it is suggested that belief in and practice of Marxism–Leninism has so dwindled that little more than lip-service is paid to it and that what motivates Soviet policy is the national interest of the Soviet Union.

Ample evidence can be found to support both theories, and no-one is ever likely to determine very precisely the degree to which ideology or national interest predominates in Soviet policy-making. Western suggestions that the gulf between communist idealism and the actual Soviet system proves the demise of ideology seem premature given that most religions have gone through phases of laxity. Clearly, however, if a people is brought up on the doctrines of a particular religion or ideology it cannot fail to penetrate their consciousness and their thinking to some extent. Furthermore, even if they wanted to, the Soviet leaders could not abandon the Marxist–Leninist ideology, if only because without it they have no standing and no legitimacy. Beyond this, in dealing with the ideological question the Soviet leaders have to face in a number of directions. When, as must happen to any state, it becomes necessary to do something apparently contrary to the national or party ideology, they have to explain to the party faithful that really it is not so; and the problem is intensified by the claims of the Soviet Union to be the repository of the true faith against the dangerous assertions and divisive attacks of the Chinese. So an inordinate stress has to be laid on the ideological factor. To justify détente it has to be spelled out that such rapprochement with the West is in no way a derogation from Leninist principles nor is the ideological struggle with capitalism one whit abated. It would be easier if the rapprochement could be explained as simply a tactical move. But that is just what a suspicious West is suggesting and what, if believed, might damage the new policies. So it must be emphasized that the policy of peaceful coexistence dates back to the earliest years of the Bolshevik revolution. In an article in the Soviet magazine *International Affairs* for April 1980, for example, A. Akhtamian remarks:

> In an attempt to slander and denigrate the fundamental principles of the Socialist States' foreign policy the Soviet Union's ideological opponents dwell on what they describe as the time-serving and tactical considerations that, they claim, lie below the policy of peaceful coexistence, allegedly alien to Leninist revolutionary doctrine . . . The very early Soviet foreign policy documents formulated the concept of 'peaceful coexistence' between nations with different social systems quite unequivocally.

Whatever, therefore, its actual contribution to Soviet policy, ideology has to be shown to be playing a major part. It may once have been possible to justify apparently non-Marxist deviations on the grounds that what is good for the Soviet Union is good for communism. But that is no longer enough. The definition of peaceful coexistence summarized above was no doubt hammered out as the best available to meet criticisms from suspicious Marxist–Leninists at home and abroad as well as from suspicious Westerners: to accommodate genuine ideological conviction and to promote the Soviet national interest. It has done a pretty good job.

5. For example, US Government Document NSC 68 of 1950, quoted in *New York Herald Tribune*, 20 January 1982: 'The Soviet Union . . . is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world'.

The problem of Eastern Europe

The Soviet order of priorities in Europe had certainly changed between the 1940s and the era of détente, together with its style and tactics. True, the security of Eastern Europe was probably still the overriding factor. Even in the 1940s, and however much he wanted the Americans out of Europe, Stalin was still not prepared to do the one thing which might bring it about: permit free elections in Eastern Europe. In that sense he placed the security of Eastern Europe above American withdrawal, as did his successors, in the very different circumstances of the 1970s, in going for the Helsinki Conference. It is not unreasonable, however, to deduce that if the security of Eastern Europe still ranked in the Soviet order of priorities only below the security of the USSR itself, the objective of pushing the Americans out of Europe had at least by then descended some notches in the scale. The question now is whether, with the fading of détente and the apparent success of the Soviet objective at Helsinki, it will rise again.

The actual objective which the Soviet Union set itself at Helsinki—to secure Western endorsement of the 1945 boundaries—has of course been achieved; and there has been the additional bonus of tacit Western acquiescence in the Brezhnev doctrine. But a Soviet critic might in 1982 question how far in fact this success, wrapped up as it was in the Helsinki agreements, had in fact consolidated the Soviet hold on Eastern Europe. Against the success of Western recognition he might set the human rights and social contacts clauses of the Helsinki agreement and argue that they had opened up a can of worms. Had they not greatly contributed to the Polish crisis with all its ramifications and possible repercussions within the Soviet Union itself? Moreover, it could be argued that the Helsinki agreement, by removing the East Europeans' latent fear of Germany, had permitted and encouraged them to be independent and obstreperous—rather as the British defeat of the French in North America encouraged feelings of independence among the American colonists. None of this might be enough to offset the undoubted benefits to the Soviet Union of the Helsinki agreements, but if the Soviet critic were drawing up an indictment of the Brezhnev foreign policy he could argue that it had not brought tranquillity to Eastern Europe, had left the East Europeans with a crippling foreign debt, had not ended the arms race and had increased the risk of deviationist ideas spreading into the Soviet Union itself. At all events, it is crystal clear that the problem of Soviet control over the East Europeans has not been solved and may indeed be getting worse; and that this remains a subject of major importance in the Soviet list of priorities.

What other matters rank high in this list? Professor Seweryn Bialer[6] believes that having had on the whole a pretty successful decade during the 1970s, the Russians now face a difficult time in the 1980s. In the past decade they achieved strategic parity, the United States was in disarray, and things were reasonably stable at home and in the Soviet bloc: growth rate was sufficient to provide guns *and* butter. Now they face a resurgent United States, unrest in the bloc, and economic difficulties intensified by populations with rising expectations: a situation which permits them to provide guns *or* butter but not both. If this persuasive analysis is anywhere near correct, it suggests that the USSR will feel themselves bound to match any American arms effort which in the Soviet judgement would give the United States superiority; but that they would give a great deal to avoid having to do so (which, indeed, is

6. Seweryn Bialer, article in *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1981.

borne out by their emphasis on the need for SALT II, etc.)—and that their fear of being forced, as they would see it, by the Americans into going for guns and neglecting butter is a very real one. Security for the Soviet Union and for Eastern Europe must still remain their highest priority. Economic development, an accommodation with the West which would permit a reduction of military expenditure, and the extension of Soviet influence generally are likely to be others.

Disadvantages for the Soviet Union of American withdrawal from Europe

With these very general objectives, how might the Soviet Union view the US connection with and military presence in Europe? A Europe free of American power is in theory a very attractive prospect and if it were, so to speak, handed to the Russians on a plate it is hard to see them rejecting it. Europe would militarily be at their mercy while they could deal bilaterally with the United States on strategic arms, unhampered by worries about American-controlled cruise and Pershing missiles on the European mainland. On the other hand there might be certain disadvantages. The Russians have given every evidence that they wish for stability in Europe. No-one can say what sort of Western Europe might emerge after an American withdrawal, but the first and undoubted effect would be to create change and uncertainty.

One possibility is that the Atlantic Alliance would continue unaltered except for the absence of American troops and weapons on the European mainland. The disadvantage of this for the Soviet Union would be the fear that the Germans, French and British, uncontrolled by the United States and without sobering strategic responsibilities, might in some irresponsible way embroil them and the Americans in a nuclear confrontation: or that a European nuclear force might emerge and fall under the control of the Germans. Moreover, without an American military threat in Europe it would become more difficult to justify austerity—political and economic—not only in Eastern Europe but in the Soviet Union itself. And American withdrawal from Western Europe would put the USSR under strong pressure to withdraw its own troops from Eastern Europe. They have of course themselves proposed a joint withdrawal, but with Eastern Europe in its present state they might not wish to be taken up on a proposal which would remove their one certain instrument of control over their restive empire.

Another and perhaps more likely possibility is the dissolution of NATO, followed by 'Finlandization' or a more genuine neutrality like that of Sweden or Switzerland. The various European movements for peace and unilateral nuclear disarmament can be interpreted as moves towards neutralism encouraged by the Soviet Union, in spite of the theoretical disadvantages for the USSR in some of their proposals. This is not the place to examine the origins and components of these movements, but there can be little doubt that the Soviet Union has in the past and will in the future do what it can to turn their activities to its own ends. Such ends may be to emasculate NATO and encourage 'Finlandization'; but they could also be to prevent installation of cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe and bring the United States to the SALT negotiating table. For 'Finlandization' contains some snags for the USSR. With Europe Finlandized the fear of European nuclear irresponsibility might be diminished, but the other objections listed above would apply much more strongly. Moreover, genuine democratic governments in Western Europe, with no entangling alliances, would be likely to prove a strong attraction

to the countries of Eastern Europe, whose stirrings in that direction, unhampered by the presence of Soviet troops, could become profoundly destabilizing. In particular, the mutual attractions of the peoples if not the governments of East and West Germany would be intensified.

If it decided that independent democratic governments in Western Europe without an American nuclear and military presence would be too destabilizing to be acceptable, the Soviet Union might consider that it would be necessary by force or subversion to turn them into communist regimes. But a communist West Germany raises the spectre of a united communist Germany which, however much the Russians may in theory desire it, would not be without problems for them. Would for instance 80 million communist Germans, the compatriots of Karl Marx, accept for ever that Moscow was the capital from which the laws of communism must be handed down? (The possible menace to the Soviet Union of 'Eurocommunism' applies more in current than in post-US withdrawal conditions and is discussed below.)

Indeed, in all these considerations it is Germany which looms largest. In spite of the disparity in physical power, the Russians still retain a good deal of their old combination of fascination and fear, admiration and distrust of the Germans, large chunks of whose pre-1939 territory are now part of the Soviet bloc. The trouble for them is that in any dissolution of the bloc system in Europe the German factor presents unpalatable alternatives. Either the West Germans remain with the rest of Western Europe, an unpredictable and perhaps adventurist force, or they break away and inevitably strengthen their links with East Germany. Evidence that, for the time being at any rate, the Russians do not care to contemplate a united Germany comes from their failure to threaten the Poles with the possibility. The prospect is anathema to Poland and a serious threat to try to bring it about might well go some way towards bringing the Poles to heel; but apart from some apparently ephemeral noises by Honecker in this direction early in 1981 nothing has been heard from the Soviet sphere on the subject. It seems that Moscow still regards German reunification as potentially more dangerous and destabilizing than the Polish revolt.

A better prospect for the Soviet Union might be the neutralization of certain individual countries of Western Europe while others remained in a weakened NATO. Under the various proposals for a nuclear-free or demilitarized zone in central Europe, nuclear weapons and perhaps foreign and other troops would be withdrawn mainly from much of both West and East Germany. The great prize for the USSR would be the removal of West Germany from NATO. The consequent removal of East Germany from the Warsaw Pact would be less damaging to the East and the Russians might calculate that risks of German reunification in the context of maintenance of the two blocs roughly beyond the frontiers of Germany would be containable; but it could still be a hazardous operation. Less hazardous and strategically nearly as rewarding might be the neutralization of Norway and Denmark, if it could be brought about.

A variant of the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Central Europe has come to be known as the 'Rapallo option'[7] for Germany. It has not been put forward openly but has apparently been floated by the Russians informally.[8] This suggests a status

7. The Soviet–German Treaty of Rapallo was signed in April 1922.
8. See G.Ginsburgs and A. Rubinstein, eds, *Soviet Foreign Policy toward Western Europe* (New York: Praeger, 1978).

for West Germany (East Germany would not, it seems, be involved) comparable to that which it held in the 1920s, totally allied neither to the USSR nor to the West but to some extent holding a balance between them. The major fallacy in the idea is that in order to hold the sort of intermediate position which it did in the 1920s at the time of the Rapallo and Locarno (1925) agreements Germany would have to be much stronger than it is now and probably become a nuclear power dominating Western Europe; and the Russians would hardly want that. Otherwise the proposal is not much more than an invitation to unilateral neutralism which the West Germans would have little reason to accept.

None of the foregoing objections from the Soviet point of view means that the Russians are likely to be in all circumstances opposed to an American withdrawal from Europe; only that there might be considerable disadvantages for them in present circumstances to be set against other favourable factors. Nor does it mean that the Soviet Union will not continue to exploit divisions in the Western Alliance and to encourage neutralism; only that there will be conflicting priorities to assess in deciding how to do so.

European integration

There is a good deal less ambivalence in the Soviet attitude towards a united Europe. Fragmented adversaries are on principle preferable to united ones and Soviet comments have been almost uniformly hostile to the idea of European union. Lenin's statement that 'A United States of Europe is possible as an agreement between the European capitalists . . . for the purpose of jointly suppressing socialism in Europe, or jointly protecting capitalist booty against Japan and America'[9] has been prayed in aid. And in recent years it has been argued that an EEC political union would contravene the Helsinki Agreement in threatening the principles of sovereignty and independence of states, and that (again quoting Lenin) 'a United States of Europe under capitalism is either impossible or reactionary'.[10] The EEC as such is now accepted as something that is here to stay, but the USSR maintains its opposition to enlargement and dislikes developments such as the increasingly close coordination in foreign policy, which might suggest progress towards political union. One practical reason is that individual countries are easier to deal with in economic negotiations. Another strong element in the hostility to union is no doubt a fear that a united Europe possessed of a European nuclear force might fall under German domination.

There are perhaps two conceivable developments which might alter the Soviet attitude. The USSR has generally regarded the EEC as something directed against itself—but supposing it were to develop an anti-American thrust; might it then be worth cultivating? The West German writer Hannes Adomeit finds evidence in Soviet publications of 1978 that the USSR decided that Western Europe was not going to be a political or military centre to challenge the superpowers and that the third force idea was not likely to succeed.[11] It would follow that there would be little point in encouraging European unity as an anti-American power centre. It is

9. Lenin, *op. cit.*, Vol. 21, p. 341, quoted in G. Shakhnazarov, 'The Labyrinths of Capitalist Integration', *International Affairs* (Moscow), September 1978, p. 38.
10. Lenin, *op cit.*, Vol. 21, p. 340, quoted in Shakhnazarov, *op. cit.*, p. 39.
11. Hannes Adomeit, *The Soviet Union and Western Europe* (Kingston, Ontario: Queen's University, 1979).

possible to conceive of circumstances in which the Soviet perception of their advantage could change—if Europe seemed to be veering of its own accord strongly away from the United States and were in need of a helpful nudge from the USSR. (The time when United States–European differences were at their height in the early 1970s was also the time of maximum United States—Soviet accord so there was little temptation for the Russians to try seriously such a tactic.)

Another possible argument for Soviet encouragement rather than undermining of European unity might be that a united Europe should be better able not only to resist US pressure but also to exert pressure of its own, which would be an advantage in cases where it was a matter of European doves versus American hawks. And a united Western Europe might present less of a political attraction to the countries of Eastern Europe than a fragmented nationalist one (although the impact of a successful united Western Europe on an Eastern bloc shaken by the Polish collapse might be profound). As things now stand, however, the case for a fragmented Europe must seem much stronger to Moscow than that for a united one; moreover, the vociferous Chinese support for the EEC and closer European union suggests that their appreciation is similar to Moscow's.

Eurocommunism

If Moscow sees advantage in a fragmented Europe it is reasonable to consider whether it is also, in present conditions, working for the establishment of communist or strongly left-wing governments in the European countries. In favour of such a suggestion is the ideological drive of the communist idea together with the obvious benefits which could ensue in the shape of governments predisposed in favour of the policies of the USSR and against those of the United States. The rise of so-called 'Eurocommunism', however, casts some doubt on this thesis. Some of the Eurocommunists have announced their adherence to the principle of the ballot box as it is understood in the West; they have criticized the policies of the Soviet Union, condemned the military takeover in Poland and made it clear that they do not regard the pronouncements of Moscow as Holy Writ; they have maintained relations with the Chinese. For the Soviet Union the prime danger is perhaps the national aspect of Eurocommunism and Mr Brezhnev has warned against 'renouncing international proletarianism'.[12] So, it has been argued, the Soviet Union would think twice before seeking to install people holding these views into office in Western Europe. Moreover, if, as is suggested below, the USSR is deeply interested in large-scale trade and technology transfer with the countries of Western Europe it might not be very sensible to seek to destabilize them. Also, too obvious support for left-wing movements would risk so alarming the West as to stimulate precisely the hawkish attitude to strategic nuclear negotiations which the USSR seeks to overcome.

On the other hand, the Eurocommunists are at best lukewarm about NATO, are inclined to neutralism and tend to hold anti-American views. Such virtues might be held to offset their disadvantages; or they might not. Even in the heyday of fully Moscow-aligned European communist parties the Russians would never lend them unqualified support when they judged it more sensible to encourage an anti-communist party following policies useful to the Soviet Union. The most obvious example is France where de Gaulle's 'Europe des patries' line together with his

12. At the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in February 1976.

dislike of NATO and of the United States seemed more worth supporting than the French Communist Party. Once again it is a question of balancing the merits of the theoretically desirable against practical disadvantages, tactical or longer term.

Trade

There remain two particular spheres where Europe has a major role to play in the overall US–Soviet relationship and which illustrate the thesis that the Soviet Union tries to use divisions between the United States and Western Europe for particular purposes judged overriding at the time, and not simply or even primarily to divide and 'decouple' the two. The first is trade. President Brezhnev embarked on a policy of limited economic interdependence with the West. In pursuit of it the Soviet Union needs trade; it needs industrial goods and it needs certain kinds of technology. The United States is one source of supply, but an unreliable one, as the passage of the Jackson Amendment, the on–off grain embargo and now the sanctions on behalf of Poland have shown. The United States has less need for trade with the East than have the Europeans (apart from grain exports) and would find sharp reductions for politico–strategic reasons less painful. If the worst came to the worst Western Europe could however supply a high proportion of what the United States might on political grounds deny. It therefore makes good sense to try to develop alternative sources in Europe and to do everything possible to distance Europe from the American harder line in the matter of restrictions on trade with Eastern Europe of strategic value. Thus in *Sotsialisticheskaya Industria* of 1980 Boris Rechkov wrote 'When Washington tries to draw West European countries into an economic cold war it obviously ignores their true economic interests which lie not in confrontation but in cooperation'. And the editor of *Soviet Weekly*, in a letter to *The Times* in January 1981, wrote 'British attempts to follow the US line [in trade restrictions] and poor credit facilities cost British companies contracts worth $1,500 million between 1975 and 1980 . . .'. In times of recession and unemployment these arguments, especially when buttressed by a major case such as the gas pipeline affair, make a powerful appeal. They encourage the Europeans, already irritated by what seems to them American inconsistency in allowing grain sales to proceed, to consider flouting the COCOM list and to resist US proposals for trade restrictions, which in turn encourages American trade interests to think themselves outflanked by their foreign competitors and to put pressure on their own government. And, though this is not the prime motive, there is the added bonus of stirring up suspicion, commercial rivalry and irritation between the Western allies. But the Soviet Union's divisive manoeuvres are essentially directed towards getting from the West the trade and technology it needs.

Nuclear weapons in Europe

The second matter of major current concern to Moscow where Euorpe has a central role to play is that of the modernization of NATO's theatre nuclear weapons. Whether the Soviet Union's anger and dismay at the NATO decision to install cruise and Pershing missiles in Europe arises from the conviction that these weapons are qualitatively different from their predecessors and that their installation would circumvent SALT, or from a disinclination to embark on the effort to maintain the superiority that the SS20 now gives them, or from some other cause, there can be little doubt that a decision to abandon the proposal is one of the things the Soviet

Union wants most from the Western Alliance. There are several possible views on how best to obtain this but clearly one line would be so to play on the fears of the Europeans (aided perhaps by the 'Peace Movements') as to persuade them to reject the missiles. A good deal of Soviet propaganda has indeed been devoted to suggesting that installation of the missiles will inevitably Europeanize a nuclear conflict. The corollary of that, that the United States is planning it this way and wishes to install the missiles precisely so that it may fight a nuclear war in Europe, leaving the United States intact, is also put about aided by reports in October 1981 that President Reagan envisaged the possibility of a limited European nuclear war. Yet, perhaps surprisingly (for it somewhat undermines the above argument), President Brezhnev immediately reaffirmed that there could be no such thing as a nuclear war limited to Europe: nuclear war begun in Europe would at once spread to the strategic weapons of the superpowers. In making this point President Brezhnev may simply have been reflecting Soviet military doctrine. If political calculation was a factor it may be that he judged it preferable to impress the Americans with the certainty of strategic nuclear war following nuclear exchanges in Europe and to relieve his East European allies of any suspicion that the Soviet Union might be planning what it attributed to the United States, rather than to encourage the suspicions of the West Europeans of their American ally. If so it confirms that to widen the divisions between Western Europe and the United States is not a Soviet end in itself. It is in principle desirable but can always yield to objectives of higher or more immediate priority.

Conclusions

The current disagreements between the USA and Western Europe stem essentially from differences of perspective and interest between the two sides of the Atlantic relationship rather than from any pattern of Soviet covert intervention in Western Europe through governments or political movements. The Soviet Union tries to exploit these natural disagreements in different ways at different times to serve whatever interests it judges most important. Withdrawal of the United States from a 'Finlandized' Europe has not for a long time been the highest priority.

The Soviet Union moreover needs trade and technology from the West European countries, which gives it an interest in their stability and relative prosperity, however useful in theory a poverty-stricken Western Europe might be in demonstrating the failure of capitalism. In exploiting the differences between Europe and America over East–West trade the principal Soviet motive is to preserve that trade so far as possible, not to break up the Atlantic Alliance. Similarly, the principal Soviet motive for exploiting the differences over nuclear weapons in Europe is to prevent installation of cruise or Pershing missiles, not to decouple Europe from America.

No doubt the Soviet Union has an ideal or 'maximalist' picture of the sort of Western Europe it would like to see: a NATO-less continent abandoned by the Americans and consisting of obedient communist states. But if that is the ultimate Soviet objective for Europe it has been put on the back-burner. If departure of US forces from Europe were the prime objective it would be reasonable to expect the Soviet Union to 'Finlandize' Eastern Europe as an inducement. That it has not done so suggests that other things are more important, for instance the stability and

loyalty of Eastern Europe and the management of the relationship with the United States.

If the departure of American forces and the collapse or emasculation of Western democracies could take place without destabilizing Europe, without creating too many shock waves and new dangerous uncertainties it would be unreservedly welcomed. And if it could be brought about with a mere nudge from the Soviet Union in the wake, say, of a successful unilateral disarmament campaign in Western Europe, or a surge of isolationism in the United States, the temptation to apply the nudge could scarcely be resisted. But in present circumstances there are risks that changes of such a sweeping nature might destabilize Eastern and Western Europe in a way injurious to the Soviet Union. The theoretical desirability of decoupling Europe from America has to be viewed against the need to manage the relationships with the United States and China, to control the nuclear arms race and to cope with internal problems. It is likely therefore to take a place (for the time being) some way down the list of priorities.

A more limited and more likely immediate objective than the early dissolution of the European–American alliance is the preservation of the status quo and stability in Europe, East and West. Even if détente with the United States has to fade the Soviets would like at least to preserve and perhaps intensify it with Western Europe. From that they might hope to achieve vital trade, modification of the cruise/Pershing plan, relative quiet in Eastern Europe and perhaps a useful influence on American strategic policies. The current differences between Europe and the United States are likely to be exploited with these aims in mind.

The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in Southern Africa: is there a conflict of interest?

COLIN W. LAWSON*

In the Autumn 1981 issue of *International Affairs* Christopher Coker argued that in looking at Soviet and East European manoeuvres in Southern Africa, Western analysts had over-emphasized Soviet strategic intentions and under-emphasized the possible conflicts between these intentions and East European interests. He then argued that 'Fundamental differences between the East Europeans and Moscow have been reflected in disputes over three main issues: the significance of Southern Africa's mineral resources; the extent to which planning should be integrated or commercial restrictions relaxed . . . and the wisdom of admitting Mozambique into the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance' (CMEA).[1]

This article argues that although Coker has raised an interesting subject, the evidence he produces to support his thesis of 'fundamental differences' is unconvincing. If by fundamental we mean primary, important, influential, then there is no substantial evidence of such differences. Nevertheless, although we can reject this 'strong' version of the thesis, we do find some evidence in favour of a weaker version: namely, although there are some conflicts of interest, they have made no significant difference to CMEA policies in Southern Africa.

This article is divided into four sections. The first three follow Coker's divisions, and provide critical examinations of his three areas of 'fundamental differences'. The fourth summarizes the main arguments and assesses their implications for the analysis of events in Southern Africa.

The significance of Southern Africa's minerals

On this first issue, it is not quite clear what the nature of the 'fundamental difference' between Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union over Southern Africa's minerals is supposed to be. Coker's argument is that during the last decade the Soviet Union's problems with domestic mineral extraction led it to insist upon East European capital participation in new Soviet natural resource projects, and to warn the East European states that it could not continue to guarantee to meet their raw material needs. Eastern Europe was thus required to contribute to Soviet domestic investment projects, at the same time as it was encouraged to develop sources of supply in the Third World. Coker presents case studies of Bulgarian and Romanian policies in Africa which, he argues, illustrate two things: first, the interest of Bulgaria and Romania in African natural resources; and secondly, the substantial time lapse between initial trade agreements and the creation of joint economic commissions—a lapse Coker interprets as signalling a lack of interest in Southern Africa which endured until change was prompted by CMEA energy problems.

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1. C. Coker, 'Adventurism and Pragmatism: The Soviet Union, Comecon, and Relations with African States,' *International Affairs*, Autumn 1981, Vol. 57, No. 4, p. 619.

0301-679X/83/1/0032—09$03.00©1983 International Affairs

The argument is overstated. For example, it is not clear that the impending CMEA energy crisis triggered renewed East European interest in African minerals and other raw materials. Certainly Romania had begun to diversify trade much earlier, even from the mid-1960s.[2] With the exception of Romania, with whom it would no doubt have preferred closer ties, the Soviet Union was not only happy to see Eastern Europe diversifying its sources of raw materials, but had, as Coker notes, encouraged it. It is true that CMEA capital committed to Soviet raw material development could not also be committed to Africa, but this problem would apply to any proposed CMEA investment in the Third World. There is nothing specifically applicable to Africa—still less to Southern Africa—about it. Moreover, Eastern Europe may prefer to invest in the Soviet Union rather than in Africa. For example, long-term stable contracts, price stability and ease of plan fulfilment are advantages cited by the otherwise rather cautious Romanians in a recent announcement of *increased* raw material reliance on the Soviet Union for the 1981–5 plan.[3]

It is true that East European countries were not overjoyed at the prospect of providing investment funds to develop Soviet resources. Compared to the previous situation, where no capital input was necessary, and where the CMEA pricing rule underpriced raw materials relative to manufactures, this was an inferior position. But in view of Eastern Europe's well-documented problems in earning hard currency, it was still preferable to buying on the world market.

Coker's analysis of the origins of the policy of contributing to Soviet resource development, in exchange for a share in the output of the projects, is perhaps what leads him to exaggerate clashes of interest in this area. He claims that

> In 1972 the Plan for Multilateral Integration required the East Europeans to bear the costs of further exploration in the Soviet Union. Three years later the Council [CMEA] pegged commodities at the prevailing market price once a year instead of every five. At its 30th meeting the following July every member was obliged to increase its respective contributions to the general investment fund, with the exception of the Soviet Union and Cuba: the only net recipients. These measures were all quite arbitrarily imposed by the Secretariat despite objections raised on all sides, especially from the Romanians. . . .[4]

Had this sequence of events actually occurred, a 'fundamental difference' over the development of African minerals would be readily explicable. In fact a less dramatic interpretation of events is more plausible and more accurate.

The Comprehensive Programme of Socialist Integration, approved in July 1971, raised the issue of financial contributions to long-term development projects which benefited more than one CMEA member. But it certainly did not insist that the whole of future Soviet mineral exploration costs would fall on East European states. When the 'Agreed Plan of Multilateral Integration Measures' was endorsed in 1975 it certainly contained provisions for substantial East European financial, material and indeed labour inputs into a series of Soviet projects—but the principle of 'interested party' was not violated, and those who chose not to participate could

2. See Colin W. Lawson, 'National Independence and Reciprocal Advantages: The Political Economy of Romanian-South Relations, Russian Research Center, Harvard University (Discussion Paper), August 1982. Forthcoming in Soviet Studies, 1983.

3. *Romanian Foreign Trade*, 1981, No. 120 (3), pp. 4–5.

4. Coker, op. cit., p. 620.

opt out. This is not to deny the existence of misgivings by some CMEA members about the strategy, though clear evidence of such disagreements is difficult to find.

A second objection to Coker's account is that CMEA is not organized on, say, the same principles as the EEC. All standard accounts describe the Secretariat as having no executive authority. Nor in any important sense does the CMEA governing body, the Council Session, for individual states must respond to suggestions of the Session within sixty days of the end of its meeting. Any individual state wishing to opt out of any recommendation may do so by exercising the 'interested party provision' of the Charter of the organization. As Brabant notes,[5] the 'fundamental decisions of the formal CMEA organs are usually reached by a Council Session convened shortly after the meeting of the Conference of Communist Parties or when both coincide, for it is here that the directions and basic principles of the CMEA activities are programmatically chartered.'

The 30th CMEA Session (Berlin 1976), which Coker mentions, followed a meeting of the Conference of Communist Parties—a meeting at which any important changes in CMEA policy would have been made. It does not seem that the Romanians raised at this meeting any especially strong objections to future development plans, contrary to Coker's suggestion. In fact at the time it was reported that Ceauşescu had delivered a 'moderate' statement to the meeting.[6] Moreover, although Romania at first avoided CMEA joint ventures, in the 1976–80 plan period she agreed to participate in the Ust-Ilimsk pulp and paper mill and other projects. In return, the Soviet Union agreed to help develop the Romanian metallurgical industry, and to assist with the production of high pressure polyethylene, caustic soda, butyl rubber and pulp and paper.[7]

Coker also overstates the severity of the impact of higher Soviet energy prices on the East European states, and so is led to exaggerate the urgency of their desire to develop Africa's resources. For example, Romania did not import Soviet oil until 1979, and then only in very small quantities. Other CMEA members who did were adversely affected by changes in the intra-CMEA pricing rules introduced in the 1970s, but not to the degree Coker suggests. From 1971 to 1975 intra-CMEA prices were, in principle, based on 1965–9 world market prices, but from 1976 a five-year moving average of preceding years' market prices, calculated annually, has been used. However, three qualifications should be made. First, these world market prices are generally only used as the starting point for a complex bargaining process, so the final prices may be only loosely related to world market levels. Second, with oil, the Soviet Union introduced substantial unilateral price increases in 1973, and in 1975 the world reference price was the 1972–4 world average.[8] Third, the Soviet Union provided extensive long-term loans to Eastern Europe to cushion the impact of higher oil prices.[9]

In brief, although developments within CMEA in the 1970s increased pressure on East European investment funds and balance of payments positions, at the end of the decade Soviet raw material supplies were still a very attractive alternative to

5. Josef M. Van Brabant, *Socialist Economic Integration* (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 179–80.

6. Radio Free Europe (RFE), Situation Report 24, 22 July 1976, p. 8.

7. Robert R. King, 'Romania and the Soviet Union: Assessing the Balance', RFE Background Report 226, 3 November 1976.

8. See Mlle F. Lemoine, 'Les prix des échanges à l'intérieur du conseil d'aide économique mutuelle' in *NATO, Comecon: Progress and Prospects* (Brussels: NATO, 1977) p. 146.

9. On this, see Vietnam's complaint over Soviet oil prices, noted below.

buying on the world market. Only Romania uses the world market for anything more than marginal energy imports. Certainly there was no 'fundamental difference' between the Soviet Union and other CMEA members over Southern Africa's mineral resources.

The coordination of planning

Coker's economic argument on the second issue is rather hard to discern. Dealing with events after 1974 he begins with the extraordinary statement that 'Trade within [CMEA] itself had failed to expand up till then largely because of deficiencies of central planning. The East Europeans now hoped to apply the lessons they had learned . . . to . . . trading with the developing world.'[10] He continues by arguing that Eastern European states had an interest in joint planning, economic cooperation and plan coordination with developing countries, stating that Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

> share a remarkable identity of views about the nature of the international economy and the dilemmas and changes which arise from their own participation. . . . [But] until recently the East Europeans laboured—and, to some extent, still do—under two separate constraints. In the first instance, direct relations with mixed socialist economies in the developing world were inconceivable until substantial changes had taken place in planning. In the second instance, until the political systems had also changed radical improvements in planning were not to be expected.'[11]

He argues that after the mid-1970s the situation changed with the emergence of apparently Marxist–Leninist regimes in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and Benin. Treaties of friendship and cooperation were signed by most East European states with the first three states, and East Germany in particular expanded relations with the first two. However, despite the 'remarkable identity of views', there were disagreements between the Soviet Union and her allies over the fact that CMEA members had 'not only pursued different objectives . . . [but] had even failed to evolve a single strategy for tackling economic development.'[12] In addition the Soviet Union 'hoped that the [multinational corporations] in Angola and Mozambique would be brought under "proper state regulation and political guidance," while many East Europeans recognized that their contribution was still an important one.'[13] 'By contrast, the East Germans like the Russians often seem more inclined to compete with the West, rather than cooperate with it.'[14]

Coker is correct in suggesting that some East European states (Romania, for example) are more willing than others to engage in joint ventures in the Third World. He is incorrect in suggesting a substantial division over the role of multinational corporations (MNCs). As Peter Wiles and Alan Smith have recently argued, the 'advice has become since the early 1960s fairly clear: the Soviet Africanists and Orientalists are of [the] opinion that the [New Communist Third

10. Coker, op. cit., p. 623.
11. Ibid., p. 624.
12. Ibid., p. 625.
13. Ibid., p. 625. The quotation is from Anatoly Gromyko, 'Africa in the Strategy of Neo-colonialism', *International Affairs* (Moscow), Feb. 1978, p. 86.
14. Ibid., p. 627.

World] should remain attached to the capitalist world market.'[15] We would add that a crucial proviso is that multinationals must be under effective state control. Ultimately, that requires a stable Moscow-oriented government, and it is to this end, as much as to economic co-operation, that Soviet, East German and Cuban efforts in Southern Africa have been directed. Soviet arms, East German security advisers and technicians and Cuban troops can secure MPLA and FRELIMO rule, even though Western oil companies are necessary to develop Angolan reserves, and South Africa transit traffic is a crucial revenue source for Mozambique.[16]

We would argue that the reason for this acceptance of the role of Western companies in the development of even embryonic communist Third World states is that CMEA nations are partly unable or partly unwilling to take over from MNCs. Unable because MNCs can often offer superior experience, equipment and marketing facilities—for example, Western oil companies are generally better equipped in the offshore drilling skills which will be needed in the next phase of development of the Angolan oil industry[17]; unwilling, because with the exception of East Germany in Mozambique, and the Soviet Union as an arms supplier, other East European states have shown little enthusiasm for extensive involvement in Southern Africa. For example, in 1978 centrally planned economies, including China, accounted for only two per cent of Mozambique's exports, and supplied only eight per cent of imports.[18]

It should be noted that none of this reluctance has any clear link to the planning capabilities of prospective partners. No doubt socialist planners would be grateful for the reduced uncertainty in their economic relations with less developed countries which effective planning would bring. But the pattern of Soviet and East European trade with Third World countries has few obvious links with their planning capabilities. If it did, it seems unlikely that Nigeria and Morocco would figure as prominently as they do in CMEA trade and project investment. CMEA states are generally interested in trading with countries rich in raw materials, with large state sectors, preferably with oil resources, and which are of substantial regional importance.[19] The preference for a large state sector is as much for administrative convenience as an ideological predisposition.

As with the first issue, we must conclude that as far as the coordination of planning is concerned, the case for 'fundamental differences' between the Soviet Union and its allies is at best 'not proven'. There are differences in approach—with the Soviet Union as a global power, and East Germany vying with Bulgaria for position as 'most orthodox ally'—that is hardly surprising. But apart from military involvement, the differences are mainly in the degree of economic disinterest.

15. Peter Wiles and Alan Smith, 'The General View, Especially from Moscow', in Peter Wiles, ed., *The New Communist Third World* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1982), p. 31. A recent example of Soviet willingness to engage in joint ventures in Southern Africa is the projected hydroelectric power station on the Cuanza River, where the other participants are the Brazilian engineering company Odebrecht and the Angolans themselves (*New York Times*, 3 September 1982, p. A5).

16. Oil provides 80 per cent of Angola's export earnings and 50 per cent of government revenue. Ninety per cent of output is exported to the West for hard currency (*Financial Times*, 4 August 1982).

17. For details see the *Financial Times*, 4 August 1982.

18. *IMF Direction of Trade Yearbook 1979–1980*.

19. See Colin W. Lawson, 'Socialist Relations with the Third World: A Case Study of the New International Economic Order', *Economics of Planning*, Vol. 16, No. 3, 1980, for a discussion of these preferences.

Mozambique and the CMEA

The third area where Coker argues there have been 'fundamental differences' between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is the easiest to appreciate, but the most difficult on which to find clear corroborant evidence. He argues that 'Mozambique has been urged to join [CMEA, but because] . . . very few East European countries would have any direct interest in "levelling up" Mozambique',[20] the application was not approved. Coker argues that the application was supported by the Soviet Union and East Germany; the latter apparently in part because of their support for what he describes as the CMEA Secretariat's position favouring plan co-ordination rather than 'the commercialization of economic relations'.[21]

There are two distinct issues here. First, is Coker's account correct? Secondly, what does the failure of Mozambique's application suggest are the criteria for admittance to CMEA?

On the first, it is likely that the account is not correct—though it should be emphasized that the written record is sparse and in places Delphic. Mozambique was only granted observer status with CMEA in 1979. Zafiris notes that soon after, reports emanating from Maputo began anticipating full membership.[22] In November 1980 Machel visited Moscow, presumably amongst other reasons to lobby for admission. In the visit's official speeches Machel reminded the Soviet Union that Mozambique had not boycotted the Olympics, was ruled by a Marxist–Leninist party, 'attach[ed] great importance to the principles and practices of proletarian internationalism . . . [and] regard[ed] cooperation between the developed socialist states and the socialist states whose economies are still developing as a decisive factor in strengthening the positions of socialism on four continents'. Nevertheless, in his responses Brezhnev confined himself to a mention of bilateral ties.[23] And, as Zafiris has noted, the final joint statement speaks of a 'coincidence of views' on bilateral relations, rather than a stronger 'identity of views'.[24]

Before the meeting, in October 1980, Mozambique had officially thanked East Germany for its support in the campaign.[25] The support was insufficient, for Mozambique still has only observer status, though it is undoubtedly still interested in full membership. The most straightforward explanation of these events is that Mozambique did not have Soviet support. If we except Soviet arms deliveries, East Germany is the only CMEA member to trade extensively with Mozambique. It has also almost certainly supplied a major part of CMEA's aid effort. Consequently we do not have to appeal to its views on planning-versus-market-relations to see why it might have supported Mozambique's application. More simply and directly it seems likely it was concerned to shift part of the aid burden onto other members.

The second issue—the criteria for a successful CMEA application—is more important, and we pursue it in more detail than in Coker's analysis. We argue that the issue of restricted membership is more complex than a simple reluctance to 'level-up' new members to the development levels of existing members, for that

20. Coker, op. cit., pp. 629–31.
21. Ibid., p. 628.
22. Nicos Zafiris, 'The People's Republic of Mozambique: Pragmatic Socialism', in Peter Wiles, ed., op. cit. See also the report by Jean-Pierre Langellier, reprinted in the *Guardian Weekly*, 11 January 1981.
23. *Pravda*, 18 November 1980, p. 2. See also *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 32, No. 47, pp. 10–11.
24. Zafiris, op. cit., p. 158.
25. Langellier, op. cit.

promise is no longer a clear boon of membership. The issue involves questions of ideological reliability and stability, as well as aid and the structure of the applicant's economic system.

It is obvious why members of the communist Third World wish to join the CMEA. The communique of the 36th CMEA session makes this clear:

> The necessity of accelerating the development and increasing the efficiency of the economies of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the Republic of Cuba and the Mongolian People's Republic envisages their wider participation in the international socialist division of labour. In accordance with the Comprehensive Programme the agreed advantageous terms of cooperation are to be further applied towards these countries.[26]

Other, Soviet-oriented non-CMEA members, are treated rather less generously:

> *Interested* CMEA countries are rendering large-scale assistance to rehabilitate and develop the national economies of Laos, Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Democratic Yemen, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan. Development of cooperation with these countries rests on a *realistic basis* and is of *reciprocal interest* for those countries and the CMEA countries.[27]

Thus, for less developed CMEA members there is a clear commitment to promote development by aid and trade concessions. For countries of 'socialist orientation' which are not CMEA members there may be some aid, but, if they wish, other CMEA members may opt out from this provision, using the 'interested party' rule. Moreover, commercial relations will not necessarily involve any concessionary element.

Within the communist Third World, what distinguishes the full CMEA members from the 'candidate' members is partly their degree of effective planning, and partly the degree of their attachment to Soviet policy, but mainly, as Singleton has argued, the assurance that their transition to a Marxist–Leninist state is irreversible. Soviet commentators are quite clear on this point. They admit that a change of ruling elite can alter relations with any African country very rapidly, whether or not it is of socialist orientation.[28]

However, fulfilment of these conditions does not of itself guarantee admission. Neither does admission imply a promise by the developed members to 'level-up' the neophyte quickly to their own level. There have been unconfirmed rumours that Hungary and perhaps Czechoslovakia opposed the admission of Vietnam in 1978, and it has been argued above that it is plausible that the Soviet Union did not support Mozambique's application—if indeed a formal application was ever made. Wiles and Smith argue that the promise of 'levelling-up', which was spelt out in CMEA's 1962 'Basic Principles of the International Socialist Division of Labour', has, under Brezhnev, been replaced by a commitment to economic aid, and, less obviously, military security.[29] They go even further than this in suggesting that because of a shift away from the ideal of 'levelling-up', the CMEA promises to its

26. *Foreign Trade*, 1982, No. 7, p. 7.

27. *Foreign Trade*, 1980, No. 10, p. 7, emphasis added. Quoted in Seth Singleton, 'The Natural Ally: Soviet Policy in Southern Africa,' in Michael Clough, ed., *Political Change in Southern Africa: Implications for United States Policy* (Berkeley, Calif.: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1982).

28. I am indebted to Seth Singleton for this point.

29. Wiles and Smith in Wiles, ed., op. cit., pp. 26–31.

developing members depend upon the date of their membership. Mongolia, joining in 1962, could expect to be levelled-up, while Cuba, joining in 1972, could expect substantial aid, though not an unequivocal policy of rapidly achieved equality. But Vietnam, both poorer and more populous, and joining in 1978, could reasonably expect only aid.

There certainly appear to be differences in treatment between members, and these must cause friction, though hard evidence on this is slight. A rare break in the normal silence which surrounds intra-CMEA disputes came over Soviet oil exports to Vietnam. In 1981 the Chairman of Vietnam's State Planning Commission complained that the Soviet Union's 1981 asking price was fifty per cent higher than in 1980 and that 'in selling to Vietnam, the Soviet Union should give some element of aid. Mongolia, for instance, pays the . . . CMEA price for oil but gets some non-refundable credit to cover part of the bill'.[30] Until 1981 Vietnam, he said, had paid less than the CMEA price.

In conclusion, over the issue of Mozambique's admission to the CMEA there is no evidence of any 'fundamental difference' between the Soviet Union, supported by East Germany, and Eastern Europe. Indeed, it is possible that there was a disagreement between East Germany and the Soviet Union, though there is no firm evidence of this. It is plausible that East Germany supported Mozambique in order to reduce her own commitments, not because of any general planning-versus-market-relations views. Moreover, other CMEA members would have opposed the application, not because they feared the implications of 'levelling-up', because that is no longer taken as a clear concomitant of membership, but simply because they were not especially interested in a rapid development of trade, and disinclined (or perhaps unable) to provide the aid, which is.

Conclusions and implications

This examination of the thesis that there are 'fundamental differences' between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe over Southern Africa, differences arising from conflicting interests, has produced substantial evidence to refute it. At best we could accept only a very weak version of the thesis, which suggested some conflicts of interest between CMEA members, but nothing which led to unambiguous confrontation between the Soviet Union and other CMEA members, *and* made a significant difference to CMEA policies in the area.

On the issue of raw materials, it is true that contributing to Soviet development plans implies that less capital resources will be available for investment in developing countries. But it does not imply that investing in the Soviet Union is less advantageous than investing elsewhere, or that substantial investments have been deflected from Southern Africa. Again, with plan coordination, there is a dispute, but not one which touches relations with Southern Africa. The dispute relates to intra-CMEA trade, and revolves around the issues of supranational planning, and of the desirability of physical planning, as opposed to market relations. On neither issue is the Soviet Union without support; on neither issue is there evidence it has influenced relations with Africa. With Mozambique, a dispute between East Germany and other members, perhaps even with the Soviet Union, is plausible: but unless Mozambique makes CMEA membership a condition of her continued support, this is unlikely to be important.

30. Interview with Nguyen Lam, *Far Eastern Economic Review*, February 27–March 5, 1981, p. 32.

The implication of these arguments is not that the Soviet Union and its allies will always act in concert in Southern Africa. The implication is that the East European states are not particularly interested in Southern Africa, and the Soviet Union will find it very difficult to persuade them to become so. With the possible exception of East Germany, none would happily accept a greater degree of involvement than at present. Should political instability in the area increase, almost total economic disengagement by the smaller CMEA members would be both prudent and likely. This East European attitude leaves the Soviet Union with greater political freedom of manoeuvre, because it knows that its allies are not significantly involved, but with less economic freedom, for it cannot rely on their aid and trade links to influence client states. Were Eastern Europe more interested, then, and only then, would there be scope for fundamental and important differences to arise.

The South African policy of the British Labour government, 1947–51

RITCHIE OVENDALE*

In 1899 Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for Colonies, and Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner, fought to maintain British supremacy in South Africa. The Cabinet was told that the contest for supremacy was between 'the Dutch and the English': what was at stake was the position of Great Britain in South Africa, 'and with it the estimate formed of our power and influence in Colonies throughout the world'.[1] At the same time, in the Transvaal, a memorandum by the State Attorney, J. C. Smuts, was accepted by the Volksraad: South Africa was to become a great state with an Afrikaner republic stretching from Table Bay to the Zambezi; the British were to be driven into the sea.[2] The Second Anglo–Boer War, 1899–1902, was won by Britain, but in 1906–07 the new Liberal administration 'magnanimously' granted responsible government first to the Transvaal and then to the Orange River Colony, effectively ensuring that South Africa would be ruled by Afrikaner Calvinists, and that it would be English-speaking South Africans and the non-European inhabitants that had to pay the price of this gesture. Milner, a great liberal statesman, had agreed to the insertion of a clause in the Treaty of Vereeniging—which ended the war—stating that the British government would not legislate for the blacks in the former Boer republics until these had achieved self-government. He regarded this as a mistake, but realized that without such a clause the war would have continued indefinitely. As early as 1901 Milner argued that any new self-governing confederation in South Africa could only be started with a British minded majority. He gave precise calculations as to how this could be achieved, and the Afrikaners never forgot these whenever the question of British immigration was raised. Indeed, until the 1960s the 'race problem' in South Africa referred not to the black–white issue, but to relations between Afrikaners and English-speaking South Africans.[3]

With the formation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 English-speaking South Africans remained loyal to the imperial connection, but on the whole they followed the policy of conciliation advanced by the Boer War leaders, Smuts and Louis Botha. This meant that no English party emerged to balance the power of Afrikaner nationalism. Indeed, during the First World War, the manhood of English-speaking South Africa was decimated on the fields of Flanders, and the natural leaders were

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1. *Cab 41* (Public Record Office, London), 25, No. 18. Salisbury to Victoria, 8 September 1899.

2. *Leyds Archives* (Transvaal Archives, Pretoria), 192(1), GR1293/99, Memorandum on Military Situation, 4 September 1899; Minutes. See also Ritchie Ovendale, 'Profit or Patriotism: Natal, the Transvaal, and the Coming of the Second Anglo-Boer War', *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 1980, Vol. VIII, pp. 209–34 at pp. 225–7.

3. See Nicholas Mansergh, *South Africa 1906–1961, The Price of Magnanimity* (London: 1962), *passim.*

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lost.[4] Smuts, the man who had been behind the Afrikaner conspiracy to drive the British out of South Africa in 1899, became a great imperial and world statesman, and the 'darling' of English-speaking South Africa, which he effectively betrayed. In 1939 South Africa did enter the Second World War at Britain's side, but only with the connivance of Smuts, the British High Commissioner, and the Governor-General.[5] That left a deeply divided country, and Oswald Pirow, the Minister of Defence, predicted that the pendulum would swing back, and English-speaking South Africans would find themselves aliens in their own country.[6] During the Second World War the Purified Nationalist Party under Dr D. F. Malan emerged as the principal opposition, and many of its leaders had Nazi sympathies.[7] Almost as if in an attempt to maintain South Africa's loyalty to the crown and Commonwealth it was chosen as the first dominion the King should visit after the war. Indeed, it was in South Africa in 1947 that his daughter, Princess Elizabeth, celebrated her twenty-first birthday, and in a broadcast dedicated herself to 'the service of our great Imperial Commonwealth to which we all belong'. The Labour government in Britain declined the King's suggestion that he return early because of the crisis winter conditions. But it was English-speaking South Africa that cheered the royal family. A year later Malan was elected Prime Minister on the basis of a policy of white supremacy.[8] The Nationalists only secured power with the support of the more moderate Afrikaner party under N. C. Havenga.

Smuts thought that they could not last: the alliance was too fragile. He told Philip J. Noel-Baker, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, on 14 June 1948, that the Nationalist victory could be attributed almost entirely to their attack on the liberal native (black) policy of Smuts's United Party. His deputy leader, Jan Hofmeyr, had used 'less guarded language' than he had, and so the Nationalists had been able 'to create prejudice in the minds of not only the Afrikaners but also some English-speaking people in the Union'. This victory against a liberal native policy was 'a misfortune both for the Union and for the world'. Smuts felt that his own native policy was the only answer to the propaganda of the communists among the natives into which the Russians were putting a great deal of effort. He also acknowledged that he had lost votes through his recognition of Israel. Many Afrikaners were traditionally anti-Semitic, and some English-speaking South Africans shared these sentiments, barring Jews from their country clubs. Others had been outraged by Zionist acts of terrorism against British conscript troops. Smuts felt, however, that Malan would behave in a most proper and constitutional manner as head of a Commonwealth government. Malan had kept the republican issue out of the election 'and could not have afforded to bring it in because if he had, he would have lost the British vote which returned him to power'. Britain, Smuts felt, should be able to have more or less normal relations with Malan.[9]

4. See Eric A. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa*, 3rd edn. (London, 1959), pp. 558–69.
5. Ritchie Ovendale, *'Appeasement' and the English Speaking World: Britain, the United States, the Dominions, and the Policy of 'Appeasement', 1937–1939* (Cardiff, 1975), pp. 300–6.
6. Oswald Pirow, *James Barry Munnik Hertzog* (Cape Town, 1958), p. 246.
7. James Barber, *South Africa's Foreign Policy 1945–1970* (London, 1973), pp. 9–11.
8. See Colin Cross, *The Fall of the British Empire* (London, 1968), pp. 256–61.
9. *DO 35* (Public Record Office, London) 3138, G2110/22, Record by Noel-Baker of Conversation with Smuts, Secret, 14 June 1948; for an evaluation of the 1948 election see W. K. Hancock, *Smuts, The Fields of Force 1919–1950* (Cambridge, 1968), pp. 497–510; for the Palestine issue see Ritchie Ovendale, 'The Palestine Policy of the British Labour Government 1945–6', *International Affairs*, Vol. 55, No. 3,

It might have been thought that the Labour government in Britain would have been opposed to the policy of racial division that existed in South Africa even before the election of the Nationalists in 1948. But the spokesman on colonial affairs, Arthur Creech Jones, expressed a widely held sentiment that South Africa would become the leading influence in the African continent.[10] The new Labour government did its best to protect South Africa from criticism in the United Nations over the attempts to incorporate the mandated territory of South West Africa and over its treatment of South African Indians involving legislation designed to delineate specific areas where Asians could buy property and to attempt to stop any further immigration from Asia.[11] Indeed, in East and West Africa Britain was already pursuing the kind of policy which South Africa wanted to follow over Indian immigration, and was using similar arguments to justify it. In 1943, in British East Africa, it was agreed that a permanent system of control was needed to protect the interests of the African (black) population. Africans were taking an increased part in skilled employment and trade: they needed to be protected from immigrants, particularly Indians, who could compete with them both then and in the future. This was in line with the established policy of the British government, and with the provisions of the United Nations Charter dealing with colonial territories. In the case of Tanganyika there was an overriding obligation under the trusteeship agreement to give priority to the advancement of the inhabitants. Draft bills were published in April 1946; amendments were made following comments from India but these did not endanger the general principle, and the bills then became law. Subsequently objections were raised by New Delhi. In 1949 the Labour government envisaged similar legislation for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland; and it was already in operation in the Gold Coast by 1948, and a strengthening of restrictions was planned for Nigeria.[12]

There were open differences, however, between Britain and South Africa on the future of the High Commission territories, Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland. Geographically these formed part of South Africa, and the Act of Union of 1910 could be interpreted as envisaging their transfer from Britain to South Africa.[13] Both General J. B. M. Hertzog and Smuts raised this issue during their premierships, but were told that Britain was bound by pledges to make no change in the status of the territories without consulting the British Parliament, and the Conservative governments then in office felt that there was no chance of parliamentary consent to a transfer. When (in London in April 1949) Malan raised the issue with Ernest Bevin, arguing that the matter had been provided for under the South Africa Act of 1910, and that nothing had been done for forty years, the Foreign Secretary told him that he could not hold out any hope, 'especially having regard to the fact that the fundamental principle associated with it was that we had to take into account the views of the local inhabitants and the native leaders'.[14] Malan said that it was a

pp. 409–31 and 'The Palestine Policy of the British Labour Government 1947: the Decision to Withdraw' *International Affairs*, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 73–93; for Hofmeyr's position see Alan Paton, *Hofmeyr* (Cape Town, 1964), pp. 475–505.

10. Cross, op. cit., pp. 238–9.

11. On the Indian question see Hancock, op. cit., pp. 450–72; see generally Barber, op. cit., pp. 23–42.

12. *DO 35*, 2752, F2077/1, Brief prepared in Colonial Office for Malan's visit to Britain, April 1949, and sent to J. J. S. Garner and K. A. East.

13. See L. M. Thompson, *The Unification of South Africa 1902–1910* (Oxford, 1960), pp. 271–8.

14. *DO 35*, 2752, F2077/1, f.33, Record by Bevin of conversation with Malan on 27 April 1949.

grave anomaly that there should be three territories geographically within the Union, economically entirely dependent on his country, and yet wholly divorced from the authority of the South African government. He thought everyone was in agreement that the conditions in and development of the native (black) territories within South Africa were not only as good as, but better than the conditions and development of the native population in any other part of Africa. Noel-Baker explained that the present Labour-dominated Parliament would be even more reluctant than previous Conservative ones to agree to the transfer of authority: there was no hope. In reply Malan hinted that under the agreement of 1910 South Africa could ask the Privy Council to order the transfer. But he did not want to take this action which would place the British government and parliament in 'a very difficult situation', and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations was left with the impression that Malan would be unlikely to pursue this suggestion.[15] It should also be remembered that in 1950 the Labour government prevented Seretse Khama, the designated Chief of the Bamangwato of Bechuanaland, from returning to his country. While at Oxford Seretse Khama had flouted tribal custom and married a white English woman. At a time when the Nationalist government in South Africa was formalizing racial purity with the Mixed Marriages Act and the Immorality Act—which effectively forbade sexual intercourse between whites and other races—the issue of miscegnation was a real one in South Africa. But official white opinion in Southern Rhodesia also viewed the matter gravely.[16] It made the South African government even more conscious of the obvious dangers of territories within its borders which pursued racial policies at variance with its own.

South Africa as part of the Western defence alliance

At the beginning of the cold war period, when the Labour government's main preoccupation was stopping the advance of communism, the accession of the Nationalist government had immediate strategic implications for Britain; these, at the time, took priority. Towards the end of the 1940s Bevin had secured the American guarantee of Europe,[17] and even an American commitment to halt the spread of communism in Asia.[18] Although Washington was aware of the dangers in the Middle East, that area remained a Commonwealth responsibility. Bevin hoped for South African assistance there, as well as in halting any communist penetration of Africa.

As the British High Commissioner, Sir Evelyn Baring, reported in September 1948, the advent of the Nationalist government in South Africa might have appeared as a setback to Commonwealth co-operation in defence matters. He observed that its supporters were 'the heirs of a long tradition of anti-British feeling and activities': during the Second World War they had openly sympathized with Britain's enemies, and they were 'morbidly sensitive' on the subject of the Union's sovereign independence. But the Nationalists were, with good reason, terrified of communism. The South African defence force was entirely dependent on Britain for its equipment and its technical and service knowledge. And, unlike Hertzog and Pirow before the war, Malan and his colleagues were in 'complete sympathy' with the aims of British

15. Ibid., f.30, Memorandum by Noel-Baker of Meeting at Foreign Office on 27 April 1950.
16. Cross, op. cit., p. 258; Barber, op. cit., pp. 112–13.
17. See Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain, the U.S.A. and the European Cold War', *History*, June 1982.
18. See Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain, the United States and the Cold War in South-East Asia', *International Affairs*, Summer 1982, Vol. 58, No. 3.

foreign policy. They were not hampered, as Smuts had been, by the attitude of the opposition. The High Commissioner advised that while it would be advisable to allow Pretoria to take the initiative, and also to avoid any appearance of attempting to rush them, there were grounds for hoping that, as practical men, the Nationalists might come to see that the interests and safety of South Africa would require some measure of cooperation on defence with Britain.[19]

By March 1949 British defence planning had reached the stage of reviewing the possibilities of armament and production within the Commonwealth that might be available in the event of war. It was decided to approach only the old dominions—South Africa, Canada, Australia and New Zealand—about bilateral discussions with Britain.[20] The South African government let it be known that it would willingly receive a visit from a small party of officers of the British planning staff, and the Minister of Defence, F. C. Erasmus, indicated to Baring that in any war with Russia Pretoria would adopt a favourable attitude towards requests concerning the use of South Africa as a transit base.[21]

But the British government had hints that the South African government was prepared to undertake even wider defence commitments. It was reported from the British embassy in Washington that towards the end of 1948 the South African Ambassador at large, and a former High Commissioner in London, Charles te Water, had spoken to Rober A. Lovett, the American Under-Secretary of State, about the possibility of South Africa's becoming a party to the North Atlantic Pact. Failing that, te Water suggested that the North Atlantic Pact be complemented by a South Atlantic Pact in which South Africa would participate. The Americans felt, however, that te Water was only speaking on his own initiative.[22] The Foreign and Commonwealth Relations offices both, initially, had the mistaken impression that that attitude of the Nationalist government was one of aloofness. They felt that while Pretoria was generally favourably disposed to any arrangements Britain might be able to make to contribute to its own and Western security, South Africa would be unlikely to accept any defence commitments outside the African continent, and in the view of Baring would probably want to confine defence responsibilities to South African territory.[23]

On 28 March an 'inspired' leader in the semi-official Nationalist newspaper, *Die Burger*, explained Pretoria's thinking. Malan, it said, even before taking office, had made his view clear on South Africa's place in 'the present world upheaval'. Not only South Africa's sympathies, but its principles, made impossible an isolationist attitude towards the challenge which the might of Russia and the spread of communism held for Western civilization. No country had more to lose than South Africa by the world domination of Russian communism. While it might still be possible for a West European country to regard bolshevism as a temporary phenomenon, 'a communist conquest from without or within will mean the beginning of an endless night of barbarism for South Africa'.[24] The strengthening of an anti-communist West was in South Africa's interests. The question was what

19. *DO 35*, 2752, F2077/1, Baring to Commonwealth Relations Office, 27 September 1948 (extract).
20. Ibid., Commonwealth Relations Office to British High Commissioners, Telegram Z No. 19 (Top Secret), 24 March 1949.
21. Ibid., Baring to Defence(A) Department, Telegram No. 108 (Top Secret), March 1949.
22. Ibid., IGI/49 F. R. Hoyer Millar to Gladwyn Jebb (Top Secret), 3 January 1949.
23. Ibid., 223/1074/72G, Stuckburgh for Jebb to Hoyer-Millar (Top Secret), 18 January 1949; Cunningham-Bruce to Holdgate, 12 January 1949; Lamour to Noel-Baker, 30 March 1949.
24. Ibid.,Noel-Baker to Leif Egeland (South African High Commission, London), March 1949.

support South Africa could give in its particular circumstances.[25] Following this, Malan told Baring that while appreciating the regional nature of the North Atlantic Pact, he hoped an African Pact, 'something separate yet linked' to it, would become a possibility. Malan had in mind a pact signed by the European powers with the colonial dependencies in Africa, by the Union, and by the United States involved through its connections with Liberia. Baring had spoken about this previously to D. D. Forsyth, an official retained from the Smuts administration. The reasoning behind the envisaged pact was that if Britain went to war against Russia, South Africa would probably give Britain considerable assistance, possibly extending even to the use of the Union Defence Force. But there would be Nationalists who would feel and say that, in 1949, as in 1914 and in 1939, South Africa had been dragged by Britain into a war not primarily its concern. But if South Africa were a signatory to a pact linked with the North Atlantic Pact, there would be no opposition as the Nationalists would feel that South Africa was joining not Britain alone but the entire Western world. Baring endorsed this argument, and said that Malan was in 'a very good mood': Britain should take advantage of it.

The High Commissioner also urged a hastening of the visit of the British defence mission: the government had moved so far 'in the right direction' that it was 'eager to talk as soon as possible to learn as much as possible from our people'. Baring warned, however, that the emphasis should be on the use of South Africa as a transit base rather than on the despatch of South African troops outside the borders of the Union. It was also important to include someone to discuss internal security. Erasmus needed this to protect himself against his own followers: outside the cabinet planning war measures with Britain was still suspect, while measures to combat communist infiltration were popular. On the issue of industrial mobilization Malan and Erasmus had agreed that a member of Britain's war production staff could meet the equivalent South African committee.[26]

In the Commonwealth Relations Office C. G. L. Sayre found this valuable evidence of a forward policy on the part of the South African government 'notable and welcome'. It could be a surprise to those who had expected the Nationalists to be 'obstinately isolationist'. But it was too late for Bevin to have talks in Washington with Dean Acheson, the American Secretary of State, on the South African Pact proposals.[27] Instead Sir Percival Liesching urged the view of the Commonwealth Relations Office on Attlee that it was 'most important to take advantage of this favourable tide and to encourage to the full that co-operation between the United Kingdom and South Africa which is so essential a part of our relationship as Members of the Commonwealth'.[28]

As Malan was in London for the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference it was possible to discuss this and related issues with him personally. With this in mind Syers approached Sir M. Esler Dening of the Foreign Office about some association of South Africa with a prospective Middle Eastern collective security arrangement: South Africa would have a vital role between the area of the Atlantic Pact and the Middle Eastern security region as a transit centre and support base. Further, an informal arrangement of mutual guarantees between some or all African powers could be suggested, as could a special arrangement between South Africa

25. Ibid., Translation of Leader in *Die Burger*, 28 March 1949.
26. Ibid., D/104, Baring to Sir Percival Liesching (Top Secret), 31 March 1949.
27. Ibid., Sayre to Liesching, 8 April 1949.
28. Ibid., Liesching to L. N. Helsby, 8 April 1949.

and the Atlantic pact powers under which South Africa would agree to provide military facilities to contribute to security in the mid-Atlantic area.[29] This thinking was in line with the reaction in South Africa to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty. Malan welcomed it as a recognition of the failure of the United Nations: Smuts foresaw the treaty replacing the Security Council and being extended to Greece, Turkey, Western Germany and, 'inevitably', Africa.[30] William Strang's weekly meeting of Under Secretaries, however, decided that there were difficulties in the way of a Middle Eastern Pact. Foreign Office officials also felt that if South Africa became a party to a pact with European powers, backed by the United States, it would no longer have to rely on the Commonwealth connection for security and inducement to remain within the Commonwealth might be weakened. Syers of the Commonwealth Relations Office, however, doubted this: South Africa was rather apprehensive about the United States. But Malan was not to be given a negative answer: it should be explained that the United States was essential to any pact and there were possible difficulties with Congress at that time; the visit of the British defence planning team to South Africa could help to prepare the way for any wider arrangements.[31]

Attlee saw Malan on 20 April, and asked Bevin to handle the South African Prime Minister.[32] Officials from the Colonial, Foreign and Commonwealth Relations Offices discussed the position the following day. F. E. Cumming Bruce thought that Malan probably had a 'white' pact in mind, but might be prepared to consider one covering non-white countries as well. It was pointed out by A. B. Cohen that there were fundamental differences between Colonial Office policy and the South African government on the question of arming 'native' troops: there could be grave political objections in African territories and the loyalty of African populations could be seriously undermined. The Chiefs of Staff, however, hoped not only for Union assistance in the defence of Southern Africa, but also for wider South African responsibilities over Egypt. In the end the meeting agreed to the suggestion from Dening that Malan should be convinced that South Africa's frontier was the Middle East. Tension between the Arab states and Israel, however, made the conclusion of any defence pact difficult.[33] There was also the danger of objections from India which could prejudice collaboration in South-east Asia.[34] Malan had a 'great regard' for Bevin, and so particular arrangements were made for him to see the Foreign Secretary on 27 April.[35] The South African Prime Minister was 'extremely anxious' to be associated with the Atlantic Pact. Bevin explained the problem of the traditional attitudes of the American Congress to colonial territories. Africa was a colonial territory and it would be impossible to get Congress to enter into any further arrangements at this stage.[36] Malan accepted this, but emphasized his conviction that South Africa was essential to the successful working of the Atlantic Pact, and to the defence of the Middle East, and he hoped that in some

29. Ibid., Syers (drafted by Cunningham-Bruce,) to Dening (Top Secret) 11 April 1949; Minute by Cunningham-Bruce, 7 April 1949.
30. Ibid., Baring to Noel-Baker, No. 13, 7 April 1949.
31. Ibid., Dening to Syers (Top Secret), 14 April 1949.
32. Ibid., M88/49, Attlee to Bevin, 20 April 1949.
33. Ibid., F2077/1, Note of a Meeting at Commonwealth Relations Office (Secret), 21 April 1949; Appendix A, 'Possible Association of South Africa in an International Collective Security Arrangement'.
34. Ibid., f.23, Summary of Meeting at Commonwealth Relations Office, 21 April 1949.
35. Ibid., Patricia Llewelyn-Davies to R. D. C. McAlpine, 26 April 1949.
36. Ibid., f.33, Record by Bevin of Conversation with Malan, 27 April 1949.

way it might be brought into the collective security system.[37] The Secretary for External Affairs, D. D. Forsyth, suggested that the Union convene a conference in Africa of representatives of those European countries which had territories in Africa south of the Sahara; the line of demarcation would exclude Egypt, Abyssinia, and Spain. The subjects would be the question of militarization of natives, and the mutual defence of Africa. The Nationalists opposed the arming of blacks, but Baring pointed to the difficulties of colonial powers with populations scarcely adequate for their own responsibilities.[38]

In June Charles te Water spoke in Athens of the Union aim to conclude a pact between African states and the neighbouring Mediterranean countries to complement the Atlantic treaty.[39] A British planning team paid a successful visit to South Africa. The size and type of South African forces which could be employed outside the Union in the event of a war against Russia was discussed. South Africa made no specific commitment, but the way was opened for further discussions on the planning level about the timing and manner of deployment of these forces. Further talks were also envisaged about industrial mobilization in the event of war. Then, in July, the Minister of Defence, F. C. Erasmus, and the Chief of the General Staff visited Britain, the United States and Canada to find out the cost of military hardware. This led to negotiations with Britain for the purchase of two destroyers, and equipment for the other two services.[40] The British naval facilities at Simonstown were also discussed. A solution to the problem of British control was seen in terms of an agreement bringing in the United States, and possibly other Atlantic powers. Bevin later intervened to oppose this suggestion: Britain in negotiating the Atlantic Pact had opposed its extension to Africa, and to approach any member on the Simonstown question would risk reviving the issue in Africa.[41]

Towards the end of 1949, following criticism from the United States about the lack of coordinated defence planning in Commonwealth countries, there was some discussion about a high level approach to the four old 'white' dominions which had of their own volition gone to war alongside Britain in 1939. Bur fears that South Africa might revive the idea of an African pact, and Australia and New Zealand that of a Pacific Pact, presented difficulties.[42] South Africa had helped with the Berlin airlift, sending sixty airmen, but the great Afrikaner nationalist 'ferment' generated by the celebrations surrounding the opening of the Voortrekker monument made it undesirable to raise any major questions with the Union at that time.[43] The new Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Patrick Gordon-Walker, further pointed out that in South Africa the Afrikaans-speaking element outnumbered the British and other European sections by 56 per cent to 44 per cent. Like the French Canadians, the Afrikaner did not share the instinctive feeling of loyalty to Britain in a crisis shown by his fellow citizens of British stock—especially those who had recently arrived—and even those of British descent had inevitably lost

37. Ibid., f.30, Memorandum by Noel-Baker of Meeting at Foreign Office, 27 April 1949.
38. Ibid., Minute by Percival Liesching of Conversation with Forsyth, 26 April 1949.
39. Ibid., *South Africa*, 4 June 1949.
40. Ibid., 2277, f.7, Annex to CP(49) (draft), 'Contributions to Commonwealth Defence made by other Commonwealth Countries' (Top Secret).
41. Ibid., 2752, F2077/1, W4891/4/68G, Bevin to Christopher Addison, 24 October 1949.
42. Ibid., 2277, 'Note of a Talk on 28 October of Defence Planning with Australia, New Zealand and South Africa', 2 November 1949.
43. Ibid., Draft Paper for Cabinet on Defence Burdens and the Commonwealth by Patrick Gordon-Walker, December 1949.

some of that feeling in the third and fourth generation. Sacrifices for defence had to be shown to be in South Africa's interest. Indeed this lack of common descent was a contributory cause to Commonwealth countries' reluctance to undertake fresh defence commitments.[44]

It was decided that Bevin should make an individual approach to the South African representatives at the Commonwealth Conference at Colombo in January 1950. There Bevin told Forsyth and Paul Sauer that, following his success in securing an American interest in the Far East,[45] the United States had shown a tendency to draw back from the Middle East, which remained an area of British responsibility. Russia was vulnerable to attack from that area, and Bevin thought it would be discouraged from aggression if it knew that it would meet with strong resistance there. South Africa would 'inevitably be concerned in what happened in the Middle East'. The Foreign Secretary hoped that Pretoria would take into account this particular problem. Sauer responded that his government was afraid that if trouble arose it would spread to Kenya and Tanganyika. South Africa would then be responsible for maintaining order in Africa from the Union northwards, and the question was how far up the continent the Union would be able to go. Harbour and other facilities would, of course, be available in South Africa itself. The Nationalists had a delicate political situation to handle, but Bevin need have no anxieties about the attitude of their government. In the last two wars only about half the (white) country had really participated, 'but if there was trouble with Russia, 90 per cent of the South African people would be whole-heartedly in it'.[46] On 15 June 1950 a letter from Erasmus indicated a much greater willingness by South Africa to assume defence commitments on the African continent and suggested a conference to discuss the extent of participation by Union forces in the event of war.[47]

It was then decided to extend the North Atlantic Treaty to Greece and Turkey. Following this, on 22 September 1950, Baring suggested to Liesching that South Africa could be associated with the work of NATO on the same basis.[48] Liesching, however, pointed to the difficulties: if military planning were to take place with South Africa by virtue of such an arrangement, Britain would have 'to open up the whole of our strategy in the Middle East with foreign countries in the context of NATO'. Neither London nor Pretoria would want that.[49] However, in May 1951 the Labour cabinet still envisaged the possibility that NATO would be gradually expanded to include some of the other Commonwealth countries.[50] When Britain tried to form the Middle East Defence Organization South Africa said it would join, but the idea collapsed as other Commonwealth countries were not so enthusiastic, and, in the end, Britain's needs in the Middle East were met by further conversations with the Americans and the admission of Greece and Turkey to

44. Ibid., f.9. Memorandum by Gordon-Walker for Draft Cabinet Paper First Revise on Defence Burdens and the Commonwealth (Top Secret), December 1949.

45. See Ritchie Ovendale, 'Britain, the United States and the Cold War in South-East Asia', *International Affairs*, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 447–64 and 'Britain, the United States, and the Recognition of Communist China', *Historical Journal*, 1983.

46. *DO 35*, 2752, F2077/1, f.38, 'Record of a Meeting at Temple Trees, Colombo, on 14 June 1950' (Top Secret).

47. Ibid., 2277, D2000/99, f.19, Note for Gordon-Walker (Top Secret), received 26 July 1950.

48. Ibid., 2752, F2077/1, f.43, Baring to Liesching (Personal) Telegram (Top Secret), 22 September 1950.

49. Ibid., f.44, Liesching to Baring (Top Secret), 2 October 1950.

50. *Cab 128* (Public Record Office, London), 19, f.175, Cab 36(51)2 (Secret), 22 May 1951.

NATO.[51] In August 1951 Britain and South Africa sponsored a defence conference in Nairobi, but attempts to form a regional defence treaty for South and Central Africa failed because South Africa opposed the arming of blacks.[52]

South Africa was also of crucial significance for the Labour government's defence programme as a source of uranium. At the end of the war Smuts knew on a personal basis of the Anglo-Canadian atomic energy developments. South Africa was thought to have the largest uranium reserves in the world, and the United States relied on Britain to obtain it. Following a visit to London in June 1946 by Brigadier Basil Schonland, Director of the South African Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (later Director of Harwell), and Professor Tavener, Director of the South African Government Metallurgical Laboratory, it was agreed to set up a purification plant in South Africa. At the end of 1950, after delays following the election of the Nationalists, and difficulties with the Americans, South Africa was informed about the Combined Policy Committee and the Combined Development Agency, the prospects of atomic energy and nuclear power, and given special privileges including access to unclassified atomic energy work in Britain and the United States. Much of this collaboration remained between British and South African scientists: it was thought that Forsyth was the only Union official with any knowledge of atomic energy matters.[53]

The economic factor

Perhaps, however, it was economic links that provided the rock base of the Anglo-South African relationship. During the office of the Labour government, 1945–51, South Africa proved to be one of the few countries with whom Britain had a favourable balance of trade. Indeed South Africa, in 1947, gave Britain substantial assistance with a gold loan of £80m and the people of the Union sent a gift of over £1m. Harold Wilson, the President of the Board of Trade, stressed openly the importance of Britain's economic links with South Africa. South Africa was the world's main exporter of mineral products, some of which were of crucial strategic importance to Britain.[54] In 1950 about 47 per cent of the total production of gold was mined in South Africa. To mine this South Africa depended upon imports of black labour and also of capital. The labour came from the British High Commission territories, and the British colonial areas in Central Africa, and British investors traditionally met the capital requirements of the South African gold mines—with handsome returns. Further discoveries of gold in the Orange Free State meant fresh opportunities for British investment. London saw 'a nice balance of interest': Britain wanted as much of South Africa's gold as it could get to strengthen the sterling area reserves; South Africa needed British capital. This 'mutual interdependence' formed the basis of a series of arrangements, and on 1 August 1950 'letters of understanding' were exchanged between Hugh Gaitskell and Eric Louw on behalf of the Union whereby South Africa would let Britain have

51. M. A. Fitzsimons, *The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 1945–51* (Notre Dame, Indiana: 1953), pp. 164–5.

52. J. E. Spence, *The Strategic Significance of Southern Africa* (London, 1970), p. 11.

53. *DO 35*, 2494, D3450/62, 'Atomic Energy Exchange of Technical Information between South Africa, United Kingdom and United States' (Top Secret) f.3, Rumbold to J. M. C. James, 24 August 1950; R. C. C. Hunt to L. J. D. Wakely, 13 January 1951 (Secret); Rumbold to Hunt, 10 June 1952 (Secret); Margaret Gowing with Lorna Arnold, *Independence and Deterrence. Britain and Atomic Energy, 1945–1952, Vol. 1* (London, 1974), pp. 8, 146, 333–5, 355, 378–83.

54. Barber, op. cit., pp. 36, 66–70.

£50m of gold, plus, as before, any residual amount of that metal. South Africa, in return, would as usual be allowed to obtain capital in Britain. The background to all the financial contacts with South Africa was 'happy personal relations'.[55]

The Cabinet paper of September 1950

The various strands of the Labour government's policy towards the Union were drawn together in a paper presented to the Cabinet in September 1950. This overall consideration of Britain's relations with South Africa was prompted by developments in the United Nations over the treatment of Asians in South Africa, and the effective incorporation of South West Africa into the Union with the passing in 1949 of the South West Africa Amendment Act which gave whites in the mandate direct representation in the South African legislature. In 1946 South Africa had conducted a referendum in South West Africa, and claimed that 208,850 of the 'natives' in the territory favoured staying under the Union flag whereas only 33,250 were against this. Britain had accepted this result. In 1950 an advisory decision by the International Court of Justice found that the mandate was still in force, and that South Africa needed the consent of the United Nations to modify the status of the territory, but the court found that there was no obligation on South Africa's part to place the territory under the trusteeship system.[56]

It should also be remembered that, at this time, the Labour government was considering restricting the entry of immigrants from the black Commonwealth into Britain. The 'colour' question had been raised in 1947 when representatives of the armed forces had objected to difficulties created by black members. These were overruled on the grounds of the importance of Commonwealth cooperation in defence, and the need for personnel exchanges between members. In 1950 a Cabinet committee, concerned at the increasing numbers of black Commonwealth citizens arriving in Britain, had advised that these might form 'ghettos', not, like previous immigrants, accepting the British way of life but maintaining their own cultural and religious traditions, and becoming an alien community within the country.[57] The labour cabinet had to face the issue of 'colour' in Britain at a time when the 'apartheid' legislation was complicating its relations with South Africa. A committee of ministers, however, decided that apart from practical administrative measures to control immigration by stowaways and 'one-trip seamen' from colonial territories, the introduction of legislation to control immigration from the colonies would not be justified. The Cabinet accepted this on 22 February 1951.[58]

In the preparation of the paper for the Cabinet, the Commonwealth Relations, Foreign and Colonial Offices all made representations in line with their particular responsibilities. The paper was drafted in the Commonwealth Relations Office, largely by G. E. Crombie. He and his colleagues had some sympathy for South Africa's predicament. This was not altogether shared by the Secretary of State, Gordon-Walker, and was not reflected in the views of the Colonial Office concerned with the development of black territories. One Commonwealth Relations Office official, G. H. Baxter, even felt obliged to delete a suggestion for a paragraph on the reasons for South Africa's racial policy 'and the balancing factors that can be

55. *DO 35*, 2672, 'Financial Relations between the Union of South Africa and the United Kingdom' (Secret), December 1950; 2670, 'Enquiries in IMF Gatt re UK–SA Gold Sales Arrangements' (Secret).

56. Barber, op. cit., pp. 26–31, 76–9.

57. *Cab 128*, 10, Cab 51(47)3 (Secret) 3 June 1947; 17, 15 June 1950.

58. Ibid., 19, f.77, Cab 15(51)4, (Secret), 22 February 1951.

discerned'.[59] Baxter did, nevertheless, leave the observation that London would be more likely to influence Pretoria in the direction of more moderate policies if an appreciation were shown of the difficulties confronting the Union, rather than if Britain ignored these and merely condemned the South African policies. This point was endorsed by both R. R. Sedgwick and Sir Cecil Syers. Baxter further emphasized that Britain was not under any obligation either to associate itself with or to dissociate itself from the internal policies being pursued by a friendly country: if Britain and other governments were to follow the line of publicly condemning any aspect of other government's domestic policies of which they disapproved, friendly relations would soon become impossible to maintain anywhere.[60] Sedgwick wanted to include the point that if South Africa left the Commonwealth, Southern Rhodesia would be left in an exposed position. While intensely loyal to Britain, its sympathies would be with South Africa on the racial issue, and the European community might conclude that its only hope of survival would be to join the Union. European settlers in neighbouring British colonies would want to follow.[61] Syers, agreeing with Sedgwick, also pointed to the danger of doing anything that 'would remove a foundation Member of the Commonwealth'.[62]

The Colonial Office at first only offered an 'office view' reached after Sir Thomas Lloyd had read the draft document. That view was that although the reasons given for maintaining good relations with South Africa were of major importance, there were other considerations of equal significance that the Cabinet should consider. Firstly, any suspicion that Britain condoned or took a lenient view of South Africa's 'native' policies would 'immediately disturb African and Indian opinion in the African colonies, thus giving rise to a potentially serious threat to internal security in Africa, and it might also seriously compromise our relations with India and Pakistan both in the United Nations and generally in South East Asia, the Far East and East Africa'. Further, any suspicion that Britain was dealing leniently with South Africa for reasons of imperial policy would embarrass Britain at a time when it was trying to persuade the United Nations of the 'enlightenment and progressiveness' of its colonial policies. London should explain its position on this clearly to Pretoria. There was concern that Britain might become isolated in its support of South Africa in the United Nations.[63] Both Crombie and Peter Hope of the Foreign Office thought these suggestions could be ignored: the Colonial Office proposals left 'too little room for manoeuvre', and it might be better not to associate the Colonial Secretary, James Griffiths, with the document.[64] The Foreign Office, however, welcomed the paper and suggested only minor amendments on the handling of the South West Africa issue. Kenneth Younger, the Minister of State, saw the draft before he left for New York.[65] Gordon-Walker made some technical amendments on the South West Africa issue,[66] and by 25 September both the

59. *DO 35*, 3839, U3030/14, Garner to Sedgwick, Baxter and Syers, 16 September 1950; minute by G. H. Baxter, 19 September 1950.
60. Ibid., Minutes by Baxter, 19 September 1950; Sedgwick, Syers, Undated.
61. Ibid., Minute by Sedgwick, 19 September 1950.
62. Ibid., Syers to Garner, 25 September 1950.
63. Ibid., 25/55/1/50, W. G. Wilson to G. E. Crombie (Secret), 20 September 1950.
64. Ibid., Crombie to Garner, 21 September 1950.
65. Ibid., C. P. Hope to Crombie (Personal), 13 September 1950; Crombie to Garner, 21 September 1950.
66. Ibid., Minute by Gordon-Walker, 24 September 1950.

Colonial and Foreign Offices had agreed to the document, Griffiths reserving the right to make certain observations in Cabinet.[67]

The paper for the Cabinet, approved by the Commonwealth Relations, Foreign and Colonial Offices, explained that the election of the Nationalists had made the conduct of Britain's relations with South Africa 'a matter of some delicacy'. But there seemed no likelihood of Malan's party being overthrown in the near future. With the passing of Smuts and Hofmeyr, the opposition United Party lacked a first-class leader and a sufficiently challenging policy to counter the Nationalists' appeal to the electorate. The Nationalist policy that had created the greatest shock in their relations with the rest of the world was 'their programme of Apartheid—a stiffer form of the traditional South African policy of racial segregation'. The Nationalists' ultimate objective was the establishment of a republican, white and predominantly Afrikaner form of government which would 'ensure the domination of the white race and postpone as long as possible, if not for ever, the rise to power of the native population'. The republican aspect had been in abeyance, but the Nationalists were pressing their racial programme. Indeed, their strength derived from the general support for some form of racial segregation 'apparent among most sections of the white population, including those of British descent'. Opinion outside South Africa, including that in Britain, was hostile. Although Britain could not associate itself with many of the Nationalists' policies, it was important to preserve good relations with South Africa for the following reasons.

In the first place, South Africa's goodwill was of particular importance to Britain 'from the general strategic and defence points of view'. If, as seemed likely, the Mediterranean were closed to Britain in any future war, the naval base at Simonstown where South Africa had granted Britain special rights would be indispensable to British shipping, and as a staging base for troops. The Union could also contribute considerable military forces, and Britain hoped to obtain a commitment from South Africa to send troops to the Middle East in the event of war. These would consist of one armoured division together with aircraft and naval forces. There were also deposits of uranium in the Union.

Secondly, the nationalists were 'staunchly anti-communist'. Malan had pledged South Africa's support in any war arising from Russian aggression. As recently as 9 September 1950 Malan, in Durban, had said South Africa would ally itself with the Commonwealth and other like-minded nations of the world in the event of a major war. Union aircrews had assisted in the Berlin blockade, and despite the unpopularity of the United Nations in South Africa, a squadron of the South African Air Force was joining the United Nations force in Korea.

Thirdly, South Africa was by far the largest producer of gold. It was of the utmost importance for the viability of the Sterling area that Britain should be able to obtain a substantive part of the Union's gold output. South Africa was also an important market for British exports, and several hundreds of millions of pounds of British capital was invested there.

The draft paper pointed out that the High Commission territories were wholly dependent on the goodwill of South Africa. The final version simply admitted that South Africa could strangle them by withholding essential facilities.

Finally, Britain had obligations to South Africa as a fellow member of the Commonwealth, and even if South Africa became a republic Britain hoped it would

67. Ibid., Crombie to Garner, 23 September 1950; Minutes by Crombie, 25 September 1950.

remain within the Commonwealth. Though Britain had many points of difference with South Africa it also had many in common, and 40 per cent of the white population was of British stock. The Commonwealth partnership relied on the principle of tolerance, and any attempt to secure complete identity of view between all its members would 'break up the association overnight'.

The document Gordon-Walker signed went on to say that, despite difficulties and differences, relations with the Nationalist government had, in practice, been surprisingly good. The Nationalist leaders were parochial, and without much experience of the outside world. If relations were carefully handled they might modify their extreme views in response to world opinion. This was more likely if Britain showed appreciation of the problems confronting them, and did not simply adopt an attitude of condemnation. The Asians in South Africa did not want to be 'repatriated' to India. On this issue Britain had maintained an attitude of neutrality in the United Nations. While attempting reconciliation behind the scenes Britain should abstain in any resolution against South Africa 'of a strongly condemnatory character'. Moreover Pakistan had said that its relations with South Africa were good. The Foreign Office's legal advisers had some doubts about the ruling of the International Court of Jurists on South West Africa. Britain should try to prevent South Africa's isolation in the United Nations, though it could also try exerting direct pressure on Pretoria.

Overall, then, although Britain could not associate itself with South Africa's 'native' policies and apartheid, this view should be stated as politely as possible, and South Africa should not be antagonized. Together with the 'older' Commonwealth countries and the United States, Britain should try to exercise a moderating influence on disagreements between South Africa and other parties, while at the same time ensuring that Britain did not act as a mediator on its own. Britain should do all it could to retain South Africa as a member of the Commonwealth, preferably as one owing direct allegiance to the crown.[68]

When presenting this paper to the cabinet on 28 September, Gordon-Walker emphasized the 'special importance' of South Africa to Britain, and said that while it was advisable to avoid expressing sympathy with the 'native' policy of the Union, Britain should refrain from publicly condemning it. Griffiths was worried about South Africa's ambitions in other parts of Africa, and pointed to signs that Pretoria was encouraging the immigration of Afrikaners into Northern Rhodesia: the economic and strategic issue had to be weighed against British colonial interests in other parts of Africa. The Minister of Health, Nye Bevan, thought Britain might have to consider whether there was more to be lost than gained by its present association with the Union government. Despite these dissenting voices, the cabinet was impressed with the general thrust of Gordon-Walker's paper, and endorsed it.[69]

Gordon-Walker's visit to Southern Africa

Towards the end of the year it was decided that Gordon-Walker should visit Southern Africa, and in January and February 1951 he spent six weeks travelling

68. Ibid., CP(50)214 (draft), Memorandum by Gordon-Walker on Relations with South Africa (Secret); *Cab 129* (Public Record Office, London) 42, ff. 54–6, CP(50)217, Memorandum by Gordon-Walker on Relations with South Africa (Secret); 25 September 1950.

69. *DO 35*, 3839, *Cab 62(50)* (Secret), 28 September 1950 (extract).

there. He found South African politics 'extremely sharp and bitter'. In April 1951 he reported to the cabinet that the Nationalist Party had many of the characteristics of 'a devoted movement of liberation': it used the Afrikaans language as a political weapon; it put its own people in every possible office; it believed unshakably in its cause. The leaders lived and dreamt politics, and their wives were as much in the the movement as they were. The Nationalists were still fighting the Boer War—or rather they had just won it. Their enemy was not so much Britain as English-speaking South Africans, and they were taking a long delayed revenge for what they regarded as oppression. When they mentioned 'the war', they meant the Boer War. They felt the Afrikaner had no home but Africa. They resented the way 'the British can look to Britain'. The Afrikaner gloried in South Africa, and was 'filled with a desperate determination to keep it as his home and to be master in his own house'.

Gordon-Walker did not like English-speaking South Africans. Perhaps their British upper-middle-class values offended his socialist sensibilities. He reported that he was 'extremely disappointed in the British in South Africa'. They considered the Boer War as their victory over the Afrikaners. For a generation they had been—and still were—'very arrogant' and despised the Afrikaners. They refused to learn or use Afrikaans. They reserved the jobs in the industries they controlled for 'British people'. They excluded Afrikaners from their clubs. Most serious of all, they failed to enter national public life. The British in South Africa deserved the 'persecution' now being visited on them by the Nationalists. The worst relations between black and white were in the cities dominated by the British: Johannesburg and Durban; but the best relations were in another British town, Port Elizabeth. The early English settlers were better than those who opened the gold mines and the sugar estates of Natal. The British still had considerable influence in business and through the press, but the Afrikaners were advancing.

Gordon-Walker thought 'the best people in South Africa' the Afrikaners in the United Party: they were well educated, self confident, and loyal to the British connection.

The Nationalists had contradictory objectives: they wished to pursue both an anti-black and an anti-British policy against the local population. Provided they concentrated on an anti-black policy, the Nationalists secured a great deal of British support in elections. The British population would vote against the Nationalists if they stressed their republicanism too strongly. Furthermore, the Nationalists' fear of Russian communism prevented any open breach with Britain. These anti-British (i.e. anti-English-speaking South African) actions were confined to the domestic field. Gordon-Walker found the 'appalling Voortrekker Monument' outside Pretoria typical of this. Designed as a national shrine, it was 'very ugly and rather hysterical', but completely Afrikaner; 'you would not know from seeing it that there were any British South Africans'. It emphasized the struggle between the Afrikaners and the blacks, and outside this 'national shrine' was a notice that non-Europeans were admitted only on Tuesdays. The Nationalists were placing their supporters in places of authority and in the police and army. Their strict application of bilingualism in effect excluded the British. They were rigging the electorate in their favour. The United Party was confident of winning the next election, but Gordon-Walker thought they were wrong—provided that the Nationalists did not do something that involved a breach with Britain. He compared the Nationalists to the Irish

Nationalists: 'they have a logic of their own that is grounded on emotions and hatreds that it is practically impossible for us to understand'.

Gordon-Walker reported that policy towards the 'African Natives' was based on the theory of permanent exclusion of 'Africans' from any share in government and political rights. The theory of apartheid, however, involved the social and national development of Africans, and to some extent this was carried out in practice through funds raised by taxes on the whites. 'Very large areas' were set aside as 'Native reserves'. Asian leaders indicated that their people were not prepared to return to India where economic conditions were far worse than in the Union, and that they would accept residential, but not economic, segregation.[70]

Before leaving for South Africa, Gordon-Walker had been appraised of London's attitude to Simonstown. It was anticipated that eventually Britain might have to come to some joint arrangement with the Union for sharing responsibility for maintaining and using the base. But there were 'powerful political considerations' which prevented considering this matter in detail. Malan could be told of British difficulties in securing air requirements in Egypt vital to the safety of the Middle East and South Africa. Surrender of the Simonstown base would be a trump card for the Egyptians in these negotiations. At a time when the Union had 'committed' itself to the defence of Africa this would be prejudicial to South Africa's interests. It could also affect the Gibraltar issue in which there would be direct South African interest if forces were engaged in the Eastern Mediterranean.[71] Erasmus, however, never raised with Gordon-Walker the matter of transfer of the base to South Africa.

In Southern Rhodesia, Gordon-Walker found nothing to compare with the 'racial hatred and tension' in places like Johannesburg. The officials were ahead of public opinion, but the general attitude towards blacks was one of 'kindly superiority— the Africans must be helped but kept in their places'. The common electoral roll, based on a qualified franchise, meant that in around twenty-five years there should be African members of parliament. The English language test helped to exclude 'a number of undesirable Afrikaners'. The gravest problem was the pull towards South Africa: Gordon-Walker was surprised at the readiness and desire to join the Union. South African immigrants were outnumbering those from Britain by two to one. There was an element in this immigration that was political: various organizations in the Union deliberately fostered this to bring Southern Rhodesia increasingly into South Africa's sphere of influence. The Prime Minister, Sir Godfrey Huggins, wanted to counter this by allowing unrestricted immigration from Britain and imposing quotas on 'other countries'.

In his report to the Cabinet Gordon-Walker pointed to the 'appallingly difficult problems, for which there can be no simple solutions' in Britain's relations with South Africa. He recommended that one of Britain's prime aims should be to contain South Africa. This did not mean a hostile policy towards the Union; indeed Britain should be friendly. But it was necessary to prevent the spread of South Africa's influence and territorial sovereignty northwards. That would not be easy: South Africa was infinitely the most powerful political unit in Africa, and its strength was increasing. In East and Central Africa there were settled white populations that South Africa might hope to bring under its political leadership and

70. *Cab 129*, 45, ff.224–30, CP(51)109, Memorandum by Gordon-Walker on Visit to Southern Africa (Secret), 16 April 1951.

71. *DO 35*, 3885, W2380/24/2, f.39, FA3, Memorandum on Simonstown, December 1950.

protection. Britain had to balance a concern for the political advancement of the blacks with maintaining the loyalty of the whites in East and Central Africa who could, to avoid domination by blacks, throw in their lot with the Union resulting in the oppression of millions of blacks and terrible wars 'between a white-ruled Eastern Africa and a black-ruled Western Africa'. Southern Rhodesia would be the test case, and it should be one of Britain's cardinal policies to keep Southern Rhodesia out of the Union: that was 'the key-stone of the policy of containing South Africa'. People in Britain, particularly those in the Labour Party, would have to realize that Southern Rhodesia's native policy was not the same as that in South Africa; if this were not done Britain would succeed in making it so, and drawing Southern Rhodesia to South Africa. The question of closer association between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland posed the question whether Southern Rhodesia would go northwards or southwards. Apart from positively drawing Southern Rhodesia northwards, Britain should try to widen the gulf between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa by means of immigration policies, railway development and capital investment. The High Commission territories could also not be held unless they had behind them 'a solid block of British territory that is distinct from and independent of the Union'. Britain had to consider the reactions of South Africa to its policies in the High Commission territories, and had to 'refrain from those acts which would unite and inflame Union public opinions'. That was a luxury Britain could not afford. Recognition of Seretse Khama would have done just that, and gravely endangered British tenure in the Territories, as would a decision to arm blacks there. Britain should announce its intention to keep the High Commission territories and refrain only from extreme actions that could provoke South Africa.

The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations argued that South Africa was very conscious of its need for British friendship, and there were in the Union powerful forces that positively desired to retain the British connection. Britain 'should be ready to develop those relations with the Union that bind her to us and make her unwilling to risk a break with us':

> These relations are also in our direct interest. Chief amongst them come co-operation in defence and in economic matters. Also important is to give the Union what help and guidance we decently can at the United Nations. Those who argue that because we dislike the Union's Native policy we should ostracise her and have nothing to do with her completely fail to understand the realities of the situation. Such a policy would not only gravely harm us in the defence and economic fields it would also weaken our power to deter South Africa from foolhardy acts from fear of breaking with us. It would immediately and directly reduce our chances of holding the Territories, which form a vital part in any policy of containing and confining the Union's influence and territorial expansion in Southern Africa.[72]

In May 1951 Gordon-Walker reiterated his arguments about Southern Rhodesia to the cabinet, and argued for a closer association in Central Africa.[73] In July Baring reported reliably that Malan had said that if South Africa allowed Seretse Khama to

72. *Cab 129*, 45, ff.224–30, CP(51)109, Memorandum by Gordon-Walker on Visit to Southern Africa (Secret), 15 April 1951.
73. Ibid., f.278, CP(51)122, Memorandum by Griffiths and Gordon-Walker on Closer Association in Central Africa (Secret), 3 May 1951.

return to Bechuanaland with his white wife 'the consequences would be deplorable'. South Africa would have to take 'very early action', and resort to economic measures. Malan thought he would have a united South Africa behind moves to force transfer. Developments in the Gold Coast, where Kwame Nkrumah was emerging as the leader backed by an 'illiterate' black electorate would mean that many English-speaking South Africans would support the nationalists on the incorporation of the High Commission territories.[74]

A few months later the Labour government was voted out of office. The Conservatives immediately set about implementing the policy towards South Africa laid down by their socialist predecessors. In November 1951 the new Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations recommended the Central African Federation as the only effective means of resisting Afrikaner pressure on these territories. Afrikaner immigration into Southern Rhodesia made the situation urgent; in Northern Rhodesia the situation was probably even more serious and, in the absence of effective action it was probable that in the 1953 general election Afrikaners would obtain half the European seats on the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council. South Africa was dominant economically, and the Nationalists had expansionist aims. A British bloc of territories in Central Africa was necessary to counter this.[75] In December he argued that while Britain could not transfer the High Commission territories to South Africa, they were at Malan's mercy. A bad quarrel with the Union would not only prejudice cooperation in defence and trade, but might lost Britain the territories. The issue required 'the most careful handling'.[76]

The Cabinet Paper of September 1950, and the report by Gordon-Walker of his visit to Southern Africa early in 1951, laid down the fundamentals of British policy towards South Africa that were, with fluctuations, pursued for the following thirty years. With the election of the Nationalists, it was Attlee's Labour government that perceived South Africa's strategic and economic importance for Britain, and the need to maintain contact to ameliorate the policy of apartheid. At the same time it was thought essential to prevent South Africa spreading northwards and expanding the Afrikaner influence—ensured by the policy of the British Liberal government of 1906–07—and the possible 'oppression' of millions of blacks. In the late 1960s the United States, under President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger, embarked on a similar policy.[77]

74. Ibid., 47, f.6, CP(51)227, Memorandum by Gordon-Walker on Solution in South African High Commission Territories (Secret), 25 July 1951.

75. Ibid., 48, ff.37–8, C(51)11, Memorandum on Closer Association in Central Africa (Confidential), 9 November 1951.

76. Ibid., f.203, C(51)49, Memorandum on Transfer of the High Commission Territories (Secret), 17 December 1951.

77. See Ritchie Ovendale, 'The United States and Southern Africa: An Evolving Foreign Policy', *Interstate*, 1976–77, pp. 26–36.

Frozen frontiers and resource wrangles: conflict and cooperation in Northern Waters

CLIVE ARCHER AND DAVID SCRIVENER*

The military–strategic significance of the North Atlantic is often seen in terms of both a bridge between North America and Western Europe—to be crossed by US troops and matériel in times of war or crisis—and a barrier by which NATO may monitor, if not check, Soviet naval activities. During the past decade concern has grown in the NATO states over the expansion of Soviet Northern Fleet operations into the North Atlantic and fears have been aired about the threat this may pose to NATO sea lines of communications (SLOCs), possibly isolating Norway behind Moscow's extending military reach.[1]

NATO governments have recently reacted to these fears with arrangements for pre-stocking heavy military equipment in Norway with a view to enhancing the Alliance's capability rapidly to reinforce the Norwegian coastline and airfields—a mission vital to the defence of NATO's SLOCs. Furthermore, greater effort has been devoted to perfecting anti-submarine warfare (ASW) equipment and operations in the North Atlantic—capabilities rendered even more significant by the growing attractiveness of the Arctic basin and the marginal Arctic seas for transit and patrol by strategic missile-carrying submarines.

The Soviet naval expansion in the Northern Waters and the accompanying Western response have served to heighten Soviet perceptions of the area's military significance and to reinforce Moscow's sensitivity to developments of any nature in the region.[2] Northern Waters can be defined as those waters where the North Atlantic meets the Arctic Ocean, stretching from Canada's eastern seaboard to the Barents Sea off North Norway and encompassing the contested zones of Svalbard (Spitzbergen), Jan Mayen, and Rockall; the island territories of the Faeroes, Iceland and Shetland; and the North East Canadian, Greenlandic and North Norwegian coastlines. The zone thus includes a number of notable land areas as well as being a bridge or a barrier of some interest to military planners. Furthermore, the worth

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1. For a graphic illustration of the continuous extension of the scope and complexity of Soviet Northern and Baltic fleet activities 1960–75, see *NATO Newsletter*, September 1970, pp. 6–11 and Admiral I. C. Kidd, 'NATO Strategy and the New Dimension at Sea', *NATO Review*, June 1976, No. 6, pp. 6–12. On the potential peace and wartime utility of the present-day Soviet naval construction programme see J. S. Breemer, 'The New Soviet Aircraft Carrier', *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, August 1981, pp. 30–5, and M. MccGwire, 'A New Trend in Soviet Naval Developments', *International Defence Review*, 1980, No. 5, pp. 675–9.

2. For a sample of recent Soviet commentary of NATO 'militarization' measures in Northern Europe, the North Atlantic and Greenland, see Captain G. Luk'yanov, 'Atlantika i NATO' (The Atlantic and NATO), *Morskoi Sbornik*, 1981, No. 3, pp. 75–82 and A. I. Petrenko, 'S.Sh.A.i problemy bezopasnosti Severa Evropy' (The USA and Security Problems of Northern Europe) *S. Sh. A. Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiia*, 1982, No. 2, pp. 18–30.

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of these waters may be measured in material, economic terms as well as according to strategic criteria. The natural resources of the Northern Waters—primarily fish, oil and gas—have grown in value over the past decade. They have also been included to an ever greater extent within national, albeit maritime, frontiers.

At the outset of the 1970s Iceland would have been pinpointed as the most politically sensitive Northern Waters territory. The US-run base at Keflavik contributed to surveillance of Soviet military activities to the north-east of the Greenland–Iceland–United Kingdom (GIUK) gap. The Icelanders were also seized with the question of ownership of resources: the British–Icelandic 'cod wars' were a precursor to the jurisdiction-resource tangle which ended the fairly permissive fisheries regime of the North East Atlantic Fisheries Convention whereby waters were open to general exploitation, subject only to certain minimal rules.[3] In its threats to remove the US Keflavik base if Britain did not capitulate in the 'cod wars', Iceland was prepared to link resource and security issues. The 'cod wars' also demonstrated the potential dangers of resource wrangles for relations among NATO allies, not just between East and West.

Icelandic actions—extensive trade agreements with the USSR and restrictions on the Keflavik base[4]—still pose an enigma for its NATO allies but they are muted in comparison with the past. Resource-related disputes have spread elsewhere in Northern Waters and the extension of Soviet naval presence in the area has underlined the strategic importance of territories previously seen to be of little prominence. Furthermore, the Icelandic example of sturdy political independence has now been followed by the Greenlanders, thereby adding greater uncertainty to a changing situation.

This article examines four key areas in the Northern Waters—Greenland, Jan Mayen, the Barents Sea and Svalbard—which have all experienced these new resource-related and jurisdictional problems. Solutions have not proved easy, partly because of the value of the resources at stake but mainly because what may seem to have been plain sailing out of the problems of one area—say, Jan Mayen—has led governments into rough seas around Greenland, Svalbard and the Barents Sea. What is also feared is the potential linkage of resource-jurisdictional issues to the security dimension along the Icelandic 'cod war' pattern.

In dealing with the four maritime territories, this article will cover their resource potential, their general security importance, their jurisdictional problems (especially current developments) and the political questions arising from them.

Jan Mayen

Jan Mayen is a volcanic island 53km long and 15 to 20km wide lying approximately 71° North and between 8° and 9° West, some 450 miles off the middle of the east coast of Greenland and 540 miles north-east of Iceland.

This bleak outpost has no valuable natural resources but the waters around it provide important fish stocks—herring, blue whiting, and, of greater consequence, capelin. The Jan Mayen Ridge to the south of the island may have oil potential, though experts have concluded:

3. D. H. Cushing, 'The Atlantic Fisheries Commission', *Marine Policy*, July 1979, Vol. 1, No. 3, pp. 230–8.

4. 'Soviet Research Vessel: Routine Port Call or Showing the Flag?', *News from Iceland*, March 1981, p. 14; 'Foreign Minister's Annual Report', ibid., May 1982, p. 12; 'Infighting in Government', ibid., April 1982; 'Row over Economic Pact with Soviet Union', ibid., August 1982, p. 3.

> the hydrocarbon potential of the northern part of the Jan Mayen Ridge . . . is regarded as more favourable mainly because it has a larger areal extent than the southern part . . .
>
> . . . However, considered in comparison with known oil-producing areas worldwide, the overall potential cannot be considered good, based on the existing fragmentary evidence.[5]

The island was annexed by Norway in 1929, eight years after the Norwegian Meteorological Institute had established a station there. Unsuccessful German attempts were made to land there during the Second World War but Norwegian authorities, working out of Iceland, kept control. During the last twenty years the island's position in the maritime gap between North Norway and Greenland has given it strategic importance: Jan Mayen now has permanent stations for LORAN A and C, CONSOL and other systems, most of which are run by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence.[6] It also seems to be linked to North Norway by a NATO SOSUS system—sonars tracking Soviet submarine movements.[7]

With the extension of West European fisheries zones out to 200 nautical miles in 1977, two jurisdictional questions arose that affected the island. The first was whether it could be counted as territory that sustained a permanent population. The Norwegians pointed to their established weather and radar stations there whilst the Danish and Icelandic governments wondered whether such an island should have a 200 mile fishery zone or whether it should be defined as a skerry. Partly because of fears that a minimal zone around Jan Mayen might allow third parties to fish in what then would be high seas, the Danish and Icelandic governments did not fully press their case when discussing the second issue—that of delineation of the fisheries zone between Greenland, Iceland and Jan Mayen.

The first move was made by the Icelanders, who established a 200 mile fisheries zone in 1975, and in October 1978 the Icelandic parliament, in deciding on an economic zone from 1 July 1979, considered that it should be extended to the full 200 miles without taking into account the future existence of any similar zone around Jan Mayen. Indeed, the Icelanders made claims beyond their 200 mile limit adjoining Jan Mayen: they considered they had special economic interests in the seas around the island.[8] At first the Norwegians wanted the zones between Jan Mayen and Iceland to be delineated by the median line but in the end accepted Iceland's claim to a full 200 mile economic zone and agreed to send the matter of the utilization of the continental shelf south of Jan Mayen to a three-man conciliation commission consisting of a Norwegian, an Icelander and an American chairman, Elliot Richardson (the former US head of delegation at UNCLOS).

Meanwhile a solution had to be worked out to control fishing in the disputed area. The major fish taken in the area is capelin. In 1979 the Soviet Union fished 668,987 tons (as well as some blue whiting and red fish), the Norwegians 1·2 million

5. *International Legal Materials*, July 1981, Vol. XX, No. 4, p. 818.

6. Satellite and AWACs systems tend to reduce the importance of these stations. See E. Ellingsen, *Jan Mayen i norsk sikkerhetspolitikk* (Jan Mayen in Norway's Security Policy) (Aschehougs leksikonservice 2–1977), p. 53.

7. O. Wilkes and N. P. Gleditsch, *Onkel Sams Kaniner: Teknisk Etterretning i Norge* (Uncle Sam's Rabbits: Technical Intelligence in Norway), (Oslo: Pax forlag, 1981), pp. 142–3.

8. The Icelandic case is presented in a semi-official publication in Norwegian: *Island og det Gamle Svalbard* (Iceland and the Old Svalbard) (Reykjavik: Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 1980).

tons, Iceland almost a million tons and the Danes 50,000 tons in the North E
Atlantic.[9]

Of the littoral states, clearly Norway and Iceland were the major fishers
capelin around Jan Mayen. A 1924 Norwegian–Danish agreement recognized t
former's long-standing interests in fishing off the East Greenland coast as well
hunting onshore. The fisheries side of this agreement was renewed in 1967 for t
years, thus showing continued Norwegian interest in the area.

In May 1980 the Danish government notified its intention to extend t
Greenlandic fishing zone to the north and east consequent to the 1976 law allowi
for such a zone up to 200 nautical miles or to the median line. This left open t
question as to whether it intended to claim the area between the median line wi
Jan Mayen and the full 200 mile limit out from Greenland. Spurred by this Dani
action, the Norwegians and Icelanders agreed the division of capelin take in t
undefined Jan Mayen area at a meeting in Reykjavik on 28 May 1980. The Icelande
were allowed 85 per cent of the total allowable catch (TAC), Norway 15 per cer
of which the Faeroese were granted a proportion. On 29 May 1980 Norw
declared a fisheries zone around Jan Mayen.

Denmark has agreed not to enforce fisheries inspection past the Greenland–J
Mayen median line but had successfully undertaken inspection tasks in Greenland
waters. Danish and Faeroese fishermen took 40,000 tons of capelin in the 19
season and there was some evidence of illegal Norwegian fishing.

In June 1981 Norway and Denmark tried to agree on a delineation of the disput
Greenland–Jan Mayen zone but failed. Iceland and the European Communi
disagreed on a general TAC for capelin though the Commission later laid down
TAC of 10,000 tons for undefined EEC waters. Meanwhile, Norway had agreed
allow the USSR to fish 280,000 tons of blue whiting with eleven boats. As part
the agreement the USSR was to submit to Norwegian fishery inspection in t
entire Jan Mayen area—including the area disputed with Denmark. With t
prospect of Greenland deciding to leave the EEC and therefore gaining control
its own fisheries zone, this represented not only an undermining of Danish clair
but also a mortgaging of future Greenlandic fish. Danish fishermen (and Faeroe
boats) went into the disputed zone to fish capelin at the end of August 1981.

In order to exercise their sovereignty and in response to Icelandic concern abo
third party fishing in the Jan Mayen area, the Norwegian government (which w
facing a general election on 14 September) sent in a fisheries protection vess
Farm, on 28 August 1981 to check on Danish and Faeroese vessels. They board
three Danish and six Faeroese vessels, issuing them with written protest notes. C
31 August Denmark reiterated its claim for a Greenlandic zone up to 200 miles a
sent in its protection vessel, *Vaedderen*, from the Faeroes. Care was taken that t
two sides' vessels did not meet.

On 1 September 1981 the Norwegian and Danish foreign ministers decided th
the matter should be dealt with at official level. On 7 September officials met
Oslo and agreed that Danish fishermen could continue their fishing and that furth
discussions should be held to settle the problem peacefully. Soon after, the capel
season around Jan Mayen closed as the fish swam west and south, effective
settling the problem for another year. At the negotiations the Danes were able
show that they successfully inspected third party and Danish vessels off the ea

9. *Politiken Weekly*, 28 August–3 September 1981, p. 17.

coast of Greenland and therefore could control fishing in the disputed zone. The question of Faeroese fishermen came up: despite Norway having allowed them some of their capelin quota, the Faeroese also claimed to be part of the Danish EEC quota and neither the Danes nor Norwegians were willing to alienate Faeroese feeling. In 1982 negotiations were held up by the European Community disagreement on a Common Fisheries Policy.

In October 1981 the new Conservative Norwegian government signed a bilateral accord with Iceland based on the findings of the Richardson Conciliation Commission and dealing with the exploitation of hydrocarbon reserves in the waters between Iceland and Jan Mayen. The Commission agreed that an oblong box should be drawn on the map around the area south of Jan Mayen—the area of the Jan Mayen Ridge where there could possibly be oil reserves. This box encompassed 12,725 square kilometres in its south-west corner which was south of the 200 mile Icelandic economic zone whilst the rest of the area lying in the claimed Jan Mayen zone comprised some 32,750 square kilometres. Recognizing Iceland's need for hydrocarbons the Commission proposed that Iceland be entitled to acquire a 25 per cent interest in any joint venture of oil exploitation in the northern part of the box with every effort made to see that the oil companies would 'carry' state participation by Iceland and Norway until a commercial find had been declared. Norway would be entitled to acquire a 25 per cent interest in any joint venture in the Icelandic section of the box (the south-west) but Iceland would not accommodate the Norwegians with a carried-interest arrangement.[10]

The political problems arising from the Jan Mayen fisheries and continental shelf disputes involved at least five parties: Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Greenland and the European Community.

Norway has been on weak political ground because of the distance of Jan Mayen from the Norwegian mainland, its small non-permanent population and the unwillingness of any Norwegian government to start a 'capelin war' with a Nordic country. Norwegian determination was partly strengthened by their sovereignty over the island, their position as the traditional major fishers of capelin and the onset of campaigning for the September 1981 General Election in which fishermen's votes were valued commodities.

Iceland's case was strengthened by its proximity to Jan Mayen, its importance in capelin fishing, its previous record on insisting on control of resources around its shores and the political difficulties of any Icelandic government accepting a 'second best' solution on fisheries questions.

The Danish government was brought into the issue by its concern to protect Greenlandic interests and by the activities of Faeroese fishermen. The Norwegian fishing agreement with Iceland on 28 May 1980 must have whetted Danish appetites for a similar favourable agreement—despite their previous lack of interest in capelin fishing. Likewise, the Norwegian acceptance of the 200 mile Icelandic economic zone has set a precedent that the Danish government will be anxious to use when pressing Greenlandic claims in the area.

The Icelandic–Norwegian accord on the continental shelf resource question was described by Icelandic Foreign Minister Olafur Johannesson as being 'a potential example to other nations'.[11] It is precisely this aspect which has led to criticism of

10. *International Legal Materials*, July 1981, Vol. XX, No. 4, pp. 841–2.
11. *News from Iceland*, November 1981, No. 70, p. 1.

Norwegian governmental action over Jan Mayen. Finn Sollie of the Fridtjof Nansen Foundation saw the link with the Barents Sea question and pointed out that a development agreement tied to a delineation settlement breaks with previous practice in border settlements:

> This, together with the co-operation arrangement which is proposed, can encourage other parties, i.e. the Soviet Union, to seek to attain special arrangements and regulations as part of the conditions for an agreement on delineation being negotiated for the Barents Sea.[12]

Furthermore, Dr Sollie was concerned lest the Icelandic precedent be used by the Danes and Greenlanders when they came to negotiate the boundary between Jan Mayen and Greenlandic waters but he was somewhat reassured by the new minority Conservative government in Norway appointing a new leader for their negotiating team with Denmark on the Jan Mayen zone. This change, and the concern it reflects, perhaps demonstrates that even a far-away place such as Jan Mayen, about which most Norwegians know little, can attract sudden political significance—it made a surprising showing in the September 1981 election literature—and can have relevance for more crucial jurisdictional questions.

Greenland

As the world's largest island, lying off the north-west of America, Greenland is an area of potential resource and present security importance. However, most of the landmass is permanently covered by an ice-cap and the inhabitants number only 50,000. From 1721 to 1953 the country was a Danish colony and from 1953 to 1979 it was an integral part of the Danish kingdom. In May 1979 Denmark established a home rule assembly and administration, granting Greenland a status within Denmark similar to that enjoyed by the Faeroes since 1948.

In 1978 specific quotas for 151,500 tons of fish were agreed for Greenlandic waters by the European Community, 58,745 tons of which were earmarked for Greenland. The total Greenlandic catch (quota and non-quota fish) for that year was 70,772 tons of which 62 per cent were cod and other codfishes, 23 per cent shrimps and 9 per cent Greenland halibut. The shrimps brought in 43 per cent of the income from fishing.[13] Fish and fishery products earned about half of Greenland's export income and if the lead and zinc exports from Marmorilik (in which few Greenlanders are involved) are excluded, the figure is nearer 85 per cent. A decrease in water temperature around Greenland in recent decades could threaten fish stocks there.[14]

Greenland is rich in minerals but their commercial exploitation has not always been possible. The cryolite deposits, of previous importance for the Greenlandic economy, are almost exhausted though new methods could stretch their economic life.[15] The lead and zinc exports from Marmorilik mentioned above amounted to 45,000 tons and 151,000 tons respectively in 1979. Iron ore, chromium, graphite

12. Finn Sollie, 'Jan–Mayen–sonen—forhandlingene med Island' (Jan Mayen—zone—Negotiations with Iceland), *Internasjonal Politikk*, 1981, No. 3, p. 399.

13. *Yearbook of Nordic Statistics 1979*, Vol. 18, NUA 1979:26 (Stockholm: Nordic Council and Nordic Statistical Secretariat, 1980), Table 68.

14. Jørgen Taagholt, 'Northern Waters: Resource Endowments', in D. Scrivener, ed., *Northern Waters: Resources and Security Issues* (Aberdeen: Centre for Defence Studies, University of Aberdeen, 1981) pp. A74–5.

15. *Politiken Weekly*, 24–30 April 1982, p. 16.

and molybdenum deposits are noteworthy and have attracted commerical interest.[16] It is estimated that there are approximately 43,000 tons of uranium ore at Narssaq, some of which has already been mined. Offshore drilling for oil and gas off west Greenland has been less successful though some hope has been expressed about the discovery of deposits off the east coast. The value of exploiting these resources depends primarily on the state of the world oil market.

Greenland's present security importance lies in its size and position, located between the north-west exits from Soviet ports (and, potentially, from Soviet rocket silos) and the north-eastern corner of the North American continent. It provides territory for the Distant Early Warning line (DEW-line) which stretches from Alaska across north Canada to Greenland and the US base at Thule in north-west Greenland which has Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) installations. The island's landmass provides the western pillar of the GIUK gap through which Soviet ships and submarines would have to exit before presenting a major threat to North Atlantic traffic in wartime. More recently the Soviet Typhoon-class submarine has been undergoing sea-trials and is potentially capable of sustained under-ice patrols and firing long-range nuclear missiles through several metres of ice.[17] Thus Greenland and the waters around it are crucial in NATO's anti-submarine warfare strategy in the North Atlantic and Arctic areas.[18]

Greenland's jurisdictional problems can be seen at two levels: vertical (frontier delineation) and horizontal (competing authorities). The major current dispute over the definition of maritime borders—that with Norway over Jan Mayen—has been covered above. The consequence of the fisheries and continental shelf agreements between Norway and Iceland has been to raise Danish and Greenlandic expectations of a similar solution for the area between Greenland and Jan Mayen. The Norwegians have pointed out that until recently Danish interest in the fisheries in the disputed zone has been minimal—in stark contrast to the strong Icelandic activity in the area between Jan Mayen and Iceland. Also, Norway has had traditional interests in the waters off eastern Greenland. Finally, the Danish fishing that has taken place in the disputed zone has been by Faeroese and Danish (in some cases Icelandic owned) vessels, not by Greenlanders.

A further complication of this frontier problem stems from the horizontal division of responsibilities on the Danish side. Whilst negotiations over jurisdictional questions are undertaken by the Danish government, the issue of fisheries quotas impinges on the European Community Common Fisheries Policy and should be determined in Brussels. With the granting of home rule to Greenland the new administration there now has responsibility for the fisheries industry and wants to leave the Community and the constraints of the Common Fisheries Policy. Minerals offshore come under the authority of a joint Greenlandic–Danish board on which both sides have the right of veto.

Despite these problems, the outline of a possible solution has emerged: increased Norwegian help in the development of Greenland's commerce in exchange for a Norwegian quota for fish caught off east Greenland. Such an agreement is seen in the context of Greenland leaving the European Community, so that Norway would

16. Taagholt, op. cit., p. A6.
17. *Politiken Weekly*, 22–28 January 1982, p. 16.
18. H. C. Bach and J. Taagholt, *Greenland and the Arctic Region in the Light of Defence Politics, Defence Aims* (Copenhagen: Information and Welfare Service of the Danish Defence, 1977), pp. 27–30.

be dealing directly with Denmark acting on behalf of Greenland in international affairs.[19]

The dividing line between south-east Greenlandic waters and those of Iceland has not become so contentious as in the Jan Mayen–Iceland or Jan Mayen–Greenland cases. However, when the Danes and Icelanders come to draw this line they may find that there are different interpretations of where it should be, as the Icelanders claim that the island of Kolbeinsey off their north-west coast should influence the extent of their zone.

The final jurisdictional problem off the east coast of Greenland is that of the line between north-east Greenland and the Norwegian territory of Svalbard. This may seem a straightforward division though the dispute over the nature of the fisheries zone and seabed around Svalbard (see below) is an added complication.

Jurisdictional questions concerning the west coast of Greenland have proved more amenable to settlement. In December 1973 the Danish and Canadian governments agreed on a division of the shelf between the west coast of Greenland and the north-eastern islands of Canada, stretching from Ellesmere Island in the north down to the area off Frobisher Bay in the south of Baffin Island. However, an unsettled issue has arisen over the use of the seas between west Greenland and Baffin Island for the Arctic Pilot Project (APP). This project, with the participation of the Canadian national oil company, Petro-Canada, is aimed at bringing the natural gas from the fields at Ellef Ringnes and Melville Island off Arctic Canada by combined icebreakers–liquefied natural gas tankers through Baffin Bay and the Davis Straits down to the southern markets.[20] The Greenlandic and Canadian inuit (eskimoes) fear the effect of these 100,000 horsepowered ships on marine mammal life—especially seals and whales, the potential for pollution and the effect on traditional inuit hunting in the area. These plans have attracted the attention of the newly-created Inuit Circumpolar Conference (ICC), an international non-governmental organization of Greenlandic, Canadian and Alaskan inuit, which has campaigned against the APP. This opposition has been supported by the Greenland home-rule assembly, and the Danish government—on behalf of the Greenlanders—made representations against APP at the UN Conference on the Law of the Sea.[21]

Again the question of the effect of competing authorities touches on jurisdictional issues. On 2 October 1972 Denmark voted in a referendum to accept membership of the European Community, and although Greenland registered a 70 per cent negative vote, it was obliged to join the Community with metropolitan Denmark. By May 1979 Greenland was granted home-rule status within the Danish kingdom with its own assembly (landsting) and administration (landsstyre) which took over responsibility for certain social and economic policies. The Danish government has kept control of defence and foreign affairs; there is a 'common-purse' arrangement by which Denmark continues to subsidize Greenland; the utilization of mineral resources has to be agreed by a joint Danish–Greenlandic committee. In the elections for the landsting in May 1979 the moderately left-wing Siumut Party led by Pastor Jonathan Motzfeldt won a majority over the centrist Atassut Party whilst the extreme socialist and independence parties got few votes and no seats. The

19. *Politiken Weekly*, 26 February–4 March 1982, p. 16.
20. Taagholt, op. cit., pp. A13–4.
21. *Politiken Weekly*, 25 February–4 March 1982, p. 16.

Siumut government has, however, felt the presence of these more extreme parties and has pressed ahead with its plan to take Greenland out of the European Community. It has argued that Greenland has suffered from the Community's Common Fisheries Policy and is unwilling to face the prospect of a 'common waters' policy that might give Community vessels permanent access to its waters.[22] Having obtained control of its economic life from Denmark, it was not anxious to see the most important activity—fishing—wrenched away by Brussels. An advisory referendum was held on 23 February 1982 allowing the Greenlanders to say whether they wanted to leave the Community. The result was by no means clear-cut. Atassut campaigned for staying in and pointed to the 443 million kroner-worth of grants and 330 million kroner in loans provided by the EEC for Greenland. However, with a high turnout of 75 per cent the Greenlandic electorate voted 52 per cent to leave the EEC and 46 per cent to stay in.[23] The home-rule administration is now negotiating with the Danish government so that the latter may obtain an Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) status for Greenland based on Articles 131–6 of the Treaty of Rome—a status similar to that held by the Falklands, the Dutch Antilles and French Polynesia. Originally it was hoped that the changeover would be settled by 1984 but this timetable now looks optimistic.

There is now a division of responsibility for policies in Greenland between the European Community (fisheries quotas, trade, competition), the Danish government (defence, foreign policy, general economic policy) and the Greenlandic administration (economic and social policies). The Greenlanders are trying to assert their authority against the Community and, to a lesser extent, Denmark. Indeed they are testing the Danish Government on the issues covered by this article—the settlement of the Jan Mayen delineation, the APP question, the CFP and the negotiation of their relations with the Community. Should the Danish government fail on these issues the Greenlanders have two strong cards. First, they could press for independence as being the one way to guarantee control over their own fisheries, maritime frontiers and natural resources and to provide them with a swift exit from the EEC. Secondly, they could then negotiate with other North Atlantic powers from a position of strength by using the US base at Thule and their strategic position in NATO as bargaining counters with other North Atlantic states—much as Iceland proceeded in its 'cod wars' with Britain. As yet, Greenlandic politicians have not openly considered these options, hoping that the Danish, Canadian, Norwegian and West German governments will be reasonable when considering Greenlandic interests in resource-related questions and the negotiations for an OCT status. In the last few years the USSR has shown increased interest in Greenland offering help with fish-processing factories and requesting a consulate in the capital of Nuuk—a request turned down by the Danes. Harsh treatment of Greenlandic requirements could lead to a political reorientation by their politicians. On the other hand, Greenland's negotiating partners can scarcely afford to be generous over many of the issues—the Canadian oil industry has invested money in APP, the West Germans in their long-distance trawlers; any part of the EEC leaving will create political waves in Britain, France and Germany; an 'Icelandic' solution of the Greenland–Jan Mayen zone not only might alienate Norwegian fishermen but could

22. For reports of present problems with European Community demands for West German and British quotas for cod fished off Greenland, see *Politiken Weekly*, 17–23 September 1982, p. 16, and 24–30 September 1982, p. 16.

23. *Politiken Weekly*, 19–25 February 1982, p. 1.

also set a further precedent for favourable treatment for the USSR in the Barents Sea. The Danish and Greenlandic governments will have their skills severely tested in the coming year.

The Barents Sea

Arctic cod, haddock and capelin stocks in the North Norwegian and Barents Seas have traditionally been exploited by Norwegian, Soviet, Polish, East German and European Community fleets. However, conservation measures and preferential treatment for politically important North Norwegian coastal fishing communities have in recent years resulted in much reduced quotas for foreign vessels. Considerable cod and capelin stocks are also found around Svalbard, particularly Bear Island to the south. These waters were included in a 200 mile fisheries protection zone established by Norway in 1977. Production of oil and gas from the Norwegian continental shelf in the North Sea is already of considerable importance to Western Europe, which obtains over 14 per cent of its gas supplies from the Norwegian Ekofisk and Frigg fields.[24] As these fields are depleted, production from Statfjord, Heimdal and Gullflaks will be substituted, with production from Sleipner the next candidate for development. Should Oslo aim to satisfy growing West European natural gas requirements into the 1990s, Norway could be obliged to undertake development of the Troll field, sacrificing valuable co-located oil deposits. The alternative would be to pursue quite vigorous exploration and exploitation off Norway's more northerly coast. Indeed, 85 per cent of the Norwegian continental shelf lies above the 62nd parallel, off central and north Norway, reaching into the North Norwegian and Barents Seas. Exploratory drilling by Norwegian firms above 62°N began in Summer 1980 on Haltenbank off Central Norway and off Troms (West Finnmark) with encouraging results.[25]

The pace and scope of offshore exploration is increasing as the present Conservative government attempts to develop a coordinated offshore energy programme that will include the more northerly waters. The government is also reviewing the projected maximum production level for the end of the decade, set in 1974, at 90 million t.o.e., taking into account the promising gas finds in the North.[26] Norwegian oil companies are reported already to have chosen the coastal towns of Harstad (69°N) and Hammerfest (70°N) as the main service centres for future projected offshore oil and gas exploration and exploitation in northern Norwegian waters.[27] Production from fields in the Norwegian Sea will depend on its at present questionable economic attractiveness to Norway and development of more advanced, sturdy drilling platforms and technology, not to mention arrangements for transportation of oil and gas by tanker or pipeline to the ever more demanding West European consumers. In the relatively shallow Barents Sea the physical and economic uncertainties are even greater although seismic tests have provided promising indications.

24. *Financial Times*, 24 September 1982.

25. After three summers of drilling, reserves of gas are estimated at 100–150 billion cubic metres in the Askeladden field—130 miles off Troms—in waters up to 260 metres deep (*Financial Times*, 21 August 1981, 29 July 1982). Another 50–60 billion cubic metres of gas were detected nearer to the coast (*Financial Times*, 24 September 1982).

26. See Gunnar Gjerde, 'Norwegian Petroleum Policy', *Co-operation and Conflict*, 1982, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 94–5.

27. *The Economist*, 10 July 1982, p. 65.

Growing American concern to limit expanded West European dependence on Soviet natural gas supplies—resulting in the current US–West European tensions over the Urengoi pipeline—has prompted Washington to consider the possibility of a greater Norwegian role in replacing West European imports of Soviet gas in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Such a development would probably include and hasten the tempo of Norwegian gas production from fields in Norway's most northern waters.

Soviet contemplation of its own future offshore energy activity in the Barents and Kara Seas was recently confirmed as Moscow commenced exploratory drilling in the Barents Sea in May–June 1982, using the first of three Arctic-conditioned drill ships ordered from Finland. Inquiries have been made as to the availability of Norwegian and even British offshore equipment and expertise for use in the area.[28] On 11 August 1982 the Norwegian Trade Minister announced that Norwegian companies would be free to sell offshore technology and know-how to Moscow for use in the Barents Sea.[29] At the same time, Norway's Deputy Foreign Minister attempted to forestall potential concern in the US administration that Norwegian energy cooperation with Moscow in the Barents Sea might circumvent Washington's restrictive policy on oil- and gas-related technology transfer to the Soviet Union.[30]

Actual oil and gas production is highly unlikely on the North Norwegian and Barents Sea continental shelves before the early to middle 1990s. Yet within the present decade exploratory drilling and preliminary field development may well be under way and have assumed dimensions of some economic and political significance. These projected operations will reflect and themselves influence Norway's relations with her allies and trading partners in Western Europe and North America, not to mention the USSR. In particular, they constitute an ever more important component part of the economic background to the Soviet–Norwegian relationship in the High North and intrude more directly on unresolved maritime jurisdictional disputes between these two states of such different military status in the Barents Sea.

The military–strategic significance of the Soviet and North Norwegian coastal areas and the abutting Barents Sea derives from their location and postwar military–technical developments.[31] The Soviet Northern Fleet based on the Kola Peninsula—only a few minutes' flying time from North Norwegian air bases—contains the highest percentage of Soviet strategic missile-carrying submarines (SSBNs) and is the only one of the four Soviet fleets with relatively unconstricted access to the high seas. While the need for egress to the deep Atlantic waters remains important for Soviet SSBNs, the Barents Sea itself is acquiring greater significance as a transit route to potential new patrol areas under the permanent Arctic ice-cap. The most recent Delta- and Typhoon-class SSBNs carrying very long-range ballistic missiles will probably deploy from their Kola bases into the marginal Arctic seas (Greenland, Barents and Kara Seas) and the extremely deep and relatively secure Central Arctic Basin.[32] The Barents Sea to the east of Svalbard

28. *Financial Times*, 13 August 1982, 29 May 1981; *Guardian*, 2 August 1982.
29. *Financial Times*, 12 August 1982.
30. *Financial Times*, 13 August 1982.
31. For a general overview, see Robert G. Weinland, 'Northern Waters: Their Strategic Significance' in D. Scrivener, ed., op. cit., pp. A53–72.
32. See Willy Østreng, 'The Strategic Balance and the Arctic Ocean: Soviet Options', *Co-operation and Conflict*, 1977, Vol. 12, No. 1, pp. 41-62 and René Besnault, 'Un Nouveau Théâtre D'Opérations Sous-Marines', *Strategique*, Part 2, 1981, pp. 76–116.

would provide the most secure route for SSBN transit to the sub-Arctic depth
This may reinforce Soviet desires to erect a military and legal maritime frontier a
far west in the Barents Sea as possible, reducing Western presence—includin
drilling for oil—to the minimum, as well as increasing Soviet sensitivity to an
change in the present low level of economic activity on and around the Svalbar
archipelago (see below). The advent of US strategic air-launched cruise missile
(ALCM) will further enhance the importance of the areas north and west of th
Kola Peninsula for Soviet strategic defence.[33] It is in the realm of strategic defenc
that the same region takes on new meaning for the United States as the importanc
of anti-submarine warfare capabilities grows both in terms of NATO peacetim
surveillance of Soviet SSBN movements and of the wartime activities of NATC
nuclear-powered hunter-killer submarines (SSN) in and through the 'gateways' t
the marginal and central Arctic seas. Soviet Kola-based naval and air power woul
play a central role in supporting the conventional operations of Soviet–Warsaw Pac
forces on the Central Front in Europe, not least through 'running the gauntlet' o
NATO forward defence at the GIUK gap in order to interdict NATO transatlanti
reinforcement and resupply. Hostile use of North Norwegian airfields would pos
a serious threat to the wartime operational requirements of both NATO and the
Soviet Union.[34]

A new element has been injected into the Soviet–Norwegian political and security relationship by the trend towards increasing coastal state control over maritime areas and resources reflected in the UNCLOS process. Complex problems of jurisdictional delimitation have compounded the need for effective management of maritime resources in an area of constant and growing military significance. As J. J. Holst recently wrote, what is also at stake is the future pattern and degree of overall political influence to be enjoyed by the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea and, one might add, the Arctic area as a whole.[35]

Bilateral negotiations on delineation of the Soviet and Norwegian continental shelf in the Barents Sea have proceeded intermittently since 1970 without success. While broader military considerations appear to lie behind the Soviet negotiating posture, divergent stances on the application of existing international law have proved a stumbling block. Norway bases its position on the median line principle, whilst the Soviet Union has consistently claimed that special circumstances should be taken into account in agreeing upon a dividing line. They have referred to their considerable industrial, fishing and infrastructural investment in the Kola Peninsula area and to their earlier claims to a Soviet polar sector extending from the western and eastern edges of their landmass to the North Pole.[36] Whether articulated or not, the proximity of the major Soviet military complex on Kola has undoubtedly been an important Soviet consideration. Norway has refused to admit the general legal relevance of the sector principle as a method of continental shelf delimitation,

33. Tomas Ries, 'Svalbard: Flashpoint of the Far North?', *International Defence Review*, No. 3, 1980, pp. 335–9.

34. For an evaluation of the military sensitivity of north Norway and the Barents Sea, see B. R. Posen, 'Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO's Northern Flank', *International Security*, Fall 1982, Vol. 7, No. 2, pp. 28–54.

35. Johan J. Holst, 'Norway's Search for a Nordpolitik', *Foreign Affairs*, Fall 1981, Vol. 60, No. 1, p. 83.

36. On the sector principle as enunciated in Soviet domestic legislation and legal writings see Captain Gerald E. Synhorst USN, 'Soviet Strategic Interest in the Maritime Arctic', *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, May 1973, esp. pp. 98–100.

insisting on an extension of the median line, reaching a point halfway between Svalbard and Soviet Novaya Zemlya. The Soviet sector line runs considerably to the west of this, placing an area of 155,000 square kilometres of seabed in the Barents Sea in dispute—an area larger than the Norwegian sector in the North Sea. Moscow has been unwilling to make any concessions and has not shown any sense of urgency, possibly to delay Norwegian and particularly Western multinational offshore activity in the Barents Sea.[37] Indeed, Norway is unlikely to begin such operations before resolution of the jurisdictional dispute. In March 1980 the Soviet Union for the first time took the initiative in calling for a resumption of the negotiations, perhaps indicating that Moscow is giving greater thought to commencement of exploratory drilling in the Kara and/or Barents Seas in the next few years. The Soviet Union might in time be willing to concede the Norwegian position on shelf delimitation which would erode Norwegian unwillingness to initiate its own exploratory activity. Soviet security sensitivities might be overcome by the prospect of obtaining Norwegian offshore equipment and Western capital investment, making development of potential oil and gas reserves on the Soviet continental shelf more practicable and attractive.

Norwegian governments have been keen to prevent political tension arising from the jurisdictional dispute. Certain past activities in the disputed zone by both sides have led to increased tension: the Soviets fired missiles into the western part of the area in 1976–7 and conducted some seismic testing in 1980. However, on the whole, both parties have observed a tacit understanding to avoid actions in the disputed area which could aggravate relations and retard final settlement of the continental shelf delimitation issue.

The requirement for effective management and conservation of the rich fish stocks in the Barents Sea came to be felt acutely in Norway in the early 1970s, particularly with respect to the joint Soviet and Norwegian stocks of arctic cod. Arrangements for fisheries management could not await resolution of the related Barents continental shelf issue. Overlapping Soviet and Norwegian fisheries jurisdiction claims became a possibility in late 1976 as Norway and the USSR declared respectively an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and fisheries protection zone (FPZ). The two governments had agreed earlier in the year on mutual access, total catches and quotas in their waters out to 200 miles. The introduction of the EEZ and FPZ raised the potential problem of inspection and enforcement rights with regard to third parties (e.g. EEC vessels) in the disputed area of the Barents Sea. Norway consequently proposed bilateral negotiations and in June 1977 these resulted in a temporary Soviet–Norwegian fisheries management agreement which included the disputed waters. After some delay in Norwegian ratification due to domestic criticism what was known as the 'Gray Zone' agreement came into effect in January 1978.[38] It covered an area out to 200 miles from the baselines of 67,000 square kilometres (26,000 square miles) of which 41,000 square kilometres lay within the disputed area of the continental shelf. The Gray Zone embraced 8,900 square miles west of the Soviet-claimed sector line and 1,200 square miles east of the median line to the north east of Ribachyi Peninsula. While total catches and quotas were to be

37. For an elaboration of this interpretation of Soviet motives see Kim Traavik and Willy Østreng, 'Security and Ocean Law: Norway and the Soviet Union in the Barents Sea', *Ocean Development and International Law Journal*, 1977, Vol. 4, No. 4, p. 361.

38. On initial domestic Norwegian reservations see Peter Egil Hegge, 'The Soviet View of the Nordic Balance', *Washington Quarterly*, 1979, Vol. 2, No. 3, p. 71.

agreed by the Norwegian–Soviet Fisheries Commission, joint enforcement—and its implications for a potentially exclusive bilateral relationship—were avoided by allowing each state jurisdiction over its own vessels and those of third countries licensed by it. Renewed regularly at yearly intervals, the arrangement has generally worked well with only minor problems such as Soviet inspection of UK trawlers in 1978. The possibility of political tensions arising from fisheries jurisdiction issues has thus been avoided. At pains to separate the immediate requirement for joint fisheries management from the delimitation issue, the Norwegians succeeded in gaining explicit recognition that the Gray Zone agreement would not prejudice either side's position on jurisdiction over the disputed continental shelf area.

The overall strategic and economic value of the Barents Sea to the USSR, Norway and her allies and economic partners remains great and promises to acquire even greater significance. Given the not incomprehensible Soviet sensitivity to all developments within range of the Kola Peninsula and the 'gateways' to the Atlantic and Arctic Seas, Norwegian policy must continue to seek to minimize tension while concurrently attempting to resolve jurisdictional and resource management issues with the USSR. Yet Norwegian appreciation of Soviet insecurities and efforts to reach agreements on urgent resource management problems with Moscow entail possible encouragement of Soviet pressures for more comprehensive condominium-type economic arrangements for the Barents Sea at large—including offshore energy activity. This was one of the criticisms made of the original Gray Zone agreement. As mentioned above, Norwegian concessions to Iceland over Jan Mayen may encourage Soviet expectations of similar gains to be made in the Barents Sea. Norwegians involved or interested in the relationship with Moscow on these issues have recognized the need for continued Western diplomatic support of Norwegian policies if Oslo is to withstand Soviet demands and pressures. Western involvement in the Barents area is hardly great at present, with restricted access to fisheries and the prospect of a highly exclusivist Norwegian policy on offshore oil and gas activity. Growing energy shortages in Western Europe and Western pressures for more extensive foreign participation in offshore energy production could severely strain the diplomatic support of Norway's allies and partners for Oslo in its relations with Moscow.[39]

Svalbard

The Arctic archipelago of Svalbard (Spitzbergen) lies in the Barents Sea approximately 500 miles north of North Cape in Northern Norway, together with which it forms the gateway from the Barents to the Norwegian Sea. The islands lie between 74° and 81°N and 10° and 35°E, comprising an area of over 62,000 square kilometres. Coal has long been the major resource exploited on land, presently mined by the Soviet Arktikugol trust at Barentsburg and Pyramiden and by a Norwegian company at Longyearbyen. A second Norwegian mine is to be opened at Sveagruva. Soviet annual production amounts to approximately 400,000 tons and Norwegian extraction may rise from the present level of around 450,000 tons to over 1 million tons with the opening of the Sveagruva mine. Reserves were estimated

39. For a discussion of this potential oil-security linkage see Finn Sollie, 'National Interests and International Implications of Resource Exploitation in Northern Waters', in D. Scrivener, ed., op. cit., pp. B6–10. On foreign perceptions of Norwegian energy policy see Willy Østreng, 'Norwegian Petroleum Policy and Ocean Management: The Need to Consider Foreign Interests', *Co-operation and Conflict*, June 1982, Vol. 17, No. 2, pp. 117–38.

at over 14 million tons in 1975.[40] The permanent population, concentrated in the mining communities, amounts to 1,200 Norwegian and 2,500 Soviet citizens. Exploratory drilling in the early 1960s revealed small oil deposits on land. Interest in onshore oil potential rose in the last decade but the prospects are not overly encouraging. There are rich fishing grounds for capelin in Svalbard waters and also arctic cod around Bear Island to the south of the archipelago. The Barents Sea continental shelf extends just beyond Svalbard which gives reason to believe that significant oil and gas reserves may be located around the islands.

Svalbard's strategic importance stems mainly from its location at the northern end of the Barents–Norwegian Sea gateway and under the flight-paths of US and Soviet ICBMs and long-range bombers. As SSBN and hunter-killer submarine operations intensify in and through the marginal and central Arctic seas, Svalbard's position may appear even more significant astride the deep trough separating it from Greenland and at the edge of the Svalbard–Bear Island–North Cape channels. The airspace above the islands will be more important for Soviet defences against US air-launched cruise missiles. Yet the deliberate absence of any real military infrastructure and the archipelago's extreme vulnerability to air strike would render effective large-scale wartime use of Svalbard by either the USSR or NATO highly problematical. In wartime both sides would probably try to deny its use to the other. However, the uses to which the islands and waters may be put in peacetime in preparation for war may well reinforce the determination of both the USSR and Norway (NATO) to ensure that the status quo on Svalbard is not disturbed.[41]

The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 conferred sovereignty over the archipelago on the Kingdom of Norway. It also provided all signatories with equal rights to economic activity on the islands and their territorial waters without discrimination and at very low taxation rates. Economic activities were to be conducted according to 'local laws and conditions' and in conformity with the subsequent Mining Code (1925). As the sovereign power, Norway has the right to determine such local laws and conditions and ensure their observation. Article 9 of the Treaty stipulated that the islands never be used for 'warlike purposes' and precluded establishment of permanent naval bases and military fortifications. The Svalbard Treaty regime is a unique combination of sovereignty, internationalization and demilitarization.

With the exception of the Soviet Union in the period 1944–7, Norwegian sovereignty over Svalbard has never been seriously contested by other powers, 49 of which have signed the Treaty.[42] In November 1944 Molotov suggested to the Foreign Minister of the Norwegian government-in-exile that Bear Island be ceded by Oslo to the Soviet Union and Svalbard be administered and defended jointly by Norway and the USSR in view of the manner in which the archipelago had been used for military purposes during the Second World War.[43] However, since 1947 the issue has been more exclusively one of the scope of Norwegian sovereignty. Difficulties have arisen over Norway's regulatory powers under the Treaty, which

40. Norwegian Royal Ministry of Justice, Report No. 39 to the Norwegian Storting (1974–5) *Concerning Svalbard*, pp. 19–21.

41. For a more positive assessment of Svalbard's wartime utility for the USSR see Tomas Ries, op. cit.

42. The USSR adhered to the Treaty in 1935.

43. For a recent re-examination of the events surrounding the Soviet demarche of 1944–7 in favour of revising the Treaty regime see Olav Riste, *London–Regjeringa: Norge i Krigsalliansen 1940–45. Vol. II 1942–45* (The London Government: Norway in the War Alliance 1940–5. Vol. II 1942–5) (Oslo: Det Norske Samlaget, 1979) pp. 315–39 and documents pp. 412–19.

the Soviet Union has consistently interpreted in a very restrictive fashion when some of its activities on Svalbard have been questioned by the Norwegian authorities. Soviet actions and arguments reflect a desire to preserve and extend what they must perceive as their legitimate special status and privileges relative to those enjoyed by others. Since the 1930s Soviet and Norwegian companies have been the only permanent operators, indicating a distinct lack of other foreign commercial interest in the archipelago's resources. Until quite recently the distances involved, not to mention poor funding, neglect and lack of policy co-ordination, resulted in a practice of relative Norwegian 'non-interference' in the activities of the Soviet mining communities and scientific expeditions.[44]

In the early 1960s revived Norwegian interest in potential energy resources together with the future prospect of greater foreign involvement in oil exploration prompted the beginnings of a more active Norwegian assertion of its sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago. In 1974–5 Svalbard was the subject of a Government White Paper and a debate in the Storting, calling for an intensification of Norwegian economic activity and more rigorous exercise of sovereignty. From almost total obscurity Svalbard was even mentioned in the election manifestos of the major parties before the September 1981 Norwegian elections and in the new Conservative Government's policy statement of 15 October 1981. The Soviet Union has often argued that Norwegian regulatory measures, such as the post-1971 introduction of conservation areas covering almost 45 per cent of Svalbard, are subject to prior Soviet agreement on their content.[45] The potential for tension-raising incidents is, for the moment, fairly limited, as the Soviets have gradually come to accept increasing Norwegian regulation outside their own mining communities and, to a more limited extent, within them.

A degree of laxity in Norwegian enforcement of certain regulatory measures recognizes the verification function which a relatively unconstricted Soviet presence in the archipelago serves with respect to the demilitarization aspects of the Svalbard Treaty. Soviet sensitivity to change—in Norwegian regulatory activity, presence and possible greater third-party involvement—is probably conditioned by Norwegian membership of NATO and the fact that Svalbard, as sovereign Norwegian territory, theoretically falls under the NATO defence responsibility. The Soviet press has been quick to note brief visits to the islands by Norwegian military personnel and occasionally refers to alleged NATO plans to install covert military facilities there—as a method of sustaining Norwegian awareness of Soviet security sensitivities.[46]

Norway and its Soviet neighbour are in dispute concerning the waters around Svalbard. The juridical status of the continental shelf remains unclear. In 1970 Norway declared that the Norwegian continental shelf in the Barents Sea extends to and beyond Svalbard, thus dismissing any assertion that Svalbard may have its own continental shelf beyond its territorial waters of four miles. The Soviet Union explicitly rejected Norway's claim. Moscow asserted the existence of a Svalbard

44. Willy Østreng, *Politics in High Latitudes: The Svalbard Archipelago* (London: C. Hurst, 1977) pp. 79–80.

45. For examples of Soviet reactions to new or stricter Norwegian regulatory measures see David Fairhall, 'Spitzbergen' in *Brassev's Defence Yearbook 1980* (Oxford; Brasseys, 1981) pp. 45–52 and Hegge, op. cit., pp. 66–8.

46. See, for example, Eng.-Col. I. Belov. 'Skandinavskie strany v planakh S.Sh.A. i NATO' (The Scandinavian Countries in US and NATO Plans), *Zarubezhnoe voennoe obozrenie*, 1982, No. 1, p. 12.

continental shelf of unspecified size and maintained that the internationalization and equality elements of the Treaty would apply in the area. The Norwegians argued that, in any case, the Svalbard Treaty only establishes a non-discriminatory resources regime on the islands and in the territorial waters of the archipelago. As far as the governments of the Western signatory states are concerned (including the United Kingdom), the question remains under review, with final judgements and treaty rights reserved.

A further source of potential aggravation compounded the unresolved jurisdictional dispute when in June 1977 Norway introduced a 200 mile fisheries protection zone around Svalbard. This followed the activation of the Norwegian EEZ and Soviet FPZ in the Barents in January and May 1977 respectively. The new zone is non-discriminatory and anticipated the northwards movement of fishing vessels to the relatively unrestricted waters of Svalbard, vulnerable to any drastic, unregulated increase in exploitation. Accepting the conservation rationale put forward by Oslo, the interested Western governments raised no objection. The Soviet government questioned the legal basis of the unilateral Norwegian action. Yet Norwegian officials seem satisified that Soviet vessels have largely complied with the regulations—submitting to net inspections etc.—while omitting to report their catch sizes specifically from the Svalbard fisheries zone.

The major sources of potential political tension in this highly sensitive region—in both military and environmental terms—involve the Soviet Union and Norway. They concern the scope of Norwegian authority on the Svalbard islands and jurisdictional delimitation in the water around them. In rational terms it might appear that acceptance of Norwegian jurisdiction over the continental shelf around Svalbard would avoid a host of possible complications. Norwegian exercise of sovereignty could accommodate Soviet security concerns by effectively controlling the form and intensity of any future non-littoral state participation in offshore energy activity. Such control need not take on an overly exclusivist complexion but could allow some West European participation in extraction of energy resources or their consumption. Whatever regime is eventually instituted around Svalbard would have to be relatively strict in order not to upset the delicate Arctic ecosystem. Other factors may nonetheless intrude.

The Soviet stance could again reflect a desire gradually to engineer a Norwegian–Soviet condominium arrangement for the Barents Sea as a whole, in line with the optimum solution to Moscow's security problems in the High North. Perhaps at some stage Moscow may be reconciled to a full Norwegian exclusive economic zone around Svalbard in exchange for a future Norwegian accommodation of the 'special circumstances' the Soviets claim justify applying the sector line when delineating the two countries' continental shelves in the Barents Sea.[47] In any event, Norway's location, size and political alignments will continue to expose her to the pressures of her Soviet neighbour. Tensions and conflicting interests between Norway and her Western allies and economic partners may, if not properly managed, simply reinforce that exposure. Such tensions might arise if an overly exclusivist Norwegian policy on resource exploitation issues in Northern Waters were to be clearly seen to be unresponsive to the growing West European need for secure energy supplies.[48]

47. Traavik and Østreng, op. cit., p. 365.
48. Sollie, op. cit.

Conclusion

In each of the four areas—Jan Mayen, Greenland, the Barents Sea and Svalbard—serious conflict over jurisdictional questions has so far been avoided. The Icelandic–Norwegian fisheries agreement and the acceptance of the Richardson Commission's recommendations on Jan Mayen; the present division of responsibilities for Greenland's resources by the Danish and Greenlandic governments; the Soviet–Norwegian 'Gray Zone' agreement for the Barents Sea; the Soviet and Norwegian *modus vivendi* in Svalbard, have all placed emphasis on cooperation. However, difficult problems remain to be tackled: that of the Jan Mayen–Greenlandic maritime boundary; the question of Greenland's membership of the European Community; the delineation of the Soviet–Norwegian frontier in the Barents Sea; the status of the zone around Svalbard and the extent of Norwegian control of Soviet activities on Svalbard. As resources—fish, oil, gas, other minerals—become more sought after, so the incentive to solve these problems becomes greater.

Discrete solutions will be less possible for each of these territories. The Norwegian agreement with Iceland has already had consequences for negotiations with Greenland/Denmark over Jan Mayen and, possibly, with the USSR over the Barents Sea. Further concessions over the Jan Mayen–Greenlandic border by the Norwegian government could raise Soviet expectations over the division of the Barents Sea. On the other hand, a tough Norwegian stance could lead to Greenlandic discontent with Danish negotiators. The security importance of Greenland gives their home-rule government a potentially strong negotiating position in dealings with North Atlantic states. The strategic position of the Barents Sea and Svalbard means that developments there are not purely of interest to the USSR and Norway but are also the concern of other NATO states. New frontiers and the exploration of resources in Northern Waters have caused the political temperature there to rise a few degrees.

Protectionism and autonomy: a comment on Hager

BRIAN HINDLEY*

Wolfgang Hager's article in the Summer 1982 issue of *International Affairs* (Vol. 58, No. 3, p. 413) deals with a subject of major importance for international relations—that of how Japan and the NICs should be treated by the governments of the European Community and, by implication, those of all the 'old' industrialized countries. His solution is '. . . managing the interface between different socio-economic systems' (p. 426) which a couple of pages later turns out to mean '. . . conducting trade policy with fewer complexes towards countries like Japan; in short, protectionism' (pp. 427–8).

There is a great deal of protectionist sentiment in the European Community (and, of course, not only in the Community), especially towards Japan and the newly industrializing countries (NICs). Policies are proposed that will radically change the structure of the international trading system; and that therefore may have far-reaching effects on international economic and political relationships. Hager has some claim to be the leading academic spokesman in Europe for this constituency. That is not in my view a claim of great virtue, but that is incidental. What is important is that Hager attempts to make a case that protection is good, not only from the point of view of the European textile industry, for example, which is not hard to demonstrate, but from the point of view of the European Community as a whole, which is much more difficult.

Actually to come to grips with Hager's arguments and reasoning, however, is not a straightforward matter. Putative facts and asserted logical relationships crowd upon one another in his article. But they are an intellectual guerilla army. When a would-be antagonist turns to grapple with them, asking what their significance is, or what cause is being said to follow what effect, they tend to scatter and vanish, leaving the antagonist to use his energies in search of what Hager might mean rather than in analysis of some firm proposition.

Faced with this situation, two courses of action are possible. One would be to take each dubious assertion and each doubtful statement of fact and scrutinize it. That would be a very long process. The other, which I shall follow here, is to attempt to select the propositions that appear to be central and to examine them.

Hager's central propositions

Four central propositions can, I believe, be extracted from Hager's *International Affairs* article. These are as follows.

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0301–679X/83/1/0077—09$03.00©1983 International Affairs

Proposition (1)

There is a threat to the existence of the European Community that

> . . . takes three main forms. The first is the *de facto* abandonment of the common commercial policy as nations and/or national industry federations make separate deals with troublesome third countries or by unilateral acts of protectionism. Secondly, within the Common Market itself, trade is impeded between member states by every conceivable device short of tariffs and quotas. Thirdly, more subtly but ultimately more devastatingly, financial protectionism—the subsidies to industry—undermines the assumptions under which the free trade game is played (p. 416).

Proposition (2)

A possible solution to this state of affairs is to ensure that the Community is able to offer sufficient protection and support so that member states will not find it worthwhile to negotiate with outsiders or otherwise to act independently:

> At present . . . all really important commercial policy acts are taken by national governments . . . This state of affairs will continue as long as the European Community, at German insistence, is the guardian of liberal orthodoxy in matters of foreign trade, leaving national governments with the task of dealing with the real issues (pp. 426–7).

Proposition (3)

The more protectionist states are right: more protection (and a more active industrial policy) would be good for Europe in ways quite apart from its effect on European unity. It would enable Europe to maintain its 'anti-industrial' way of life (p. 417) (whereas without protection, that way of life would have to be abandoned).

Proposition (4)

Europe needs more protection than formerly because of the rise of Japan and the NICs. The set of rules it has lived with (and prospered under) since 1948 is no longer tolerable under these new conditions, which are defined by the coexistence of

> Two socio-economic worlds . . . One, ours, is characterised by unfree labour markets and still relatively free markets for allocating real capital. The other is a world of free labour markets (kept 'free' by jailing trade unionists, if necessary) and systems of capital allocation by central plans or strategic consensus by a handful of entrepreneurs and bureaucrats. Two things can be fairly categorically stated about the two worlds in interaction. First, there is no natural equilibrium solution possible even in theory, even less one which maintains full employment in the high cost area. Secondly, in the traditional adjustment model the initiative lies wholly with systems which allocate capital centrally (p. 420).

However, 'there is no reason why states with similar socio-economic systems should not trade freely' (p. 427).

These four propositions have rather different force, importance and validity. Proposition (1), for example, is a not terribly exaggerated caricature (to use one of Hager's significant favourite words) of European reality. Note, however, that no

causal connection is asserted (either in the quoted passage or elsewhere in Hager's paper) between the first of the three cited threats and the other two.

This bears upon proposition (2). Internal Community protectionism, with which Hager is rightly concerned, occurs because the national governments find it expedient to respond to the importuning of their industrial interests with respect to insiders as well as outsiders. Presumably Hager believes that increased protection against outsiders at the level of the Community will reduce the force of the importuning of national governments for protection against insiders. But it is far from self-evident that this would be so: British Leyland presents as large a political problem for a British government if it is being knocked out by Volkswagen as if it is being knocked out by Datsun. Perhaps it is implicit in Hager's proposal that the power of the national governments to respond will be eliminated, but if so, he raises issues much more extensive than those he actually discusses. In any event, Hager supplies no reason to suppose that the adoption by the Community of a protectionist ideology in its relations with the outside world would facilitate the adoption of a free trade ideology by the national governments towards one another.

In fact, we have some evidence on the point. The kind of policies advocated by Hager for manufacturing exist in agriculture. The Common Agricultural Policy seems a poor model for Community policy elsewhere. Whatever one's view of the CAP, however, it most certainly cannot be said that the very high protection against outsiders at Community level has led to intra-Community free trade. On the contrary, agriculture may be the sector worst affected by internal protectionism.

Mention of the CAP underlines another peculiarity of Hager's presentation, which is the almost entire absence of political discussion (apart from his scolding of the German government): and this when the central subject is commercial policy! (I am reminded of Mike Finger's comment: 'There are no statesmen in this business. Trade theory is about whose hand is in whose pocket, and trade policy is about who should take it out'[1]). Reading Hager, one might think that a politician had never urged or granted a tariff or subsidy for any other reason than the greater social good or pure honest error about where it lay. It is a habit more typical of a lobbyist making a case than of an enquirer after social truth. But this, and the other problems connected with propositions (1) and (2), can be ignored: though Hager uses them as the mainspring of his article, (1) and (2) are inessential at least in the sense that (3) and (4) can be correct even if (1) and (2) are false. And if (3) is correct, Hager has made a case for more European protection. If (4) is correct, he has made a case for discrimination between trading partners.

In the section that follows I shall concentrate on (4), which raises issues of substance for the structure of international politics. I shall turn briefly to analytical economic issues at the end of the paper.

The hypothesis of different socio-economic systems

Hager stresses three themes in his attempt to establish the vital difference required to make his case for discriminatory treatment. These are:

(1) the absence of aggressive trades unions in Japan and the NICs;

(2) the allocation of capital by 'central plans or strategic consensus' (p. 420) in

1. J. M. Finger, 'Policy Research', in *Journal of Political Economy* 1980.

those countries and their consequent (?) ability to choose what to produce for the European market[2]; and

(3) their alleged subsidization of exports or export-producing industries.[3]

Do any of these themes, if true, or any combination of them, lead to the conclusion that it is in Europe's interest to adopt higher, discriminatory, or unilaterally variable levels of protection with respect to countries so characterized? Alternatively, do they establish some moral right to take such action? I shall discuss briefly each one in turn.

On the first point, it is true that the presence of flexible competitors, willing and able to seize opportunities presented to them, will increase the costs to members of a trade union of disruptive action. Unwarranted wage increases won by unions will then have a greater effect in reducing the employment of union members. However, the proposition that it would therefore be a good thing to increase the level of protection against such competitors, or to adopt protective measures which could be easily varied at the discretion of the political authorities, does not seem to me to flow naturally from these facts.

Behind Hager's specific contention, however, one suspects that another and more complex issue lies: that of the social conditions (if any) that we have an ethical right to require of our trading partners within a GATT-type legal structure. There is not space to discuss this issue here.[4] However, I do not think the conclusion can be reached that because we have aggressive trade unions, we have a right to require our trading partners to have aggressive unions also.[5]

Different problems arise if the issue is not the appropriate level of truculence of unions but the allegation that the labour involved in production of exports is physically coerced or in conditions of slavery. I do not think (although I am not sure) that Hager would wish to argue that this case is relevant to Japan and all of the various NICs that concern him.

Hager places great stress on his second theme, that of the 'strategic freedom of . . . industrial policy makers to decide what to buy and sell' (p. 414). At times, he seems to suggest that such freedom is used with malign intent towards Europe. Such a suggestion seems to carry paranoia to absurd levels, yet it is difficult to see where else the force of the point lies. Why should we be concerned with the means by which trading partners select the products they believe they can efficiently produce? Why is Hager concerned that this is done by 'a handful of entrepreneurs and bureaucrats' (p. 420)? Does he think that it is somewhere, and ought to be

2. 'Europe is a high cost area with decentralised real-capital formation, and hence intrinsically on the defensive. Under free trade conditions, any of the low-cost producers can decide to produce anything for the European market, constrained only by other outside competitors' (p. 423).

3. 'The state—to present an only slightly exaggerated model—provides everything: cheap capital, control of the work force, protection from outside suppliers, credits for both exports and imports, virtually free land and low cost inputs like electricity, and then hands the package over to the entrepreneur' (p. 422).

4. See, however, Deepak Lal, *Resurrection of the Pauper-labour Argument* (London: Trade Policy Research Centre, 1981).

5. Hager makes frequent adverse comparisons of the 'pliant' behaviour of trades unions in Japan and the NICs and the aggressiveness of their European counterparts (e.g. p. 421). On outcomes, the position might look different. OECD statistics suggest that between 1970 and 1979, German real weekly earnings rose by some 25 per cent and Japanese by 45 per cent. *In* Britain, with proper macho unions, the figure was 18 per cent. That British workers obtain satisfaction from the theatrical aspects of the behaviour of their unions, and are prepared to sacrifice real income for it, is possibly a tenable position. One can hardly require the taste to be universal however.

everywhere, done by popular referendum? I cannot see what concerns him if not the possibility of malign intent.

It eventually becomes clear, however, that Hager himself does not regard this characteristic of 'unfree capital markets' as having any real importance. On page 421 he asserts, in the vein already touched upon, that 'In most NICs, of course, unions simply receive orders on the right wage for the year, on the East European pattern'. A footnote to this sentence reads 'This is apparently not so in Hong Kong, probably the only economy in the world with both free labour and capital markets'. But although Hager thereby concedes that Hong Kong does not have unfree capital markets, he still cites it as a peril, along with the other East Asian NICs, and does not exempt it from the trade regime he proposes for them.[6]

It seems, therefore, that Hager's three criteria for detecting different socio-economic systems are not to be applied *en bloc*: to fail only two is to be condemned. Or even to fail one: I do not think that Hager can produce evidence that Hong Kong has engaged in extensive subsidy programmes (by European standards or by more stringent ones). But if it is enough to have a 'docile and flexible labour force' then the United States as well as Hong Kong must be declared a different socio-economic system, for those are the precise words that Hager uses (p. 418) to describe the American labour force.[7] I think that Hager should tell us (and the textile unions and employers' federations) whether Hong Kong is to be treated as a different socio-economic system or not, and, if so, on what grounds.

The issue of whether some meaningful line can be drawn to discriminate between socio-economic systems from the point of view of trade regime is not merely a matter of acquitting Hager of the charge that he seeks to surround Japan and the NICs with a miasma of otherness, which then, by sleight of mind, provides the justification for different treatment.[8] Were Hager's suggestions adopted, it would also present a problem in European politics. If 'different socio-economic systems' have a right in principle to defend themselves with rigorous and discretionary measures of trade control, as he suggests, this inevitably puts pressure on any line drawn to separate like from unlike. Hager's own definition clearly could not be given a legal form that would draw the line where he wants it. More important, others might have different notions of where it *ought* to be drawn.

A British trade union, for example, might with some justice regard Britain and the Federal Republic of Germany as different socio-economic systems. They have different histories and different traditions. The Federal Republic possesses what appears to be, by British standards, 'a docile and flexible labour force', and German workers produce much more output than British workers when supplied with the

6. Hong Kong's example might also have suggested to Hager that central direction of capital is not crucial to the success of any of the NICs.

7. Hager may use the term idiosyncratically, however. He comments (p. 418) that the United States has 'a—by European standards—docile and flexible labour force . . .'. Over the past ten years, the United States has lost through strikes roughly ten times as many days per worker as the Federal Republic. The British figure is eleven times that of the German.

8. Hager is vehement in his denunciation of the 'arrogant racism' (pp. 418–19) that he claims to detect in the hypothesis that people newly entering industrial culture will first move into relatively simple lines of production. The hypothesis may be wrong but it is not racist (unless it is racist to believe that most of the people on the verge of industrialization are non-white). Moreover, one might note that the 'arrogant racists' who adopt this hypothesis frequently use it as a basis to urge open trade relations between Europe and the Third World. Hager's denunciation of them, on the other hand, is part of an argument that trade with the non-white sections of the world should be rigidly controlled by Europeans because non-whites belong to 'different socio-economic systems'.

same capital equipment. Does Hager therefore concede a right for the British socio-economic system to be protected against the German? If not, how will he explain to BL workers—having established the principle that they *ought* to be protected against competition from the different socio-economic system of Japan—that they ought *not* to be protected against competition from Germany? An assumed or imagined common identity or identity of interest within Europe is a dangerous basis for a European policy, especially a European policy authorizing acts against outsiders that one wishes to discourage among insiders.

Perhaps enough has been said to suggest the possibility that Hager's attempt to draw a border-line between 'different socio-economic systems' is unhelpful and unsuccessful rationalization. If so, it is unneccessary to dwell on Hager's third criterion of difference, that of subsidization, which does indeed raise issues of substance and difficulty, not appropriately treated in abbreviated fashion. Nevertheless, it is important to note that Hager's implicit and erroneous equation of 'free trade conditions' (p. 423) and 'unconditional open market policy' (p. 425) with GATT rules suggests that he may be misinformed about these and certainly raises the risk that his readers will be misled. The GATT does offer means of dealing with sudden surges of imports that threaten import-competing industries: it does allow countervailing duties to offset the effects of subsidies.[9] That these instruments could be reformed with benefit is certainly a tenable position. Hager, however, seems to suggest that they offer no protection at all, and if this interpretation of him is correct, his position is so extreme as to be eccentric. It would be interesting to see him try to argue it.

One more point of possible misunderstanding should be touched upon before leaving the issues raised by Hager's attempt to define different socio-economic systems. On page 419, speaking of Japan and the NICs, Hager comments that '. . . the extent of the problem is not adequately measured by the usual statistics on import shares from certain sources'. Readers without the trade statistics at their finger tips might miss the full significance of what Hager is saying (or, to be more precise, not saying).

In 1980, imports from Japan into EEC countries represented 2·4 per cent of their overall imports.[10] For the Community as a whole, imports in 1980 were 25 per cent of GDP.[11] Hence imports from Japan were about 0·6 per cent of Community GDP.

In 1979, imports of manufactures from the four Asian NICs that attract most of Hager's attention (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore) were $9 billion,[12] about three-quarters of the level of imports from Japan. Between them, therefore, Japan and these four NICs sent to the EEC goods with a value of the order of 1 per cent of Community GDP.

Even if these countries imported nothing at all from the Community (which of course they do, though the Community is in substantial deficit with them),[13] it would on the face of it be absurd to hold trade with them responsible for any major

9. The relevant GATT Articles are XIX (emergency protection against sudden surges of imports) and VI (anti-dumping and countervailing duties). The *Agreement on Interpretation* negotiated during the Tokyo Round NTN is also relevant.

10. Wolfgang Hager and Robert Taylor, *EEC Protectionism: Present Practice and Future Trends, Vol. II* (Brussels: European Research Associates, 1982) p. 41.

11. Ibid., p. 237.

12. Ibid., p. 171.

13. Note, however, Hager's treatment of the much larger deficit with the United States (pp. 413–14, 415) as compared with his treatment of Japan and the NICs.

part of the Community's current problems. To hold that a more rigid control of trade with them will enable the Community to evade its difficulties appears not only absurd but irresponsibly escapist. It is this appearance that Hager is trying to avoid when he comments that import shares do not adequately measure the problem.

But the reasons given for omitting to present them are not convincing. 'First' says Hager 'for a heavy exporter like the European Community, it is the world market situation that matters. By 1980 Japan and the NICs together accounted for about 20 per cent of world manufactured exports' (p. 419). What someone else's market share demonstrates, however, Hager does not say. If other countries grow more rapidly than those of the European Community, they are likely to have a more rapidly growing share of world exports. This is quite consistent with a rapid increase in the level of European exports: Europe is not *ipso facto* threatened. (In fact, the share of European Community countries in world exports rose from 31 per cent in 1958 to 35·6 per cent in 1979[14]). In any event, how will protection of the European market help Europe's world market situation? This is another of those many cases where Hager presumably believes that there is some causal connection, but does not say what it is. As a result, what he says has no bearing on the point at issue.

His second defence of his omission is that '. . . new competitors, naturally enough, capture markets by price competition, something which goes right against the grain of modern capitalism . . .' (pp. 419–20). I think it must be said that there is a good deal of evidence that old-fashioned capitalists were not very much in favour of price competition either; but presumably what Hager wants to say is that *capitalism* cannot function effectively when price competition is present. It is typical of his approach to evidence that he adduces only one piece of it in support of this proposition. This is a quotation from a publication of the United States Department of Commerce—that well-known source of authoritative revelation about the inner nature and needs of capitalism (as opposed to capitalists)—on the textile problem.[15]

I yield to no-one in my respect for the United States Department of Commerce. Nevertheless, I remain wedded to the view that if someone is telling me that an exporter is through his activities calling '. . . into question the Western world as we know it' (p. 413) or demanding '. . . a profound adjustment in the organisation of our economies and societies' (p. 423), it is really quite useful to know that his exports are around 2·4 per cent of total imports.

Hager on international economics

I shall be brief on this subject. To discuss properly the third in the list of propositions that I attributed to Hager (that more protection would be good for Europe) inevitably involves some minimum of technical economic analysis. This may be of less interest to the non-specialist than other aspects of Hager's argument: on the other hand, Hager has nothing to say that will interest specialists.

14. Hager and Taylor, op. cit., p. 211.

15. Hager's fn. 12 claims that this work is called *Textile Outlook for the Sixties* and that it was published in 1969. Possibly to publish at that date a work of that title was the Department's contribution to the elimination of that uncertainty that Hager goes on to tell us is so debilitating for capitalism (as opposed to capitalists).

Indeed, on the central issue of whether and by what means more protection will make Europe better off, he has nothing to say to anybody. He simply assumes that it will, as though it is non-controversial.

Possibly he thinks that a series of hostile comments on the economic theory of comparative cost and what he takes to be its assumptions and conclusions will act as a substitute for the theory or evidence he needs to make such a proposition. But (stated so baldly) it is obvious that this is not so: destruction of the logic of a theory (even when achieved) cannot demonstrate that the opposite of its conclusion is true.

The most likely explanation for this omission, however, is that Hager thinks that it is possible to generalize from what protection can achieve for a single industry to what protection of many industries can achieve for the economy as a whole. Protection of a single industry undoubtedly can increase the output of that industry beyond what it would otherwise have been. It does *not* follow that protection of many industries will expand output in the economy as a whole (or even of each one of the protected industries).

Hager also wants to generalize from the position of a particular industry to the position of European industry as a whole. His Table 1 (p. 422), for example, gives figures (supplied by the German textile and garment union and not, as Hager says (p. 421), entirely reliable) which show that while the productivity of Hong Kong textile workers is 90 per cent of the German level, their total wage cost is only 19·4 per cent of the German level. That this is the state of the textile industry is of course common ground to protectionists and to those who advocate a more liberal trade regime, and has been for years: the controversy is about what ought to be done, given this situation.

Hager appears to want to argue, however, that this kind of disproportion holds true across the board: 'There is no doubt that most consumer items can be, or shortly will be, more cheaply produced somewhere else' than Europe (p. 419). The evidence provided for this ambiguous statement,[16] however, hardly matches its scope: a quotation from an OECD report on the omnipresence of developing country competition in 2-digit divisions (which are very broad classifications of goods such as for example, 'transportation equipment') and the implicit suggestion that we can generalize from the textile industry.[17]

Even if the textile industry had, all of a sudden, become a typical industry in this sense, Hager says nothing that establishes that Europe would gain from protection. Protection is, after all, a tax on one group of citizens for the benefit of another. One might approve the choice of beneficiaries (and at the same time doubt that protection is the best way of helping them): but how will protection make Europeans as a whole better off? Rather than guess what Hager would have said

16. The ambiguity lies in whether Hager is talking of relative or absolute costs. His article contains evidence to support either interpretation. This is an egregious confusion.

17. His ground for this belief appears in large part to be that there is a great deal of labour in the Third World and that the '. . . marginal price of labour will remain close to subsistence level' (p. 421). This is regrettably likely to be correct. However, not much can be inferred from it alone. High wage workers successfully compete with low wage workers all the time. High wage Germany and Sweden sell manufactured goods to low wage countries and out-compete lower wage countries such as the UK (in motor cars and steel for example). The US sells textiles to Asia. The Indian motor-car industry survives only through the imposition of enormous duties. It does not threaten those of Europe, the United States or Japan.

had he attempted to establish such a proposition, I shall simply state what I take to be three relevant results of elementary economic analysis. They are:

(1) that unless a country has some monopoly power in international trade, the welfare of its residents will fall as a result of increased protection;

(2) that when the exchange rate is floating, an increase in protection will not increase aggregate employment (that is, that increases in the output of protected industries will be offset by contractions in output of others, especially export industries); and that

(3) when the exchange rate is fixed, an increase in protection may make possible an increase in employment but that this course will be inferior in welfare terms to devaluation (subject to the exception involved in (1)).[18]

I do not want to suggest that any sane man must accept the truth of these: on the contrary, sane men who well understand the relevant conditions and process of logic from which they stem argue about them all the time. I do want to suggest that they constitute a difficulty for Hager's argument. He may, for example, wish to argue that the European Community has some monopoly power in international trade, though this course seems closed to him by that large part of his article devoted to the proposition that Europe has lost a monopoly power it once had. Or he may believe that real wages in Europe will not adjust downwards: although to move from that Cambridge Economic Policy Group proposition to the tariff policies that they advocate requires additional assumptions that he seems to abandon in his comments on the way in which European unions and firms exploited their 'collective monopoly power'.

Indeed, it is not clear what argument he can use to support the proposition that the welfare of Europeans will be improved by tariff protection that is consistent with his arguments on other points. It is not even clear from his article that he recognizes that there is a problem that his argument must meet.

Concluding comments

Hager scolds (e.g. p. 427) the government of the Federal Republic of Germany for its relative liberalism in trade matters. Might he persuade it to think otherwise?

He will not do so by the intellectual force of his argument. This is inadequate by almost any standard: mis-describing the current situation; providing no reason to suppose that his suggested policy will achieve either its political or its economic goals; ignoring relevant professional literature; even failing to generate criteria that he can himself consistently apply (as in the case of Hong Kong). But issues of trade policy are not invariably settled in terms of intellectual merit, and Hager, by appearing to lend some authority to the myth that what is good for the European textile industry is good for Europe, will add to the force of protectionist pleading.

One must hope nevertheless that the German government will stand firm. Incentives to intra-Community protectionism are endemic in a situation in which the governments of the member states seek re-election and look for means of providing favours for their constituents. So long as this remains true the only

18. On (1) and its conditions see, for example, W. M. Corden, *Trade Policy and Economic Welfare* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974). On (2) and (3), see, for example, Robert Mundell, 'Flexible Exchange Rates and Employment Policy', *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, November, 1961 and E. Tower, 'Commercial Policy under Fixed and Flexible Exchange Rates', *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, August 1973.

sensible course of action is patient application of existing Community law and well-founded attempts to widen its scope.

Hager may be right in saying that the European Community will cease to exist as a result of internal protectionism, but I do not think so. In any event, it is not evident that preservation of the Community on Hager's terms is worth the candle. What a sour and introverted creature that would be! Hager's policies will not yield, as he would have it, an easy-going, decent and pluralist society; they would drive us instead towards the Europe of stone-throwing demonstrations in the streets of Brussels, of deals patched together after all-night sittings, and of overturned trucks of Italian wine and Spanish fruit.

Philip Noel-Baker: A Tribute*

Philip Noel-Baker's death has brought an end to a life of unrivalled dedication to the cause of disarmament and peace. From the Peace Conference in 1919 to the day of his death 63 years later, he worked tirelessly for general and complete disarmament. There were those who considered that his objective was unrealistic but Philip never lowered his sights for he profoundly believed that general and complete disarmament was a prerequisite to world peace and that anything less would be an unacceptable compromise. Unless the world leaders addressed themselves urgently to reaching agreement on a comprehensive programme of disarmament, nuclear annihilation of our planet would come increasingly closer; and he saw little sign of urgency in the policies and negotiations of the nuclear powers.

His great hero was Lord Robert Cecil, the outstanding figure of the early disarmament conferences following The First World War. As a working colleague and close friend, Philip credited Cecil as being the source of the inspiration and resolve which motivated him throughout his life. His staunch belief in the League of Nations stemmed from the days they worked together in the League and was later to be reflected in his support of the United Nations. Philip made his contribution to the birth of both. He never faltered in his adherence to the UN Charter as the only recipe for peace. His last two years were spent in campaigning for the success of last summer's UN Second Special Session on Disarmament which he saw as a watershed in the fight for disarmament. As joint chairman, with Lord (Fenner) Brockway, of the World Disarmament Campaign, he travelled the world calling for a total commitment to make the Session a real stepping stone to disarmament. Whether in Japan on Hiroshima Day, in Canada, or in the Soviet Union where I accompanied him in December 1981; whether he was speaking to sixth formers, small town audiences or big rallies, in Parliament or to the UN General Assembly, to a PUGWASH conference or the Scientific Council of the Soviet Union, he was accorded the same deep respect and attention. He had an abiding affection for young people which was widely reciprocated. In his latter years he must have carried his message of disarmament personally to millions of people across the world. I doubt if any other man before or after him would achieve as much. Of the many speeches I heard him give the most memorable was the intervention he made in the UN General Assembly during its Special Session last summer—the last time he was to address an international audience. Speaking without a note with his usual eloquence and clarity of purpose, he pleaded for a stronger and more effective United Nations and for urgency in halting the arms race and beginning the process of disarmament. Even those who had heard him speak many times before were on their feet applauding with the rest.

Philip's concern that the United Nations should exert a stronger influence on the conduct of international affairs was bred of his firm belief that it has the real potential and capacity for resolving conflict and eliminating poverty and disease in the poor countries of the South. He shared the view that the 'small wars' of the Third World were a threat to world security and stability and that the UN, through its peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding, could provide a vital contribution to the peaceful settlement of disputes. The recipient of many honours and decorations, including the Nobel Peace Prize, Philip cherished more highly than most the UN Peace Medal awarded to him by Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim.

With Philip Noel-Baker's death a light may have gone out, but the memory of the flame that burned in him will endure. I for one will remember with pride that I lived in his time. It is good to know that many of his papers are already deposited in Churchill College, Cambridge where they are being indexed. His more recent papers, including speeches and a manuscript of a book, are shortly to be edited. When all the work is completed, Lord Noel-Baker's papers will form a unique library of resource material from which future generations of students of international relations will be able to benefit. For the rest, the best

* Lord Noel-Baker PC, a President of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Winner (1959) Nobel Peace Prize and Olympic Silver Medallist, died in London on 8 October 1982 at the age of 92.

tribute we can pay him is to continue to foster his unquenchable belief in peace through disarmament.

Philip always insisted that the Disarmament conference of 1932 was at the point of breakthrough, with the nations within a hair's breadth of agreeing a structure for disarmament, only to be thwarted by the insistence of Britain's military leaders to retain a firepower capacity above the levels agreed by other states. Fifty years later, the member states of that conference are still playing the numbers game; but this time it is not just their individual survival which is at stake. It is the survival of the whole world which is threatened.

Michael Harbottle

Book reviews

Chatham House Books

The Soviet Union in the Middle East: Policies and Perspectives. Edited by Adeed Dawisha and Karen Dawisha. London: Heinemann for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1982. 172 pp. Index. Pb.: £5·50.

THE Dawishas had a hard act to follow. Their edited book is the second in a series resulting from study groups on Soviet foreign policy organized by the Royal Institute of International Affairs. The first book, *Soviet-East European Dilemmas* (edited by Karen Dawisha and Philip Hanson) was a striking success in articulating a sophisticated view of the dilemmas of diversity faced by the Soviet Union in Eastern Europe. The book under review takes the analysis to the Soviet Union's southern flank and assess Moscow's aims and actions as well as 'the response of indigenous states to Soviet overtures and activities' (p. 2). The result is equally as impressive as its predecessor.

What makes the Dawishas' book work so well is its coherence of contributions on main themes. Success is in large measure due to the presence of two major threads woven throughout the text, which no doubt resulted from study group discussions. The first thread is the refusal to take 'the Soviet threat' as the starting point (p. 6). Rather, the authors emphasize the predicaments of power faced by the Soviet Union in the Middle East, and thus they question Moscow's 'ability to translate power into control' (p. 7). The second and connected theme is the emphasis on the attitude of local states to the Soviet Union. Almost all the chapters make it plain that the main determinant of international relations in the Middle East is to be sought in the objectives and actions of local, rather than super powers. As Adeed Dawisha trenchantly points out, this local diversity accounts for why 'Moscow's footprints implanted on many and various parts of the region in the 1950s and 1960s, had disappeared by the 1980s in the treacherous quicksand of Arab politics' (p. 22).

To a certain extent there is inevitably unevenness in an edited book. The better chapters are those which clearly emphasize the two main themes. Apart from the editors' own contributions, four other chapters are especially impressive. Malcolm Yapp is often ruthless in demolishing myths about Soviet motives in the northern tier. On the other hand, Edwina Moreton gracefully undermines the simple proxy thesis of Cuban and East German involvement in the area. Anthony Stacpoole is thankfully clear about the notoriously complex issue of Soviet energy policy, and Jonathan Alford is equally succinct about the frequently overstated military dimension of superpower rivalry in the Middle East.

Perhaps the most persuasive evidence for the accuracy and perceptiveness of the Dawishas' book is its relevance to contemporary conflict. As the Polish crisis validated the analysis of the first study group book, so the current crises in the Lebanon and between Iran and Iraq validate the Dawishas' book. The inability of the Soviet Union to cope with, let alone manipulate either event, only attests to the relevance of the twin themes of superpower predicaments and predominance of local issues. The Dawishas have clearly met the challenge set by the first book from the Chatham House study group, and consequently have set an admirable target for future volumes in the series.

University of Leicester GERALD SEGAL

International Relations and Organizations

The Foreign Policy Process: A Modern Primer. By Lincoln P. Bloomfield. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall. 1982. 236 pp. Index. £7·45.

Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World. By K. J. Holsti *et al.* London: Allen and Unwin. 1982. 225 pp. Index. £18·00.

FOREIGN policy analysis has been in the doldrums for quite some time. Pre-theories which were heralded with much interest some years ago never really developed beyond that point.

As such, they provided frameworks which scholars loosely used, failed to 'fill in', or else eventually dismissed for a variety of reasons as unworkable. Two further developments served to pull the field of foreign policy analysis away from earlier aspirations. The first was an ever-increasing interest in the concept of interdependence (the term eventually entered into diplomatic language), which was fashionable throughout most of the 1970s but has since been challenged. Secondly, there were those who sought refuge in a somewhat earlier perspective—the search for 'global patterns' in a world society. The former, interdependence, serves as a link between these two books.

Although primarily concerned with policy making in the United States, *The Foreign Policy Process: A Modern Primer* reflects the rather loosely formulated interdependence ethos of the 1970s built around welfare, the environment and trade. These Professor Bloomfield sees as constituting one of the two broad blocks of foreign policy activity, the other being traditional political-military questions. In its objective of understanding of how foreign policy is made, admittedly from an American perspective, the book succeeds in capturing the flavour and nature of the process very well. Students should certainly start with, and derive especial benefit from, chapters 3 and 4. It is a pity that theoretical considerations relating to decision-making receive very little attention, given the author's considerable recent experience in government as well as academic life.

The starting point for *Why Nations Realign* is an interest in foreign policy change and a dissatisfaction with models of 'a global village', 'cobwebs' and interdependence. The concern of this book is with a type of foreign policy behaviour in which governments seek to change, usually simultaneously, the total pattern of their external relations. The focus, therefore, is not so much on normal foreign policy change, which tends to be slow and incremental and has a low linkage between issues, but on that which is fundamental and non-incremental in nature. The six states under examination range from Bhutan through Burma, Canada and China. In many ways this book represents an acknowledgement of the need to work within an appropriate and manageable analytical framework. This in fact is carefully set out in the introduction, and its application is reviewed in the final chapter. There are, of course, the kinds of difficulties one might expect, connected with determining the commencement and ending of foreign policy restructuring, and the inevitable questions connected with explanation and how to give weight to different influences. Nevertheless, this book is an interesting contribution and it is to be hoped that the framework is applied to other cases.

University of Lancaster R. P. Barston

L'Historien et les Relations Internationales: Recueil d'études en hommage à Jacques Freymond. Textes réunis par Saul Friedländer, Harish Kapur, André Reszler. Geneva: Institut universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales. 1981. 521 pp. Sw. frs. 60.00.

Like most such collections, this volume of essays (twenty-five in French, six in English, one in German) commemorating the seventieth birthday of the Swiss scholar, Jacques Freymond, embraces a wide range of topics. In this case it is perhaps appropriate, for Freymond himself has written on an extraordinary variety of subjects, as the useful fifteen-page bibliography of his writings testifies. Moreover, the brief chronology provided by the editors reveals the considerable experience of practical affairs which enriches his scholarship. He is best known as the director and guiding spirit of the *Institut universitaire de Hautes Études Internationales* in Geneva from 1955 to 1978, but his varied career also includes the higher echelons of the Swiss army, local government, and most notably the International Committee of the Red Cross, for which he undertook several delicate missions.

The theme of the collection—the historian and international relations—was also suggested by Freymond's fruitful criss-crossing of disciplinary boundaries. Several essays in the first part, which is the one most explicitly devoted to this theme, reflect recent methodological debates among French historians. These include suggestive explorations by Jean-Pierre Aguet, Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Gilbert Etienne, Saul Friedländer, Miklos Molnar and others of such concepts as '*la longue durée*', '*l'histoire événementielle*' and '*la mentalité collective*'. Other influences are also evident, e.g. game theory in Urs Luterbacher's difficult analysis of

the US-USSR-PRC triangle, and Marxism in Thierry Hentsch's advocacy of a critical study of world society. There are also brief but stimulating essays by Louis J. Halle, Kenneth W. Thompson, Bertrand de Jouvenal and Denis de Rougement on topics which have long interested them.

What emerges from this section is the value of broadly conceived political history for the understanding of international relations. This involves going beyond the 'official mind' to the symbols, perceptions and myths which dominate the public consciousness, e.g. significant dates and places, or the myths of nationalism, imperialism, race and the universal state sketched all too briefly by André Reszler. The fifteen historical studies in the second part, mainly confined to twentieth-century European history, and the four papers on contemporary problems in the final section, support this general conclusion.

The book, which is attractively printed and bound, is a fitting tribute to a distinguished scholar.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth M. Wright

Managing the Risks of International Agreements. By Richard B. Bilder. Madison, Wisc., London: University of Wisconsin Press. 1981. 302 pp. Index. $22.50.

The basic premise of this very informative book is that states (annoyingly called nations) have to cooperate, whatever the presumptions of the *realpolitik* camp. For as long as the state system lasts, agreements will be the commonest manifestation of this need. But they involve uncertainty and risk—'an inevitable aspect of life and social interaction' (p. 11). *Ergo*, cooperation is increased if risks are minimized. But how? There are irreconcilable tensions between the desire for flexibility and freedom of choice by states which can result in imperfect compromises. The purpose of the book is both to catalogue the methods and means by which risks can be managed and progress made and, in so doing, relate theories of international cooperation to diplomatic and political realities. The attempt at *praxis* is, however, limited. Not only does it make clear that, of necessity, individual negotiations and issues need tailor-made risk-management techniques, but there is virtually no mention of theories of international cooperation although, since the author is an international lawyer, legal references and analogies abound. Nonetheless, it is worthy of attention not only by practitioners of world affairs, to which it is primarily addressed, but also by those who hope for a better world.

The differences between the approach to negotiations of political leaders and that of lawyers are analysed clearly and succinctly. But what of the situation after the ink is dry? What of non-performance? Bilder concludes that 'in general, nations seem more likely to be worried that they will themselves be rigidly bound to an agreement, without any possibility of escape, than that their treaty partner might somehow escape' (p. 199). While bureaucrats and their political masters might privately agree, if only because of post-signature inertia, lawyers and other politicians might not.

The catalogue of risk-management techniques is as nearly exhaustive as possible. Several are suggestive, drawn from other areas of human interaction. One such is 'hedging' techniques, as used extensively by commodity dealers. But there are major assumptions. A crucial one is that states are unitary actors with an agreed foreign policy position. The US experience with SALT II is therefore explained in terms of the perception of potential benefits being less than perceived potential costs. Another is that states will be 'rational', carefully assessing gains and losses. But both Iran and Libya could be acting 'rationally' in their own estimation.

There is surprisingly little in the book on the role of benefits and costs of cooperation in negotiation: one must assume that they are subsumed under 'risks'. However, the importance of trust is highlighted and the particular contribution of the book to international relations literature is the detailing, with many examples, of types of agreement which can develop in its absence. They can, for instance, be non-binding or tacit, have clear withdrawal provisions or involve careful step-by-step procedures and order of performance.

In short, this work is both a framework of analysis for further research and an admirable attempt to bridge the gap between academic abstraction and policy-making. But will the secrets of the negotiating chamber ever be fully revealed? Secrecy, bureacratic complexity, diplomatic reticence and difficulty in articulating how decisions were reached pose obvious

problems for the analyst. But, at the very least, this book will inform the practitioners what, in outline, is possible once they are in the chamber.

North Staffordshire Polytechnic TONY THORNDIKE

Non-Governmental Organizations at the United Nations: Identity, Role and Function. By Pei-Heng Chiang. New York: Praeger. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 355pp. Index.

DESPITE the increase in the number, size and range of activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), particularly in the last ten to twenty years, they have received very little attention in the study of international relations. The exception is a number of works on multinational corporations, but in the world of diplomacy these do not count as NGOs. *Transnational Associations*, a house journal of the Union of International Associations, is published in Brussels, but is only taken in Britain by two universities, three science libraries and Chatham House. So this book is both welcome and useful.

Dr Chiang has produced a well written and thoroughly researched historical account of the consultative arrangements between NGOs and the Economic and Social Council. The core of the book is on the early fight of the NGOs, led by the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), for as wide a range of privileges as possible; how the procedures became institutionalized in 1950 and how they survived a challenge mounted against them in 1967–8. It makes interesting reading to find that in the early days the claims of the WFTU and other NGOs were supported by the Soviet Union against British and American opposition and that the only NGOs to have been deprived of consultative status were expelled because of American objections to 'propaganda' in complaints to the Commission on Human Rights. By the 1960s the positions of the governments were reversed, so that the revelation in 1967 that the CIA had been channelling funds to NGOs was seized upon by Soviet and Third World delegates to insist upon a complete review of the consultative arrangements. Chiang shows how the NGOs emerged from this review with no expulsions and the basic arrangements confirmed, largely because some of the Third World delegates came to appreciate the value for them of the work of the NGOs. In the end Waldron-Ramsey of Tanzania 'apologised to the council for having initiated the review in the first place' (p. 184).

Chiang comments that there is much dissatisfaction with the amount of 'time and energy . . . consumed by the need to satisfy administrative and procedural requirements' (p. 244). This would be the main criticism of his book as well. There are no statistics on what proportion of the NGOs have representatives in New York or how often and on what subjects the rights to put items on ECOSOC's agenda, to speak and to circulate documents have been exercised. Indeed, it would be worth asking whether the Article 71 arrangements now have their prime importance in the legitimation they give to NGO involvement in other parts of the UN system: lobbying in General Assembly and Security Council subsidiary bodies, at the major ad hoc conferences and within the Secretariat. Chiang is not alone in emphasizing the public procedures. He quotes an NGO representative as complaining 'most of the time their participation is ignored', then continuing in a truly amazing manner 'their proposals (are) incorporated in official texts without mention of origin' (p. 235). Most lobbyists would be happy to be 'ignored' in such fashion! Elsewhere Chiang mentions in passing that 'General Assembly resolutions were drafted by NGO representatives for government delegates' (p. 222). One would like to know how such successes are achieved.

Chiang sees dangers of a global 'brave new world' emerging if NGOs succcumb to these pressures. He is surely grossly exaggerating such dangers. The NGOs need not and do not all have to relate to the UN in the same way. Some can find benefits in becoming 'insiders' while others will determinedly remain critics, and each type may find its position strengthened by the existence of the other.

City University, London PETER WILLETTS

Defence and Disarmament

The Arms Race and Arms Control. London: Taylor & Francis for SIPRI. 1982. 242 pp. Index. Pb.: £3·95.

Debate on Disarmament. Edited by Michael Clarke and Marjorie Mowlam. London, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1982. 143 pp. Index. Pb.: £3·95.

Arms Control and Peacekeeping: Feeling Safe in this World. By Ralph M. Goldman. New York: Random House. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Transatlantic.) 301 pp. Index. Pb: £6·45.

THE significance of the issues which are encompassed by the portmanteau term 'arms control and disarmament' partly explains, though it does not wholly excuse, the difficult way in which much of the analysis and argument about them is so often presented. The complexity of the issues is a contributing factor, of course, and there is no getting away from the difficulty of nicely mixing general principles with a wealth of detail. The mix however makes the difference, and a principle can become an assertion in the same easy way that detail can become an incubus.

It is nice to be able to report, therefore, that this SIPRI publication is a selection of material from the 1982 Yearbook which represents many of the strengths of the Institute's activities; it was produced as a special review in advance of the UN Second Special Session on Disarmament, but it has the advantage of presenting a wide range of information and argument in a readily available fashion at reasonable length and at a reasonable price. The introduction, by Director Blackaby, reflects the purpose attributed to the enterprise, and treads the tightrope between concern and remaining a 'neutral, unbiased source of information' (page v) with reasonable skill and vigour.

Vigour is also very evident in *Debate on Disarmament*, which emanates from a course of 'alternative' lectures at the University of Newcastle. The introduction by Michael Clarke and Marjorie Mowlam is essentially an introduction to the Peace Movement as well as to the volume, and is lively stuff, in which only two points ring hollow. Table 1 on page 15 attributes numbers to the size of disarmament demonstrations between October and December 1981, and looks a bit spurious to me. I have seen other estimates for most of these gatherings: it is, anyway, intrinsically difficult to assess whether 450,000 or 500,000 (or 200,000) people are assembled, but—I think this is a crucial point— the specifics are not fundamental to the argument. What is incontestable, and can be reasonably asserted, is the much wider range of interest and active support the movement has attracted. The second point is the assertion that it was the BBC's invitation to Professor Martin to give the Reith lectures that created the opportunity for the lectures and, subsequently, this book. This is linked to the E. P. Thompson/Michael Pentz clashes with the BBC; the lectures 'assert and demonstrate that within the universities there is a second voice distinct from that of the Government and media establishment' (p. 28). I think this is over-egged, too. The Reith lectures may have offered the opportunity to make a splash, but I would be sorry to think that the organisers had no other case than to launch a counter-value response. Of the contributions themselves, that by Mary Kaldor is well presented, though it has a rather wet conclusion and an untypical error of detail about Admiral Rickover being Chief of Naval Staff: John Robinson and Jonathan Dimbleby produce thoughtful, critical arguments of considerable interest. Michael Pentz sidesteps some awkward issues, while providing some useful information, and E. P. Thompson does a knockabout turn which had more relevance to the Newcastle *locale* than to the seriousness of the arguments which he slips in now and again. In this piece, he is in some danger of creating a Billy Connolly image, which would do him less than full justice. I thought the collection was rather uneven and evangelist; but it was produced very quickly and therefore has a freshness, vis-à-vis the Reith lectures, that shows that at least one publisher has a sense of the market.

Professor Goldman's book is a survey which clearly derives from a university course. It contains an enormous amount of information, simply and sometimes rather broadly laid out. A history of warfare in fifteen pages is no mean feat, even if some of the material is ethnocentrically limited in its selection. The meat of the book however contains lots of interesting material on insecurity, distrust and peace-keeping experiences to chew over; and there are extensive bibliographical and factual appendices. It looks to me as if the Arms

Control and Peacekeeping course at San Francisco State would be fun to take: even if it left one slightly more optimistic than any comparable European university course might do.

However, what the books have—for the most part—in common is a concern to explain, clearly if not always fully, and to diminish the proportions of quasi-theological complexity and apparently significant data in favour of argument. They do not go so far as Robin Ranger might wish in distinguishing between the political and the technical perspectives of arms control and disarmament; but that distinction is particularly difficult to make at the broad level of informing a general audience, if at no other, and each of these books has, in its individual way, helped to explain why the issues are of legitimate and extensive concern.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

Arms Control II: A New Approach to International Security. Edited by John H. Barton and Ryukichi Imai. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain. 1981. 328 pp. £21·25.

THIS book is both depressing and frustrating: depressing because its central theme is that 'traditional' methods of arms limitation have failed; frustrating because the alternatives to them appear to lack unity and coherence. There can be little doubt, however, that it is an important contribution to an ongoing debate. In order to appreciate the full implications of this collection of essays, it is necessary to compare them with the earlier Stanford volume, *International Arms Control: Issues and Agreements*, edited by J. H. Barton and L. O. Weiler (1976). This concentrated on arms control as a superpower activity, in which idealistic popular pressures for disarmament were linked to realistic bureaucratic calculations for sustaining national security at minimum cost. The new volume is based on the assumption that the superpower relationship is of declining importance in world politics, and the centre of gravity in international affairs is shifting to the Third World. Given this framework, SALT or START talks appear increasingly irrelevant to future international political developments which are going to be governed by considerations of regional security.

Arms Control II is an attempt to explore the nature of arms limitations in such a regional context, in this case South-east Asia, using a team of American and Japanese scholars. The first six chapters review past attempts at arms control, discuss its relationship with political stability, and examine the political, economic and technological dimensions of both sets of concerns. The theme which emerges is that regional stability appears to have been little affected by past efforts at arms control. If future arms control activities are to concentrate in this area, then they will frequently not be recognizable as such: rather they will be seen in unilateral national attempts at restraint in arms procurement, regulation of trade and technology transfers and very subtle attempts at political manipulation, coupled with what are now known as Confidence Building Measures. Processes of control will be informal and implicit, rather than via conference diplomacy and explicit treaties. Much attention is focused on the difficulties of distinguishing between civil and military technology transfers, and the problems of exercising any form of regulation over the arms trade. The reader is left with the impression that the new form of arms control will dissolve into its context, and will both revolve around intangible and relative concepts such as security and reciprocity, and lack any clear connection with processes of disarmament.

The remaining chapters of the book comprise a series of case studies, in which varied attempts are made to evaluate the importance of these ideas to the situations in Korea, Taiwan, Japan, China and the United States. They are of value in their own right, but also serve to reinforce the impression that in this new conception, traditional ideas of arms control appear to have ceased to exist, and what are really being proposed are measures to maintain regional order in a static world.

This book deserves to be widely read and considered, for it challenges the orthodoxy of arms control in a scholarly and convincing manner. Above all, it highlights a central dilemma that has been posed for arms controllers, namely, whether to abandon the old links between these activities and General and Complete Disarmament, links which have slowly atrophied since the early 1960s despite considerable public support for such an objective, and instead, regard the aims of these regulatory activities as the maintenance of order and the status quo on a regional basis. Yet the 'crisis of arms control' identified by the book appears to be mis-stated, for it rests on a belief that similar arms control regimes are applicable to all regions. If it were accepted that the type of arms control activities relevant to Europe and

US—USSR relations may not be relevant in other areas, then the effect of this volume is to expand the scope of such regulation, without replacing one variant with another.

All in all, a very stimulating book.

University of Southampton JOHN SIMPSON

Ground Rules: Soviet and American Involvement in Regional Conflicts. By Joanne Gowa and Nils H. Wessell. Philadelphia: Foreign Policy Research Institute. 1982. 104pp. $3.95.

THIS short book is long overdue. The crisis over Afghanistan at least should have convinced the world's leaders that some more explicit ground rules of superpower international behaviour were essential, if a catastrophe stemming from misunderstanding were not to occur. In both America and the Soviet Union a clear appreciation of the limits of the other's tolerance is vital. It is not only a matter of recognition of general spheres of influence but of the acceptable limits of action within those spheres.

At this stage in the twentieth century, military tripwires on their own are no adequate protection against the outbreak of armed conflicts which nobody wants. By definition they operate too late in the day to avert confrontation. Joanne Gowa and Nils Wessell insist that 'a genuine commitment to restraint' is the necessary precondition for an effective control procedure. This may seem to some to beg the whole question of the political will for peace and how to generate it. International agreements, even if not enforceable by sanctions, do, however, create some pressure, partly of a moral character, to conform by compliance.

The core of this book consists of case studies of three areas—the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa and Yugoslavia—where acute crises could arise. The choice of countries is deliberately confined to those presumably perceived by the Soviet Union as not lying within its own area of exclusive jurisdiction. The authors also apply another criterion—the level of 'crisis maturation'—in selecting their potential crises, on the basis that early anticipation is essential if ground rules are to work.

In a sense the starting point of the study is encouragement derived from the Helsinki Final Act. The object is to manage potential crises before they actually develop and the authors cite both Cyrus Vance and Leonid Brezhnev as explicitly recognizing the need for ground rules in pronouncements over the last few years. Topics discussed in general include controls on conventional arms transfers and zones of disengagement and limited deployment.

Though the Southern African case is not regarded as particularly promising in this context, there are some interesting, if rather obviously commonsense, suggestions for ground rules in that region. It is, for example, suggested that restraint on American trade with and investment in South Africa should be traded for a limitation on arms and financial aid from the Soviet bloc to the ANC and SWAPO. Attempts should be made, it is argued, to find common rather than conflicting interests in the region, probably at the expense of South Africa. Implicit in a number of suggestions is, however, acceptance by the Soviet Union of linkages between, for instance, arms control negotiations or economic cooperation in Europe and regional intervention.

The overall conclusion is that the more remote in time the potential crisis the better ground rules would function as an early warning system on a step-by-step basis. For this reason Yugoslavia and an extension of the Helsinki approach to confidence building measures are seen to have the most potential.

Sceptics may want to dismiss the book's thesis as idealistic or naive, both of which it in some ways is, but they would do well to ponder whether in the search for an enduring international security, or balance of strategic interests, the world can afford not to undertake a few field trials in the hope of progressively changing the nature of some of the critical problems which it faces, rather than going blindly for unattainable or unacceptable final solutions.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

The Uncertain Ally: British Defence Policy 1960–1990. By Michael Chichester and John Wilkinson. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1982. 246 pp. Index. £15·00.

ONE's interest in this book is kindled before one reads it; in his foreword, Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Neil Cameron declares his disagreement with some of the views of the

authors. They, in their introduction, stress that it was at the printers before John Wilkinson became parliamentary private secretary to Secretary of State for Defence John Nott. One can see the reasons why when one puts the book down. In essence it argues that British defence policy has been overcommitted to the continent, that the Royal Navy has been neglected and the Royal Air Force frustrated, that reserve forces have been undervalued and underemployed and—wait for it—that a government serious about defence ought to reconsider conscription.

The arguments are deployed in an unusual manner. The first third of the book looks back to 1960; somewhat partisan, the authors criticize Tory and Labour ministers alike for regarding as sacrosanct Eden's pledge in 1954 to maintain the then British force levels in Germany. Their reference period means that no mention is made of the Sandys reductions which would have cut BAOR to 45,000 men but for the November 1958 Berlin ultimatum; however, credit should have been given to Callaghan whose efforts to complete the Sandys programme in 1967 were terminated by events in Czechoslovakia in 1968.

The remaining two-thirds is subtitled 'A New Look for the Future'. The style here is more portentous, redolent of WEU documents and Wilkinson's service as rapporteur to one of its Assembly committees, but not calculated to rivet attention. Nonetheless, the arguments emerge, and one begins to appreciate Sir Neil's disclaimers. More reliance on properly organised reserves, yes; but what would his predecessor at King's make of the suggestion to reduce British forces-in-being on the Central front? Yet Chichester and Wilkinson have a good point; the 1954 pledge was primarily political, made at a time when West Germany was unarmed; now and for a long time past there have been twelve German divisions. And yet this is not the only thing which has changed; so also has Warsaw Pact equipment, doctrine and training. This has more bearing on the matter than is allowed here.

One is left with the feeling that the authors' supporting arguments are not always up to the standard of their prescriptions. The case for national specialization within the Atlantic Alliance is a good one and would readily permit the adoption by Britain of a maritime and air strategy. But to assert that the Royal Navy has persistently been shabbily treated is not on. Which brings us back to the authors' introduction: since the book was written, Wilkinson has been taken into Nott's office, Chichester has had to swallow the 1982 defence review, and the Falklands episode has underlined one of their central contentions!

In some respects, then, an exasperating book with signs of being written under pressure, but still worth the attention of the serious student of defence.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

Ethics and Nuclear Deterrence. Edited by Geoffrey Goodwin. London, Canberra: Croom Helm for Council on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament. 1982. 199 pp. Index. £11·95.

THIS collection of essays arose from meetings sponsored by the Council on Christian Approaches to Defence and Disarmament. From the evidence in print, the meetings opposed 'Christian realists' to 'Christian idealists'; mediators were Geoffrey Goodwin and Ronald Hope-Jones, who wrote the first and last chapters respectively.

The Christian realists, notably in this book G.R. Dunstan, argue that there can be no profitable appeal to a specifically Christian treatment of the problem of international security. The great Christian writers on the subject, such as St Ambrose and St Augustine themselves had recourse to Greek philosophy and Roman law in order to give an account of the obligations of politics, and so were part of a wider and richer tradition than just their own religious one. The Christian contribution consisted not in uttering pious maxims to a recalcitrant world, but in seeking to humanize the life of politics above all through influencing the character of Christian people. Christian idealism, in the version represented in this book by Bruce Kent, looks not to humanizing power politics but to transcending it: considers that it might be better for Christians to suffer injustice rather than defend themselves; gives the pursuit of peace priority even over the maintenance of a Christian order.

The debate on the ethics of nuclear deterrence in the book turns on the question of whether a conditional intention to-commit an immoral act, namely, in this context, the mass killing of civilians, is as immorral as the actual commission of that act. Arthur Hockaday (in a learned chapter complete with disputatious footnotes) says no: a conditional intention of this kind is morally acceptable when its principal objective is to see the situation it seeks to

prevent does not actually come about. Barrie Paskins has an acute reply to this line of argument. He says (p. 98) that the distinction between action and intention is intelligible only in retrospect; we may decide to punish attempted murder less severely than its successful completion. In prospect, in the future time to which the conditional intention underpinning nuclear deterrence refers, intention is indistinguishable from action, and so a moral defence cannot be based on any such distinction.

One way of sorting out this disagreement might be to consider, on the one hand, those who argue that nuclear deterrence has worked—that it has prevented open conflict among the nuclear powers—and who find therefore some virtue in it; and, on the other hand, those who are preoccupied with the possibility, or what they might call the probability, of the failure of deterrence, and who therefore call for a new system of managing the relations among the great powers in which the price of breakdown is less than total. This classification will do for the sorting of most of the contributors to this volume, except for Geoffrey Best who does not write about nuclear deterrence, but about humanity in warfare, and Barrie Paskins who thinks that deterrence is stable and robust, but that we should nevertheless move away from it on moral though not especially Christian grounds. The range of attitudes that can be called Christian might depress or encourage the reader according to taste, but this is for the most part an interesting and sometimes a provocative book.

Australian National University, Canberra R. J. VINCENT

Politics, Economics and Social

The Political Economy of Underdevelopment. By Amiya Kumar Bagchi. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1982. 280 pp. Index. £20.00. Pb.: £7·50.

THIS book is the fourth in the Modern Cambridge Economics series—the successor to Keynes' Cambridge Economic Handbooks. The new series is edited by Joan Robinson and Phyllis Deane, who also contributed to two of the previous three volumes in this series. The series is aimed at 'the intelligent undergraduate and interested general reader'. The present book by Professor Bagchi falls well within this definition and represents a good example of current Indian—perhaps more specifically Calcuttan—thinking about development problems. It is written from a broadly radical Marxist or neo-Marxist and (selectively) classical viewpoint, with emphasis on class relations and social structures. Roughly it may be classified as within the 'dependency' literature, although the author prefers the terms exploitation and retardation to dependency. The book is also characterized by a sense of historical analysis with emphasis on pre-capitalist and colonial structures and relationships and also emphasis on non-economic (political, social, anthropological, etc.) relations. The subject is both inequalities between countries and inequalities within developing countries, and the interrelationship between the two. After two more general chapters, there are chapters on Latin America, Asia (with India, Indonesia and China), rural and agrarian problems, fluctuations and instability in developing countries, population growth and a last chapter on 'planning for capitalism in the third world' (based largely on Indian planning experience).

While even the 'marginalist' development student could read this book with profit there is an obvious, at times almost provocative, disregard for marginalist economics. As an example we may quote the footnote on pp. 114–15 where the author argues against the theory that the low wages of labour in plantations are due to the high degree of capital intensity of the process of production: 'The truth is the other way round: it is the forcible cheapening of labour and land that enables the plantation-owner to accumulate capital and adopt capital-intensive techniques'. But it surely remains true that cheap labour will act as a disincentive for the plantation owners to use capital-intensive methods and rather use their high profits for investment elsewhere or distribution to their shareholders. In fact, to accept this 'marginalist' position would have fitted very well into the author's general picture. Eyebrows may also be raised at the author's view in the last chapter on listing food aid and other aid as a cause of the Indian balance of payments crisis up to 1974–75. Also the author's general view about aid—and especially food aid as disincentive to local production—does not sit well with the agricultural progress which India has actually made.

Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex HANS W. SINGER

Authority, Priority and Human Development. By Jyotirindra Das Gupta. New Delhi, London: Oxford University Press. 1982. 118 pp. Index. £5·50.

THE text of this study is almost exactly 100 pages long—a very short space for the consideration of a vast topic. The field is, however, in fact narrower than the title would imply. 'Development' is deliberately confined to rural areas, since this 'affects the largest part of mankind' (p. vii). Implicitly, at least, Professor Gupta's 'authority' and 'priority' are derived from political processes, in contrast to those aid schemes evolved by administrators, foreign or indigenous.

While the strategies and the immediate goals which emerge may appear to fall short of the ideals postulated by administrators and academics, they may well achieve more palpable and positive alleviation of human misery. Cooperation with those running the projects is enhanced, in as much as the 'authority' of their position is more fully accepted; the 'priorities' assigned to different aspects of their tasks are more likely to be in accord with the empirical situation. Castles and others appear to have demonstrated that welfare outcomes differ little regardless of the political complexion of the governments involved. A case study of India, and even slighter ones of Kenya and the Philippines, would appear to reinforce this view; the way in which communist state governments have cooperated with plans made by the Congress and Janata parties in Delhi is significant.

Unfortunately the book is too short to furnish us with the evidence on which Gupta bases his conclusions. We are given no idea of the way in which politics confers authority, or the mechanisms by which priorities are determined. There are no insights into the way in which legislatures or local councils deal with welfare problems, or their relationship with workers in the field. Gupta invites us to take his word for it that 'politics' does matter, but we are given few insights into how or why. There are indications that larger and more detailed works by the same author will emerge in due course. They may well be worth waiting for.

The poor with whom this book is concerned are those for whom agriculture no longer provides full-time employment, if any at all. Such groups are becoming increasingly numerous all over the Third World. The dilemma facing governments is whether these people shall be wage-earners or depend on doles or charity and whether they shall stay in the rural areas or migrate into cities which grow larger day by day. Though Gupta does not mention it, this is why the conditions of the poor must inevitably be a political concern.

This book was printed in India. Even specialist academics find difficult the tortured English beloved of those who, like Gupta, work in American universities. It is not surprising that the Indian compositor should sometimes be defeated by the task of setting up this text. It is to be hoped that Professor Gupta will devote considerable time to correcting the proofs of his future output.

University of Dundee PHILIP WHITAKER

Communist Legislatures in Comparative Perspective. Edited by Daniel Nelson and Stephen White. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press. 1982. 210 pp. Index. $33.50. Pb.: $10.95.

THE aim of the editors of this volume is to re-examine the role of soviets and assemblies in communist countries to see whether they deserve any more attention today than political scientists have been prepared to give them in the past. The book is a symposium, with chapters on the Soviet Union, China, and the communist countries of Eastern Europe, with the exception of Hungary. There is an eleven-page introductory chapter by Daniel Nelson and a brief concluding section by Stephen White.

It must be said that the work exhibits many of the faults to which symposia are so prone. The chapters are of uneven quality and not well coordinated. All except one deal with legislatures at national level; the exception—the chapter on Romania—deals predominantly with the regional level, which raises a rather different set of questions. Some of the chapters are already familiar from their authors' earlier work, whilst the selection of countries covered is unfortunately disparate and raises substantive problems which will be referred to below. That said, there is a great deal of information in the book, and the facts and figures presented

in each chapter, except for a weak chapter on Czechoslovakia, will make it a very handy work of reference.

Necessarily, the discussion turns on whether or not communist legislatures are still open to the charge of being no more than 'rubber stamps'. No author suggests that the traditional view be radically revised, but most call for a moderate reassessment. Nelson, in his lead article (supported by White and others in their respective chapters), holds that whilst these formally representative bodies still do not provide credible links of accountability between government and the governed, their role within the political system is nevertheless tending to grow. Most authors refer to the increasing amount of business conducted by standing committees as the most significant evidence of change.

The editors might perhaps have been better advised to limit the discussion to Eastern Europe, where economic and cultural development has offered new possibilities to institutions which at a less sophisticated stage functioned simply as 'schools of government' and as administrative arms of a centralized state. If, within that scope, they had dealt with representative institutions both at central and at local level, the result would have been a much tighter work, with a single coherent perspective. But bringing in China leads the reader to wonder about all the other communist countries, and the fact that the chapter on China is both informative and lively only reinforces the sense of a void beyond an open door. On no one dimension is the perspective truly comparative. We are given some useful information, but we are not really given what the book's title promises.

University of Manchester MICHAEL WALLER

Environment and Trade: the Relation of International Trade and Environmental Policy. Edited by Seymour J. Rubin and Thomas R. Graham. London: Pinter; Totowa, N.J.: Allanheld, Osmun for The American Society of International Law. 1982. 208 pp. Index. £16·95.

As tariffs fall, non-tariff barriers loom larger. Often introduced for reasons which have nothing to do with international trade, they may yet impair or even nullify trade concessions. Of increasing importance amongst such barriers are environmental measures. Inevitably they affect costs of production and/or consumption and, therefore, the international location of industries and trade flows. When firms are forced to produce in ways which reduce or eliminate environmental damage, their costs rise and their country's trade balance is adversely affected. Should those firms bear the burden on the Polluter Pays Principle or should government compensate them for costs incurred on behalf of society? If the latter, the firms' contribution to the trade balance may be safeguarded, but foreign rivals may complain of subsidized competition and demand countervailing duties from their governments. When it comes to environmental measures relating to consumption, such as motor car emission standards, the question is whether these can be non-discriminatory between domestic and foreign suppliers. Finally, when one country imposes costly environmental regulations while another does not, firms may be tempted to expand their activities in the latter and contract in the former.

Much depends on how important these costs are. Various macro-estimates made or reviewed by the authors in Part I of this book suggest that, so far, these costs have not been substantial and the trade effects slight. (One of the case studies in Part II may cast some doubt on this at the micro-level, but let this pass.) This does not minimize the importance of a subject which is still in its infancy. Tariffs have not yet disappeared and major concern with the environment is of relatively recent origin. A Standards Code was agreed in the Tokyo Round of GATT, and this refers to environmental as well as other standards. As always in GATT accords, there is no one to enforce these standards. Adherence depends on inter-governmental cooperation. In the present context, the issue is how to make environmental rules sufficiently compatible so as not to impair trade unduly. The Code came into force in 1980 and there has not yet been time for a case law to emerge. If the major incompatibilities between the various current national approaches to the environment are not to degenerate into a new form of protection, the time to examine this subject is now. To this, the present volume contributes. If it is largely written in terms of zero-sum economics and a belief that price competition prevails in international trade in manufactures, this may

not always seem realistic. But it may be widely regarded as the best possible first approach to a new aspect of international economic relations.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

Third World Political Organizations: A Review of Developments. By Gwyneth Williams. London: Macmillan. 1981. 133 pp. Index. £12·00.

THIS book is inappropriately titled, as only two of the six chapters are about organizations which may be described as belonging to the Third World. Its actual coverage is of international conferences in the 1960s and 1970s concerned with development. The first two chapters are on the establishment of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development and the work of its first five plenary sessions. Then there are chapters on the Non-Aligned Movement, on the Sixth and Seventh Special Sessions of the UN General Assembly, on OPEC and on the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation. The institutions are well chosen. The decision not to give a separate chapter to the Group of Seventy Seven is justified by the need to make frequent reference to it in dealing with the other institutions. However, given the themes of the book, the absence of any discussion of the regular sessions of the General Assembly, particularly its Committee of the Whole, or the negotiations in and about the UN Industrial Development Organization or the establishment of the International Fund for Agricultural Development as a new UN specialized agency, is to be regretted.

The approach is to give an outline of what appeared to be the main issues at each meeting and a summary of the decisions taken. No distinctions are made as to which decisions have been implemented and which have not, nor is any attempt made to follow particular issues through the various conferences of the two decades. Judging by the text and the footnotes given, most of the writing was done by a regurgitation of contemporary press reports. As the press systematically provides poor coverage of the Third World, of international organizations and of macro-economic issues, the result is patchy and of poor quality. It is not apparent that use has been made of any primary sources, such as documents or interviews with delegates. Furthermore, much of the detail is sloppily presented. The lists of members of the Group of Seventy Seven (p. 13) and the Non-Aligned (p. 47) both contain errors, while the twenty-one-page 'Date Chart of Main Events Affecting the Third World' given as an appendix contains many omissions on the date and place of meetings and trivial errors in the other columns. The lack of knowledge of the procedures of the institutions shows, as in the failure to understand that the UN Seventh Special Session was convoked before the Sixth Special Session although it took place sixteen months later. Thus it is not true that the 1973 Non-Aligned summit 'led directly to the UN Sixth Session' (p. 60): it led to the Seventh Special Session, while the Sixth was convened as a result of a separate, later initiative by President Boumedienne. Consequent errors follow on pages 66, 68, 73 and 114. There is a need for a book on the history of international economic negotiations, but *Third World Political Organizations* is neither analytical nor a comprehensive and accurate factual survey of events.

City University, London PETER WILLETTS

The Politics of Human Rights. Edited by Paula R. Newberg. New York, London: New York University Press. 1981. (Distributed by Columbia University Press.) 287 pp. $29.25. Pb.: $11.70.

THIS book publishes some of the background material commissioned for a United Nations Association of the USA panel on human rights in American foreign policy which met in 1978. Its first part is concerned with theory: how to think about human rights in international relations; then it deals with certain practical questions related to policy in a section that ranges from a discussion of human rights and basic needs in a North–South context to the place of human rights in South-east Asian cultures; and its third part deals with human rights in US aid policy and with the implementation of the new American convention on human rights. The book is topped and tailed by Paula Newberg herself in a good account of the problematical place of human rights on the agenda of foreign policy, and a useful appendix (written with Barnett R. Rubin) on the function of statistical analysis in human rights policy.

Three chapters stand out in what is a book of generally high quality, if somewhat unbalanced in favour of North–South issues over East–West ones. The first is Tracy B. Strong's brilliant account of the place of rights in American domestic and foreign policy. He manages to deal in a fresh way with the self-conscious exceptionalism of the United States, the idea that this state alone was created to defend the natural rights of men; that the justification for its continued existence lies only in the extent to which it preserved these rights; and that as these rights were the rights of all men and not just of Americans, so Americans could never remain deaf to appeals from foreigners based on natural rights: the only question was about the circumstances in which the issue might be taken up. In this regard, Strong argues that Woodrow Wilson is firmly in the rights tradition of American foreign policy, no radical innovator, but merely applying, in a changed configuration of power politics, the Monroe Doctrine to Europe. The second outstanding chapter is that by Richard A. Falk in which he spells out the place of human rights in a variety of what he calls 'logics': statist, hegemonial, naturalist, supranationalist, transnationalist, and populist. His expectations about human rights in what remains fundamentally a statist/hegemonial system are not great, but he does not despair of the possibility of reform in the system. The third chapter of note is that by Sidney Weintraub on human rights and basic needs in United States' aid policy, in which he, like Falk, retains his faith in the possibility of a credible human rights policy even at the conclusion of an analysis that has been so graphic about the difficulties.

This book is about human rights in American foreign policy, but there is a sense in which anything which is a prominent issue in the foreign policy of the United States is a prominent issue in the rest of the world. In this regard it is interesting that more than one of the contributors to the book notice the foreignness of a preoccupation with human rights to foreigners: how odd an Englishman would find it to think that what made him English was applicable also overseas, or even across the channel; and why Swedes or Germans find good reason not to 'politicize' the activities of the multilateral development banks by making an issue of human rights.

Australian National University, Canberra R. J. VINCENT

National Industrial Strategies and the World Economy. Edited by John Pinder. Totowa, NJ: Allanheld, Osmun; London: Croom Helm. 1982. 302 pp. Index. £17·95.

HERE is a thoroughly researched and reasoned plea for a 'positive' international economic policy. Free trade allows rising imports of labour-intensive products from the newer to the older industrial countries. Worried about unemployment, the latter respond with 'orderly marketing arrangements' and other restrictions which could all too easily become permanent. Although it would not be in the interest of those countries to end free trade, they face a problem because old industries can be more quickly expanded in new countries than new industries in old countries. Macro-economic policies do not solve this particular problem. The reason given is that the rewards of creating new activities and new jobs are insufficient in relation to the costs and difficulties for the entrepreneur who creates them. In consequence, there are too few new opportunities in relation to those which are wound up. If, then, there is not to be a new wave of protectionism, new enterprise should be encouraged—which means subsidized. Since new opportunities depend more on research and development than the older ones, heavy capital outlays are involved and these can be recouped more quickly if intra-industry specialization and trade can be conducted freely on a world-wide scale. At the same time, decisions to subsidize are taken by national governments. Too much diversity in their respective policies can undermine their very purpose of job creation. Hence the argument of the editor and his seven collaborators that there is need of an international industrial policy.

Over 300 tightly argued pages in small print cannot be adequately summarized in a few lines. Briefly, the authors survey the different approaches to date towards the problems of five industry groups which suffer from excess capacity, and the different attitudes of the major industrial powers towards industrial policy. For instance, some governments encourage recession cartels, while others outlaw them. Again, some governments provide manpower training, or at least support it by an industry-oriented state system of education, while others think this is the time for education cuts. If such points account for some of the differences

between, say, Japanese and US policies and performance, matters are further complicated by European preoccupations with social peace. The resulting diverse approaches make competition more uneven and so endanger international economic integration. Although political integration still lags behind economic integration, it should not be impossible to achieve at least more common interpretations of, for instance, the already agreed code of subsidization and use it to speed up the adjustment of the most advanced industrial sectors. If this may sound a bit like an argument for more uniform protection of the infant industries of the rich, it also provides a better chance for the exports of old products from new countries. From a free trader's point of view, it is a positive argument in the sense of *reculer pour mieux sauter.*

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

Our Changing Geopolitical Premises. By Thomas P. Rona. New Brunswick, London: Transaction for the National Strategy Information Center. 1982. 352 pp. Pb.

Down to Earth: Environment and Human Needs. By Erik P. Eckholm. London: Pluto for Earthscan and the International Institute for Environment and Development; New York: Norton. 1982. 238 pp. Index. Pb.: £3·95.

PERHAPS the author of *Our Changing Geopolitical Premises* ought to have added the words 'and use of language' to his title. That way the reader would have at least been warned to expect the odd turn of phrase or two, a goodly spattering of Americanisms and upmarket expressions topped off with the statutory dose of computer jargon and high technology terminology. They are in fact all here, plus some of the author's own inventions. Those readers who like their English neat and precise will be appalled at the way he strings his sentences together, as well as labouring some rather obvious and elementary points. Someone clearly ought to have done a radical 'cut and paste' job on this one.

As society evolves, its perceptions and premises change in response to new situations and challenges. Each period as well as each society has its own ideologies, political systems, economic priorities, social and cultural norms, and so on. Although we are all prisoners of the age in which we live, it is nevertheless useful to know how we got there and what sort of system we will bequeath to future generations. If this is what the author set out to examine, he has fallen a very long way from his central markers. What he in fact gives us is a rather rambling, personal and not very consistent view of the world.

He obviously believes, for example, in the innate superiority of the political and economic systems of the West, but he seems to distrust the democratic process. He also seems to think that people have too much information for their good, i.e. they can be manipulated by it. Maybe so, but isn't this the price one pays for living in a democracy? On the other hand, he is not a unilateral disarmer, more a balance of terror man, though exactly how all of these will square with his overall vision of a supernational state is not clear.

His major premises, which are spelled out at great length (chs. 9–13), are in fact relatively uncontroversial. Few people would, for example, question his premise that 'the maintenance of societal cohesion and stability is an explicit goal of each "Western" nation, to be pursued on par with the protection of the individual citizen's rights' (p. 109). Not a lot of people, particularly in the Third World, would however agree with him that 'the industrialised nations have lost (or relinquished) the political and economic domination of the World. Their attempts at remaining preponderant producers of wealth and privileged consumers of resources are ineffective and increasingly threatened' (p. 55). Why then was there all the fuss about a New Order?

Barbara Ward was originally commissioned to write *Down to Earth* to mark the tenth anniversary of the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment. However, on account of her failing health she invited Erik Eckholm to work with her on the project. Although they discussed its general outline and substance, it was left to him to write up the work. She dictated the foreword just before she died in May 1981. The book itself is very fittingly dedicated to her memory and to the good work which she did to make the rest of us aware of the environment and the irrevocable damage which is done daily to the ecosystem.

Eckholm looks at human conditions under three main headings, namely, the global underclass, the population factor and health and the human environment. The global underclass, i.e. those at the very bottom of the human pile, are probably the ones who will benefit most from a cleaner, safer environment. Yet their state of absolute poverty and the

endless cycles of hunger, illiteracy, exploitation and disease often mean they have to destroy and despoil the very basis of their existence. He does not tell us how this problem will be resolved, though he writes with feeling and much sympathy.

Various other factors are discussed in detail—the oceans, pollution and toxic wastes, the atmosphere, energy, soil erosion and desertification, deforestation and biological diversity and economic development. He goes through each of these topics methodically and catalogues innumerable instances and occasions in which immense damage has been done to the environment. It is a depressing story, but one which must nevertheless be told in order to ensure 'the care and maintenance of a small planet'. This is in fact a highly readable and very sobering book. Its price will almost certainly ensure that it gets the widest possible circulation.

University of Glasgow GEORGE C. ABBOTT

Development Financing: a Framework for International Financial Co-operation. Edited by Salah Al-Shaikhly. London: Pinter; Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1982. 183 pp. Index. £16·50.

Multinational Banks and Underdevelopment. By Maurice A. Odle. New York: Pergamon. 1981. 205 pp. Index. $20·00.

THE first of these books consists of eight papers and forms the second volume of a project sponsored by the Bureau of the Arab States and carried out by the Centre for Research on the New International Economic Order, Oxford. The opening paper by Dragoslav Avramovic, 'Open issues in international finance', sets out the scope of the project and identitifes six problem areas in international finance. The first of these concerns the gaps in financial institutional structures including shortage of finance, cash for commodity stabilization, export finance, funds for energy and mineral development, finance for economic cooperation between developing countries, and debt reorganization. The second is the persistent imbalance in international payments with rapidly growing deficits in non-oil developing countries. The third covers the difficulties encountered by the international private banking system in continuing to channel surpluses to the deficit countries. The fourth problem area comprises the disarray of the international monetary system with adverse repercussions on international trade and investment: 'The decline of the US dollar as the key reserve currency has affected the real value not only of current income of the exporting countries, but also of financial assets held in this currency' (p. 2). This is a factor of particular importance to exporters of exhaustible resources. The fact that the developing countries do not have an adequate share in decision-making and the control and management of most existing international financial and monetary institutions comprises the fifth area. (This accounts for some of the gaps listed in Avramovic's first problem area.) Finally, there is the problem that the international and monetary institutions are not universal as most of the socialist states, including the Soviet Union, are not members. These six problems form the background against which 'the issues of reform and restructuring of the international financial system and institutions have to be approached' (p. 3). and are the principal issues which are dealt with in the other papers in the book.

Abdelkader Sid Ahmed, the Algerian energy minister, argues that in spite of the emergence of the 'dollar system' after 1971 the philosophy of Bretton Woods continues 'to shape the character of the international monetary system' (p. 18). He argues that the OPEC Special Fund should be backed up by a Development Agency whose main function would be to provide funds for development projects, particularly those 'likely to promote their dependence on imported energy' (p. 29). An initial authorized capital fund of $20 billion is proposed for the Agency.

Two papers, by Dr Lal Jayawardena and Michael Stewart, deal with massive transfers of resources to developing countries, the former in terms of the challenges involved, the latter in relation to mechanisms and institutions. Vijay Joshi, in the concluding chapter 'Development Finance in the Nineteen Eighties,' states that 'active steps need to be taken to promote the recyling of funds through international public institutions' (p. 177) in order to ensure that the imperfections of the world capital market do not reduce the capital flows to the non-oil developing countries to unacceptable levels. The problem is that proposals and solutions put forward by the developing countries to correct their imbalances do not get the

approval of the industrialized creditor countries. Unfortunately, as the Pearson Committee estimated in 1969—before oil bills began to rise—the cost of servicing debt alone would by 1977 exceed the total amount of new loans to developing countries in Africa by 20 per cent and in Latin America by 30 per cent. The same argument was raised in the Brandt Report and later discussed at Cancún. The message from the papers collected together in this volume is that changes in international trading arrangements and decision-making processes in the international financial institutions are necessary if economic relationships between North and South are to be improved.

Maurice A. Odle's book is dedicated to a New International Financial Order. He complains that although much has been written about multinational corporations, discussion has rarely touched the foreign economic activities of US banks. This is the 'perceived gap' (p. ix) in the literature which he sets out to close. The scope of the study is 'cross country' and is intended 'to demonstrate the generality of multinational host country relations rather than the uniqueness of operations in any one of the territories which are on the periphery of the international capitalist system' (p. ix). The impact of multinational banks as described here is generally detrimental to host economies, through discrimination against local small-scale industry and agriculture in favour of 'elitist consumer goods' (p. 187), either imported or assembled under licence. The results of this, according to Odle, are 'an economy more deeply reinforced in dependency relations' (p. 187) with the industrialized countries, and persistent lack of development and unfair distribution of incomes. Funds lent via consortia arrangements are criticized because they go to a small number of countries, encouraging economic polarization both between rich and poor countries, and between recipients and the rest of the Third World.

The final chapter, 'Summary and Conclusion' puts forward no solutions but states that attempts to curb the power of multinational banks by limiting their expansion, the introduction of competition from state banks, and outright nationalization have all, for various reasons, failed. So far as multinational banking is concerned the structure of the new international economic order remains undefined.

RICHARD BAILEY

Social Order and the General Theory of Strategy. By Alexander Atkinson. London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1981. 305 pp. Index. Pb.: £8·50.

DR ATKINSON's book (which appears to have been his LSE PhD thesis also) resembles not so much the curate's egg as the kind of Scotch egg commonly stocked nowadays by catchpenny grocers. There is in it, in other words, a small but undeniably wholesome core of a good idea surrounded by indigestible outer layers of worrying prose and inadequate methodology.

The good idea is that Clausewitz and those thinkers that have taken their cue from him (possibily fewer in number, incidentally, than Atkinson seems to think) went badly wrong over guerrilla warfare. One cannot go along with Clausewitz and think guerrilla warfare to be of small account and at the same time make sense of the American war in Vietnam, or the wars that brought into being the People's Republic of China. What Clausewitz also failed to do, according to the author, was to come clean on the invisible contract whereby warring parties 'agree' to have the outcome of the war depend upon the 'decisive battle'. Should one side tear up the contract and go 'guerrilla' from the beginning the other side has no choice but to follow suit.

There is no doubt something really worth talking about here, even if it is still possible to suspect that the irregular may be a poor match for regular forces whenever the latter are licensed to act with ruthlessness—Clausewitz cannot be blamed if such licences are today harder to come by than they were in the Napoleonic era. And the awkward counter-example of the success of British counter-insurgency operations in Malaya needs to be explained.

It seems to this reviewer that the natural way for the author to have explored his idea would have been historically, much as a historian of ideas would treat the failure of classical (Newtonian) mechanics properly to comprehend what we now call relativistic phenomena. He would make use of the concept of the paradigm, to assess how one way of making sense of a body of facts (the Newtonian) was displaced or accommodated by a fundamentally different way of treating substantially the same body of facts (the Einsteinian). He would

find that this was a sociological process as much as a scientific one and that all kinds of factors governed the pace and nature of the transition from one paradigm to the other.

The parallel between Clausewitz and Newton is of course far from exact, but there are some resemblances. For instance the weakest parts of the Newtonian paradigm were precisely the parts where Newton himself was vaguest. Similarly the author has little trouble in showing Clausewitz hesitating between force as a political instrument and force as something knowing no laws but its own.

But even though the author does insert the word 'paradigm' now and then into his text, he is not interested in a 'history of ideas' approach. Rather, he chooses to present his case through trying, in a modest way, to give the sort of account an open-minded Clausewitz might have given, had he been there, of the Chinese civil wars (1930–50). Partly because documents are scarce; partly because the author appears not to know Chinese; and partly because, in translation at any rate, Chinese communist accounts of the thinking that supposedly informed their actions in the field, not least those given by Mao himself, are of exceptional banality ('we retreat, the enemy advances' is only barely a parody), this entirely fails to work.

Dr Atkinson is to be thanked, nevertheless, for giving an important idea an airing. And if the price of having the idea see the light of day was to go along with the author's extravagant liking for the mixed metaphor and unreasonable infatuation with the Chinese revolution, his publishers were probably correct to pay it.

University of Lancaster IAN BELLANY

Law and Diplomacy in Commodity Economics. A Study of Techniques, Cooperation and Conflict in International Public Policy Issues. By Emiko Atimomo. London: Macmillan. 1981. 384 pp. £30·00.

THE increasing political concern over the divide between the rich and the poor nations of the world has given rise to a demand for a change in the traditional legal and diplomatic techniques of conducting international economic affairs. The New International Economic Order, and the repercussions following the Brandt Report on the North–South division of wealth, have brought into question whether the conventional practice, teaching and research on the legal and diplomatic response to the problem are adequate. Nowhere is this more pronounced than in the area of commodity economics. It is often the commodity producers who lose out under the old legal and diplomatic structure; their lack of organization, both internally and supranationally, mean that their commodities are at the mercy of crude market forces in an international economy controlled and manipulated by the developed countries.

Law and Diplomacy in Commodity Economics is an attempt to analyse the development of law and diplomacy in this area and to examine the extent to which conventional thinking has been, and should continue to be, modified. Emiko Atimomo has spent the past eleven years researching for the book, a period during which awareness of the problem has considerably increased. The book is divided into two parts. First, the author considers some of the general characteristics of international law and diplomacy. Traditional international law is not sufficiently flexible to meet the demands that commodity producers should expect of it; it has an obsession with sovereignty and nationalism and has consequently failed to provide solutions to many international disputes (the author cites Vietnam, Cyprus and the Middle East as some examples of the failure of international law). For this reason, various commodity institutions have rejected the approach of the International Court of Justice to the settlement of disputes and have instead adopted the more conciliatory and consultative methods offered by GATT and UNCTAD. Similarly, the drafting of treaties has undergone modifications. The use of imprecise terminology in traditional international agreements is largely the result of the conservative and ultra-legalistic approach of the drafters; in commodity economics this is unsatisfactory and should be eliminated, although the author recognizes that this will be a long process. International economic law is a 'boundary melting discipline' which involves not only legal but also political, economic and diplomatic aspects. On diplomatic techniques a similar change can be detected. Today's diplomat is more likely to be an expert on the subject matter of the negotiations taking place than an official of the foreign ministry briefed for the occasion. Also, negotiations are more often conducted through international organizations or through direct contact between the political heads of

state rather than at diplomatic level or by sovereign heads. This has important repurcussions when commodity agreements are being negotiated.

Part two deals with 'Conflict and Co-operation in Commodity Diplomacy'. The author considers the negotiating positions in UNCTAD and also the quasi-UN systems. Under this latter heading he uses cocoa and tin as examples of how cooperation between producers is possible and how conflicts between them and the consumers arise. He points to the possible cooperation, given the necessary good will, between the members of the Cocoa Producers Alliance; but he also highlights the conflict with the consumers in the Cocoa Conferences held under the auspices of UNCTAD. Resolving the conflict is the challenge that faces international law and diplomacy.

There is a strong interdependence between law and diplomacy in international economic transactions. The book examines in detail the problems that arise and the attempts that have been made to resolve them. Plenty of examples are taken from the organizational structure of the various international commodities. A change from the traditional legal and diplomatic techniques is taking place; the book clearly shows that much more has to be done in order to achieve a fairer distribution of the world's wealth between developed and developing nations.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth JOHN WILLIAMS

Law

Documents on the Laws of War. Edited by A. Roberts and R. Guelff. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1982. 488 pp. Index. £18·50. Pb.: £10·95.

A WORK of this nature has met a need that has been outstanding for some time. It is a collection of the texts of the main Conventions currently governing the law of warfare and one or two other directly related documents. It starts with the 1856 Paris Declaration respecting Maritime Warfare and concludes with the United Nations Convention on 'Prohibitions or restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects', signed on 10 April 1981, but not yet in force.

The editors, the present Reader in International Relations at the University of Oxford and an American scholar, have prefaced these documents with an introduction (pp. 1–22) which attempts an historical summary of the law of war, 'over thousands of years', in one paragraph of modest proportions: a somewhat ambitious undertaking.

This is followed by an excursus upon the 'sources' of the law of war. The editors, quite rightly, include at that point a reference to the 'American and British Manuals' (p. 7), which, possibly in the interests of brevity, gives a slightly distorted appraisal of their value. The 1929 British Manual, chapter XIV (1936), para. 443, on superior orders, was amended in April 1944, as was its American counterpart. This amendment assuredly has not 'favoured obeying superior orders' if by that phrase is meant affording a defence to a charge of war criminality.

Each of the Conventions presented by the editors is prefaced by a brief explanatory note which will be of considerable use to the student of what has now become a large body of law, complex and technical as modern warfare itself. Moreover, it is manifest at any diplomatic conference devoted to this part of the law that no government delegation is anxious to appear less humanitarian than its neighbour.

The editors have performed a further useful service to the reader by placing at the end of each instrument a list of states subscribing to it, with dates, the texts of any reservations by those states, the date on which the instrument came into force, and whether it is still in force. With a community of states numbering about 160, the total number of subscribing states at any one time, and whether a particular state has so subscribed, is essential knowledge. Thus, the date of publication of this book, April 1981, becomes a 'critical date'.

Each of the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 governing the treatment of war victims contains a 'common' article requiring states '. . . in time of peace as in time of war, to disseminate the text . . . as widely as possible . . . and to include the study thereof in programmes of military, and if possible, civil instruction . . .' (e.g. p. 322). This excellent

requirement is repeated, in slightly attenuated form, in Article 83 (1) of Protocol 1 Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (p. 437).

Not the least of the merits of this work, indispensable to practitioners and students alike, is that it goes a long way down the road of implementation of the 'civil instruction' requirement just cited, an activity for which the government of this country has hitherto showed no great enthusiasm. We are thus much indebted to the patient and scholarly labours of the two editors.

G. I. A. D. DRAPER

History

World in the Balance: Behind the Scenes of World War II. By Gerhard L. Weinberg. London, Hanover: University Press of New England for Brandeis University Press. 1982. 165 pp. Index. £8·75; $15.60. Pb.: £3·25; $5.60.

THE title of this collection of lectures and previously published essays by the Professor of History at the University of North Carolina promises rather more than the text provides. This is not to say that the matter of the text is not well worth consideration, for Professor Weinberg is a profoundly informed historian with a lively and questing mind, who has to his credit the two volumes of *The Foreign Policy of Hitler's Germany* (1970, 1980) and *Germany and the Soviet Union* (1954). He is particularly well *au courant* with the German source material. The title simply suggests a more substantial and synoptic study.

The first two lectures are in fact no more than a *Rundblick*, in which Weinberg sweeps his binoculars over the Second World War from the point of view first of the Axis and then of the Allies: thoughtful, perceptive, alert, but perhaps no more than one would expect from a good academic speaking on some formal occasion. The meat of the book is really to be found in two excellent essays on Hitler's view of the United States and his declaration of war in December 1941, and in another about Germany's preliminary planning for a colonial empire, particularly in Africa.

The first American-oriented essay is, in effect, a documented analysis of ambivalence. 'Hitler's beliefs had once demonstrated clearly that the United States was racially strong and a dangerous threat. Soon after, these same murky doctrines had revealed to him with equal clarity that the United States was weak and degenerate'. Each of these contradictory assumptions, Weinberg points out, derived from fantasies and ideological dogmas which were not checked or qualified in Hitler's mind by accurate intelligence or a properly organized Foreign Service. Thus—see the second essay—he lost his war by bringing America into it on a backwash of prejudice, myopia and ignorance. But—it is an important point—'Only rarely during the escalation of incidents in the Atlantic, never during the attempt to involve Japan in war with Great Britain, and certainly not in the final crisis did anyone among Hitler's political, diplomatic or military leaders advocate a more cautious approach. . . . There is a curious irony in a situation where the leaders of a country were united on war with the one nation they were least likely and worst equipped to defeat.'

The best essay in the book is on 'German Colonial Plans and Policies, 1938–1942'. Though it first appeared in a German *Festschrift* as early as 1963, its value persists because it is founded primarily on contemporary sources in the German archives. In this field unity at the top was less evident. Should the Party run the colonies, or the Foreign Office? The Party won. And what colonies? Weinberg shows how the Italian alliance and France's obduracy imposed many constraints on Germany's expansionist schemes—which are seen to fritter away once her armies stick in the Russian mud. Still, it is interesting to be reminded in detail that these high hopes existed, and amusing to read how German bureaucrats, blinkered but thorough, sat down to work out the details of postal services amid the far-distant jungles and issued handbooks for the putative overlords of Africa. In the end, only Rommel's *Afrika Korps* profited—in the most marginal way—from the Reich's laborious efforts to prepare itself for the Empire it was never to acquire.

RONALD LEWIN

The Hitler State: The Foundation and Development of the Internal Structure of the Third Reich. Eng. edn. By Martin Broszat. Trans. by John W. Hiden. London, New York: Longman. 1981. 378 pp. Index. £9·95. Pb.: £6·50.

First published as *Der Staat Hitlers* in 1969, this much-admired study by the Director of the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* in Munich makes a welcome reappearance in a translation of excellent quality. Two warning notes should be struck. The first is that the publishers are incorrect in claiming that this new edition is 'a valuable synthesis of the massive amount of scholarship that has appeared on the post-1919 history of Germany'. In his introduction Dr Broszat buttresses his earlier conclusions by reference to other books published since 1969, and he has amplified his biography to bring it up to date, but he does not appear to have amended the text of the original *Der Staat Hitlers*.

Secondly, the study is not, as the title suggests, an examination of the changing structure of the *Reich* throughout Hitler's whole reign. It concentrates on the mid-1930s, a phase when, as Dr Broszat argues, a precarious balance was still maintained between the residual elements of the German conservative tradition and the radical anarchic dynamism of National Socialism. After 1938 the balance swung with increasing violence away from the traditional areas of regulatory conservatism within the structure of German society, whether it be in the armed forces, the judiciary, the civil service or local government (all of which, of course, had been progressively undermined since Hitler became *Führer*). So penetrating is Dr Broszat's analysis that one regrets that he was unable to project his study into the wartime period, and assess the ways in which Germany's war effort in all its aspects, domestic and economic as well as military, was impaired by the earlier weakening of the structure of the state. Up to 1938 Hitler was attempting to lay the foundations for a Greater Germany: as Dr Broszat indicates with much detailed evidence, the foundations were cracked and fissured from the start, but under the pressure of war the gaps yawned more widely.

While Broszat's thesis is perfectly valid, that much of the deliquescence of the old order—the rule of law, the responsibility of the citizen, the autonomy of the armed services, etc.—was the result not simply of the inherently anarchic character of National Socialism, but also of the volitions of the bulk of German society in the 1930s, it may be thought that Hitler's own dominance is understressed: that he appears too much as a figure tossed by the waves of party ideology, a struggling helmsman rather than the master of the ship of state. In short, the question is whether the apparent ambivalence in the reshaping of Germany's inner structure during the early years of his regime was a by-product of circumstance rather than a calculated balancing-act on Hitler's part—nicely judged, as he would have claimed, in relation to the attainment of his long-term objectives which, if not always disclosed, were always present in his mind. But such comments only indicate the stimulating effect of a profound and penetrating book which no student of the Third Reich can afford to ignore.

Ronald Lewin

Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis 1931–1938: A Study in Ideology and Diplomacy. By John Fox. Clarendon (Oxford University Press) for London School of Economics. 1982. 445 pp. Index. £20·00.

Dr Fox's intention, stated at the outset of his book, is to examine the role of the German Foreign Office in the making of its country's Far Eastern policies from the Manchurian crisis to the onset of full-scale war between the Chinese and Japanese in 1937–8. In thus making clear his particular focus within Germany itself, he stands splendidly apart from those numerous authors of theses and monographs who, on the basis of diplomatic records alone, explicitly or implicitly claim to have studied a state's foreign relations in their entirety. Indeed, far from having overstated the nature of his work, Dr Fox has produced a survey that does in fact extend well beyond the confines of the *Auswärtiges Amt*, vindicating in the process the use of the all-embracing term 'Germany' in the book's title. Careful and detailed, yet entirely clear in its main themes and arguments, this is a thorough professional study, doubly welcome at a time when a number of breathless amateur offerings have been appearing on various Far Eastern topics of the 1930s and 1940s.

Until Ribbentrop's unwelcome arrival as Foreign Minister in February 1938, the central aims of the *Auswärtiges Amt* regarding the Far East were to avoid being drawn into the hardening confrontation between Japan and China, and to preserve a balanced approach to

the two parties. Developments in the Far East itself, culminating in the fighting after the Marco Polo bridge incident, were to render these aims unattainable. Quite apart from this consideration, however, as Dr Fox demonstrates, the Foreign Office's attempts to pursue such a course were repeatedly undermined by rival bodies within the Third Reich itself, bodies with very different priorities where the Far East was concerned. The outcome was that in 1938, despite the strong connections that had existed until then between the German Army and the Nationalist regime in China, Berlin distanced itself from Chiang Kai-shek and accorded recognition to Manchukuo. The pro-Japanese inclinations of Ribbentrop (and of the Ambassador in Tokyo, von Dirksen) thus triumphed, even though between 1933 and 1937, as Dr Fox makes clear, the predilections of Hitler himself had at times accorded rather with the approach of von Neurath and his colleagues in the Foreign Office.

Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis, besides providing detailed matter concerning, for example, commercial transactions and arms supplies, offers material for students of wider issues relating to international affairs in the 1930s and foreign policy in general. Perhaps Dr Fox himself might usefully have gone out of his way a little in order to indicate, say, some of the roughly comparable cases to be found concerning such issues as the control of foreign policy (e.g. involving the Treasury and the Foreign Office in London in the mid 1930s); the place of international economic affairs in the entirety of foreign relations (e.g. involving Neville Chamberlain's treatment of Japan in the same period); the role of ideology in the shaping of foreign policy; and, not least, the tendency for Far Eastern policies during and on either side of this period to be shaped by considerations that had their focus in Europe rather than somewhere between India and the central Pacific. In this respect, the approach to be found in Berlin was not so very different from that in London, Washington, Moscow and even, at times, Tokyo.

University of Sussex CHRISTOPHER THORNE

Witnesses to the Origins of the Cold War. Edited by Thomas T. Hammond. Seattle, London: University of Washington Press. 1982. 318 pp. Index. $28.15.

THIS is an important book of essays by American eye witnesses to the emergence of the cold war in Eastern Europe. Many of these observers were relatively junior officials in the 1940s, but have since held distinguished academic posts, and, on the whole, they offer a balanced, if retrospective account of the years during which Stalin exerted Russian control over the lands of the former Dual Monarchy, and seemed set to expand to the North Sea and the Atlantic. Most of the contributors have relied not only on their own memory of events, but have also consulted some of the recent literature and the published *Foreign Relations of the United States* documents. They have not, however, looked at the material in the National Archives in Washington, or at the extensive collections of private papers in other libraries.

Thomas T. Hammond, in his introductory essay, offers a survey of the orthodox versus revisionist debate on the origins of the cold war. He singles out for special consideration Gar Alperowitz's atomic diplomacy thesis—that the United States used the atomic bomb to threaten a non-expansionist peaceful Russia—and quotes Robert James Maddox's devastating critique of Alperowitz's violation of 'the standards of honest writing' (p. 18). Most of the contributors to this volume substantiate Maddox's case: Cyril E. Black, a Foreign Service Officer in Sofia, recollects that the atomic bomb played no role in American policy towards Bulgaria; Cortlandt V. R. Schuyler, the American Military Representative on the Allied Control Commission for Romania, argues that the cold war was the result of 'the incompatibility of two competing political philosophies', and that the atomic bomb had no effect on either American or Russian attitudes in Romania (p. 157); the American Liaison Officer to the Berlin City Government, Karl Mautner, cannot recall anyone 'even remotely' raising 'the idea of exploiting our nuclear monopoly in connection with Berlin' (p. 248).

Similarly, the analyses of the American participants refute the economic imperialism thesis of Joyce and Gabriel Kolko. Maddox had earlier exposed Gabriel Kolko's methodological aberrations. Richard T. Davies, the Third Secretary in Warsaw, explains that the only American businessmen 'who showed any interest in Poland in 1947–1949 did so because they were forlornly seeking compensation for property nationalized by the Communist government, not because they thought there might be trade opportunities there' (p. 277). Indeed,

Martin F. Hertz, the Third Secretary in Vienna, argues that it was Russia that had economic objectives in Austria.

This book also includes George Kennan's analysis of the American delusion that some East European countries would escape Russian political domination, William Hardy McNeill's case that Stalin never lent 'direct or unambiguous support to the Greek Communist cause' (p. 122), John A. Armitage's reminder of the shock to the West of the collapse of democracy in Czechoslovakia, and Louis Mark Jr's recollection that American officials in Hungary 'did not foresee any need for conflict with Soviet authorities' (p. 208).

Hammond comments, surprisingly, that the 'revisionist' writers still appear on university reading lists. This book is further evidence for Maddox's position. If those writers are still recommended—apart from their historiographical significance—they should no longer be considered.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth RITCHIE OVENDALE

The Struggle for World Power 1500–1980. By William Woodruff. London: Macmillan. 1982. 371 pp. Index. £20·00.

THIS is a curiously wrought book although the intentions of the author are admirable. They also reflect what may be taken as very much an American concern, and need. He writes, 'The historical naivety shown in public life today can only be described as staggering' and believes that the fault can most usefully be countered by relating the story of power in a world context: 'Everything, including the selection and emphasis of material, as well as the countries and people which have received most attention, has been subordinated to my major aim, which is to show the changing nature and shift in world, not national or continental, power'.

What 'world' power is, in contrast to 'national' or 'continental' power, is not made explicit. There is a case for arguing that nineteenth-century 'world politics' were for the most part European politics enacted upon a world stage. Only with the emancipation and economic and technological development of the extra-European world can world politics, properly so-called, be said to have begun, and in modern times that did not happen until well into the present century.

The author does, however, direct most of his attention to the present century, although he arrives there by way of a detailed recital of events—political, economic, technological (especially regarding weapons), and in the history of ideas—from the Renaissance onwards. This is not done without interpretation, but the many perceptive observations he makes are so interlarded with facts and dates that the reader is left more bewildered than enlightened, the more so as the story jumps from subject to subject, and from period to period, in the very loose chronological framework adopted.

Moreover, not all the facts are accurate. It was not Wilhelm II but his grandfather who was proclaimed German Emperor at Versailles (p. 87); the Khalifa, not the Mahdi, was defeated at Omdurman (p. 124); NATO was established not in 1950 but in 1949 (p. 260); the king who returned to Greece after the Second World War was George II, not 'King Konstantin' (p. 283); the German Army was held 'before Stalingrad' not in December 1941 but a year later (p. 285); the first two African countries to achieve independence in the post-war period were not Morocco and Tunisia (p. 292) but Libya and the Sudan. Life-dates follow some rulers—Francis I and Henry VIII (p. 34)—while reign-dates follow others—Charles VII and Louis XI (p. 44)—with nothing to indicate which is intended.

This book ambitiously tries to do in a single volume what is usually left to the multi-volume series. The author, while conscious of the importance of ethics in state relations, rightly stresses the primacy of power and force in the story which he tells. But to what ends were the power and force directed? And what modifying influence upon these ends had the international system? Here the author takes us only so far, but it is to these deeper questions that he might have devoted more time—as he so interestingly does in the Epilogue—rather than burden his narrative with facts most of which can be obtained in reference books.

BRIAN PORTER

A History of European Integration. Vol. I: 1945–1947, The Formation of the European Unity Movement. By Walter Lipgens. Eng. edn. Trans. by P. S. Falla and A. J. Ryder. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1982. 723 pp. Index. (First publ. Stuttgart: Klett, 1977 as *Die Anfänge der europäischen Einigungspolitik 1945–1950, 1. Teil: 1945–1947.*)

THIS massive study of the years when 'Europe' was struggling to take institutional form first appeared in the Federal Republic of Germany in 1977. This first volume of the English edition, admirably translated by Dr A. J. Ryder and Mr P. S. Falla, takes the story from the closing stages of the Second World War to the preparations for the Hague Congress of 1948. Following the opening of the Foreign Office papers for the period it contains a more detailed account of the evolution of British official attitudes, while Professor Alan Milward also supplies an expanded account of the Paris Conference.

Thanks to the depth and breadth of Professor Lipgens' documentation, he brings out many fresh details in a story whose broad outlines are, of course, familiar. His greatest strength lies in the highly detailed chronicling of the activities of the quite extraordinarily numerous and diverse range of individuals and organizations constituting the 'European movement'. If at times all the minutiae of earnest journeyings and inflated resolutions becomes a trifle wearying, from it comes a rich illustration of the extent to which 'European union' was almost all things to almost all men. Among a cast of thousands one notes Michel Debré as a member of the *Comité français pour l'Europe unie dans le cadre de l'ONU* (p. 624), and the signatures of Michael Foot and Ian Mikardo on a federalist Early Day Motion in 1947 (p. 605). And precisely because the appeal of unity was so broad and ambiguous one sees the European Movement wrestling painfully over world as against purely European organization, federalism as against co-operation, whether to accept the cold war division of Europe, as well as conventional Left–Right tensions, and coming to terms with the marred benediction of Churchill's Zurich speech.

Where Professor Lipgens is rather less successful is in relating the tireless comings and goings of the activists to the behaviour of governments. Perhaps this will come through more strongly in the later volume, which will carry the story through to 1950. For the moment, though, we at times get a disappointingly limited insight into the world of the policymakers. This may in part be because of restricted access to the archives, but even the British section is not altogether successful in assessing the impact of the activists on official policy. But then, like others before him, Professor Lipgens is not entirely at his ease in his handling of Bevin, who he clearly believes impeded the European cause by clinging too long to efforts to avoid offending the Russians. Professor Lipgens makes no secret of his own federalist sympathies, or of his view that the unwillingness of Europe to unite was tantamount to her acceptance of decline. But, however arguable some of his personal appreciations may be, this is a rich and erudite account which is a 'must' for every collection on the period.

University of Keele MARTIN HARRISON

A Short History Of World War I. 1st UK edn. By James L. Stokesbury. London: Hale. 1982. 348 pp. Index. (First publ. New York: Morrow, 1981.) £11·95.

A Short History Of World War II. 1st UK edn. By James L. Stokesbury. London: Hale. 1982. 420 pp. Index. (First publ. New York: Morrow, 1981.) £11·95.

THE author, who is Professor of History at Acadia University, Nova Scotia, has presumably produced these companion volumes as textbooks for undergraduate courses or for the non-specialist requiring easily digestible narrative histories of the two world wars. The volumes are neatly arranged with short dramatic chapters and adequate maps (though without illustrations), and presented in a lively, popular style sometimes lapsing into banality or cliché. Thus in August 1914 everyone at Moltke's headquarters 'was infected with the jitters. Moltke ate little and slept less . . . Though he could not stand the heat, he was still in the kitchen' (p. 45). In the War Cabinet (sic) of 1915, Churchill 'stood out like the proverbial sore thumb' (p. 115). The Arab revolt was 'assisted by a rather bizarre English character named T. E. Lawrence. Most responsible British soldiers thought he was crazy' (p. 191). The chapters describing Verdun and the Somme are curiously titled 'The Love Battles' and only one hundred pages later do we learn that this is a reference to Scott Fitzgerald's *Tender Is The Night.* Professor Stokesbury does not point out that Fitzgerald was unfortunately mistaken in believing that European civilisation could not stand more bloodbaths like these.

These volumes are a monument to the author's gargantuan reading and it is greatly to his credit that he has been able to condense such diverse material into a generally accurate and concise narrative. It is a pity, however, that he does not allow more than a rare glimpse of revisionism or controversy in the text. For example, Norman Stone's *The Eastern Front* is praised in the bibliography but his novel interpretation of the Russian war effort of 1914–17 is not brought out. Casualty statistics for various First World War campaigns are confidently quoted but the debatable nature of all such precise figures is not mentioned. More seriously, in the Second World War, the historiographical problems raised by the revelation of Allied code-breaking successes are scarcely hinted at. 'Intelligence operations' get only four references in the index and the only specific mention of 'Ultra' seems to be in a reference to Winterbotham's unreliable memoirs in the bibliography. Since both volumes lack footnotes or references the bibliographies are of critical importance. There are extensive suggestions for further reading well-organized in sections on background material and more specific military studies. The latest publication date quoted seems to be 1977 and there are some surprising omissions: nothing on Ultra except Winterbotham; no works by M. R. D. Foot on S.O.E.; and nothing by Albert Seaton on the Russo-German war. The standard biography of Auchinleck is said to be by J. H. Robertson (surely a mistake for John Connell?) in 1959. Nor are scholarly works based on original research properly distinguished from potboilers and blockbusters. In sum, while these volumes differ from many previous general histories of the world wars, such as Liddell Hart's, in providing a balanced, impersonal coverage of all campaigns and home fronts, they do not supersede some of the more distinguished studies. For students new to the subject and requiring a stimulating introduction I would still give preference to C. R. M. F. Cruttwell's *The Great War* (1934, reprinted 1964) for the First World War; and either Gordon Wright's *The Ordeal Of Total War* (1968), or P. Calvocoressi and G. Wint's *Total War* (1972) for the Second.

King's College, London BRIAN BOND

American Intervention in Greece, 1943–1949. By Lawrence S. Wittner. New York, Guildford: Columbia University Press. 1982. 445 pp. Index. $29.50.

THE origins and development of the cold war have now been extensively trampled over by scholars for several decades. European perspectives may shift the picture away from the bi-polar approach which has long dominated the discussion but Wittner is probably right to conclude that, as it were, at 'macro' level the returns are diminishing. He suggests that there is room instead for a country-by-country approach which may, cumulatively, provide the basis for richer generalizations. His study of the American perception of the issues in Greece and the consequences of intervention is offered in this spirit, and its massive reading of manuscript collections, the oral interviews and written communications all combine to make a good case for such an approach. There is no lack of American material and there are nearly one hundred pages of notes densely clustered at the back—not to mention the extensive bibliography. Even so, the Freedom of Information Act notwithstanding, important US official records remain closed and the author has not had access to any significant Greek diplomatic correspondence. The absence of such material—not to mention Soviet archives and those of neighbouring Balkan countries—while probably unavoidable, should introduce a greater note of caution and restraint.

What we are given, in great detail, is a fascinating exposition of American dealings with Greece at almost all relevant levels. It is not a comprehensive study of the interplay of all the factors affecting the evolution of Greece during these critical years. The author makes no claim, in this respect, to have made a breakthrough in the area of modern Greek history and suggests that he has diligently summarized 'existing scholarly knowledge in this area'. So he has, but 'scholarly knowledge' does not in fact provide a consensus on the strategy, tactics and objectives of the various left factions in Greece. To that degree, a little more charity might have been extended to the makers and manipulators of American policy. Wittner, however, finds that his country's dealings with Greece were 'not very pretty, and any attempt to relate them accurately leads, inevitably, to the exposure of official lying, cynicism, and cruelty'. He is not disposed to tidy up his nation's record 'in accordance with patriotic norms'. Great powers, he says, are nasty and it would be nice if they stopped bullying smaller nations. No doubt, but these initial rhetorical flourishes weaken rather than

strengthen the book's impact and indeed its last chapter, 'Aftermath 1950–1980' could almost have been written by Andreas Papandreou himself. Every strong word uttered by Lyndon Johnson to the then Greek ambassador is treated as gospel on the latter's account. It might be worth pointing out that great powers have problems too and cannot be expected to behave as though they were small powers. Such a suggestion raises complex issues but an otherwise excellent detailed historical account is marred, in my opinion, by this desire to draw simple lessons.

University of Glasgow KEITH ROBBINS

The Price of Admiralty: The War Diary of the German Naval Attaché in Japan, 1939–1943. Vol. I: 25 August 1939–23 August 1940. Edited and translated by John W. M. Chapman. Ripe, Sussex: Saltire Press. 1982. 241 pp. £6·00.

THIS is the first of three volumes planned to make available in English a version of the war diaries of two successive German Naval Attachés in Tokyo between 1939 and 1943, Captain Lietzmann and Admiral Wenneker. The original, now in the military archives at Freiburg, is not complete. There is a gap between May and November 1942 (the turning period of the Pacific war) which, however, Mr Chapman thinks can be largely filled from other sources. His method of presentation is simply to cite in full the most significant entries, summarize others and to 'edit out' the mass of 'technical material' which comprises a large part of the original. Such compression was presumably dictated by the economic practicalities of publishing, but in a scholarly work it should have been possible to indicate the range of subjects struck out under so vague a category as 'technical'. Students would have also been grateful for at least a basic guide through the maze of abbreviated classification headings in the German archives which figure so largely in the otherwise highly informative notes. The equally discerning Introduction is also marred by the banishing to the notes printed at the back of valuable comment which is well worthy of inclusion in the main narrative.

It is difficult to assess from this single volume the ultimate value of the whole enterprise for readers without access to the German and Japanese archives. It is important to remember that the Attachés had close contact with very limited Japanese circles: officers of the naval staff and a few flag officers, serving and retired. Official, let alone unofficial, civilian opinion hardly appeared in their reports. Inevitably there is much stress on 'comradely' understanding of each other's problems and an over-optimistic expectation of the likelihood of active cooperation between the two navies. It is here that the editor's contributions, based on a deep understanding of the complexities of Japan's attitude to Germany, are most valuable. Beyond their common aim of humbling Britain, the two countries had few fully shared interests. Japan was determined not to become involved in the European war; Hitler had no particular desire to see Britain's Asian empire fall into Japanese hands. Japan's irritation with the sale of German arms to China up to 1938 was followed by dismay at the Russo–German treaty of 1939, which seemed a nullification of the Anti-Comintern Pact which had brought her into the Axis in 1936.

It is not to be wondered at, therefore, that the Attachés encountered very great caution in the Japanese navy's response to their requests for practical help in setting up a supply organization for German submarines and surface raiders operating in the Far East—their main professional objective in this early period of the war. To what extent that caution decreased and naval cooperation grew will, one hopes, be revealed in the later volumes of this interesting work.

BRYAN RANFT

Western Europe

Government Coalitions in Western Democracies. Edited by Eric C. Browne and John Dreijmanis. New York, London: Longman. 1982. 384 pp. Index. Pb. £9·95.

THIS book consists of contributions on eleven states sandwiched between a very brief introduction and a more substantial conclusion, both by Eric Browne. Each chapter has a bibliography. The contributions on Finland, Denmark, Iceland, Belgium, the Netherlands,

Austria and Switzerland are the most useful because these political systems tend to get neglected compared with those covered in the other chapters—West Germany, Italy, Israel and Ireland. Perhaps this is why Iceland is allowed forty-four pages as against West Germany's twenty-four. But then Switzerland only gets eighteen. In fact, the chapter on Switzerland is in some respects the most interesting because Switzerland is an exceptional case, the land of 'magic formula' coalitions, that is, all four of the major parties have been represented in government since 1959, and during this period, have controlled between 83 and 88 per cent of the seats in the Swiss Federal Assembly. Apparently, most Swiss favour this grand coalition. The author of this chapter, Jürg Steiner, implies that this grand coalition is only possible because of the weakness of the Swiss central government: 'In Switzerland, party life is dominated by cantonal leaders' (p. 333). The interest groups are more centrally organized than the parties, and 'the result is that the interest groups are better able to speak with a single voice on a national level than are the parties'. In his conclusion, Browne claims 'This book represents a beginning in the development of a theory of cabinet coalition behaviour. Having given general consideration to those processes identified as critical in any theory of cabinet coalitions—formation, payoff distribution, maintenance/dissolution' (p. 356), Browne feels future research is needed to account 'for the failure of some actors to be eligible for coalition membership' and 'to inquire into the circumstances which determine the limits of an actor's willingness to accommodate the preferred positions of others.' Most students of politics would find this volume useful for dipping into to get a quick overview of the smaller European democracies.

University of Nottingham DAVID CHILDS

Europe's Future in the Arab View: Dimensions of a New Political Cooperation in the Mediterranean Region. Edited by Dieter Bielenstein. Saarbrücken, Fort Lauderdale: Verlag Breitenbach for Institut für Internationale Begegnungen, Bonn. 1981. 166 pp. Pb.: DM 22·00.

THIS collection of papers is fascinating not for what it says but for what it represents. It does not give an account of Europe's future from an Arab view. It represents, however, the fears of German and Egyptian academics about the future 'identity' of their nations in the wake of the oil crisis and a resented American underpinning of their security. In a memorable analogy one of the Egyptian contributors sums up the underlying theme of change. All civilizations, he says, shift to the places where energy is produced. 'With the coming of the bronze and iron technology, which was the product of ancient Egypt, an energy crisis developed as the land of Egypt itself lacked wood, which was the sole source of energy at that time. Wood was sought in far-off places first by conquest, then by trade but at great cost and ultimately to no avail. Finally, the civilisation moved to the lands where wood was available, namely to Kush in the south and Minoan Crete in the north'.

Nevertheless, the dominant partner is presently the European one. The *lingua franca* of the seminar is English. Self-consciously the German Institute for International Relations is seeking to avoid the charge of imperialism by asking for Arab views of Europe as an antidote to Eurocentric views. The lack of Arab cultural programes in Europe is regretted. The shade of Edward Said's attack on Orientalism as imperialistic hangs over many of the contributions, including a particularly fine piece by Professor Büttner. His history of Orientalism in Germany in terms of German internal conditions and his reflections on the difficulties of intercultural communication should interest all historians of thought. In contrast the reflections of the Arab contributors on the ideas—not the beliefs—they have learnt in the West, and the impact of the West on Egyptian history, are disappointingly banal. The best piece is by Professor Farah of the Atomic Energy Institute in Cairo on the problems in obtaining and assimilating what is needed to provide for the education and livelihoods of a rapidly expanding population.

Finally, the contribution which comes closest to the title of the book, an account of the deficiencies and possibilities of Euro-Arab dialogue, is more interesting for the emotions it reveals than for its information or vision. It is marred by the omission of two pages.

University of Keele C. J. BREWIN

The Contemporary Spanish Economy: A Historical Perspective. By Sima Lieberman. London: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 384 pp. Index. £20·00.

THIS book sets out to 'trace the institutional causality which explains the peculiarities of contemporary Spanish development and which accounts for the serious economic, political and social problems Spain faces today' (p. xi). This is an ambitious task. Professor Lieberman describes the inflow of foreign capital in the nineteenth century, the slow pace of Spanish industrial development behind highly protective barriers up to the Stabilization Plan of 1959 and the subsequent rapid rates of growth which Spain experienced in the 1960s and early 1970s. The structure of agriculture price support schemes and the different systems of land tenure also receive detailed treatment.

In the last three chapters the author outlines the 'economic crisis of the 1970s' (ch. V) and traces the development of free trade unions, the steep rise in unemployment and refers briefly to future growth. It is to these chapters that the reader familiar with developments up to the death of Franco in 1975 is likely to turn with especial interest as material up to this date has already been fairly extensively covered in other studies. Here, however, the reader may well be disappointed. While the views that 'the economic difficulties experienced by the "western world" in the 1970s probably had a stronger impact on the Spanish economy than on other Western European economies' (p. 270) and that 'What the domestic economy needs is a transformation of its productive capacity, which will increase the capital intensity of production techniques so as to bring Spanish levels of productivity closer to those existing in competing nations' (p. 296) are unexceptionable there are few novel insights into the problems besetting the Spanish economy. The same applies to the passages dealing with the trade unions, legalized in 1977, and the rapid growth in unemployment (equivalent to 5 per cent of the active population in 1975 and currently close to 16 per cent). It would also be useful to be given some estimate of what percentage of the workforce is affiliated to the various trade unions.

As an introduction for the general reader to the peculiarities of the contemporary Spanish economy this lengthy book cannot be wholeheartedly recommended. It covers a considerable amount of ground, but does not leave the reader with a clear picture of the various forces which have shaped the course of the economy in latter years. Detailed description does not necessarily make for clarity and in this study excessive detail has tended to obscure rather than illuminate the main themes. Moreover sentences such as 'What these labour leaders failed to realize was that many of their bourgeois co-conspirators were in fact part of the traditional élite class' (p. 146) add little if the composition and function of the élite class is not explained. A surprising omission in this study of Spain's 'stiff-jointed institutions' (p. 8) is an analysis of the structure and workings of the civil service, an institution which is still of considerable importance in the day-to-day workings of the contemporary Spanish economy.

ALISON WRIGHT

USSR and Eastern Europe

The Soviet Union and its Geographical Problems. By Roy E. H. Mellor. London: Macmillan. 1982. 207 pp. Index. £12·50. Pb.: £4·95.

IN recent years, students of the Soviet Union have been amply provided with standard texts, both regional and systematic, on the geography of that country, most of which present, in greater or lesser detail, essentially similar material.

Professor Mellor's book is a welcome—and successful—attempt to break away from this somewhat standardized format and to concentrate on a number of basic trends and problems. In his opening statement, the author draws our attention to three major features: the harshness of the physical environment, the rapid economic changes now in progress and 'the relaxation of the tight encapsulation of Stalinist days' (p. xii).

Chapter 1, 'The Soviet Milieu' rightly deals in some detail with the physical environments of the USSR and the problems which they continue to present to economic planners. This

is followed by eight chapters on aspects of the country's human and economic geography, covering in turn the territorial origins and organization of the Soviet state, its population and settlement geographies, agriculture, industry (resource base and major branches), the transport system and Soviet international relations (political, strategic and economic) since the Second World War. In each case, the basic facts are succinctly stated and major trends and problems clearly defined and discussed.

Errors are few and far between, though it should be noted that the National Okrug (p. 36) was renamed Autonomous Okrug several years ago, that the Kray is not confined to Siberia as suggested on p. 37, and that at least half of total Soviet oil production now comes from Western Siberia (p. 112 'well over a quarter of all crude oil production may now be coming from Western Siberia'). A point on which this reviewer joins issue with the author is the latter's use of the word 'Russia' and particularly 'European Russia' where 'USSR' and 'European USSR' would be more correct. This has led the author to include in his 'European Russia' not only the Ukraine (p. 67) which at least has a Slav population, but also Lithuania (p. 116) which is European but not Russian, and Georgia, which is neither.

These minor deficiencies apart, this volume performs a valuable role in providing, in the author's words (p. xi) a 'review of the geography of the Soviet Union designed for students and others seeking an introduction to this, the world's largest compact political territory'. Readers of Professor Mellor's book will be stimulated to delve deeper into the problems he discusses and will be assisted by the useful guides to further reading provided at the end of each chapter.

University of Durham J. C. DEWDNEY

East Central Europe: Yesterday—Today—Tomorrow. Edited by Milorad M. Drachkovitch. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 417 pp. Index. $25.95.

THE history of Poland cannot be predicted; one must wait on events. This sentiment could be extended to the whole of East Central Europe. Thirteen of the seventeen papers included in this book were first read at an international conference at Stanford in January 1980. Then came the historic Gdansk agreement of 31 August 1980 which led to every contributor being asked for a brief comment. By the date of publication, May 1982, events had further overtaken the editor. The declaration of martial law in December 1981 brought to an end the legal existence of Solidarity and attempted to put the political clock back.

The book is divided into two parts. The first provides a 'Panoramic survey of developments over several decades'. Adam Ulam provides some reflections on the years since 1945; Robert F. Byrnes examines the relationship with the Soviet Union and the way the region has evolved; Leszek Kolakowski writes on ideology; Robert Wesson on Eurocommunism; Peter Wiles on the region as an active element in the Soviet Empire; Werner Gumpel on the area and international economics; Richard Starr on Soviet foreign policy; John Erickson on the Warsaw Pact; and Hugh Seton-Watson provides some historical musings.

A wealth of information is provided and this reviewer particularly enjoyed the contributions of Byrnes, Kolakowski and Erickson. Kolakowski compares the ideas of Solzhenitsyn, Sakharov and Zinoviev on ideology and comes to the conclusion that Solzhenitsyn is wrong in believing that the present Soviet leadership is the prisoner of Marxist–Leninist ideology. Rather, it 'adheres to the doctrines as a tool to retain and extend its power'.

The second part is devoted to surveys of the evolution of Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the GDR, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Yugoslavia.

The Polish events led to the inconceivable happening: a free trade union operating for sixteen months with the official communist party helpless. East Central Europe will clearly never be the same again; hence the unthinkable may again happen. In the light of these events two themes are missing from this study: the role of religion and the possibility of a 'barracks socialism' emerging. The influence of the churches has grown not only in this region but also in the Soviet Union. What consequences will flow from this? The military has come to power on the back of the communist party in Poland and intends to remain in power. Arguably, only the instruments of coercion have sustained communist rule. Will economic failure produce the same scenario in other countries?

Although this publication contains much interesting material it has fallen between several stools. The implications of the Polish events for the region deserve to be treated in a further conference.

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London MARTIN MCCAULEY

Postwar Soviet Politics: The Fall of Zhdanov and the Defeat of Moderation, 1946–53. By Werner G. Hahn. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1982. 242 pp. Index. £17·00. $29.25.

ZHDANOV gained notoriety in the postwar years for his repressive policies, and became one of that select band of Stalin's associates to have a period named after him. The *Zhdanovshchina* was associated with strident ideological campaigns accompanied by outbursts of intense chauvinism at home, while virulent cold war denunciations and assertions were broadcast to the wider world. However, in the well supported argument of Werner G. Hahn, Zhdanov promoted such a hard-line approach as a tactic to gain power, rather than as a strategy to be pursued once he had firmly established his position in the top echelons of Soviet government. Having examined the mechanics of Zhdanov's rise, Hahn subjects to an interesting scrutiny three great debates of 1947 in philosophy, biology and economics. To take in turn just the most prominent figure from each of them, G. F. Aleksandrov was under suspicion for having failed in a book on Western philosophy to criticize it sufficiently, for example, not giving enough emphasis to the fact that Hegel had been a blatant German racist and nationalist. T. D. Lysenko, on the other hand, was placed on a pedestal for having developed a distinctively Soviet theory of genetics. And Ye. S. Varga was in trouble for having suggested in a book on changes in the economy of capitalism as a result of the Second World War that Western governments had gained considerable power over their economies and introduced a significant amount of planning into them. Zhdanov or his close associates took a moderate line in each of these debates, especially against Lysenko, leaving himself open to attack by those who had taken up the extremist position that he himself had helped to enunciate, especially since the break with Yugoslavia had intensified the cold war atmosphere. Reaction triumphed after the fall and death of Zhdanov in the summer of 1948, and such events as the Leningrad Case and 'Doctors' Plot' made Stalin's last years much more uncomfortable than those immediately following the war. Hahn clearly indicates that political struggles existed not only for position but also over ideas during Stalin's dictatorship, and that comparative liberals like the philosopher B. M. Kedrov could survive even the most difficult times.

University of Aberdeen PAUL DUKES

Russia at the Crossroads: The 26th Congress of the CPSU. Edited by Seweryn Bialer and Thane Gustafson. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 223 pp. Index. £18·00.

WESTERN analysts widely assume that in the 1980s the Soviet Union will face a number of serious problems—international, domestic, political, social and economic. The book under review attempts to identify the main ones among them and, in addition, to assess the Brezhnev era.

One of the foreign problems will be that of Soviet-controlled Eastern Europe, where multiple pressures for change exist. The Soviet leadership's dilemma will be whether (and to what extent) to tolerate departure from the Soviet norm in the area in order to encourage the established régimes' stability and viability, or whether to increase control over the area in order to assure adherence to the Soviet norm and uniformity. For several reasons, in the years to come the Soviet Union may find it more difficult to carry the 'burden of empire'.

Domestic problems will include, inter alia, those of a slow-down in economic growth, the declining capital growth rate, the relative scarcity of labour, low labour productivity, energy resources, the population's standard of living, and demographic trends. At least some of them stem from, or are influenced by, the nature of directive economic management: overmanning at the enterprise level is an example, and Nancy Nimitz discusses systemic obstacles to technological innovation in industry.

Besides, there will be the problem of succession which will inject a pronounced element of unpredictability and uncertainty into the entire Soviet political process. The succession, aside from its intrinsic importance, may release pressures which already exist within society, but which previously had limited opportunity for expression (Seweryn Bialer, p. 24), as well

as erode, if only temporarily, Soviet dominance over Eastern Europe and thereby hasten existing tendencies toward autonomy and reform (Charles Gati, p. 185). It will also raise the question of the new leadership's attitudes and responsiveness, that of systemic constraints on change, that of the impact of domestic difficulties on the new leadership's international behaviour (the former could increase the new leadership's need for spectacular successes abroad), etc.

While the contributors recognize that the Soviet Union is confronted with mounting problems, their interpretations of the problems diverge, and the disagreements are traced by Richard Coffman and Michael Klecheski. According to them, for instance, the contributors' differing responses to the 26th Congress of the CPSU are rooted in prior assumptions about the likelihood that the Soviet Union is approaching a crossroads in the 1980s. Expectations that the Soviet Union *is* approaching a crossroads in its history mould one response. The alternative response grants that changes are occurring in the context of Soviet policies, but does not believe that the Soviet Union has reached a crossroads necessitating major changes in the existing system (pp. 218–9).

It goes without saying that the diversity of opinions concerning the Soviet Union's present condition and future prospects, displayed by the contributors, does not diminish the book's importance. Systematic and painstaking research into this superpower is needed now more than ever before, among other reasons because of Western anxieties about present and future Soviet foreign policy intentions. And these anxieties are justified, inter alia, by the Soviet Union's past record of international behaviour, as well as by its unending and unrelenting arms build-up.

St Antony's College, Oxford J. L. PORKET

Britain and Soviet Communism: The Impact of a Revolution. By F. S. Northedge and Audrey Wells. London: Macmillan. 1982. 280 pp. Index. £15·00. Pb.: £6·95.

THE authors of this volume are concerned with 'the problem of how Britain is best to deal with the Soviet Union' (p. viii) and to this end they have produced a very readable account of Anglo-Soviet relations, past and present, replete with reflections about the USSR's impact on Britain, particularly on the Left. The spirit behind the book is positive. The thinking falls well within the outlook of men like Lloyd George: trade would improve political relations; much at fault in the relationship is due to misunderstanding and ignorance. One can only agree. However, the authors' repeated sermons on 'our ignorance of the USSR' (see, for example, pp. 236 and 241) are weakened by the fact that neither of them is able to read Russian and the Russians themselves publish little of significance in English. Instead the authors modestly confine themselves to a somewhat arbitrary selection of English language sources to focus purely on the British side of the relationship. They claim to do no more, but the excuse offered is specious: that there is a 'paucity of information available to Western scholars about the making of the external policy of the Soviet Union' (p. vii). Agreed, we do not have the Politburo minutes; but we do have over thirty volumes of Soviet diplomatic correspondence covering the years 1917 to 1939, with telegrams to and from Moscow packed with judgements about countries like Britain from the Commissar, his colleagues and subordinates (including Politburo decisions as well).

The text is lucid and the judgements made are, on the whole, well-informed. Only occasionally is one unnerved by a rather cavalier treatment of historical fact in the authors' earnest pursuit of better Anglo-Soviet relations. For example: 'Had Soviet industrialisation begun on the basis of substantial economic cooperation with the West, Western countries might have been in a position to exercise some influence on Soviet affairs during those crucial years when Russia's future was in the melting pot' (p. 42). The whole point about the rush to industrialize at the end of the 1920s was that Western hostility precipitated it in the first place and the climate which engendered Russian fears was, of course, the same climate which made Western aid on any scale so unlikely.

The absurdity of some of these judgements stems directly from the authors' failure to consult available sources. A prime example of this is their odd treatment of June 1941. Here they argue that 'it requires some imagination to accuse Stalin, of all people, of blindness to Russia's interests' (p. 77). One would have thought it requires an outstanding piece of fiction to demonstrate otherwise. Surely the authors are aware that there is more on this (and in

English) than Llewellyn Woodward and Churchill's memoirs! There are other indications that the subject has not been approached with the scholarly scrupulousness it requires. Alongside the above there are a number of minor errors in the text which show a careless disregard for historical fact available in secondary sources, as well as a failure to consult the most obvious of these, such as Carr's volumes on the period 1917 to 1929 other than merely *The Interregnum*—indeed the authors appear to think that Carr's *History* is still 'in progress' (p. 250) when it was completed in 1978. Litvinov is described as 'Foreign Minister' in 1921 (p. 35)—what would poor old Chicherin say? Roosevelt is said to have recognized Russia in March 1933 (p. 52); Moscow is said to have used the term 'social fascists' by the end of 1927 (p. 206) etc. (see Carr's *Foundation of a Planned Economy Vol. 3, II* pp. 638–43.)

But the most unfortunate example of the authors' approach to the use of sources is the attack on Carr as a blindly pro-Soviet intellectual (have the authors not read his articles on the purges written at the time?). On pp. 153–4 he is deliberately quoted out of context. The flavour of this attempt to denigrate him can be caught from this sentence: 'Russia has a reputation for taking over small countries, but, says Carr, that is the way of progress'. Carr nowhere says this, and to counter the impression given by the selection of amputated phrases used to 'prove' all this, he should be read unexpurgated in the original volume of *The Soviet Impact on the Western World*. At the very least this sort of smear casts the credibility of the whole volume into question. It is a shame that to prove a rather good case about Anglo-Soviet relations, the authors have at times distorted the evidence so wretchedly.

University of Birmingham JONATHAN HASLAM

The Economy of Yugoslavia. By Fred Singleton and Bernard Carter. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 279pp. Index. £19·95.

THE Yugoslav economy is interesting as a case study of market socialism, and because of the extreme variety of cultural, economic and even geographical conditions within the state of Yugoslavia set up after the First World War. This book emphasizes the diversity to be found in Yugoslavia and gives an admirably clear summary of the historical background, the troubled politics of Yugoslavia between the wars, and its economic conditions during that period.

The most important section covers the evolution of the Yugoslav economy since the Communist Party came to power in 1945. The style of economic planning and organization has altered with the shifts in Yugoslavia's political direction. The Yugoslavs began by copying the Soviet model of centralized state planning, and after the 1948 break with Moscow embarked on a short-lived collectivization drive to prove their communist zeal, but in the early 1950s they changed course. Tito espoused workers' control—'self-management' in Yugoslav terminology—which has become the ideological cornerstone of Yugoslav socialism and the organizational basis for its economy. As a result of decentralization of powers to enterprises, and (since the early 1960s) a belief in market mechanisms, the Yugoslav state has divested itself of the levers of economic control to an astonishing degree. This book explains the present complex system of economic organization, which includes decentralization of economic powers to shop floor units within larger enterprises, and is further complicated by the federal governmental structure. Planning is indicative, and appears to be based on political compromise and persuasion. When both break down the government sometimes steps in with arbitrary administrative measures.

One of the authors' difficulties is how far to pursue the political factors intertwined with the various economic reforms and reorganizations. They settle for charting the main political developments and clarifying the formal economic organization. This is understandable in a primarily economic analysis, but is not wholly satisfactory. It leaves unclear, for example, how far the Party tries to pull the decentralized economic units together.

Yugoslavia is also a case study of economic development, and this book is very helpful in examining both its rapid growth and its inherent weaknesses: the enormous gap between the developed and poorer regions; how the division of the country into republics (with diverse national and economic interests) undermines the reality of a Yugoslav market; and why Yugolsavia is so vulnerable to inflation. There is an excellent analysis of the precise nature of the high unemployment rate.

This book does not pursue in any depth some of the interesting questions which have been raised in earlier literature about the possible conflict between self-management and socialist economic goals; but as an introductory book for students or non-specialists it is very readable and informative, and reflects the detailed personal knowledge both authors have of Yugoslavia.

Somerville College, Oxford APRIL CARTER

Self-Management in Yugoslavia and the Developing World. By Hans Dieter Seibel and Ukandi G. Damachi. London: Macmillan. 1982. 316 pp. Index. £20·00.

National Income and Outlay in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia. By Jaroslav Krejci. London: Macmillan. 1982. 122 pp. Index. £15·00.

YUGOSLAVIA's system of self-management has developed from the first law in this area in 1950, which concerned only state economic enterprises, to the concept of a self-managed society, which is enshrined in the 1974 Constitution and the 1976 Law on Associated Labour. When the process began Yugoslavia was one of the least economically developed countries in Europe, with a per capita national income of less than $200 per year. Today it is at the middle level of development, with a per capita annual income of over $2,500. Between 1953 and 1964 it sustained a rate of growth of over 8 per cent per year. Can these successes be attributed to the system of self-management? Has Yugoslavia's experience anything to teach the developing countries of the Third World today? Professors Seibel and Damachi are amongst those who would answer yes to both these questions.

The first two thirds of their book consist of an account of the evolution of the system. The main source is a semi-official apologia, 'Yugoslavia: Self-management in Action', by Milan Bajec. There are also sixteen pages of verbatim quotations from the 1974 Constitution, which is described as 'A Model Constitution of Self-Management'. This is supplemented by impressionistic accounts of interviews with managers, officials of trade unions and chairmen of workers' councils which took place during a tour of enterprises in Slovenia and Croatia in 1973. Over 'the customary libations of Turkish coffee, soda water, cognac and fruit juice' and in the presence of an official interpreter, various personal stories were recounted—including one about a worker who was cured of stammering by having to present the grievances of his fellow workers to the general manager (p. 76)! One is reminded of the enthusiastic accounts of life in the Soviet Union which Hewlett Johnson and the Webbs brought home in the 1930s. Little is said about the real problems of Yugoslavia's workers. There is no serious discussion of such issues as the role of the League of Communists, the reason for strikes, the relationship between self-management and inflation and the problems of regional economic inequalities. Although published in 1982, the book was clearly written before 1976, as it fails to examine the 1976 Law on Associated Labour.

The last section of the book begins with some interesting studies in social anthropology which suggest that there is a tradition of cooperation amongst some West African tribes which goes back to pre-colonial times. The rice-saving cooperatives of the Mano, Kpelle and Dan peoples of Liberia, and various forms of sickness and burial clubs, are cited as examples. It is suggested that modern forms of self-management can grow from these traditions; however, the argument is no more convincing than to suggest that the self-help cow clubs which flourished in North Yorkshire in the nineteenth century form a basis for the collectivization of agriculture.

A case can be made that the Yugoslav experience has relevance to the problems of the Third World. Unfortunately, this book does not do justice to that case.

Professor Krejci's comparative study *National Income and Outlay in Czechoslovakia, Poland and Yugoslavia* has a narrower focus than that of Seibel and Damachi. The author concentrates his statistical searchlight on the economic performance of the three chosen societies, each avowedly built on Marxist principles, but each owing much to its own unique historical and cultural background. Marx may have attempted to discover universal laws on such matters as surplus value, but he also knew that no nation can forget its own history.

Professor Krejci was deeply involved with the development of the post-war economy of Czechoslovakia, serving for a time as head of the National Income Department of the State Planning Office, until suffering what is euphemistically called 'an enforced break in his academic and professional career' (1954–67). After a brief return to public life during the

Prague Spring, he managed to keep a healthy distance ahead of the advancing Red Army, and now teaches in Lancaster University.

Such a background enables him to evaluate the statistical raw material which he employs with such skill. (Statistics, as he delicately puts it, can be 'the correct addition of incorrect figures', or as the computer operator's formula expresses it: RI=RO—Rubbish in=Rubbish out.) In a long appendix to this short monograph Krejci gives us the data from the official statistics, but in the text his examples are based on a sophisticated and wholly convincing interpretation of this raw material.

The work is not only a valuable exercise in methodology, but also provides a penetrating analysis of the reality behind the numbers. His study of the effort–reward relationship based on comparisons of per capita NMP and per capita personal consumption in the three countries shows that in the period 1955–1980 'only Yugoslavia managed to keep a more or less proportionate development of effort and reward' (p. 72). In Czechoslovakia per capita NMP increased by 13 per cent more than per capita personal consumption, and productivity by 41 per cent more than real wages. In Poland the figures are similar. Solidarity knows this; does General Jaruzelski? In an illuminating chapter on regional differences, the success of Czechoslovakia in closing the gap between the Czech lands and Slovakia contrasts with the failure of the Yugoslavs to improve Kosovo's position relative to the northern republics.

This study is a spin-off from a much larger collective enterprise on the Economic History of Eastern Europe since 1919, directed by Michael Kaser. Krejci's work is the first swallow which heralds a bounteous spring.

Bradford University F. B. SINGLETON

The Economic Development of the USSR. By Roger Munting. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 228 pp. Index. £13·95.

MUNTING's book is the first in a new series on modern European history to be published by Croom Helm and so it is significant not only for its own sake but also for the impression it creates about the series. As far as the present reviewer is concerned, this impression is largely favourable: the series has started well.

Books in this series are intended as introductory texts, which normally means that a great deal of material has to be surveyed, but within space limitations which prohibit a very detailed or in-depth treatment of most issues. Munting tackles this difficulty by concentrating in each chapter on a small number of major issues, which allows him to achieve a certain amount of depth though it also involves omitting other topics. However, this approach is considerably better than giving a superficial account of everything, and has the further merit of raising questions which invite the reader to seek out more detailed or specialized material elsewhere. That is surely just what we should expect from a good textbook.

As for the book itself, Munting begins his account before the 1917 revolution, emphasizing the extent and rate of development already under way in Russia before the First World War, and covers the period up to the 1970s, ending with three more general chapters on population, labour and incomes (ch. 8), the USSR in the world economy (ch. 9) and a short conclusion. The latter, while noting points of continuity between pre- and post-revolutionary Russia, also emphasises the major new departure—planning. Despite serious shortcomings and weaknesses the Soviet Union has impressive achievements to its credit, though the recent slowdown in economic growth rates has allowed a number of social and economic problems to come to the surface.

On a more critical note, there are just a few confusing printing errors and, more seriously, some rather unclear tables and statistics: in fact the presentation and use of statistics is generally not as careful as it should be. For example: the text on p. 32 refers to an increase in industrial production of 74·1 per cent between 1900 and 1913, whereas the quoted figures imply an increase of 93·2 per cent; I suspect the figures shown in Table 1.5 are in thousands; there are some confusing changes of units (e.g. as between Tables 1.1 and 7.3, or 4.5 and 4.6); and finally, the end of p. 105 is confusing—I presume it means growth in (GNP per unit of capital) rather than (growth in GNP) per unit of capital.

Overall, however, this is a stimulating book providing a balanced account of the principal features of Soviet economic development at about the right length and level for an introduction: it should prove to be a useful addition to the literature.

University of Stirling PAUL HARE

The Third World in Soviet Military Thought. By Mark N. Katz. London, Canber Croom Helm. 1982. 188 pp. Index. £10·95.

Dr Katz divides Soviet military thinking about conflict in the Third World into six aspec the relationship of local war to world war; the nature and types of wars in the Third Worl peaceful coexistence and wars of national liberation; indigenous Third World forc American ideas and actions in local wars; and the Soviet role in Third World conflicts. The aspects are examined in Soviet military writings during the early Brezhnev era (1964–68), t middle years (1969–75) and the more recent period (1976–81) in order to establish how t Soviet view of the Third World has changed, to see whether there are policy differenc between the Party and the military and to assess the relationship between military thoug and Soviet foreign policy.

The documented changes in the Soviet view of the Third World can be summarized ve briefly: local wars are no longer thought inevitably to lead to world war and Soviet milita strength is one of the main reasons why they will not escalate. Three new kinds of war ha been added to the traditional typology of four: wars by the people against a regime extreme reaction; wars between and within Third World countries; and wars of nations (the path of socialist development in defence of socialism. Dr Katz points out that th enhanced categorization still does not enable Soviet theorists to deal intellectually with wa between socialist countries. After 1971 the military began to be in favour of peacef coexistence, having previously expressed their disapproval of the concept by remaining siler The Soviet view of indigenous Third World forces has become increasingly pessimistic these forces have shown themselves to be unreliable as allies and as socialists. Soviet conce with American ideas about local wars has given way to a more objective analysis of Americ military action. The Soviet role in Third World conflicts used to be seen as minimal—tl Marxist—Leninist view of history made Soviet intervention unnecessary to encourage tl spread of socialism. However, pessimism about the reliability of indigenous forces accompanied by the recognition that direct intervention is sometimes necessary to sa socialist gains in the Third World. The author sees this intervention as being essential defensive, though no less alarming to the West for that.

Dr Katz documents these changes so thoroughly and painstakingly that he sometim becomes repetitive. His analysis of the policy differences between the military and the Par and the relationship between military thought and Soviet foreign policy is more superficia He also gives a brief account of civil–military relations (too complex a topic for a mere tw pages); and concludes with an epilogue on the implications of his findings for US policy.

As a study of the changes in Soviet military thinking about the Third World, this is valuable book. Perhaps the author was too ambitious in attempting to fulfil his other ain in such a short monograph.

University of Surrey MARGOT LIG

Middle East

Inside the Middle East. By Dilip Hiro. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1982. 471 p Index. £12·50.

Dilip Hiro is not a Middle East specialist; that is possibly one of the reasons why h comprehensive study of the region could be recommended to the general reader. At the sam time, however, the wealth of research and detail makes it an adequate reference book for tl specialist. Both would welcome the glossary of Arabic, Hebrew and Russian works and a li of common abbreviations which Mr Hiro sets out at the beginning. The study, which is i five parts, deals in turn with the history of the region, secular and religious forces at work the internal and external policies of Israel, the Arabs and the international arena and a analysis of future trends. Mr Hiro's previous major works have been on India: studies of th interaction of religion, culture and politics in a Third World setting of which he has persona experience. When it comes to dealing with religion and culture in the Arab world, Mr Hiro drawing on that experience, elucidates with skill, perception and conviction. His politic analysis on the other hand he handles as an outside observer attempting to impose th

discipline and clarity of a researcher rather than a specialist on the complex arguments and projections relating to the region's future. Aware of the rapidly changing situations in the Middle East, Mr Hiro has drawn heavily on newspaper items and commentaries. He is himself a journalist and the combination of academic application and journalistic style has once again proved to be a highly effective one.

KATE MAGUIRE

The Middle East and North Africa: The Challenge to Western Security. By Peter Duigan and L. H. Gann. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1981. 141 pp. Index.

THIS study was written in 1980 and although the authors projected much of what has subsequently taken place in the Middle East, the study has to a certain extent been outdated by events. At the outset the authors clearly indicate that this study has been written with American interests in mind. This is important when the reader comes up against their proposed possible solutions to regional problems.

The first two chapters attempt to outline the World of Islam and the Middle East in general. The limit on space allocated to this background must account for the broad generalizations and incomplete and unexplained conclusions which emerge from time to time. The focal point of the study is obviously not in these introductory paragraphs but in the following two chapters, entitled Trouble Spots. According to American interests these are the Maghreb, Israel and Lebanon, Iran, the Gulf states, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. While internal and regional rivalries are given some attention, the overriding concern is the Soviet Union and the American conviction that all Soviet policies in the region are directed towards controlling Middle East oil supplies to the West. The writers freely criticize American administrations for their handling of situations in the Middle East, such as that in Iran, when, the writers claim, the United States should not have given in over the hostages. They point out that being a diplomat has risks like any other profession. Yet the tactics and solutions the writers suggest the present US administration should take, in a number of cases, would lead the United States into the very predicaments and prolonged conflicts which the authors criticize US foreign policy for not avoiding. For example, in the Maghreb: the United States should support a moderate monarchy in Morocco because an unstable Morocco would damage the interests of Israel, Egypt and Zaire. The United States should supply Morocco with more hardware and set up military bases there to combat a Soviet arms build-up in Libya; regarding Libya, the United States should encourage Egyptian expansionism at Libya's expense; for Iran, there is a suggestion of a fall back to a 'spheres of influence' agreement, the Soviet Union taking Iran and Afghanistan and the United States Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. It therefore comes as some surprise that the Arab–Israeli conflict is handled more sensitively and less naively.

Now that the Middle East has been neatly parcelled up and disposed of by outside parties, mainly the United States, the authors conclude with what could be described as the United States' grand strategy: 'The Saudis can become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf by using oil, money, and diplomacy, not guns. Pakistan can provide the troops, and the West can supply the arms.'

KATE MAGUIRE

The New Arab Social Order: A Study of the Social Impact of Oil Wealth. By Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1982. 208 pp. Index. £13·95.

THE 'new Arab social order' of which Saad Eddin Ibrahim writes covers more than is implied by the phrase 'a study of the social impact of oil wealth', although this latter focus is central to the book. It is a compelling analysis of the current disarray of the Arab world which locates this contemporary system in the context of the oil price increase. The argument is illustrated with an array of relatively up-to-date statistics and survey findings and a lively human dimension is added in a chapter which sketches the life and politics of some archetypes ranging from 'The Lumpen Capitalist: The Saudi Entrepreneur' to 'The Angry Muslim Militant'.

The major argument is that oil wealth has brought about social, economic and political changes akin in quantity and quality to those brought about by colonialism. The author

examines the effects of oil by focussing on Saudi Arabia and Egypt as two ends of the scale: the capital rich labour importer and the poor labour exporter. He analyses the negative and positive aspects of inter-Arab labour migration on both social systems. For Egypt, he argues that it was Sadat's accession to power which changed Nasser's policy of industrialization through utilizing Egyptian skills to one of 'exporting negatives and importing positives', that is, the 'demographic surplus' is exchanged for capital inflows through remittances. On balance the conclusion for Egypt is more negative than positive; the consequences have included a labour shortage of the educated and skilled working class, wage increases caused by immigration and inflation effecting those on fixed salaries. Some of these consequences are not the direct result of the impact of oil wealth as the author is aware when he touches (perhaps too briefly) on the changing class structure and development polices under Sadat.

For Saudi Arabia, there is a different set of negatives and positives. Without the import of labour, the massive development plans for infrastructure and education would have been impossible. Yet the consequences are envisaged as destabilizing of culture and the political dominance of the ruling family. The author argues that repressive labour laws, unequal distribution, new political consciousness among young educated Saudis and an increasing crime rate press Saudi Arabia into a dilemma of security versus growth. According to Ibrahim, the 1977 Mecca 'mosque siege' was the first manifestation of a 'convergence of dissidence'.

In the final chapters the author attempts to come to some overall conception of the 'new Arab social order'. He argues that it is rooted in the extent of interdependence with all its tensions, conflicts and inequalities between states and that these are determined by 'the flow of manpower and money across Arab state borders at levels and magnitudes never precedented in the last few centuries' (p. 156). This interdependence has come about not through the political success of the nationalists of the 1950s and 1960s but through oil price increases and demands for manpower.

Although certain parts, for example, the treatment of the Arab world as a social system, are less than convincing and some of the material could be interpreted differently, the work as a whole is interesting, stimulating and written in a lively fashion with lots of valuable material on contemporary Arab societies.

University of Manchester DAVID POOL

Saudi Arabia's Development Potential: Application of an Islamic Growth Model. By Robert E. Looney. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 358 pp. Index. £25·00.

Saudi Arabia: Energy, Development Planning, and Industrialization. Edited by Ragaei El Mallakh and Dorothea El Mallakh. Lexington, Mass.: 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 204 pp. Index. £16·50.

THE exploitation of oil resources by international firms and the exercise of OPEC muscle have propelled Saudi Arabia into international pre-eminence, mitigating her parochial inclinations. There has consequently been an upsurge of interest in Saudi Arabian affairs. The above two books appear to have been written about the same time in the climate of the second oil price explosion of 1979–80. The second one (the lesser of the two volumes) is a collection of articles edited by the two El Mallakhs consisting of fifteen mostly short essays contributed by seventeen authors (nine of whom are evidently Saudis) for a conference held in October 1980. The topics discussed are wide-ranging and rather lacking in thematic coherence; hardly any are particularly original. The Saudi contributions tend to be descriptive in style, often an uneasy mixture of apologia and eulogy for the kingdom of Saudi Arabia. One notable exception to this is an opening introductory article by Ali Johany in which he puts forward the interesting suggestion 'Everybody would be better off if the real price of water were paid and then given back to consumers as a lump sum. . .' (p. 13). The four more substantial articles in the collection deal with the interaction of Saudi oil and industrial policies (Paul Stevens), the prospects for the Saudi petrochemical industry (Hugh Hambleton), a description of the Saudi third development plan for 1980–5 (the El Mallakhs) and monetary sources of inflation (Michael Keran and Ahmed Al-Malik). Interestingly, this latter essay asserts that Saudi Arabia is not essentially different from industrial countries in the

impact monetary policy exerts on inflation, and concludes that Saudi 'domestic monetary policy plays a significant role in determining the domestic rate of inflation' (p. 142).

This conclusion is contradicted by Robert Looney in his more coherent and systematic survey of the Saudi economy, in which he finds inter alia a 'lack of a significant relationship between the growth of money and inflation' (p. 291). But this is only one of many interesting findings in a commendable and comprehensive treatment of the Saudi development potential which should also prove to be a good textbook, especially the parts containing econometric exercises. The author sees the Islamic role of the Saudi government in terms of a commitment to 'developing the economy as a model Islamic showcase' (p. 43). Despite his emphasis on the adverse influences Islamic doctrine and practice have had on restricting the sophistication of the financial/banking sector and severely limiting the participation of women in economic activity outside the home, the author surprisingly concludes that 'Islamic institutions, while altering the manner in which economic activity is carried out, do not seem to have fundamentally affected the final relationships between the most important macroindicators of economic performance' (p. 237). In what sense, one might then wonder, is it after all an Islamic growth model? This is not made clear, and the author hastens to caution other Middle Eastern countries against similarly basing their economic policies upon Islamic principles since they lack the Saudi latitude and financial bounties. Saudi decision-makers in the economic field are found to be pragmatic, realistic, probably more capable than Iran's Shah of coping with the notorious fragility of an oil-based economy; they are reckoned to be more disposed towards finding answers to the problems which continually arise in an economy that has become critically dependent on oil revenues for expansion, on foreign workers for performance, and on an increasingly dominant government sector irrespective of the Saudi ethos favouring private enterprise. Improvements in the country's planning are seen as crucial but these are not adequately analysed. Although the author shows awareness of the need for institutional and political development, his work is seldom explicit or helpful in this area. One wonders what sort of interpretation Saudi planners might make of his statement 'So far in addition to their phenomenal good luck, Saudi planners have avoided politicoeconomic crises by staying ahead of them. The same feat has to be achieved in the socioeconomic area if the past trend is to become self-sustaining' (p. 94). Nevertheless, there is a great deal in Looney's work which can inspire Saudi leaders and which has been clearly and tactfully expressed. This should be particularly valuable for a country with little tradition of open public debate and hardly any institutions of public accountability of government, two aspects which are becoming not only essential as a means of finding the right answers to development problems, but are also coveted ends in themselves to be enjoyed in an affluent society.

School of Oriental and African Studies A. K. SELBY

Afghanistan: Key to a Continent. By John C. Griffiths. London: Deutsch. 1981. 224 pp. £7·95.

The Struggle for Afghanistan. By Nancy Peabody Newell and Richard S. Newell. Ithaca, NY, London: Cornell University Press. 1981. 236 pp. Index. $14·95.

The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan. By Alfred L. Monks. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1981. 60 pp. $4·25.

INITIAL attempts to interpret the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in December 1979 recalled the actions of the British in 1839. The British, too, had occupied Afghanistan to place in power a more compliant ruler, hitherto in exile under their protection, and had likewise found that his survival depended on their continuing indefinitely to fight Afghan tribesmen, who proved embarrassingly difficult to defeat. That the differences are as striking as the similarities is plain from these very useful books. Griffiths, who writes vividly and lucidly about Afghanistan's varied peoples, has placed the internal crisis in its historical context by focussing on the themes of modernization and Pushtunistan. Rapid change, which nineteenth century rulers had avoided, brought its usual destabilizing effects, especially after 1953 when the changes were such as to convince the mullahs that Islam was in danger. Prince Daoud, in power 1953–63 and 1973–8, compounded the risks of modernization by his demand for Pushtunistan, intended to be a client state formed from the Pathan areas of Pakistan. This hostility to an American ally undermined the policy of ensuring independence through equal

acceptance of Soviet and American aid, and by the 1970s Afghanistan was in danger of becoming a client state of the USSR. Daoud's belated attempts to escape from dependence on the Soviet government and on home-grown Marxist politicians led the latter to overthrow him in 1978. They in their turn, with an even more radical social programme, became the target for even more violent conservative resistance.

It is this Marxist phase on which the Newells concentrate. They show how the process of modernization included the rise to political prominence of those who had been newly educated to serve in furthering the process but who, frustrated by its slowness and by their own lowly role, organized themselves as a Leninist elite ready to seize power and transform society. The sequence of events whereby this revolution was engineered is necessarily obscure, but the Newells, like Griffiths, know Afghanistan well enough to assess the relative probability of reports and rumours. The provisional account they have constructed of developments since 1973, including an analysis of the mujahidin rebellion, reads convincingly and brings to life the hitherto shadowy figures of Taraki, Amin and Karmal. In both works the Afghan upheaval appears as a crisis of modernization, of a kind whose features have become all too familiar. Strategically important states like Afghanistan and Iran have become dangerously troublesome to the major powers in a far more complex way than was ever the case in the nineteenth century.

Equally complex and unpredictable has become the response of those powers, as Monks illustrates in his admirably clear analysis of the Soviet intervention. Every such intervention revives the question as to whether Soviet leaders enthusiastically exploit conflict in pursuit of a grand ideological design or respond defensively to it in an improvised quest for security. Monks is one of those who has broken out of this cycle of controversy by asking a simpler and more directly answerable question: what is there in the way in which Soviet leaders have traditionally perceived and thought about world politics which has, in any given crisis, made one course of action seem more obvious to them than another? First, he identifies as central to Soviet foreign policy the assumptions that international politics consist essentially and inevitably of a conflict between Soviet-led 'socialism' and American-led 'imperialism', and that events everywhere must be interpreted primarily in terms of this conflict. Secondly, Soviet policy is aimed consistently at a permanent alteration in their favour of the 'correlation of forces' in this global conflict, especially by assisting whatever groups seem most likely to lead their country away from the 'imperialist' camp. Thirdly, he detects a recent shift of emphasis in Soviet military doctrine towards greater readiness to use war to preserve not only established socialist states but also states newly setting out on the socialist path. Given such fixed ways of construing the world, military intervention to rescue the Afghan socialist experiment was the most obvious course for any Soviet leader. The preposterousness of Soviet political language has led many observers to discount official explanations of Soviet policy. By expressing Soviet ideas on foreign policy in plain words Monks is able to demonstrate that the invasion did follow logically from traditional communist thinking.

The strength of all three books lies in their analysis of what has already happened. Their suggestions as to what should be done merely underline the difficulty of outsiders doing anything at all without a wholesale reconstruing of the problem. Griffiths suggests encouraging the mujahidin to accept Karmal as leader of a coalition government, together with a Soviet–US guarantee of Afghan independence. The improbabilities inherent in this solution are matched by the Newells' hope that India will be reconciled with China and Pakistan, Iran with the United States and with its neighbours, and Israel with the Arabs so as to facilitate regional support for the mujahidin, with America providing military and financial aid at a discreet distance. Monks is more realistic when he calls for the American government to project an image sufficiently powerful to make the Russians reinterpret the possibilities immediately open to them, but even he goes beyond what is at all likely to happen when he suggests that American policy throughout the Third World should now mirror that of the Russians, backing whatever forces of Right or Left seem the best prospect as allies, to the extent of supporting those opposed to an established government. He makes an impressive case for this, but there is, perhaps regrettably, no evidence that public opinion would allow the United States and allied governments to pursue a long-term and amoral political strategy in the manner, say, of the British during the Great Game.

University of Glasgow

DAVID GILLARD

Africa

Ideology and Development in Africa. By Crawford Young. New Haven, Conn., London: Yale University Press for Council on Foreign Relations. 1982. 376 pp. Index. £19·95.

THE sheer diversity of the African states, as regards their political and economic attributes, is sufficient to ensure that broad comparative surveys are attractive to contemplate, frightening to attempt, and invariably disappointing to read. Crawford Young has the audacity to go even further, and to frame this survey as a test of an influential and straightforward hypothesis; that it is the regimes' choice of ideological perspective which is the key to explanation of the differences in developmental performance. How else to explain the disparities between states with broadly similar colonial legacies?

The result is a fascinating, well-balanced and informative discussion of those states which, to the author, best exemplify the three ideological options he wishes to compare. The 'Afro-Marxist' regimes chosen are Congo-Brazzaville, Benin, Madagascar, Somalia, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique. The states of Tanzania, Algeria, Guinea Bissau, Guinea, Ghana (to 1966) and Mali (to 1968) are classified as 'Populist Socialist'. Kenya, Nigeria and Ivory Coast are initially chosen as the exemplars of the 'African Capitalist' camp; should this selection from the largest and loosest of his categories seem to tip the scales unduly, balance is restored by a survey of the 'perverted capitalist states' of Gabon and Zaire. The book's strength lies in the quality of each of these profiles, which show how ideological considerations interwove with economic, political and strategic imperatives to produce the divergent 'pathways' towards (or away from) development.

There is no attempt at quantitative measurement of development, but rather an avowedly subjective but self-consciously fair consideration of regime performance, focussing on six major areas: economic growth (especially of peasant agriculture), disparities in income distribution, autonomy or independence, incidence of repression, level of participation, and the capacity or effectiveness of state agencies.

But what of the original question? Crawford Young is uneasily aware of the elusiveness of any clear-cut conclusion. He repeatedly shows how other factors 'crisscrossed the ideological spectrum and diluted its explanatory power' (p. 279) and, while maintaining his position that ideological preference is a significant causal factor, he studiously avoids coming to any 'single, unambiguous conclusion' (p. 324).

This is a pity, since the material presented here does indicate the importance of ideology, though not always as a choice of 'policy paradigms' which influence regime performance. It is often the imperatives of the various crises which African states have faced; and the need to legitimate imposed responses, which produce ideological differences. Ideological variation is both a cause and a consequence of differences in regime performance, and it is the careful documentation of this complex relationship, rather than the theoretical framework of the hypothesis or the conclusion, which make this a worthwhile and valuable book.

University of Birmingham DAVID BROWN

South Africa and Southern Mozambique: Labour, Railways and Trade in the Making of a Relationship. By Simon E. Katzenellenbogen. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1982. 178 pp. Index. £18·50.

The Mass Media in the Struggle for Zimbabwe: Censorship and Propaganda under Rhodesian Front Rule. By Elaine Windrich. Gwelo: Mambo. 1982. 112 pp. Index. (Mambo Occasional Papers: Socio-Economic Series No. 15.) Pb.

THESE two studies are narrowly focussed monographs that deal with different aspects of white rule in southern Africa. Katzenellenbogen's study tells the story of how colonial Mozambique came to be dominated economically by South Africa. The core of the relationship between the two countries was large scale migration of cheap labour from southern Mozambique to the gold and coal mines of the Transvaal. In return for permitting recruitment for the mines, the Portuguese colonial authorities secured guarantees that a substantial proportion of Transvaal's imports would be channelled through the port of Lourenço Marques as well as the admission of products from Mozambique free of duty. Katzenellenbogen examines the formal basis of the relationship in agreements between the

rnments involved. These culminated in the 1928 convention between Portugal and South .a which governed relations for the next thirty-five years.

;reement on the 1928 convention forms the conclusion of the study, although Katzenbogen does allude to subsequent developments, including a weakening of Mozambique's uining position as a result of the rise in the price of gold and of the extension of South :a's communication network, which has reduced the importance of Lourenço Marques ›uto) as a port for the Republic. The negotiations between the governments and the icting interests that made agreement between the two sides difficult provide the main ; of the study. Katzenellenbogen does not delve into the reasons why Africans from ıern Mozambique were so amenable to recruitment by the mines or the effect that the ıce of so many able-bodied men had on the region, though he accepts that it has been jor factor in Mozambique's underdevelopment.

ɔnetheless, for the Portuguese colonial authorities, who derived considerable revenue the export of labour, the relationship was clearly advantageous, especially as the mines' ndence on cheap labour and their importance in the economy of South Africa provided ambique with leverage in negotiations over trade and the use of the railway to Lourenço ıues to counter the objections of Cape and Natal interests to the continuance of ambique privileges secured prior to Union. On the other hand, Portugal's financial :ulties and political instability, particularly after the end of the First World War, ided the basis of South Africa's hopes that it would eventually be able to take over ıern Mozambique altogether. An interesting account is given of Smuts's attempt to ›it Portugal's weakness to extend South African control. It includes a map showing the :xtent of Smuts's territorial ambitions during this period. In general, however, there is attempt to relate what is a meticulously researched study to a wider picture of relations ng the states of southern Africa.

indrich examines the policy of the Rhodesian government towards the media from the ion of the Rhodesian Front in December 1962 to the elections under the Lancaster se agreement that brought Robert Mugabe to power. Three different aspects of the :y are examined in detail: the use of the Ministry of Information to promote Rhodesian ıt propaganda; the take-over of Rhodesian broadcasting; and the censorship of the press. ıppendix provides a case study of how the regime presented the first large scale massacre frican civilians, which resulted from a raid on a refugee camp in Mozambique in 1976. :xposes the contradictions in the different accounts the authorities gave of this particular ›de and justifies her conclusion that the government bungled the propaganda exercise to fy the raid. Indeed, while she shows the unpleasantness of the Rhodesian Front's exercise overnmental power and use of social pressure within the white community to enforce ormity on the media, her account does not suggest that control of the media made a ificant contribution to the regime's survival, though she raises the question at the end in context of Mugabe's election as to whether the whites were fooled by their own ›aganda. The seizure of a South African newspaper in 1975 showed the lengths to which regime went to keep out unwelcome news. However, I think she underestimates the ess of Rhodesian propaganda overseas, particularly during the period of the internal ement. If that settlement had received Western recognition, as seemed possible at the ', the outcome might have suggested a different conclusion about the effectiveness of the :rnment's control of information. She does not attempt to relate her study to the options ıg the new government in Zimbabwe. Within these limitations, it is a well argued and ten history of one aspect of a defunct regime. However, the title of the book is slightly eading if it suggests to the reader that the media in general dissented from the views of authorities. On the contrary, her study brings out well the inherent tendency towards ıboration with the regime that makes much of the petty censorship of the press in icular appear both silly and unnecessary.

en's University of Belfast A. B. GUELKE

Presidential Constitution of Nigeria. By B. O. Nwabueze. London: Hurst for amife, Enugu and Lagos. 1982. 558 pp. Index. £19·50.

FESSOR NWABUEZE has long established himself as the African guru of the study of ıtitutionalism in the emergent states of anglophone Africa. This is the fourth substantial

book in less than ten years on the linked themes of presidentialism, judicialism and constitutionalism in Commonwealth Africa, every one a scholarly and welcome contribution for those willing to look beyond and beneath the surface switchbacks of political change in the developing world. This time the focus is on the new Nigeria alone.

Amid the interest aroused since 1979 by Nigeria's attempt to construct a successful Second Republic, as different from the failed First as the sahel from the rainforest, the understandable preoccupation with, say, the complexion of its multi-state composition and its billions of petronaira has tended to overshadow the most radical difference of all between 'Nigeria 1960' and 'Nigeria 1980'; namely, the fact that the Westminster model has followed the one-party state out of the window as the preferred system of government and that Nigeria's nation-state now rests on an American-style presidential constitution.

Despite the shared principle between the American and Nigerian constitutions that the executive is basically a single person in whom the total executive authority is vested, Nwabueze has usefully devised the label of 'consultative presidency' to describe the Nigerian experience. This concept reflects the obligation laid on the President to consult with numerous bodies in the exercise of his powers. In his admirable analysis of Nigeria's new constitution, Nwabueze leads on logically from the general meaning of federalism and a written constitution, through the rationale of the Nigerian experiment, to the division of powers sanctioned by it. From here he considers the nature of the new Nigerian notion of an executive president, the limitations on his power and his relations to the legislature and the judicature. There is, expectedly in the Nigerian case where in 1979 Shehu Shagari became, to cite the title of one polemic, 'President by Mathematics', a full discussion of the election of the first President and the controversial '$12\frac{2}{3}$' provision as argued before the Supreme Court in Lagos. Other chapters (there are nearly thirty in all, extending to over five hundred pages) consider the national assembly, the judicature and the public service within the Nigerian novelty of a presidential constitution, citizenship, the right to life and the dignity of the human person, and the series of freedoms guaranteed by the constitution.

One omission, however, is surprising enough to invite comment. How is it that, when so much of the working of the new constitution is held to depend on the application of the 'federal character of Nigeria', a concept frequently invoked and underlying the whole constitution, such a key phrase is totally ignored in the index (though not, of course, in the text itself, *if* you can find it), the first place that most of Professor Nwabueze's students (and many of his colleagues at the Bar, I suspect) would have learned to look for it and rightly expect to find it?

This is all sound, legal-academic text, crisply argued and respectably supported by comparative evidence and case law. Yet Nigeria would not be the first new state, nor surely will it be the last, to learn that democracy has more to it than the enunciation of high principles and the advancement of constitutional presumptions. The most Utopian of constitutions in this world would still have to be operated by human beings, and this is where the rub lies. It is for this reason that Nwabueze's concluding chapter, on the formation of a national ethic and the prospect for the future of constitutionalism in Nigeria, is one of the most important sections of the book.

With the general election of 1983 almost on us, this is an exceedingly timely text. The polity of Nigeria is going to be put to its severest test yet. Discounting the pie-in-the-sky provision naively aimed at outlawing coups, there must be a sincere hope in every Nigerian's breast, despite Professor Nwabueze's belief that '[as Nigerians] our capacity to circumvent the law, to act outside and against it, is surpassed, if at all, only by a few countries' (p. 541), that they have got it right this time and that the presidential constitution deliberately chosen by the leaders of thought of the putative Second Republic will stand a better chance of survival than the Westminster one insisted on by the political elite of the First Republic. For all the fine words of written constitutions, in Africa above all it is still political culture and human beings that will win or lose the day.

St Antony's College, Oxford A. H. M. Kirk-Greene

Asia and Australasia

China in the Global Community. Edited by James C. Hsiung and Samuel S. Kim. New York: Praeger. 1981. 271pp. Index. £17·95.

THE years since the death of Mao Zedong in 1976 have witnessed rapid and comprehensive change in many aspects of Chinese domestic politics and foreign policy. The same period has also seen the publication of more scholarly books on China's foreign policy than appeared in the previous twenty-five years. Inevitably this has meant that words which may have seemed fresh and new at the time of writing will have lost some of their originality or have become outdated by the time they appear in print.

To some extent, *China and the Global Community* has encountered both problems. To take a trivial example, its first sentence refers to the 'novelty' of its title, yet all too many of the recent books have very similar titles which link 'China' and 'the world' in some permutation. More fundamentally, it was written before China's emphatic move away from an ambitious modernization programme which seemed at the time likely to define foreign policy objectives for the foreseeable future and hence was understandably a strong influence on some of the contributions to this volume.

The book grew out of a three-day workshop which met in 1976 and was itself the product of a sense of dissatisfaction with what were then perceived to be the 'predominant Sinocentric approaches in the study of Chinese foreign policy'. Contributors were instructed to adopt a more global perspective, to be more aware of general international relations research and to pay particular attention to the discrepancies between rhetoric and reality in China's foreign policy. In the resulting volume, some general chapters are then followed by more detailed studies.

A new approach to China's foreign policy may well be needed but this book fails to achieve its stated objective in that respect. This is partly because of the difficulties already mentioned but also, one suspects, because the contributors did not take their guidelines too seriously. For example, out of nearly six hundred footnotes, only seven can be said to relate in any sense to international relations research. Moreover, some ninety per cent of the footnotes are 'Sinocentric' rather than 'globalist' in their orientation (either Chinese in origin or primarily concerned with China).

All this is not to say that the book does not have great value. Indeed it is one of the best and certainly the most professional of the recent works in this field. The general chapters by the editors and Steven I. Levine are useful and interesting, although they contain few surprises for the specialist. There is a thoughtful and well researched contribution from Bruce D. Larkin on China and the Third World, followed by equally valuable discussions of China's energy development (Kim Woodward), foreign trade (Nai-Ruenn Chen), China and the UN (William R. Feeney), arms control (Shao-chuan Lang), and the law of the sea conference (Hungdah Chiu). Samuel S. Kim concludes with a perceptive and wide-ranging overall assessment of Chinese foreign policy.

University of Birmingham J. D. ARMSTRONG

The Roots of Modern Japan. By Jean-Pierre Lehmann. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1982. 352 pp. Index. £16·00. Pb.: £6·95.

THIS book claims to be 'an intensive historical analysis of the sources, forces, motivations, consequences and characteristics of Japan's transformation to modernity', aimed at disseminating wider knowledge and understanding of the evolution of modern Japan. The opening section attempts to highlight significant patterns in Japanese history against the background of Japan's early development. There follows a detailed account of social, economic, political and intellectual developments during the Edo period (1600–1867). The final section is an analysis of changes in the same fields during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, followed by a postscript on Japanese expansionism and imperialism in the twentieth century. A glossary of Japanese terms and brief bibliography are appended.

The treatment of the subject matter is thematic rather than chronological, and while facts are there in abundance their inclusion is essentially to support the analysis. The book's overall theme—which many would regard as a truism—is that Japan's achievements resulted neither from a confrontation between tradition and modernity, nor from static social and

cultural values, but from constant 'dialectic' between an economic base and cultural superstructure. The exposition of this theme and the supporting analysis are in general both stimulating and convincing.

There must, of course, be reservations. The dangers of generalization and oversimplification are inherent in the book's approach. The author avoids taking a stance on the controversial issue of 'modernization', largely by avoiding use of the term and using instead the phrase 'transformation to modernity'. 'Modernity', however, is itself never defined. Maybe there is no universal yardstick for modernity but the economic, but if economic performance is the sole index of modernity here then this should be clearly stated. 'Modern' attributes (including rationality!) are frequently referred to, but there is little indication as to whether the author defines modernity in the stricter sense of 'modern economic growth', or whether he is merely taking his cue from the 'modernization' historians. There is also an inconsistent approach to the use of terminology. The retention and use of Japanese terms where there is no acceptable translation will appeal to the specialist, although the quantity of Japanese words in the text may confuse the non-Japanese speaker. The application of English terminology is less discriminating. The term 'feudalism', for example, is used extensively with little discussion of its applicability in the circumstances, whereas use of the word 'class' in relation to the four estates of the Tokugawa period is singled out for a barrage of criticism. The book is perhaps too long for the general reader—it is a book to be read in its entirety—and its conversational prose style is prone to loose, confusing sentence construction. The bold assertion of historical patterns gives the book an air of authority and 'newness', although its assertions are rarely totally novel, being rather statements of phenomena or ideas which are normally taken for granted. The somewhat infelicitously termed 'samurai-ization', for example, is rarely disputed.

Nevertheless the attempt to define and investigate some of the more widely accepted generalizations regarding Japan is likely to assist the understanding of non-specialists where a simple chronological account would not. Japanese history in the West has become the monopoly of highly specialized professionals; study of Japan rarely figures in general history syllabi and there is a widespread ignorance of Japanese historical development. It is therefore a pleasure to find an account of Tokugawa and Meiji Japan which does not cater exclusively for the specialist, which has a considerable comparative element, and which is, by and large, both highly readable and thought-provoking.

London School of Economics JANET HUNTER

North America

Years of Upheaval. By Henry Kissinger. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson and Michael Joseph. 1982. 1,283 pp.

Dynamics of Third Party Intervention: Kissinger in the Middle East. Edited by Jeffrey Z. Rubin. New York: Praeger for Study of Social Issues. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 303 pp. Index. £18·00.

United States Foreign Policy and World Order. 2nd edn. By James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver. Boston: Little, Brown. 1981. 467 pp. Index.

IF length is anything to go by, the great American novel is being out-manoeuvred by the great American memoir. Dr Kissinger has now published over 2,500 pages of contemporary history covering his years as National Security Advisor to President Richard Nixon and, in the last year of Nixon's administration, as Secretary of State. This second volume is devoted to Nixon's unfinished second term and ends with the resignation of the President in August 1974. But, for those with the time to read, there is not too much of it. Henry Kissinger writes beautifully, with precision, and his narrative is absorbing. He tells of great events and, working out of a Washington that had adopted the star system developed by Hollywood two generations earlier, his tales are highly personalized. His own role is confidently stated. He dominates the photographic sections and rules the text. He is the star, and was so closely identified with Nixon's foreign policy formulation that history and autobiography become indistinguishable. Myths have been created and are still being made, but the archives must

be opened and the accounts of others balanced before objective judgements can be made about this sort of history.

China, Vietnam, the Soviet Union, Jew and Arab in the Middle East, issues of detente, the Year of Europe, the oil crisis; these constitute the areas of focus. The spotlight is on Dr Kissinger, but increasingly the stage is lit by the glow of something called Watergate. This spreads until it illuminates the President himself. A shattered Nixon prays in the Lincoln Room at midnight, accepts the inevitability of resignation, and flies off in his helicopter well before high noon. Dr Kissinger is there, and reflects at leisure.

He is curiously responsive to the power of the presidency and to the awesomeness of its symbolic roles, even though, or perhaps because, he has been so close to it and has participated so fully in the decision-making process. Sometimes he gets carried away, and resorts to extravagant statements that sit oddly with his professed realism. Why does he seem to believe, until it finally happened, that the destruction of a president 'was too staggering to contemplate'? He carefully calls the illegal activities of the Nixon White House extralegal, but balances his criticism by reference to the 'viciousness, self-righteousness and occasional brutality of some of Nixon's enemies' (p. 89). Are we left with a type of pragmatism that judges matters only by their results? If 'a foreign policy issue does not present itself as a theory but a series of realities' (p. 235); if general theorems must be related to concrete circumstances, and overemphasis on ideology might increase vulnerability, then there is a problem in reconciling principles and objectives. It does not seem enough to conclude that 'moral convictions must arm us to face the ambiguity inseparable from the long haul or else they will wind up disarming us' (p. 242). He always emphasizes the need to negotiate from strength, and this must be right, but there is some cause for unease in statements like the following: 'Nixon authorised an immediate B.52 strike. Within forty-eight hours the cease-fire in Laos was established' (p. 317). In advocating the Washington Special Action Group's recommendation to resume bombing in March 1973 Dr Kissinger recognizes the dangers, but justifies the course of action because in crises 'the most daring course is often the safest' (p. 320). The President temporizes, Watergate grows, Hanoi exploits presidential weakness, Cambodia is doomed, Congress cuts off funds, Dr Kissinger is again desperate.

On another front, the 40 Committee, which includes the National Security Adviser, channels funds to Chile merely to maintain the possibility of another election, certainly not to establish the Allende regime. Dr Kissinger is right to emphasise that there is a real, nasty world out there, but his 'realism' sometimes sounds too defensive. It cannot be denied that in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate the idea that 'we had to earn the right to conduct foreign policy by moral purity that we could prevail through righteousness rather than power—had an inevitable attraction' (p. 411). But perhaps the underlying analysis of what constituted geopolitical threats to American interests is capable of a different construction. In many parts of the contemporary world ethical principles have been embodied in religio-philosophical forms that help to define the concept of the nation state. It might almost behove the West to become post-secular.

Rubin's book is a very different sort of animal. Based on Edward Sheehan's excellent article in *Foreign Policy* (1976) on Kissinger's achievements in the Middle East after the Yom Kippur War, a number of 'experts', including social psychologists and labour-management specialists, bent their skills in evaluating Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy. For the most part the essays avoid jargon, although the analysis of game play carries the risk of overdressing the obvious. The editor's comments are highly personal and conversational as he discusses his All-Star Team, and there are laborious statements both of intent and summary conclusion. Nevertheless, the exercise is not without value.

Nathan and Oliver's *United States Foreign Policy and World Order* is the second edition of an established text updated during the Carter administration. A major change is the dropping of the institutional analysis that made up Part II of the first edition. This will be expanded and published separately. What we have here is a readable and authoritative analysis of post-World War II US foreign policy developed chronologically, and in a form that will be enjoyed by students of history.

University of Keele

D. K. Adams

The United States and the Republic of Korea: Background for Policy. By Claude A. Buss. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 184 pp. Index. $10.95.

The Future of US-China Relations. Edited by John Bryan Starr. New York, London: New York University Press. 1981. 270 pp. Index. $32.50.

BOTH these books deal with important areas of the Asian policy of the United States at the moment of transition between the Carter and Reagan administrations, looking respectively at a minor ally and major enemy turned no one quite knows what.

The Hoover Institution is a byword for the deepest conservatism, but readers expecting a panegyric to America's longest-standing Asian confederate would be wrong. Professor Buss has produced a restrained and judicious study of the main features of the Washington–Seoul axis, with the emphasis on the two decades following the rise to power of the late president Park Chung Hee. He sketches a convincing portrait of a South Korea whose social and economic dynamism has still not softened the political repression of a military dictatorship which thrives on the tensions created by the postwar division of the Korean nation. He shows how its links with Washington have to be seen in the complex context of its relations with Russia, China and Japan, and at the same time how US Korean policy has necessarily been subordinated to its concerns worldwide. It is the story of a relationship between two states with very little in common apart from their hostility to communism, a relationship which America never sought, but which it must preserve for the foreseeable future. It must do so because American supervision of South Korea is as essential to stability in East Asia as Soviet control of the North. This makes Korea important to the United States; it does not make it, as Professor Buss claims, 'a flashpoint that could ignite a global war' (p. ix). To say this is to give Korea a centrality it does not possess, but there is no doubt that the nexus between Washington and its half of the peninsula deserves close analysis, and Professor Buss has performed a useful service in giving us just such a guide to the latest phase of its history.

The second work comprises papers commissioned by the United Nations Association of the United States as part of a wide-ranging study of the causes and consequences of the normalization of relations between Washington and Beijing agreed on in December 1978. They cover the issues of China's modernization, Sino–American academic exchanges, the legal status of Taiwan, and the roles played by Russia, Japan, Korea and South East Asia in the normalization process. The topic is momentous—nothing less than the rapprochement of two of the greatest powers in the world after a generation of enmity and misunderstanding—and it is a pity that its long-term historical significance could not have been made the subject of a paper in its own right. That reservation apart, the symposium does a valuable job, particularly in the information it provides on the modernization programme, and in the insights it offers into the achievement of normal relations in the 1970s: Professor Bernard Gordon makes an especially interesting contribution here from the perspective of Indochina. The tone of the papers is suitably cautious, and while generally optimistic, remarkably free of the illusions which have so often obscured America's vision of China over the past century. It is in marked contrast to the bitter and unrepentant conclusions of one of the respondents, Admiral Noel Gayler, who shows all too clearly that he has learned nothing from the experience of Vietnam. But whereas the UNA colloquy may have put Admiral Gayler in a minority of one, its thinking has had no discernible impact on the China policy of the Reagan administration, where Taiwan has resumed an importance not seen since the days of Johnson and Rusk. Belief in the power of enlightened public opinion is one of the articles of faith of American liberal democracy, but it has yet to be shown that it can match the ignorance and the prejudice of the men who continually become the leaders of the American democratic system.

University of Hull JOHN MAJOR

The American People and South Africa: Publics, Elites and Policymaking Processes. Edited by Alfred O. Hero, Jr and John Barratt. Lexington, Mass.: Heath. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot. 229 pp. Index. £15·50.

THIS is a puzzle of a book. The contents list and the subtitle make clear that most of the dozen contributors are less concerned to describe and analyse what is going on in South Africa (Giliomee and Rothberg are the exceptions) than to offer sketches of various domestic American constituences, lobbies and pressure groups and their separate efforts to effect

change in the practices of apartheid. The puzzle lies in the failure of the editors to integrate the essays into a coherent statement about the American 'policymaking process.'

At a very basic, empirical level some of the contributors recognize there are problems. The veteran pollster, Hero, for example, (in his role as essay-writer rather than editor) detects an 'élite–mass divergence,' with the latter wanting US government pressure on South Africa, which the former tends to deprecate. But entangled with this political problem is a methodological one. The evidence of the divergence comes from the printed media (ch. 2) rather than the electronic—yet we are informed (ch. 3) that radio and television are greater shapers and reflecters of public opinion than newspapers, journals and books. And what is public opinion? Is it American Universities (ch. 8) or Religious Institutions (ch. 7—rather narrowly drawn)? The sum or the product of such groups? Or another larger, less or more volatile, less or more powerful agent? We are not told.

Though there is no systemic analysis in the work as a whole, individual contributors suggest various models of the American policymaking process. Crocker (ch. 8) describes and prescribes a consensual view of the workings of power, only to confuse this with notions of natural, mutual countervalence *and* to offer some justified criticisms of the faith which holds that a consensus must be (epistemologically) right. Crocker's own solution, which echoes the 'realists' of the early postwar years, stresses the need for rationality in government—something we could all agree upon, while completely disagreeing about its meaning.

Giliomee's essay on 'South Africa between Past and Future' has something of Crocker's theoretical uncertainties; but it is more honest with itself in asking the question implicit in all the other contributions. What moral and material reasons has the United States for seeking to end—even only to mitigate—apartheid? To bring the 'free market'? But, as Giliomee shows, the free market is not free; and capital may have an interest in ending the peculiar privilege of white labour in South Africa.

Such a thought highlights the pluralist, harmony-of-interests model which uneasily contains these essays. All the more pity, therefore, but all the more understandable is the failure of White's essay on the Black American Constituency to describe the intensity and range of debate in this 'constituency' for generations—not just on South Africa, or even black Africa itself, but on how to win freedom in the capitalist and racist society where they already were.

University of Sussex MICHAEL DUNNE

The Imperious Economy. By David P. Calleo. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1982. 265 pp. Index. £12·25.

STRUCTURAL problems in the American economy have conjured into existence a wide range of books. Few of these books have attempted to deal with the pervasive dissonances between US domestic and foreign policies. Despite the economic turbulence of the last few years, most American authors have not perceived any link between the national economic policy and the international activities of the US government. This book is a good attempt at rectifying this deficiency.

Professor Calleo spends most of his book writing about the political economy of the years since 1900. He focusses particularly on the attempts by successive presidents to liberate economic management at home from the shackles of the dollar's international role. Most of his chapters are spent berating American leadership for trying to conduct international policy-making as though it believed in a smoothly adjusting liberal world economy with America indisputably at its head, but conducting domestic policy with dogmatic Keynesian manipulation. (How quickly Keynesian has become a dirty word for American academics.) The consequence has been increasing inflation, a secular decline in productivity growth and international impotence for the US economy.

The Kissinger world view, as Calleo sees it, was a prime cause of American decline. It allowed laxity—excess military spending, burgeoning budget deficits, flabby domestic political institutions, and the gradual take-over of the congressional process by what Americans euphemistically call 'interest group politics'. In Kissinger's view, continued American hegemony would have arrested the shift of economic and political power away from the United States. Calleo, quite rightly, believes that this was an absurd illusion. The

more America exercised power, in exporting depreciated dollars in the form of trade deficits, in toppling unsympathetic regimes, in sustaining others, the more US influence evaporated.

Liberal capitalism, which the United States suggested was its model for other states, has never been followed by America itself. Indeed, almost alone among Western countries, the United States has still fully to deregulate energy prices, the severest symbol of international economic imbalances in the 1970s.

Unsurprisingly, Calleo sympathizes with the Reagan dream of a balanced and prosperous economy rid of its illiberal shackles. He does not stress enough, however, that most Reaganomic tenets, such as supply-side economics, are just as much attempts at temporary patch-ups as previous switches of emphasis, such as Nixon's 1971 New Economic Game Plan. The United States can no longer operate independently of domestic and international economic polices, as other countries have continuously learned to their cost. The fundamental strengths of the US economy, which are often ignored in America, have allowed political illusions to persist too long.

The current bout of extraordinary pessimism in the United States, particularly with regard to economic performance, has gone too far. Calleo's short section on remedies sometimes allows this overly pessimistic view to surface; but generally he recommends, if somewhat lamely, the right sort of structural remedies for the restoration of American economic influence. Calleo's survey tells us that the economic self-examination of America has only just begun. The road to change will be a long one.

Chris Goodall

The President's Agenda: Domestic Policy Choice from Kennedy to Carter (with notes on Ronald Reagan). By Paul Charles Light. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1982. 246 pp. Index. £12·50. $22.45.

This study of the way in which presidents have developed their initiatives in domestic policy is based upon a questionnaire and interviews with 126 staff members of five presidential administrations. Not all the responses, to judge by the extracts quoted, were greatly enlivening; and, since Professor Light himself adds that political scientist's pedantry which concerns itself with the careful definition of issue, alternative, strategy, programme and so on as parts of the decision-making process, the result is a book worthy rather than exciting.

The ability of presidents to develop an agenda of policies which can then be effectively pressed to a legislative conclusion is, in Light's view, the result of two different sets of circumstances. First, there is the capacity of the president and his staff to choose issues and formulate programmes. As the president and his White House advisers settle down, their expertise grows, their judgment of priorities develops, and, with reasonably competent staff, their management skills and understanding of Congress improve. Over his term of office, the president should become more effective in the generation of appropriate programmes. But this is only half the picture. To carry his proposals into law, the president must have favourable political circumstances. Lyndon Johnson was an active president, with an extensive programme, but his success depended less on his manipulative talents and energy and the quality of his staff than on the election result which gave him a Congress with a majority of liberal Democrats. As Congress has re-asserted itself in the last decade, with the growth of legislative surveillance of the presidency, the proliferation of sub-committees with the right to consider proposals, and the formal restrictions on presidential power pushed through in the post-Watergate period, so the president's task has become more difficult. In addition, the president must contend with an increasingly critical press once the honeymoon period is over, and a diminution of public support as his term continues. Thus, enshrined in the process of presidential policy making is a paradox: as the president's capacity to develop programmes strengthens, so his ability to secure their passage into law weakens.

All this is obvious enough, and there will be few observers of the modern presidency greatly surprised by this conclusion. Professor Light is a little more venturesome when he speculates on the way in which this 'no win' presidency might be converted into a manageable and successful presidency. He suggests that future presidents should start their serious planning earlier, should set their targets on a limited number of critically important programmes, and should avoid the inexpert and amateur White House staffs which have characterized some recent administrations. They would then be, at any rate, well equipped

to take advantage of the honeymoon period, while carefully preparing a second wave of proposals to follow. Sceptics may observe the way in which President Reagan has parodied this suggestion, with tax cuts in 1981 and tax increases in 1982: propose in haste, repent at leisure.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge GERARD EVANS

Latin America

Revolution and the Rebirth of Inequality—A Theory applied to the National Revolution in Bolivia. By Jonathan Kelley and Herbert S. Klein. Berkeley, London: University of California Press. 1982. 279 pp. Index. £18·50.

The Church and Politics in Chile: Challenges to Modern Catholicism. By Brian H. Smith. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 1982. 383 pp. Index. £21·50. Pb: £6·90.

IN much textbook writing about modern Latin America, the Bolivian Revolution of 1952 onwards is presented as the second of three social revolutions occurring in the region this century. It was preceded, of course, by Mexico's great upheaval of the 1910s, and followed a few years later by Fidel Castro's Soviet-style transformation of Cuba. (Nicaragua seems likely to become a candidate for inclusion in this select list in future textbooks.) Unlike Mexico, which had undergone ruthless 'modernization' at the hands of Porfirio Díaz, or Cuba, where extensive penetration by American interests had given many Cubans an untypically high standard of living by the 1950s, Bolivia was (and remains) one of the poorest of Latin American countries. What difference did the revolution make? What difference could it have made? Jonathan Kelley and Herbert S. Klein—the latter an excellent scholar who has recently given us an admirable general history of Bolivia which is distinctly more of a pleasure to read than the work under review here—have no difficulty in convincing us of the radical nature of this particular revolution. A traditional elite *was* displaced: a profound agrarian reform *did* sweep through the countryside; a range of new opportunities *was* opened up to the omnipresent poor. Drawing on a rich stock of hitherto unused survey data, the authors show (pp. 105–22) that, not altogether surprisingly, the popular perception of these changes was generally favourable, not least among the Indian peasants whose previous lot had been so dire. But the primary aim of this strongly quantitative study is less to provide an all-round description of the revolution—given the state of the literature, this would have been welcome—than to use Bolivia as a test-case for a series of lengthily explained hypotheses about social revolutions in general, including communist revolutions. The authors' main point is that while revolutions undoubtedly reduce inequality in the short term, their ultimate outcome, after a generation or so, is to bring about its rebirth—at a higher or lower level than before the revolution, depending on the rate of economic growth in the meantime. Human capital, as opposed to physical capital, seems to be largely immune to revolutionary upheaval: inherited privilege in one form or another invariably raises its head again in due course. Those acquainted with the history of revolutions will not, perhaps, be especially astonished by this conclusion, but it is solidly and ingeniously (if at times somewhat ponderously) argued here; and to the reader primarily interested in Bolivia, this book will yield interesting information not readily available elsewhere.

Brian H. Smith's very thorough and illuminating study of the role of the Catholic Church in Chilean politics will surely be welcomed by all those who have followed recent Chilean affairs and also by students of contemporary trends in international Catholicism. This very worthwhile book raises far too many interesting issues to be dealt with in a short review. Professor Smith is particularly interesting, I think, on the relationship of the Church to the ill-fated Allende government and to its brutally draconian successor-regime. The Chilean Church had long since disentangled itself from too close an association with the status quo and conservative political parties; for a while, indeed, its 'official' outlook on matters of social reform came close to coinciding with that of Eduardo Frei's Christian Democrat party (in power from 1964 to 1970). With the election of Allende in 1970, the hierarchy adopted a 'correct' but also in some ways rather sympathetic attitude to the new government's plans for far-reaching reform. That there were dilemmas implicit in this course of action is very

clear. A number of better-off Catholics resented the Church's increasingly firm stance in favour of the poor. Influenced by Catholic-Marxist dialogue and liberation theology, other Catholics—notably those in the 'Christians for Socialism' movement—wanted what was virtually a partisan attachment to the more revolutionary wing of Allende's *Unidad Popular* coalition. In the anguished last phase of the government, the hierarchy sought to present itself as a force for moderation and conciliation—to no avail. Some bishops, it is clear, had private doubts about the ultimate direction of Allende's programme, and welcomed the coup d'état in what seems, in retrospect, to have been somewhat insensitive language. The Church as a whole, however, now became the one Chilean institution able to operate more or less independently in the authoritarian political framework; since 1973 it has laboured valiantly to alleviate the effects of repression and the harsh economic policies pursued by the Pinochet regime. As part and parcel of this, a whole host of new 'grass-roots' Catholic activities and practices has sprung into being—almost certainly signifying greater Catholic influence in the poorer sections of the community, but also, thinks Professor Smith, likely to pose new problems for the hierarchy when the dictatorship comes to an end. Although the style of this book is at times somewhat influenced by sociologese (I do wish American social scientists would realize that English is *not* German), I can strongly recommend it as a very valuable contribution to the literature on recent times in Chile, and also to the literature on the 'post-Vatican II' Catholic Church.

University of Essex SIMON COLLIER

Jamaica: Struggle in the Periphery. By Michael Manley. London: Third World Media for Writers and Readers. 1982. 259 pp. Index. Pb.: £3·95.

IT is difficult to evaluate Michael Manley's new book because it is far from clear what he is trying to achieve. The book is, he says, neither history nor autobiography, but is intended rather as a reflection, after the event, upon the controversy which surrounded his period as Prime Minister of Jamaica between 1972 and 1980. These years were indeed amongst the most turbulent in Jamaica's colourful history. Manley came to power on a tide of hope buoyed up by the support of Jamaica's underprivileged classes for his extensive programme of reform, but eventually fell from grace eight and a half years later after his party had suffered one of the heaviest electoral defeats ever witnessed in modern Jamaica. His attempt to redress the ills of Jamaican society in accordance with the principles of 'democratic socialism' aroused the hostility of the United States, brought his country's economy to the point of virtual collapse and engendered the worst levels of political violence ever known in Jamaica. In the process, Manley's reputation as one of the Third World's leading visionaries was badly damaged.

This last point perhaps provides the clue to the real purpose of this book. It is designed above all to present the case for Manley's defence. He writes, it seems, 'from the position of electoral defeat, but not from the perspective of failure' (p. xi). The bulk of the book is thus devoted to a restatement of the Caribbean dilemma of dependence, a justification of his government's programme of reform and a description of the severe problems which it encountered. These are explained away largely by reference to 'destabilization' at the hands of the government of the United States. Indeed, one of the most remarkable passages in the book tells of a midnight meeting in a hotel in Miami with Philip Habib, then President Carter's Special Representative for Latin American Affairs, in which Manley was suddenly confronted with a copy of a document produced by the National Executive Committee of his party warning of the possibility of psychological warfare being deployed against the Jamaican people.

His obsession with 'destabilization' suggests that, despite the proclaimed intention of the book, Manley has not in fact reflected very deeply on his experience of office. He presents evidence of 'destabilization' only for the year 1976, at the end of which, it is important to point out, Manley's government was triumphantly re-elected by the Jamaican people. Even if similar tactics continued into his second term they hardly constitute a complete explanation for the failure of his various proposals of reform. It would have been encouraging if Manley had thought more about the merits of his own brand of politics. He does concede at the end of the book that 'we have learned many things' (p. 219), but they turn out to be no more than tactical refinements to essentially the same strategy. The harder questions about the

viability of 'democratic socialist' change in a peripheral capitalist economy like that of Jamaica are avoided.

Huddersfield Polytechnic ANTHONY PAYNE

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USSR Facts & Figures Annual: Vol. 6, 1982. Edited by John L. Scherer. Gulf Breeze, Fla: Academic International Press. 1982. 425 pp. $46.50.

THIS valuable work offers a vast amount of raw information, taken in the main from Soviet publications and covering most aspects of Soviet life. The final section, 'Special topics', is more historical in approach, containing for example a brief analysis of 'defections since 1945'. The contents lists of previous volumes are included.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

Southeast Asian Affairs 1981. Singapore, London: Heinemann Asia for the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1981. 361 pp.

LIKE its predecessors, this volume contains regional papers, dealing mainly with ASEAN, followed by country studies which provide scholarly and readable surveys of recent developments or cover special topics, such as land reform in the Philippines. Two articles are devoted to Brunei, East Asia's least written-about nation.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

The Times Survey of Foreign Ministries of the World. Edited by Zara Steiner. London: Times Books, 1982. 624 p. Index. £40·00.

THIS new reference work undertakes to survey the history of the leading foreign ministries of the major countries of Europe, of Australia and Canada, Japan, the Soviet Union and China. The arrangement is alphabetical by name of country. Each article, written by an expert from the country concerned, follows a similar pattern outlining the role and development of the essential organs of international relations. The early history of some of the long-established systems, as in Spain, Portugal, France and the Netherlands, is necessarily brief, sketching the conduct of foreign policy prior to the establishment of a specific body responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs. The accent is essentially on the conduct of foreign affairs and the change in ministerial and governmental structure of the bodies concerned during the years leading up to the First World War, the involvement in the conflict, the inter-war years, the Second World War and the subsequent reorientation up to the present day. Each article is accompanied by an organigramme and a short bibliography. There is a succinct list of international organizations and their abbreviations, as well as an index.

Chatham House Library N. G.

Asia & Pacific 1982. Saffron Walden: World of Information. 1982. 327 pp. £15·00.

THE third edition of this annual follows the same pattern as the previous year's. Twenty short signed essays on political, economic and security problems in the region are followed by country by country reviews each of which includes an expanded section devoted to factual and statistical information, as well as a clear map. Photographs are interspersed in the text: there is a minimum of advertising material. This is a useful reference work, especially for the businessman and the traveller.

Chatham House Library N. G.

Year Book on International Communist Affairs 1982. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 576 p. $39·95.

THIS Year Book, now in its 16th edition, has increased considerably in size and coverage. It now includes, besides the orthodox ruling and non-ruling parties and various Trotskyist groups, the governing movements in such countries as Ethiopia, Grenada and Mozambique. Events in Poland and their repercussions lend special interest to this edition of a valuable reference work.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

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Books Reviewed, Winter 1982–83

Britain and Europe: ten years of Community membership

Roy Jenkins*

The beginning of this year saw the tenth anniversary of Britain's accession to the European Community: an event which the government announced its intention to 'mark'; not to 'celebrate'. The official opposition seemed to feel it cause more for a wake than a party. Their attitude sums up our behaviour as members over this decade. It has been a semi-detached relationship with very serious results both for Britain's power and influence in the world and for the development of the Community itself.

The decade itself has not produced much to celebrate, either in Britain or in our partners in the European Community. In Britain 1973 was the year unemployment went over one million, and Edward Heath felt the consequences so dire his government had to change its course. Now with record unemployment, manufacturing output lower than it was then, and balance of payment problems on the horizon, it is easy to start the search for scapegoats to provide an explanation for our failings at home, and to cast around for others to blame for our own predicament. Starting from this premise, some seek to persuade us to bury our head in the sands of isolationism; to try to cut ourselves off in a self-dependent economic cocoon of tariff barriers and import controls; to try to deceive ourselves into believing that we are not inevitably linked with the economic and political future and fortunes of those around us; that we can go it alone, ignoring our past and present reliance on trade with the rest of the world for our prosperity and survival. To my mind, it is overwhelmingly apparent that if Britain cannot succeed within the European Community, where there are no tariff barriers and where non-tariff restrictions are also mostly, although not completely, removed, and with access to a market of 300 million people compared to our own market of only 56 million, it is difficult to see how Britain could succeed outside it.

For too long, the question 'in or out?' has absorbed British politicans, to the neglect of the issue of what we should do *in* Europe. Whether or not we should join the Community dominated the politics of the early sixties, when we tried and failed to become a member. It dominated the politics of the early seventies, even after the House of Commons voted in 1971 by a majority of more than 100 to join the EEC, and even though that decision was subsequently endorsed by a majority of two to one in the referendum of 1975. Now, after ten years, our membership has had a profound effect on the British economy and Britain's position in the world; I think for the good. It is time we abandoned the constant 'in or out' argument and concentrated instead on being a member and playing a constructive role in reforming the Community to meet the needs of the latter part of the twentieth century.

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It is not as though there is a serious policy option of our now withdrawing from the European Community. The Labour Party is, of course, firmly committed in theory to such a policy. And this time they say, in defiance of every democratic argument they advanced when demanding the first referendum, that they would take us out without even a second referendum. But it is my belief that we are now so deeply involved with the Community, that the inter-twining of our economy with those of our partners is now so great, that not even the Labour Party—were it to form the next government, which I consider an unlikely possibility—would carry out that threat. All the signs are that from Mrs Castle (with whom I remember having long, impassioned arguments about the merits of EEC membership) to the TUC, the costs of withdrawal are now being realized. There is talk of 'negotiation', or 'withdrawal over a period', of 'looking at the implications'. It is all the familiar language of saying one thing and preparing to do another.

The disadvantages of withdrawal are now becoming clear to even the most hostile observer. My view throughout the 1970s was that the economic case for joining the EEC was always fairly evenly balanced. Each government White Paper admitted this, as I did in my speeches for Britain in Europe during the referendum campaign. But the political advantages were enormous. I think now that that view was unnecessarily pessimistic, given the more hostile world economic climate with which, in or out, we would have had to operate since 1973. The political advantages have indeed been great, but the economic balance of advantage of continued membership is also considerable.

Let us look at the figures. When we joined the EEC, less than 30 per cent of our trade was with member states. Now they account for more than 43 per cent, an increase of very nearly a half. In addition, another 15 or 16 per cent of our trade is done with countries around the Community, with which the Community has special Free Trade Agreements. These would, at the best, need to be renegotiated if we came out. West Germany, with a quarter of the population of the United States, sometimes surpasses it as our biggest export market, and all the other EEC countries, with the exception of Greece, are among the top ten British export markets. On top of that, between 1972 and 1980, the value of British exports to the Community increased by 480 per cent, whilst with the United States the figure was 234 per cent, for Japan 237 per cent and the rest of the world 295 per cent. In the first eight months of 1982 British exports to the Community were worth nearly four times our exports to the USA. After a relatively modest net surplus on our Community trade in 1980 the figures have slipped back and this year there is a relatively modest deficit, but that only reflects our increasingly poor world-wide trading performance in the past year or so. British exports are now clearly and substantially dependent on continued access to the European markets' 300 million people.

Because of this, it is equally apparent that if Britain were to decide to withdraw from the EEC, withdrawal would have—at the very least—a considerable disruptive and destructive effect on British industry, and perhaps particularly on our increasingly important service industries. In turn, it would be bound to have an equally devastating effect on jobs. There has been a running and acrimonious dispute between proponents and opponents of the Community as to precisely how many thousands, or even millions of jobs might be at stake if Britain were to leave the EEC. I consider this a somewhat unquantifiable dispute and equally I consider it fairly grotesque, given the current appalling levels of unemployment, seriously to

consider a policy that would in any way, and to any extent, exacerbate employment prospects further. When the full extent of our energy should be concentrated on creating new jobs, and bringing stability to those employees whose future employment is clouded with uncertainty, it seems folly in the extreme to embark on a policy so deliberately disruptive and counter to the settled direction of Britain's major trade thrust.

But the benefits of membership do not stop with trade. One of the most significant advantages of our EEC membership, particularly in Britain's present economic condition, is the level of foreign investment that has been attracted here. Overseas investors want to set up factories within the EEC frontiers in order to avoid the tariffs that would otherwise be imposed on their exported products. They need the access to the large and wealthy market that the Community presents. In general, production costs in Britain are higher than elsewhere: to take one well-publicized current example, new car prices in West Germany and across Europe are approximately 20 per cent lower than in Britain, thanks principally to lower production costs. It is claimed that for certain products it would actually be cheaper to export direct from the United States or from Japan to the EEC rather than to continue exports from the UK to the EEC were Britain to withdraw and be obliged to pay EEC tariffs. A high proportion of foreign investment in Britain comes from the United States and Japan. Sony, for example, has set up in South Wales. Asked why it came to Britain, the company specifically mentioned access to European markets as one of the most important reasons.

Before we joined the Community, the British share of American investment overseas was falling. Since 1973 it has risen. Indeed, 50 per cent of all American non-oil investment now comes to the European Community countries, compared to less than 33 per cent in the 1960s; and of half of the total US non-oil direct investment, 39 per cent was invested in the United Kingdom in 1977–8, rising to 44 per cent in 1979. Significantly, US investment both in Britain and in the rest of the EEC is heavily concentrated in manufacturing. In Britain this accounts for 84 per cent of total investment, excluding again oil, banking and insurance. Clearly the fact that Britain has tariff-free access to the whole EEC market must be a vital factor in any US decision to invest in UK manufacturing and this is borne out if one then considers the export figures to other EEC countries of overseas companies based in the United Kingdom. A recent study on inward investment in the UK, commissioned by the European League for Economic Cooperation, gives an interesting insight into the thinking of the British management of several of the largest American and Japanese subsidiaries with manufacturing bases in Britain. Questioned about the effect they thought withdrawal from the EEC would have on their parent companies' future investment policy towards their British subsidiaries, the message was unequivocally gloomy. The more optimistic felt that their company would freeze further growth; others feared that their company would pull out of Britain altogether, and move to another country within the EEC.

Together with the trade figures, this amounts to a formidable economic benefit accruing to Britain from membership of the Community. It is a benefit we have felt even though we joined the Community at the worst possible moment, just before the first oil crisis marked the transition from 25 years of relatively easy growth in the industrialized world to a far harsher climate.

These last ten years have seen the world's economy going from crisis to crisis. Economic difficulties combined with international uncertainties have meant that

relations between Europe and the United States have deteriorated to perhaps the lowest point since the formation of the Alliance. During the summer and into the autumn of 1982, we had the deplorable sight of the American government taking sanctions against firms from allied countries acting wholly legally within their own domestic laws. Then there has been the acrimonious trade dispute over steel with the American threat of punitive tariffs and import restrictions. I have seen too many undulations to believe the doom mongers who shout 'Danger—collapse of Alliance' at every sign of trouble. Nevertheless the present position is deeply disturbing.

In this situation our place must be with Europe, not confronting the United States (or, for that matter, the rest of the world), but uniting so that our voice is as strong as theirs and so that we can protect our interests. I have already mentioned the steel dispute. The final agreement which was reached was far better for Britain than it would have been if we had negotiated alone. It will, of course, still cause us problems, although British Steel's difficulties are far more the result of the present government's domestic economic policies than of American import restrictions. But had we been negotiating with the United States on our own, with British Steel heavily supported by the British taxpayer, a major target of the American steel producer, can it be argued that we would have got a better deal? The only realistic answer is no. Nor was this an isolated incident. Since the Community countries jointly represent one third of total world trade, the Commission is ensured a powerful position in international trade circles which would be denied to Britain, or to any other of the EEC member countries, were they to try to go it alone. It is no coincidence that, apart from the USA and Japan, most of the world's trading countries have formed themselves into trading blocs: Comecon, ASEAN, OPEC, the 'Group of 77'. As the effects of recession and increased oil and energy costs bite deeply right across the world, there are growing pressures in all the more industrially developed countries, not just in Britain, to resort to protectionist measures to shore up their struggling industries while the less developed countries, so dependent on exporting to those more industrially developed countries, bitterly resent such clamps on their precarious economies. We must avoid the vicious downward spiral of protection which stunted economic growth in the 1930s. The traditional trade union motto 'unity is strength' applies just as much to international as to industrial affairs. Only with the Community can we get the unity, the strength and therefore the security that we need.

Take two examples: the lengthy negotiations that have taken place on the Multi-Fibre Arrangement, which will determine the import and export quotas on textiles up to July 1986; and the recent GATT negotiations in Geneva, which have shown up all too clearly the strains on maintaining an amicable balance of interests between the essentially conflicting aspirations of the major participants. In both negotiations, in which Britain has a crucial interest, our case is being put jointly with fellow Community partners by the EEC Commission.

These are considerable benefits which we gain from our membership of the European Community. In return for them we must be prepared to play our part in constructive future developments. For too long we have been an uncertain member of the Community. This constant indecision has been the tragedy of our European relations. Ten years ago when we became a member, we did not join a perfect institution which was frozen for all time. We joined a living, growing body, capable of change, indeed, crying out for it. The half-hearted involvement of one of its most powerful members and the constant impression that we are only in it on the

narrow accountancy basis of a grocer's shop has cut off most attempts at change before they even started.

Take political cooperation. This is one of the few areas of the Community's work which has not only developed over recent years but which also owes something to British governments, specifically to British Foreign Secretaries. This is ironic since it is an area which is outside the Treaty of Rome, and therefore for which the Community as such has no formal responsibility. Nevertheless, when Lord Carrington was Foreign Secretary, he played a notable part in developing the Community's policies towards the Soviet Union in the immediate aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan, and towards the Middle East, where I believe Europe can play a significant and crucial role. In a sense, it was perhaps inevitable that this area should develop more rapidly than others—and I certainly regard it as a most important and desirable development. Many policies for which the Community has responsibility inevitably carry foreign policy implications. For example, agricultural exports to non-EEC countries, and in particular to the USSR; food and development aid to sensitive areas in the Third World, such as Cambodia; trade sanctions against Iran and, more recently, Argentina. In these instances and others, the importance of a consensus on foreign policy is clearly apparent; and this has inevitably led to the necessity of a more clearly defined structure within which to develop systematic discussion and coordination of policies. Despite a rather good British record on this, a major opportunity in the field was missed last year.

In the summer of 1982 the Foreign Ministers of Italy and Germany put forward the so-called Genscher/Colombo Plan. This was a far-reaching but practical initiative designed to pull the Community out of the quagmire in which it has become stuck and move it forward. There were some predictable reservations about the institutional aspects of the Plan. It made, however, important proposals for coordination of security policies, which carried economic as well as defence implications. A common procurement policy could be of great importance for our defence-related industries. It also provided an excellent opportunity for serious and constructive discussion on the future development of the Community. Yet it has been allowed to sink almost without trace. The blame for this should not of course all be placed at the British government's door. Some other Community countries have not done much about it either. But it is typical not only of this government's attitude but of the attitude of its predecessor too, that such initiatives are encouraged to founder. Indeed, I personally believe that the wider political implications of the Genscher/Colombo Plan clearly show that the Community is not a static and stagnant entity incapable of change and reform. It is significant that it is the German and Italian governments which are seeking to expand the Community's role and to shift its concentration away from an unbalanced preoccupation with agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy and towards wider concerns. No comparable initiative has come from Britain, the fourth major power of the Community. Britain should seize this opportunity to steer the Community towards policies more relevant to her interests and work with our partners to launch a re-vamped, revitalized Community starting from the constructive basis provided by these various proposals. For we cannot have our cake and eat it. We cannot seek a minimalist Community in which we take a minimalist interest and then turn round and accuse our Community partners of playing the game at our expense.

It is our negative attitude to the Community, our apparent desire to confront other members instead of working with them, that has been the main block

preventing such changes. Specifically it has militated against attempts to reform agricultural spending. By the use of a doubtful strategy to block price increases earlier this year, to which we were not directly opposed, in a mistaken attempt to strengthen our legitimate demand for a rebate on our Budget contributions, we not only caused enormous unanimous irritation against ourselves, we distracted discussion away from serious reform of the CAP too. We also caused a major crisis in the use of the veto. The veto has, since 1965, been the bastion of national defence against European integration. It was created by and for de Gaulle. It has never formally been accepted by those who wanted to advance to greater unity. When the Council of Ministers overrode the British veto, the decision was seized on by both sides: with horror by the basically chauvinist British government and official opposition, who saw the veto as their only refuge; and with delight by integrationists who felt that an important step to unity had been taken. Neither is right. The veto has been abused and used as a way of obstructing all change in the Community. This is against enlightened British interest. Britain wants and needs change in the Community. On the other hand, major decisions in the Community must command general support. As a matter of hard political practice, the veto in some form therefore probably has to continue. What I hope will emerge from last year's events is more restraint in its use, more awareness of the damage it can cause and a more discriminating approach to the question of what really is a vital national interest.

One of the problems of the Community is that 'vital national interests' almost always work negatively, in favour of keeping the past upon its throne, and hardly ever in favour of constructing new policies. Most member states are in varying degrees guilty of this. But the British government is a particular culprit. We have devoted our energy to obstructing policy and to demanding 'our' money back, rather than to promoting new Community policies which offer the only effective long term way of correcting an unfair budget balance.

There are obvious weaknesses in always having to renegotiate a short term solution to the British budget problem. We must deal instead with the underlying problem. The sensible British approach must be to pare agricultural spending as much as possible and encourage other areas of Community activity. It is in Britain's interests and, I believe, in Europe's too for the EEC to spend more money to develop Community activity on regional and social policies, industrial innovation, energy conservation and the development of renewable resources of energy. These are important policies not only because they will correct the budget problem but because they will help solve some of Europe's chronic economic difficulties. The imbalance of wealth and development between regions, exacerbated by the slump, the problems of ethnic minorities, the decline of old industries and the failure to invest in new, are all Europe-wide problems which could be helped by European Community policies.

In particular we need to develop Community industrial policy to spend money not only on easing the pain for areas dependent on declining industries but also on encouraging new, high technology investment. But if we are to do this, we cannot always take a minimalist line. I do not believe it is in Britain's interest to say rigidly we will never consider raising the current 1 per cent VAT ceiling; that is no way to get the Community to change. We cannot criticize the Community incessantly for failing to recognize our own special interests and yet fail ourselves to put forward positive and constructive measures for the Community's development that would

shape it more along the lines on which we in Britain want it to go, and from which we would benefit.

Some pessimists believe the Community is not capable of change. They stress that its institutional arrangements inhibit decision-making almost totally, that its policies are so complicated and so heavily weighted towards agriculture that it will break down. That is not going to happen. The Community provided for its members the motive for growth in the second half of the 1950s and 1960s. It has provided protection against the worst ravages of the recession and uncertain world politics in the 1970s and early 1980s. I look forward to another ten years of British membership as a time when we can pull together to tackle the problems and use the vast untapped potential of cooperation and concerted action to build constructively for the future, to create a safer and more prosperous world. To do otherwise would be to show a remarkable lack of consistency and irreparably to damage Britain's position in the world. If, after all the negotiations we went through in the 1960s and 1970s, we were to turn round abruptly and come out of the European Community, the effects on international opinion would be very grave; not only in Europe and the United States but also in the Commonwealth and developing world where I know of no country which wants us to leave. Even the USSR, which claims it wants the Community to break up, would see Britain on its own as a weak, vacillating country without purpose.

The deep economic and social problems Britain faces can only be solved by the British themselves. But the EEC can provide the stability in foreign policy and the strength and security in economic policy which I believe are the vital basis for the regeneration and renewal of Britain.

The external policy of François Mitterrand

Marie-Claude Smouts*

he days following 10 May 1981, it was not unusual to hear the ministers and ;ials responsible for French diplomacy begin their remarks with the preamble: socialists think that . . .'. The new designation of the *Quai d'Orsay*, rebaptized ıistry of External Relations', showed clearly the wish of the government to slate the analyses and policies of the new majority into action in the international ere, and M. Cheysson explained: 'There is no foreign policy, there is the policy 'rance. It finds expression abroad, just as it finds expression in France'.[1] Where lic opinion is concerned, however, the coincidence of foreign policy with ıestic objectives has not been fully perceived and the two domains have remained ırate. Moreover, the principal leaders of the opposition, who were received by Head of State on the eve of the summit meeting of industrialized countries, made the distinction. Virulent in their criticism of the government's economic social policy, which they condemn in its entirety, they do not basically lenge the broad lines of its diplomacy, even if they point to some cases of veté' in relations with the United States and denounce certain initiatives taken Central America or 'ambiguities' in policy towards the USSR.

'hereas the internal reforms have been swift, far-reaching and innovatory entralization, nationalization, workers' rights within the company, etc.), so ign policy appears characterized by continuity, in analysis and in strategy if not nplementation. The broad direction of policy of the Fifth Republic has been ntained and everything has been done to reassure France's traditional ners—in the West, Europe and Africa—of the lasting nature of its alliances and s friendship. The projection of the domestic political approach into the external l announced by M. Cheysson has therefore been less spectacular than the reverse act, that of international realities upon the conduct of internal affairs: the second ıluation of the franc in June 1982 and the drastic austerity measures which ımpanied it bear clear witness to this. The aspiration towards greater justice at ıe extends into the external sphere in the approach to the problems of the Third rld and of the New International Economic Order, but here, as in most fields, ıestic concerns are also apparent and provide a reminder of the concrete limits ch the economic situation and the needs of security set to initiatives inspired by cal considerations alone: where arms sales, trade with South Africa and relations ı Zaïre are concerned, socialist France has made few changes.

rançois Mitterrand has involved France in an enormous gamble: that of reducing ualities, sharing out national power and wealth differently, and building a new l of socialism without, for all that, making France follow a solitary path which ies the realities of international interdependence and solidarity. Once the rhetoric

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Message of greetings from the Minister to the staff of the Ministry of External Relations, 7 January

-5850/83/2/0155—13$3.00©1983 International Affairs

of the 'break with capitalism' was abandoned, and the temptation of 'neutralism' rejected, he found himself with the same assets and the same constraints as his predecessors in the narrow course open to the foreign policy of a medium-sized European power which has inherited an independent nuclear force and a vast network of cooperation in Africa, and which is anxious to play a world political role while trying to fare as well as possible in the international economic system—with an additional handicap: that of having to prove the worth of his strategy to partners who have been sometimes hostile, and always sceptical. In order to convince and reassure, it was necessary to state plainly the broad lines of France's external policy and to back it up with a political analysis and a philosophy of action. According to a tradition firmly established under the Fifth Republic, this task falls to the Head of State.

The Presidential framework

Like his three predecessors, François Mitterrand considers external policy to be the 'exclusive domain' of the Head of State and makes a point of recalling that 'external policy is his direct responsibility'.[2] No-one in France disputes any longer this well-entrenched tradition, neither the socialist deputies so ready in the past to condemn the diminution of parliament's powers, nor the Minister of Foreign Affairs, a man of undoubted strong character, who describes his function in this way: 'The role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not to define the external policy of France. It is to provide a powerful and efficient instrument for the maintenance of external relations in all fields'.[3] The importance of the Head of State in the definition and conduct of foreign policy is probably increased by the fact that the main divisions over external affairs are now within 'the majority' and the government. In fact, the conventional nature of foreign policy has disappointed certain socialist supporters, especially as regards policy towards Africa, while the taking up of positions which are resolutely 'Atlanticist' and firm towards the USSR irritates the French Communist Party. These differences have not so far brought about a government crisis, but the President of the Republic has to arbitrate to ensure that France speaks with a single voice.

Certain characteristics of the decision-making process strengthen the central position of the President. Where foreign policy is concerned, the *Elysée* is relatively lightly equipped: in addition to the General Secretary of the *Elysée*, with whom he is in constant touch, the Head of State is surrounded by four technical advisers and senior officials and by a special adviser (Jacques Attali), a personal aide assisted himself by two advisers.[4] This team provides liaison between the Presidency and the ministers concerned, primarily the Prime Minister and the Ministers of External Relations, Defence and External Trade. The President receives the Minister of External Relations at least once a week. Despite the flexibility of the system, the bureaucratic machine sometimes creaks, and the methods of work are partly responsible for this. The President being in the habit of entrusting simultaneously

2. In Cabinet meeting, 12 January 1982.

3. Before the National Assembly, 3 December 1981. See Alfred Grosser, *La politique extérieure de la Ve Republique*, a course of lectures given at the *Institut d'Etudes Politiques* in Paris, 1981–2, section II and, by the same author, 'François Mitterrand dans le monde', published in *L'Expansion*, 7–20 May 1982, p. 203.

4. For an excellent analysis of the President's entourage and of the working methods at the *Elysée*, see Samy Cohen, 'Les hommes de l'Elysée', *Pouvoirs*, 1981, Vol. 20, pp. 87–100.

to several people the study of the same dossier, areas of responsibility often overlap and 'very quickly there have grown up around François Mitterrand two competing channels of information'.[5] This system ensures that he receives very complete information on the basis of which he alone has to take decisions, but the other side of the coin is that 'political' and 'expert' advice do not always marry together well (this could be seen in the conclusion of the gas contract with the Soviet Union, in the last phases of the negotiations about Algerian gas and in certain aspects of diplomatic relations with the United States) and that the Head of State does not always have time to master the information which he receives (hence the initial hesitation over condemning the Israeli intervention in Lebanon).

Whatever may be the role of the aides—and that of the Socialist Party, whose 'big names' are often listened to—the 'presidentialization' of foreign policy means that the mainspring of external policy is essentially the political philosophy and analysis of the President. As far as can be judged where this complex and sometimes disconcerting man is concerned, these rest on a double foundation: a deeply 'humanist' vision of the world and an acute sense of history. In his writings, as in his speeches with their slightly old-fashioned eloquence, François Mitterrand puts man at the heart of political thought. For him, the individual and human values are the primary concern. He differs in that from Charles de Gaulle who accorded the State, above and beyond men, supreme importance; he resembles him by having the same 'historic' vision of national destiny. In the United States, on his first visit, he said: 'France's approach is that of a country which . . . is trying to keep alive the civilization created two centuries ago and which, in order to last, needs to be reformed';[6] in Japan, he acclaimed 'the passion of those peoples which draw upon their traditions in order to conquer the future'; time and again the Head of State has expressed an obsessive concern to ensure that his country's experience of socialism should be something other than a 'brief and glorious fracture of history', and that it should form, on the contrary, an enduring element in the history of France. This philosophy lies behind the analysis of the international situation which forms the basis for the broad lines of external policy.

The psychological and moral consequences of the world economic crisis in the Western democracies preoccupy the Head of State. The culture and values of the West are threatened by recession, by unemployment, and by a loss of hope which, gradually, could bring about the disintegration of the social fabric, the rejection of collective effort and the loss of the civic spirit (in the Roman sense of the term) which is indispensable for the survival of every national community.[7] He sees, running parallel to this Western crisis, signs of internal erosion gnawing at the East European system, events in Poland being the most obvious sign of this, while at the same time Soviet military power is increasing considerably and is being deployed outside the European continent. The President's famous phrase 'Everything is good which will enable us to get away from Yalta' is more than a new version of the 'Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals' of General de Gaulle. It envisages the consequences of the cracking which could break up the postwar edifice, with incalculable repercussions for the whole of Europe. 'Getting away from Yalta' means following, on the continent of Europe, a foreign policy designed to convince

5. Cohen, 'Les hommes de l'Elysée', p. 94.
6. Washington, 18 October 1981.
7. See Jacques Huntzinger, National Secretary for International Affairs of the Socialist Party, 'La politique extérieure du Parti socialiste', *Politique étrangère*, March 1982, pp. 33–44.

the Soviet Union that it has every interest in allowing to develop in Eastern Europe diverse forms of socialism which do not threaten its security. That means, in the Third World, refusing to accept that every conflict, whether internal or between neighbours, should immediately be treated by the United States as another East–West issue.

Based on a particular analysis and on principles—independence, solidarity and respect for international law—the foreign policy of François Mitterrand has a certain consistency. That does not prevent there being some areas of uncertainty, but three main lines of policy stand out clearly: security within the Atlantic Alliance, European solidarity and the balanced development of the countries of the Third World.

The security dimension

The theme of security recurs like a *leitmotiv* in the speeches of François Mitterrand. The President does not conceal his anxiety about 'Soviet over-armament in Europe', the 'enormous advantage' which the USSR has in conventional forces and the supremacy which it could obtain in the years 1985–6 as regards strategic nuclear forces; nor an equal anxiety about the wave of neutralism and pacifism breaking over Europe, especially in the Federal Republic. François Mitterrand has explained clearly his attitude to this: pacifism is not peace, peace can be based only on a balance of forces. 'Imbalance = dangerous risk': such is the equation. France is in favour, therefore, of everything which contributes to preserving or maintaining this balance: an effort to strengthen the armed forces, if that is necessary, and arms negotiations.

As soon as he came to power, Mitterrand took up a clear position on the installation of the American 'Euromissiles', in contradistinction to his predecessor who had not adopted an official stance: 'If I condemn neutralism, it is because I believe that peace is linked to the balance of forces in the world. The deployment of the Soviet SS-20s and Backfires breaks this balance in Europe. I do not accept it and I agree that it is necessary to increase our armed strength in order to restore the balance'.[8] But, at the same time, France insisted that the two superpowers must start negotiations: it approved of the discussions on intermediate range missiles which opened in Geneva on 30 November, 1981, and is urging the negotiators to come rapidly to a conclusion. François Mitterrand has reaffirmed his position on what he means by 'the zero option': 'There must be neither SS-20s nor Pershing-2s'.

As regards France's security, the basic assumptions remain unchanged: it rests on the nuclear deterrent force and this force can only be independent. On the subject of this reversal in his own thinking, François Mitterrand, who had at one time fought against the strike-force, explained his attitude before the Danish parliament:

> My people's wishes must be respected. It is now a quarter of a century since this choice was made, against my judgement, but the fact is that, for a quarter of a century, the defence of France has been based on this kind of weapon. If it disappeared, nothing would be left of my country's means of defence . . . Even though the choice of weapons was not my choice, I am now accountable for the security of my country and I take care to see that my country's weapons

8. Interview published by *Stern*, 8 July 1981.

> remain above the level below which their ability to deter would be destroyed. It must therefore be understood that there is no ideological choice involved here.[9]

The nature of French defence has been reaffirmed on several occasions, most notably in Hamburg, in an address to the Übersee Club: 'We act in such a way that our forces are sufficiently formidable for no-one to seek to attack our country. We seek to deter'.[10] Like his predecessors, François Mitterrand pursues, within the Atlantic Alliance, a discreet cooperation with NATO's military organization, but there is no question of returning to the integrated military structure. The deterrent force is not something which can be available to others and France must continue to take the decisions: 'We cannot allow the security, the voice of France, to depend on considerations arrived at 5,000 kilometres away from us'.

To remain above the threshold below which French defence would lose its credibility, the nuclear deterrent force has been maintained and modernized: a seventh submarine is being built, equipped with a new strategic missile; new intercontinental ballistic missiles have been studied; new tactical missiles have been prepared. As for the neutron bomb, the Head of State confirmed, in the spring of 1982, in Hamburg and in Paris: 'France is able to build it immediately. The decision has not been taken, but it can be'.[11]

Some ambiguity still hangs, however, over the real purpose of the French forces and over their role in European defence. Officially, the strategic doctrine is still that of the 'sanctuary' (the President used the word in Copenhagen, but not in Hamburg): the military resources which France possesses, which are not those permitting of a graduated response, are designed to defend the national territory. Given the relationship 'of weak to strong' in which it finds itself, France cannot venture to negotiate about a part of its nuclear armament; in particular it refuses to accept that the negotiations in Geneva should include all or part of its forces in the tally of Western nuclear weapons. On this last point, the argument has not changed since the days of General de Gaulle: 'We refuse absolutely to be involved in this gigantic challenge which the superpowers have hurled at each other, and which is out of all proportion to what we possess'.[12]

Numerous signs suggest that this strict interpretation of the imperatives of national independence does not prevent a possible evolution of French defence policy, which was outlined as long ago as 1975 under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and which the upsurge of neutralism in West Germany could hasten.[13] In fact, the strengthening of the Atlantic Alliance and the anchoring of the Federal Republic of Germany in this alliance are a major concern of the French leaders.[14] In these circumstances, how could one not at least indicate that France, for its part, would be ready to recognize its obligations towards its European allies? Thus Mitterrand declared in Copenhagen:

> Though we possess, to ensure our survival, an autonomous deterrent capability designed to preserve the national sanctuary, we consider also that we have obligations towards others and that it would be most vain or most imprudent

9. Copenhagen, 29 April 1982.
10. Hamburg, 14 May 1982.
11. Press conference, Paris, 10 June 1982.
12. Press conference, Paris, 24 September 1981.
13. See Alfred Grosser, *Les Occidentaux*, (Paris: Fayard, 1978), pp. 371–3.
14. See the interview granted by Mitterrand to Joseph Kraft in the *Washington Post*, 4 March 1982.

> to desire the help and friendship of the other countries of the West, of which we are a part, if we were to neglect our duties towards them.

The Prime Minister, M. Pierre Mauroy, had been more precise in September 1981:

> Isolation is out of the question. We must draw the consequences of this, in particular when we examine the defence of our frontiers and of the approaches to them. Aggression against France does not begin when the enemy penetrates national territory.[15]

Although one must carefully distinguish between the policy of the government and that of the Socialist Party, one may note that the Socialist Party's proposals for peace, security and disarmament, published on 2 June 1982, state: 'France must contribute to the security of its partners', that its deterrent force 'contributes to the existence of genuine deterrence on the old continent'.

Since February 1982, joint consideration of the problems of defence has been undertaken by France and Germany. M. Mitterrand has summarized the philosophy behind this, as far as the French side is concerned: 'I mean that I look upon the Federal German Republic as a large and important country and that I am determined that in no circumstances should the difference in present situations, which results from the accidents of history, mean that one country should have the means to ensure its independence while the other does not'.[16] Could the implementation of Franco–German military cooperation lead France to make a public commitment that, in the event of conflict in Europe, it will take part in forward defence with its conventional forces?

The Franco–German summit in Bonn (21–2 October 1982) gave new impetus to the consultations between the two countries in the military and strategic field. A joint commission was created which meets every three months and includes several specialized study groups, among them a nuclear group. Certainly, as M. Mitterrand took care to make clear, 'it is not a question of the FRG being associated with France's nuclear strategy', but of a joint study designed to bring defence doctrines closer together.

This boost to military and strategic consultation between the two countries comes at a moment when, on the one hand, the European member countries of NATO are being asked by General Rogers to consider the organization in Europe of a 'forward defence' by conventional deterrent forces and, on the other hand, France finds itself faced, for financial reasons, with hard choices where its future weapons programmes are concerned. In 1983, the military planning bill for the period 1984–8 will be published, showing how the French forces will look in the future. The internal debate over the role of the French defence forces has begun. Out of this could come a new doctrine for the use of tactical nuclear weapons directly concerning German territory. The future prospects for this line of thought depend on the debate within the French administration and on the kind of welcome which the Federal Republic might give to it. But one can now and henceforth consider that, at the conceptual level, thinking about French defence forms part of a diplomatic perspective which takes account of the European dimension and is no longer limited to the defence of the national territory alone (*sanctuarization*).

15. Speech delivered to the *Institut des hautes études de défense nationale*, 14 September 1981.
16. Speech delivered to the Übersee Club, Hamburg, 14 May 1982.

Whatever may be the outcome of the internal debate and of the process of cooperation entered into with Germany, the two countries are however at one in the belief that there is not yet any alternative to the American presence in Europe.

The United States and the Atlantic relationship

France's relations with the United States are never easy. The chances were slim that a socialist Head of State who had brought four communist ministers into government would be able to reverse this state of affairs and get along well with the most conservative President that the United States has known for a long time and whose economic programme was the exact opposite of his own. Concerned for the security of Europe, wanting to reassure Washington about the nature of changes under way in France and to prevent the United States from making every effort to bring about the failure of the enterprise, Mitterrand took up the challenge. His concern about revitalizing the Atlantic Alliance, as well as the firmness of his stance towards the Soviet Union, made him the most faithful ally of the United States within NATO. Never had a French President under the Fifth Republic expressed such 'Atlanticist' attitudes, never had he met so frequently his American counterpart. Over economic and financial matters, over relations with the East and especially over the problems of Central America, the divergences were real, but they were approached without unnecessary aggressiveness, in a manner very different from that which had often characterized Franco–American relations in the past. At the Versailles summit, the climate remained so courteous that, on the French side, the prospect of a gentleman's agreement with the United States was viewed with optimism.

Some weeks later, nothing remained of the spirit of Versailles: the dollar was reaching high points in Paris; American interest rates were not falling; Washington was taking the decision to extend to European companies working under American licence the embargo on oil and gas equipment destined for the USSR and was taking measures designed to limit imports of steel from the EEC. France had staked a great deal—too much?—on the possibilities of agreement with the United States. The impression of having been duped and ill rewarded for well-meaning efforts provoked a wave of resentment which was increased by the pressures on the franc and the need to devalue a second time. A considerable part of the French Left is convinced that it is the object of a financial and trade war designed to bring about the failure of the process of reform under way in France. The opposition is sarcastic about the credulity of the novices who thought that they could win round a superpower which never cares about anything but its own selfish interests.

At bottom, the problem is neither new nor peculiar to France: it is to get the United States to understand that the Atlantic Alliance is not only a community designed to provide security against the East, but also a community of values and interests. In particular the United States cannot ask the Europeans to make an additional effort where defence is concerned, and to align themselves with its policies towards the East, at the same time as it is contributing to the weakening of Europe through a restrictive trading policy and through a lax monetary policy which unsettles international commercial dealings and discourages investment. As the French President has put it: 'It is difficult to insist on a vigorous military alliance, the members of which are totally committed to it and together defend their

existence, while with the dear ally, very dear ally, the feeling seems to prevail that, in the field of trade, peace does not exist'.[17]

Where many of its points of dispute with the United States are concerned, France finds its analysis shared by West Germany and it is seeking, at the European level, a rejoinder to the American demands. The European Council which met in Brussels on June 28–9 was a step in this direction. France, like the Federal Republic, is unwilling in particular that the European countries should be drawn by the American embargo into a process of sanctions against the Soviet Union. Although François Mitterrand and Helmut Schmidt accepted at Versailles certain additional controls over 'strategic' products and a certain limiting of credits for trade with the USSR, they refused to end all trade relations with it. For François Mitterrand: 'The economic blockade is an act of war which is never successful'. But the French position is paradoxical because, breaking with the accommodating approach of his predecessor, Mitterrand has adopted, since coming to power, a very firm attitude towards the Soviet Union. Indicating that there would be no summit meeting as long as the USSR was in Afghanistan, then condemning in vivid terms the repression in Poland ('in a state of siege since the postwar period . . . it remains for the Kremlin the main road for invasions'),[18] the President has limited Franco-Soviet political dialogue to the minimum. What is more, he broke a taboo by going to an Eastern country (Hungary) without having made 'the trip to Moscow', something which none of his predecessors had dared to do, showing in this way his refusal to accept the tutelage of the Soviet Union over Eastern Europe. But, at the same time, France has continued space cooperation and trade with the USSR. In particular, it has signed a contract for Siberian gas, payable in francs, and representing 5 per cent of France's energy supply for 1990. This signing marked the completion of an enormously complex web of technical, financial and economic deals put together over a period of several years. Politically, it came at a very bad moment, obliging French diplomacy to separate political logic from economic logic, a rather unrealistic distinction which is unlikely to last. Be that as it may, France considers that the nature and the volume of its trade with the Soviet Union do not threaten the vital interests of the West and are a matter for it alone, as a sovereign nation, to decide.

France in Europe

A common approach to many aspects of transatlantic relations has helped to build up relations between the 'Franco-German couple', the two countries being united, moreover, by a close economic interdependence. Twice within a year the Federal Republic agreed to revalue the mark and to save France from the humiliation of a unilateral readjustment. This gesture of solidarity reflects the fact that the interests of the two countries are inseparable. France's trade deficit with West Germany reached in 1982 an annual amount of about DM 10,000 million (FFr 30,000 million in 1982 as against FFr 23,000 million in 1981 and FFr 16,000 million in 1980). The FRG is trying to avoid a situation in which France is driven to close its frontiers by the extent of its external deficit.

In the Community sphere, the 'Paris–Bonn axis' is less openly displayed than it was under the presidency of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, but France has more points of agreement with Germany than with any other of its partners in the EEC. The

17. Hamburg, 14 May 1982.
18. Agence France-Presse, 5 February 1982.

arrival of the socialist government in France has coincided with a moment of deep crisis within the EEC, shaken as it is by Britain's permanent questioning of the basic principles of the Common Agricultural Policy and by the prospect of an enlargement towards the south. After underlining the importance which it attached to the Europe of the Ten and to the European dimension in the solution of conflicts, the new French government has encountered the same problems as its predecessors. In the agricultural field it is defending, as in the past, the interests of its producers, for example, in refusing to accept any formula arbitrarily limiting agricultural spending, and requesting the elimination of compensatory amounts. In keeping with its domestic programme, France has set out two new requirements for any reform of the CAP: it must not bring unemployment in the agricultural sector; and the reform must take into account the interests of the small producers. The same attitude prevails as regards the entry of Spain and Portugal into the Common Market: while favouring this enlargement which will anchor the two countries in a democratic community, France is worried about the repercussions which it could have on agriculture in the south of France. It is asking, therefore, that a long transitional period should be arranged and that membership should take place under good conditions: the consequences for the budget will have to be carefully considered, but, above all, the organization of the market for Mediterranean products should be improved. Mitterrand's trip to Madrid, in June 1982, showed the extent of the disagreements over the agricultural aspects of Spanish membership.

As regards the British contribution to the Community budget, the present French government has shown itself to be more intransigent than its predecessors. However, anxious to end the exclusiveness of the Franco-German dialogue, and to establish more balanced contacts with all partners in the Community, Mitterrand had made Franco-British relations more relaxed—relations which had been extremely bad under Giscard d'Estaing. During the Falklands affair, France proclaimed its solidarity with Britain in the face of Argentine 'aggression', while reserving its position on the problem of sovereignty over the archipelago, although such a commitment risked endangering a whole area of French policy in the Third World. On the other hand, like the Federal Republic, France would not agree to the establishment of the semi-automatic correcting mechanism requested by Britain which would have given it for several years financial compensation close to that which it had obtained for 1980 and 1981 (1·2 and 1·4 thousand million ECUs respectively). Aware that the problem posed by Great Britain is real and that the British pay out more than they receive, France is willing to agree to a gesture of solidarity. But the compensation granted to the British must be in the form of a lump sum, and must be temporary and limited. It agrees with an act of solidarity but not with some kind of law of 'exact return' (*juste retour*) contrary to the commitments contained in the Treaty of Rome. At the time of the great Community crisis of May 1982, France, with the other partners, would not accept the juridical link which Great Britain wanted to establish between the fixing (and the increase) of agricultural prices and the British contribution. What is more noteworthy, France decided that the British veto on the setting of the new agricultural prices could be over-ridden. In this way, it agreed to waive the sacrosanct rule of unanimity for which it had itself won acceptance in the 'Luxembourg compromise' of 29 January 1966.

The juridical justification advanced by the French delegation (that the Luxembourg compromise must not apply to measures for implementing an existing common policy) is not entirely convincing: other vetos put forward by Ireland or

by Greece in comparable cases had not been 'got round'. In this affair, Britain's partners showed above all a wish to safeguard what they had built, however rickety and threatened the edifice might be. The idea is going about that the terms and conditions of the British presence could be redefined in so far as the normal application of the rules of the Treaty of Rome appears unacceptable to it. One would then be on the way to the 'several-speed' Europe alluded to by M. Cheysson, or the 'variable-geometry' Europe of which M. Delors has spoken.

Giving a fresh impetus to Europe has always been a concern of new Presidents when they come to power. Giscard d'Estaing had tried to do this with institutions (the European Council), while the socialist government has advocated a 'European social zone' which would put employment at the centre of the Community's programme of action. Moreover, a French memorandum addressed in October 1981 to the Community partners contained a catalogue of measures which could reinvigorate the EEC.[19] The new course of American policy, in the summer of 1982, could revive interest in the fundamental proposal: the drawing up of a real internal trade policy which would defend the Community against unfair trade practices by creating a mechanism comparable to the American Trade Act. France is ready to make every effort to ensure that the Community reacts in a united way, but already the trap into which so many French negotiators have already fallen is coming into view: called upon to choose between French proposals and American proposals, the partners break ranks, each goes to battle on his own account and France finds itself isolated again.

Development, aid and a global role

To the difficulty of breathing a new spirit into foreign policy while continuing to pursue policies inherited from previous administrations, there is added that of reconciling the ideal of justice with the exigencies of the balance of payments. As regards relations with the Third World, the analysis is firm, but the implementation of policy is sometimes uncertain where three major policy lines are concerned: the pursuit of a new international order; a refusal to accept the domination of the blocs; and an anxiousness to assume world responsibilities without interfering in the internal affairs of states.

Development aid policy and the pursuit of a more equitable new international economic order represent the extension into the outside world of the policy of social justice proclaimed at home. At the Ottawa, Cancún and Versailles summits, Mitterrand insisted that a start should be made to the 'global negotiations' called for by the 'Group of 77', refused by the United States and considered with suspicion by West Germany and Great Britain. Furthermore, in the face of the rising tide of dangers on the international scene, where there is no longer a single region which enjoys stability, the need to establish new ground rules which will make it possible to reduce the gap between the industrial countries and the developing countries is seen as imperative and as the only way to remedy ominous imbalances. The concern to convince public opinion that it is of course in the interests of the North to encourage the development of countries which offer raw materials and the prospect of new commercial outlets sometimes gives the arguments put forward by governing circles a mercantile tone which makes them hardly distinguishable from the language

19. See Françoise de la Serre, 'La politique européenne de la France: New Look ou New Deal?', *Politique étrangère*, March 1982, pp. 125–37.

employed in the time of Giscard d'Estaing, who was already going very far verbally in the direction of the demands made by the Third World.

In international negotiations the new team is continuing with, and emphasizing more strongly, the policy defined during the seven-year period of the previous presidency: support for the demands of the 'Group of 77' concerning the stabilization of raw material prices, the organization of markets and the conclusion of commodity agreements; a refusal to modify the distribution of power in the specialized institutions, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Given the stagnation of the North–South negotiations, the change in French policy can be seen above all in a greater clarity where figures are concerned, and in new ways of conducting bilateral cooperation. Aid granted to the French overseas territories and departments now no longer inflates optimistically the percentage of public aid granted to the developing countries. This has increased by 28 per cent in a year, representing 0·46 per cent of the gross national product (the same percentage as in West Germany), instead of 0·38 per cent. (The total amount of aid, including overseas departments and territories, represents 0·71 per cent of the GNP). The intention of the French government, announced officially by the President of the Republic and the Minister of Finance, is to take this percentage to 0·7 per cent by 1988. France works in the bilateral field and in international institutions: thus, for example, it agreed to an increase in its contribution to the IMF and proposed the creation of a special fund (IDA Special Fund '84) which would enable the World Bank to maintain the global level of its activities with regard to the poorest countries of the Third World, despite the reduction in the American contribution.

In addition to this financial effort—real but modest—an effort is being made to rethink the way in which public aid is given and to construct a new philosophy of development. This leads to some contradictions, especially when official statements call simultaneously for the development of the countries of the South along self-sufficient lines and for an increase in trade between France and those countries. To overcome this contradiction, the Ministry of Cooperation and Development is championing the idea that an industrial strategy adapted to the foreseeable needs of the developing countries must be worked out, planned and defined, at least in part, with the Third World. From this point of view, the policy of cooperation would take varied forms: cooperation agreements based upon an injection of public development aid for those countries which have a low capacity for self-financing; co-development agreements providing for financial relations and trade, over a period of years, with countries which have oil revenues or countries which are in the process of building up their industries to meet the needs of their domestic markets (Algeria, Mexico, the Middle East, etc.). The agreement on gas concluded with Algeria in February 1982 has been presented by the French government as 'the first stone' in the restructuring of relations between North and South. Excessively costly, since the Algerian gas is being bought at a price 13·5 per cent above the price on the world market, this agreement is first and foremost political and sets the seal on a process of reconciliation with a country which France considers central to any Mediterranean policy. Too onerous and too fraught with international repercussions (neither the gas-producing countries of Africa, nor the consumer countries, like Italy, consider it with pleasure!) this agreement cannot serve as a model. On the other hand, the charter of economic cooperation signed with Algeria in June 1982 is a precedent showing the new trend of bilateral cooperation sought by France.

Economic difficulties and rising unemployment leave only a little room for manoeuvre in constructing a new economic and financial policy towards the countries of the South. Protectionism is growing ever more tempting and the principal challenge to the 'Third-Worldist' policy of the new government—the test of its credibility—will be to reconcile the slogan 'reconquer the home market' with the free entry onto the French market of manufactured goods from the Third World.

At the political level, French 'Third-Worldism' is based on an analysis totally different from that of the United States. Whereas the Reagan administration sees in every conflict, whether internal or in frontier regions, an attempt at destabilization by the Soviet Union, and whereas it makes a point of classing the protagonists as 'pro-Western' and 'pro-Soviet', France refuses to see everything in terms of East–West rivalry. Not only does it consider that non-alignment is not contrary to Western interests, but it considers that it is poverty, oppression and injustice which clear a path for the Soviet Union. Rather than letting peoples struggle alone against oligarchical and repressive regimes, and find support only in the pro-Soviet camp, it is better to help them find other alternatives. This analysis lies behind the Franco-Mexican declaration of 28 August 1981, recognizing the Revolutionary Democratic Front which leads the guerrilla war in El Salvador as a 'representative political force'. This analysis likewise lies behind the contract for the sale of arms signed with Nicaragua in December 1981.[20] With this policy of balance, the difficult thing is to know whether the revolutionary movements which one says one is 'accompanying' have already fallen or not 'into the orbit from which one wants to protect them'[21] and whether one does not risk supporting developments which lead to regimes contrary to all the principles which one intended to defend.

To what extent will the government pursue its logic to the end, particularly in Africa? The departure of Jean-Pierre Cot from the Ministry of Cooperation and Development in December 1982 was presented by the media as a sign of the defeat of the 'idealists' by the 'realists'. This presentation is somewhat simplistic, but it contains an element of truth. Observers are agreed that few things have changed in France's relations with the states of French-speaking Africa.[22] Certainly, until now two principles have been respected: France does not want to be the policeman of Africa; and it is for the Africans themselves to manage their affairs, especially through the Organization of African Unity. This policy has been applied in Chad since the departure of the Libyan troops. But when one considers President Mitterrand's trips to Africa, the obvious concern to reassure the French-speaking states and the omnipresence of the theme of security, one cannot help wondering whether the categorical assertion of the socialist government 'there will be no more new Kolwesis' will always be compatible with the renewed commitments to contribute to the security of the African states.

France's African policy is developing the opening begun when Louis de Guiringaud was minister, particularly towards Portuguese-speaking Africa. An effort at cooperation with the 'front-line states' (Mozambique, Angola, Zimbabwe) reflects

20. This contract, of above all symbolic significance, amounts to 90 million francs and provides for the delivery of two patrol boats, two helicopters and some lorries.

21. See the analysis by Michel Tatu, 'La position française: des difficultés d'être un bon "latino"', *Politique étrangère*, June 1982, pp. 319–24.

22. See 'La France en Afrique', *Politique Africaine*, No. 5, February 1982 and 'Le pouvoir d'être riche', *Politique Africaine*, No. 6, May 1982.

the wish completely to reorganize relations with southern Africa and to help those countries to loosen the grip of South Africa over their economies while not leaving them face to face with the Soviet bloc. But, towards South Africa, policy remains extremely cautious, in view of the dependence of the French economy as regards trade with Pretoria and imports of raw materials. Economic pragmatism is clearly prevailing over idealism and all idea of 'sanctions' has disappeared from official pronouncements.

To conduct its foreign policy, France has chosen to utilize the only assets which a medium-sized power can possess: consistency of policies, firmness of principle and respect for international law. In a period of economic warfare and generalized violence this position is continually confronted with brutal reality. The big question is how far one can go in making accommodations with pragmatism without betraying fundamental commitments.

Mitterrand's policy in the Middle East provides the most significant example of the high-risk diplomacy which the pursuit of a balanced position based on moral principles constitutes. Because he has given signs of friendship to Israel by going to Jerusalem and by breaking with the foreign policy smelling strongly of oil conducted since 1967, François Mitterrand considers that he can proclaim the right of the Palestinian people to have a state, without Israel feeling betrayed. Because he has accepted the Camp David agreement, he considers that he can seek, with Egypt, ways of rescuing the negotiations over Lebanon from deadlock with a formula which permits the disengagement of forces while avoiding the crushing of the PLO. This is a foreign policy full of nuances, the vulnerability of which is shown by the tragic train of events, but which, for the French President, is the only one which accords with France's vocation: to make heard above the passions the voice of justice and reason.

This de Gaullian style in the foreign policy of François Mitterrand is in keeping with French opinion. But, considering the economic crisis, the problem of unemployment and the disarray of the supporters of the Left, an anxiety is growing: is one not on the way to the point beyond which verbal diplomacy is no longer sufficient to compensate for the loss of prestige due to the weakening of the economy? The international repercussions of French internal policy are still to come. The year 1983 will be decisive.

Acknowledgement: The author and editor are most grateful to Rodney Balcomb for translation of this article from the French.

The Falklands crisis in the United Nations, 31 March–14 June 1982

ANTHONY PARSONS*

There were features of the Falklands crisis in the UN which combined to give it a unique quality. In the first place, its unexpectedness: the crisis hit the Security Council like a bolt from the blue. The Falklands problem had of course been considered sporadically by the General Assembly over the years, but I doubt whether more than a handful of delegations were aware of the bilateral discussions which had taken place in New York in February 1982 between the British Minister of State, Mr Richard Luce, and the Argentine Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr Enrique Ros; still less of the subsequent diplomatic exchanges between the British and Argentine governments. The tension which had built up in late March over the incident of the scrap dealers on South Georgia had not impinged on the Security Council, which was preoccupied with the Middle East—the Lebanon and the West Bank—and latterly with a novel Nicaraguan complaint about potential United States aggression and interference in Central America. Secondly, the crisis, when it struck, attracted more public attention than the most long-serving members of the UN Secretariat could remember being generated by any event in the history of the Organization. Even now, it is not easy to understand why. Perhaps it was the very improbability of a war between Britain and Argentina, or the remoteness and the romantic overtones of the cause of the hostilities; perhaps the spectacle of an ex-imperial power which had willingly given up a vast empire suddenly girding itself to defend a tiny community 8,000 miles from its shores; perhaps the novelty of the involvement in conflict of a country from a continent which has been blessedly almost free of the wars and tensions which have beset Europe, Africa and Asia over the past two or three generations. Whatever the reasons, the fact was that, particularly when the negotiations moved to the United Nations, television, radio and press, not just from Britain, the United States and Argentina, but from all over the world, swarmed to New York. For weeks, every time the Secretary-General, myself, or the Argentine negotiators entered or left the UN building, we were besieged by hordes of cameras and microphones. I and my staff had never known anything like it. We must have given hundreds of press, TV and radio interviews. It reached the stage when I was being buttonholed by total strangers in the streets of New York and told by visitors from Africa, Eastern Europe and as far away as East Asia that we, the principal actors in the Falklands drama in New York, were appearing on their television screens more frequently than their own political leaders!

My narrative begins on 31 March when the newly arrived Argentine Permanent Representative, Eduardo Roca, called on the President of the Security Council for the month of March, Mrs Jeane Kirkpatrick of the United States, to tell her that his government was contemplating bringing the question of South Georgia to the

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0020–5850/83/2/0169—10$3.00©1983 International Affairs

attention of the Security Council. Mrs Kirkpatrick was disposed to arrange a meeting between him and me without having recourse to the Council. This meeting never took place although, on 1 April, Ambassador Roca circulated a letter to the Council setting out the Argentine position on the South Georgia incident.

On 1 April the storm broke in New York. The UN Secretary-General, alarmed by press reports, summoned Ambassador Roca and myself separately in the morning to appeal to both our governments to exercise restraint. I responded positively and the Secretary-General, having publicized his appeal at the midday press conference, reiterated it at New York airport in the afternoon as he was leaving for a previously arranged series of visits to European capitals. By that time events had moved on. I had been informed at lunch time by the FCO that an Argentine invasion was imminent and had been instructed to call an emergency meeting of the Security Council to take pre-emptive action. I saw Ambassador Kamanda of Zaïre (the President for the month of April) early in the afternoon and the Council met in informal consultations shortly thereafter. I outlined the situation to the astonishment of the assembled delegates. Some of them clearly thought that I had lost my senses and there were murmurs about the need for further time. I insisted that there was no time to lose and the Council met in the late afternoon in public session for the adoption of a Presidential statement appealing to both parties to exercise restraint. After a brief exchange between myself and Ambassador Roca, who appeared to be taken by surprise by this development, the President read out the statement. I immediately took the floor to assure the Council that my government would be guided by the Presidential appeal and challenged Ambassador Roca to respond similarly. He remained silent.

When we returned that evening to our delegation offices, we were in little doubt that we would wake up the following morning to hear the news that Argentine forces had invaded the Falklands. We decided that we must be ready to initiate immediate action in the Security Council. We agreed on two important considerations. First, we must concentrate on the illegitimate use of force to settle a long-standing political problem. Secondly, we must act quickly and avoid becoming mired in the long negotiations which normally precede the adoption of a resolution by the Council. That evening we sketched out the text which was adopted two days later as Security Council Resolution No. 502.

The following morning, 2 April, our worst fears were realized. Argentine forces had invaded the Falklands. After hurried consultation with London, I called the Council, set out the salient facts and read out, in final form, the text of the resolution which I was tabling. I took the almost unprecedented step of bypassing the customary stages of circulating a 'working paper' leading to a preliminary draft resolution, a 'blue draft', in order to put the Council on notice that (a) we would not accept amendments to our draft, and (b) we would, according to the conventions, insist on a vote within 24 hours of tabling. My first intention was to demand a vote the same day but I readily acceded to pressure from members of the Council to wait until 3 April as the Foreign Minister of Argentina, Mr Costa Mendez, was *en route* for New York to present his government's case to the Council.

On 3 April, the Argentinian Foreign Minister arrived and a fierce and complex debate ensued during which Argentine forces invaded South Georgia. Costa Mendez spoke first, the burden of his statement, backed by a lengthy historical survey, being that Argentina had done nothing more than recover national territory which had been seized by the British by an illegitimate act of force in 1833. He was

supported to a greater or lesser extent by certain Latin American delegates including the Foreign Minister of Panama (the Latin American member of the Council) who expressed himself in vitriolic terms and concluded by proposing a suspension of the meeting for two or three hours so that the Council could consider the text of an alternative, and strongly prejudiced, draft resolution which he had read out to the Council. I opposed this delaying tactic equally firmly and it was defeated in a procedural vote by seven in favour (China, Ireland, Japan, Panama, Poland, Spain and the USSR) to three (France, the United Kingdom and the United States) with four abstentions (Guyana, Jordan, Togo and Zaïre), thus failing to secure the necessary nine votes.

The debate continued and I spoke in refutation of the statement by the Argentinian Foreign Minister, in particular of the dangerous proposition he had put forward that the peaceful settlement Articles of the UN Charter applied only to disputes which had arisen since the Charter entered into force in 1945. At the close of the debate the Panamanian Foreign Minister tried to rob me of my vote by claiming that, under Article 27(3) of the Charter 'in decisions under Chapter VI [Pacific Settlement of Disputes] of the Charter a party to a dispute—in this case the United Kingdom—shall abstain from voting'. I counter-attacked that the resolution had been drafted in relation to a breach of the peace and had been proposed with Chapter VII [Actions with respect to threats to the peace . . .] of the Charter in mind: hence the provisions of Article 27(3) did not apply. I was supported by the Permanent Representative of Spain, an accepted expert on UN procedures, and Panama decided not to call for a procedural vote.

What were our feelings as the vote drew near? We knew that our maximum number of favourable votes was ten since the three communist delegations (USSR, China and Poland) could not be expected to support a draft resolution tabled by the United Kingdom nor, for different reasons, could Spain and Panama. Everything depended on the votes of the four non-aligned delegates, three from Africa and one (Jordan) from Asia. Without securing the support of three of these four, assuming that we could count on Japan and Ireland, we would still fall short of the necessary nine votes for the adoption of the resolution. For once in the United Nations, the debate itself was of crucial importance. Few delegations were knowledgeable about the Falklands. The non-aligned had committed themselves at successive summits to the Argentine position on sovereignty: yet all non-aligned states in the UN have a healthy antipathy to the use of force to settle political problems. It was an open contest and I felt, as never before in my UN experience, that the listeners were hanging on the words of the speakers, and that a significant number of delegations were ready to decide their votes in the light of the debate, not in the light of previously entrenched positions as has for years been the case over, for example, the Middle East and Southern Africa.

Before the debate started on 3 April, we in the British delegation discussed this question at length. As I recall, we concluded that we would probably secure seven or eight votes; with luck we would get nine, with unbelievable luck we might achieve the maximum of ten. Would there be a Soviet or Chinese veto? We discounted the latter, our instinct telling us that China would abstain. We had no feel for the likely position of the USSR, even less as the Soviet delegation dashed to and from the telephone as the debate wore on.

When the moment came, we were on tenterhooks, although careful to give no outward sign of concern: I did not even look in the direction of my Soviet colleague

as the pencils went up! The result was better than we had dared to hope for—ten in favour (United Kingdom, United States, France, Guyana, Ireland, Japan, Togo, Zaïre, Uganda and Jordan), one against (Panama) with four abstentions (China, USSR, Poland and Spain). Resolution 502 was born, and I confess that, on our return to my office to report the day's proceedings to London, I and my Falklands team unhesitatingly emptied a couple of bottles of champagne which we found in the refrigerator—the left-overs from a farewell party of the previous week. Antipathy to the use of force had triumphed. We had secured a firm base of international support amongst a wide spectrum of member states, without which, in my view, it would have been difficult to persuade our partners, friends and allies to join us in the economic and political measures which, coupled with military action under Article 51 of the Charter (the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence), formed the three planks of the British government's policy, accepted by all parties in parliament, in reacting to the Argentine aggression.

There followed a period of intensive private and public activity in the UN while Secretary of State Haig pursued his shuttle diplomacy between London and Buenos Aires throughout April. We took opportunities in various UN bodies to press our case against Argentina while the Argentines concentrated on mobilizing support amongst the non-aligned movement for their sovereignty claim, and solidarity in the Organization of American States. I kept in close touch with the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council. Regular briefings were held with the ten members of the European Community and with Commonwealth delegations. On 8 April the Secretary-General established a task force headed by Under-Secretary-General Rafee Ahmed of Pakistan to work on contingency plans in the event that Secretary Haig's efforts failed and the Secretary-General was called upon to use his good offices between the parties. On 19 April the Secretary-General gave to ourselves, the Argentine and US delegations a list of the ways in which the UN might be able to help to bring about a negotiated settlement. We conscientiously circulated to the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, the detailed measures which we were taking under Article 51. This led to a blizzard of Notes from ourselves and the Argentine delegation, eventually numbering well over one hundred, describing and justifying the various military and other moves made by both sides. Throughout I made our position crystal clear both in public and in private: namely, that we would obviously prefer the peaceful implementation of the central paragraph of SCR 502—total Argentine withdrawal—but we would not in the meantime allow anything to inhibit us from exercising our inherent right to self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

Throughout April nerves became increasingly frayed amongst the Security Council membership as the international media, and our own Notes, reported the steady advance of the British Task Force. To begin with it had been difficult to convince my colleagues that we meant business and there was a tendency to believe that the Falklands crisis would follow the pattern of so many events of which the Security Council was seized—a violent change in the status quo followed by an interminable negotiation leaving the altered situation unredressed: the Middle East, Afghanistan, South-east Asia being good examples. However, as the days of April passed, there was a growing realization that we were serious. Pressure from various delegations rose and fell for a return to the Security Council and a call for military restraint combined with negotiations. I held firmly to our line and the President of the Council, as well as the Secretary-General, maintained that the Council should

do nothing which might inhibit Secretary Haig's efforts to reach a negotiated settlement. Our repossession of South Georgia on 25 April further raised the temperature and the pace quickened at the turn of the month with our announcement of a Total Exclusion Zone, Secretary Haig's announcement of the failure of his mission, and the sinking of the *General Belgrano* on 2 May followed two days later by the sinking of HMS *Sheffield*. The stage was set for the next phase, the initiative by the Secretary-General, which he had increasingly come to regard as both necessary and inevitable.

On 2 May, coincidentally with the abortive initiative by the President of Peru, the Secretary-General gave to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, Mr Francis Pym, who was staying that night with me in New York, a 'set of ideas' for a negotiated settlement. This included the concepts of mutual withdrawal, the commencement of diplomatic negotiations for a definitive settlement of the dispute, the lifting of sanctions and exclusion zones, and the establishment of transitional arrangements in the Falklands pending the outcome of the diplomatic negotiations. The same day he presented his 'set of ideas' to the Argentine delegation. He was immediately almost blown off course by a formal request from Ireland to return to the Security Council. This led to a difficult session of informal consultations of the Council in which I repeatedly made clear that we were not prepared to 'exercise restraint'—a meaningless phrase in the circumstances of the hostilities in the South Atlantic—or to freeze our military preparations in any circumstances other than immediate Argentine withdrawal. Fortunately it emerged that our support had not evaporated and the disposition of the Council was to allow the Secretary-General to pursue his negotiations without the hindrance of an acrimonious public debate: Ireland agreed to suspend its request.

On 5 and 6 May respectively the Argentine and British governments indicated their willingness to proceed on the basis of the Secretary-General's 'set of ideas', and the most intensive and vigorous series of negotiations, attended by maximum public interest, continued until 19 May. The Secretary-General saw myself and my Argentine colleague, Vice-Minister Enrique Ros, once or more often twice a day throughout the whole period, weekends included, working in an orderly and systematic way towards the elaboration of an agreement which would embrace the points in his original document, and which would put the islands under temporary UN administration for a defined period during which negotiations for a final settlement would be carried out under his auspices.

As the talks progressed my hopes fluctuated. I began with little optimism but was inclined to revise this when, on 11 May, the Argentine delegation agreed to a formulation under which the outcome of the diplomatic negotiations would not be prejudged at the outset, i.e., establishing that the outcome need not be the transfer of the Falklands to Argentine sovereignty. This was a major concession, or so it seemed. By the weekend of 15/16 May, when I was summoned to London for consultations, I was not entirely without hope of a successful result, although my instinct told me otherwise. The two sides did not seem to be impossibly far apart on the modalities of mutual withdrawal and the timing of the lifting of exclusion zones and sanctions. On the interim administration of the islands under UN auspices we were still separated on the vital point of principle that the democratic institutions in the Falklands must be revived during the transitional period. But we appeared reasonably close on the nature and duration of the diplomatic negotiations

for a definitive solution. There were other differences but they did not seem necessarily to be unbridgeable.

That weekend in London and at Chequers our final position on the draft agreement was worked out. It was subsequently announced to the House of Commons and published on 20 May. I returned to New York on 17 May and presented our proposals to the Secretary-General the same morning, making clear that they were final and that we required a response from the government of Argentina within forty-eight hours: in our view there was no case for allowing the negotiations to drag on any longer. In the late evening of 18 May the Secretary-General gave me a summary of the Argentine response: it was immediately clear that this amounted to rejection of our proposals. This was confirmed when I received the full text on the morning of 19 May. The Secretary-General made a last-minute attempt to avert failure: he spoke on the telephone to President Galtieri and to Mrs Thatcher and subsequently sent to both sides an *aide-memoire* containing full formulations on the two questions of the interim administration and the diplomatic negotiations, with briefer comments on the other points. I responded on 20 May that we would have views on his *aide-memoire*, which did not agree with our own proposals (although it was not far removed from them) but that we would need to see the Argentine reaction before commenting in detail. The Secretary-General received no response from the Argentine delegation by the deadline which he had set.

On the evening of 20 May the Secretary-General reported failure to the President of the Security Council. On 21 May, at the request of Panama, the Council met in open session for a debate which continued for five days. The Secretary-General opened the proceedings with a methodical and impartial summary of the negotiations. He concluded that, towards the end of the previous week, essential agreement had been reached on many points, leaving four crucial differences: namely, certain aspects of the interim administration of the territory; provisions for the extension of the time frame for completion of the diplomatic negotiations and the related duration of the interim administration; certain aspects of the mutual withdrawal of forces; and the geographic area to be covered by the terms of the interim agreement. The Secretary-General described how he had spoken by telephone to President Galtieri and Mrs Thatcher and drew attention to the subsequent *aide-memoire* which he had presented to both parties. He finished his summary by stating that, by the previous evening, the necessary accommodations had not been made: he had therefore concluded that he must inform the President of the Council of his appraisal.

Vice-Minister Ros spoke next in strong but measured terms. He rehearsed the Argentine position on all aspects of the dispute and reiterated Argentina's willingness to negotiate on the basis of SCR 502 notwithstanding their reservations about the resolution. He criticized in detail our position on the various aspects of the Pérez de Cuéllar negotiations and dealt fiercely and at length with our military build-up and the hostilities which had already taken place (by that time British forces had landed on the Falklands).

I spoke next. I first responded to all the points which Ros had made, ending with the question of who had shown flexibility or rigidity during Pérez de Cuéllar's negotiations. I said that my government could have adopted the legitimate attitude that there was no alternative to the withdrawal of the aggressor and the full restoration of the *status quo ante*. But, by 17 May, we had been prepared to

contemplate parallel and mutual withdrawal under United Nations supervision, and a short interim period under UN administration in order to enable diplomatic negotiations to proceed for a definitive settlement of the problem. Although we insisted that the democratic institutions on the islands should remain during the interim period, we were prepared to accept Argentine representation in those institutions disproportionate to the size of the Argentine community. None of this demonstrated rigidity or inflexibility. However, the Argentine response to our proposals had been wholly unsatisfactory, and we had no choice but to regard it as a further attempt to procrastinate in order to enable Argentina to consolidate its hold on what it had seized by force. The Argentine government had insisted on including South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in the agreement. This was unacceptable. These islands were 1,000 miles from the Falklands: they were uninhabited and our title to them rested on different grounds to our title to the Falklands. The Argentine government had insisted on an unequal process of withdrawal of forces which we would not accept. The Argentine government had rejected the continuation in being of the democratic institutions on the islands which we had developed over the years in accordance with our obligations under Article 73 of the Charter. Argentina was only prepared to entertain the possibility that 'persons' who were members of the population of British origin, and Argentine residents in the islands, in equal numbers, might be appointed as 'advisers' by the UN interim administration. This was not only wholly unacceptable to us in concept but the idea of parity in numbers of 'advisers' between a population of about 30 and a population of about 1,800 was ludicrous. Argentina required freedom of access with respect to residence and property during the interim period. This would have enabled Argentina fundamentally to change the demographic status of the islands during a short interim administration, clearly an unacceptable proposition. The Argentine formulation on how and when and by what means the negotiations for a final settlement should be concluded was also totally unacceptable: there was equally no assurance, contrary to what we had previously been led to believe, that Argentina agreed to language which would leave it beyond doubt that the outcome of the negotiations should not be prejudged at the outset. I summed up that I had said enough to demonstrate the justice of my government's conclusion that the Argentine response amounted to a comprehensive rejection of our proposals. I concluded that, although my government's mind would never be closed to any avenue which promised to bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis, we could not in the meantime allow ourselves to be in any way inhibited from carrying out military action in accordance with our inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of the Charter.

Nearly 50 delegations then spoke in the debate, apart from frequent interventions by myself, Argentina, Panama and others in right of reply and to introduce or explain draft resolutions. Almost every member of the Latin American group took the floor in support of Argentina. Many of the Latin American delegates expressed their support in relatively restrained terms: only Venezuela and Panama were nakedly hostile and abusive and I had some brisk exchanges with the Foreign Minister of Panama. These effusions were offset by strong statements on our side from New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Kenya, Belgium, Guyana and other Caribbean representatives. The remainder of our friends and partners, including the United States, expressed themselves in carefully balanced language.

At the end of the debate my Irish colleague tabled a resolution designed to achieve a suspension of hostilities and a resumption of negotiations in terms which I had told him in advance that we would have to oppose. But the non-aligned members of the Council, less of course Panama, were anxious to avoid a British negative vote and proposed to amend the Irish text to a point where we could accept it. I thanked my non-aligned colleagues but warned them that their amendments, although acceptable to us, might well impose an impossible task on the Secretary-General. We were resolved not to accept a cease-fire unless it was inextricably linked to immediate Argentine withdrawal. In the light of all our experience in the past rounds of negotiations conducted by Secretary Haig, the President of Peru and the Secretary-General, my honest feeling was that the Secretary-General would not be able to achieve positive results within the deadline of seven days which the draft resolution stipulated. I advised them to make sure that the Secretary-General was willing to try his hand again, before they brought their draft to a vote. After consulting the Secretary-General, they decided to go ahead and, on 26 May, Security Council Resolution 505 was adopted unanimously. I made our position clear in explanation of our vote.

The Secretary-General lost no time in approaching my Argentine opposite number and myself, although he was under no illusions regarding the magnitude of his task since I had made clear in my statements in the debate that we were not prepared to become embroiled in another endless negotiation leaving our hands tied and Argentine forces entrenched on the islands. After a week of hectic but fruitless negotiation the Secretary-General reported failure to the Council on 2 June, and the formal meetings resumed.

My Spanish colleague took the lead with Panama on behalf of Argentina and, after two days of debate and negotiation involving several amendments to their original text, they pressed to the vote an apparently innocuous cease-fire resolution which, in our judgment, would have had precisely the effect which we refused to contemplate. The vote was deliberately timed to coincide with a ministerial meeting of the non-aligned movement Coordinating Bureau which was taking place in Havana.

Even at this late stage, and even given the predilection of the United Nations to adopt without question calls for cease-fires and military restraint, Spain and Panama had the gravest difficulty in securing the necessary nine votes to turn our negative vote into a veto. We were not isolated. Had it not been for two last-minute switches in voting intentions, the draft would only have secured seven votes. As it was, the voting was nine in favour (Spain, Panama, China, USSR, Poland, Ireland, Japan, Uganda and Zaïre), two against (United Kingdom, United States) with four abstentions (France, Jordan, Guyana and Togo). Three of the five uncommitted non-aligned delegations had not been prepared to cast their votes in the opposite sense to ours. Fortunately any odium which might have attached to us for using our veto was diverted by the astonishing statement by Mrs Kirkpatrick after the vote that she had been requested by her government to record the fact that, were it possible to change their vote, they would like to change it from a veto—a 'no'—to an abstention. This revelation left the Council and the media stunned and I was able to escape from the Chamber almost unnoticed by the press, the microphones and the television cameras as they engulfed Mrs Kirkpatrick.

The conclusion of this debate brought the drama in the United Nations to a close. The Secretary-General, whose mandate under SCR 505 remained in being,

made a last-minute attempt with us and Argentina to avert a final battle for Port Stanley, but without success. On 14 June Argentine troops on the Falklands surrendered and on 24 June British forces repossessed the South Sandwich Islands. By that time the attention of the Security Council had turned to the tragedy of the Lebanon and the General Assembly was in the midst of the Second Special Session on Disarmament: action in New York over the Falklands had dwindled to desultory exchanges of Notes by ourselves, the Argentine and Panamanian Missions.

As I reflect many months later on what was undoubtedly the most hectic and tempestuous episode in my long association with the United Nations, a multitude of impressions and indeed of lessons for the future fill my mind. I will end this article by setting some of these down.

First, the Falklands crisis exploded the myth that Western states, and particularly ex-imperial powers, are permanently isolated and on the defensive in an Organization which is dominated by a Third World majority and obsessed by the doctrine of decolonization. Our cause was right—resistance to the use of force to settle political disputes—and our policy was clear and resolute. The uncommitted non-aligned members of the Security Council, and a large number of delegations outside the Council, were prepared to judge the case on its merits. We started out with the maximum support for our initiative in calling the Security Council and tabling our own resolution and, even when the natural instinct of the United Nations to favour negotiations against mounting hostilities took charge, the basic justice of our cause was not forgotten and I never felt the coldness of isolation. As I have pointed out earlier in this article, only two of the five uncommitted non-aligned delegations on the Council felt able to support an apparently innocuous draft resolution calling for a cease-fire as late as 4 June.

Secondly, the Falklands crisis destroyed a second myth, namely that United Nations debates are invariably sterile affairs consisting of dull set speeches generally addressed to domestic audiences with the pattern of voting predetermined before the debate begins. The Falklands debates were lively, serious and full of meaning. Many of the statements delivered, including a large number of my own, were extemporized in the light of the current day's proceedings. There was no miasma of boredom hanging over the Council Chamber. Every word was listened to with close attention, every document carefully studied, and I felt thoughout, as I have no doubt that my Argentine opposite numbers did, that tactical errors and omissions in debate and in private consultations could cost support and forfeit votes when the time came. This was in vivid contrast to the sterilities of debate on the subjects which mainly preoccupy the Security Council. The Falklands debate had a pristine quality which I had not previously encountered.

Thirdly, I was profoundly impressed by the diplomatic skill, the dedication and impartiality of the Secretary-General. I had known and liked Javier Pérez de Cuéllar for a long time and had warmly welcomed his election, only a few months before, to the Secretary-Generalship. The Falklands crisis was his first and most exacting test. He did not succeed, but no-one could have done more or done it with greater expertise. He passed with flying colours, an excellent augury for the future of the Organization under his stewardship.

Fourthly, I was intrigued by the difference between the attitudes of many states as expressed in their capitals, compared to their public positions as stated before the eyes of the world in New York. On the Latin American side, so far as I know, little or no hostility was manifested towards Britain in the majority of Latin

American capitals. This contrasted strongly with the flood of rhetoric which poured out in the Security Council. On our side, we received invaluable support from the United States, certain Commonwealth countries and our European partners in capitals: with some notable exceptions to which I have drawn attention this was not apparent in statements before the Council.

Fifthly, what were the true intentions of Argentina following the invasion? Were their protestations of willingness to implement SCR 502 in all its parts sincere? I can only express a personal view but, on reflection, I still believe that what I thought at the time was right. I am convinced that the Argentine government made two fatal miscalculations at the outset. They did not believe that we would react militarily to their seizure of the Falklands and South Georgia and they never expected that we would win and hold the diplomatic initiative in New York: how could a former imperial power prevail diplomatically in the UN over an issue of decolonization against a member of the non-aligned movement whose cause in the South Atlantic had been espoused by successive non-aligned summits? They were wrong: they had underestimated the depth of the antipathy of virtually the whole membership to the use of force to settle political disputes, whatever the merits of the case. Thereafter I believe that the Argentine government was determined to remain in possession of the islands; having embarked on their military adventure, they had no intention of seriously negotiating the peaceful implementation of SCR 502. Their objective was to play for time indefinitely in the hope that international opinion would gradually move against us; that the origins of the crisis would be forgotten; that as our military reaction developed we would be seen as the aggressor and they as the victim; that as they gradually pushed us onto the wrong foot in the eyes of world opinion we would not dare to pursue our military operations beyond, say, a temporary blockade; and that, after a time, we would abandon our attempts to repossess the islands and content ourselves with saving face in a welter of interminable UN negotiations. I may of course be wrong and I must emphasize that the above opinion is strictly personal.

In conclusion I venture to suggest that the reputation of Britain in the United Nations has been greatly enhanced by our handling of the Falklands crisis. Not only our allies and partners, but our adversaries too, could witness the unswerving determination with which we pursued all three aspects of our policy, diplomatic, military and economic. And I like to believe that many non-aligned countries may have felt reassured to know that Britain is still both capable and willing to act firmly when important national interests and internationally accepted principles are at stake.

The politics of South Atlantic security: a survey of proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organization

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The recent conflict between Britain and Argentina transformed the South Atlantic into an area of major international concern. It also underlined the extent to which the region had been generally neglected by both policymakers and academics. It is true that since the early 1970s interest in the region had been growing for a variety of reasons: anxiety in Washington over increased Soviet naval capabilities; continuing political instability and uncertainty in southern Africa; increased awareness of the importance of undersea resources; concern over the future status of Antarctica. Despite these factors, the literature on the region remains uneven. There is a large literature dealing with the strategic importance of the Cape route and an even larger one dealing with the growth of Soviet naval capabilities. Yet relatively little attention has been paid to the task of relating Western concern for South Atlantic security to the interests and perceptions of the major Latin American states, particularly Argentina and Brazil.[1] This paper will examine these interests and perceptions and will try and present a broad overview of the major elements in the South Atlantic jigsaw puzzle. It will focus on the various proposals that have been made for the formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization.

For the purposes of this discussion, the South Atlantic can be defined as that part of the Atlantic ocean south of the Tropic of Cancer, the southern limit of NATO. In talking about a South Atlantic Treaty Organization I will refer to all moves aimed at developing a more tightly-knit multilateral system of South Atlantic defence along NATO lines—moves that have at various times involved the United States, Brazil, Argentina, Chile, South Africa and Uruguay.

In one important sense, however, the focus on 'SATO' is misleading: as I will argue, the divergence of views amongst the supposed members of a South Atlantic pact has been so great that its formation was always highly improbable. Nevertheless, the subject is worth examining in more detail for three reasons. First, because despite being pronounced dead on so many occasions, the idea of a South Atlantic pact has simply refused to die. It appears to have an intuitive logic that many a strategist finds unchallengeable. Secondly, because recent differences between the United States and its Latin American neighbours over the South Atlantic are indicative of wider problems in US–Latin American relations, indeed perhaps in American policy towards the Third World as a whole. Thirdly, because now that the Falklands conflict is over and attention is being focussed on the problem of constructing a durable settlement in the region, it is important to have a clearer understanding of exactly how attitudes and policies towards the South Atlantic have

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1. For an earlier article dealing with this problem see Margaret Daly Hayes, 'Der Südatlantik: Interessen der Grossmächte und der Anlieger', *Europa-archiv*, Folge 18, 1978, pp. 589–98.

0020–5850/83/2/0179—15$3.00©1983 International Affairs

developed over the past 20 years. This paper will not examine attitudes towards the Falklands issue itself, but will try rather to analyse the interests and changing attitudes of the major South Atlantic powers—Brazil, Argentina, South Africa and the United States—towards the problem of South Atlantic security. It will be further limited in that I will examine the United States and South Africa only from the perspective of their cooperation with the countries of Latin America.

South Africa

South Africa is the country which has most consistently favoured the formation of 'SATO' and promoted attempts to develop a more tightly-knit system of South Atlantic security. Clearly, South African membership of such a grouping would have obvious military advantages, given the country's strategic location and its own military capabilities, particularly in the field of intelligence and reconnaissance. Moreover, from Pretoria's point of view membership of such a pact would have important political advantages. A central theme of South African foreign policy has been the emphasis on the country's strategic importance to the West and on the extent of the Soviet threat to Western interests in both southern Africa and the South Atlantic. South Africa is a country which has a definite stake in poor relations between the superpowers. A military grouping in the South Atlantic, however informal, has been viewed as an important means of gaining allies and respectability, of overcoming the country's political isolation and of defusing the antipathy generated by apartheid. This policy has led South Africa to seek to develop relations with the countries of Latin America. In addition, there is little doubt that Latin America has also been seen as an important target area for the development of trade and investment.[2]

When Vorster became premier in 1966, South Africa launched its foreign policy of 'outward movement' or 'dialogue' and in the same year the Argentinian and South African navies began an exchange programme for naval staff. In November 1967 a South African naval unit visited Buenos Aires and joint exercises were held.[3] During his visits to Brazil (to inaugurate the Rio–Cape Town air service) and to Buenos Aires, the South African foreign minister, Hilgard Müller, constantly stressed the need for a common approach to South Atlantic defence in the face of the growing Soviet threat.[4] In an interview in Buenos Aires he stated that a South Atlantic pact between Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, the United States and South Africa was a likely development, although this was later denied.[5] Despite this denial, together with others from Brazil and Argentina, speculation continued and was further fuelled by the nine day visit to South Africa in May 1969 of the Argentinian naval chiefs of staff.[6]

In 1976 there was a renewal of speculation about South Africa's alleged involvement in 'SATO' following the visit of the head of the South African navy, Vice Admiral James Johnson, to Brazil and Argentina during the annual UNITAS naval exercises between the United States and several Latin American countries. In an

2. See David Fig, 'The Atlantic Connection: Growing Links Between South Africa and Latin America', in *Britain and Latin America* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1979), pp. 92–109.
3. 'Argentina and South Africa plan stronger trade and defence ties', *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 January 1968.
4. 'Red peril seen in South Atlantic', *Christian Science Monitor*, 12 April 1969.
5. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 15 April 1969.
6. 'Red flag off the Cape of Good Hope', *Daily Telegraph*, 16 May 1969.

interview in Rio de Janeiro, Admiral Johnson declared: 'The Communists are turning the area into a Soviet lake . . . On any day you can see 30–35 Soviet ships pass by here and there's nothing we can do. We are all alone'.[7] More recently, the presence (albeit unofficial) of South African representatives at a conference held in Buenos Aires in May 1981 to discuss the possible formation of a South Atlantic pact has kept the issue of South African involvement alive.[8] South African concern for South Atlantic security and its desire to use the concern felt by others as a means of overcoming its own diplomatic isolation has thus been a major theme of recent South African foreign policy. However, despite Pretoria's interest in the idea of 'SATO' and closer military cooperation with Latin America, the attitudes of the other members of such a grouping to South African involvement have ranged, as we shall see, from ambivalence to outright hostility.

Argentina

Of the countries of Latin America it is Argentina which has most frequently been linked with the various rumours and reports of a South Atlantic pact. As early as 1956 Argentina responded to a recommendation by the Inter-American Defense Board that naval cooperation in the South Atlantic should be improved, and in July of that year sent invitations to Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay for 'preparatory talks to study the bases for an organization for the defence of the South Atlantic'.[9] After lengthy stalling by Brazil, a conference did take place in Buenos Aires in May 1957, although little progress was made towards the formation of any formal pact or alliance.[10] I have already noted the various moves in the late 1960s towards closer military and political ties between Pretoria and Buenos Aires and since that time there have been regular reports that Argentina, and particularly the Argentinian navy, was actively promoting the idea of 'SATO' behind the scenes whilst officially denying any such intention. In 1976 the Argentinian foreign minister, Rear Admiral César Guzzetti, expressed his country's grave concern 'that the South Atlantic might be the object of a modification . . . that could endanger our sea communications'.[11] Commenting on the visit of the head of the Brazilian navy, Azevedo Henning, to Buenos Aires in April 1976, the Argentinian paper *La Nación* emphasized the concern in the armed forces over the growing Soviet threat in the South Atlantic and the belief that this threat could only be effectively countered by joint action and military cooperation between Argentina, Brazil and South Africa.[12] Similarly, *La Prensa* in an editorial in 1980 on Soviet expansionism in the region called for better cooperation between the countries involved and, pointing to a recent visit by the United States Secretary of the Navy, declared: 'There does exist

7. 'Talk grows of South Atlantic pact aimed at Russia', *International Herald Tribune*, 30 November 1976.

8. 'Pact meeting: Mystery over South African delegates', *Rand Daily Mail*, 26 May 1981; 'South Atlantic pact takes shape in Argentina', *Financial Times*, 26 May 1981. For a survey of South Africa's position, see Admiral H. H. Biermann, 'The South African Response' in Patrick Wall, ed., *The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World* (London: Stacey International, 1977).

9. *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 22 May 1957.

10. *New York Times*, 12, 14 May 1957. Because of the limited results of this conference, there is some debate as to whether the *Pacto Atlantico Sur* of 1957 should be included in a survey of proposals for a 'SATO'. Yet although the 1957 pact was concerned only with training exercises, it is clear that the original Argentinian proposals envisaged a far more extensive system of multilateral defence for the South Atlantic.

11. 'SATO is revived', *Observer Foreign News Service*, 1 December 1976.

12. *La Nación*, 8 April 1976. Quoted in Hayes, 'Der Südatlantik', p. 592.

for mutual support and cooperation in the defence of the South Atlantic
ie Soviet presence in West Africa and in the South Atlantic in general must
en a strategic response in order to preserve our national security'.[13] Indeed in
speculation increased significantly, due partly to the changed attitude of
ngton and partly to the improvement in relations between Brazil and
tina following President Figueiredos's visit in May of that year. At the time
; visit the Argentinian foreign minister, Carlos Washington Pastor, spoke of
ipprochement as laying the basis for 'an alliance against world communism'
ecifically mentioned the possibility of a South Atlantic defence pact.[14] It is
o coincidence that the conference on 'SATO' in May 1981 was held in Buenos
[15]

re has thus been a considerable body of opinion within Argentina, both
l and unofficial, that has favoured the creation of a South Atlantic pact. The
f this opinion can be found in the fervent anti-communism of the Argentinian
y and perhaps also in the common interests and perspectives of Argentina
outh Africa generated by their pariah status. It can also be related to the
ly held geopolitical views of many military officers. As John Child has
d out, if there is one part of the world where geopolitics is a flourishing
t, it is in southern Latin America.[16] Apart from, and in some ways in response
e obsession with Brazil and the potential Brazilian threat, this geopolitical
on has a strong maritime emphasis, highlighting the significance of the South
ic and the need to safeguard Argentina's claims in Antarctica.[17] It sees
tina as having special responsibility for the control of several key exit and
points to both the South Atlantic and Antarctica. According to this view,
tina's future lies in the integration of all its national territories and in the
tation of its ocean resources. Only by doing so can it recover its lost status
vercome the acute sense of internal and external vulnerability that has
terized the country's recent foreign policy.[18]

although this kind of thinking is significant and reflects serious national
rns, Argentina's attitude to the South Atlantic must be viewed within the
t of the country's overall foreign policy. There is not room here to attempt
iled survey of Argentinian foreign policy, especially given its complexity and
lity.[19] It is worthwhile, however, to highlight those factors which tended to
against any Argentinian involvement in a South Atlantic pact.

t, the stress on the Soviet threat in the South Atlantic and the willingness to
rate with Brazil is very much a viewpoint associated with the Argentinian
The army has generally been far more concerned with the perceived threat of

a *Prensa*, 5 July 1980.
'Bündnisstrategien im südlichen Latein Amerika: Ansätze zu einem Sudatlantikpakt', *Neue
r Zeitung*, 14 September 1980.
inancial Times, 28 May 1981.
See John Child, 'Geopolitical Thinking in Latin America', *Latin American Research Review*,
Vol. XIV, No. 2, pp. 89–111.
For details of Argentina's claims in Antarctica see Eduardo M. de la Cruz, 'Derechos Argentinos
a Antárticda y las pretensiones ajenas', *Estrategia*, 43/44, 1976–7, pp. 60–71.
See Juan E. Guglialmelli, 'Argentina. Política Nacional y Política de Fronteras', *Estrategia*, 37/38,
, pp. 5–21.
For a survey of Argentina's foreign policy see Edward S. Milenky, *Argentina's Foreign Policies*
er, Colorado: Westview, 1978); also John Finan, 'Argentina' in Harold Davis and Larman C.
, eds, *Latin American Foreign Policies: An Analysis* (London: Johns Hopkins University Press,

Brazilian expansionism and even a cursory reading of the many books and articles devoted to this theme makes it clear that this 'threat' is seen to exist on both land and sea: Argentina's maritime pretensions are as much threatened by Brazil as by the Soviet Union.[20]

Secondly, there is the wider problem of relations with Brazil. Since the late 1970s there has been a very significant improvement in relations and the elements of cooperation in what Helio Jaguaribe has called a relationship of 'conflictive cooperation' have certainly come to the fore.[21] Moreover, the erosion of the balance of power between the two countries makes it hard to see what Argentina could hope to gain from a return to confrontation. Nevertheless the situation remains very fluid and the legacy of mutual suspicion must, at the very least, serve to complicate any moves towards a formal military agreement over the South Atlantic.

Thirdly, superficial ideological common interests have often obscured the extent to which Argentina and the United States must be seen as historic rivals. In a sense recent tensions over the Falklands have only added to an already very long list of difficulties and conflicts between the two countries. Argentina's globalist pretensions, its affinities with Europe, its pioneering advocacy of the principles of non-intervention and the juridical equality of states all made Argentina a traditional opponent of Pan-Americanism and hemispheric solidarity under United States leadership. Argentina remained neutral in both world wars.[22] It delayed ratification of the Rio Pact for four years and the Charter of the Organization of American States for eight. In 1954 it abstained from supporting the US-sponsored Declaration of Solidarity for the Preservation of the Political Integrity of American States against International Communism and again in 1962 over the resolution expelling Cuba from the OAS. The postwar period has seen frequent disputes over trade issues, foreign investment, policy towards Cuba, nuclear energy and human rights.[23]

Fourthly, there is the question of relations with the Soviet Union—a crucial point if we are talking about Argentinian involvement in a pact aimed at countering Soviet expansionism. Argentina was the first Latin American country to send a representative to Soviet Russia and ever since has tried to maintain an independent position towards both superpowers. Perón established formal diplomatic relations in 1946 and in 1953 the first trade treaty was signed. Economic ties were significantly strengthened with the signing of a three year trade agreement in 1971 and, politically, the two countries were moving closer together in the two years preceding the coup of 1976.[24] Despite the virulent anti-communism of the military regimes that have governed since 1976, these relations have continued to develop. The Soviet Union has become the largest purchaser of Argentinian grain and meat exports; the Soviet Union and Cuba have blocked all discussions of Argentina's human rights record in the UN Commission on Human Rights; Soviet turbines are installed in

20. See for example, Juan E. Guglialmelli, 'Golbery do Couto y Silva, el "destino manifiesto" brasileño y el atlántico sur', *Estrategia*, 39, March–April 1976, pp. 5–22.

21. See Helio Jaguaribe, 'El Brasil y America Latina', *Estudios Internacionales*, Vol. 8, No. 29, Jan–March 1975; also Carlos Moneta and Rolf Wichmann, 'Brazil and the Southern Cone', in Wayne Selcher, ed., *Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle Power* (Boulder, Colarado: Westview, 1981).

22. Alone among Latin American states Argentina maintained relations with the Axis powers until 1944 and then made only a formal break.

23. See Milenky, *Argentina's Foreign Policies*, Chapter 4.

24. Milenky, *Argentina's Foreign Policies*, pp. 153–7.

ıe Salto Grande hydroelectric project and the Soviet Union has assisted Argentina ı fishing, oceanography and offshore oil exploration.[25]

.Edward Milenky has suggested that Argentina's foreign policy can be seen as a :ries of alternations between what he calls a 'statist-nationalist' foreign policy and 'classic liberal' foreign policy.[26] The first views Argentina as a non-aligned, strictly atin American, developing country and can be seen in the long tradition of .dependence and universalism: in Perón's proclamation of the 'Third Position', ıuidistant between the United States and the Soviet Union; in the 'developmenlism' of the Frondizi period (1958–62); in the ideological pluralism of the Lanusse ›vernment (1970–3); and in the revived Perónist foreign policy of 1973–6. The cond views Argentina as a nearly developed, Western, Christian nation and can : seen in the strongly pro-Western and violently anti-communist tendencies of nganía (1966–70) and the regimes that have ruled since 1976. It is no surprise to ıd that speculation about Argentinian involvement in a South Atlantic pact and e promotion of closer ties with South Africa should have been prominent during ese two latter periods. The important point is, however, that both these foreign licies reflect pressures that are continually present in Argentinian politics. Thus, wever much a regime may speak of the need for a 'crusade against world mmunism', such rhetoric can never tell the whole story. Anti-communism may ide foreign policy, for example in the case of Argentina's involvement in Central nerica, but will not necessarily do so, as witnessed, for example, by the decision ignore the US grain embargo after the invasion of Afghanistan or the move to pand relations with China.[27]

Argentina, then, certainly has a strong and long-standing interest in the security the South Atlantic. Moreover, in contrast to Brazil, Argentina has shown far ore interest in developing a formal pact or treaty and in seeking South African ırticipation. Yet the imperatives of economic development, the force of nationalist eling and the continued suspicion of both Brazil and the United States have all rved to complicate the possibility of Argentina's involvement in a South Atlantic :eaty Organization.

razil

razil is the other country in Latin America which has a major stake in developments the South Atlantic. Brazil's externally oriented development model has meant ıat foreign trade and the expansion of exports have been of crucial importance to ıe national economy and in 1977 over 66 per cent of Brazil's exports had to cross ıe Atlantic by sea.[28] The importance of the South Atlantic is increased still further r Brazil's heavy dependence on imported oil. The country currently imports :tween 80 and 85 per cent of its petroleum needs and despite efforts at diversifiıtion the major part still comes from the Middle East via the Cape.

Since the late 1960s Brazil has made increasing efforts to use its ocean space and sources more effectively. The country's merchant marine and shipbuilding capality has increased dramatically: the merchant marine increased from below

25. In 1972 total trade amounted to £15 million. By 1978 Argentina's exports to the Soviet Union had ien to £242 million. See 'Trade drives Argentina east', *Financial Times*, 7 April 1980, and Robert S. iiken, 'Eastern Winds in Latin America', *Foreign Policy*, No. 42, Spring 1981, pp. 97–8.
26. Milenky, *Argentina's Foreign Policies*, pp. 1–20.
27. See *Le Monde*, 10 June 1980.
28. FUNCEX, 'Destino das Exportacoes Brasileiras'.

1 million tons in 1967 with an average age of 10 years to over 5 million tons in 1977 with an average age of 4 years.[29] In 1970 Brazil extended its territorial sea to 200 miles and has conducted an extremely active diplomacy at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. It has developed offshore oil; its annual fish catch ranks about 18th in the world and in 1968 it established an Interministerial Commission on the Exploration and Utilization of the Sea Bed and Ocean (CIEFMAR).[30] In addition, Brazil has maintained a consistent, although discreet, interest in Antarctica and in 1975 received adherent status to the Antarctic Treaty, emphasizing both its security requirements and its wish to participate in the exploration of Antarctic natural resources.[31]

In the light of these factors and given Brazil's geographical position it is hardly surprising that the Brazilian military should have long viewed the South Atlantic and the west coast of Africa as an area vital to the country's national security. As General Golbery do Couto y Silva, Brazil's leading geopolitician, wrote in 1957:

> We must take it upon ourselves vigilantly to observe what takes place along the whole west coast of Africa, for it is incumbent upon us by self-interest and even tradition to preserve it from domination by aggressive imperialist forces.[32]

More recently, military writers have sought to go beyond this stress on the defensive importance of the South Atlantic and to propose that Brazil should develop a more dynamic role in the area. Thus Vice Admiral Hilton Berutti Augusto Moreira wrote in 1972:

> To provide Brazil with adequate maritime power and to take maximum advantage of the country's geo-strategic position are essential decisions for the attainment of the national objective of rapid development and for support for a high degree of effective national security.[33]

Another leading strategist, General Meira Mattos, proposed in 1977 that Brazil should develop a new, far more ambitious 'South Atlantic Strategy' based on a large increase in the country's air and naval capabilities.[34]

Again not surprisingly, the victory of the MPLA in Angola, the continued presence of Cuban troops in Africa and the growth of Soviet naval influence in the South Atlantic all served to increase the concern of the Brazilian military for the region's security. In December 1975 the navy minister, Azevedo Henning, emphasized the dangers of Soviet military expansionism in the South Atlantic in a widely reported speech to the *Escola Superior de Guerra* (the Brazilian Higher War College).[35] In 1976 an article in the college's journal *Segurança e Desenvolvimento* pointed to two types of threat:

29. See Michael Morris, *International Politics and the Sea: The Case of Brazil* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1979), p. 276.

30. Michael Morris, *International Politics and the Sea*, pp. 25–6.

31. For a discussion of Brazil's position on Antarctica see Therezinha de Castro, *Rumo à Antártica* (Rio de Janeiro: Livraria Freitas Bastos, 1976); also Carlos J. Moneta, 'Antarctica, Latin America and the International System in the 1980s: Towards a New Antarctic Order', *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, Vol. 33, No. 1, February 1981, pp. 29–68, and M. J. Peterson, 'Antarctica: The Last Great Land Rush', *International Organisation*, Vol. 34, No. 3, Summer 1980, pp. 377–403.

32. Golbery do Couto y Silva, *Aspectos Geopoliticos do Brasil*, (Rio de Janeiro: Jose Olympio, 1957), pp. 27–8.

33. Hilton Berutti Augusto Moreira, 'O Brasil e suas responsibilidades no Atlântico Sul', *Segurança e Desenvolvimento*, No. 169, 1972, p. 103.

34. Carlos de Meira Mattos, *A Geopolitica e as Projecões do Poder* (Rio de Janeiro: Jose Olympio, 1977) esp. chapters VIII and IX.

35. *Veja*, 31 December 1975.

> In times of peace: A higher level of ideological penetration and greater infiltration of agitators mainly via diplomatic and commercial missions . . . In a war situation: the transformation of Angola into a communist country represents a very considerable increase in the aggressive power that can be levelled against South America in general and Brazil, because of its geographical position, in particular.[36]

This line of thinking was vigorously taken up by the conservative press and together with a number of official visits of Brazilian and Argentinian naval chiefs, fuelled speculation through 1976 that a South Atlantic pact was in the making.[37] Since then there have been frequent and cordial naval visits and exercises, both bilateral and multilateral. In 1980, during a visit to Buenos Aires, the Brazilian navy minister, da Fonseca, stated:

> In reality the greatest danger that faces us comes from outside our continent and we must unite to confront it . . . in no other moment was the unity of the nations of our continent and particularly of our navies as important as it is now.[38]

Yet despite Brazil's interests in the South Atlantic and despite military concern over South Atlantic security, Brazil has consistently opposed the formation of a regional defence pact, particularly one involving South Africa. In response to the Argentinian proposals of 1956, Brazil insisted that any agreement on improved defence must be within the Rio Treaty, that United States participation was essential and that no new alliance or pact was necessary.[39] This position, supported by the United States, effectively undermined the original Argentinian proposals for a new strong regional defence pact anchored on Buenos Aires.[40]

Following the military coup of 1964, the possibility of Brazilian participation in a South Atlantic pact appeared to increase. The ideology of the new regime laid heavy stress on the importance of national security and anti-communism, together with a close pro-American alignment. In keeping with the idea of 'ideological frontiers', a Brazilian general commanded the forces which intervened in the Dominican Republic in 1965. It was this kind of atmosphere, together with the fact that South Africa was at the time Brazil's most important trading partner in Africa, which led to speculation of closer military cooperation between the two countries in 1969 during the visit of the South African foreign minister, Hilgard Müller. This speculation was strengthened by the Brazilian government's support for Salazarist Portugal and became linked with the idea of a Luso–Brazilian Community, a rather vague and romantic attempt to join Brazil, Portugal and the Portuguese territories in Africa in a kind of commonwealth.[41] In 1969 it was reported that Brazil nearly

36. 'Atlântico Sul: Tres Visões de uma Estrategia', *Seguranca e Desenvolvimento*, No. 164, 1976, p. 136.
37. See, for instance, *O Estado de Sao Paulo*, 24 September 1976; *Jornal do Brasil*, 28 September 1976.
38. *Jornal do Brasil*, 27 July 1980.
39. *Neue Züricher Zeitung*, 28 May 1957.
40. Despite Brazil's position, the *Pacto Atlantico Sur*, signed in 1957, embodied agreements on training, the coordination of naval planning and cooperation on signalling and intelligence. See *New York Times*, 21 May 1957.
41. For a detailed discussion of the Luso–Brazilian Community, see Wayne Selcher, *The Afro-Asian Dimension of Brazilian Foreign Policy* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1974), pp. 61–5.

took part in naval exercises with Portugal and South Africa.[42] Yet despite the rumours, nothing concrete emerged and in July 1969 Brazil issued a formal note in the United Nations, denying any involvement in a South Atlantic pact. Nor did Brazil take up Caetano's proposals for greater Brazilian involvement in west Africa and the South Atlantic under the aegis of a Luso–Brazilian Community.[43]

Since the early 1970s Brazilian hostility to the idea of a South Atlantic pact has continued to harden. Faced with the twin pressures of the need to expand exports and, particularly after 1973, to secure oil supplies, Brazilian foreign policy has sought to move away from the close pro-American, narrowly anti-communist line that characterized the mid-1960s. Flexibility, pragmatism, independence and diversification have become the central themes of the country's foreign policy. Two aspects of this policy are relevant here. First, there is the switch in Brazil's Africa policy and the decision to concentrate on developing relations with black Africa and to minimize all formal contacts with South Africa. In November 1975, despite misgivings from within certain parts of the military, Brazil became the first non-communist country to recognize the MPLA government in Angola.[44] Since then Brazil has worked hard (and successfully) to expand economic ties in Africa, particularly with Nigeria, Angola and Algeria. Indeed, looking to the future, the Angola–Nigeria–Brazil triangle holds many interesting possibilities for political, economic and even military cooperation across the South Atlantic.[45] Secondly, as with Argentina, Brazil's economic relations with the Soviet Union have expanded steadily through the 1970s and in July 1981 a US$5 billion, five year trade agreement was signed in Moscow.[46]

In the light of this policy, officials have repeatedly denied any Brazilian interest in a South Atlantic pact. In September 1976 the foreign minister, Antonio Azeredo Silveira, stated: 'There is not the slightest possibility of establishing a collective security system in the South Atlantic, especially with the awkward and unwanted presence of South Africa'.[47] When such a pact was proposed in October 1977 by the Uruguayan admiral Hugo Marquez, Brasilia issued an immediate denial.[48] In an interview in 1979, the navy minister da Fonseca dismissed the necessity of a South Atlantic pact.[49] For Brazil talk of a 'SATO' is, to quote a recent statement, 'inopportune, superfluous and dangerous'.[50] Inopportune, because the Brazilian

42. It is worth pointing out that these moves coincided with Portugal's efforts to draw NATO into its colonial war as part of wider proposals to improve the security of the South Atlantic. See Christopher Coker, 'The Western Alliance and Africa', *African Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 324, July 1982, pp. 324–8.

43. See *New York Times*, 14 July 1969; *Le Monde*, 13 July 1969.

44. The decision to recognize the MPLA was apparently taken without the unanimous approval of the *Conselho Nacional de Segurança*; see *Jornal do Brasil*, 2 July 1979.

45. See Tom Forrest, 'Brazil and Africa: Geopolitics, Trade and Technology in the South Atlantic', *African Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 322, January 1982, pp. 3–20. For a Nigerian view of the 'SATO' question, see A. Bolaji Akinyemi, 'The Need for an African South Atlantic Organisation' *Nigerian Forum*, Vol. I 1981, pp. 125–130, quoted in Wayne Selcher, 'Dilemas de Política en las Relaciones de Brasil con Africa: Ejemplo de Obstáculos en las Relaciones Sur-Sur', *Foro Internacional*, Vol. XXIII, No. 1, jul-set 1982, p. 36.

46. For details of this agreement see Jim Brooke, 'Dateline Brazil: Southern Superpower', *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1981, p. 178.

47. Quoted in Hayes, *Der Südatlantik*, p. 593. Brazil's pragmatic approach to diplomacy has meant that, despite the official switch in its African policy, discreet although highly profitable ties with South Africa have continued and in 1978–9 South African exports to Brazil were larger than those of any other African country.

48. *Jornal do Brasil*, 6, 7 October 1977.

49. 'Não é preciso um pacto no Atlântico Sul', *Veja*, 25 April 1979.

50. Reported in *Le Monde*, 19 August 1981.

government does not believe that the level of threat can warrant the formation of a new defence pact; superfluous, because the security of the region is already covered by the Rio Treaty;[51] and dangerous, because such a pact would needlessly militarize the South Atlantic and escalate superpower rivalry in the region.

On the one hand, then, there remains a significant body of opinion within the Brazilian military that would tend to favour an improved system of South Atlantic defence. Moreover, speculation about Brazilian involvement, even if misplaced, does underline the level of Brazilian interest in the region. On the other hand, the thrust of Brazilian foreign policy, at least since 1973, has been against the formation of any new pact or alliance. It is a foreign policy based primarily on the need to maintain maximum diplomatic flexibility and it is widely felt in Brasilia that a return to cold war politics would severely threaten the country's room to manoeuvre.[52] Yet although Brazilian participation in a 'SATO' is highly unlikely, Brazil remains a country with the capacity unilaterally to alter the bases of South Atlantic politics. Up to now it has chosen to maintain a low profile. Defence spending has been low and the navy has only a limited deep-water capability.[53] Nevertheless, a modernization programme is under way and a naval base is being constructed on the island of Trindade, some 700 miles east of Rio de Janeiro. These factors, together with Brazil's increasingly sophisticated armaments industry, clearly lay the basis for a more dynamic role in the South Atlantic, should a future Brazilian government so choose.

The United States

For most of the postwar period United States defence planning paid only slight attention to the South Atlantic region.[54] Indeed for Latin America as a whole, US security doctrine assumed that the level of external threat to the area would remain low and that hemispheric solidarity behind Washington's leadership could be maintained. For these reasons the inter-American security system that emerged during and immediately after the end of the Second World War was a relatively loose one. Security relations were formalized in the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, or Rio Pact, signed in 1947, which has been supplemented over the years by bilateral military assistance treaties, and in the Charter of the Organization of American States. Yet there has never been any kind of permanent military organization. As Gordon Connell Smith points out, 'The Inter-American Defense Board was established for political rather than military reasons'.[55] Subsequently, it has acquired no operational significance and has no forces under its direct command. Moreover, the two occasions when inter-American military

51. At the San Jose de Costa Rica Conference in 1975, the eastern security limit of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Treaty) was fixed at 20 degrees West of Greenwich.

52. In keeping with this policy, military ties with the United States have been progressively reduced. In 1977 the military assistance agreements were ended and, more recently, Brazil withdrew from the annual UNITAS naval exercises.

53. See Max G. Manwaring, 'Brazilian Military Power: A Capability Analysis', in Selcher, ed., *Brazil in the International System: The Rise of a Middle Power.*

54. During the Second World War the north-east of Brazil and the Atlantic narrows had been included within the US strategic defence perimeter, the so-called 'Quarter-Sphere Defense'. Following the end of the war, however, the Latin American region was effectively demoted in strategic terms. See John Child, 'Strategic Concepts in Latin America: An Update', *Inter-American Economic Affairs*, No. 34, Summer 1980, pp. 61–82.

55. Gordon Connell Smith, *The Inter-American System* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 122.

measures have been taken, regarding Cuba and the Dominican Republic, served in many ways to impair the possibility of future cooperation and to underline Latin American concern that all inter-American defence arrangements could at least potentially be used by the United States to further its hegemonic aspirations.

Cooperation over the South Atlantic has been even more limited. In 1959 the Inter-American Defense Board approved a Plan for the Defense of Inter-American Maritime Traffic, from which the South Atlantic Maritime Area Command (CAMUS) was created. CAMUS is made up of representatives of Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay with the overall command alternating between Brazilian and Argentinian naval officers. The aim of CAMUS is to provide an integrated command in wartime and its activities have included the Atlantic convoy and communications exercises. In addition, since the early 1960s, the United States navy based in Puerto Rico has participated with the navies of Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia and Uruguay in the regular UNITAS exercises. Elsewhere in the South Atlantic, the United States military presence has been minimal. It has no naval or air force bases on the west or southern coasts of Africa. It has maintained a military attaché in its Pretoria embassy but US naval ships have not been allowed to dock in South Africa since 1967.

However, given the low level of perceived threat to the area, it is easy to see why there were no major United States initiatives during the 1950s or 1960s for a more extensive system of South Atlantic defence. It is true that the Cuban crisis increased Washington's concern over possible communist advances in Latin America; yet the Cuban crisis—together with the Congo crisis on the other side of the Atlantic—also demonstrated the inability of the Soviet Union to project its power over long distances.

Since the late 1960s this situation has changed significantly and the South Atlantic has begun to figure far more prominently on the list of United States security concerns. First, there is the increasing importance of the South Atlantic shipping lanes.[56] The argument here has become familiar and is based on the fact that since the mid 1960s an ever higher percentage of imports to the United States and Western Europe has been transported around the southern tip of Africa. The level of usage is around 2,300 ships a month, of which 600 are oil tankers. Secondly, the perceived threat to this shipping has increased because of the dramatic growth in Soviet naval capabilities.[57] The Soviet Union, which in Stalin's time possessed only a coastal navy, now has more surface ships and more submarines than the United States. The Soviet navy first appeared off west African waters in 1969 after Ghana seized two Russian trawlers. In 1970, following an amphibious attack by the Portuguese on Conakry, the Soviet Union sent a small naval contingent to the region, thus creating what has since become the West Africa Patrol.[58] Since 1970,

56. For a typical statement of the strategic importance of the South Atlantic, see Robert J. Hanks, *The Cape Route: Imperilled Western Lifeline* (Cambridge, Mass., Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1981) and Stewart Menaul, 'The Security of the Southern Oceans: Southern Africa the Key', *NATO's Fifteen Nations*, April–May, 1972.

57. See for example, M. MccGwire and J. McDonnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Influence: Domestic and Foreign Dimensions* (New York: Praeger, 1977); Bradford Dismukes and James McConnell, eds., *Soviet Naval Diplomacy* (New York: Pergamon, 1979); US Senate, Committee on Commerce, *Soviet Oceans Development* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976).

58. See David K. Hall, 'Naval Diplomacy in West African Waters', in Stephen S. Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1981).

the Soviet Union has also been making qualitative changes in the types of naval vessels, particularly submarines, entering Cuban ports;[59] and finally, it has developed a sophisticated surveillance system over the South Atlantic from bases in Cuba, Guinea and Angola.[60] Thirdly, United States concern has grown because of the rise to power in Angola of the MPLA and the continuing political instability in southern Africa. The logistical support provided to the MPLA, the arms shipments and, above all, the transport of 12,000 Cuban regular soldiers are all used to support the thesis that the South Atlantic is well on the way to becoming a Soviet lake. Finally, in addition to these three major factors, one should add the growing awareness in Washington of the importance of undersea resources and of maintaining open access to Antarctica.[61]

For most of the 1970s, however, these increased security concerns have only indirectly and intermittently been translated into actual policy initiatives for strengthening South Atlantic defence. In the Nixon/Kissinger period it is possible to discern the beginnings of what might have been a more tightly-knit system of South Atlantic defence. Both South Africa and Brazil were viewed under the Nixon Doctrine as strong regional powers which should be encouraged to play a larger part in the defence of Western interests. Yet in practice the Nixon administration did little to promote a more active South African role in South Atlantic defence and even upheld President Johnson's ban on the sale of naval reconnaissance aircraft to Pretoria.[62] Similarly, the Kissinger–Silveira Memorandum of Understanding of 1976 did little to overcome the growing difficulties in US–Brazilian relations. Under President Carter the prospects for an American inspired initiative on South Atlantic security receded still further. Continued indecision towards Angola; antipathy to South Africa; worsening relations with Brazil over trade, nuclear proliferation and human rights; serious estrangement from Buenos Aires: all these factors combined to ensure that Washington did not respond to the calls in 1976 for the formation of a South Atlantic pact that were being voiced in various parts of Latin America.

With the advent of the Reagan administration, however, it appeared that the concern of US defence planners over the South Atlantic would be far more closely reflected in actual policy. An improvement in relations with Bueno Aires, Pretoria and Brasilia became a major priority. The dominant concern of American foreign policy became the country's strategic capability *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union and the need to build up strong regimes in the Third World to counter Soviet adventurism. This triumph of the globalist viewpoint and the obvious enthusiasm of certain members of the new administration for closer relations with various Latin American military regimes fuelled speculation that a South Atlantic pact might soon emerge. Closer military cooperation with Latin America was viewed as essential because, to quote Jeane Kirkpatrick, the United States is 'being surrounded by a ring of Soviet bases on and around our southern and eastern borders'.[63] In 1980 a top Reagan aide, General Daniel Graham, was reported to have said in Buenos Aires 'that

59. See Jorge I. Domínguez, 'The United States and its Regional Security Interests: The Caribbean, Central and South America', *Daedalus*, Vol. 109, No. 4, Fall 1980, p. 199.

60. See Worth H. Bagley, 'Sea Power and Western Security: The Next Decade', *Adelphi Papers*, No. 139, 1977.

61. For a recent view of the increasing emphasis placed on strategic seabed resources by the US Department of Defense, see Leigh S. Ratiner, 'The Law of the Sea: Crossroads for US Policy', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 5, Summer 1982, pp. 1,006–1,021.

62. See Coker, 'The Western Alliance and Africa', p. 329.

63. Quoted in Leiken, 'Eastern Winds in Latin America', p. 96.

Mr Reagan would favour a NATO-like treaty linking the militaristic nations of South America with South Africa'.[64] The successive visits to Buenos Aires in 1981 of General Vernon Walters, General Edward Meyer, General Richard Ingram and Admiral Harry Train clearly pointed to the American desire to establish closer military ties.[65] Similarly, in his speech in Brasilia in August 1981, Assistant Secretary Thomas Enders stressed his concern for the security of the South Atlantic. This concern, together with the need to exclude foreign intervention in the Caribbean and preoccupation with Soviet activities in Afghanistan and Poland, were proclaimed as factors which would draw the United States and Brazil closer together.[66]

Yet despite this change in United States policy, nothing has materialized and in recent months the prospects for a South Atlantic pact have once again receded. Whilst the United States administration would still like to develop South Africa as a cold war bulwark, the lack of political progress within South Africa and continuing difficulties over Namibia have made it far harder to draw closer to Pretoria than many in the Reagan team had hoped. Similarly, Brazil remains determined to keep the cold war out of the South Atlantic and to continue with its wide ranging and increasingly independent foreign policy. Moreover, although many of the quarrels of the Carter period have been settled, important difficulties remain in US–Brazilian relations.[67] Finally, even before the Falklands invasion, American overtures to Buenos Aires appeared to have met with only limited success. In April 1981 the Argentinian foreign minister, Oscar Camilión, reaffirmed Argentina's independence of United States foreign policy and declared his country's intention of continuing to develop its trade with the Soviet Union. He also stated that Argentinian participation in joint naval exercises with the United States did not imply a commitment to collaborate in the defence of the South Atlantic sea lanes.[68]

Although it is still too early to assess recent American attempts to repair the damage done to US–Latin American relations by Washington's support for Britain over the Falklands, two points can be made. Firstly, that, as President Reagan's recent visit to Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica and Honduras showed, the re-establishment of closer relations with Latin America remains a high priority. Secondly, that, although increasing attention is being paid to the region's growing economic and financial problems, there has, as yet, been little deviation from the strongly ideological and geopolitical perspective that has characterized the Reagan administration's Latin American policy.

Britain

Up until the recent conflict with Argentina, Britain had maintained an extremely low profile in the South Atlantic. Diplomatically, Latin America does not appear to have ranked particularly high on any government's list of priorities. Militarily, British presence in the region all but ended with the cancellation of the Simonstown Agreement with South Africa in 1974 and with the continuing reductions in the Royal Navy's long range capabilities. Yet despite the limitations of official policy, there has been a significant body of opinion within Britain which has consistently

64. *New York Times*, 20 April 1980.
65. *Le Monde*, 24 July 1981.
66. *Le Monde*, 19 August 1981.
67. See Albert Fishlow, 'The United States and Brazil: the Case of the Missing Relationship', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 4, Spring 1982, pp. 904–23.
68. See Charles Maechling, 'The Argentinian Pariah', *Foreign Policy*, No. 45, Winter 1981–82, p. 81.

stressed the strategic importance of the South Atlantic and argued both for the re-establishment of closer ties with South Africa and for consideration of a wider regional security arrangement which would include Latin American countries. To quote one example of this line of thinking:

> Hopefully this [the policy of détente in southern Africa] might lead, in due course, to some form of Southern Hemisphere Defence Pact embracing not only South Africa but Australia and New Zealand, Brazil and Argentina, assisted by other maritime powers such as the United States, Great Britain and France.[69]

Now that Britain finds itself in the anomalous and in many ways problematic position of having a major military presence in the area, it is possible that such thinking may re-emerge. At the time of writing there are few indications as to how British policy in the region might develop. Much will depend, politically, on the British government's success in extricating itself from an over-exposed position on the Falklands and, militarily, on the outcome of the current debate on British defence policy and, in particular, on the future of the Royal Navy.

Conclusions

What then are the conclusions that can be drawn from this brief survey of the politics of South Atlantic defence? In the first place, despite the persistence of rumours and speculation about 'SATO', it is evident that the interests and perceptions of the countries involved are so divergent that it is hard to envisage any kind of closer or more tightly-knit system of South Atlantic defence. Of course it is possible to argue that a full-blown treaty organization along NATO lines has always been an unrealistic option, but that this does not necessarily exclude lower levels of cooperation. This is certainly true and it is likely that we shall continue to see the kinds of joint naval exercises and visits of naval personnel that have become the norm over the past few years. Pentagon planners may thus have to settle for this as a second best, but at least politically viable option. As Admiral Harry Train, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, said in Montevideo in July 1981, the need to safeguard the security of the South Atlantic 'must lead the nations concerned to develop a natural defence, even without a pact, treaty or formal agreement'.[70] Whether one considers this kind of cooperation to be adequate depends of course on how one balances the political problems and disadvantages of a 'SATO' against the level of external threat. I have concentrated on examining these very considerable problems and have not tried to provide any overall strategic assessment of the South Atlantic nor to speculate about Soviet intentions in the region. There are, however, important grounds for at least questioning whether the extent of the Soviet threat is as self-evident as many would have us believe.[71] Moreover, even if you are persuaded that the level of threat is sufficient to merit a more vigorous NATO response, it is far from clear why this need necessarily involve Brazil, Argentina or South Africa, especially given their relatively limited

69. Patrick Wall, 'The Southern African Background', in Wall, ed., *The Southern Oceans and the Security of the Free World*, p. 32.
70. *Le Monde*, 24 July 1981.
71. For a recent article dealing with this problem see Larry W. Bowman, 'The Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States: an Appraisal and Policy Analysis', *African Affairs*, Vol. 81, No. 323, April 1982, pp. 159–91.

military capabilities and the political complications that their involvement would inevitably entail.[72]

Secondly, the difficulties encountered by the Reagan administration in trying to strengthen military cooperation with Brazil and Argentina over the South Atlantic point to a more fundamental problem in US–Latin American relations. The attempt to develop a policy towards the region based on a narrow anti-Soviet line has not proved conspicuously successful, even with those governments ideologically most likely to endorse it. This problem serves to highlight the extent to which inter-American politics have changed since the cold war years. The countries of the region have developed both politically and economically and their international roles and foreign policy needs have widened and become more complex. Because of these changes the possibility of their accepting a narrow US-oriented interpretation of security has become more limited. The decline in United States influence in Latin America is certainly striking but is often not sufficiently taken into account by those whose primary concern is with the global struggle with the Soviet Union—or, if it is appreciated, it is used to present an exaggerated picture of how the Soviet Union has made massive gains in the region. Security concerns are important for all Latin American countries, but two points need to be remembered. First, that security for most countries in the region means primarily internal security and security against threats from neighbouring states. It is against these kinds of threats that their armed forces have been designed to operate. The perception of external threat by a major power remains low. Secondly, although important, security concerns cannot dominate the list of priorities of even the most virulently anti-communist regime. Problems of economic development remain paramount and it is arguably the lack of any serious US initiatives in this area that has impeded efforts to re-establish closer relations with Latin America in general, and with Brazil in particular.

Finally, if, in the wake of the Falklands conflict, we are looking for a new basis for a durable settlement in the region, it is very doubtful whether the concept of a South Atlantic regional organization can offer a constructive focus for improving relations between the countries involved.

72. There can be little doubt that NATO has drawn up its own plans for the defence of South Atlantic shipping. As Admiral Harry Train has written: '. . . there is no NATO border. There never was the slightest thought in the mind of the drafters [of the NATO charter] that it [Article 6] should prevent collective planning, manoeuvres or operations south of the Tropic of Cancer . . .'. Quoted in Bowman, p. 177. Recommendation 102 of the 1972 NATO Assembly instructed the Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) to develop contingency plans for the defence of the Cape Route, and it is worth-while quoting Christopher Coker's recent conclusion regarding South Africa's role in these plans: 'What the SACLANT story illustrates is how little South Africa itself has figured in NATO planning . . .'. See Coker, 'The Western Alliance and Africa', p. 331.

The United States' commitment to Western Europe: strategic ambiguity and political disintegration?*

PHIL WILLIAMS†

During the last twenty years there has been frequent, albeit intermittent, speculation regarding the possible emergence of a West European defence identity which would give the allies a degree of self-reliance which has been lacking throughout the postwar period. Such speculation had two major sources—hopes for Europe and fears about the United States. On the one side, West European economic integration and the advances made in political cooperation not only appeared as a possible precursor to greater unity in defence, but also seemed precariously incomplete without comparable progress in this area. On the other side, discussions about a more independent Western Europe have increasingly been prompted by anxiety about the United States security guarantee. It is essential, therefore, to analyse the American commitment to Western Europe in an attempt both to identify its strengths and weaknesses and to assess its durability and resilience.

Although this task is formidable, there are several key distinctions which, if made at the outset, may help to render it more manageable. The first distinction is that between the strategic dimension of the commitment (which may be inherently ambiguous) and the political commitment of the United States to underwrite West European security. Indeed, so long as the political relationship between the United States and its European allies is in good repair, even a high degree of ambiguity in the strategic guarantee will not necessarily prove inimical to the security of the allies. The difficulty is, though, that the political relationship itself has two distinct dimensions, corresponding roughly to the difference between structure and process. The first of these dimensions concerns the underlying political, economic and strategic interests which give the United States a very substantial stake in the security and integrity of Western Europe; the second concerns day to day management of diplomatic relations within the Alliance. At this second level the relationship between the United States and Western Europe has appeared increasingly fragile as the allies have confronted a wide range of highly divisive issues. The key questions, however, concern the relationship between the two levels. Are the current strains and tensions simply another example of the discord and frictions which are perhaps endemic amongst close allies? Is it the case, as one Congressional report suggested, that 'NATO controversies in general resemble the controversies which enliven democratic societies but do not undermine their legitimacy',[1] or is this too sanguine a view? Do the diplomatic squabbles that seem to have become a major characteristic

*This article was prepared in connection with Chatham House's research project on US–European relations funded by the Leverhulme Trust. The author wishes to thank Stephen Woolcock and Joan Pearce for their helpful contributions and to thank members of a study group at the Institute which discussed an earlier draft of the paper.

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1. *NATO Today: The Alliance in Evolution.* A Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, April 1982 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982) p. 1.

0020–5850/83/0195—15$3.00©1983 International Affairs

of NATO in the 1980s threaten the validity of the United States' commitment to Western Europe or does the US stake in European security provide the commitment with a permanence and stability that transcend differences amongst the NATO allies at any one time?

Even if American interests give the commitment to Western Europe an unusual resilience, however, it still has to be acknowledged that interests are not always self-evident, and that commitments, to be effective in deterring adversaries and reassuring allies, have to be manifested in highly visible if often symbolic fashion. Probably the most significant example of this has been the presence since 1951 of a substantial number of United States troops in Europe. Yet the recent controversies in Atlantic relations have been accompanied by the beginning of what appears to be a resurgence of Congressional demands for a reduction in this military presence. How powerful such sentiments—which are generally, if somewhat indiscriminately, characterized as neo-Mansfieldism—will prove to be remains to be seen. Nevertheless, the debate certainly cannot be ignored, not least because it raises far-reaching questions about whether it is possible to downgrade the troops, which are a symbol of the US commitment to Europe, without eroding the commitment itself. Has the symbol become the substance? Could the United States commitment be maintained with a troop deployment significantly lower than the present one? Is the manner of troop reductions as important as the numbers? Whatever the answer to these questions, the very existence of the debate only seven years after 'Mansfieldism' was officially presumed dead suggests that a carefully considered readjustment of roles and responsibilities may be the only alternative to the periodic outbursts of recrimination and antipathy towards Europe in the United States Congress. Certainly, some reform of the Alliance is preferable to continued drift and eventual fragmentation. Before assessing the prospects for the future of the US commitment to Europe, however, it is necessary to examine these other issues—the strategic guarantee, United States interests in Europe, the current tensions and the growing debate over the American military presence in Europe—with particular attention both to the forces of continuity and to those of change.

Strategic ambiguity

In a statement in Brussels in September 1979, Dr Henry Kissinger raised once again the vexed and complex issue of the American nuclear guarantee to Western Europe.[2] The publicity surrounding his statement, however, owed far less to any novelty in the argument than to Kissinger's personal eminence and the suggestion that the strategic reassurances he had regularly given to the European allies at North Atlantic Council meetings were virtually meaningless. Indeed, fears that changes in the overall strategic balance between the superpowers might undermine the United States commitment to Western Europe can be traced back to the early 1950s. Anxieties on this score were implicit in NSC-68, explicit in many of the critiques of massive retaliation (including Kissinger's) and prevalent in de Gaulle's thinking about Atlantic relations. It is arguable, though, that such assessments—like Kissinger's more recent one—rested upon a narrow and somewhat artificial notion of credibility. Dr Kissinger in particular appeared to view credibility as dependent primarily, if not exclusively, upon the strategic balance and the possession by the

2. The Kissinger statement is reprinted as 'NATO: The Next Thirty Years' in *Survival*, Vol. 21, No. 6, Nov./Dec. 1979, pp. 264–8.

United States of strategic counterforce capabilities and options at least the equivalent of those deployed by or available to the Soviet Union.

A contrary, and arguably more balanced, assessment was offered by McGeorge Bundy in his keynote address to the IISS Conference shortly after Kissinger's statement. Bundy suggested that the credibility of the American security guarantee to Western Europe was not critically dependent upon the strategic superiority which the United States had possessed for most of the postwar period, but has depended instead on two great facts: 'the visible deployment of major American military forces in Europe, and the very evident risk that any large scale engagement between Soviet and American forces would rapidly and uncontrollably become general, nuclear, and disastrous'.[3] In other words, extended deterrence rests not on the United States coolly and rationally threatening to initiate strategic nuclear war on Europe's behalf, but on Washington's willingness to make what Thomas Schelling described as 'threats that leave something to chance'.[4] Such threats exploit the uncertainties and the potential for escalation that would be inherent in any large-scale military engagement in Europe—so long as the United States maintains a substantial military presence on the continent.

While this argument is very persuasive, it is perhaps not quite as clear-cut as Bundy's analysis suggests. Even the American military presence is not without its worries and ambiguities. On the one hand, the deployment of US troops in Europe is designed to make American engagement in hostilities automatic and inescapable. Burning bridges, eliminating options and minimizing freedom of action are, after all, the very essence of commitment. As Schelling put it: 'The commitment process on which all American overseas deterrence depends—and on which all confidence within the alliance depends—is a process of surrendering and destroying options that we might have been expected to find too attractive in an emergency'.[5] On the other hand, these conventional forces are intended to contribute to a flexible response strategy, one aim of which is to avoid an early use of nuclear weapons. Thus, although the conventional forces may be a prerequisite for escalation, they can also be regarded as an insurance against it. What makes this paradox particularly troubling to Europeans is that in the event of hostilities in Europe, Moscow and Washington would have a common interest in limiting both the weapons used and the geographical scope of the conflict. It is in this context that flexible response and multiple options can be seen as the antithesis of a commitment. To use a distinction made by Stanley Hoffman: without the American troops Europe would fear *abandonment*; with the troops the allies are afraid of '*decoupling*'—that a conflict in Europe could prove separable and distinct from intercontinental war between the two superpowers.[6] Indeed, the emphasis by McGeorge Bundy and others on the need for NATO to adopt a 'No First Use' posture,[7] together with the demands by General Rogers for more emphasis on 'conventional deterrence'[8] seem

3. McGeorge Bundy, 'The Future of Strategic Deterrence', *Survival*, Vol. 21, No. 6, Nov./Dec. 1979, pp. 268–72.

4. T. C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967) develops this notion at considerable length.

5. T. C. Schelling, *Arms and Influence*, p. 44.

6. S. Hoffman, 'New Variations on Old Themes', *International Security*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Summer 1978, see pages 90–91.

7. M. Bundy, G. Kennan, R. S. McNamara and G. Smith, 'Nuclear Weapons and the Atlantic Alliance', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 4, Spring 1982, pp. 753–68.

8. General Bernard W. Rogers, 'The Atlantic Alliance: Prescriptions for a Difficult Decade', *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 60, No. 5, Summer 1982, pp. 1145–56.

to accentuate the possibility of such a decoupling and the limiting of hostilities to both the conventional level and the European theatre. The implication is that Bundy's original argument cannot go unqualified: a US conventional presence in Europe may display Washington's willingness to become involved in hostilities, but it can also act as a substitute for nuclear involvement.

One of NATO's major dilemmas, in fact, is that actions designed to alleviate European concerns about abandonment almost inevitably fuel anxieties over the possibility of 'decoupling'. The issue has arisen in acute form in relation to the question of theatre nuclear force modernization. Without a specific European-based counter to the SS-20 and the Backfire, it appeared that NATO's deterrent posture might be seriously weakened: question marks would inevitably surround the President's willingness to use America's strategic retaliatory forces to respond to a Soviet nuclear attack directed solely against Western Europe. At crucial points on the escalation ladder, the Soviet Union would find itself in a dominant position where it could place the onus for further and possibly suicidal escalation on the United States. In such circumstances the abandonment of Europe could emerge as the least unattractive possibility. Yet the North Atlantic Council's decision to deploy American cruise missiles and extended range Pershings in Europe—if and when it is implemented—may succeed in eliminating one fear only at the expense of exacerbating another. To many of its critics such a development seems to increase the prospects of 'decoupling' and of a nuclear war being confined to Europe. The other side of this argument is that cruise and Pershing will not necessarily restore the 'seamless web' of deterrence as was initially hoped. Indeed, if the weapons are genuinely 'Russostrategic', in the sense that they are intended to hit major targets within the Soviet Union, then, apart from their greater accuracy and discrimination, they are not very different from the strategic capabilities deployed within the United States and in the submarine forces—and in the event of a Soviet nuclear attack on Western Europe, let alone a conventional one, an American President would face exactly the same dilemmas as if the weapons did not exist. What counts is not from where the missiles are fired, but where they land. Merely locating missiles in Europe, therefore, does not make the Soviet Union any more attractive as a potential target for United States retaliation, given the risks to the American homeland. The implication is that the Intermediate Nuclear Force deployment only makes strategic sense for the United States if the weapons are intended, in the first instance at least, for use against Eastern Europe, thereby giving the United States the capacity to match the Soviet Union option for option *below* the level at which superpower homelands become involved.

That this would necessarily detract from the credibility of extended deterrence, however, is not certain. In part, the argument revolves around the relationship between options and escalation. If escalation is regarded simply as something which is deliberate and controlled then it can be argued that the addition of options, whether they are conventional or nuclear, increases the likelihood of escalation—the greater the number of steps on the ladder, the greater the chance that Washington would be prepared to climb at least some of them. The converse of this is that with fewer alternatives, the choices may appear more drastic and forbidding. Thus a wide repertoire of options, by providing for both graduated and gradual escalation, may enhance the credibility of extended deterrence. On the other hand, the availability of options, each of which is designed for a particular level of hostilities,

may increase the number of potential stopping places and enhance the prospects for containing the conflict. In so far as it implies a higher degree of control, the notion of graduated escalation may impair deterrence by seemingly reducing the potential costs to the aggressor.

What makes this even more problematic is that escalation may be inadvertent and uncontrolled as well as deliberate and carefully calibrated. Indeed, the participation of the United States in European defence and its willingness to escalate hostilities, albeit in a limited and controlled way, inevitably raises the possibility of further and potentially uncontrollable escalation. The very essence of threats which leave something to chance is that hostilities can take on a dynamism of their own and very easily escalate to a level much higher than that desired by the belligerents. To the extent that concerns about 'decoupling' depend on certain key assumptions about the controllability of hostilities, therefore, they may be greatly exaggerated and unnecessary. Although this is an issue on which dogmatic statements abound, it is also an issue pervaded with uncertainty. Strategic ambiguity is a fact of life in Europe. Just as a war being confined to the theatre is a worry for Europe, the possibility that hostilities would become uncontrollable can hardly be ruled out by the superpowers. Threats which leave something to chance may not be wholly satisfactory, but they are almost certainly adequate. Indeed, deterrence in Europe may be easier to achieve than is often suggested—partly because the incentives for Soviet aggression are not very great, but also because the risks are incalculable and the potential costs enormous. Even though extended deterrence is full of tensions, paradoxes, contradictions and uncertainties, therefore, this does not mean that it is not credible. As Bundy has argued, 'the American strategic protection of Western Europe is a classic case, so far, of doctrinal confusion and pragmatic success'.[9] And so long as the United States is unequivocally involved in European defence and has a clear interest in maintaining the integrity of Western Europe, then this seems likely to remain the case.

The problem with many analyses of extended deterrence is that by concentrating exclusively on the strategic dimension they become narrow and artificial. By focussing upon questions regarding US actions in a crisis and how these might be influenced by the balance of nuclear power, the availability of particular options, or the location of certain weapons, such an approach excludes from consideration both the broader political commitment and the underlying interests which prompted the United States to enter an 'entangling alliance' with Western Europe in 1949 and have sustained that alliance ever since. It is to these interests that attention must now be given.

United States interests in Western Europe

The stake of the United States in the continued security and integrity of Western Europe is enormous. Indeed, the old adage that the only thing worse than dealing with allies is to have no allies, has particular relevance to United States involvement in NATO. Although the allies are increasingly regarded, with both frustration and disillusionment, as a serious drain on American resources—and one for which there are no commensurate benefits—a more dispassionate analysis suggests that the costs to the United States of the 'entangling alliance' with Western Europe are more than

9. See Bundy, 'The Future of Strategic Deterrence'.

offset by the political, strategic and economic advantages. To put it crudely, the alliance simultaneously *augments* American capabilities and *denies* the resources of Western Europe to the Soviet Union. It was recognized in the late 1940s that a Soviet Union which dominated the Western as well as the Eastern part of the Continent and, consequently, was able to harness the industrial capacity of Western Europe to its own military effort, would be a much more formidable adversary than a Soviet Union confronted with an independent Western Europe which was both economically strong and politically stable. This was made explicit in some of the discussions of the Marshall Plan when spokesmen for the administration argued that without economic assistance and reinvigoration, Western Europe would be vulnerable to Soviet pressure, with dire consequences for the level of American defence spending. In other words, economic aid to Western Europe was an investment with a good return. A similar justification was provided for the North Atlantic Treaty and the Military Assistance Programme, while the decision to deploy US troops in Europe was presented, in large part, as a pump-priming exercise designed to bolster the morale of the allies and stimulate them into significant rearmament efforts of their own.[10] Throughout the early history of NATO, therefore, there was a shrewd appreciation by the United States that the costs and risks of the commitment to Europe were very clearly outweighed by its benefits. In short, *realpolitik*, not altruism, provided the basis for American policy. Furthermore, such considerations are probably as significant in the 1980s as they were in the 1940s. So long as superpower competition continues, and the United States pursues a policy of containment, Washington can hardly be indifferent to the fate of Western Europe.

Against this, it could be argued that much has changed since the inception of the Atlantic Alliance, that technological advances have outmoded traditional geopolitical imperatives and rendered the balance of power in Europe irrelevant to American security. Yet the requirement of denying West European resources to the Soviet Union is as compelling as ever. Nor should the economic stake of the United States in Western Europe be ignored. Even in the late 1940s economic considerations were far from insignificant: the desire for expanding markets and viable trading partners was as critical as the need for military allies in propelling Washington towards involvement with Western Europe. And since then the asymmetrical dependence of Western Europe upon the United States has been replaced by a pervasive interdependence as the American economic stake in Europe has grown considerably. Although United States reliance on foreign trade has traditionally been minimal, this is no longer the case. In 1981 foreign trade amounted to over one fifth of the United States GNP while exports alone provided 12.8 per cent of the total.[11] Furthermore, Western Europe offers not only an important market for American goods but one in which the United States has generally achieved a surplus on its balance of trade to help offset deficits elsewhere. In addition, somewhere between 45 and 50 per cent of direct investment abroad is investment in Europe—a figure which compares with 14.7 per cent in 1950. Indeed, it is in investment patterns that the change has been most striking as Western Europe has overtaken both Canada and Latin America as a recipient of United States capital. The effect

10. This point is developed further in Phil Williams, *The Senate and US Troops in Europe*, forthcoming from Macmillan.

11. I am grateful to Stephen Woolcock for this and the subsequent figures on US trade.

of all this has been summed up by Stephen Woolcock in his argument that 'any change of tack towards pan-Americanism or the Pacific trade merely serves to slow the decline of United States economic interests in these areas . . . If the United States is economically dependent on the international economy it is dependent on Western Europe.'[12] What makes this conclusion even more compelling is that the re-emergence of the West European economies has also made them important to the United States in less direct ways—particularly in a period when American economic preponderance is less overwhelming that it was. As one commentator has noted, 'it is vital to the United States that the weight of these economies should be thrown . . . broadly behind purposes congruent with American interests. These interests include the maintenance of the Free Trade System, close collaboration in the orderly management of the world economy, encouragement of free-market systems in the Third World and joint economic pressure, when feasible and appropriate, against hostile political forces whether in the Communist bloc or the LDCs.'[13]

On any objective criteria, therefore, the interests of the United States are so irrevocably bound up with the fate of Western Europe that Washington could not renege on or relinquish its commitment to the NATO allies without very severe consequences for its own security and economic welfare. Yet two caveats are necessary. The first is that there are degrees of commitment: the United States commitment to Europe is not an all-or-nothing issue in which the only alternative to the current level of involvement is complete withdrawal and a return to Fortress America. The second qualification is that a government's policies and actions are sometimes determined less by a detached assessment of interests than by entrenched attitudes, prejudices, beliefs and perceptions. And it is at this level that there are serious problems. Whether these are sufficiently intractable to bring about a weakening of the US commitment to Europe and render policy-makers oblivious to US strategic and economic interests remains to be seen. Rational calculation would dictate against such a move—but governments, and more especially parliaments, do not always behave on this basis. It is with this in mind that attention must now be given to the present malaise in NATO.

The current crisis in NATO

There has been much argument about the severity of the current strains in Atlantic relations. Some analysts have dismissed the tensions of the 1980s as merely the latest in a series of disputes that is familiar to all seasoned observers of the Western Alliance. Furthermore, it is argued, the crises of 1954, 1956, 1966 and 1973–4 were all resolved or contained and there is no reason why the outcome of the current malaise should be any more damaging.[14] While it would be misleading to exaggerate the novelty of the present disputes, however, their corrosive impact should not be underestimated. After all, NATO has been in considerable disarray from the end of 1979 through to the end of 1982. As well as being of longer duration than the previous disputes the current tensions also encompass a broader range of issues. And although they have been accentuated by events they also represent the

12. S. Woolcock, *The Role of the USA and Europe in the World Economy*, July 1981, (unpublished paper).

13. D. Watt, 'America's Alliances: Europe' in *America's Security in the 1980s, Part II*, Adelphi Paper 174 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring 1982), pp. 19–26 at p. 21.

14. *NATO Today: The Alliance in Evolution*, pp. 9–17 in particular.

culmination of several long-term trends, all of which are inimical to the cohesion of the Alliance. Strictly speaking, the crises in Afghanistan, Iran and Poland did not cause the difficulties for NATO that are often ascribed to them; what they did was to dramatize or sharpen issues that the allies have traditionally tended to obscure, rationalize, ignore or temporarily contain. Consequently, NATO has been faced simultaneously with a crisis of expectations and attitudes (especially in the United States) coupled with a crisis of adjustment and leadership.

The crisis of expectation is more readily understandable when it is remembered that just as commitments are not undertaken for altruistic purposes, neither are they established unconditionally or without some reciprocal obligation being accepted by those to whom protection is extended. Thus it is important to consider the conditions attached to the American security guarantee as part of the initial 'transatlantic bargain'. Indeed, an analysis of the assumptions on which the Atlantic Alliance was founded makes the disillusionment that is prevalent in the United States much more explicable.

When the Atlantic Alliance was created the interests of the United States and Western Europe complemented each other perfectly. The Europeans required both economic assistance and protection against the Soviet Union; the United States supplied both. The coalition which resulted was intended to be comprehensive, covering the whole spectrum of Atlantic relations. In the United States in particular it was conceived of less as a traditional military alliance and more as an embryonic Atlantic Community. The expectation was that in the long term, Western Europe would evolve into an equal partner of the United States—and that there would automatically be a natural harmony of interests and affinity of outlook across the Atlantic. In order to encourage such an evolution, the United States emphasized that the Alliance was based on reciprocity of effort: European 'self-help' in rebuilding its military strength and thereby contributing to the containment of the Soviet Union was a prerequisite for continued American assistance. It was also a price that the Europeans—at the outset at least—were prepared to pay. In short, *comprehensiveness*, *harmony* and *reciprocity* provided the main bases on which the Alliance was established.

Problems have arisen in each of these areas: comprehensive cooperation has been replaced by much more selective cooperation, the harmony of interests and outlook has disappeared, and the principle of reciprocity, in the eyes of many Americans, has been abandoned by the Europeans. In the first place, difficulties have arisen over the range of activities to be encompassed within the Atlantic framework. Not only has the transition from Alliance to Community not occurred but the comprehensive cooperation which existed in the late 1940s and early 1950s has been reduced and restricted. Yet this is not too surprising. Rather than being a natural feature of the Alliance, such cooperation may have been a function of American economic strength on the one side and West European weakness on the other. As the relationship has become less asymmetrical, frictions have increased. Far from enhancing cooperation, the development of economic interdependence (as opposed simply to European economic dependence on the United States) has brought with it new vulnerabilities and resentments. This was evident in the Nixon–Kissinger linkage strategy of the early 1970s. The administration's argument that the Europeans could not have 'regional egoism' on economic matters and continued cooperation in security affairs, represented an attempt—albeit a clumsy one—to halt the trend whereby security partners who were ostensibly also economic

partners, were increasingly becoming economic competitors. The trend may, however, be irreversible. Indeed, the economic recession has transformed competition into confrontation, nominal partners into implicit adversaries. The United States and the European Community are not only finding cooperation difficult, but increasingly appear to regard each other's actions and policies as a major threat to deeply cherished economic objectives.

One possible implication of this is that 'permanent multipurpose alliances premised on pervasive antagonisms between different nations or blocs' will be much more difficult to sustain in the future.[15] Seyom Brown has suggested in fact that this could seriously undermine NATO, 'constructed as it was on the assumption of a two-camp power competition . . . with stable membership in each camp across a wide variety of issues.'[16] Although the Alliance may prove unexpectedly resilient in the face of such disruptive trends, the mutual suspicion and animosity that has characterized Atlantic relations during the first part of the 1980s will not readily dissipate—especially in view of the other problems which have arisen.

As well as arguments over what the Alliance is *for* there is also disagreement about what it is directed *against*. At the heart of many of NATO's problems are divergent perceptions of threat. Without broad agreement between the United States and the West Europeans regarding the dangers of Soviet expansionism, an Atlantic Alliance could hardly have been created. Yet within two years of the Treaty being signed, differences of perspective and assessment emerged to bedevil relations among the allies. As a result of the fall of China and the Korean War, the United States' policy of containment was both globalized and militarized: communism, as opposed to the Soviet Union, became the main enemy and the theatre of conflict was extended from Europe to Asia. The Europeans, in contrast, adhered to the initial conception of the Alliance. Adopting what can be regarded as either a more parochial or more realistic approach, they concerned themselves primarily with the immediate regional threat to Western Europe and, for the most part, gave the United States only minimum diplomatic support elsewhere. Inevitably this caused tension. During the Korean War there were frequent complaints in Congress that 90 per cent of the casualties and 90 per cent of the effort were American and that the Europeans were not behaving as allies should. Fifteen years later these arguments were echoed in relation to Vietnam. Another fifteen years on and Afghanistan raised similar problems as the United States attempted to impose its revised threat perceptions upon reluctant Europeans committed to the preservation of détente in Europe. On this occasion, the American arguments had more credence: in contrast to the situations in Vietnam and Korea, the United States could point here to direct Soviet intervention. Thus the Soviet action highlighted more starkly than ever before the contrast between European and American views of the Alliance. Is it simply a regional organization designed to meet a geographically circumscribed threat, or does it provide a more ambitious and extensive framework for containing a global threat? The rhetoric of unity alone can no longer obscure the widely differing answers that have been given to this question by European governments on the one hand and the United States on the other. Although NATO communiqués during the last few years suggest that the Europeans have accepted the principle

15. S. Brown, 'A World of Multiple Relations' in J. Chace and E. Ravenal, eds: *Atlantis Lost* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1976), p. 112.
16. S. Brown, 'A World of Multiple Relations'.

that they should *compensate* for US military activities outside the NATO area by doing more in the central region, this may prove to be little more than a temporary solution. If the United States intensifies demands that the allies accept a more far-reaching conception of NATO's role, continues to press the Europeans to look beyond the traditional confines of the Atlantic area, and requires that they make military dispositions commensurate with this enlarged perspective, the result could be a deepening split.

In making such overtures, of course, the United States would be trying to change the terms of the initial 'transatlantic bargain' (in which European efforts were limited to the European theatre) and to resolve the ambiguities about the purpose and scope of NATO which began with the Korean War. Should the Europeans not go along, there will be increasing complaints about European parochialism and selfishness, and the lack of reciprocity in Alliance relations. Such complaints will be given added bite by the fact that Washington has rarely been satisfied, let alone impressed, by the efforts of its allies within the European theatre. Thus, arguments over the scope of the Alliance will be accompanied by further arguments about burden-sharing as the United States tries both to reassert the principle of reciprocity and to impose its view of the Soviet threat upon a Western Europe still intent on cooperation with Moscow.

What makes these issues all the more intractable is that they have erupted at a time when the Alliance is undergoing a crisis of adjustment. Although the Europeans have disappointed American expectations in that they have not emerged as a unified second pillar of the Alliance, they have at least reached the point where they readily assert preferences and pursue policies at odds with those of Washington. Even though Western Europe is comparatively stronger, and the United States comparatively weaker, however, the allies—especially the Federal Republic of Germany—remain acutely aware of their dependence on the United States for security. Inevitably this makes for an uneasy and ambivalent relationship which is all the more difficult because it follows a period of undoubted American pre-eminence. That neither the United States nor Western Europe is any longer clear on the distribution of responsibilities is reflected in European complaints about lack of consultation and United States grumbling about the reluctance of its allies to take the hard decisions necessary for their security.

Related to this is the crisis of leadership within the Alliance. American disillusionment with Europe is paralleled by European doubts and reservations about the quality of United States leadership. It is partly that there have been growing anxieties about the American capacity either to act decisively in the short term or to formulate coherent and effective policies for the long term. The absence of presidents with whom the allies have an obvious affinity, the endemic bureaucratic and personality battles in Washington, and the resurgence of what is sometimes deemed an 'irresponsible' Congress have all contributed to this. On the other hand, when the United States, especially under the Reagan administration, has tried to reassert its leadership in the Alliance, the Europeans have been reluctant to follow in the prescribed direction.

In these circumstances, it is hardly surprising that NATO has suffered from what could be described as the politics of symbolism. American suspicions that the allies do not take their defence seriously, coupled with the belief that they have an erroneous and potentially dangerous appreciation of the Soviet Union, have provoked Washington into elevating several issues into tests of loyalty for the allies

and demanding conformity even in the absence of consensus. The question of implementing the TNF modernization decision of December 1979, for example, has been described by the US Ambassador in Bonn as a 'battle for the soul of Europe'. The issue of sanctions against the Soviet Union, the Siberian gas pipeline, and the NATO goal of a 3 per cent per annum real increase in defence budgets were similarly, if temporarily, transformed into tests of loyalty for the Europeans. Furthermore, the only way that the European allies can defuse American anxieties about their commitment to the United States is through palpable actions. Simple reaffirmations of loyalty will no longer suffice. The politics of gesture will have to be replaced by the politics of sacrifice.

Nowhere are the demands for such a change more insistent than in the United States Congress and particularly in the Senate, where the disenchantment with Europe has been manifested in growing pressure for US troop withdrawals. What makes this all the more disturbing is that the American military presence in Western Europe becomes more rather than less crucial at times of tension in Atlantic relations. Although the troops are not insignificant militarily, their real importance is political. They are the major symbol and manifestation of the United States' interest in maintaining the independence of Western Europe. Should Alliance relations fall into further disrepair *and* the stresses and strains be accompanied by a substantial reduction in the military presence, this could render Western Europe much more vulnerable to Soviet pressure. Militating against such an eventuality, though, is the more competitive relationship between the superpowers which has developed in the aftermath of Afghanistan. As a result, it would appear almost absurd for the United States Congress, unilaterally and voluntarily, to relinquish positions of strength. After all, the pressure for troop reductions in the 1960s and 1970s was fuelled partly by dissatisfaction with the Europeans but also by optimism about détente with the Soviet Union. A recurrence of the first of these conditions without the second may therefore be insufficient to generate the same level of sustained pressure that was obtained under the leadership of Senator Mansfield. There may also be a recognition that a period of disarray in Atlantic relations makes it inopportune to engage in any activity which could be construed as a dismantling of the Alliance structure. Indeed, it is perhaps another irony of the Atlantic connection that the symbol of Alliance unity is inflated in importance by the very disappearance of that unity. Thus the 1980s could turn into a decade during which the adverse effects of political disintegration are contained and alleviated by the perpetuation of a military presence to encourage and reassure the Europeans until they are better able to look after their own security. On the other hand, there are several factors which suggest that in the mid 1980s Congressional pressures for US troop withdrawals from Western Europe could prove overwhelming. And it is this possibility which must now be examined.

Congress and US troops in Europe: the current debate

Under Senator Mansfield, the pressure for US troop withdrawals from Western Europe reached a peak in 1973 and declined thereafter as the Senate refused to mandate the cuts demanded by the Majority Leader. The pressures of the 1980s may prove more difficult to contain. There are several reasons for this. In the first place, the Senate is less well disposed towards Western Europe than in the past. Although the punitive element was not entirely absent in Mansfield's approach it

has become much more pronounced. This is largely because of the political strains and tensions of the last several years. It was almost inevitable that these would be accompanied by an upsurge of anti-European sentiment in the Congress. Nor is it surprising that several Senators have linked the military presence to other controversial issues or outstanding problems on the NATO agenda. Senator Cohen of Maine, for example, has argued that continuation of the US deployment in Europe should be conditional upon the Europeans going ahead with the implementation of the cruise missile decision. Similarly, Senator Stevens, who, as Chairman of the Defence Appropriations Subcommittee, has become the leading proponent of troop cuts (even though he voted against the Mansfield Amendments) linked the question initially to European determination to go ahead with the gas pipeline deal with the Soviet Union. Although Stevens has revised his position and put more emphasis on the budgetary dimension, his message is unequivocal: if the Europeans do not take their defence seriously the United States should not take it seriously either; if the Europeans are unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices to provide for their security they cannot expect the United States to do so.

What gives such arguments particular force is that the United States does appear to be doing a great deal on Europe's behalf. Indeed the American military presence in Europe has actually grown since the mid 1970s when it stood at around 310,000 men. Part of Senator Stevens' argument is that the Pentagon, without specific Congressional authorization, has increased the number to over 350,000. Stevens' case, though, does not rest simply upon the number of troops in Europe. On other criteria too, it appears that the United States is doing disproportionately more than its allies. The origins of this can be found in the period immediately prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. During the debate over SALT II in autumn 1979, President Carter, responding to the promptings of Senator Sam Nunn and Henry Kissinger, agreed to a 5 per cent increase in the United States defence budget. Events in Afghanistan both confirmed the wisdom of this and imposed a requirement for even greater increases. The response in the Senate was predictable: inevitable comparisons were made between the scale of the American increases and the unwillingness or inability of some of the European allies to meet the target of a 3 per cent per annum real increase in defence budgets which had been agreed upon in 1978. Oversimplistic but politically persuasive comparisons were also made between the percentage of GNP devoted to defence by the United States and that allocated to defence by the European allies. The result was a widespread sense of dissatisfaction with Western Europe and a growing demand that something had to be done to rectify the inequalities.

Such demands will almost certainly become even more strident as the pressure grows on the Reagan administration to hold down defence spending in order to keep the budget deficit from getting even further out of control. Although some of this pressure can be accommodated by stretching out the military build-up, cuts in existing and projected programmes will not only have to be made but have to be seen to be made. The financial savings likely to result from a reduction in the United States military presence in Europe would be negligible unless accompanied by an absolute cut in military manpower. Nevertheless, the need for a gesture in this direction may appear overwhelming at a time when the popular image of the European allies is at possibly an all-time low. The West Europeans are seen as ungrateful allies who have abused American aid and friendship and who may no longer have the moral fibre to make them worth defending. Furthermore, a troop

cut would appeal both to those who argue that the deployment of US forces in Europe is an aberration from the proper principles of American strategy and diplomacy, and to those who acknowledge that Western Europe remains important but believe that the United States devotes too much attention and too many resources to it at a time when other areas such as South-west Asia have taken on unprecedented strategic significance. Indeed, it appears that there are serious divisions within the Reagan administration itself between those whose first priority is coalition defence in Europe and the advocates of a maritime supremacy strategy. This latter approach is reminiscent of ideas propounded by Senator Robert Taft and former President, Herbert Hoover during the 'Great Debate' of 1951 over sending troops to Europe. Yet this should not be surprising. Unilateralism has deep historical, intellectual and emotional roots in the American approach to foreign policy and it is natural that it should come to the fore at a time of disillusionment with allies.

One consequence of this is that the Atlanticists who have traditionally been in the ascendancy in Washington may no longer have the political clout which, in the early 1970s, enabled them to contain and ultimately defeat the demands of Senator Mansfield. Related to this is the possibility that the Reagan administration may not be willing or able to sustain a campaign to mobilize opinion in Congress against troop withdrawals in the same way that the Nixon White House did. And even if President Reagan is prepared to engage in extensive lobbying, it is not clear that it will succeed. Troop withdrawals from Europe appeal to different Senators for different reasons: some support the idea to jolt the Europeans into doing more, others do so in a mood of recrimination, while yet others may regard such an action as part of a necessary change in United States strategic priorities. Furthermore, there does not seem to be a clear divide on the issue between conservatives and liberals. This may be one of the most important differences from Senator Mansfield's campaign, which was supported almost exclusively by liberal Senators. Since then, conservative disillusionment with the European allies may have eroded the strong support for the status quo which was a major factor in defeating the Mansfield Amendments. The other key difference lies in Senator Stevens's tactics: whereas Mansfield introduced far-reaching amendments which provoked much debate but no legislative action, Stevens seems to have opted for a more incremental and low key approach. All this is not to suggest that a total withdrawal of the US military presence in Europe is imminent, but it is to suggest that a lower level of American forces is a probability rather than a possibility. The implications of this for the United States commitment must now be considered.

The future of the commitment

In considering the impact of US troop reductions in Europe, the analysis inevitably returns to one of the questions posed at the outset: has the symbol become the substance? In answering this the degree of retrenchment and the political circumstances which surround it are crucial. On the one hand it would be a mistake to treat the numbers as sacrosanct or to treat troop reductions as synonymous with total US disengagement. So long as a substantial US military presence remains in Europe—and Senator Mathias has suggested that the current debate is less about

how many will leave than about how many will remain[17]—then the impact on European security may not be too severe. Indeed, US force reductions could be construed as part of a tacit move towards a more rational division of labour in which Western Europe takes on more of the responsibility for its security in Europe itself while the United States looks after the global aspects of Western security. If presented and accepted in this way, then the adverse impact of reductions could be minimized: the measures could be seen as part of an attempt to put the commitment on a more sustainable long term basis. On the other hand, if Congressional action on troops is regarded as punitive, then this could spark off another round of mutual recrimination and antipathy and provoke an even more serious rift in the Alliance.

Much, of course, will depend on the West European response to troop withdrawals. On the one side, it would be short-sighted and foolish for the Europeans to treat either a freeze on the number of United States troops in Europe or a limited reduction as the precursor to complete American disengagement. There *is* room for manoeuvre in determining the size of the United States contingent—especially given the *increase* in numbers since the mid 1970s. In this sense, Senator Mansfield's old argument that the commitment does not depend on the precise number of troops has a certain validity. Against this, the importance of the troops—as both the major manifestation of the United States' commitment and the link to the American strategic guarantee—suggests that substantial reductions (which could be defined somewhat arbitrarily as around 100,000 men) would understandably be regarded as a serious weakening of US resolve and commitment.

This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union would attempt to take advantage of such a change in an overtly aggressive way. Indeed, it is possible that Moscow regards European doubts about the validity of the United States' commitment as an example of self-induced paranoia. There is certainly little to indicate that the Soviet Union regards the commitment as unreliable or as something which could successfully be challenged. On the contrary, Soviet behaviour suggests that the commitment is accepted as a *norm* of the superpower relationship and that Moscow is content to work within the constraints it imposes. The present arrangements, after all, have the advantage of legitimizing the Soviet presence in Eastern Europe. They also contain the German problem. From the Soviet perspective it may also be preferable to face an American-dominated Western Europe rather than a more cohesive West European defence identity with significantly augmented nuclear forces and a capacity for independent and possibly unpredictable action. Furthermore, Moscow may well be aware that any interest it has in subjugating Western Europe is more than offset by the United States' interest in maintaining the independence of its allies—despite the aggravations in Atlantic relations. Not only would the process of political disintegration in NATO have to go even further than seems likely at the moment, therefore, but Europe would also have to be virtually deprived of an American military presence before the calculus of risk, cost and gain could begin to appear sufficiently attractive for the Soviet Union to contemplate direct aggression.

In a sense, though, this is irrelevant. The United States' commitment has as much (if not more) to do with reassuring the allies as with deterring the Soviet Union. And if the European anxieties about that commitment increase then a deferential

17. Personal conversation with the author, North Atlantic Assembly meeting, London, 19 November 1982.

approach towards Moscow seems more likely than any serious augmentation of European defence efforts. Congressional critics of the allies would certainly regard such a trend as confirmation of all their fears and resentments about European lack of resolve. In this event the process could become a circular one with Congressional concerns and European anxieties feeding off each other and generating a series of self-fulfilling prophecies. A European reaction to troop reductions which emphasized the need for an accommodating attitude towards the Soviet Union would generate further disquiet in Washington and might provoke additional legislation on troop cuts—with even more debilitating consequences for both European confidence in extended deterrence and European willingness to stand up to Moscow. The implication is that the symbol and substance of the US commitment have become indistinguishable, and that substantial changes in troop strength would therefore have far-reaching implications for Alliance cohesion. Strategic ambiguity is tolerable; strategic ambiguity accompanied by political tension is manageable if the military presence is maintained at somewhere near its present level; but if strategic ambiguity is accompanied by both political disaffection and substantial troop withdrawals, the United States commitment would no longer provide the underpinning for Western European security that has been manifest since the late 1940s. Daunting though the prospect may be, it can no longer be ignored. In short, the crisis in NATO in the 1980s is, potentially at least, the most serious since the inception of the Alliance. And it is far from certain that it can be resolved in a way which maintains the Alliance structure in its present form. What the alternatives are, though, is a question for another paper.

The question of control in British defence sales policy

FREDERIC S. PEARSON*

Stanley and Pearton[1] and others who have traced the politics of arms sales have noted that governments seek to control sales for a variety of reasons and in a variety of ways. Among the reasons are desires to keep sophisticated arms and arms technologies from reaching enemies or regimes considered unstable or untrustworthy; to reward or strengthen favoured, and punish or weaken disliked foreign governments; to promote or restrict arms industries and national arms production capabilities; to increase the quantity and quality of arms available to the state's own armed forces; to prevent wars, balance power relations, or promote the war efforts of certain regimes in certain regions; to improve trade balances; and simply to keep track of the destination and use of arms sold abroad.

Control in this sense does not necessarily mean the limitation or reduction of sales abroad, but rather the *potential* for limitation or promotion of arms transfers, for acquisition of information, and for linking arms transfers to foreign policy objectives. In the past, control has sometimes meant refusing sales or transfers to specific countries, establishing aggregate limits on transfers for arms control or other purposes, or linking sales to foreign policy (rewards and punishments), economic policy (trade, industry, employment, finance), military policy (procurement, strategy, release of technology), or intelligence (keeping track of deals and deliveries). Means of control include licences, quantitative or qualitative restrictions and ceilings, end-use certification, public and legislative report requirements, arms control impact statements, legislative and executive review and veto powers, international agreements, and government ownership of the means of arms production.

The last point leads to the question, noted by Edmonds and Dillon[2] of 'who controls the controllers?' Government ownership of the means of defence production could afford increased control over sales processes and consequences. Presumably it is easier to link arms trade to foreign policy goals if the government itself

* The author is very grateful to the Centre for the Study of Arms Control and International Security at the University of Lancaster, and its Director, Professor Ian Bellany, for the opportunity to carry out the research in this study and for generous support and advice during a year as Senior Visiting Research Fellow. Martin Edmonds and Michael Dillon of the Department of Politics of the University of Lancaster also provided invaluable advice. Research also was facilitated by the consultations of many in Britain, including Bruce George, Peter Nailor, Chris Smith, Paul Stares, and Trevor Taylor. The Center for International Studies of the University of Missouri–St. Louis, USA maintained long-distance support as well. Finally, thanks go to those in the British government, in defence industries, and at academic institutes and conference centres who were willing to be interviewed or make their research facilities available. The views and conclusions expressed here are those of the author alone.

1. John Stanley and Maurice Pearton, *The International Trade in Arms* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1972).

2. The phrase appears in a draft of a forthcoming volume on transfers and public accountability. See also Martin Edmonds, 'The Domestic and International Dimensions of British Arms Sales, 1966–1978', and Michael Dillon 'Arms Transfers and the Federal Republic of Germany', in Cindy Cannizzo, ed., *The Gun Merchants: Politics and Policies of the Major Arms Suppliers* (New York: Pergamon, 1980), chs. 4 and 5.

0020–5850/83/2/0211—28$3.00©1983 International Affairs

produces and markets the weapons; no unfettered weapons merchants would run around complicating national interests. Conceivably, though, rather than making arms transfers more closely serve government foreign policy goals, government ownership of or deep involvement in the defence business increases the state's dependence on sales and reduces perceived policy choices. With such involvement, the government develops an interest, both financial and bureaucratic, in sales—and this interest could come to override other aspects of the national interest and effective control over sales.

In this study, the questions of who controls arms sales and for what purposes are examined using the British example. We will look both at controls adopted by and pressures brought to bear on the British government. Britain's traditional interests in the arms trade and the evolving mixture of UK government stakes in the arms business mean that London will be interested both in controlling that trade and increasing it, and afford London the means to pursue both aims. While the British government has traditionally maintained official distance from arms marketing, it has long reviewed important sales closely through licensing procedures, and more recently has been drawn more intimately into sales bargaining and promotion.

The British case highlights the effects of nationalized, semi-nationalized, and privately owned arms industries on government arms transfer policy. In this mixed arms economy, there is a centuries-old public weapons production sector, with the Royal Ordnance Factories producing infantry equipment for the British Army, augmented by nationalizations of the aircraft and shipbuilding industries during the 1970s. Even more recently, however, British Aerospace Corporation has been partially de-nationalized, or 'privatized', and less successful efforts have been made to do the same to both British Shipbuilders and the Royal Ordnance Factories. Public holdings in defence production give the British government—regardless of political party dominance—a built-in interest in overseas defence sales, in terms of jobs, return on investments, and longer production runs. The government also has significant interests in the private sector, however, again in terms of employment, returns on rather massive research and development subventions, and the availability of weapons for UK forces. The focus of ownership does not determine the interests, but can compound them.

As a medium power adjusting to a diminished world role, Britain carries continued military responsibilities in NATO, for the remaining British dependencies—as the Falklands episode vividly illustrated—and in Northern Ireland, as well as lingering political ambitions in a few regions, such as the Persian Gulf. The United Kingdom also maintains perhaps Europe's most diverse arms industry; with aspirations for an 'independent' defence industrial base in land, sea, and air equipment—though this is an increasingly problematic ambition. Nowhere were the conflicts among these ambitions and between ambition—or responsibility—and capability clearer than in the Prime Minister's statement, the very week in March 1982 when the Royal Navy was unprepared to expel a group of Argentinian merchants from South Georgia, to the effect that Britain must be ready and able to take on the Russians *alone* if necessary, and hence must purchase the costly Trident system.

While Britain is unique in its amalgam of approaches to arms production, it also faces problems common to all arms-exporting countries: the growing cost of weapons development, leading to pressures for international or inter-company collaboration; the impact of overseas sales and sales competition on domestic jobs;

competition from both established and newly emerging exporters such as Israel and Brazil; difficulties in penetrating foreign markets, including the potentially lucrative American market; difficulties in predicting demand for certain types of systems and uncertainties about customers' political stability (for example, Iran) and ability or willingness to pay; and potentially shrinking domestic and foreign markets for certain systems as world economic difficulties mount.

These problems affect the complex interaction of producers, controllers, and customers, some of whom play two or more roles simultaneously. The arms trade represents at the same time various political and economic costs and benefits. Britain clings to its nominally independent military role in world politics at least partly through military sales, seeking political ties with certain regimes (especially those with oil wealth) and a market sufficiently large to support the cost of developing modern weapons. While civilian production might provide more labour-intensive jobs with less inflationary effects, military production undeniably keeps thousands working. Yet the weapons business is also costly, especially when large portions of public investment are committed to the notion that it is better to produce one's own weapons than to buy them conceivably more cheaply as needed abroad. Once in the sales business, government the nominal and ultimate controller, and the major defence customer for domestic arms industries, comes under intense pressure to become government the promoter.

The framework of British defence sales

Before considering the controls and pressures involved in British arms sales, a brief summary is in order of the agencies and procedures through which prospective arms deals must pass.[3] In terms of control potential, it should be remembered that all exports of new or used military equipment from the United Kingdom require licences, and that all licence applications are reviewed by the relevant ministries.

In 1966, the British Government established a Defence Sales Organization (DSO) within the Ministry of Defence to facilitate, though (with the exception of products from the Royal Ordnance Factories) not formally contract for sales. In this, Britain was responding to its declining world armament role (for example loss of its place as primary aircraft supplier), and to the commercial thrust given to US foreign military sales by Defense Secretary Robert McNamara and his deputy Henry Kuss. While British companies would remain responsible for marketing their goods and for obtaining licences through the Department of Trade,[4] the DSO would help cut through government red tape in obtaining clearances, coordinate inter-ministerial consideration of sales, promote UK defence products by organizing yearly exhibitions, engage the support of the armed services and defence attachés overseas, and

3. Information on procedures comes mainly from a document issued by the Ministry of Defence, 'Procedures Used by Her Majesty's Government in Reaching Arms Sales Decisions' (1978); from Edmonds, 'British Arms Sales'; from the author's confidential interviews with representatives of UK government agencies and defence contractors in late 1981 and early 1982; and from publications by and about the Defence Sales Organization.

4. All exports from or transhipment through Britain of defence equipment, defined as arms, ammunition, military stores, paramilitary police equipment, and as having dual military–civilian uses must, by law, be licensed by the Department of Trade. The licence is valid for twelve months, and can be renewed, usually with little controversy. Exports by nationalized defence industries, while not formally licensed, are subject to the same licence review procedure, including consideration by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of political implications, by the Ministry of Defence of security and strategic implications, both for British forces and abroad, and by the Treasury and/or Export Credit Guarantee Department in the Department of Industry if financing or credit guarantees are required.

provide advice and surveys of market prospects. It was also given direct responsibility to market the Royal Ordnance Factories' products, and through extensive dealings with Iran, the MoD came to control a 'quasi-non-governmental organization' (quango), then called Millbank Technical Services, and later reformed as International Military Services Limited (IMS).

Enquiries about arms purchases generally come to the MoD from defence attachés in the field or company representatives with foreign contacts, and are forwarded through the licensing process[4] if details on a prospective contract have been worked out. A division of the MoD, called Defence Secretariat 13, arranges liaison with the other ministries which must review the application—the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, sometimes the Export Credit Guarantee Department (ECGD) and the Treasury. Often the British government will be asked to issue a Memorandum of Understanding and to stand behind a deal arranged by private companies. Since government-to-government sales have become increasingly popular, the British government has evolved informal ways of underwriting sales without technically becoming responsible for them. The use of International Military Services, to be discussed below, is one such means. Finally, if equipment has been jointly produced in collaboration with foreign firms or governments, inter-governmental consultation about sales may be necessary. For sales to Warsaw Pact or other communist countries, consultation and COCOM (Coordinating Committee on Export Controls) regulations devised by the Western bloc are employed.

Most of the 6,000–7,000 licence applications received yearly by the UK are relatively routine, with fewer than 3 per cent of applications being formally refused, though controversial enquiries are discouraged before reaching the application stage. It has been estimated that up to 7 per cent of applications were refused in earlier years, before export sales became such a primary concern for the British government and before review of applications became systematized. Applications which were formally refused in past years can now be discouraged earlier, as criteria of acceptability are more apparent. If a prospective sale is large and/or politically controversial (in Britain or the customer's region), or involves restricted technologies, ministers themselves could be consulted; if they are unable to agree informally, inter-ministerial committees can be convened, and ultimately the Cabinet consulted.

Both the MoD and the Foreign Office have established departments to facilitate communication in this deliberative process—respectively, Defence Secretariat 13 and the Defence Department. Each Ministry wants to retain a separate capability to evaluate arms transfers, but in practice it appears that the MoD plays the leading role in arms sales. An Undersecretary has maintained that the FCO is consulted on all proposals to sell arms, and opposes them only for 'compelling' political or security reasons.[5] In practice, such opposition is rare, and the MoD seems well aware of sensitive 'no sale' areas where the FCO might veto the release of certain types of military equipment. The Foreign Office would be unlikely to hear of arms purchase requests that were discouraged at an early stage by the MoD, and hence may not be fully aware of all interest by other countries in purchasing British arms. Ambassadors and embassy staff relay useful sales-related information to the Foreign Office, which in turn can pass it to the Ministry of Defence, but while there is

5. Testimony by Douglas Hurd, MP, before House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1980–81, 'Overseas Arms Sales: Foreign Policy Aspects' (March 4, 1981).

regular exchange of sales information, the MoD develops sales prospects generally without much consultation with the Foreign Office.

Within the Ministry of Defence, two sets of perspectives seem evident: on the one hand, UK armed services' concerns about acquisition of equipment and about release of sensitive technologies to the wrong people abroad—with possible resultant use against the United Kingdom; and on the other, the marketing concerns of the Defence Sales Organization and those promoting exports of British equipment. Tailoring weapons design for export appeal has traditionally not been a primary concern of the armed forces; they demand weapons suited to British defence missions, now largely concentrated in the North Atlantic and Northern Europe, and readily available to British forces (not sold over their heads to foreign customers). Arguments that exports are necessary if the United Kingdom is to afford sophisticated weapons production have been making headway, but military leaders, still to an extent resisting commercialization, note that the most sophisticated weapons are not necessarily those with the greatest export appeal, for reasons of price and logistics.

Designed to increase defence sales volume, the Defence Sales Organization has affected the government's control function. One of its main tasks, at least as industry sees it, is to wave the flag *inside* the British government in favour of sales and saleable designs. The Organization has become a convenient lever for arms manufacturers to use in influencing both licence applications and arms procurement decisions, even decisions by other ministries. This does not mean that others invariably cave in to pressure from this source, or even that pressure is bluntly applied, but rather that a consistent voice for export authorization is now available with increasing representation on inter-ministerial and procurement committees.

Despite formal controls, British equipment still sometimes gets to the 'wrong people,' most frequently defined as communist states, terrorists, the IRA, etc. End-use, or 'sole use'[6] provisions are part of many British deals, but enforcement is left to the Customs and Excise Department, with little or no follow-up by the Ministry of Defence or the Foreign Office. If a violator is identified, no new sales will be authorized, and private citizens can be prosecuted. In its licence reviews, the Department of Trade seeks to detect bogus end-use documents, and the Foreign Office is aware of the problem, but there are many means to circumvent enforcement, and much interest in doing business. In fact, end-use requirements have become less specific in recent years; the government now asks only that customers consult and inform London of retransfers of military equipment, rather than seeking its formal permission. Current end-use provisions deal only with unauthorized retransfers, rather than with *use*. The United Kingdom has also given up trying to distinguish offensive from defensive weapons, though with regard to human rights some distinction as to repressive potential (for example, machine guns) is still attempted.

In a sense, most of Britain's decision-making on arms sales is reactive, with cases considered individually as applications are made. Little in the way of general policy exists.[7] As noted below, departments have established certain rules about the release

6. Sole use, meaning that the equipment will not be passed on by the customer without prior consultation with the MoD, is a provision of all government-to-government contracts, while private firms often but not invariably include similar understandings in contracts. The government tries to include them as well in Memoranda of Understanding backing private deals.

7. Edmonds, 'British Arms Sales'.

of sensitive technologies and about countries which are poor political or financial risks. Yet longer term policy re-evaluation and planning is sporadic. The Arms Control Research Unit in the Foreign Office undertook a classified study of medium-term implications of arms sales, but evidently little use was made of the findings since they came during, and were lost in, the transition between Labour and Conservative governments in 1979. The Conservatives changed Britain's approach to arms sales somewhat by easing back on boycotts and restrictions in the cause of human rights, by providing higher level government backing in the form of sales teams and missions, and by calling publicly for more exportable designs and for manufacturers to reduce prices by scheduling payments over longer periods. Yet while disagreements between ministries can be referred to the Cabinet, the Cabinet Office, staffed by approximately 100 civil servants seconded from various ministries, has no permanent unit considering the political or economic implications and consequences of defence sales for British interests. Ad hoc studies are occasionally authorized, however, as in an assessment of arms balances in the Middle East undertaken a few years ago.

Finally, there is no statutory requirement in Britain for consulting or even informing parliament about prospective or existing sales. At least two parliamentary committees—Public Accounts and Defence—investigate issues related to defence sales, but Whitehall is quite restrictive about the information it releases and the committees are handicapped by their limited numbers of staff. Purportedly because of companies' and overseas customers' possible objections, the government does not even release details or figures of sales to specific countries. Its annual White Paper on Defence Estimates provides aggregate figures, with recent ones also including breakdowns by type of weapons. However, various important categories of goods are excluded from those surveys.

The pattern of British defence sales

Scarcity of data, therefore, means that estimates of UK sales volume are necessarily subject to doubt,[8] especially in view of the wide variety (sometimes differing by a factor of two) of figures compiled in various sources, and presented in Table 1a. In view of these discrepancies, it is best to look at trends in exports as judged from a number of data sources. The government and arms manufacturers can point to a steady increase in the current value of sales abroad, but corrected for inflation, or looking strictly at Third World sales, the increase is far less impressive, even allowing for data variations. It seems to have been based largely on the Gulf purchases of the mid 1970s, based on high oil revenues. In recent years (1979–82), in fact, the real value of sales has hardly increased at all despite concerted sales efforts.[9] While the number of British overseas sales contracts generally has increased since the mid 1970s, Table 1b shows that the proportion of very large (over £1 million) sales has stayed relatively constant, averaging around 44 per cent. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Britain has now dropped to fifth place among exporters of major weapons, behind both France (at

8. On data ambiguities, see Edmonds, 'British Arms Sales'.

9. See, for example, *Financial Times* 24 June 1980. Lawrence Freedman indicates, however, that MoD figures may understate the value of exports. London stockbrokers noted arms sales 57 per cent higher than reported government figures in 1975. See Lawrence Freedman, *Arms Production in the United Kingdom: Problems and Prospects* (London: RIIA, 1978), fn. 36.

Table 1a:
UK defence sales—various estimates*

	1966–7	67–8	68–9	69–70	70–1	71–2	72–3	73–4	74–5	75–6	76–7	77–8	78–9	79–80	80–1	
1. £m	152	165	214	227	235	242	257	425	468	530	600	790	901	—	—	Current £
2. £m	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	477	537	777	1,070	1,075	1,200	1,500	Current £
3. £m	—	—	—	—	870	—	—	1,230	—	—	—	—	—	1,040	—	Constant £
4. £m	—	509	609	632	609	570	564	860	792	700	708	—	—	—	—	Constant 1976
5. $m	—	—	324	123	264	663	801	671	584	820	950	1,024	—	—	—	Constant 1977
6. $m	—	—	348	185	393	369	316	579	647	587	680	—	—	—	—	Constant 1975
7. $m	—	—	—	—	—	—	360	450	410	530	720	1,020	770	600	—	To Third World Current $

1. Defence Estimates and Hansard, 6 December 1976 and 14 March 1977 (estimates of deliveries, derived from Customs and Excise Tariff figures at freight on board prices, excluding aircraft).
2. Defence Estimates, April 1981 (estimates of deliveries, adding aircraft and other items after 1979; valued by Customs and Excise).
3. Lord Orr-Ewing, Debate on 'Defence Equipment: Policy on Overseas Sales', House of Lords (*Hansard*, March 1980; unspecified as to comparison of totals, though purported to include arms and services in 1979–80).
4. MoD; data compiled by Mary Kaldor, University of Sussex, 1977 (unspecified as to composition of totals; estimates likely to have been based on Customs and Excise figures).
5. ACDA (US, 1980) (deliveries, valued according to *estimated* production cost and use value of conventional equipment, including weapons and dual purpose equipment parts, ammunition, support equipment and defence industry infrastructure, but *excluding* construction, training, and technical services).
6. SIPRI deliveries, valued according to *estimates* of trade value and indices, of *major* weapons (aircraft, missiles, armoured vehicles, and warships, aircraft spares, transports, trainers, and licensed production agreements).
7. US Government on Third World, 1981 (probably CIA estimates of deliveries valued according to estimated production cost and use value).

* For a recent discussion of the complexities of estimating arms transfer values, see Michael Brzoska, 'Arms Transfer Data Sources', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, No. 26 (March 1982), pp. 39–75.

roughly three times Britain's volume) and Italy, and being pushed hard by West Germany.[10]

Table 1b
Number of overseas defence sales contracts and number valued at over £1 million

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Total	186	150	123	195	287
Over £1m	79	69	71	69	116
(%)	(42%)	(46%)	(58%)	(35%)	(40%)

Source: *Hansard*, House of Commons (July 21, 1981).

In Table 2a, sales are broken down by region, with necessarily varying criteria depending upon data sources. Generally, though important aircraft sales figures were unavailable by region for some years, the proportions are relatively constant. The Middle East accounted for most sales, but peaked in 1978 with Iranian orders; after this, it fell back to its former figure of 30–40 per cent of British exports. Asia and Africa picked up at least temporarily in 1980, but generally accounted for 5–12 per cent. NATO quite consistently took around 20 per cent, and Latin America fell in 1980 but generally took between 15 and 30 per cent of British sales. This indicates that Britain was not totally oriented towards the Middle East, though OPEC countries in general accounted for 36–38 per cent of sales from 1966 to 1977. The Middle East has also ranked quite high in British aircraft exports, with an entire sales division of British Aerospace allocated to supplying the Saudi air force alone (including construction as well as combat supplies). Recently, British aircraft have also gone to India and Latin America.

While the Third World (technically its financially better-off countries) has been Britain's primary weapons market, industrialized Western countries also represent a substantial and growing market—including the United States, now Britain's third or fourth leading defence customer, as pressures have mounted for a more genuine 'two-way street' in UK–US defence purchases, and as British firms have become content with subcontracting for or co-producing equipment with American firms. While the sterling volume of sales is greatest in the Middle East, in terms of numbers of contracts the market is much more balanced. Table 2b shows that in 1979 Western Europe, Latin America, Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa represented substantial markets; in 1981 more agreements were announced in the press with North America than with the Middle East, and Europe was a close third.

Furthermore, from the viewpoint of countries in those regions, Britain ranked higher in relation to other suppliers as a source of defence sales to North America,

10. It is difficult to account fully for France's apparently greater sales success. British officials and academicians tend to attribute it to unflagging French governmental support; export-oriented defence procurement policies; greater willingness to conclude politically controversial sales and offer France as an alternative to reliance on superpowers; liberal credit terms and promises of uninterrupted resupply even in wartime. However, a look at industrial performance and manufacturing productivity in recent years also shows France to have the fastest growth in both output and available capital, roughly twice the UK growth rate (the lowest on aggregate among major European countries, North America, and Japan). Such performance should ultimately affect exports of industrial goods including arms. See J. P. Stein and Allen D. Lee, *Productivity Growth in Industrialized Countries at the Sectoral Level, 1963–1974* (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, July 1977).

Table 2a
Breakdown of UK arms sales by area or region (£ million, current)

	1966–75	1973–77[1]	1975[2]	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Third World	—	2,465 (76%)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Developed World	—	770 (24%)	—	—	—	—	—	—
NATO	25%	570 (18%)	52 (26%)[3]	43 (20%)	48 (13%)	77 (20%)	82 (21%)	111 (21%)
OPEC	36%	1,215 (38%)	—	—	—	—	—	—
NATO Europe	—	220 (7%)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other Europe	3%	65 (2%)	—	—	—	—	—	—
North America	—	350 (11%)	—	—	—	—	—	—
East Asia	6%	390 (12%)	20 (4%)	12 (6%)	19 (5%)	46 (12%)	63 (16%)	134 (25%)
South Asia	4%	65 (2%)	—	—	—	—	—	—
Africa	9%	180 (6%)	5 (3%)	12 (6%)	10 (3%)	18 (5%)	36 (9%)	121 (23%)
Middle East	33%	1,280 (40%)	91 (46%)	128 (59%)	162 (46%)	202 (52%)	127 (32%)	158 (29%)
Latin America	14%	565 (17%)	30 (15%)	23 (11%)	117 (33%)	49 (13%)	85 (22%)	13 (2%)

1. Figures compiled by US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
2. Figures in MoD Statement on Defence Expenditures, 1981 (Vol. 2), p. 21.

Regions here are defined as: NATO and other Western Europe
Asia and Far East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Middle East and North Africa
Latin America and Caribbean

3. Percentages of Customs and Excise identified equipment, excluding aircraft.

NATO, and Latin America than to the Middle East. Generally, the British defence market has been fairly constant over the past decade. Listings of purchasers, without distinction as to amount of purchase, in 1973–7, 1979, and 1981 showed that of 81 country customers (62 in the early 1980s), 22 bought goods in all three periods, and an additional 28 bought in two periods. This left 31 countries purchasing goods during only one portion of the decade.[11]

Table 2b
Defence sales by regions

	Sales destinations (1979)[1] (countries)	Number of negotiated or agreed contracts and orders (1981)[2]	UK rank on regional arms sales 1973–1977[3]
Middle East	13	39	4
Western Europe	13	38	7 (5)
North America	2	47	2
Latin America	10		3
Asia	10	19	4
Sub-Saharan Africa	11	16	6
Pacific	2	14	—
Eastern Europe/ USSR	0	1	—
NATO	—	—	3

1. *Hansard*, House of Commons (15 April 1980).
2. Contract listings from late 1980 compiled by the Committee Against the Arms Trade.
3. Regions defined as: Middle East; Europe and NATO Europe in parentheses; North America; Latin America; East Asia; Africa; NATO.

The breakdown of items exported (see Table 3) shows that while aircraft accounted for the bulk of sales, ground equipment had a significant and more consistent share of around 20 per cent of UK exports. Sea equipment took up generally less than 10 per cent, with electronics and communication evidently (when figures were available) providing another 20 per cent. While ground and air equipment sales generally seemed to grow steadily from year to year, ship sales fluctuated severely. Growth in missile sales tapered off at the end of the decade, and data were insufficient to judge growth rates in electronics, though if 1979 is an indication, they may not have been as spectacular as one would imagine for a 'glamour' industry.

Finally, looking briefly at the question of costs and benefits of defence sales, we can quote government claims that these sales account for roughly 80,000 jobs (140,000 direct and indirect 'job opportunities' have recently been mentioned) and £1.5 billion of revenue in 1981, or 2½ per cent of total UK exports, and a quarter to a third of total UK defence production. The figure of 80,000 seems remarkably

11. Data for these admittedly rough calculations came from the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1973–77), Hansard (1979), and the Committee Against the Arms Trade (1980–81).

low for a defence industry estimated to contain between 9,000 and 10,000 contractors and subcontractors. The average profit on defence exports is reported to have risen from 9 to 10 per cent, on sales growth of 20–23 per cent between 1976 and 1978.[12] Government (MoD) contracts with industries generally limit profit margins to between 11 and 14 per cent, but this can vary. Procurement contracts can be based either on fixed price limits, to head off cost overruns, or cost-plus provisions allowing for inflation and unforeseen problems. Prices of exports are generally set higher than domestic sales, supposedly because of required warranties, promotional costs, etc. Different prices can be quoted to favoured overseas customers, though customers tend to keep track of price variations. This affords companies the opportunity to make up for cash limits, as do certain export credit insurance arrangements, discussed below.

Table 3
Type of equipment exported
% of total UK defence equipment exports (£ million—current) with growth rate from previous year in parentheses

	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980
Ground + Spares + Ammo	21	23 (22)	18 (17)	27 (99)	25 (−5)	18 (19)
Air + Spares	68	67 (12)	62 (34)	47 (5)	45 (−4)	—
Sea + Spares	9	7 (−14)	16 (242)	4 (−68)	8 (110)	5 (−28)
Missiles	3	3 (38)	3 (50)	2 (−1)	2 (0)	2 (4)
Special Electronics and Training Equipment	—	—	—	20	19 (−3)	—

Source: MoD Statement on Defence Estimates 1981 (Vol. 2) p. 21.

One way of calculating sales benefits is to determine the return on government investment in defence production. The effect of nationalized industries is discussed below, but it has been noted that Royal Ordnance Factories exports have not often yielded a profit and have often failed to return fixed overhead costs. The government imposes levies on commercial exports of defence equipment designed at its own expense, in order to recoup such costs. Because levies are variable and can be adjusted to help exporters meet foreign price competition, levies have yielded only £9 million per year on government expenditures of hundreds of millions.[13]

The impetus to boost defence sales comes in part from the declining national budget base. Mary Kaldor has argued that Britain has traditionally exported more

12. See Hurd, 'Overseas Arms Sales'; *Financial Times*, 24 June 1980.
13. Freedman, *Arms Production in the United Kingdom*, p. 29.

when able to afford less procurement for its own forces, and vice versa.[14] This substitution effect was evident in the Defence Secretary's commercial mission in 1981 to boost exports while cutting £200 million from the budget and still aiming to meet NATO commitments to raise defence spending by 3 per cent. Defence production takes over 20 per cent of UK research and development expenditure, and over 50 per cent of government sponsored R & D,[15] and exports account for roughly 30 per cent of that production (though for certain products this figure is higher). As seen in Table 4, defence export *revenue* almost exactly equals these yearly R & D expenditures. The close match seems due primarily to coincidental budgeting decisions (incremental inflation-affected increases in R & D) and the basically stagnant real sales volume in recent years (inflation being the main cause of any rise). Little of the export revenue is directly returned to the government to offset its costs in subsidies, advanced payments, loans, loan guarantees, and seed money for projects later cancelled.

In fact, a number of myths have grown up around defence sales which do not appear to be valid. For instance, it is often claimed, especially by industry, that domestic procurement of defence goods is necessary for foreign sales, since prospective customers require a seal of approval by home forces. While customers might feel better with such assurances, findings of *inverse* procurement–export correlations belie this claim. New forms of government warranties or Memoranda of Understanding can substitute for actual purchases, though manufacturers benefit when government buys more and holds goods in stock or in armed service inventories waiting for foreign customers.

It is also argued that defence sales provide longer production runs and therefore reduce unit costs. However, such marginal cost reductions vary greatly depending on weapon sophistication, for example, such factors as speed, weight, technological

Table 4
Export revenue as % of costs

	1976–77	77–78	78–79	79–80	Est. 80–81	Est. 81–82
As % of gross R & D expenditure (using latter export revenue year)						
Total	98	101	100	89	96	—
As % of gross defence production expenditure						
Total	39.5	46.6	40.2	38.9	39	—
Land	24.7	41.2* (28.1)	38.5 (25.7)	27.3	—	—
Sea	20.8	5.8	10	5.9	—	—
Air	72.9	63.6	48.7	—	—	—

Source: Ministry of Defence, *Statement on the Defence Estimates 1981*, Vol. 2, pp. 21 and 24–25.
*Road vehicles suddenly included.

14. Mary Kaldor, *Defence Industries—National and International Implications* (Sussex: unpublished manuscript, 1972); this finding has been corroborated by A. J. Alexander, W. P. Butz, and M. D. Mihalka, *Modeling the Production and International Trade of Arms: An Economic Framework for Analyzing Policy Alternatives* (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand Series in International Security and Arms Control, March, 1981).

15. Editorial, *Engineering Today*, 15 February 1979.

add-ons; expensive systems can have relatively steep cost or production learning curves, with significant reductions coming with the first blocks of units, sometimes those bought by the producing government for its own forces.[16] Exports lengthen production runs, but may not reduce unit costs very much, and the exceedingly high cost of even mass-produced sophisticated modern weapons discourages foreign purchasers unless government backed credit or subsidies are offered. The benefit is in keeping design and production teams working longer, in filling gaps between projects, and in providing the sales volume if domestic procurement falls short.

Furthermore, Trevor Taylor claims that government R & D costs are not necessarily recovered through exports. British weapons requiring the most R & D were generally the least successful exports.

> Over the last five years military aircraft have provided only 16.8 per cent of arms exports but have taken over 55 per cent of official R & D funds . . . Naval equipment accounted for over 20 per cent of the British total . . . but took less than 16 per cent of R & D funds. Most striking of all, ground equipment constituted over 55 per cent of defence sales between 1975 and 1979 yet absorbed under 12 per cent of R & D spending.[17]

However, according to calculations reflected in Table 4, naval exports do not produce sufficient export revenue to cover their costs, expressed in terms of central government expenditure on defence production. In this sense, on a purely cost-accounting basis, the case for continuing such production in the face of scant sales seems questionable if exports are a major consideration. It is also apparent from Table 4 that defence sales revenues have not consistently increased as a percentage of costs. This is true of land, sea, and air production, and taken as a percentage of production costs in each sector.

Criteria for control

Andrew Pierre has described Britain as basically dominated by economic incentives in the arms sales business. He evidently agrees with the SIPRI classification of British arms sales as a commercial rather than a strategic venture, and with Lawrence Freedman as citing 'commercial pragmatism' as the main constraint on UK sales.[18]

16. One industry estimate for British military airframes posits an '85% learning curve', with each doubling of production volume reducing man-hours required (direct labour costs) by 15 per cent. This translates roughly to an 8–10 per cent reduction in unit costs as production is doubled. Significant cost reductions can therefore be realized at between 200 and 400 units or less. While British domestic procurement of fighter aircraft in the past seldom exceeded 100 units, new jointly produced Tornado fighter sales in the producing states (Germany, Britain, and Italy) were likely to exceed 250 units even with defence budget stringency and cost overruns. Collaborative production tends to raise unit costs somewhat, though. The US, with military aircraft domestic procurements three times as large as the UK, enjoys a unit cost advantage, and Britain has tried joint projects, government subsidy, and export sales promotion as means to compete. One alternative means has been suggested: to open UK procurement to more competitive bidding from abroad and from international collaborative projects, thereby increasing competition for UK firms and forcing more productivity and lower costs. On learning curves see Keith Hartley, *A Market for Aircraft*, Hobart Paper 57 (London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 1974), esp. pp. 18–22; and J. P. Large *et al.*, *Production Rate and Production Cost* (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, December 1974), *Parametric Equations for Estimating Aircraft Airframe Costs* (Rand, February 1976), *A Critique of Aircraft Airframe Cost Models* (Rand, September 1977), and *Estimated Costs of Extended Low-Rate Airframe Production* (Rand, March 1978).

17. Trevor Taylor, 'Research Note: British Arms Exports and R & D Costs', *Survival*, No. 22 (Nov./Dec. 1980), p. 259.

18. Andrew J. Pierre, *The Global Politics of Arms Sales* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 101–2; *SIPRI Yearbook* (London: Taylor & Francis, 1980); Freedman, 'Arms Production in the United Kingdom', p. 29.

Yet the record of defence sales shows them to be more complicated than merely a commercial proposition. Freedman has pointed to a commitment to sell unless a compelling reason is found not to, and Edmonds, with a slightly different nuance, to a 'disposition to export arms, within a defined and established procedure of decision-making in which "careful and conscious selectivity" in allowing arms sales is exercised'.[19] In other words, Britain will sell arms but, according to the government, only after trying to think through the implications.

Economic implications and aspects of defence sales controls will be discussed later. The first question is to what extent political considerations still play a role in arms transfers, as they clearly did in Britain's imperial heyday, and to what extent government officials really do think through implications. The fact that civil servants claim to be concerned lest a denial of a licence application should severely damage the government's relations with the customer nation can be taken two ways: either as a rationalization and apology for the fact that only 1–3 per cent of applicants are refused, or as an indication that such deals do cement political relations.

Political controls

One way in which economic interests relate to political interests is in the desire for an independent weapons manufacturing capability. Pierre takes the fact that Britain has been willing to depend on the United States for nuclear delivery vehicles and technology since 1961 as an indication that, unlike France, it no longer lays great stress on the maintenance of 'an independent foreign policy underpinned by an autonomous arms industry'. In that sense Pierre reverses the conventional wisdom about French motivations a bit, arguing persuasively that there is more to Parisian arms policy than a mad grab for export revenue.[20]

However, albeit with a difference in ambition, much the same can be said for Britain. Although the tradition in London is for less *dirigisme* or open government involvement in sales promotion, clearly British manufacturers and the Defence Sales Organization would like to match the French *commercial* success. But financial considerations aside, civil servants and MPs from both houses also still refer to independent forces and the need to be ready for possible wars.[21] They refer to the lack of preparation before the Second World War, despite the prospect that future wars would not resemble that conflict. Some refer to nuclear forces in this light—though Britain is far from independent even in purchasing the likes of Trident. MPs of various parties also call for autonomy in conventional weaponry. Again this may be an apologia for defence manufacturers' interests, or for trade unions' job

19. Edmonds, 'British Arms Sales', pp. 71–6.

20. In selling arms widely the French clearly pursue political influence as well as revenue. They have professed to offer an alternative to dependence on one or both superpowers, and they have tailored their marketing emphases to those regions—Africa, the Middle East, Latin America—where they seek to develop cooperative ties of various sorts. They also refrain from selling to politically hostile (Eastern bloc) or overly embarrassing (South Africa at times of great black African objection) regimes. See Jean Klein, 'France and the Arms Trade', in Cindy Cannizzo, ed., *The Gun Merchants: Politics and Policies of the Major Arms Suppliers* (New York: Pergamon, 1980), pp. 127–66.

21. See the statement by Lord Newall, Hansard, House of Lords, March 1980. The impact of the Falklands dispute of 1982 may be to reinforce the arguments of those, often not taken seriously in recent years, who maintain that Britain could still become involved, on her own, in foreign wars and has lingering foreign responsibilities to shoulder. Unfortunately the Falklands war has also called into question the wisdom of a free and easy arms export policy, as the Canberras, Sea Darts, Sea Wolfs, over-age destroyers and carriers, and Lynx helicopters in the British-trained Argentinian fleet came back to threaten British seamen in the South Atlantic.

concerns, but Britain still possesses basically autonomous conventional production capability (although some key systems are imported), and it is a potent selling point when parliamentary votes are cast on defence budgets.

One indicator that commercial interests still do not quite rule the day in UK arms transfers is the continuing struggle of manufacturers and the Defence Sales Organization to overcome military service predominance in defence procurement. Weapons designed solely for export are not yet built at government expense, though the services have recently been talked into accepting lighter, cheaper frigates and submarines in the interest of exportability.

Britain's political aspirations are linked to its defence sales efforts, but these aspirations have been a bit more modest or constrained than French aspirations in recent years. While maintaining an interest in 'autonomy', Britain has forged close political, consultative, and strategic links with the United States. Britain's military role has been designated, despite the Falklands diversion, as basically one within NATO. Political ambitions go a bit further afield—to the Middle East, for example—but the independent military production base is conceived as relevant mainly to nearby area defence. Britain also consults more frequently with NATO's leading military power than with any other West European state about political matters, including the implications of its arms exports. This does not mean that Britain usually seeks clearance from Washington, but that on certain occasions it may restrain its impulse to sell equipment, or at least check in on the implications of such sales (as in controversial areas such as the Middle East). France is more flexible in this regard, and freer of self-imposed restraints or allied pressures, as are Italy and West Germany—which keeps a generally low arms export profile through collaborative and subcontracting relations. Possibly because of this flexibility, along with higher productivity and key design decisions (see footnote 10), France and Italy have surpassed British export totals. Customers wishing to circumvent US influence might be more likely to turn to France than to Britain, although Britain is a convenient alternative to the United States for states like Oman (and for Washington in dealing with states like Oman).

In a sense Britain's current political controls over defence sales are negative in that they prevent sales to certain states, such as those with close Soviet ties, or those likely to damage UK security. It is far more difficult to find controls designed to manipulate or influence foreign regimes—or, as in the context of US and French sales, to win friends and influence people (both the United States and France also employ negative controls against specific states). Arms are used for influence still in isolated cases, such as the intimate UK–Omani relationship. Somewhat similar links are also maintained with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Regionally it is less controversial for Britain to play a low profile politico-military role than for the United States to build an even more massive presence, despite Omani and Saudi preferences for US equipment. Yet there are relatively few Omans left for Britain: few places where British bases are combined with an arms pipeline to maintain political influence.

For the most part British arms flow to places that can afford, or obtain credit to pay for them. But they do not flow entirely indiscriminately. Freedman lists two main types of restrictions—creditworthiness; and security status, or wider strategic concerns. Edmonds speaks of the following criteria: effect of sales on UK security; impact on regional military balances; compatibility with UK foreign and economic policy interests; alliance or treaty commitments; and the interests of British armed

forces. Foreign Office minister Douglas Hurd has listed the following constraints: (1) threats to the United Kingdom or NATO; (2) UN mandated embargoes; (3) special political considerations such as opposition of other states to sales; and in some cases (4) considerations of regional stability and introduction of new technologies in certain regions; (5) the nature of the equipment and its possible uses; (6) human rights considerations; (7) needs to safeguard UK dependencies; and (8) multilateral arms control implications. British weapons sales to certain countries are now or have previously been prohibited: in addition to Soviet bloc states, South Africa, Taiwan, and, since the Falklands and Lebanese crises, Argentina and Israel are the only recent cases. Honduras supported Guatemala in the Belize dispute and was denied a shipment of armoured cars in the late 1970s. Yet despite the UN embargo of South Africa, UK defence goods do get through, especially as spare parts, if they are classed as having dual civil and military communications applications and can be put on a special 'C' list of Commonwealth goods (for which even NATO states would need a licence). The ban on Taiwan is based on political and commercial ambitions *vis-à-vis* Peking, which itself was exempted from normal COCOM restrictions. Thus, as with most arms suppliers' controls, loopholes and provisions for selective application are evident.[22]

Of all the criteria for restraint listed above, the UK security question—the concern that weapons will be used against British interests—seems the most pressing. Yet even in light of these worries Britain has gone ahead with sales of certain of its less lethal systems to Iraq, Libya and Central America. Commercial interests are difficult to resist, and it is also difficult accurately to assess regional power balances. Definitions can serve political interests. Most civil servants today fall back on a rather commercially convenient dictum that Israel is so far ahead of the Arabs (presumably thanks to US suppliers), that there is little danger in selling large quantities to Arab states, despite the potential of such supplies for fuelling disastrous wars such as that of Iraq, with Jordanian and Gulf states' support, against Iran. Although Foreign Office policy, and British policy generally, is not to sell to states in ongoing disputes, this is subject to reinterpretation and to evasion through third party transfers.

Related to UK security is the release of sensitive information or technology. Weapons systems can sometimes be modified through interministerial consultation to remove ultra-sophisticated devices. The MoD, concerned lest sophisticated devices fall into the hands of 'Soviet penetrated' regimes, keeps a list of countries which cannot receive various levels of technology, so the weapon system can be matched to the recipient. This has been an embarrassing problem in negotiations with India in recent years. The Foreign Office, also concerned about security, has

22. The UK has favoured and proposed, in multilateral arms control meetings, regional restraints on arms transfers, based on supplier–recipient agreements. London also co-sponsored the draft UN convention on the transfer of inhumane weapons, such as certain mines, boobytraps, incendiary, and plastic fragmentation devices. While all weapons could be classed as inhumane, evidently Britain saw these in particular as a threat in the hands of groups like the IRA. Britain also supported the UN study of conventional arms trade, approved in principle in 1980, and advocated the publication by all states of total volumes of arms production and trade (it was thought best to have Denmark and non-aligned Singapore introduce the actual proposal). London is concerned that the USSR comply with provisions of full disclosure in any world arms register, although the proposal for only *aggregate* production and trade figures fits Britain's own tradition of secrecy about recipients of arms and details of individual deals. See Hurd's testimony, 'Overseas Arms Sales', pp. 41–42.

maintained a form of matrix in which countries are matched to types of weapon and to control criteria:

> Our advice is always sought and we give advice as regards the country, the type of weapon and the scale and duration of supply. We do not regard it as part of the job of the FCO to cover commercial matters or the details of a contract.[23]

Yet the Foreign Office lacks technical expertise on weapons systems and must rely on MoD technology assessments or open source materials. Geographical departments in the Foreign Office may review the initial release of information by companies pursuing sales, and then might consider the security risks of potential customers in the final weapon sale. However, such considerations generally are imprecise.

Obviously, British, French, American, German and Italian arms sales to the same region could exacerbate friction, nullify attempts at regional balance, and conflict with ultimate NATO security interests. Yet there is remarkably little coordination among the allies and spokesmen refer to arms transfers as a keenly competitive business. NATO arms transfer coordination is probably greatest between Britain and the United States, and where strategic concerns are heightened, as in the Gulf. Much less consultation is evident on Latin American or Asian sales. Both for commercial rationalization and political coordination, marketing agreements between NATO allies have sometimes been proposed, but British officials have generally taken a dim view of this, maintaining that NATO, with a strictly North Atlantic purview, has no obligation or authority to coordinate restraint of sales to other areas:

> . . . at the moment . . . there are no foreign policy considerations in the minds of any of the allied governments which would in principle prevent the supply of arms; . . . if one is thinking about Saudi Arabia or the Gulf countries or Oman or, indeed, about many other parts of the third world, we are in a position where none of the allies, and quite rightly in my view, feels that it would be right for them to prevent their suppliers supplying.[24]

This reflects British assumptions that they still can and must compete in a variety of weapons categories, that UK–US strategic coordination is sufficient, and that it would be a mistake to become dependent on single suppliers—for example, the United States in fighter planes—for NATO arms capabilities.

Notable disagreements have sometimes arisen between the two main ministries concerned with political control. Some in the Foreign Office still recall with dismay 'excesses' of the Defence Sales Organization during the multifarious and lucrative deals with Iran during the mid to late 1970s. Evidently, for instance, the Foreign Office was not consulted when Sir Ronald Ellis, then the Head of Defence Sales, concluded an approximately £1 billion deal for an Iranian military installation during a personal meeting with the Shah, agreeing to accept payment for the project in oil.[25]

Occasionally the Defence Sales Organization has ventured to evaluate the impact of arms exports on political stability abroad. While few formal and systematic

23. Hurd, 'Overseas Arms Sales', p. 51.
24. Hurd, 'Overseas Arms Sales', p. 48; see also Lawrence G. Franko, 'Restraining Arms Exports to the Third World: Will Europe Agree?', *Survival*, Jan/Feb. 1979, pp. 14–25.
25. Personal confidential interview, December 1981.

attempts are made to calculate regional consequences or balance of power impacts, public pronouncements have sometimes made evaluations sound (unaccountably) systematic:

> . . . Something like 96 per cent of the stuff we supplied has never been used in anger, and I think that, from a political point of view, is excellent. We have produced export business, we have developed a technological base which can go into civilian production . . . and yet we have not been involved, except with that 4 per cent, in actual conflict. The equipment has been used for training or running around in the desert but not to shoot anybody.[26]

One way of assessing the efficiency of political controls and extent of restraint is to look at licence refusals or refusals to sell. Lord Strathcona, a Minister of State at the MoD, has listed the following refusals: Uganda under Amin; the PLO; Argentina (civilian control equipment usable in torture); Iran (temporary hold on spare parts during US hostage dispute—with willingness to supply spares at other times); and South Africa (exceptions noted above).[27] By contrast, in view of Afghanistan, Britain felt more entitled to sell to Pakistan, subject to financing; despite human rights violations, Indonesia and Turkey (which lacked funds to purchase arms) as well as Singapore, would be allowed to buy equipment because of established good relations and/or alliance ties. This was a retreat from previous statements that no sales would be made to states guilty of torture.[28] Many of the refusals listed related to terrorism and IRA access to weapons. While commercial considerations predominate in most UK arms exports, clearly political relationships still play a role—as in Turkey's ease of access.

The economic control factor

The Ministry of Defence and Defence Sales Organization have evolved a rather complex set of relations with both nationalized and private industry. As noted earlier, the DSO is seen as representing defence contractors' interests in government and now has representatives on all the main procurement committees.[29] The DSO automatically becomes a party to inter-governmental understandings and agreements on defence exports, and sells the Royal Ordnance Factories' goods directly. It has now evolved an indirect 'arm's length' role in putting together packages of sales and services and in arranging agents' commissions through International Military Services, which, though MoD owned (except for one share held by the Treasury) is a commercially independent operation. A division of the Defence Sales Organization also coordinates Britain's role in collaborative international defence projects (for example, Tornado aircraft) and sales. Indirect export credit is allowed to the Royal Ordnance Factories on equipment purchased from them by International Military Services, the goods being exported through IMS.

26. Sir Ronald Ellis, 'The Future of British Defence Sales', *Defence Attaché*, Nov./Dec. 1979, p. 17.
27. Debate on 'Defence Equipment', House of Lords, March 1980.
28. *Guardian*, 9 June 1980. As Lord Strathcona put it in March 1980: 'We would not sell arms to what we would regard as repressive regimes'. The April modification read: 'Under some definitions there are practically no countries in the world which do not resort to what some people would regard as torture'.
29. DSO officials sit on the Defence Equipment Policy Committee, which influences design specifications, as well as on the Operational Requirements Committee, which initially approves services' priorities. The DSO has constant access to and liaison with the three services, and is represented on the National Defence Coordinating Council, which brings together top level ministry and management staff to discuss long-term sales and contracting issues, such as types of contracts, role of subcontractors, and organization of government sales missions abroad.

By means of such arrangements, the MoD is able to keep a low profile in sales, allowing companies, under consultation with the Export Credit Guarantee Department, to arrange financing and engineer contract terms abroad. Thus, the DSO and the MoD are kept aware of impending deals, and can affect the final form of contract arrangements if desired. The MoD and Foreign Office generally concentrate on contract delivery dates and schedules; the Treasury considers economic details and R & D repayment levies. Yet, as seen below, the MoD comes under certain economic pressures because of government involvements in both ownership and marketing of Royal Ordnance goods, because of responsibility for IMS, and because of close relations with private industry. These pressures tend to undermine or reverse the control process.

Nationalized industries

British nationalized defence industries operate in much the same way as private commercial ventures. The relevant government ministry (formal owner) appoints a board of directors which is allowed commercial autonomy, but is kept responsible to government boards. If the nationalized firm is a limited company under the Companies Act, it can also compete for funds on private financial markets as well as making limited, though potentially significant demands on the Treasury. Operating boards can disobey their ministerial bosses, but in doing so risk dismissal, as would any corporate board disobeying stockholders.

In general, British nationalizations in the defence sector have been related to Labour Party ideology and to issues of economic 'rationalization'. Part of the ideology has been to harness industry to public interests and assure control over industry and investment priorities. Concern for rationalization has been most pressing in aerospace and shipbuilding. By the 1960s and 1970s it was apparent that the British market could no longer support the variety of aircraft manufacturers that existed in the 1950s. From around 1960, the government began forcing consolidation, by reserving contract awards for single merged manufacturers, as on the TSR-2 project. Finally, in the late 1970s the last of the larger privately merged aircraft corporations was integrated into the wholly government owned British Aerospace Ltd (BAe). Economic stringency has more recently moved the Conservative government in the opposite direction, with the sale of British Aerospace shares into private ownership. Helicopter production remained in private hands, with Westland's monopoly; British Shipbuilders were finally consolidated only in the late 1970s. The structure of the nationalized British defence industry, therefore, is hardly competitive (though arguably it has not even been competitive in private hands since the Second World War). The electronics and avionics industries, still privately owned, remain the only major competitive sector.

Conservatives have, of course, tended to criticize nationalizations on ideological grounds, but they have also questioned whether in fact nationalization has produced greater government control over defence sales.

> The reality . . . is that 'public accountability', in the sense of reporting to Parliament, actually decreases after nationalization, with the cessation of direct ministerial responsibility.[30]

30. James Bellini and Geoffrey Pattie, *A New World Role for the Medium Power: The British Opportunity* (London: Royal United Services Institute, 1977).

We have already noted a certain 'hands off' stance by the British government in the sales business, applying even to the nationalized sector. Ministries can retain formal ownership and supervisory directorship of manufacturers, and yet leave them to their own commercial operations. Ministries can even avoid having to report to parliament, through means such as partial privatization or creation of quango affiliates. The converse is also true, in the sense that ministries can have considerable potential control of *both* governmentally *and* privately owned enterprises, through procurement decisions, licensing of systems and subsystems, subsidies, patents, contract specifications, and legislative proposals. On the whole, nationalization leaves firms approximately where they were under private ownership in terms of government regulation and market competition; the significance of the change may be in potential for added business control over government.

In terms of potential control, the government could prevent those commercial decisions by nationalized firms which were considered contrary to the national interest—such as a decision to close Royal Ordnance Factories and increase unemployment in Leeds, for instance. Often, however, the choice involves not so much government *fiat* as willingness to throw added funds from the Treasury into the bargain, as in keeping an unproductive plant open longer. Increasingly, the same choice is also presented by private firms seeking government subsidies, purchase commitments, or tax benefits. With the ever-increasing research and production costs of major defence systems, private and public firms alike want greater government financial participation and guarantees, although of course less government regulation as well.

Therefore, whether a company is public or private—and BAe in a sense is both—management imperatives these days relate to a cat-and-mouse game with government agencies: trying to elicit financial commitments, yet retain design initiative so that export features can be built in (the Chairman of BAe has estimated that two-thirds of the production of the proposed P110 fighter would have to be exported to make it commercially viable). Government, on the other hand, tries to maintain only limited financial liability while guaranteeing control of design specifications.[31] This leaves export-oriented features open to negotiation and compromise. The Thatcher government's joint venture concept (i.e., often 50/50 government/company funding) and the general search for funds may also encourage international collaborative projects, despite problems with such schemes. Problems include production delays, varying levels of commitment, and insistence on nationalistic grounds (rather than technologically rational decisions) on producing certain parts of systems.

The Royal Ordnance Factories' Trading Fund illustrates the semi-independent financial status accorded British nationalized defence industries. While the Thatcher government has toyed with privatization of even these traditionally wholly public

31. The fact that government control is increasingly seen as a matter of financial arrangements rather than administrative edicts is seen in the controversy about what type of contract to award. Fixed-price contracts insure against cost-overruns, while cost-plus (or minus) contracts allow for inflation and unforeseen costs. The trend has been towards fixed-price, and yet the government in recent naval missile contracts has opted for variable-cost contracts, much to the displeasure of some parliamentarians. The reason is purportedly a concern that companies should not make excessive profits by cutting costs in fixed-price deals and pocketing the difference. Supposedly variable-cost contracts pay less if production costs are reduced. Why a company would have incentives to reduce costs if government payments go down accordingly is not clear. See reports by defence correspondent Bridget Bloom, *Financial Times*, 21 January 1982 and *seriatim* 1982.

enterprises, their relatively poor profit showing has reduced the number of interested investors, and they remain the government's responsibility.[32] The Royal Ordnance Factories' overseas sales are financed by an MoD supervised trading fund rather than by monies from the defence budget ('votes'). Due to cash flow problems, however, votes have sometimes been used to purchase equipment, store it, and sell later to foreign customers. The Trade Fund is a reserve of export revenue from which future sales can be engineered and supported. The Royal Ordnance Factories may borrow from a National Loans Fund to replenish the Trade Fund if cash flow problems occur, and profits beyond immediate reinvestment needs are to be repaid to the Treasury, which provided seed money for the Trade Fund.[33]

Clearly then, the British form of nationalization subjects the government to potential financial responsibility for the industry's losses, as well as affording some potential financial gain, but no apparent increase of control over management decisions. The potential for control is there, but is offset by a desire to maintain distance from commercial hurly-burly (embarrassing payments to foreign agents, for example). In the words of the former Permanent Undersecretary at the MoD, Sir Frank Cooper, 'I think that "arm's length" is a rather wonderful phrase, really. I think that I accept it so long as it is my interpretation of what arm's length is.' Maintaining that it would be impossible totally 'to get the risk off votes', Sir Frank justified the type of 'ex-gratia' payment to the MoD from the Royal Ordnance Factories 1977–8 Trade Fund accounts (evidently prefunded Iranian money) as part of the 'living partnership' between the two bodies. The Defence Ministry takes design risks, makes the Royal Ordnance Factories the preferred source for MoD supplies, stands behind both the ROFs and the IMS to cover bad debts (the ROFs, as a public body, cannot *directly* obtain ECGD cover, although IMS, as a limited company, can). The MoD will be charged for anything that goes wrong with the design, so if contracts turn out to be more profitable than expected (as Iran's did), in return the MoD should have an extra slice of the benefits.[34] As ultimate owner,

32. The Public Accounts Committee estimated in 1977 that only 10 per cent of ROF exports were at a real profit, with over half at an effective and considerable loss.

33. The fund must cover the cost of all goods and services received and charge for all supplies of goods and services to the government (in fact the ROFs and other manufacturers have improved productivity and charged for deliveries faster than the government was able to pay from the votes during 1981–2, thus compounding the defence budget crisis). The ROFs also have a profound impact on the private sector, since nearly 80 per cent of their support work is subcontracted to UK firms. In fact the loss of Iranian tank orders affected the private subcontractors more than ROFs, since only 10 per cent of ROF production was taken up in the project.

The trading fund system was set up in 1974, with initial assets of £35m public dividend capital and £59.5m in debt to the National Loan Fund. Indebtedness to the NLF cannot exceed the original debt by more than £50m on principal, and the fund must be managed so revenue is sufficient to meet costs, cover depreciation (replacement), and pay an *average* dividend of 10 per cent per year over five-year periods. The ROFs have managed to meet these terms. Yearly dividends from the trading fund are negotiated with the Treasury once trade results are known. The repayment to the NLF is also determined as is the amount the ROFs can keep in reserves.

See Government Trading Funds Act 1973, *Royal Ordnance Factories Trading Fund Accounts, 1978–79* (London: HMSO, December 1979); House of Commons, Public Accounts Committee, Hearings 1980–81 Session, p. 23; UK Ministry of Defence, *Defence in the 1980s* (Statement on the Defence Estimates), Vol. 1 (1980), pp. 29 and 82; House of Commons, Public Accounts Committee, Hearings, Sixteenth Report, 1979–80 Session.

34. The Director of the Royal Ordnance Factories has indicated that this arrangement was somewhat inequitable, but that new arrangements had been devised in 1978 to lessen the need for extra payment to the MoD evidently by providing more initially; indeed he would have to be convinced to make such payments in future. Under arrangements being discussed, more risk for bad debts would be borne directly by the ROFs or jointly with IMS–ROF and customer. This is important since approximately

the MoD is in a position to extract, along with the Treasury, a greater share of profits if profits seem likely; however, the loss side of the ledger has loomed larger lately in the minds of those in Whitehall as they try to disengage from the responsibilities of ownership.[35]

Both the Royal Ordnance Factories and British Shipbuilders have opposed privatization because they see certain advantages in continued government ownership. Although nationalization does not prevent government project cancellations, it increases the obligations of the Defence and Industry Ministries to lobby at top level for restorations. The Defence Sales Organization and the DoI can even be useful in finding ways around Export Credit Guarantee Department limits by pushing for 'national interest' classification of particular sales.

The 'world market' is particularly far from free in shipbuilding, with many governments heavily subsidizing their manufacturers and thus offsetting each other's efforts and advantages. The United Kingdom invested £412m in British Shipbuilders during 1980–1, including £165m from an intervention fund to meet foreign competitors' prices. Reasonable credit terms of 8–10 per cent over 8 years are also available through government subsidy of financial lenders. Yet the results in overseas sales are far from encouraging. In a sale of patrol boats to Hong Kong, with the Ministry of Defence picking up 25 per cent of the cost, over-sophistication of design and cost overruns led to the prospect of the government picking up 25 per cent of a £50m bill—over 50 per cent more than expected. In addition the boats were judged too sophisticated and costly to be sold elsewhere.[36] The government's investments in such undertakings are certainly subject to question, although the basic management and employment problems of British industry, such as productivity and foreign competition, and potential solutions have relatively little to do with the question of government *versus* private ownership, and are unlikely to be solved by denationalization.

The quango solution

Officially the Thatcher government took a dim view of quangos in the British economy, considering them little more desirable than nationalization. Yet in the defence field, little action has been taken against them. As indicated above, the beauty of IMS from the government perspective is the chance to control the pace and characteristics of complex sales and service packages, bringing together the resources of a number of British and foreign contractors, without actually being

£87m in bad debts on arms exports went uncollected by the MoD, according to the Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee in 1976–7 alone. See Public Accounts Committee, Sixteenth Report, 1979–80 session, pp. 22–3. Poor bookkeeping and collection seems an endemic problem in defence sales for a variety of countries. In Britain, according to 1978 reports in the *Guardian*, invoices to customers for payment on training and ammunition sales were frequently not even presented until long after MoD votes had been used to pay contractors. The MoD promised computerized invoice control for 1979.

35. In the case of the Royal Ordnance Factories, labour unrest has added to government financial worries in the past, since employees are civil servants and must be paid out of government accounts and pension schemes. Difficulties in Iran and poor trading conditions abroad reportedly added to these concerns, despite the facts that the ROFs have paid £40m in dividends in the past six years and reinvested £100m. *Financial Times*, 15 May 1981 and 26 September 1980.

36. In fact, since nationalization in 1977, BS has obtained export orders for four support and 30 patrol craft, only to have the number of support vessels later cut to two. Fourteen of the patrol craft were to be built *overseas* under licence. House of Commons Debates, Hansard, 29 January 1981; *The Observer*, 11 January 1981.

identified as a party to the sale. IMS is also able to acquire export credit backing and compete for private financing: it is 'commercially flexible'. In the felicitous phrasing of Sir Frank Cooper, '. . . we always wanted to see IMS at arm's length from the Ministry of Defence, behaving commercially and as commercially as it possibly could.'[37]

International Military Services grew from the tradition and indeed the operations of the Crown Agents, individual civil servants who for over 100 years provided all necessary goods to British colonial governors. When Commonwealth governments wanted to keep supplies coming, it was necessary to nationalize parts of the operation since individuals could not form legal contracts with foreign governments. Millbank Technical Services (MTS) was designated to handle military sales to Iran at the Shah's request (he had heard of MTS almost by accident, probably from Jordan or Saudi Arabia, where Britain had fitted out the air force). After a record of contractors' shoddy performances, MTS was taken over by the Ministry of Defence and reformed as IMS, which brought together groups of contractors in package deals and cut down on unnecessary middlemen and their 20 per cent commissions. This would increase the Shah's control over what was delivered, and guarantee UK government efforts to rectify anything that went wrong.

When the Shah was deposed, IMS was given control of all the Royal Ordnance Factories' non-NATO sales contracts; the Factories sell goods to the DSO Sales Supply Office, which sells to IMS, which then completes the sale abroad. A new trading agreement was worked out between IMS and the Factories so that business costs were shared and IMS would market the Factories' products; this was suspended pending a government decision on the future of privatization of the Factories. IMS also sought to move more heavily into the military construction business, using its experience building Iranian naval bases and military (tank) production facilities. It has continued to concentrate on Middle Eastern ties, along with African, and (to a lesser extent) Latin American activity. The joint and high-level forces of IMS, the Royal Ordnance Factories, and the Defence Sales Organization worked to obtain the Jordanian commitment to purchase some of the Shir tanks refused by Iran when the Shah fell. The Export Credit Guarantee Department repaid much of the Iranian construction losses for contracts that were not prefunded, thereby transferring the quango's bad debts to another government department (IMS, of course, had to pay ECGD for the credit insurance premiums). IMS does not technically operate a trade fund, though its reserves and the percentage owed to the Treasury resemble one. If prepayment comes to IMS from the customer on an MoD financed deal, then it is immediately turned over to the MoD; if it is a separate IMS arranged deal, the prepayment is held and invested by IMS. Since IMS is not covered by the Trade Fund Act, however, all decisions on financial recovery must be formally negotiated between the Treasury, the Ministry of Defence and IMS.

In a sense, the Ministry of Defence has tried for the best of both worlds—government control without too much responsibility—through IMS. Yet it is difficult to determine whether the best or the worst has resulted. For example, IMS tries to assure that contracting companies comply with MoD requirements without any need for direct MoD contact with the companies. However, the Ministry is also pledged to assist IMS to obtain business, to make monies available to cover IMS *and* contractors' losses or claims against them, and to assist with cash flow

37. Public Accounts Committee, Hearings, 1980–81 Session, p. 28.

until insurance repays the losses. It will consult about indemnifying IMS if asking it to undertake business the latter considers to be commercially unacceptable, and will consult on providing more money if IMS reserves are 'barely adequate' (as they seemed after Iran). Periodically, the MoD has tried to move IMS off votes and on to greater reserves of its own. Nevertheless, it can make limited monies available to IMS on short notice, even in advance of parliamentary votes.[38] Despite the policy of 'arm's length', therefore, the British government is directly implicated in defence-related exports, and heavily committed financially to support them.

Private companies and export credit

The government is also involved in the private sector's defence exports, both as initial and main procurer of defence equipment, and in underwriting sales and research (much of which is conducted in government R & D establishments). This can increase the direct cost to the government of defence sales. Industrial leaders emphasize the need for the Ministry of Defence to 'buy British', so that foreign customers have an implied stamp of approval and so that production runs can be guaranteed. Yet if 'buying British' means eschewing the purchase of cheaper but equally effective foreign equipment, the government is being asked to pay a premium so that firms can export more. The premium may be worthwhile politically in terms of military 'self-sufficiency', British jobs and manufacturing potential, and exports do bring revenue to the government through repayment levies for research and development subsidies; the costs are not readily apparent to the public. Industrial leaders also call for governmental assistance in sales, to open doors to the right people in foreign governments, and to select and back the British firm most likely to succeed in winning the order—the type of methods used by France.[39]

Yet in practice, some British executives, especially those in the more competitive electronics firms, also say that they have sufficient marketing talent and connections of their own, and prefer to be able to compete for export markets rather than have them parcelled out. They do, however, want the military to accept more exportable products with perhaps lower standards, and often electronic components are subcontracted as part of other firms' export contracts. Some electronics manufacturers see themselves as producing essentially two product lines, with separate design and production teams, one for the British government (and whomever else will buy), and another for more marketable private export ventures.[40] However, the exportability problem is not quite so simple; in naval equipment British standards may be above foreign customers' needs (the light materials used in frigates sunk near the Falkland Islands were basically private venture designs ultimately accepted by the Royal Navy), but foreign buyers often demand very highly sophisticated equipment for their land forces—sometimes to a higher degree than that demanded by British services or than the government is willing to release. Businessmen seem to view military priorities in procurement as excuses about 'their role', a role no longer (at least until the Falklands crisis) taken very seriously. As one executive put

38. See testimony by Sir John Cuckney, Director of IMS, Public Accounts Committee, Hearings, 1980–81 Session, p. 86; and Public Accounts Committee, Hearings, 1980–81 Session, Appendix IX.

39. J. W. Sutherland, 'Export Selling of Defence Electronics', presentation to Conference on Arms Sales and Political Influence, University of Southampton, April 1972.

40. Personal confidential interview, March 1982. One electronics firm purportedly earmarks a set 5 per cent of turnover for private (risk) ventures, relying on government subsidies and contracts for the rest.

it, as long as a system works well, i.e., kills Russians, it does not have to be the best.[41]

Executives of the largest private firms sit on the National Defence Coordinating Council and also on the newly established Procurement Executive policy committee, along with representatives of the Ministry of Defence, the Foreign Office and the Department of Industry on certain occasions. Government–corporate dialogue concerns such matters as the amount of government funds available, government resistance to performance bonds sometimes requested by customers dealing with private firms, percentage of allowable profit, R & D support and recoverable R & D levies. The government seldom sees company price and profit calculations, however.

The plethora of smaller subcontractors and component manufacturers also has a voice in government, and one that may soon be included on the two highest councils. The Defence Manufacturers Association was formed in the early 1970s to represent these firms, although its actual members number only about 300. It tries to ease government regulations and procurement requirements, advises firms on such regulations, and supports the carry-over of defence budget funds from year to year. Making systems more flexible for saleability—for example, producing tanks as platforms upon which more or less sophisticated equipment can be mounted—is a prime concern. Furthermore, subcontractors argue that they should be protected by government regulations from the whims of main system contractors in areas such as payment terms and R & D subsidies for subsystems.

Finally, export credits represent an additional means of government control of and responsibility for arms deals. The Export Credit Guarantee Department is basically a government insurance agency providing credit backing either to the customer country in a civil or military trade agreement, or to the exporting company to cover against customer default. It works with London or foreign banks—mainly US and Japanese—to obtain buyer credit in sales agreements, and must clear its commitments to these banks with the Treasury in larger sales. The Department itself issues insurance coverage for the exporter against defaults, charging a premium and attempting to spread the risk over a large business volume, as in normal insurance practice. OECD and Berne Convention rules on credit limits and terms are followed in arranging buyer credit; the OECD generally considers arms deals more risky than other forms of trade, although the experience of the ECGD suggests that this is not in fact the case.

The ECGD refers to the Treasury's rating of foreign countries' creditworthiness (ratings are the same for civilian and military sales). Well-developed states are generally rated near the top—these include the communist countries (except Poland) which have normally paid their bills religiously—and LDCs rank nearer the bottom.[42] In the past few years, political instability, especially that in Iran, has led

41. Personal confidential interview, March 1982.

42. Ratings are arranged in four categories; oil rich LDCs are relatively high, but Libya for example has a poor payment record (ECGD once had to cover a deficit) and, along with Oman (despite close British connections) and Iraq is on the lower 'C' rather than 'B' list. Oddly enough, Egypt ranks higher. Most NATO countries and EEC members, including Greece, are rated as 'A' level risks along with South Africa and Namibia; Turkey however is lower. South African 'homelands' are on the 'D' or lowest list. Zambia and Iran have been considered such poor repayers that they are off the list and entirely restricted. Countries in all categories can get short-term (six month) credit. But the 'D' or lowest category is excluded from longer-term commitments. In more controversial 'national interest' arms sales, including all sales of lethal equipment or with large monetary value, Whitehall is consulted as well before guarantees are issued.

to increased claims and a net loss from ECGD reserves. Unlike the American FMS, but similarly to French COFACE credit arrangements, the ECGD does not provide direct financing. The exporting firm takes a loan with a bank, on which the ECGD is consulted, and the bank is insured by the ECGD for 100 per cent of risk; the exporter is covered for 90 per cent of risk. If the exporter fails to deliver the goods, it must repay the loan. The ECGD or the Treasury analyses the exporter's reliability, and examines the terms of contracts and buyers' loan terms, looking for termination clauses, arbitration clauses, and payment arrangements. The exporter's ability to deliver is also investigated if credit is going to the buyer.[43] The Department even covers the risk that export licences will be cancelled by other government departments.

ECGD *officials* meet regularly with their counterparts in OECD, and exchange reasonably accurate information on the credit terms being used by each country, even in pending deals. In this way, buyers are prevented from easily playing one country off against another in bargaining for credit. Countries such as West Germany, which will not officially finance arms purchases and rely on private financing, also attend and participate in these meetings.

Credit coverage in collaborative deals can be quite complicated. In UK–French Jaguar sales, a buyer could receive UK but not French credit (Dassault Aircraft pushed Mirage sales), yet exporters (British Aerospace) could obtain credit from France. The ECGD would not cover the buyer credit denied by France, but would facilitate reinsurance for the supplier, which can be passed on to the buyer. As long as British Aerospace was responsible for the loan, French COFACE would back it.[44]

Credit is provided on a first come, first served basis, and companies compete to get in under the yearly credit limit. Each contract is covered separately, so the ECGD can be responsible for covering losses on one deal even if other deals by the same company are returning profits. Credit insurance is also a way for companies to ease the impact of fixed price government contracts, in that they can insure themselves against unforeseen cost increases. In this sense and as noted above, the ECGD is used on the one hand by the government to facilitate and restrain weapons sales, and on the other by the companies to help them financially to weather controls by other government departments.

Conclusion

The British government is hampered in applying political and economic controls to arms transfers, i.e., linking transfers to foreign policy, arms control, or commercial and fiscal goals. Its control is limited by deep-rooted government interests in sales and defence industry production and ownership. The clearest criteria for control are release of sophisticated equipment and British security interests. An item suchas the Rapier anti-aircraft missile has been released mainly to NATO allies and

43. The terms of the loans are generally shorter in arms than in civil sales, normally 5–8 years at not lower than the OECD limit of 8½ per cent; recently rates have ranged between 10 and 11 per cent, depending on the country's credit rating, because of the tight money situation. In collaborative production (with other countries), the exporter obtains the percentage of credit from each country's government equal to that country's share of production. Sterling is generally used for ECGD cover and loans, but dollars are used by the United Kingdom in collaborative sales to provide credit and avoid mixes of currencies in such multiple stream financing. Debtors sometimes prefer to obtain multiple currencies and thereby pay lower returns through speculative balancing.

44. Personal confidential interview, January 1982.

advanced industrial states such as Japan, Australia, and Switzerland. Yet as the years pass, restrictions ease, and in the case of Rapier, controls broke down early to the extent that potential Third World troublespots such as Iran, Abu Dhabi, Kenya, and Brunei obtained access. While London turned down certain Iranian and Iraqi requests for supplies during their recent war, British equipment, such as tank recovery vehicles, evidently was sent to Iraq through Jordan and/or the Arab Gulf states. It is questionable whether UK foreign policy interests have been served by Iraq's abortive attack on Iran.

While selective restraints on sales have been imposed by various British governments, as with most of today's arms exporting states, loopholes abound and long-term and comprehensive limits are eroded. The influence exercised in favour of arms transfers by nationalized, semi-national, and private business interests, as well as by a government agency charged with promoting sales, contributes to the erosion.

There is in fact a severe divergence between control of foreign policy and control of defence sales in the British government. The Foreign Office plays a distinctly secondary and reactive role in decisions to promote or proceed with sales. Unlike its American counterpart, the FCO seldom if ever initiates a sale proposal and is not the main clearing-house for obtaining inter-ministerial approval or comments on sales. Although the Falkland dispute dragged on for over seventeen years, and was frequently mentioned as a case in which arms sales should be controlled, the main evident limit on arms sales to Argentina was on grounds of human rights concerns rather than strategic defence.

While the government has strong commercial interests in arms exports, its main motivations—as defined through the Ministry of Defence—seem to be in maintaining production lines and the viability of defence firms: a strategic interest. In the process, it has determined to promote sales, but to do so in the least evidently commercial way, i.e., at 'arm's length' through quangos and subsidies.

These involvements have not notably enhanced the government's ability to link defence sales either to political, military (procurement), or economic policy. Britain remains intent on a high degree of military self-sufficiency, and yet the military is asked increasingly to tailor its weapons designs to multiple user and export criteria. Britain retains political interests in regional stability, particularly in the Middle East, Asia, and Latin America, yet the erosion of arms export and end-use controls may have helped fuel wars in the Persian Gulf and South Atlantic which materially threatened British interests. In the past, IMS has supplied participants in the Algeria–Morocco, Tanzania–Uganda, and Iran–Iraq fighting. Economically, the government subsidizes at best marginally profitable operations in ship, tank, and aircraft production and suffers increasing problems of ECGD losses on default on arms sales payments and cash shortfall in its own procurement. Growth in arms sales revenue has been sporadic, especially in relation to cost and inflation. Judged by government figures, the employment benefit of defence sales is relatively low.

This leaves the question of whether a medium-sized state with profound economic problems and shrinking global involvements (or a basically one-theatre military role) should be in the arms sales business. Related questions are whether such a government should own its arms-producing facilities, should adopt a direct, or an arm's length but intensive interest in sales, or should leave sales strictly to private manufacturers which prove themselves competitive and export under government licence. In the British case, nationalization and, arguably, rationalization of defence

industries have not resulted in spectacularly higher sales, clearly better equipment, more socially productive investment decisions, or a better alignment of defence sales and foreign policy interests. Privatizing existing enterprises would hardly solve basic productivity and technology problems, although it might lessen some of the government's spending responsibilities.

There is an evident lack of an overall plan for arms sales and politico–economic policy, comprising the long-term effects of various force postures, military production formats, and arms export restrictions on British overseas political interests and ability to defend key interests in conjunction with NATO. Such planning might include the budgetary and political benefits and costs of various options—such as importing rather than manufacturing key weapons systems, exporting only certain types of equipment, according to economic competitiveness or regional military impact, to certain regions and in certain circumstances (excluding regional warfare, for example), participating in more or less joint international arms production, subsidizing only the most efficient manufacturers of the most necessary equipment, reducing government undertakings to stand behind weapons sales unless such sales served immediate and demonstrable foreign policy interests, and increasing efforts, including international efforts, to control or at least account for end-use. A plan of this sort need not conflict with basic policies necessary to sell weapons overseas, such as a commitment to honour existing contracts and supply spare parts unless vitally pressing legal or political concerns (for example, UN embargoes) force licence revocation. It could inspire more precise definitions and rules which would more predictably regulate and derive greater social benefits from defence sales.

The Three World theory and post-Mao China's global strategy

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After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, China in its alarm turned increasingly to the West, in particular to the United States. The Chinese quest for modernization also pushed Beijing ever closer to the industrial states, while its much publicized relations with Third World countries were neglected. Since this time, the Three World theory has rarely been mentioned by Chinese officials. However, the more recent deterioration in Sino–American relations, due partly to disputes over Washington's arms sales to Taiwan, and the reappearance in the official Chinese press of criticism directed against both superpowers as hegemonists, have prompted China-watchers to speculate that Beijing is reviving the theory of the Three Worlds. Nothing could be further from the truth. The cooling of Beijing's attitude toward Washington not only does not indicate the resurgence of the Three World theory, it signals clearly a policy shift in the opposite direction. This article argues as its central thesis that notwithstanding the extreme flexibility of the Three World theory, changes in the international environment and in China's domestic political development have shattered its basic tenets. The once celebrated united front strategy has been greatly undermined in Beijing's policy calculations; China is feeling its way toward an integrated foreign policy emphasizing friendly or at least working relations with *all* countries.

The united front and the Three World theory

In his first appearance at the United Nations in April 1974, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping drew world-wide attention with his speech differentiating the three political forces in international politics. The now famous 'Three World' theory, though accredited to Mao Zedong by the Chinese leaders, was first most clearly and explicitly presented by Deng in this UN speech.[1] The concept postulated that the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, constituted the First World; the developing countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions together formed the Third World; and the developed countries between the two made up the Second World.[2] Deng declared vehemently that China belonged to the Third World. This view of world order subsequently became standard rhetoric in

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1. Deng's speech was made on 9 April 1974 at the Sixth Special Session of the UN General Assembly (convened to study the problems of raw materials and development). Deng was the Chairman of the Chinese delegation. For the full text of his speech in English see the Supplement to *Peking Review*, No. 15, 12 April 1974. The Chinese leadership asserted that it was Mao who first formulated the Three World theory in his talk with the leader of a Third World country in February 1974. The unidentified leader was probably President K. D. Kaunda of the Republic of Zambia, who had an interview with Mao on the afternoon of 22 February 1974.

2. It is interesting to note that the 'socialist countries' other than the Soviet Union were not included in the 'three worlds' presented by Deng; neither were they mentioned by Mao when he first formulated the concept in February 1974. This was not simply an oversight. Mao apparently had difficulty in placing the Soviet satellite states: to classify them as a Soviet bloc would only admit Soviet leadership

0020-5850/83/2/0239—11$3.00©1983 International Affairs

Beijing's foreign policy statements. On 1 November 1977 *Renmin Ribao* published a lengthy document entitled 'Chairman Mao's theory of the differentiation of the Three Worlds is a major contribution to Marxism–Leninism' and vowed to uphold Mao's revolutionary line in foreign policy.[3] The document reaffirmed Mao's Three World theory as first articulated by Deng three and a half years earlier and stressed in particular the strategic dimensions of the concept.

Central to the Three World concept is the united front strategy,[4] the genesis of which can be traced back to the early years of the Chinese Communist Party when it joined the Nationalist Party in the 1920s for the common goal of defeating the regional warlords. An anti-Japanese united front including the reactionary and bourgeois classes was advocated by Mao at the beginning of China's anti-Japanese war, and a similar strategy was again adopted during China's civil war. Mao insisted that the Chinese communists must persevere in a political line of 'developing the progressive forces, winning over the middle forces, and isolating the diehard forces'.[5] The anti-Chiang Kai-shek united front constituted workers, peasants, petty bourgeoisie and national bourgeoisie. The last two categories, though to be liquidated after the civil war, were regarded by Mao as essential elements in the coalition front. In short, the basic principle of a united front strategy was 'not to strike out in all directions and provoke too many oppositions'.[6] This strategy enabled the Chinese communists to win the war by concentrating their efforts on attacking the Chiang regime, their chief enemy.

Mao's inclination to divide China's social and political forces into three categories in his united front strategy was first applied to the international situation in his conversation with American correspondent Anna Louise Strong in 1946. Mao stated that United States 'reactionaries' were striving to dominate the world but that their drive was halted by the Soviet Union, the 'progressive' socialist state and a 'defender of world peace'. The United States and the Soviet Union were separated by a vast zone which included many capitalist, colonial and semicolonial countries in Europe, Africa and Asia—including China. Before the United States had subjugated these 'middle zone' countries, Mao stressed, an attack on the Soviet Union was out of the question.[7] Eighteen years later, Mao modified his view of the world order in an interview with M.M. Ali of Zanzibar on 18 June 1964 by dividing the middle forces into two categories: a first middle zone, comprising the developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and a second middle zone made up of the developed

and domination in the communist world; to classify them with the Second World, on the other hand, would blur the ideological line between the capitalist and socialist states. The Chinese leaders later solved the problem by declaring that the 'international proletariats' of the socialist states and the 'oppressed' people of the developing countries belonged to the Third World. See 'Chairman Mao's theory of the differentiation of the Three Worlds is a major contribution to Marxism–Leninism,' *Renmin Ribao*, 1 November 1977. In any case, the role of the socialist states was only marginal in the PRC's Three World strategic concept.

3. *Renmin Ribao* devoted the whole issue (six pages) of 1 November 1977 to the document, unprecedented in China's foreign policy statements. For the English version of this document see *Peking Review*, No. 45, 4 November 1977.

4. For a detailed account of the origin and evolution of Mao's united front strategy see J. D. Armstrong, *Chinese Foreign Policy and the United Front Doctrine* (California: University of California Press, 1977); and L. P. Van Slyke, *Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History* (Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 1967).

5. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* (Chinese version, characters in horizontal order; Beijing, 1952), Vol. 4, p. 1154.

6. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* (Beijing, 1977), Vol. 5, p. 23.

7. *Selected Works of Mao Zedong* (Beijing, 1952), Vol. 4, pp. 1089–1091.

countries from Western Europe plus Japan, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.[8] It is not difficult to see that Mao's two-middle zone concept was the forerunner of his Three World theory: the first middle zone has become the Third World, the second middle zone the Second World; and the two contending superpowers the First World. As in the 'middle zone' concept, the Second and Third World countries were the centre of superpower contention. The Soviet Union, of course, was now labelled by Beijing as a 'social-imperialist' state which had replaced the United States as the main threat to world peace. The essence of Mao's Three World theory was to unite the 'progressive' Third World states, to win over the 'middle' Second World and to isolate the two 'reactionary' superpowers.

At the outset, Beijing thus engaged the two superpowers, especially the Soviet Union, in a war of nerves. Identifying China as a member of the Third World that formed the strategic base of the united front, Beijing had apparently assigned itself a leadership role in the forefront of 'defence' against superpower expansion. How did Mao and other Chinese leaders calculate and differentiate the world's political forces? The Chinese themselves gave a straight and direct answer: there was no hard and fast formula.[9] The political forces were delineated to meet the PRC's strategic requirements of the time, and these in turn were determined by Chinese perception and analysis of the overall situation in the global system. In essence, the Three World theory was a dynamic concept which could be modified and adopted to new situations by changing or shifting the composition of political forces in the 'three worlds'. The concept itself was therefore part of and an instrument of Beijing's global strategy.

The three phases of post-Mao foreign policy

Since Deng Xiaoping's historical UN speech and the publication of *Renmin Ribao's* article on the Three World theory, both the international environment and China's domestic politics have undergone tremendous changes. In the regional and international arena, the unification of the two Vietnams in 1975 changed the basic power structure and great power relations in the region. The US withdrawal from Indochina signalled the end of an era of direct American involvement and the beginning of diminishing US military presence in the Asia–Pacific region. Hidden differences and conflicts between the Chinese and the Vietnamese re-emerged after the removal of the common US military threat. The Soviet involvement in the 1975 Angolan civil war, on the other hand, marked the Soviet Union's increasing strategic offensive and its ascendancy as a global power. Conflicts between China and Vietnam exploded into a large-scale border war in February 1979 after Vietnam had invaded Kampuchea and installed a pro-Hanoi regime in Phnom Penh. Finally, before the 1970s drew to a close, the world was surprised and shocked by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

8. *Long Live Mao Zedong's Thought* (Beijing, 1969), p. 514. This volume of Mao's speeches and writings was collected and circulated in China during the Cultural Revolution. It was made available outside China by Taiwan. It is generally regarded as authentic by China scholars. For the authenticity of the above document see Stuart Schram, 'Mao Tse-tung: A Self-Portrait', *China Quarterly*, No. 57, Jan./March 1974, pp. 156–65. On 21 January 1964 *Renmin Ribao* published an editorial dividing the intermediate zone into two zones, similar to that postulated by Mao six months later.

9. 'Chairman Mao's Theory of the Differentiation of the Three Worlds . . .' *Renmin Ribao*, 1 November 1977.

On the domestic front, China recovered from the crises of leadership succession after Mao's death in September 1976 and overcame other, natural, disasters in the mid 1970s. It hastily launched an ambitious modernization programme, aiming at transforming a poor and backward economy into an industrial and prosperous China by the end of the century. However, Beijing soon found out that there were numerous obstacles confronting this new 'Long March' toward modernization. Politically, there existed a strong undercurrent of 'leftist' feeling, directed by a faction in the leadership which insisted on a policy of upholding and following whatever Mao had said and conducted, and opposed policy reforms introduced by the moderate faction. Economically, Beijing was embarrassed by its over-ambitious modernization programme and was forced to adopt a more realistic plan.

In the light of changing international and domestic environments, then, how did the Chinese leadership calculate new strategies and modify the Three World theory? We can distinguish three phases of development since the theory's inception in 1974: first, asserting Mao's revolutionary line in foreign policy; second, uniting all anti-Soviet forces including the United States; and third, emphasizing a self-reliance strategy. There is no clear-cut dividing line between the different phases of development. Roughly, the first phase lasted from 1974 to 1978, the second phase began in late 1978 and endured for slightly more than one year, and the third and present phase began to take shape at the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, overlappings or concurrent uses of strategies were common in all three phases of development.

In his 1974 UN speech Deng Xiaoping declared that: 'history develops in struggle, and the world advances amidst turbulence . . . Countries want independence, nations want liberation and the people want revolution—this is the irresistible trend of history'. The Beijing leaders maintain that the PRC, being a communist state, would support 'the revolutionary struggles of the communist parties of all countries'.[10] China also repeatedly pointed out, however, that revolution could not be exported and that all communist parties were independent and should make their own decisions. This 'revolutionary' basis was then reaffirmed by Chinese leaders as Beijing's official foreign policy line in *Renmin Ribao*'s 1977 article on the Three Worlds. The policy was clearly aimed at rallying Third World support for its global strategies; it reiterated that the developing countries were the main force in the international united front against hegemonism.

The reasons why Beijing took this revolutionary line in foreign policy lie in China's assessment of the global situation, its perception of external threat and domestic Chinese politics. After the breakthroughs of the early 1970s when China secured diplomatic relations with numerous developed and developing countries and established connections with the United States, Beijing's diplomatic offensive came to a complete halt in the middle of the decade. Little progress had been made in negotiations with Japan for a peace and friendship treaty because of the latter's objection to the 'anti-hegemony' clause aimed at the Soviet Union; negotiations with the United States on formal diplomatic links were also deadlocked over the Taiwan issue. Meanwhile, Beijing watched hopelessly the gradual shifting of Vietnam and India towards its arch-rival the Soviet Union and the latter's military and diplomatic gains in Angola and the Horn of Africa. Frustrations on the

10. See Hua Guofeng's Political Report to the 11th National Congress on 18 August 1977.

diplomatic front apparently strengthened the radical hard-liners' demand for a revolutionary line policy against all 'reactionary' forces.

At the same time, a debate was apparently going on among Beijing's top leadership concerning China's defence strategies.[11] Marshal Ye Jianying in a speech marking the fiftieth anniversary of the establishment of the Red Army stressed the importance of the 'people's war' in China's defence strategy. Yet Ye also pointed out the urgency of strengthening China's defences, equipping its armies, navy and air forces with modern facilities including missiles and nuclear weapons. Ye's speech highlighted the controversies over China's defence strategies.[12] Understandably, the military establishment argued for stronger defences and demanded that top priority be accorded to the modernization of China's backward and poorly equipped military forces.[13] Many Chinese leaders, including some from the top echelons of the military, however, disagreed and argued that the top priority should be developing the PRC's backward economy.[14]

It is important to note that practically all Chinese leaders realized the necessity of modernizing China's defences, they disagreed merely on the timing and urgency of the modernization process. The debate on the timing was closely related to Chinese leaders' perceptions of external threat. The military hard-liners perceived a distinctive possibility of a future Sino-Soviet war, including a nuclear attack from the Russians. China, therefore, they argued, must be prepared for fighting all kinds of war against the USSR and accordingly must modernize its defences at full speed.[15] The moderates, on the other hand, were inclined to believe that China's present defences were formidable enough to deter the Soviet Union and that if a Soviet attack did take place it was likely to be a large-scale conventional attack.[16]

11. The debate over China's defence strategies has, of course, persisted since the establishment of the communist regime in 1949. For an excellent account of the issues involved in the controversial debate see Alice Langley Hsieh, *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1962).

12. For the full text of Ye's speech see *Hongqi*, No. 8, 1977. In July 1975 the Military Affairs Commission (MAC) of the PLA isued a report recommending the acquisition of advanced weapons systems for the PLA. Chief of Staff Deng Xiaoping suggested at an MAC meeting that weapons procurement could be financed by reducing the Chinese armed forces. Deng was by no means a military hard-liner, however; his proposal was primarily aimed at countering the exteme leftist policies advocated by the radical leadership faction which grotesquely exaggerated Mao's 'people's war' strategy and the importance of China's militia forces. In any case, the Chinese leaders failed to reach a consensus on China's military modernization programme in the first half of 1977 even after the downfall of the radical Gang of Four. A series of military conferences held in Beijing in early 1977 merely reached some agreement on purchasing a limited range of defensive weapons from Western sources. For an account of the 1975 MAC meetings and the debates over military modernization among Chinese leadership factions see Harry Harding, 'The Domestic Politics of China's Global Posture, 1973–78,' in Thomas Fingar, ed., *China's Quest for Independence: Policy Evolution in the 1970s* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview, 1980), pp. 114–24.

13. An article in *Hongqi* by the Theoretical Group of China's Academy of Military Science declared that the political future of a socialist China, under the dictatorship of the proletariats, depends on modernizing China's defence. Xu Xiangqian, China's defence minister, also argued that China should learn advanced technology and experience from foreign countries. See *Hongqi*, No. 8, 1977.

14. See especially Nie Rongzhen's speech at the National Working Conference on the Militia, *Renmin Ribao* 8 August 1978. Nie was then a vice-chairman of the Military Commission of the Central Committee.

15. Xu Xiangqian, *Hongqi*, No. 8, 1977.

16. Nie Rongzhen, Speech at National Working Conference on the Militia. See also Chinese foreign minister Huang Hua's speech at the UN General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament on 29 May 1978. Huang asserted that future war between the two superpowers was more likely to be conventional war. Apparently the Chinese believed that the USSR would hesitate to launch a nuclear attack in a future war; neither Nie nor Huang, however, explained why they dismissed the likelihood of a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union.

The importance of a people's war and guerrilla warfare in a future protracted war against the USSR, according to the moderates, would increase, not decline. For the time being, the latter seemed to have won the debate and persuaded the military hard-liners to agree that 'a strong defence must be built upon the foundation of a strong national economy; only when the economy has developed rapidly can national defence be progressed'.[17]

This belief in a people's war and guerrilla tactics was clearly reflected in the PRC's global strategy—a revolutionary line emphasizing the Third World (the 'countryside') as the strategic base in the anti-Soviet united front. This school of strategic thinking was reinforced by the political climate of China's domestic scene. Elated by the arrest of the Gang of Four and the quick restoration of social order, the Chinese leadership under Hua Guofeng (who lacked a strong power base in either the military establishment, Party apparatus or state bureaucracies) ruled the country and its ideologically perplexed people by relying heavily on Mao's 'teachings'. It is thus not surprising that Mao's revolutionary line was adopted as the guideline for China's foreign policy and the backbone of its Three World theory.

Yet the objective realities had forced the Chinese leadership to play down the revolutionary line even before the downfall of Hua's 'whatever' faction.[18] Beijing's open conflicts with Hanoi had driven the latter toward the Soviet Union and gave Moscow the opportunity to encircle China from the south. The progress of negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on SALT II apparently aroused Chinese concern about a detente between the two superpowers that might allow Russia a free hand to strengthen its military posture against China. In a drive to avoid diplomatic isolation, Beijing concluded a peace and friendship treaty with Tokyo in August 1978; previous difficulties were overcome by the inclusion of a clause specifying the non-binding nature of the 'anti-hegemony' clause regarding relations with third countries. Beijing also compromised on the Taiwan issue and announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with the United States at the end of 1978.

In response to the perceived increasing Soviet threat and a resurgent trend towards 'appeasement' in the West, Beijing reiterated the urgency of forming an international anti-hegemony front. The second phase of the Three World theory called for a united front, including the United States, the primary target of which was clearly the Soviet Union. In an interview with *Time* magazine in January 1979 before his departure for the United States, Deng Xiaoping asserted that the significance of normalization of relations between China and the United States lay not in the development of bilateral relations but in the global strategic implications.[19] Deng noted that the United States had been on the strategic retreat since the early 1970s and that 'the true hot bed of war' was not America but the Soviet Union. He insisted that the best way to resist Soviet expansion, whose characteristic tactics were to 'bullying the soft and fearing the strong' and 'going in and grabbing at every opportunity,' was not through negotiations or agreements but through the establishment of an anti-Soviet united front constituting developing and developed

17. Nie Rongzhen, Speech at National Working Conference on the Militia. See also 'Speed up national defence modernization—celebrating the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the People's Liberation Army', joint 'August First' editorial of 1977 by *Renmin Ribao, Hongqi* and *Jiefangjun Bao*.

18. That is, a policy line to follow whatever Mao had said and conducted.

19. *Time*, 5 February 1979, pp. 26–9. The interview with *Time* Editor-in-Chief Hedley Donovan was held in Beijing four days before Deng's scheduled departure for Washington on 29 January.

countries and including the United States. Beijing's strategy at the time was twofold: first, to rally the support of Washington for China's military campaign against Vietnam and second, to obstruct the conclusion of SALT II between the two superpowers. Deng failed badly to achieve the second objective and was only partly successful in lobbying Washington's support for China's Vietnam venture. Nevertheless, Jimmy Carter's ambivalent attitude towards Deng's provocative statements, together with the timing of China's attack on Vietnam (which took place less than two weeks after Deng's US visit) and the visit of US Treasury Secretary Michael Blumenthal to Beijing in the heat of the border war, cautioned the Kremlin leaders against taking adventurous options against the Chinese.

The inability of the People's Liberation Armies to win a decisive victory against the outnumbered Vietnamese, however, aroused a new round of debate concerning China's defence strategies among Chinese leaders. It worried and alarmed the hardline military leadership faction, which renewed its demands for top priority status for modernization of China's defences. The military leaders had apparently learned the lessons from the fighting in Vietnam and discarded Mao's concept of people's war. In an important editorial summing up the lessons of the Korean war and the more recent border war with the Vietnamese, *Jiefangjun Bao* argued that the only way to win a modern war was to meet the technical requirements of modern warfare.[20] The editorial maintained that over the past three decades the pace of modernizing China's defence had been too slow and had failed to close the widening gap between China and other more technologically advanced countries. The same theme was echoed by China's defence minister Xu Xiangqian: 'Achieving the modernization of defence is an extremely important strategic task, an urgent need for resisting the social-imperialist's invasion and an essential condition for protecting and developing China's socialist construction'.[21]

Yet China's ability to stand up and defy the Soviet threat during its border war with Vietnam may have persuaded some civilian leaders that China was strong enough to defend itself and that it should pay more attention to raising the overall living standard of the Chinese people. This, however, represented apparently only a minority view among Chinese leaders. A clear indicator that the military hardliners had probably won this new round in the strategic debate was the noted absence of any major statement by a top leader to counter the *Jiefangjun Bao* editorial or Xu's article. Meanwhile, the visits of Chinese military missions to European states, especially France, the United Kingdom, West Germany and Italy, for weapon shopping increased sharply in 1978 and 1979.[22] In the autumn of 1979, Hua Guofeng became the first Chinese head of state to visit the above European countries. At the same time, China's economic and trade policies laid stress on learning all possible advanced technology and skills from abroad, and negotiations for concluding loan agreements were conducted with an increasing number of industrial countries, including the United States. Efforts to improve relations with the Second World countries and the United States had thus clearly become a higher

20. 'Raise our armies' fighting capabilities to a modern and advanced level', *Jiefangjun Bao*, 1 August 1979. Reprinted in *Renmin Ribao*, 2 August 1979.
21. 'Striving for the realization of defence modernization', *Hongqi*, No. 10, 1979.
22. For an account of China's military shopping and her actual purchases from the West see William T. Tow and Douglas T. Stuart, 'China's military turns to the West', *International Affairs*, Vol. 57, No. 2, Spring 1981, pp. 286–300.

priority in Beijing's overall strategic calculations than maintaining the revolutionary line Third World-based policy.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan, however, brought the second phase of the Three World theory to a sudden end and started the evolution process of the third and current phase. The crisis jolted the Beijing leaders into reassessing China's global strategy. The Afghan incident demonstrated to the Chinese that the Soviet Union was capable of launching a swift attack and supporting a war against a neighbouring country using large numbers of combat troops and enormous quantities of arms and equipment supplied through airlift and mountainous land routes. The Chinese leaders believed that the Soviets were prepared and ready for waging various types of war—a nuclear war or a conventional war, a world war or a limited war.[23] Beijing's immediate response to the new Soviet threat was nevertheless cautious and calculated.

When former US Secretary of Defense Harold Brown deliberately made provocative statements against the Soviets in Beijing several days after the Russians began their invasion of Afghanistan, the Chinese were surprisingly prudent and restrained from making similar accusations. Beijing was apparently fully aware of the real danger to China's national security behind Brown's 'China card'; it was clear to the Chinese leaders that the United States would offer only limited assistance, if any, to China in a Sino-Soviet war. Chinese realism and prudence were also reflected in Beijing's ambivalent attitudes regarding the purchase of military weapons from the West. Its hesitation to purchase advanced weapons from America's European allies, though it could be partly explained by China's shortage of currency reserves and concerns about its capability to absorb the new technology, reflected Chinese worries about Soviet reactions.

More significantly, the failure of the Western allies to form a coordinated strategy against the Soviet Union cast doubt on China's own united front scheme which had been overtly emphasized during the second phase of the Three World strategy. Beijing kept warning the United States and its allies that, despite the Soviet attack at the east, the USSR's primary military goal remained in Europe and that it would continue to expand and strike, if unchecked, the Southern Front, where the oil-rich Gulf states are located, because of the stalemate at the two other fronts in Europe and Asia.[24] The whole world, the PRC reiterated, must therefore unite and stand firm against the relentless 'polar bear'. Yet in private the Beijing leaders realized that China must rely on its own efforts for national defence against Soviet threats.

Beijing asserted that 'China has always sought to build its security on the basis of an independent and self-reliant defence policy and it will never resort to sheltering under an external protective umbrella'.[25] The PRC flatly rejected the idea of 'balanced arms sales' and made it clear that Beijing would rather refuse to buy US arms than consent to US arms to Taiwan.[26] Indeed, the Taiwan issue was probably a major consideration in prompting the PRC to play down the united front strategy since 1980. Beijing was apparently trying to make a point that the PRC would not

23. For a detailed and thorough official Chinese analysis of the Afghan incident see 'Soviet military strategy for world domination', *Renmin Ribao*, 11 January 1980. (For the English translation see *Beijing Review*, No. 4, 28 January 1980.)

24. 'Soviet military strategy for world domination'.

25. '1980 in retrospect: the international situation', *Beijing Review*, No. 1, 5 January 1981.

26. *Renmin Ribao*, 12 June 1981.

compromise its territorial integrity in exchange for US participation in the anti-Soviet front.

The Chinese leaders do not see any imminent Soviet military attack. The Soviet Union, it is argued, is not likely to invade China because it cannot possibly benefit from such an action. Even granting that the Soviet troops could succeed in occupying large areas of Chinese territory, Beijing believes that continuous resistance from the Chinese people would drag the Russians into a costly and protracted war. The Chinese leaders often reiterate a saying from Zhou Enlai: 'China is an attractive piece of meat coveted by all yet too tough for anyone to bite into it'. Beijing also seems to rule out the possibility of a nuclear attack from the Soviets. In a recent study by the Beijing Institute for International Strategic Studies, the Chinese asserted that the Soviet Union would not launch a nuclear attack because it could not destroy all of China's nuclear weapons in a first strike and would therefore face a nuclear counterattack.[27]

To some Chinese leaders, moreover, the USSR's invasion of Afghanistan had also exposed its hidden vulnerability. Beijing believed that the Soviet Union was over-stretched; burdened with heavy military and economic commitments in Eastern Europe, Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan and other parts of the world, its global expansion was seriously impeding its plans to revive the faltering economy. Furthermore, as viewed from Beijing, the Kremlin leaders were also troubled by internal ethnic instability and increasing resentment in their East European allies, such as the unrest and crises in Poland. This perception of inherent Soviet weakness apparently convinced some Chinese leaders that the Russians might not be in a position to launch any attack against China for some time to come. This calculation of Soviet limitations was reinforced one year after the Afghan incident when it became clear that the Russians were not able to win a quick and decisive war, despite their far superior military weapons and much better equipped armies, against the local guerrillas who were largely armed with light weapons supplied by China and the United States. The PRC hailed the situation in Afghanistan as a classical people's war: a resistance to outside aggressors by guerrilla units, armed with patriotism and skilful guerrilla tactics most suitable to special local conditions.[28] To the Chinese, the Afghan resistance had demonstrated vividly that self-reliance was the key to repulsing foreign invasion, external assistance, though important, being only secondary.

It was obviously no coincidence that a campaign to 'raise the spirit of patriotism and revolutionary heroism' was being conducted among the PLA units.[29] The merits of Mao's guerrilla tactics in a people's war were reaffirmed in the document appraising the CCP's history since 1949.[30] In contrast to the first phase of the post-Mao policy strategy, however, the reassertion of the people's war was devoid of revolutionary slogans, whereas the independence and self-reliance aspects of the

27. *The Japan Times*, 12 June 1981.

28. 'The revelation of the Afghan war', *Hongqi*, No. 1, 1981. See also 'Afghanistan: one year after the Soviet invasion', *Beijing Review*, No. 1, 5 January 1981.

29. See the title of *Jiefangjun Bao's* editorial on 1 August 1980. (Reprinted in part in *Renmin Ribao*, 2 August 1980.)

30. 'Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party since the founding of the People's Republic of China', adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the CCP on 27 June 1981. For full text see *Renmin Ribao*, 1 July 1981; *Hongqi*, No. 13, 1981; *Beijing Review*, No. 27, 6 July 1981.

guerrilla warfare were emphasized.[31] The military was also called upon to assist in the four modernizations (industry, agriculture, defence, and science and technology) with patriotic and heroic spirit; the defence industry was urged fully to utilize its capacity to develop and produce consumer goods for civilian uses. The combination of military and civilian production, it was argued, could raise the overall technology level of China's industry, including the defence industry.[32]

Meanwhile, developments in domestic Chinese politics had reinforced the evolution of the current phase of China's foreign policy strategy. The fifth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee, held in February 1980, successfully removed the 'whatever' faction from power. The eventual demotion of Hua Guofeng and the ascendancy of Zhao Ziyang as the Premier and Hu Yaobang as Party Chairman completed Deng's strategy to eliminate all 'leftist' elements among the top leadership. The new leadership declared that class struggle was no longer essential in China because its socialist transformation was fundamentally completed. To concentrate on economic construction was regarded as a crucial 'strategic shift' that China must make and from which it must never deviate except in the event of large-scale invasion by a foreign enemy.[33] From a long term perspective, it was argued, a self-reliance strategy was imperative in achieving a steady and sustained economic growth towards modernization on all four fronts. In any case, owing to the PRC's limited currency reserves and current economic retrenchment, the Beijing leadership had little option but to rely on China's own efforts.

Parallel to a renewed emphasis on self-reliance was the gradual formulation of an integrated foreign policy. The Chinese leaders began to realize that military capability should not be the only nor necessarily the most important aspect of China's defence policy. Beijing apparently became convinced that a united and stable domestic political system, a prosperous economy and a peaceful international environment were equally important to a country's security. This new policy framework, voiced only by a disregarded minority in the past, began to gain ground in mid 1981 when it became apparent that despite the heroic resistance of local guerrillas, the Soviet forces were going to stay in Afghanistan. At the same time, the cooling of Sino–American relations had also forced Beijing to reassess its anti-Soviet front. The Chinese leaders believed that the Americans were more interested in strengthening their own global influence than in forming an anti-Soviet alliance with China. Without active US participation, Beijing's united front strategy could easily be crippled.

Sensing the changing international environment, the Chinese leaders were quick to modify their global strategy. Talk of an 'inevitable' new world war was no longer heard of from Chinese leaders. Publicity of a united front against social-imperialist hegemonism was greatly subdued. Instead, Beijing had emphasized the desirability of peaceful solutions to *all* international disputes. China took a neutral position in

31. It is significant that *Renmin Ribao* (and other major newspapers) published on their front pages on 7 July 1981 Mao's five telegraphs containing instructions of guerrilla tactics to army commanders. The telegraphs stressed the 'independence' and 'self-reliance' aspects of the guerrilla warfare. See also article in *Renmin Ribao*, 1 August 1981, by Yang Yong, Deputy Chief of General Staff of the PLA, and article in *Hongqi*, No. 15, 1981, by Fu Zhong, Deputy Director of the General Political Department of the PLA. The two articles reaffirmed Mao's 'people's war' concept and asserted Mao's axiom that 'although weapons are important in a war, it is the people, not weapons, that decide the outcome of a war'.

32. *Renmin Ribao*, 9 August 1980.

33. 'Resolution on certain questions in the history of our party . . .'

the war between Iran and Iraq and urged the two sides to end the military conflict by peaceful means. In the case of the Anglo–Argentine war over the Falkland Islands, Beijing, accusing the United States of siding with Britain and the Soviet Union with Argentina, urged the two conflicting nations to restrain from using military forces. Indeed, Beijing even hinted that it would recognize the existence of Israel, a move that would certainly provoke repercussions from Arabian states, in exchange for a peaceful solution in the Middle East conflict.[34] Furthermore, although there were reasonable doubts about Beijing's sincerity in seeking peaceful solutions for conflicts in Indochina and disputes over the Taiwan Strait, China's 'peace offensive' was nevertheless in line with the major thrust of its foreign policy.[35]

Conclusion

Following its inception in 1974, the Three World theory had served with some success the Chinese objective of opposing the two superpowers and isolating the Soviet Union, China's chief enemy. However, the changing international environment and the dynamics of China's domestic politics forced Beijing constantly to modify the Three World scheme. The latest adaptation of China's foreign policy has marked a drastic departure from its revolutionary united front strategy. Instead of being preoccupied with identifying 'enemies' and 'friends', the essence of the united front strategy, Beijing has emphasized self-reliance and is striving to maintain cordial, or at least working, relations with all nations. This new foreign policy line has been reinforced by the ascendancy in Chinese domestic politics of a pragmatic, collective leadership.

Contrary to the beliefs of many observers, China's recent positive response to Soviet overtures and the renewal of negotiations on bilateral relations between the two communist states held in Beijing last October do not indicate a new shift in Chinese foreign policy. Indeed, Beijing's effort to improve relations with Moscow was the anticipated and logical development of China's self-reliant and independent foreign policy line. Although the Chinese leaders still insisted that China would uphold the general spirit of the Three World theory and the united front strategy, they also admitted that an international united front on a global scale was no longer advocated by the Chinese government.[36] 'Anti-hegemonic' policy has been restricted to certain situations, such as the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and the alleged US support of Israeli and South African hegemonism. In practice, therefore, the Three World theory has been discarded by the post-Mao leadership. In the final analysis, a Three World theory deprived of its united front strategy simply has no operational value, although no doubt the Chinese government may on occasion revert to it for rhetorical purposes.

34. *Beijing Review*, No. 43, 26 October 1981, p. 9.

35. On the eve of the 32nd anniversary of the founding of the PRC, Beijing announced a nine-point proposal as a basis for negotiating with Taipei concerning the return of Taiwan to the mainland; see *Renmin Ribao*, 1 October 1981. Beijing also softened its stand on political solutions to Indochina conflicts proposed by the ASEAN and other countries.

36. Information based on the author's interviews with policy analysts at Beijing's Institute of International Studies, the 'think tank' of China's foreign policies, 25 November 1982.

Book reviews

Chatham House Books

The East European Predicament: Changing Patterns in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. By Peter Summerscale. Aldershot, Hants: Gower for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1982. 147 pp. Index. £12·50.

THE author of this book is a member of the Foreign Service who was given a year's sabbatical leave for research at Chatham House on Eastern Europe. The book is essentially a long essay on the predicament of the East European dependencies of the Soviet Union, giving first place to forces operating within the area, but also taking into account the policy of the USSR and the policy options available to the governments of the Western Alliance.

Rather than spread himself over the whole field, being well aware of the considerable differences among the six countries in question, he has looked at only three. Those chosen are Poland, the most populous of them, whose communist party had the mildest political methods and the most incompetent economic policy of the whole region; Romania, in which the political regime has been extremely strict and the economy comparatively backward, but whose foreign policy has shown a certain independence from the Soviet line; and Czechoslovakia, with the most oppressive political regime and the most servile foreign policy but a comparatively comfortable economic situation. He has left out, reluctantly, East Germany, which is involved in the wider issues of German affairs; Hungary, with an economic policy diverging in some respects from orthodox communist practice; and Bulgaria, which almost all writers on Eastern Europe tend (wrongly) to ignore.

Within the limits set by time and by his own decisions, the author has done an excellent job. The essential features of each country are set forth with admirable clarity, and with an economy in the use of words which is perhaps inherent in the diplomatic profession but is sadly absent from most academic writing. Would that the political scientists might model themselves on Mr Summerscale!

In conclusion, he sets out a number of possible trends for the future, and possible options for the West. He is wise not to have engaged in speculation about the succession to Brezhnev; but this will of course have powerful repercussions in Eastern Europe. When he comes to Western options, a certain diplomatic blandness creeps in at times. When he speaks of the possibility of a 'return to the cold war' or the merits and disadvantages of 'ideological warfare', it is not always obvious to the reader that these phrases refer only to Western policy, and that the question discussed is only whether the West should or should not adopt a more hostile stance. It is not made clear to the reader—Mr Summerscale perhaps assumes that the reader will know this without being reminded, but here I think he would be wrong—that, whatever attitude the West may or may not adopt towards the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union will pursue political warfare and direct ideological hatred against the West without respite.

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London HUGH SETON-WATSON

International Relations and Organizations

Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics. Edited by Christer Jönsson. London: Pinter. 1982. 210 pp. Index. £15·50.

THIS book consists of a set of papers prepared for a workshop on Perception and Misperception in International Politics at the 1980 sessions of the European Consortium for Political Research. Papers prepared for conferences can often prove, after the event, to be lightweight and insubstantial. This, however, is not a charge which can be levelled against this particular set of papers, all of which reflect considerable thought and effort.

There has always been scepticism expressed about introducing a psychological dimension into the study of international politics. Two problems in particular have frequently been

raised. First, international behaviour is almost invariably the result of collective decision-making and presupposes a social rather than a psychological explanation. Second, even when policy can be attributed primarily to a limited number of individuals, the data necessary to undertake a psychological study are rarely available. Although, of course, psychological studies of leaders have been made, the methodology is often suspect and their relevance for the study of international politics is generally tangential.

Psychological studies of leaders, moreover, have tended to centre on the idea of personality. This group of papers, however, sets out to show that psychology involves more than the study of personality and that other areas of psychological research have much to offer anyone struggling to understand international politics. Cognitive psychology is considered to be particularly fruitful and this area is the source of inspiration for all the authors in this volume. The underlying premise is that established beliefs can structure action. As a consequence, if the central beliefs of a decision-maker or group of decision-makers are identified, then it becomes possible to explain, even predict, the response to a new development in the international arena.

The premise is not new. For over a decade, there have been concerted efforts to develop research programmes designed to identify and structure the belief systems, or operational codes, as they have come to be known, of key decision-makers. This approach has been supplemented by attempts to uncover the cognitive processes involved when individuals reach decisions: an approach known as cognitive mapping.

In a very useful introduction to this volume, the editor plots the major steps in the development of a cognitive approach to international politics, and makes an assessment of the progress so far. The next four papers, by Shapiro and Bonham, Sjöblom, Holsti, and Cutler are all concerned with extending and integrating the ideas associated with operational codes and cognitive mapping. These papers, however, presuppose a familiarity with the literature and are likely to leave the uninitiated reader gasping at the finishing post. The subsequent papers are, happily, much more approachable. The chapter by Jönsson and Westerlund draws upon the rich literature associated with role theory and uses it to analyse relations between the superpowers. The data lead to some interesting conclusions, although the procedures used to collect and analyse these data are inadequately discussed.

Edmead offers a fascinating argument of why cost-benefit analysis cannot be used to explain changes of perception in conflicts. The same theme is treated, but much more sceptically, by Hart. He examines the reversal in President Carter's image of the Soviet Union following the invasion of Afghanistan, and concludes that a cognitive approach cannot help to explain Carter's about-turn.

Despite this scepticism, the approach does seem capable of throwing an interesting light on the way decisions are made in international politics. As a final note, it is encouraging to see that good, albeit specialized papers of this kind can still find a publisher.

University of Lancaster R. LITTLE

An Introduction to Foreign Policy Analysis: The Foreign Policy System. Edited by Michael Clarke and Brian White. Ormskirk, Lancs; Northridge, Calif.: Hesketh. 1981. 120 pp. Index. £3·80.

THIS brief, clearly written volume is likely to be quite useful for students taking the popular courses in foreign policy analysis. It centres around the issues of the process of foreign policy, which is analysed as a system operating within domestic and international contexts and comparable among individual states in terms of circumstances, processes and performance—see, respectively, the chapters by White, Clarke, Farrands and M. Smith. Moreover, the sophisticated bureacratic political approach is presented in some detail, by S. Smith and the international environment is examined by D. Allen.

We are thus offered a coherent broad framework. It is not a reflection upon the performance of the contributors but rather upon the present state of contemporary analysis that we are not offered a comprehensive or even partial theory of foreign policy. This does, however, raise several awkward problems. To start with, foreign policy analysis is not as comprehensive as the term indicates—it applies primarily to Western, especially American foreign policies but scarcely to those of the Third World countries and only marginally to those of East European states.

Moreover, the ultimate objective of the analysis is not indicated; it could be considered as aiming at two distinct goals which are, however, generally confused in practice: either some form of general theoretical explanation or simply making sense of puzzling events and circumstances (see, for example, page 87). On the one hand, the repeated references to the fact that foreign policy analysis is a complex and confused field in which we have no organizing theory but merely a variety of frameworks (for example, page 31) indicate that the authors are not seeking a theoretical advance. On the other, the copious historical examples serve only—though successfully—to illustrate the meaning of the conceptualizations. There is no attempt to come to grips with the complex issue of the application of the individual approaches; the useful 1979 volume edited by Paul Gordon Lauren, *Diplomacy: History, Theory, and Policy* is not referred to at all.

Fairly detailed discussion of the two extensive applications of analysis to actual foreign policy are not particularly helpful for future work. Systematically arranging a checklist of all the factors potentially relevant, as done by Michael Brecher, obliges the user to explore *all* the factors until he discovers what *is* relevant; it is virtually impossible to match Brecher's unique work on Israel, made possible by privileged access to information more readily available than in any other country except the United States and by sustained research stretching over more than a decade. Graham Allison's analysis of the Cuban missile crisis deals with a limited and exceptionally well documented event and could not easily be replicated or extended. Where then should this 'introduction' lead? If to the reading of the literature quoted, in what way would this necessarily facilitate understanding of actual foreign policy? If to the study of the latter, how should we choose the most promising approach and how should we apply it?

Furthermore, the various approaches are presented as open frameworks without any attempt to engender really interesting questions or to tackle the puzzles and paradoxes encountered in life. This is a shortcoming recently admitted by James Rosenau; a useful lead in this direction has been given by another omitted book, *Political Paradoxes and Puzzles* by Arun Bose (1977).

Finally, the question of evaluation of foreign policy both in terms of efficiency and of acceptability in respect of values is ignored. It does not directly come within the scope of the process, but it requires a consideration of the problem to what extent foreign policy is a response to broadly determinist forces in the international environment or a broadly voluntarist result of forces in the domestic environment. The two contributions devoted to the environment do not tackle the issue.

Obviously the format of the book precludes any extensive analysis of all these issues. They should, however, have been mentioned and their absence detracts from the pedagogic value of this otherwise well thought out volume.

JOSEPH FRANKEL

Foreign Policy Making in Times of Crisis. By John R. Oneal. Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press. 1982. 358 pp. Index. $27.50.

THE substance of Mr Oneal's study is historical; the intent is to show how an efficient policy-making apparatus can work today. To reach the sensible conclusions, readers must face the esoteric jargon of international relations theory and a notably dense and inelegant style. Oneal takes three major crises of the postwar period, all sufficiently remote to be treated with knowledge and some objectivity, and yet all concerned with the dominant problem of American foreign policy today: relations with the Soviet Union. He looks at the Iranian crisis of 1945–6, the Greek crisis of 1947–8, and the Berlin blockade of 1948–9. To each of these case studies he applies a schematic treatment, seeking to determine whether American policy-makers adapted creatively to the challenges which they faced.

Four aspects of crisis management are involved: the image formed of the opponent and his intentions; the development of goals and policies towards that opponent; the nature of the coalitions within the American government which determined those policies; and the effect of the crisis on the institutional forms of policy-making and administration. He recognizes that in the first two crises, outside factors played an important part in the resolution of the problem. In Iran, the prime minister, Ahmed Qavam, pursued an independent and skilful policy. In Greece, the breach between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union deprived the Greek

insurgents of their major support, and possibly contributed more than anything else to the eventual result. It is, indeed, in the Greek example that Oneal sees the most obvious American mistakes, both in the contemporary exaggeration of Stalin's involvement on the insurgent side, which encouraged the belief in world-wide communist conspiracy so important in the following decades, and in the conclusion that American military and economic resources would always ensure the success of counter-guerrilla operations. In Oneal's view, it was the Berlin blockade which brought out most effectively the American Government's ability to develop and manage effectively a policy which steered successfully between the dangers of capitulation and war.

Nevertheless, in all these cases, the problems of decision-making were clear. Although warning signs were apparent, response was delayed; even in Berlin, it took the application of the blockade itself to galvanize the administration into action. The creation of the CIA, to improve the flow of information, and of the National Security Council, to coordinate the conduct of affairs, were necessary improvements in the institutional structure. To his historical analysis Oneal adds a series of practical recommendations for policy-makers, urging the importance of expert information analysis, clarity of policy formation, and effective institutions in the field of foreign relations. This is, of course, not merely sensible, but also obvious, and the professionals already know it; but the lay observer, recalling some recent events in the conduct of both American and British foreign policy, may think that the reminder is not untimely.

Emmanuel College, Cambridge GERARD EVANS

Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States. By Adam Watson. London: Methuen. 1982. 239 pp. Index. £9·50.

'No good book on the wider aspects of diplomacy, as distinct from foreign policies of individual states and the details of diplomatic practice, had been written since Harold Nicolson's classic *Diplomacy*, which was first published in 1939', writes Adam Watson on the origins of his new book (p. 12). Watson clearly set himself the task of writing a Nicolson for the 1980s, and it should be said at the outset that he has succeeded admirably.

Watson brings to the task many of the qualities of his predecessor—considerable practical experience of diplomacy, a wide-ranging historical knowledge, and a keen sense of the political and military context within which diplomacy has to operate. Like Nicolson, Watson is writing for the citizens of democratic states; he hopes to provide them with the background necessary for informed choices of the aims of diplomacy.

In a succession of clear, carefully argued chapters, Watson outlines the main features of diplomacy, the purposes it serves, the constraints within which it operates, its historical evolution and contemporary practice, criticisms it has received, and alternatives which have been proposed. Particularly enlightening are those chapters which explore the interaction of diplomacy with other major aspects of international politics—power, ideology, interdependence, law, justice, and moral responsibility.

Watson's approach to his subject has much in common with that of his fellow members, past and present, of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, notably Martin Wight, Herbert Butterfield, and Hedley Bull. At the heart of the book is the idea of 'international society' defined as a system of independent states who agree to regulate their relations according to a set of rules and to operate a set of common institutions. 'The diplomatic dialogue' is for Watson both the principal means of making 'international society' in this sense and one of its most important institutions.

Although Watson clearly regards this *raison de système* as diplomacy's most creative task, he is by no means neglectful of the *raison d'état* aspect of diplomacy by which states pursue their individual aims. Nor is he particularly optimistic about the prospects for repeating the success of what he calls the 'European diplomatic society' which evolved between the Italian Renaissance and the First World War. Today's global international system, he argues, is too culturally fragmented and lacks common values. Nevertheless he does show the ways in which diplomatic practices have been adapting slowly to the new global challenges.

Watson defines diplomacy as 'the process of dialogue and negotiation by which states in a system conduct their relations and pursue their purposes by means short of war' (p. 11). The actual dynamics of communication and negotiation do not, however, get much attention.

Here it would have been helpful to have drawn on the best of the recent American social science literature, despite Watson's own largely justifiable criticism of this tendency in his preface.

It is to be hoped that the publishers will soon issue this readable, informative book in a reasonably priced paperback edition so that it can reach a wider readership, especially among students of international relations.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth M. WRIGHT

The United Nations Security Council: Towards Greater Effectiveness. By Davidson Nicol, with Margaret Croke and Babarunde Adeniran. New York: The United Nations Institute for Training and Research. 1982. 334 pp. $10.00.

THIS book follows up and complements (at a quarter of the cost) Dr Nicol's earlier *Paths to Peace: the UN Security Council and its Presidency* published by Pergamon, a collection of essays by a distinguished group of former presidents of the council and others, preparatory to a seminar on the council held by UNITAR.

This new paperback draws on the same seminar, and in view of the renewed notoriety of the council and its relevance to British foreign policy over the Falklands affair, not to mention the long procession of highly relevant matters it has dealt with since its formation, it is of the greatest interest now. Its chief value rests in the expert opinions and suggestions for reform or change emerging from the seminar's discussions, including the United Kingdom's own view given therein that on the whole improvements are needed less in the mechanisms or procedures of the council than in the spirit with which the members of it approach its tasks.

The UNITAR seminar's own conclusions are refreshingly practical, for instance, that the council should take on actively striving to help maintain peace rather than merely reacting to events. Under Article 28(2) of the Charter, periodic meetings to review matters 'in a reflective manner' might 'assist states in promoting peaceful change'. Other articles, it is pointed out, call for a system for armaments regulation, that regional organizations should honour their obligations to report to the council, and that these reports should be requested. The council should take bold initiatives to encourage awareness that economic and social developments were 'essential underpinnings' of peace. It could have a pre-crisis monitoring committee, be able to influence events in the early stages and use its powers to create subsidiary organs if need be. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice has given it wide room for action. It should report on the implementation of its decisions. The president of the council could do more, and a council president providing good offices in a dispute while in office should be asked to prolong them beyond his term if required. Alternatively, an ombudsman, 'wise men' or experts might serve.

Some thirty-five states were asked for their views on ways and means of enhancing the council's effectiveness. The United Kingdom said that the council had indeed often been ineffective, members being apt to do no more than reflect the conflicts inherent in the discussion instead of trying to resolve them. The way ahead lay mainly in a change in the spirit in which they approached their roles, which should owe more to conciliation and less to challenge.

The tips of many political icebergs surface in this book. Below the surface will remain the reluctance of governments to brook any interference in their domestic affairs. But the UN and its Security Council have provided new ways to approach the world's problems, and UNITAR's Dr Nicol and his colleagues are appraising them here most usefully.

BRIAN MEREDITH

A History of the United Nations. Vol. I: The Years of Western Domination, 1945–1955. By Evan Luard. London: Macmillan. 1982. 404 pp. Index. £25·00.

THIS is the first volume of a larger work which will assess the effectiveness of the United Nations' attempts to maintain international peace and security and consider whether the use of alternative responses and procedures might enable the organization to play a more significant role.

In the first part of this book Mr Luard provides a neat commentary on the antecedents, the planning, the conception and birth of the new world security organization. In the second

he describes the background to, and the actions taken by the United Nations in dealing with disputes and threats to the peace in its first ten years, concentrating in particular on Indonesia, Palestine and the Middle East, the Korean War and Kashmir. And, although Mr Luard has provided an admirably lucid survey which appears to make extensive use of published United Nations documents, the book, sadly, is slightly disappointing.

First, as Mr Luard himself points out in his introduction, this is not a 'definitive' history because some of the evidence necessary for final judgements, including all the internal documents of the secretariat of the United Nations, is not yet available. But he does not appear to have attempted to overcome part of this problem by using government papers that have been released, for example, in the United States and in the United Kingdom. Nor does he seem to have considered the work of other authors who have also explored this area—for instance Alan James's *The Politics of Peacekeeping* with its clear analysis of the variety of ways in which the United Nations might help to remove threats to the peace, ameliorate conditions and change the framework in which disputes might be handled; or Robert E. Riggs's *The United States and the United Nations,* which examines the United States' degree of success in using the United Nations as an instrument of its foreign policy, and whose judgements are sometimes at variance with those of Mr Luard.

Secondly, some of Mr Luard's themes are not very convincingly argued. He attempts to prove that the 'West' abused its voting position in the organization. Yet Mr Luard's case studies provide evidence that the 'West' was not always united and did not always win its political campaigns. Then he argues that the United Nations as an organization largely failed because it did not persuade or induce enough disputants to undertake quiet, private negotiations on the substance of their problems but rather allowed them in many cases to use the political organs for propaganda and other purposes. Although it is clearly true that the organization provided a platform and loudspeaker for cold war invective, it also constrained states to compromise and helped to mitigate some of the worst excesses of that period. But perhaps more importantly, Mr Luard inadequately discusses how the organization could have persuaded states to use the peaceful settlement procedures in the ways he desires.

And thirdly, it is not immediately clear for whom the book has been written. If it is for the undergraduate the author's lack of references to support his judgements, the irritating errors, the sketchy exploration of his basic thesis, the absence of a bibliography and of a further reading list, and a price of £25, are likely to militate against recommendation. This is a great pity because there is much of value in the book.

University of Lancaster DAVID TRAVERS

Australia and the League of Nations. By W. J. Hudson. Sydney: Sydney University Press for Australian Institute of International Affairs. 1980. 224 pp. Index.

ONE important consequence of the First World War was that the British Dominions and India were brought on to the international stage through their membership of the League of Nations. They used this opening in very different ways. Canada, South Africa and the Irish Free State took advantage of their enhanced position to emphasize their independence of Britain. At the other end of the spectrum, New Zealand seemed to do little other than echo its master's voice. Australia, too, as Hudson shows in this book, was by and large willing to toe the British line, and this lent credence to the view that the Commonwealth simply provided Britain with extra votes.

One reason for Australia's low image at Geneva may have been the fact that its foreign policy machinery was rudimentary. Hudson observes that the Department of External Affairs was only established 'as a proper foreign office' (p. 188) in 1935, and recounts many examples of diplomatic clumsiness by its inexperienced representatives to the League. However, he claims that Australia did produce one statesman of international stature in Stanley Bruce, who was prime minister from 1923 to 1929 and went on to win great renown when, in 1933, he became Australia's High Commissioner in London and its representative to the League. Hudson also gives the impression that it was Bruce who provided what clarity there was in Australian foreign policy.

In this policy there were two distinctive and unquestioned guidelines: a determination to maintain the 'white immigration policy', and a concern about the threat which Japan might pose to her security. Accordingly, whenever discussions at Geneva bore on these matters,

Australia was quick to speak out. Although Hudson says that its New Guinea Mandate was 'the one area about which Australia was tenderly sensitive and constantly conscious of Geneva' (p. 132) it is hard to see how this affected her policy there. Generally speaking Australia seems to have been impervious to League criticisms but was, by contrast, furious at what was regarded as bad intra-imperial form when, in 1922, a British member of the Mandates Commission publicly criticized its administration of Nauru. But otherwise, as Hudson shows, Australia was not really interested in the League, regarding it as Eurocentric and not wanting to get involved in European problems. It was not interested in disarmament or the League quest for peace through law, and did not believe in collective security.

In view of this, some of Hudson's chapter titles sound forced, implying a League idealism which Australia did not possess. Nonetheless, this scholarly and well written book is most welcome. It will be found valuable by a wide variety of readers as it throws light not only on the League of Nations and Australian political history, but also on the problems of British Imperial foreign policy in the inter-war years. Especially in view of the problems which Hudson encountered in his search for material, his work is a considerable achievement.

University of Keele LORNA LLOYD

The Superpowers and Regional Tensions: the USSR, the United States and Europe. By William E. Griffith. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot). 135 pp. Index. £13·50.

IT is planned that this book on the superpowers and European problems will be followed by another on the superpowers and the Middle East. The idea is a good one. In the last few years we have witnessed a serious deterioration in relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, marked by the decline of détente and by a resumption of military building reminiscent of the early 1960s. Griffith seeks to examine the impact of these developments on key regions which are themselves undergoing major changes, and which are facing a series of serious economic and political problems.

Unfortunately, the execution of this book falls somewhat short of its aspirations. First, it attempts too much. In seeking to provide some background it gives too many glib overviews. There are, for example, two-page synopses of the nature of US and Soviet foreign policy, and 'The Global Perspective'. Secondly, the style is occasionally too clipped and occasionally too clever. But one has read many worse books from North American political scientists. Thirdly, the book is expensive, for one gets only just over a hundred pages of text of what one could hope to read in a series of articles in *Time* or *Newsweek*. Fourthly, Professor Griffith gives a very American view of Europe's problems: the EEC gets nine references and the Warsaw Pact only four—yet Watergate gets six.

Finally, some of the detailed arguments are unsatisfactory. To overcome the present 'crisis' in relations between Western Europe and the United States we are advised that the 'best method' would be to set up 'new institutions to understand and cope with the crisis' (p. 109). How any new institution will 'understand' the 'crisis', and why it will work, are not demonstrated. A new institution would presumably be no more than another forum for existing problems, since the 'crisis' is not primarily one of communication but of different perceptions of a common problem. Elsewhere one wonders about Professor Griffith's logic. We are told that 'the West Europeans must begin to negotiate with the United States as a unit for otherwise they will continue to be divided and frustrated' (p. 110). This puts the cart before the horse. The West Europeans do not negotiate as a 'unit' precisely *because* they are divided.

Having said all that, this book is worth some attention. Although it will not tell the specialist anything new, it does give a breezy overview of a complex and important aspect of the contemporary scene. One looks forward to a more substantial volume dealing with the ever more urgent interaction between Middle Eastern problems and the changing relations of the superpowers. And one also hopes to get a better sense of the extent to which non-Americans increasingly see the foreign policy of the Reagan administration not only as part of the solution to serious regional tensions, but also as one part of the problem.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth KEN BOOTH

Mackinder: Geography as an aid to Statecraft. By W. H. Parker. London, New York: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1982. 295 pp. Index. £15·00.

HALFORD MACKINDER was a remarkable man. A first in physical sciences at Oxford and President of the Union in 1883; a second in history after only one year, simultaneously winning a scholarship for work in geology; called to the Bar in 1886; Reader in Geography at Oxford and first Principal of Christchurch's Extension College at Reading which under his drive became a University College and ultimately the University of Reading; Director of the London School of Economics from 1903 to 1908; for twelve years a member of parliament; imperialist; businessman; masterful lecturer and speaker; author of more than a hundred papers and books, including at least two whose concepts are familiar—even though their provenance may not be—to every undergraduate student of international relations.

And yet this biography leaves an impression of failure. He gained a professorial title only in 1923, two years before he reached the age of retirement. His period of office at the LSE was short. He did not achieve great success in the House of Commons, and he never attained office. His writings, though highly influential in Germany and the United States, were little regarded in his own country until the last ten years of his life when Hitler seemed bent on giving practical reality to his central thesis.

Is it the biographer or the man that is wanting? Perhaps it is both. The reader is left with no clear idea of objective, either of author or of subject. The subtitle of the book suggests that the purpose of the book is to analyse through the ideas of Mackinder the importance of geography for state policy, whereas what in fact the book offers is a description of Mackinder's life, an exposition of his thinking, and a somewhat bitty commentary on some of the criticisms that have been made of it. Mackinder's high abilities are extolled, sometimes in slightly lurid language ('A first-class brain and the power to visualize the unfolding of historical processes within their geographical constraints enabled him to harness his scientific, economic and political knowledge to the chariot of his disciplined imagination' (p. 57)), but one never gets the feel of what kind of man he was, what his dearest ambitions were, and how far he had or felt himself to have achieved them.

The book therefore does not quite come off as biography. It does not quite come off as analysis either, because Dr Parker discusses Mackinder's thought only within its own terms. Mackinder was brilliantly innovative in 1904, and his imaginative foresight was quite exceptional, but it is not surprising that he was unable to anticipate not merely the development of modern weapons technology (on which Dr Parker does have a few comments), but the emergence of an international division of labour and an ideological, economic and violent interpenetration of state frontiers that fundamentally change the context and significance of geopolitical propositions. The central 'heartland' notion is not thereby made out of date, but its role as a component of statecraft needs to be seen in a different and wider perspective, and this Dr Parker does not offer to us.

The author has nevertheless performed a most useful service with his lucid and lively explanation of Mackinder's thought and his correction of many of the more ill-informed criticisms that have been levelled against it. Every student of international relations will profit from reading it, if only because he will gain thereby a more accurate understanding of some of the most formative notions in the development of his subject.

University of Lancaster P. A. REYNOLDS

Defence and Disarmament

The Birth of NATO. By Sir Nicholas Henderson. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1982. 130 pp. £7·95.

TWENTY years ago *NATO Letter* appeared once a month and the bulk of the literature in English on the Atlantic Alliance was written by Americans for Americans. Since then, writing on NATO has been one of the few growth industries in Britain, though the restyled *NATO Review* now comes out only six times a year. Even its most faithful readers will concede that it is sometimes less than a riveting read, but some interest was aroused towards the end of 1979 when the editor commissioned a series of articles on the different

contributions made by the founding countries to the inception of the Alliance thirty years previously. It is no doubt a reflection on the present reviewer that he cannot recall much of what was written about Britain, but he is prepared nevertheless to assert that Sir Nicholas Henderson's account of the birth of NATO is worth as much as he can recall of the series to date. Henderson's account is the most contemporary of contemporary history: as a young diplomat, he was a member of the seven-power team which drafted the treaty; his book deals with the troubled eighteen months before it was signed in April 1949. His writing is cool and detached and yet conveys the sense of urgency; further, it demonstrates a lucid and balanced professional judgement. Bevin is not only described as a statesman but revealed as a visionary; George Kennan on the other hand emerges as the elegant advocate of containment who yet shrank from the logical consequence of his own prescription; the French in their acrobatics on Italian membership are shown from the very beginning to have had idiosyncratic views on the Alliance, views which are sometimes unfairly attributed solely to de Gaulle.

While not a stylish book, *The Birth of NATO* displays the elegance of a dry and self-confident mind. Looking back after a third of a century has elapsed, Sir Nicholas in his introduction admits to some decline in his early belief in the inevitability of the Alliance; those of his readers with memories as long are likely to find piquant his reminder that at the conception of the Alliance, when British, Canadian and American diplomats were doing their best to hoodwink their future allies, none other than Donald Maclean was privy to their purpose. Long or short memories notwithstanding, the chief merit of this book lies in its authoritative demonstration that the North Atlantic Treaty was far from being a cynical instrument of American policy foisted on a reluctant Europe. As the years roll by and revisionist historians seek to establish their orthodoxy, this cannot be repeated too frequently.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War. By Daniel Frei with Christian Catrina. Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research. 1982. 255 pp. $19.00.

THIS is an important book; it is also a maddening one. Its construction is clumsy: too extended an opening yields to a diffuse introduction and the attempt to cover all aspects of the subject results in the core chapters being so stuffed with observations from writers on strategy that assessment is difficult and evaluation teeters on the brink of assertion. The reason for all this is to be found in the acknowledgements: the book was written in the space of three months while the author ran a research institute and carried out his normal duties as a university professor in Zurich. The warmth of his praise for his research associate is no more than deserved, for it transpires that the three months included what must have been time-consuming trips to Moscow and Washington for interview purposes.

Yet, if the reader grits his teeth and soldiers on, the book improves and its conclusions and prescriptions are level-headed. Frei rightly discounts the probability of nuclear war being self-activated or initiated without proper orders; he considers the risks arising from misjudgement, miscalculation and misunderstanding before addressing himself to the possibility of unintentional escalation of conventional into nuclear war. He concludes that the risk of unintentional nuclear war is extremely small, which is cheering, but adds that even the slightest chance of its occurrence makes it a matter of grave concern, which is obvious. Hence his prescriptions: 'first, progress in arms control and disarmament leading ultimately to general and complete disarmament and, secondly, implementation of a working system of international conflict resolution replacing war or the threat of force as an instrument for settling international disputes' (p. 223). Fortunately, Frei abstains from elaborating a milleniary blueprint for the second while sketching possible practical steps for the first. In the present state of public opinion, the coolness of his conclusions would calm much fevered concern; it remains a pity, however, that his soothing draught comes packaged in such an unappealing fashion.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

Limited Nuclear War: Political Theory and War Convention. By Ian Clark. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 1982. 266 pp. Index. £16·50.

THIS is a timely book in view of current debate about limited nuclear options and about the ethical basis of nuclear deterrence. It represents an attempt, drawing on the approaches of

international relations, strategic theory and political philosophy, to analyse the theory and practice of war limitation in general, so as to explore the meaning and significance of limited nuclear war theories in particular. Given that, as the author puts it, 'Limitation has been the chosen means by which strategists have sought to put the policy back into the usage of nuclear weapons' (p. 2), there can hardly be a more important subject.

The book examines the basic idea of the limitation of war, introducing a distinction between limitations based on accepted conventions as to what counts as war, and those based on conventions about how wars may be fought. The author outlines three models of limitation—limitation by champion, by charity and by city-swapping—and relates to these a historical review of the practice of limited war and the associated theories. He then offers an excellent succinct analysis of theories and plans for limited nuclear war before concluding that 'political philosophy provides no adequate chart for selecting a course between the Scylla of limited war and the Charybdis of nuclear holocaust' (p. 244).

This sketch of the book does less than justice to the author's formidable erudition (and to his valuable bibliography). Nor does it indicate how extremely interesting much of the book is. Readers who are marginally concerned with this field would find much of value here, and it should be essential reading for specialists.

I do, however, have one reservation. This concerns the possibility that the book overemphasizes the contribution that political theory can make to our understanding of this subject. Thus, having drawn from the political theorists the requirements (p. 102) that 'the conduct of war be a discriminating activity in terms of the human targets towards which it is directed', and that 'war be pursued with a particular end in view, and that the means adopted be such as to secure, and not contradict, this end', it would seem to follow at once that an argument from political philosophy for limited nuclear war would be hard to find. Hence, the conclusion eventually reached seems unsurprising, although much of the rest of the book is nevertheless valuable for its splendid clarification of theories of limited nuclear war. Again, it is perhaps the political theorist in the author's approach which led to the sentence, 'Without an explicit political theory for the employment of nuclear forces in war, there can be no viable theory as to why these forces should *not* be used' (p. 202, italics in original). Many who are not theorists would have no difficulty in drawing reasons from other sources for the non-use of nuclear weapons.

I would not, however, wish to end on this negative note. The conclusion that the theory of limited nuclear war is bankrupt is important, and even if it is unsurprising, the way that the conclusion is reached here is absorbing and enriching.

University of Manchester PHILIP GUMMETT

Strategic Studies and Public Policy: The American Experience. By Colin Gray. Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press. 1982. 230 pp. Index. $19.50.

COLIN GRAY'S output is prodigious. Over the past ten years since his first major article on Arms Races was published in *World Politics* there is not a major scholarly or policy-related journal in his field that has not carried one or more of his articles. This is without question his most important book to date and will be a standard work of reference and guidance for future generations of strategists.

It is important for three reasons. First, for what it says about the nature of the relationships between strategic theory, technology and policy. Herein lies his most lasting contribution; he has helped clarify, in his inimitable style, the complexities and semantic ambiguities of the very nature of the study of strategy, policy and change. Although he has worked hard to cover every contingency and meet every counter argument to his propositions—and in so doing makes immense demands on his readers—there remains, still, ample room for honest dissent and criticism.

Of particular note is his failure to give adequate emphasis to the political and teleological dimension of strategy and policy. This must partly explain the surprising absence of reference to peace studies as a legitimate element of strategic theory and the contributions *inter alia* of Anatol Rapoport, Kenneth Boulding or Gunner Myrdal. Because they do not share his *Weltanschauung* or *Moralpolitik* does not mean—given his own definitions—that they should be put to one side.

Secondly, it is an important book for doing what other books that have looked at the evolution of strategic theory and policy have been less successful in achieving: the analysis of the relationship of strategic theory and the practice of US defence and military policy. He has cut through description and given a balanced, detailed and reasoned analysis of why and how there were shifts in direction and emphasis in US strategic theory and practice. He provides an invaluable service and helps put the major contributors to strategic theory into context and perspective.

But the third and most important reason why the book should be a necessary purchase is that it reveals much of Colin Gray himself—whether he feels himself to be the detached scholar and academic, or the paid and committed consultant. In the past he has become involved in open argument with the goliaths of US strategic theory—Bernard Brodie in particular—and more recently has attracted impassioned criticism for his forthright opinions on contemporary US policy questions. Much of this attack could have been put in fairer perspective had there been better—even sympathetic—understanding of his position, and his own ultimate purposes and concerns. But Gray has never shirked debate or eschewed accountability for his arguments and, by inference, his influence. *Strategic Studies and Public Policy* is a powerful and honest statement of who he is, the way he appr. aches his work and where he stands.

University of Lancaster MARTIN EDMONDS

The Soviet Estimate: US Intelligence Analysis and Russian Military Strength. By John Prados. New York: Dial. 1982. 367 pp. Index. $17.95.

A COMMON problem in intelligence work is not so much a shortage of information but an excess of it. The challenge posed by an adversary's secrecy is often to find out everything he is up to rather than to try and make sense of it. The collection of information becomes more important than its interpretation. Not unnaturally the same tendency can afflict those attempting to analyse the intelligence agencies themselves from outside, for these are amongst the most secretive parts of any government's apparatus. This is true even in the United States, though a generation of scandals, foreign policy controversies, uninhibited memoirs, the Freedom of Information Act and a national tendency to leak secrets to the press has left the US intelligence community remarkably open.

John Prados has taken advantage of this openness to produce an account of the way in which estimates on Soviet strategic capabilities have been formed from the onset of the cold war to the present day. He has been assiduous in his search for relevant materials. The bibliography is enormous, and includes archives and recently declassified material. The author has interviewed extensively. Although much of the ground has been gone over before nobody else has done it so thoroughly. Furthermore, the story is brought up to date. In addition to the old favourites—the 'bomber gap', 'missile gap', Cuban missile crisis and Soviet ICBM 'build-up'—Prados covers SALT II, the Backfire Bomber and the Soviet defence budget as well as the 'Team B' escapade.

Unfortunately the author has suffered from the tendency mentioned at the start of this review. Having achieved so much in accumulating information he is reluctant to leave anything out. When this tendency is combined with the large number of issues to be covered, the result is a fact-packed journey during which the reader is rarely allowed time to pause to take it all in or to discover where he is bound. The story jerks from descriptions of the organization of the estimating process to some of the more controversial estimates, with few themes to hold it together.

Although many of the individual episodes are described extremely well, for example the near-failure in recognizing the introduction of Soviet missiles into Cuba in 1962, others, such as the various stages of SALT, are just too compressed. Given the lack of serious historical work on SALT, particularly the 1972–7 period (where Prados has some extremely interesting material) this is a shame.

There is no theory of intelligence or US policy-making or even of the arms race to help structure the work, just a few disjointed observations by way of conclusion. He has some pointed things to say about the way intelligence has been manipulated in policy-formation but he does not do enough to turn this from a general proposition into something more specific. Sometimes, as in the case of the vexed question of the charges of Soviet non-

compliance with SALT, he may have given more weight to those charging manipulation than they deserve. So much has to be covered that there is never enough time to develop and test hypotheses, or properly challenge those that others have made in this field.

Despite these flaws, this work is still of enormous value, simply because of the amount of hard information it contains. As far as one can tell, the information is used properly, the analysis is careful and the individual judgements reasonable. Unfortunately, this *is* only as far as one can tell because Prados neglects to reference the book properly. By and large only direct quotes get a footnote, but when so much new material is being brought to bear it is immensely frustrating not to be able to follow up sources.

Overall, therefore, a book that does not quite realize its potential. Given the importance and interest of the subject and the amount of work that has gone into Prados's account, this is inevitably something of a disappointment.

King's College, London LAWRENCE FREEDMAN

Arms Control and Defence Postures in the 1980s. Edited by Richard Burt. Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1982. 230 pp. Index. £15·95.

A PRODUCT of seminars run by the Washington Foreign Policy Institute, this volume brings together ten papers covering specific fields of arms control (chemical weapons and nuclear non-proliferation being notable absentees), as well as more general aspects of the inter-penetration of arms control and strategy. The stage is set by Robert Osgood in a succinct introduction in which, while noting how the high hopes placed in arms control during the 1960s and 1970s have been disappointed, he nevertheless observes that 'in many countries the conspicuous pursuit of arms control is regarded as an indispensable concomitant of security policies, if only for domestic political reasons . . . [so that] in one way or another, for better or for worse, it will play a significant international role in the 1980s . . .'.

In his opening chapter, the Editor—who has since become Head of the State Department's Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs—analyses the relationship of arms control to defence, and has some constructive proposals both for general policy-making and for the conduct of current negotiations. In place of what he sees as the present tendency to approach these questions on an 'expedient, piecemeal basis', he considers that 'unless more coherent, long-term plans linking military purposes with force structure and sizing are adopted, arms control will inevitably be forced to take on a burden it is unsuited to bear. In the end national security, along with arms control itself, will suffer'.

Peter Hughes and William Schneider, on the comprehensive banning of nuclear tests, present forcefully the case against this, *conceived as an arms control measure*. Yet, in concentrating on the reliability aspect, they risk neglecting the basic point that, as a back-door attempt to reduce or limit nuclear weapons, a CTB is unlikely to work. For either testing is going seriously to inhibit a country's nuclear weapon capability, or it isn't. In the former event, there must be limits to the degree to which it can be accepted by a power determined to retain that capability; in the latter, it will not make much difference anyhow. The authors do indeed get near to recognizing this when they say 'some proponents of a CTB believe that [it] would not significantly impact US nuclear weapon capabilities, yet others advocate it for precisely that reason' (p. 35). On the more direct effort to limit nuclear weapons, Charles Sorrels scrutinizes the SALT process, judging that the United States needs to persevere, but to scale down exaggerated expectations; and to employ its most skilful diplomacy to avoid the divisiveness *vis-à-vis* its European allies that must always be a prime aim of Soviet policy.

Richard Betts, on control of the arms trade, after exposing the contradictions and failures of the Carter administration, propounds some sensible guidelines for US arms sales to the Third World that pay due regard to the military, economic, political and moral factors involved. Equally balanced is Robert Gessert's treatment of force reductions in Europe (MBFR), which surely furnish a model of how *not* to go about things—embarking for adventitious reasons on negotiations that, if only because of the existing Soviet preponderance and the ineluctable facts of geography, can hardly be expected to do much to enhance Western security. Still, he sees value in maintaining them, although 'new initiatives should not be taken to get MBFR back on the track, or on to a new track, until there is much greater clarity what that track is'.

Space permits no more than passing mention of Michael Higgins and Christopher Makins's discussion of the tactical nuclear force issue in relation to 'grey area' arms control; Benjamin Lambert on the place of arms control in Soviet defence planning; William Hyland on the problems arising from US inter-Service rivalry; and Richard Haass on the Indian Ocean, where he stresses the need for a more coherent political and economic approach to the region, as a step to reaching some understanding with the Soviet Union on reciprocal restraint. 'The most that can be expected from both arms and arms control is that they will help to create an environment in which other initiatives might have a better chance of prospering'.

No-one concerned with 'real life' arms control could fail to benefit from reading these papers, which are all of high quality. Their approach, professional and hard-headed, eschews the moralizing that tends to inform the debate on this side of the Atlantic (there are no clergymen among the contributors). Only in one instance does hard-headed threaten to become cold-blooded: Geoffrey Kemp's final chapter, on the military uses of outer space. This addresses the subject strictly from the viewpoint of American space opportunities, appraised in not only defence but also economic terms, of which latter the Shuttle is seen as 'symbol and substance'. Kemp surveys the possibilities in a futuristic vein as fascinating as it is (in the vogue word) chilling. He presents fairly enough the case for arms control measures to supplement the 1967 agreement, and to complete negotiations already begun on anti-satellite weapons, for a Moon Treaty, and in the context of SALT II. But he evidently regards the extreme difficulty of framing, and verifying, effective restraints, coupled with the prospect of growing competition in space between the superpowers anyhow, as tipping the balance against the chance of such attempts succeeding, or even perhaps being desirable at all. Albeit well-argued, and informative, this gloomy prognostication ends the book on a hawkish note uncharacteristic of it as a whole. Even so, however, the author stops short of actually endorsing the quoted view (p. 205) of General Thomas Stafford that outer space affords scope for the deployment of force that 'does not violate national boundaries, does not kill people, and can provide a visible show of determination at relatively modest cost'!

MICHAEL CULLIS

The Arms Race: The Political Economy of Military Growth. By Miroslav Nincic. New York: Praeger. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 209 pp. Index. £18·00.

THIS book takes an interesting approach to an important subject. The political economy of military growth is a vital, and on the whole neglected, part of the study of arms racing. As an approach, it draws attention to the domestic dynamics behind the arms race, and offers a model of arms racing which has quite different implications from the standard interaction model of behaviour between states.

Unfortunately, the questions which the author asks in this book, and the framework he sets out for them, are much more interesting than the analysis he delivers. Of the substantive chapters, three contain an overview of the political economy of the military sector in the United States and the Soviet Union, one discusses the relationship between military hardware and strategic doctrine, one looks at the arms trade, especially that with the Third World, and two cover the domestic and bilateral possibilities for arms limitation by the superpowers.

There are a few high points. In chapters 2–4, the author offers some useful insights into the economic uses of military spending in the superpowers, and draws clearly the very different opportunities and problems that face the Soviet Union in comparison with the United States. Chapter 8 contains the beginnings of some useful ideas on bilateral arms control possibilities.

But on the whole the analysis is superficial, and the supporting evidence much too thin. The nature of the argument requires extensive evidence, but instead of in-depth case studies or comprehensive literature reviews, we are given only illustrations. The discussion of the Soviet Union is hardly more than a sketch, and the discussion of strategic doctrine is so selective as to border on parody. Questionable assumptions and assertions abound (e.g., on page 5: 'The number of nations possessing nuclear weapons seems to be doubling approximately every 11 years . . .'), and the chapter on the arms trade is not convincingly integrated into the main theme of the book.

It is hard to imagine who the author sees as his audience. Those who share his views will find little new. Those who don't will not be convinced by such weak argument, and the

general presentation is too patchy for the book to qualify as a useful text. It is, however, devoutly to be hoped that others will take up the questions which Dr Nincic poses.

University of Warwick BARRY BUZAN

Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, Politics. Edited by Richard K. Betts. Oxford: Blackwell for the Brookings Institution. 1982. 612 pp. Index. £24·50. Pb.: £9·95.

IN Europe at present it is too easy to think of cruise missiles with reference only to NATO's long-range theatre nuclear forces. This excellent volume demonstrates what a bewildering array of cruise missile options actually exists, and how hard it is to develop the technology and deploy the weapon in ways that make for military, political and strategic coherence.

The chapters are all by considerable authorities (including, to name but some, Burt, MccGwire, Ruina, Huisken, Quester, Kincade, Garthoff and Freedman). Their coverage of technical characteristics, Soviet air defence, the origins and bureaucratic politics of cruise missiles, conventional deployment options, Soviet perspectives, arms control implications, and implications for NATO politics and for the European powers are very full, giving the book incidental additional value for the more general study of the weapons acquisition process, arms control, Soviet strategic theory and military practice, and other matters. Inevitably, there is a certain amount of overlap and redundancy, but the editor splendidly summarizes the main issues and lessons.

One of the most striking points to emerge from the book is that the cruise missile shows just how tortuous and complex the weapons development process can be, and how contradictory can be the arguments advanced by a weapon's proponents at different times and places. Although clearly not an example of technological determinism (because of the evident influence of political leaders upon the furtherance of the programme, often in the teeth of military opposition), there nevertheless comes through a strong sense of inevitability about the prospects for development and deployment in one form or another of so protean a technology.

All the more reason, then, to consider what the cruise missile could usefully do, and what arms control implications might attach to its deployment in various modes. And here, despite some disagreements among the authors, the book demonstrates how the cruise missile is unlikely to be the wonder weapon that has so often been portrayed, much doubt being cast upon its cost-effectiveness in comparison with other systems for many military and strategic purposes.

In arms control terms, the book shows how the picture is more complex than is often argued. We are reminded that the verifiability problem also arises with other developments in strategic weapons, and that, offsetting the costs, there could be arms control benefits if cruise missiles were deployed so as to increase crisis stability, though this would require decisions to give up other, destabilizing, deployment options. The biggest difficulty, according to Betts, arises from the increasing interest in conventional uses of the cruise missile and its consequences for nuclear arms control, given the verification problem. For him, the key questions for the immediate future are (p. 561) 'how financially inexpensive conventional cruise missiles will really be' and 'how strategically expensive the death of negotiated arms control could be'.

University of Manchester PHILIP GUMMETT

Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament. (The Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues under the Chairmanship of Olof Palme.) London, Sydney: Pan. 1982. 202 pp. Pb.: £1·95.

THE body that drafted this report is hardly a 'Commission' in the usual sense of the word. It set itself up, taking the Brandt Commission as its model, and drafted its own terms of reference. All of its members, who include our own Dr David Owen and are drawn in balanced proportions from the West, the communist and the Third Worlds, are either experienced statesmen or notable experts in arms control questions. Certainly they cannot be dismissed as high-minded busybodies remote from the realities of world affairs; and the contributions of such specialists as Johann Holst, Leslie Gelb and Pierre Lelouche ensure a high level of expertise.

All such documents are a mixture of platitude, silliness and common sense, but the strength of this last ingredient is here refreshingly strong. Few will quarrel with its analysis of the nuclear arms competition, of the perils posed by a 'nuclear war-fighting capability', of the burdens imposed on Third World economies by arms expenditure, and of the need to reverse the process of escalation that is beginning to distort the economies of rich and poor alike. The goal of 'General and Complete Disarmament' is a no doubt necessary obeisance to a popular orthodoxy, but the steps proposed for attaining it are on the whole moderate and sensible. The superpowers are urged to persevere with Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and the limitation of Intermediate Nuclear Forces while stabilizing, and if possible reducing, the conventional balance. There should be agreement on the banning of chemical weapons, the demilitarization of outer space and the monitoring of weapons research. Arms transfers to Third World countries should be checked, and the peacekeeping capabilities of the United Nations strengthened. The only remotely controversial proposal is that for the removal of battlefield nuclear weapons in Europe; a recommendation attacked by the Soviet member, M. Arbatov, for not going far enough, and enlarged by Herr Egon Bahr into a proposal for the removal of nuclear weapons from the territory of all non-nuclear states.

On the whole the report deserves commendation as a pointer to the desirable and not totally impossible, so long as one overlooks the inevitable element of woolly exhortation. 'A doctrine of common security', it informs us on p. 139, 'must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments'. 'Little man, little man', Queen Elizabeth once rebuked an impertinent bishop, '*Must* is not a word to be used to princes'. Well-meaning people have been admonishing princes in this fashion for a very long time. To discover why their advice has been so constantly rejected, we need rather tougher analysis than any to be found here.

Oriel College, Oxford MICHAEL HOWARD

Controlling the Bomb. Nuclear Proliferation in the 1980s. By Lewis A. Dunn. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1982. 209 pp. Index. £14·95. Pb: £4·95.

THE appearance of yet another book on this theme must justify itself by certain obvious criteria. Does it say anything new or original; does it clarify understanding of familiar material; and does it put forward any convincing proposals for action?

To a reviewer perhaps over-exposed to the subject, Mr Dunn's work—sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund, written as a staff member of the Hudson Institute, and commended on the dust jacket by such eminences as J. K. Galbraith and Joseph Nye—may not fully measure up to these requirements, for all the breadth of study and painstaking rehearsal of the arguments that have gone into it. Not that he fails to cover the ground adequately enough in a short space. The initial chapters on the historical background are followed by discussion of the prospects and consequences of further proliferation, and possible measures to control and ameliorate these: for his belief that such proliferation is inevitable leads him to concentrate on what can be done in that event, rather than on the likelihood of being able to hold the present position indefinitely. It is neither the assumptions nor the scope, but rather the quality of his analysis that may strike one as unsatisfying. Granted, this may to some extent reflect the intractable nature of the subject-matter itself, often so uncertain and speculative that almost every sentence invites qualification. But the effect here is frequently to cancel out, or even contradict, what has gone before, leaving the reader with no very clear idea of what it all adds up to. Nor is he helped by a flat and at times ungainly style (at least to cisatlantic eyes).

This applies among others to the chapter 'How many countries will get the bomb?' where some of Mr Dunn's apprehensions seem anyhow a little far-fetched—in the case of Eastern Europe surely quite unrealistic. The next chapter ('What difference will it make?') also lacks cutting edge, although it affords welcome confirmation that the author is not one of those who profess to view the spread of nuclear weapons with unconcern, or even with approval as an influence for 'balance' or 'responsibility': a claim not only belied by some of the 'mad' polities operating in our world, but the logical end of which can only be to advocate general possession of the bomb.

The concluding section of the book deals with possible courses of action open to the United States, and others, to contain what the author terms the 'outcroppings' of prolifera-tion. Here again, the arguments are marshalled conscientiously, and all the current arms

control expedients—including some that tend to impugn common sense—are duly passed in review. But no definite conclusions emerge, until in a brief final chapter a 'three-fold strategy' is proclaimed, to 'hold the line at no more than . . . a continuation of the first decade's pattern of slow and limited proliferation'. Actually, however, it is not plain just what *are* envisaged as the 'three divergent and sometimes apparently inconsistent' components of the strategy, from out of a number of policies advanced at this point—steps to tighten and refine control of nuclear trade; sanctions; security guarantees; confidence-building measures; selective supply of conventional arms; and diplomatic initiatives to alleviate disputes in sensitive areas. But whatever they are, the author admits that 'tensions' between them are bound to occur; and that the further objective of 'heading off the next use of nuclear weapons, while mitigating the other regional and global consequences of the bomb's spread . . . may be considerably more difficult'.

Even if none of this advances us as far as might be hoped, Mr Dunn must be given credit for grappling with the problems, knowledgeably and on the whole fairly; while the fact that he is now Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Affairs in the State Department behoves us the more, perhaps, to pay due attention to his thinking about them.

MICHAEL CULLIS

The Defence of Western Europe. By Bernard Burrows and Geoffrey Edwards. London, Boston: Butterworth. 1982. 155 pp. Index. £16·00.

THIS book developed from a Federal Trust working party which, starting from a consideration of the possibilities of developing a European Defence Force, went on to consider other means of European cooperation in defence and security matters. It fits in very well to the Butterworths European Studies series of monographs, with its stylish end-boards and high standards of production. The book is closely and thoroughly argued, and repays careful reading: it covers a great deal of ground in 147 pages of text and is full of interesting, suggestive, and sometimes wry commentary and analysis. It is conventional in the European sense, in that non-defence aspects of security are given a good deal of consideration, and the current range of problems within Europe, and between the European and North American partners in NATO, is sketched in at a usefully general level of argument.

The final conclusions summarize the arguments of the earlier chapters and carry some of the proposals that have been discussed a little further forward. The authors conclude that there is 'little basis in reality or in public sentiment for speculation about a self-contained European defence of Europe separate from America' (p. 141), but say that this does not invalidate other motives for improving cooperation in defence between West Europeans. They suggest a rationalization between the functions of the Eurogroup and the Independent European Programme Group; the involvement of the European Commission in the industrial and procurement activities of the IEPG; the setting up of a European Nuclear Planning Group; and some coordination in the patrol and refit cycles of the French and British submarine deterrent forces. They also discuss ways of improving defence policy coordination and consultation, and creating a longer-term and more cohesive European perspective on energy, strategic minerals and East–West interdependence. And they close with a sober, but finally rather optimistic, judgement about the possibility of actually achieving closer cooperation.

Indeed, the general tone of the book is sober but optimistic: in faith and with reason, these problems can be managed, even if they cannot be solved ideally; the hazards are great, but the effort must be made. I found it very good reading; but the key to it all is, I think, the rational assumption that governments will pay due attention to the longer term foreign policy perspectives inherent in alliances, and the defence aspects of security. At a time when domestic policies seem to be so preoccupying, and predetermining so many international activities, I wonder if the tone is sufficiently exciting and vote-catching to hold political attention or overcome institutional *ennui*? To the extent that, since the text was written in the late summer of 1981, the divisions and distractions of Europe have festered, there now seems a somewhat paradoxical—but perceptible—possibility that rational analysis might regain some attraction. Things really are as bad as that!

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

Politics, Economics and Social

Federalism and Federation. By Preston King. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 159 pp. Index. £9·95. Pb.: £5·95.

Models of Autonomy. Edited by Yoram Dinstein. New Brunswick, London: Transaction for Tel Aviv University. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 319 pp. Index. £29·00.

Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control. By Robert A. Dahl. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1982. 229 pp. Index. £14·50.

One of the chief preoccupations of international relations is the issue of order and justice between sovereign states, whereas one of the central problems of politics has been the question about the conditions of good life within the boundary of the state. There are, however, a number of issue-areas relevant to both concerns. Federalism, the nature of federation, co-existence of hostile communities and control of interest groups within a polity, and other related issues, such as national self-determination and secession, constitute one such area, and the above three books are concerned with certain of these topics.

Any empirical study of federations must begin with an analysis of what a federation is, and this is what King's book attempts to do. He considers federalism as an ideology and a federation as an institution. The first half of the book deals with what he considers as the three versions of federalism, i.e., centralism, decentralism and an advocacy of balance. The second half explores the definition of federation.

Despite its clear structure, part one is rather disjointed in terms of its substance, though the conclusions of its chapters are individually sound. In part two, a number of important assertions are made as regards the nature of federation, culminating in an attack on the conventional view which places federations between unitary states and confederations in terms of the degree of centralization. One of the conclusions of the book is that federal states are 'a subcategory of sovereign states' (p. 139). This, however, is common knowledge among those who are familiar with international law/relations, and it may seem odd that King should produce this conclusion as if it were a new conception. This is due to the fact that he is writing against the background of debate emanating from classical political doctrine which holds indivisibility to be the mark of sovereignty. According to this doctrine, a unitary state had an undivided sovereign and was therefore a sovereign state, whereas a confederation of states was not governed by a single sovereign and thus was not a sovereign state. This theory could not account for federations, for they were neither unitary nor confederal and were hence thought to be neither sovereign nor non-sovereign. According to King, however, a federation *is* a sovereign state, because (1) the mark of sovereignty is not its indivisibility, as the classical doctrine held, but the finality of decision, and (2) a federal state is equipped with a central government which, while incorporating constituent territorial units, is capable of making ultimate decisions.

Although King's conclusion is correct, it would appear that he could have dismissed the classical doctrine without much ado had he clearly distinguished between two questions: (1) how sovereignty is exercised within a state, and (2) whether a given political community can be said to be a sovereign state. In (1), 'sovereignty' means the right to rule and is a predicate of a political organ of a state, e.g., the monarch, the parliament, or 'the people'. In (2), the word 'sovereign' is used to refer to the character of a political community as a constitutionally independent organization. The two questions are related in that unless (2) is answered affirmatively (1) cannot arise, but the two senses of the word 'sovereign(ty)' are separable, referring as it does to two conceptually distinct entities. The realization of this point will make us say that a political community is a sovereign state if it is constitutionally independent of other sovereign states, and that it is entirely irrelevant to this how the right to rule is exercised within that community, and, in particular, whether it is done in an undivided fashion.

The second book concerns autonomy, territorial and personal, though it also deals with related phenomena such as federations and associated statehood. It is a collection of essays edited with a view to providing some understanding of the concept of autonomy as embodied in the Camp David accords with respect to the status of the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. There are some excellent chapters, for example 'Federalism and Autonomy' by

Rudolph Bernhardt and 'Autonomous Arrangements in the Balkan States' by Zvi Yavets, but as is often the case with the work of many hands, the book as a whole suffers from divergence. Some chapters are written from a historical/political viewpoint, others from a legal perspective. Some are extremely detailed, others very brief. Some deal with current issues and others go back to previous centuries. What emerges from these many-faceted analyses is that while the the literal meaning of 'autonomy' is 'self-rule', it is usually restricted in one way or another, and its characteristics 'differ from case to case—from personal autonomy granted to an ethnic group in matters of language, culture and religion to autonomy bordering on full political–territorial independence' (p. 285). However the term is interpreted, the crux of the issue in the Middle East context, as the editor Dinstein points out, is that the Palestinian people are not participating in the 'process of peace' and thus autonomy is not the expression of their self-determination. It must be added here that the editor's effective chapter at the end of the book brings its loose strands together and saves it from the ultimate charge of diversity without organization.

The third book under review is a serious and extremely well-thought-out study of democracy in the contemporary world. Dahl's concern is democracy within a 'country', or the large-scale democracy of a 'nation-state' as opposed to the ancient 'city-state'. He argues that in this modern set-up autonomous organizations, representing various interest groups, not only inevitably emerge, but are also desirable as they minimize government coercion and encourage political liberty and human well-being. However, autonomous organizations also do harm to democracy by perpetuating political inequalities, deforming civic consciousness, distorting the public agenda and leading to the control of public affairs by private interests. Herein lies, in Dahl's view, the problem of modern democracy. Specific solutions to this problem can be reached only in the context of the specific characteristics of a particular country, but Dahl attempts to arrive at some general conclusions about major alternative solutions. Thus he devotes one chapter each to three general approaches to the problem of democratic pluralism: a more complete democracy, socialism and the enhancement of civic virtues. He exposes the limits of each of these solutions with thoroughness and considerable analytical skill. In the final chapter, Dahl discusses how the defects of pluralism may be dealt with in the special case of the United States. The book is well written, though it demands a considerable degree of concentration and, unfortunately, there are some serious printing errors on page 38.

Overall, King's book may be found useful by first year students of politics and international relations while Dahl's book is highly recommended primarily to the more advanced students of politics. Dinstein's book may be of some interest to those studying comparative government, legal theory or the Middle East, but is rather expensive for what it contains.

University of Keele HIDEMI SUGANAMI

Militarism: The History of an International Debate 1861–1979. By V. R. Berghahn. Leamington Spa, Warwicks: Berg. 1981. 132 pp. Index. £8·95.

IN many respects this is a most welcome contribution to the subject. Militarism is a concept which has long been bandied around with almost cavalier abandon, more for its symbolic effect than for any analytic or synthetic purpose. Merely to be reminded of this fact provides a valuable cautionary tale, and Professor Berghahn's study implicitly serves this function. Explicitly, however, it is of less value, since no conclusion is reached which gives the reader any clear conceptual guide towards understanding the term.

But this was not really Professor Berghahn's immediate objective, even though to suggest in the title that there was a 'debate' might lead the unwary to believe that he would arrive at a point, in the present, at which a synthesis had been largely agreed. His task was to follow over the past century the different interpretations that have been ascribed to the concept. The conclusion that one must draw from the content of the book is that whenever a particular approach is adopted—whether through civil–military relations, international politics, history, political sociology or economics—not only the questions asked, but also the meaning of 'militarism', are different.

The weakness of the book lies in the failure of the author to give sufficient emphasis to the use of the term as a vehicle by which authors have summarized their arguments and findings over a wide range of studies. These studies were not about militarism *per se*; rather, they

were about industrial production, foreign policy, mass society, political culture, capitalism, military intervention or development, and the concept merely provided a useful shorthand to suggest, in the final analysis, either undue military influence or a particular societal orientation. Its strength is that it brings home not only cultural and national differences but also temporal ones; it is a timely reminder that what might be valid in the case of Nazi Germany, Tsarist Russia or the Third World today is not necessarily so in the post-1945 United States.

The debate to which he refers is artificial. The convention is used, however, to give a structure and direction to the book. It is arguable whether the device succeeds, especially in his conclusion where the distinction is drawn between the work of historians and that of social scientists. If there has been a debate, it certainly has not been conducted between these two groups. Aside from some contributors to militarism who have been omitted—Andreski and Skjelsback, for example,—the book provides a useful bibliographical service; but it should not be taken as the last word on the subject.

University of Lancaster MARTIN EDMONDS

An Introduction to Political Geography. By John R. Short. London, Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 1982. 193pp. Index. £10·00. Pb.: £5·95.

IN considering international, national and local levels of 'political' activity, *An Introduction to Political Geography* constitutes an interesting and useful text. It is not, however, without shortcomings that leave it vulnerable to serious criticism by those of differing intellectual and/or political persuasions. Moreover, while the volume may offer much that is 'new' to mainstream geography students, little will be unfamiliar to students of international relations or politics. Non-geographers might also wonder, at the end of their read, about the point of the word 'geography' in the title.

Part I offers a discussion of the 'political geography of world order'. This, in essence, is a 'revisionist' account of the cold war coupled with a Marxist–structuralist interpretation of contemporary North–South relations. Geopolitical theorists like Halford Mackinder also receive passing consideration.

The discussions in part I are interesting but, by virtually ignoring traditional views of the cold war and 'liberal' perspectives upon international economic relations, remain open to the criticisms that will inevitably arise from a number of students of contemporary international affairs.

Part II, the analysis of the nation state, initially contrasts pluralist and Marxist perspectives. This done, the discussion centres upon differing strands of contemporary Marxist analysis of the state, differentiated along two axes: firstly, that between an emphasis upon the political functions (law and order, etc.) of the state in capitalist society and an emphasis upon the economic functions (demand management, etc.); secondly, the degree of autonomy from economic determination enjoyed by the state—lesser to greater. It is here, in the discussion of the nation state, that geography makes some sort of an entry but only through the rather obvious point that the nation state *is*, definitionally, a spatial entity. Beyond this, however, spatiality seems to contribute surprisingly little to the analysis of political matters presented in the volume as a whole.

Part III, on the 'local state' or local government and politics, provides a neat, albeit brief, description of the structure of local government in England and Wales and in the United States. Attention is then directed towards alternative perspectives—primarily pluralist and Marxist—upon the nature and functioning of local politics.

Overall, *An Introduction to Political Geography* clearly has much to offer those geography students whose diet has been of an increasingly technical and 'social scientific' flavour. It also has something to offer the general student of politics and international relations, providing a neat, if often rather partial, survey of a broad spectrum of politics and the contemporary political economy. Its content demonstrates, yet again, the total futility of disciplinary differentiation and fragmentation within the social sciences. However, the aforementioned partiality of the approaches considered will limit the volume to the role of a supplementary, rather than a primary, text and render it open to strong criticism by those of an unsympathetic intellectual disposition.

University of Reading R. J. BARRY JONES

Introduction to Political Economy. By E. J. Mishan. London, Melbourne: Hutchinson. 1982. 270pp. Index. £15·00. Pb.: £5·50.

IN his sagacious article on the Treasury in *The Times Literary Supplement* (July 16, 1982) Burke Trend lamented the demise of political economy—a subject far more comprehensive in scope than the currently fashionable manifestation of economics.

If Burke Trend should light on this book, he will not find that it wholly meets the need that he expressed. In terms of the distinctions drawn by Mishan himself on page 19 between political economy, normative economics, welfare economics and allocation economics, this book lies squarely in the last-mentioned field. It contains few facts, and little discussion of institutions or of the historical development of any economy. Important economic policy areas such as money, employment, inflation, trade, changing technology, growth and development find no place at all, except at a general, philosophical level in the last forty pages. Even in terms of Mishan's own rather narrow definitions the title is a misnomer. Admittedly, the boundaries of political economy are imprecise, but if its rebirth—of which there are signs—should be limited to the subject matter of the bulk of this book, it would be unhelpful.

What the reader will principally find is a clear, succinct and straightforward account of the theory of welfare economics, focused on the idea of optimality in resource allocation. This is a field in which Mishan over a lengthy period has made numerous valuable academic contributions, and on which he has written extremely widely, not only for his fellow professionals and for students, but also at a more popular level for a wider audience. It is divided into five parts, which deal respectively with: the agenda of political economy; allocation within a partial economic context; collective goods and bads; resource allocation within a general context; and sources of economic failure in a technological age. The material is presented in non-mathematical form and makes relatively little use of diagrams. The treatment succeeds in demystifying the subject, and the last, too-short part, most characteristic of Mishan's distinctive philosophical viewpoint, ought to achieve the purpose of inducing the student to reflect on important issues. The more advanced academic student would probably be better advised to seek one of Professor Mishan's other books, such as his *Introduction to Normative Economics*. The book may also be of some interest to others who once knew or think they knew what this esoteric branch of economic theory was all about—and to those who never did but now feel that they ought to. But those whose main interest is in the broad approach to contemporary issues that is espoused by this journal will be unlikely to find it so rewarding. Meanwhile, students of policy must await the unifier of grasp who will provide the eighties with a broad Political Economy in a more classical sense. But perhaps the subject has become too specialized for that to be possible.

University of St Andrews P. ROBSON

Dynamics of Global Crisis. By Samir Amin *et al.* London: Macmillan. 1982. 248pp. £12·50. Pb.: £4·95.

THIS book consists of separate essays by Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank and Immanuel Wallerstein. A volume that is both interesting and somewhat uneven, its contents are generally what would be expected by those familiar with the past work of the contributors.

The common focus of all four writers is the contemporary crisis in the world capitalist system: a crisis, it should be noted, that incorporates, but is by no means confined to, the current global recession. The interest of the contributors is to explore the prospects of, and suitable conditions for, a world-wide transition from capitalism to socialism. This investigation, in turn, transports the reader across an extremely broad canvas, from the USA's post-Second World War hegemony within the global political economy, through the problems of the less developed countries and the nature of the so-called 'socialist' countries, to the prospects of a major war.

The discussions in *Dynamics of Global Crisis* all reflect a broadly Marxist approach and methodology: one, however, which acknowledges some of the shortcomings of classical Marxism.

Areas of significant disagreement are, however, revealed amongst the contributors. Such areas of dispute include the prospects for a major international financial collapse and a

significant additional increase in unemployment; the possibility of war breaking out amongst the 'core' nations in the global political economy; the nature of the USSR, and other 'socialist' countries, and their role in the world economy; the utility to the less developed countries of 'delinking' from the global capitalist system; and, finally, the prospects of capitalism's final collapse in the short and medium term.

Each essay in *Dynamics of Global Crisis* offers something of interest. While acknowledging the role of Kondratieff 'long cycles' in economic life, Wallerstein stresses the approaching limits upon the ability of capitalism to overcome 'crises of accumulation'. Arrighi discusses the bases and significance of post-Second World War US hegemony (largely synthesizing now conventional ideas); the problems created by 'unruly' capital, labour and 'peripheral' states; and, finally (somewhat unsatisfactorily), three alternative scenarios for the future—resurgent imperialist rivalry, peaceful resolution of the current crisis, and the intensifying continuation of the crisis on into the 1990s. Frank covers much, with particular value attaching to his critique of 'Keynesianism' and general discussion of the exhaustion of postwar capitalist safety-nets. Frank is, however, exceptional in perceiving but poor short-term prospects for 'socialism': seeing, rather, enhanced possibilities of nationalist and populist responses to contemporary pressures. Amin contributes a piece that, by covering an extremely wide range of issues, provides much that is illuminating but assumes such a staccato form as to weaken the cogency and persuasiveness of its argument.

Overall, differences of view and some lapses in exposition by the authors do not seriously qualify the valuable perspective upon the contemporary problems of the global political economy provided by *Dynamics of Global Crisis.*

University of Reading R. J. BARRY JONES

Capitalism and Colonial Production. By H. Alavi *et al.* London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 198pp. Index. £12·95.

Production, Purpose and Structure: Towards a Socialist Theory of Production. By Jeremy Bray. London: Pinter, 1982. 173pp. Index. £8·95.

THE first of these two volumes is a collection of papers given at a conference at Brisbane in summer 1980; it deals with the changes in the mode of production in selected areas of South-east Asia consequent upon colonial penetration. The strengths and the weaknesses of scholarship inspired by Marx are well exemplified in these papers. On the one hand they are carefully factual and empirical giving balanced attention to both politics and property rights as well as straightforward economics. On the other hand, however, the underlining, the repeated use of inverted commas and the tiresome style of mock disputation are likely to irritate those who prefer clear, conventional prose.

The clear thesis to which this collection addresses itself is to be found on page 3:

> It is an attempt to solve the analytical problems of treating this process of social transformation and to illustrate that solution by reference to a number of different examples of colonial and capitalist transformations of what are now considered to be Third World societies. Again this argument is located within a debate about modes of production—but where others have settled for new terms to account for the complex situation, we have sought to show that colonialism created a distinctive form of capitalism in these societies. They are not dual economies; there is not feudalism or semi-feudalism in the countryside. There is, in fact, capitalism, but of a different form, in all parts of the economy.

For Marxists this book is a contribution to their literature. For more agnostic readers there is much to make the collection worth dipping into. The discussions of modes of production, feudalism in particular, are interesting. Missing, though, is any consideration of the element of fealty whereby the lowly commend themselves to a lord, thus sacrificing some liberty in exchange for the security that the lord promises. Warfare in pre-capitalist societies is not regarded as being of any great causal significance. On the whole, while the detail and the jargon are sometimes tedious and distracting, there is enough compensation to make these papers well worth reading.

The title of Jeremy Bray's book suggests that the author will address a central problem of comparative economics. It is argued at the outset that there is no socialist theory of production, and that such a lack of theory as to what goods and services shall be produced

and how production shall be carried on under socialism has the undesirable consequences defined on page 1:

> It generates the view that socialists and the socially concerned are better at spending money than at producing goods. The riposte that it is workers who produce the goods and services is no answer if socialism offers workers no view as to how the goods can be better produced, and in practice fails to produce them. It creates political parties composed of workers and of legitimate claimants on production—from the social services and for social need generally.

The need for theory is articulated in chapter 2 but chapter 3 consists of nine pages of text and thirty of (largely mathematical) appendix headed 'The use of the Treasury and NIESR models in policy optimization for the UK 1982–6'. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 deal with policy problem areas—exchange rate regimes, wages and inflation and industrial policy—which are highly politicized, yet the whole tone is one of how to achieve perfect computation. Indeed, the book as a whole is all about means, with nothing about political ends. The final chapter treads an uneasy line between science and mysticism.

With respect to exchange rates, Bray recommends the adoption of a 'good' strategy as defined by Smale. As we learn in chapter 7, a 'good' strategy is one which avoids worst outcomes and encourages cooperative behaviour. The idea is that a target path for the exchange rate be announced in the form of a modified crawling peg. On page 77 it is conceded that this is not specifically socialist. The key issue in wage bargains is held to be relativities. A counter-inflation policy through national relativity bargaining is presented, with government to guarantee inflation-proofing—financed by a surcharge on employers' national insurance contributions. Chapter 6 is nearer to the theme of production; here the argument is pitched in terms of companies being obliged to build models and enter planning agreements: 'Participation would have to be compulsory . . .' (p. 125). But no matter how many interlinked company models feed the centre with information, a theory of production, socialist or otherwise, must deal with the criteria for determining what shall be produced and by what methods. There is nothing of this.

The first major criticism of this book, then, must be that it fails even to aim at its stated target. An even more fundamental criticism concerns the emphasis on mathematics and computer models and the neglect of political analysis. It is not difficult to define the one-sidedness of Adam Smith and regret the practice of the Labour government of 1974–9 but the task of devising a political economy of socialist production is immensely difficult.

Bristol Polytechnic FRANK GARDNER

International Economic Integration. Edited by Ali M. El Agraa. London: Macmillan. 1982. 287pp. Index. £20·00.

THIS book draws on the experience of Africa, Central and South America, and Comecon as well as on that of Western Europe in an attempt to shed new light on regional free trade. As a contribution to the economic history of those areas, it will have a place in the literature; also as confirmation that negative integration is less difficult to achieve than positive. This is by now well known in regard to Western Europe where negative integration succeeded quietly in manufactures and positive integration in agriculture led to noisy disputes. It is of interest to note that, in the LDCs, negative integration in primaries yielded some results but attempted positive integration in manufactures proved fatal to such schemes.

Despite these merits, at least one reader put this book down with some unease. The reason is the *mésalliance* of most of the authors with the theories of the 1950s. Take the case of free trade amongst LDCs first. For them, 'economic integration is about promoting or enhancing economic development and is advanced basically in terms of a dynamic infant industry argument' (p. 265). If such were the guidelines, no wonder these schemes faltered. The 'infant industry argument' is one for temporary protection, while regional free trade can gain international acceptance only if the tariff after union is no higher than the average of the tariffs before. To call the protectionist aspect 'positive integration' and the free trade one 'negative' is no escape. You cannot go both ways at once.

On Europe, we are told that 'integration is about resource reallocation as determined by the law of comparative advantage defined basically in a static sense'. When we seek *ex ante* guidelines, this may be a good first approach. In retrospect, however, we find that modest

ex ante expectations were exceeded by events. The reason was the emergence of intra-industry trade in manufactures which could not have been foreseen in the 1950s. To use the *ex ante* tools of comparative statics *ex post* means working with an antiquated kit, however nicely repolished. Curiously one has to wait for the chapter on Comecon before intra-trade gets a few pages. There it is frowned upon as of interest to producers rather than consumers.

Although quantitative analysis tends to be tied to comparative statics, so that good quantitative analysis nearly always understates, it is at any rate not tied to a particular ideology. The chapter on this subject by David Mayes gives clear warning against confusing comparative static effects with total effects, and against attributing all change to one cause. Failure to observe the latter caution could lead to the conclusion that the greatest investment effect of the European customs union occurred in Japan (p. 35)

University of Exeter F. V. Meyer

The Oil Factor in US Foreign Policy 1980–1990. By Melvin A. Conant. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 119pp. Index. £11·50.

Global Insecurity: A Strategy for Energy and Economic Renewal. Edited by Daniel Yergin and Martin Hillenbrand. Boston: Houghton Mifflin for the Atlantic Institute for International Affairs. 1982. 427pp. Index. $15.95.

It takes considerable courage to deliver an unpopular and unfashionable message to a public which is being encouraged by its own government to believe that the energy crisis was and is a phoney subject; for that reason alone, both these books are to be commended. Both are primarily targeted at the United States, where the problem is most serious: as Yergin points out, 'By 1982, many people wanted to pretend that the events of 1979–80 had occurred in the distant past, as though they had no relevance to the present and future. At a time when it was impossible to sort out the effects of short- and long-term conservation, recession, and oil inventory reductions, many nevertheless hurried to pronounce the problem "solved" ' (p. 15). Both these books are a frontal attack on that position (not nearly so widely held in Western Europe and Japan) which is particularly welcome from authoritative American commentators.

The Conant volume is a synthesis of a series of Council on Foreign Relations seminars to which the author has added his own conclusions. For the European reader the book may seem unsatisfactory in that within comparatively few pages it covers a great deal of territory: oil and allied strategy, the interests of Europe and Japan, the USSR, oil-producing nations, the international oil system and the prospects for common action by Western countries over energy security. Necessarily, much of this material is rather sketchy and phrased as questions for consideration rather than giving answers. In many places, assertions such as 'A Western Europe which by the 1990s obtained 20% of its gas from the USSR would differ greatly from the Europe of today, as would a Europe tied to the USSR by a common electricity grid . . .' (pp. 29–30) and '. . . unless the overall strategic balance is redressed and the Rapid Deployment Force created in fact, the Kremlin might be emboldened to take initiatives that would test the capability of the United States' (p. 90), require detailed discussion which they do not receive.

However, the purpose of this volume is rather different; it is to reawaken the United States to the fact that there is an important place for energy in foreign policy making. This is something that has been completely forgotten or ignored by the Reagan administration, where the comfortable doctrine that energy is something best dealt with by the private sector with no government interference, means that (with the break-up of the Department of Energy) not only is there an important lack of competence in government on energy matters, but it is very difficult to make it understood that attitudes towards Israel and the Palestinians are exceptionally important in the calculus of international oil trade. All this has to be relearned in Washington, preferably before the next oil crisis. For as the concluding chapter suggests, 'There is little point in thinking about the US initiatives with the Allies, the producers, the LDCs, and the USSR without first remedying the American decision making and implementing process' (p. 100).

Yergin and Hillenbrand have spread their net wider to take into account the broad economic and social consequences of the energy crisis. As the Director of the International Energy Agency has observed, 'There is still an oil gap, only now it is expressed in the

number of unemployed' (p. 26). In the six chapters devoted to Western Europe, Japan and the United States this problem is pursued using an upper and lower bound projection for energy supply and demand, developed by Robert Stobaugh. The chapters on Japan chronicle the remarkable progress made by that country in the post-1973 period but they fall somewhat short of an explanation of how the industrial power worst hit by the energy crisis has managed to cope with it best. The chapters on 'Europe's farewell to full employment', and 'The social contract under stress in Western Europe', if they fail to elucidate the precise nature of the link between employment and energy crisis (how much, for example, of UK unemployment can be ascribed to sharply increased energy prices?), nevertheless raise the essential issue of social and political consequences of another sharp discontinuity in the world energy market.

However, lest we in the industrialized countries begin to feel too sorry for ourselves, there is a chapter on the non-oil producing developing countries and the particularly fragile nature of their economic situation, where their hopes for even moderate development depend on steady increases in oil consumption which in turn depend on their ability to meet bills. Following on from the latter point, the chapter on debt burden and the new protectionism reads particularly vividly with the example of Mexico—a developing country and a major oil producer—coming within an inch of default and causing serious strains in the international financial system.

Finally, Ian Smart's contribution on energy and the power of nations makes important observations on how access to energy will be an increasingly salient factor in international politics. The comparison between NATO and the Warsaw Pact is striking and important in that it demonstrates the potential vulnerability of the United States in the face of continuing Soviet self-sufficiency. But perhaps the most telling issue is that of how to cope with continuing uncertainty; as Smart points out: 'Because it entails additional investment in alternative options, energy uncertainty must be regarded as a cost to the international system. . . . The fundamental issue for the 1980s is not whether such costs can be avoided, because they cannot. It is rather how they are to be distributed internationally and within national economies. The pattern of distribution, rather than the aggregate cost, will determine the impact of energy on the relative power of nations. But it is the total cost that will ultimately measure the impact of energy on the overall prosperity of the world economy from which no nation can entirely divorce itself' (pp. 373–4).

JONATHAN P. STERN

Development and Underdevelopment in Historical Perspective: Populism, Nationalism and Industrialisation. By Gavin Kitching. London, New York: Methuen. 1982. 196pp. Index. Pb.

THE subtitle of this book, 'Populism, Nationalism and Industrialisation', conveys the nature of its contents. Gavin Kitching has had the excellent idea of organizing a book on development around the writings and policies of individuals and groups opposed to large-scale industrialization. The result is an excellent and informative work which is accessible to economists, sociologists and historians interested in problems of development.

As industrialization gathered pace in the nineteenth century, a number of opposing strands emerged. Socialism was opposed to the capitalistic, profit-oriented nature of the process and its adverse consequences in terms of wealth inequality, poverty, waste, etc. But socialists, especially after Marx, welcomed large-scale industrialization as a progressive step towards the eventual triumph of socialism. Populism, on the other hand, was a movement against industrialization, especially of the large-scale variety, and was rooted in small urban crafts and agriculture. England is perhaps the exception in that a populist movement never took root there, but every other country experiencing development developed a populist strain. France and especially Russia provided the philosophical basis of populism in the nineteenth century. Nowadays neopopulism extols the peasantry and blends with the 'small is beautiful' ideas of Schumacher.

Kitching surveys populism and neopopulism. He covers not only the well known areas, such as Russian *Narodniki*, but also the less well known, such as the interwar ferment in Eastern Europe in favour of an agrarian path of development. Bringing the theory of populism up to the most recent decades, he then surveys the experiences of Tanzania and

China as populist development in action and also covers the activities of the ILO as a promoter of employment-oriented policies. Throughout Kitching plays the role of a critical expositor rather than a partisan of populism. The result is a well-balanced and useful book.

London School of Economics MEGHNAD DESAI

The Theory and Experience of Economic Development: Essays in Honor of Sir W. Arthur Lewis. Edited by Mark Gersovitz *et al.* London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 403pp. Index. £25·00.

THIS is a star-studded book with twenty-two contributions further honouring the already justly much-honoured Arthur Lewis for his seminal contributions to development economics. The contents are organized in five sections. The opening two essays—by Findlay and Bhagwati—assess Arthur Lewis's contribution; then follow six pieces (by Ranis and Fei; Kuznets; Taylor; Stiglitz; Rosenweig; Gersovitz) on 'The Dual Economy', based on Arthur Lewis's celebrated 1954 article from the Manchester School on 'Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour'. Next come five contributions (by Bardhan; Findlay; Harberger and Edwards; Branson and Katseli; Ohlin) on 'The Open Economy', based on Lewis's 1955 'Theory of Economic Growth', linking up with the concluding remarks of his 1954 article. The next three contributions are on cost, benefit and planning (by Srinvasan; Dasgupta; Baumol) based on Lewis's 1949 volume *The Principles of Economic Planning* and his 1966 book *Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy*. The final section comprises six contributions (by Cairncross; Kindleberger; Reynolds; Diaz-Alejandro; Little; Hirschman) on 'Economic History and History of Thought', where Arthur Lewis's key contributions are the Wicksell Lectures, 1969, 'Aspects of Tropical Trade, 1883–1965' and more recently his *Growth and Fluctuations 1870–1930*, published in 1978.

In the framework of a brief review it is impossible to do justice to these various contributions or even to list their titles! The wide range of the contributions, picking out specific items in Lewis's work, pay implicit tribute to the width and depth of his contribution. The two initial essays on Arthur Lewis's work by Findlay and Bhagwati are excellent and complementary; the one by Bhagwati has the advantage of including key quotations from Lewis's own writings. Excellent as these assessments are, the best person to assess Arthur Lewis's contribution would be Arthur Lewis himself—and he has done precisely that in his recent 'Pioneer Seminar' to the World Bank. Together with other such seminars, this will be published in a forthcoming volume edited by Dudley Seers and Gerald Meyer. Readers of the present volume may want to watch out for this.

Ronald Findlay, in his appreciation, includes an interesting combination of Lewis's 'dual-economy' and neo-classical explanations of falling marginal productivity of capital to explain the higher rates of growth of middle-income countries compared with low-income countries (and the return to lower rates of growth in the high-income industrial countries). However, while the data seem to support the first part of the hypothesis, one must be careful to avoid the obvious statistical fallacy that countries have graduated from low-income to medium-income status precisely because they had higher growth rates in the past. As the reviewer has shown (in a recent note in *World Development*), this explains a considerable part of the apparently increasing gap between low-income and middle-income countries. Also, on a *per capita* basis much of the difference between middle-income and high-income countries disappears.

Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex H. W. SINGER

Modern World Development. A Geographical Perspective. By Michael Chisholm. London, Melbourne: Hutchinson. 1982. 216pp. Index. £4·95.

THE author is Professor of Geography at the University of Cambridge, so this book represents a contribution to development studies from a high academic level and from an unusual disciplinary angle. The geographical approach has been recognized as important even by the most hard-line economists: the importance of natural resources (oil!), problems of environment, influence of climate, etc. At a time when the obvious priority lies with the sub-Saharan African countries, whose problems are so clearly linked with their location in the dry tropics, this should be enough to vindicate a geographical approach.

However, Professor Chisholm's volume is by no means limited to these obvious geographical factors. Rather, it represents a full survey of development economics. He has obviously done his homework well, as testified by the thirteen-page bibliography and a nine-page index. He modestly calls his book an 'extended essay' but in fact it can be used as a highly readable general introduction to the subject. The author's conclusions are in a general Keynesian direction and *à la* Brandt; he is not impressed by neo-Marxist or dependency views. He also concludes that the springs of development are varied and differ among different types of countries so that no single *primum mobile* can be identified.

For an economist, the book contains some flashes of new insight but also some surprising *faux pas*. For example, the view that benefits from trade and investment tend to be unequally distributed between rich and poor countries cannot be disproved—or proved for that matter—by analysing net capital flows in balance of payments statistics.

The data of the book seem to end in 1977 or so. With more up-to-date data the references to the 'sharp rise in commodity prices' and the conclusions based on it would have to be strongly modified. Even so, the thirty-two tables and twenty-one figures provide valuable material for the reader and the author must be congratulated for having produced so much interesting material in a book of less than 200 pages of text.

Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex H. W. SINGER

International Reserves, Exchange Rates, and Developing Country Finance. Edited by Norman C. Miller. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 160pp. Index. £15·50.

THE papers in this volume were originally presented at the Second International Monetary Conference held in Philadelphia in November 1980, sponsored by the Global Interdependence Center in collaboration with the Group of Thirty.

Although it is not always possible to get the true essence of any conference from the distilled version of the published papers, there is enough evidence here to suggest that discussions ranged pretty freely and widely and that there was a healthy air of controversy about the proceedings. The two main themes which the conference discussed were exchange rates and international reserves and the financing needs of the developing countries. Underlying the discussions was the question: how can the present international monetary system be altered in order better to achieve these objectives?

However, not everyone agreed that the present system needed altering. In fact, the editor states that on each issue discussions fell broadly into the pessimistic and the optimistic view. There was no agreement, for example, as to whether the present system was inflationary; the extent to which reserve currencies create or facilitate inflation; or the amount of central bank sterilization of reserves which actually took place. There was also no agreement on the health of the present system. Was it a time-bomb slowly ticking away or was it basically sound, requiring only a few minor adjustments? Again, the contribution which the creation of an SDR substitution account would make towards reducing exchange rate volatility was given a full airing, but no consensus emerged.

In all, there are eighteen papers including an introductory chapter which provides an admirable summary of what each paper is about. The individual papers are well-written, crisp and to the point. The arguments generally are clear and cogent, and even when the authors move on to controversial ground one feels that they do so from the logic of their own analysis rather than on the basis of established positions or preconceived notions. The contributors themselves are either high-powered academics in their own right or individuals who hold, or have held, equally high-powered positions in public life or international business and finance.

Several contributors stand out for various reasons. For example, Dr Witteveen writes on the substitution account, and who better to undertake this task, given the crucial role which he obviously played in the discussion? However, having lain down the burdens of high office, one would have expected him to make the case more vigorously. On the other hand, Kurt Richebacher makes a short but spirited attack on borrowing for consumption which he considers leads to disaster. Not everyone, of course, will agree with him. Henry Wallick argues that international monetary policy is lagging behind domestic monetary policy and that it might therefore be better for central banks to decide on the level of international

reserves and let the market determine the exchange rate. An equally challenging proposal is that put forward by Robert Triffin who advocates the formation of more regional monetary unions along the lines of the EMS in order to reduce the dollar overhang and its use as an intervention currency.

The author has succeeded in packing quite a lot of useful material into this book. Unfortunately there is no index to guide those who wish to be selective or to follow individual leads; however, this does not seriously detract from the contribution which it makes to the literature.

University of Glasgow GEORGE C. ABBOTT

Development Strategies in Semi-Industrial Economies. By Bela Balassa *et al.* Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank. 1982. 394pp. Index. $51.95.

POLICY-MAKERS complain—sometimes with justification—of the unwillingness of economists to produce workable operational counterparts to their theoretical models. One economist to accept the challenge is Bela Balassa. For a quarter of a century he has been a leading academic analyst of trade and development issues from a practical policy standpoint, and is a director of several policy-oriented World Bank research projects. His particular approach to trade policy and development issues relies heavily on the concept of 'effective protection' which he and other economists have refined and elaborated to provide estimates of the overall structures of incentives. This approach, which emphasizes the hidden costs of protection, underlies many of the typical policy reform suggestions made by the IBRD, and to have it fully spelled out in this way will be of special interest to those not fully acquainted with it.

This volume by Balassa and ten associates mainly consists (pp. 83–353) of detailed quantitative estimates of the incentive systems of six semi-industrial developing economies. On the basis of this information and less detailed data on five other such economies, the effects of incentives on resource allocation, international trade performance and economic growth are evaluated. The six semi-industrialized countries studied in part II are: Argentina, Colombia, Israel, Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan. The other five countries whose experience is referred to in part I are: Brazil, Chile, India, Mexico and Yugoslavia. Part I (pp. 9–79) is more general and comparative, and for those who have no special interest in the six countries studied in part II, it is these closely packed pages that will be of most interest.

The principal message is that discrimination against exports and highly distorted domestic price systems seriously impair market performance. An outward-oriented development strategy based on resource allocation according to comparative advantage is therefore recommended. The specific reforms that are suggested to make this possible include devaluation; a reduction in differences in incentives as between manufacture and agriculture and as between domestic sales and foreign markets; a reduction in the level of tariffs and in the dispersion of tariff rates; and the replacement of quantitative restrictions by other incentives. In short: get prices right, exports will grow and development will ensue.

For semi-industrial economies the advice is persuasive, though the techniques and the advice throw little light on the problem of how to determine 'dynamic comparative advantage' and how to relax the basic constraints on development. Moreover, even for such countries, the study is silent on the immense importance of what happens *outside* the market, through multinationals and other agencies. The advice is also generally sensible, if again only part of the answer for other countries that are near that stage of development. For still less advanced countries—the majority—it is less evidently applicable, without much qualification. Balassa *et al.*, of course, are not much concerned with less advanced countries in their evaluation of data, but chapter 4 does make recommendations for developing countries at large.

This book is a very useful compendium of experience and policy advice. Certainly anyone concerned with detailed economic analysis of the six countries in question will find the individual case studies valuable, though perhaps too dated to illuminate current policy choices. In this connection it should be emphasized that the analyses and policy recommendations of part II are based on the situation before the oil crisis, and do not consider subsequent developments. The general reader is likely to profit most from part I. If the World Bank wishes to proselytize, why, rather than financing sumptuously produced prestigious books on splendid paper, does it not make available the first short part as a

cheap, didactive paperback; for few readers are likely to buy it in this form, even in high income countries.

University of St Andrews PETER ROBSO

Multinationals from Developing Countries. Edited by Krishna Kumar and Maxwell G McLeod. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 211pp Index. £16·00.

THIS collection of eleven essays represents a useful addition to the growing literature o Third World multinationals. Essays by John Dunning and Louis T. Wells provide valuabl summaries of the theoretical significance of this relatively recent phenomenon. As might b expected, Dunning uses the terminology and categories of his eclectic theory of internationa production while Wells draws on the tradition of analysis pioneered by Raymond Verno and is particularly concerned to isolate those special characteristics of Third World economie which dictate the kinds of competitive advantages that their firms will possess over loca enterprises and multinationals from the industrialized West when they compete together i foreign countries. There is very little inconsistency between Dunning and Wells in spite o differences in terminology. Both draw attention to the skill of Third World firms in usin relatively labour-intensive methods and adapting to short production runs. Wells also point to the reservoir of very cheap and uncodified management skill to be found in the leadin industrial firms of the Third World, noting that when these enterprises invest abroad the tend to employ more expatriate personnel and take a much smaller share in the equity of th subsidiary than would commonly be the case with the US or European firms.

There follow essays on outward investment from South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan India, and Latin America, and on the ASEAN countries, Indonesia, and Nigeria as hosts t Third World multinationals. Krishna Kumar provides a final contribution on the multina tionalization of public-sector enterprises. These nine papers are of uneven quality. Lecra on ASEAN and Nambudiri and his colleagues on Nigeria, like Chen, report the results o modest surveys and so rise above some of the less substantial contributions. Ram Gropa Agrawal on Indian joint ventures never manages to forge an explanatory link between th informal cost-benefit analysis of Indian DFI to India which occupies most of the second hal of his paper and a rather speculative UNCTAD-esque introduction about the politica desirability of South–South cooperation. There is no evidence to show that Indian privat entrepreneurs were moved by his own utopian aspirations. On the other hand, goo economic reasons for their actions abound. Data present a constant problem to all thes authors, and an otherwise rather slight piece by Kiam Wie Thee on Indian joint ventures i Indonesia is memorable for suggestive remarks about the vast discrepancies between India and Indonesian official estimates of Indian DFI in Indonesia (pp. 137–8) and the dodge employed to get round Indonesian regulations governing the percentage of equity to be hel by indigenous Pribumis, which doubtless contribute to the statistical chaos (p. 140). Th theme of inadequacy of official statistics is also taken up by Eduardo White in his treatmen of Latin American DFI. This is in many ways the most substantial essay in the collection The little detailed research on Third World DFI that has been made available in English ove the past five years by Lecraw and others has been almost exclusively concerned with Asia White has taken this opportunity to present in English a substantial and appetizing summary o research carried out by a team to which he belonged at the Institute of Latin America Integration, the full results of which are as yet available only in Spanish. The essay is rich i detail, shows a mature understanding of the role of the state in the evolution of Latin America multinationals, and is a welcome replacement for the informative but essentially descriptiv stopgap contributed by Carlos Diaz Alejandro to T. Agmon and C. P. Kindleberger's earlie collection, *Multinationals from Small Countries* (Cambridge, Mass., 1977).

University of Warwick CHARLES JONE

Failed Multinational Ventures: The Political Economy of International Divestments. By Leon Grunberg. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot. 176pp. Index. £15·00.

LEON GRUNBERG is a sociologist bristling with irritation at conventional economists whon he believes to have slighted the role of rivalries within large multinational firms in determinin

precisely where the divestment axe will fall and neglected the predicament of labour forces in the face of major closures. Economists may have to plead guilty on the second charge, though they will surely be able to meet the first. To this extent the central thesis of this revised and abbreviated doctoral dissertation is perhaps a little less novel than the author supposes, though none the worse for that, and those familiar with the literature may safely confine their attention to the central chapters in which three case studies are presented.

The thesis is that while changing market conditions may dictate that some firms in an industry must go out of business it is not necessarily the least efficient in any national market that go to the wall. Precisely which firms are axed is determined by the struggles for power and resources which occur between subsidiaries within each large multinational firm, and to the strategic planners at head office the narrowly defined current performance of a subsidiary within its national market will not always be the deciding factor. Grunberg supports this plausible contention with studies of the divestment by British Leyland of its Italian subsidiary, Innocenti, the initial aborted attempt by Chrysler to get out of Britain, and the closing of Imperial Typewriters by Litton Industries, all of which took place in 1975. In addition to published sources Grunberg had access to some privileged material emanating from trades unions and the firms themselves and also conducted lengthy interviews with a number of participants including some executives or former executives of the companies concerned.

University of Warwick CHARLES JONES

Agricultural Price Policies and the Developing Countries. By George S. Tolley *et al.*, Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the World Bank. 1982. 242pp. Index. $32.50. £18·75.

THIS book attempts to examine agricultural price intervention in four developing countries—Korea, Bangladesh, Thailand and Venezuela—using basic economic tools. It identifies policies and analyses their effects but does not recommend alternative policies. It does, however, suggest and demonstrate relatively simple methods of analysing and measuring the major effects of price policies. The book will please econometricians but at the same time practising politicians will be reassured that they are still necessary as no general theory is identified, since policy requirements vary 'according to the individual circumstances of a country and its stage (sic) of development' (p. 232).

The authors suggest that many developing countries have agricultural pricing policies which are disincentives to raising agricultural productivity. Korea is used as an example of a country which has for a decade successfully pursued high farm price policies and, it is argued, as a result has in some years achieved self-sufficiency in essential foods. It is further recommended, however, that high cost price programmes should be phased out in Korea to free resources for other development goals.

The chapters dealing with individual case studies are detailed and emphasize market forces and the responses of producer and consumer. But these responses do not preoccupy the authors and the case studies are discussed in a realistic context. For example, it is recognized that the longer term effects of price incentives might be the most important element in the development process. The authors also emphasize that the mitigation of wide price fluctuations lowers the perceived risks to farm investment and encourages the adoption of new technology. Non-price factors, such as poor water control and the utilization of tracts ill-suited to a particular use, are also presented as important considerations.

The scope of the book is wide-ranging in approach even if of necessity it deals with only four countries. Often-overlooked features of price policies are given appropriate treatment, for example, the tendency of price interventions to outlast their usefulness: a short term intervention to encourage an innovation should not be sustained to a point beyond the general adoption of the chosen innovation for then it becomes a subsidy which might more appropriately be deployed elsewhere. The timing of a price support policy may be crucial if it is to be effective, and it must accord with international market trends. In addition the distortions of price intervention which is too extensive for too long are discussed, covering the social as well as the government costs of such policies.

The overall effect of the book is of a well written study bearing the signs of careful editing; even the econometrics should not deter the reasonably motivated reader: the formulae are embedded in a readable, clear and well designed text. The book should assist those seeking

an introduction to pricing mechanisms in agriculture as well as to those who are familiar with them but are looking for comparative studies. Decision-makers in, as well as academics, agency staff, consultants and students concerned with, the four countries treated can only gain by acquiring this comprehensive and well conceived study.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London J. A. ALLAN

Electricity Pricing: Theory and Case Studies. By M. Munasinghe and J. Warford. Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press for the World Bank. 381pp. Index. £17·00.

THIS detailed study, which attempts to synthesize the theoretical economic principles and the policy issues involved in setting electricity tariffs in the less developed economies, will be of greatest value to the applied analyst in the electricity supply industry. On a more general level the book gives an interesting insight into the application of a pure economic principle, that of marginal cost pricing, to a particular sector. The authors' approach to the topic owes much to an earlier World Bank publication, *Electricity Economics* by R. Turvey and D. Anderson (1977) to which a number of references are made and indebtedness acknowledged.

The first part of the book outlines the economic principles underlying marginal cost pricing with a particular emphasis upon its application in the electricity supply industry. The second part consists of a number of case studies, all of which relate to Asian economies and were prepared as part of a World Bank seminar by a number of contributors.

In the first part of the book (pp. 1–96) the authors argue convincingly that electricity tariffs should be related to the long run marginal cost of the supply system. It is held that by doing so the supply authorities will provide a better utilization of capacity and, through the use of economic (as opposed to financial) costing criteria, ensure that resources are efficiently allocated. The authors give a full analysis of how this pricing principle relates to electricity supply system planning and develop a pragmatic approach to marginal cost pricing. The final chapter in the first part of the book takes a brief look at a number of existing tariff structures.

The second part of the book (pp. 98–248) relates to the case studies of five Asian economies—Indonesia, Pakistan, the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Each of the case studies follows a standard basic format. A short historical perspective of the electricity system is given, after which the present organizational structure is explained. Following this the existing physical characteristics are outlined along with expected future developments in terms of demand forecasts and generation requirements. After this the strict long-run marginal cost is calculated for each system, and then adjusted to allow for differing socio-political objectives pertaining in the separate countries. This section contains very detailed information on the five countries under consideration.

The book also contains a number of appendices (pp. 251–367). These give information relating to power sector statistics for developing countries as well as an example of a computer programme to calculate the long-run marginal cost of an electricity system. If there is a criticism of the study, it is that these appendices are too long and in some cases not directly relevant to the study.

The book is, then, a very good introduction to the application of marginal cost pricing. The authors are obviously adherents of this pricing policy and strongly advocate its use even under conditions where optimal resource allocation is not possible. In forwarding their case for marginal cost pricing the authors have brought together a very comprehensive study of the economics of the electricity industry in Asia.

University of Aberdeen A. MCGUIRE

Human Rights and United States Policy Toward Latin America. By Lars Schoultz. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1982. 421pp. £22·80. Pb.: £5·70.

The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Edited by Louis Henkin. New York: Columbia University Press. 1981. 523pp. Index. $45.50.

LARS SCHOULTZ has written a very good account of the part played by human rights considerations in recent United States foreign policy towards Latin America. His focus is on

how decisions on this matter were actually made, in Congress from the early 1970s when Congressman Fraser and others made it an issue there, and in the executive particularly during the Carter years. He seeks by these means to get at the values underlying United States foreign policy towards Latin America. The book deals with how public opinion in general, and interest groups in particular, regard the question of human rights in Latin America. It then examines the place of human rights in United States diplomacy towards, aid to and trade (including trade in arms) with Latin America. And it concludes with a view as to why human rights became a prominent issue in this arena in the 1970s, another as to whether its prominence in the United States made any difference to Latin America, and a third as to how human rights activists might best influence foreign policy.

Schoultz rejects what he calls the traditional United States explanation of Latin American lapses in the matter of human rights as derivative either from the shortcomings of Hispanic political culture or from anomalous despotism. He has a more interesting theory about the rise of new classes to join the established governing coalitions in Latin America, their threatening to split them apart, being bought off by the redistribution of wealth which in circumstances of non-growth is financed by printing money which causes inflation, then being excluded from power by the military regimes which aim to restore economic soundness and political stability, at which point dissent is discouraged and human rights violations begin. In the end, Schoultz is sceptical as to whether the United States can do much to interdict this cycle, but he is convinced that it tried to do so, in the main for the best reasons, during the middle and latter 1970s. Aid, particularly, became in some degree the reward for good Latin American behaviour, and its withdrawal the penalty for bad behaviour during the Carter administration, and the Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs had a prominent role in the State Department's decision-making on the distribution of aid. Diplomatically too, Latin American governments with a poor human rights record had a rougher time during the Carter years than when Kissinger issued instructions to an ambassador to cut out the political science lectures. But trade, apart from, in some measure, the arms trade, was not a lever lightly used. The strong presumption was in favour of exports, and offending governments, as Schoultz says, got a dollar by trade for every dime they lost in aid.

Elsewhere in the world, says Schoultz, Carter's human rights policy was rapidly compromised for reasons of political and economic security. But towards Latin America, where, he argues, the old threats of external attack and internal subversion were not so prominent as they had once been, human rights could play a more consistent part in foreign policy. Indeed, they were there in foreign policy at all only because ritual anti-communism had become a much less credible sign-post for policy, and it was necessary for the United States to recapture, after Vietnam and Watergate, some of its old moral direction abroad as well as at home. Human rights were things the United States needed to champion for internal purposes, rather than to achieve for external ones, and the record of effectiveness was spotty. Schoultz's expectations are not great, then, but a high United States line on human rights might at least serve to encourage the domestic opponents of despotic regimes, and if human rights activism is well organized and planned on the basis of concrete cases rather than on general moral worthiness, it might make a small difference.

The book edited by Louis Henkin is written by lawyers, but not only for lawyers. It is a very helpful analysis of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which came into force in 1976. Henkin himself writes an interesting introduction in which he stresses the unique and revolutionary purpose that international law has taken on by admitting individuals into its province, and the chapters that follow are nearly all of equally high quality. Each of them deals with the interpretation of its section of the Covenant aided by the *travaux préparatoires* and by the work of the Human Rights Committee set up under the Covenant. There are particularly instructive chapters by Antonio Cassese on self-determination, Louis B. Sohn on minorities, and Oscar Schachter on implementation.

Australian National University, Canberra R. J. VINCENT

Ethnic Identities in a Transnational World. Edited by John F. Stack, Jr. Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood. 1981. 226pp. Index. £21·95. $27.50.

THE title of this collaborative volume alludes to two important features of the contemporary international system: a widely felt 'need for roots', to borrow Simone Weil's phrase, in an

ethnic community, and a greatly increased mobility of ideas, people and goods on a global scale. The complex interaction of these two apparently opposite forces is the common theme of these otherwise quite different essays, which were all written especially for this book. This attempt to link ethnicity and transnationalism, two recent additions to the vocabulary of international relations, is handled by the editor and his contributors with a commendable sensitivity to their limitations in a world still dominated by states.

John F. Stack, Jr, provides an introduction and conclusion which draw out the implications of the diverse material presented by the individual essays. His own chapter, 'Ethnic Groups as Emerging Transnational Actors', attempts a level-of-analysis approach which seemed to this reviewer repetitious and overly burdened with social science terminology. Each of the more specialized studies is well done, combining a wealth of detail with broad analysis.

John P. Paul's 'The Greek Lobby and American Foreign Policy: A Transnational Perspective' focusses on the issue of US military and economic aid to Turkey in relation to the Cyprus conflict during 1974 and 1975; he concludes that the Greek-American community was a significant but not decisive factor in the various Congressional votes on the question.

In 'International Migration and French Foreign Relations' Martin Slater examines the guest worker in France as a case study in the relations between labour-exporting and labour-importing countries. James P. Piscatori's 'The Formation of the Saudi Identity: A Case Study of the Utility of Transnationalism' documents with a careful historical survey the importance of Islam and pan-Arabism in the related processes of conferring legitimacy on the authority of the Saudi monarchy and forming a national identity.

The international repercussions of American popular culture and the development of black movements in the United States are discussed by Pierre-Michel Fontaine in his 'Transnational Relations and Racial Mobilization: Emerging Black Movements in Brazil'. David B. Kanin outlines the politics of international sport, particularly the Olympic Games, in 'Ethnicity and the Politics of Cultural Exchange: Transnational Sport in the International System', although his fascinating account of national manipulation of international sporting events seems to bely his own definition of cultural exchange as interactions 'arranged with a sympathetic, personal relationship as their goal' (p. 163).

There are a few misprints and editorial slips (e.g. 'Massini' for Mazzini on p. 164), a useful short bibliography, and a rather sketchy index.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth M. WRIGHT

Islam and Contemporary Society. Edited by Salem Azzam. London, New York: Longman for the Islamic Council of Europe. 1982. 279pp. Index. Pb.: £3·50.

THIS book, consisting of contributions by leading Muslim scholars, purports to present Islam to the West and to correct Western misconceptions. Only five of the eleven articles actually achieve that objective. 'Islam as a Supreme Doctrine' by Professor Muhammad Qutb, 'Islam and the Pillars of its Faith' by Dr Ebrahim M. A. El-Khouly, 'Islam as Culture and Civilization' by Professor Isma'il Al Faruqi, 'Islam and Aesthetic Expression' by Dr Lois Lamya' Al Faruqi, and 'Islam and the Secular Thrust of Western Imperialism' by Altaf Gauhar, are spirited, honest and intelligent expositions of Islam. Their achievement, however, is neutralized by the rest of the book's contents.

'Banking and the Islamic Standpoint', by Prince Mohammed Al-Faisal Al-Saud, presents a wholly wishful reading of Islam. At pages 123 and 127, for instance, it says:

> Spending here comprises all kinds of lawful spending including investment. In the language of the Arabs 'spending' has various meanings, among them . . . 'making money'.

Fortunately for Arabs and for Islam, the author exposes his error by using the same English word, 'spending', for two different Arabic words, '*nafaqa*' and '*masraf*', and by concentrating on the latter, which is a banking term, instead of the former, which is the Quranic term. While *masraf* means use and, like its English counterpart, includes both spending and investment, *nafaqa* means spending and cannot possibly include 'making money'. Spending and earning, like black and white, can never be the same in any language whatever.

'The Economic System of Islam', by Dr Sadiq Al-Mahdi, is also an opinionated and eclectic use of Islam in the service of the author's own inclinations. Dr Seyyed Hossein Nasr's two articles, 'Intellect and Intuition: Their Relationship from the Islamic Perspective',

and 'Islam and Modern Science', are essentially, though subtly, sectarian. Of Islam as understood by the mainstream of Muslims, they promote positive misunderstanding.

Allahbukhsh K. Brohi's two articles, 'Islam: its Political and Legal Principles', and 'Human Rights and Duties in Islam: A Philosophic Approach', are essentially speculative and occasionally unsure. Not many Muslims can help being nonplussed by this:

> if the People with a capital 'p' is regarded as a corporation whose entity solely transcends time and is to be viewed as a kind of immortal stuff, then what is there to differentiate it from the doctrine of Islam which says it is God alone Who is Sovereign? (p. 240).

Again, when the crucial Quranic term 'muttaqi' is equated with 'self-controlled' (p. 71), the unwary Western reader must wonder whether the Yogi may not be the best of Muslims. Discriminating readers, on the other hand, will find flashes of rare insight.

'Universal Islamic Declaration', which provides the epilogue, is conceived and expressed in the Western idiom and is falsified by that circumstance. 'Code', 'principles', 'state', carry very different incidents and implications than do the Islamic terms 'Deen', 'Ahkam', and 'Khalifa'. A postscript: some of the articles miss editing very badly.

FATEH M. SANDEELA

History

Ideology and Experience: Antisemitism in France at the Time of the Dreyfus Affair. By Stephen Wilson. London, Toronto: Associated University Presses. 1982. 812pp. Index. £30·00.

THIS is not a book about the Dreyfus case but it gives the affair a dimension that future students will find impossible to ignore. Indeed, the magnitude of Dr Wilson's achievement is such that for the first time he makes the affair fully credible. He brings this about by moving the focus of interest away from the fate of Dreyfus as an individual and on to a society subject to widespread antisemitism. It is not a pretty picture, but it is unfortunately recognizable.

In general terms, Wilson has aimed to further the understanding of antisemitism in terms of its social function in a particular society at a particular time. France at the time of the affair offered unique advantages. First, it was sufficiently removed from the Third Reich to be considered in its own perspective; second, the Jewish population of France was so small at the time—some 80,000 or about 0·2 per cent of the whole—that it made more evident the socio-ideological function of antisemitism; third, the period is exceptionally well documented, both at primary and at secondary level—to say nothing of the mass of disparate evidence that Wilson has culled from pamphlets, police reports, novels, autobiographies, posters, debating societies, subscription lists, etc. Indeed, it is difficult to recall a comparable example of the historical analysis of an antisemitic phenomenon. Wilson uses this material to reconstruct antisemitism as an ideology (especially through the writings of Edouard Drumont), as an organized movement in the *Ligue Antisémitique Française* and the *Action Française* and as an instrument of violence in, for example, the anti Jewish riots of 1898. Does this minute scrutiny help to explain how an abuse of justice perpetrated on one individual could convulse a nation over perhaps a decade? On the way to an answer Wilson brings out both the rationality and the irrationality of antisemitism. It was rational in that it provided an internally consistent and coherent explanation of a supposed state of cosmic and national decadence of which the Jews were identified as the active agent. Antisemitism on this analysis not only gave to its adherents the picture of an ideal unchanging world but also accounted for the disintegration of that world into the crisis, confusion and disorientation characteristic of the end of the nineteenth century under the impact of modernity. The ideology was irrational, however, in that it took no account of the tiny total of French Jews and their absence from positions of power and influence. Moreover, Wilson shows that there was no discernible connection between those areas where antisemitism flourished and the actual presence of Jews. But why should the Jews be singled out as the agents and beneficiaries of corruption? Wilson points to the fact that though antisemitism 'was conducted less and less in traditional religious terms, it was still mainly a Catholic phenomenon' (p. 741), that is to

say it could draw on a teaching and doctrinal heritage that was by no means limited to Catholic circles but which had also penetrated the thinking of free-thinkers and liberals. The animus accumulated over the centuries was readily to hand when social and other problems displaced the resentment of the affected groups on to a scapegoat already identified. Dr Wilson has illuminated this process in the modern French context in a masterly fashion.

University of Warwick LIONEL KOCHAN

Prelude to Appeasement: East Central European Diplomacy in the Early 1930s. By Lisanne Radice. Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs. 1981. (Distrib. by Columbia University Press.) 218pp. Index. $22.75.

HOWEVER prescient subsequent generations think they ought to have been, statesmen of the time did not respond at once to the rise of Hitler. The first reactions came surprisingly from Litvinov and Mussolini, the latter with a firm proposal for a four-power pact. This idea particularly worried the Poles since it threatened them with exclusion from the decision circle of Europe. Russian stirrings interested the French who sensed the possibility of an eastern settlement involving Germany. By January 1934 Poland had ratified its non-aggression pact with Russia and concluded one with Germany, and French and Soviet ministers had exchanged official visits. It was a moment when the post-Hitler shape of Europe might have been changed for the better rather than the worse.

So argues Lisanne Radice in a discussion of the period that takes proper account of eastern Europe. Internal problems and changes of government produced a series of delays on the French side; but through the first half of 1934 the Soviet Union proved accommodating and Poland maintained its willingness to keep on improved terms with both its large neighbours. However, French proposals for a combined Eastern Locarno and Franco–Soviet treaty were slow to materialize and lacked precision; Poland became evasive, Germany subtly hostile. The position of Britain was ambivalent; it accepted the idea, but partly to manoeuvre France and Germany into agreement. And there were the usual Franco–British differences of interpretation and emphasis.

The Franco–Soviet rapprochement proceeded haltingly. But significantly, when Laval succeeded Barthou, assassinated in October 1934, French interest shifted to a concern for an understanding with Germany, and this matched the British mood of early 1935. The original idea was therefore virtually dead before Hitler announced his rearmament plans in March of that year and Poland became more evasive still. It was re-canvassed in several weaker versions after the conclusion of the Franco–Soviet Treaty in May 1935, concluded largely against Laval's sentiments; but even before that Treaty was ratified by the French Assembly in February 1936, an element of farce had entered all further talk of an Eastern pact. Hitler was bent on overthrowing Versailles, and Britain was on course for eventual appeasement.

The story is worth telling, though, as the author herself says, the French proposals were flawed by ambiguity from the start and so had little hope of success. If the relation of the tale takes some time, it is partly because of the range of sources, including valuable Polish ones, that are used; and the conclusions are crisp. It is unfortunate mainly that—perhaps because of publication delays—there is no reference to the literature of the last few years.

University of Glasgow W. V. WALLACE

The Spanish Civil War. By Antony Beevor. London: Orbis. 1982. 320pp. Index. £12·00.

Comintern Army: The International Brigades and the Spanish Civil War. By R. Dan Richardson. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky. 1982. 232pp. Index. $19.50.

ANTONY BEEVOR's publishers are entitled to call his book the first all-round study of the civil war since Franco's death, and it is in many ways an impressive attempt to grapple with an immensely complex subject. Operational maps help to clarify the military narrative, which is always competently done: he has the advantage of being a former army man. A lavish series of photographs, catching facets of the conflict from a diversity of angles, help to bring the tragic drama back to life. An introductory section emphasizes the corruptions and injustices of prewar Spain, and the blank refusal of the ruling classes to admit the need for reconstruction. It was to protect old abuses and keep the country in its semi-mediaeval condition that the generals launched their attack on the Republic in July 1936,

They called themselves 'Nationalists', brought into Spain a horde of Moorish mercenaries, Germans and Italians, and practised unlimited brutality. Physical destruction of all actual or suspected opponents was the only way Spain's bloodsuckers could think of to make themselves safe for another generation. Mass murder continued long after the fighting: Beevor quotes an estimate of 200,000 executions in the following four years as the most generally received.

Jealousies and jockeyings among factions were prominent on both sides. Falangists and Carlists were really further apart than communists and anarchists, but Franco's heterogeneous supporters were shepherded by the vested interests which were making use of them all, with religion as façade. Compared with that 'cunning opportunist' (p. 118), there was no individual nearly as astute in the other camp. The communist party's growing ascendancy imposed what unity there was; many anarchists never really accepted the need of centralized direction. One is often left feeling that they wanted to enjoy the rewards of victory before winning the war.

Beevor however is convinced that communist centralizing, in collision with anarchist faith in 'worker self-management', led to morale being 'mortally stricken' (p. 91). His account of communist doings is unrelievedly black. Stalinist tactics were utilized to gain control through 'a few picked men in key posts' (p. 183); police repression was organized to liquidate or intimidate dissenters. It has to be remembered that there were very few communists before the war, so that the great majority in the party were recent converts. To win them the party must have had something to offer besides its connection with Russia, the Republic's only friend in Europe. But the sudden influx of raw new members may well have made it easier for Soviet and other foreign communists to push their tactics. The book's method excludes detailed references to sources; in matters so extremely controversial, this must be regretted. Its author does cover himself by admitting at the start that 'The absolute truth about such a politically passionate subject can never be known' (p. 8).

During the five months beginning in November 1936, the International Brigades, Richardson acknowledges, 'played a crucial, perhaps decisive, military role': they could not have saved Madrid by themselves, but Madrid could not have been saved without them (pp. 81, 87). There are some errors of detail in his work. 'Saklatvata' on page 73 should be 'Saklatvala'. On page 157 Ernest Bevin is confused with Aneurin Bevan. It is only from across the Atlantic that the ILP can look a 'Marxist' and 'revolutionary' party (p. 29). What matters more is that the book, though it brings together much significant material, is inspired by a resolve to depict the Brigades as an instrument of Third International aggrandizement, and to show the Comintern and everything connected with it in the most luridly sinister light. It is quite true that communist parties had a great deal to do with recruiting the Brigades. Even crusades have to be organized by someone. Richardson recognizes that since a large proportion of Brigade men were communists, accustomed to a high standard of party discipline, they took naturally enough to the discipline of a serious military force (pp. 54, 131), very unlike the anarchists. But he believes that they were subjected to a continual reign of terror by stalinist political bosses headed by the 'iron-fisted autocrat' André Marty. No doubt there was a morbid tendency to suspect treason and 'Trotskyism' everywhere, but no doubt also the enemy were not blind to chances of smuggling agents into Republican Spain, a point only referred to in a brief footnote on page 193. Strangely, in view of the picture painted here, it has always been easy to meet old members of the Brigades who look back on their service with well-justified pride, and went through it without the least inkling that they and their comrades were being terrorized by a ruthless secret police.

V. G. Kiernan

Who Voted for Hitler? By Richard F. Hamilton. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1982. 664pp. Index. £35·50. Pb.: £11·70.

Professor Hamilton challenges the orthodox view that the German lower middle classes were peculiarly vulnerable to the National Socialist appeal during the twilight of the Weimar Republic. He argues that there is remarkably little empirical evidence underpinning the claim that the lower middle classes—in any case a very diverse group—gave the NSDAP heavy electoral support. Investigating voting patterns in a number of major cities during the Weimar period, he analyses the behaviour of individual city districts, and concludes that the urban

lower middle classes played no distinctive role in the NSDAP's electoral triumphs. Relatively speaking, the best Nazi results usually occurred in the wealthiest districts, with the Protestant upper and upper middle classes voting especially heavily for the NSDAP during the early 1930s. The less wealthy a district, the less well the Nazis normally fared, although their support was not negligible in working-class areas—around 25 per cent—and in absolute terms these districts delivered about half the urban Nazi vote. What of Protestant rural Germany, where the NSDAP achieved its best electoral results? Hamilton doubts whether the Nazis' successes there signified specifically lower-middle-class support; Catholic rural areas, with as many lower-middle-class voters, were especially reluctant to vote Nazi. Furthermore, in many rural Protestant communities virtually everyone, not just the lower middle classes, supported Hitler.

Using a range of published sources, Hamilton reappraises the rise of Nazism in the light of his findings. The attitude of the quality press to the NSDAP and the responses of a wide range of political and economic institutions to the crisis of the early 1930s are considered in some detail. The left-wing parties appear divided and incapable of expanding their base of support during a savage depression. Germany's traditional elites emerge as fragmented, out of touch, and ineffective. They tolerated, and occasionally assisted, the NSDAP, hoping to bolster their own position, but only to see themselves decisively outmanoeuvred. The NSDAP's leaders, who displayed formidable organizational skills, served neither as a tool of the bourgeoisie, nor as the embodiment of lower-middle-class panic. For Hamilton the preponderance within their ranks of veterans from a lost war, largely junior ex-officers and NCOs, who felt betrayed and cheated by the peacetime government, was crucial. Parallels are drawn with the French experience during the Algerian crisis and with similar military disasters elsewhere.

While some of these arguments will be familiar to historians and references to some recent published research will be missed, Hamilton's stimulating conclusions and his penetrating assessment of earlier research on the sociology and history of Nazism command attention. His central task, the analysis of urban voting patterns in Weimar Germany, has challenged much of the received wisdom on the social basis of early Nazism and for this we are in his debt. *Who Voted for Hitler?* promises to become the standard work in its field.

Heriot-Watt University, Edinburgh CONAN FISCHER

The Hut Six Story: Breaking the Enigma Codes. By Gordon Welchman. London: Allen Lane. 1982. 326pp. Index. £8·95.

THE philosophers at Oxford taught me not to generalize from a single instance. To judge from the brouhaha about the recently disclosed treachery of Mr Prime at GCHQ, Cheltenham, one might imagine that our cryptanalytical institutions were crammed with Russophile moles. But though in the Second World War the incentive to aid an embattled USSR was even greater, out of the many hundreds of responsible officers who handled secret material at Bletchley Park—Ultra, etc.—only one name has been mentioned (and that without absolute certainty) as a trafficker with Russia. In other words, Prime situations are liable to make us forget the totally committed dedication of the overwhelming majority in such institutions. In America the NSA has had its own leakages, but the mathematical factor remains the same.

In Gordon Welchman's important book we have an instance of that unqualified dedication. A mathematics don at Sidney Sussex, Welchman joined Bletchley on the first day of the war, a part of that remarkable Cambridge contingent which was the steel in Bletchley's shaft. The first half of his book describes what nobody has tackled before: the precise nature of the cryptological considerations which resulted in our breaking into the Germans' Enigma cypher—and thereafter never losing grip on one or other aspect of it—as early as the spring of 1940. The narrative works at two levels. The reasonably intelligent reader can pick a path through the maze of technicalities to work out for himself how, in principle, the triumph was achieved. For the sophisticated cryptanalyst Welchman supplies a mass of supportive evidence by way of tables of figures and other arcane mysteries.

The particular point is that Welchman himself was at the heart of this invaluable intellectual achievement, and his account illustrates exactly the consuming sense of dedication and urgency which made the problem dominate his conscious and unconscious life throughout

those anxious winter months and, under the strain, quickened his perception in a way that must never have occurred at Sidney Sussex. For all students of Ultra and its heartland, Bletchley, this book is essential.

In the second half of the book Welchman correlates his experience in these years with his postwar career in the United States (of which he is now a citizen) as a top-level adviser to, *inter alia*, the USAF and NATO, primarily on problems of signal-security. His message is bleak. He has found, in many practical ways, a pervasive state of apathy and ignorance about such matters among senior officers. It might well be argued, on the basis of his record, that the Primes of this world not only consist of the ideologically twisted moles in our clandestine organizations, but also find their representatives among the 'top brass' who spend billions on armaments but lack the vision to make certain that their communications are one hundred per cent secure.

RONALD LEWIN

Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler's Europe 1939–1945. By Werner Rings. Trans. by J. Maxwell Brownjohn. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1982. 351pp. Index. £9·50.

THIS is a very useful supplement to our knowledge of resistance and, more especially, collaboration in German-occupied Europe. It is not, as one extract from a review of the original German-language edition printed on the present volume's dust cover has it, a 'study which describes the full extent of collaboration and resistance for the very first time'. Pan-European resistance has been analysed already—in terms of what it was, who resisted, when, where, how and why—in some excellent recent studies, for example, M. D. R. Foot's *Resistance* (1978), Henri Michel's *The Shadow War* (1975), and J. Haestrup's *Europe Ablaze* (1978). Mr Rings does not appear to suggest that his own work has superseded these, and nor does it. He covers much familiar ground and although he organizes his information around a new typology of resistance—symbolic, polemic, defensive, offensive—it is hard to see that these categories can be distinguished fundamentally from earlier equivalent classifications—passive and administrative resistance, clandestine press and escape lines, the underground state and aid to persecuted groups, intelligence and subversion.

Indeed, Rings's assessment of resistance lacks some of the thematic clarity which is to be found in the works of Michel and Foot, regarding who resisted and why; there is no comparative study of such factors as class, nationalism or religion as stimuli to resistance. Nor, in terms of how, where and when, does the impact of topography and the state of play in the 'big' conventional war upon the nature and scale of the 'small' irregular war come through clearly. Strangely, there is no consideration at all of resistance or collaboration in Germany or Austria, which would both seem to fall under the remit of the title. There is hardly a word upon collaboration in Albania, Hungary, Slovakia, Italy and Greece, nor upon resistance in the three former.

The strength of this study is in its analysis of collaboration. As Rings observes, except for David Littlejohn's *The Patriotic Traitors* (1972), there is no work which has specifically assessed collaboration as a phenomenon in a number of occupied European countries. While Littlejohn's book is both interesting and readable, it hardly constitutes a comparative analysis of collaboration. Rings has provided this, again through a typology, classifying collaboration as neutral, unconditional, conditional and tactical. Certainly, equivalents of these categories have been used by other writers in assessing collaboration in individual states, but Rings shows how extensively they can be applied to depict behaviour in much of wartime Europe. Perhaps the most original section is that on 'working-class' collaboration.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

Anglo-American Economic Collaboration in War and Peace 1942–1949. By Sir Richard Clarke. Edited by Sir Alec Cairncross. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1982. 215pp. £12·50.

SIR RICHARD ('OTTO') CLARKE was a civil servant in the Treasury over the period covered by this book. From 1947 he served as chairman of the interministerial 'London Committee' which supervised the delegation to the OEEC and directed all Marshall Aid negotiations and

then under the new title of European Economic Cooperation Committee directed British policy towards all schemes for European economic integration. In the last year of his life he apparently decided to tell the story of what happened but to all intents and purposes he got no further than the end of 1946. His story remains as a set of fragmentary jottings about the end of the war and the Anglo-American Financial Negotiations, covering eighty-five pages in all. It is filled out with a short commentary by Cairncross, which moderates some of Clarke's more quirky passages and with twenty-seven Treasury memoranda and other documents printed in full. Most of these are now accessible in the Public Record Office. They have been well chosen to point out the direction of Clarke's story had he lived to tell the end.

This is therefore a most curious mixture of a book. It does not give a coherent account of Treasury policy over these years, neither does it give a coherent account of Clarke's own role in the formulation of that policy. It is more an illustrated recollection of what Clarke thought at the time. His thoughts were sometimes rather more erratic and his opinions more wilful than either his own text or the documents reveal. There is nothing about the period after Marshall's Harvard speech which is new other than the few documents relating to British policy towards economic cooperation with Europe. The work deals essentially with Bretton Woods and the dollar loan to Britain and this is by now rather well worked-over territory. The main impression it leaves is the same as that left by the study of the available public archives on the period. How little time or detachment was possible in the activities of a busy responsible Ministry for any kind of long-term analysis! No doubt that is what was mainly responsible for the contrast between the subtle analysis of immediate tactical issues in policy formulation and negotiations and the emotional prejudice and simple melodrama which replaced accurate analysis on the rare occasions when longer-term policy issues had to be discussed. But there were surely other reasons too for this, and in so far as Clarke shows this contrast very clearly he was representative of his type. It might have been more charitable to have printed one of his numerous accurate assessments of the likely short-term impact of convertible drawing rights in 1948 or quota removals in 1949 alongside the faintly crazy memorandum of September 1948 suggesting an ultimate union between the British Commonwealth and the United States. The value of the book may prove to be as further evidence about the workings of the civil service rather than as new light on the historical period under discussion.

UMIST, University of Manchester ALAN S. MILWARD

Colonialism and the Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence 1945–49. By Robert J. McMahon. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1982. 338pp. Index. £15·75.

THE battle for Indonesia's independence involved many interests other than those of the two principals, the Indonesian nationalist movement and the Dutch. In this respect Indonesia's place in international politics during the period immediately after the Second World War was comparable to that of Vietnam. However, the Indonesian situation was entirely different from that of Vietnam as seen from the vantage point of policymakers in Washington. The ultimate consequence of this was American pressure on the Dutch to grant independence to a non-communist Indonesian nationalist government.

Robert J. McMahon, an historian with the US Department of State, has traced carefully and thoroughly the evolution of the United States' attitude toward Dutch colonialism and Indonesia from before the Second World War until after independence. The core of the book is a detailed study of the development of US policy from the time of the Allied reoccupation in August 1945 until independence in December 1949; the analysis is based on the archives of the State Department as well as on British Foreign Office papers, private collections and the extensive literature in English on the Indonesian nationalist movement. *Colonialism and the Cold War: The United States and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence* is the most complete study of its subject available and it will be an essential reference work for students of American policy in South-east Asia.

For all that, the book contains few if any surprises. What McMahon has succeeded in doing is demonstrating that publicly expressed US policy mirrored the sometimes contradictory advice given by different sections of the State Department to the President and Secretary

of State at the time. As the author states, the book '. . . attempts to show how other, more dominant interests of American diplomacy, shaped by events outside Indonesia, conditioned American policy toward the area. In short, it seeks to illuminate the fundamental relationship between America's colonial policy and a deepening Cold War' (p. 14).

Indeed, it is this last point which comes through most clearly. Because Indonesia was so peripheral to the United States' post-war concerns, policy came to be made on the most simplistic cold war grounds. The ability of the Hatta government to put down the communist rebellion at Madium in 1948 underlined for American policymakers the point that US economic interests in Indonesia and new global cold war concerns would be best met by pressing the recalcitrant Dutch to retreat from their empire. By 1949 the Dutch government had no choice but to acquiesce. However, as McMahon ably argues, the international alignment of Indonesia, and American influence in South-east Asia, were still to be determined.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London ROBERT H. TAYLOR

Bitter Legacy: Polish–American Relations in the Wake of World War II. By Richard C. Lukas. Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky. 1982. 191pp. Index. £12·00.

WHEN the war in Europe ended, Soviet troops had advanced through Poland into the heart of Germany. It was inevitable that Poland should come under Soviet influence and clearly there was little that the Western allies could do to assist the Poles to achieve their freedom. At the outset of his book, Lukas tells us that the United States had written the area off as a Soviet sphere of influence, although there remained a belief that the United States could still exert some influence through economic diplomacy and even ensure that the Polish Peasant Party under Mikolajczyk, the head of the former government in exile, would continue to play a part in the political life of the country.

In fact there was a gradual worsening of relations. For a time American economic aid continued despite the tightening of the communist grip on the country. The fraudulent elections of January 1947, which left the communists in undisputed control, was a turning point. The Polish authorities were still anxious to get American economic aid but they were now less likely to get a sympathetic response and more likely to find unacceptable conditions attached to any offer of aid.

There is no doubt that some aspects of American policy were not calculated to improve relations with the Poles. Lukas suggests that the United States was more concerned with Germany than Poland. Hence the reluctance to accept the incorporation of former German territory into Poland, an attitude which was resented by anti-communist Poles in exile as well as the Polish authorities.

The real question raised by this book is whether different policies on the part of the United States could have made any significant difference to the course of relations between the two countries. Would it have made a difference if the United States had taken a different line on the boundary issue, and perhaps taken a tougher stand on conditions for economic aid before the elections of 1947 had confirmed the communists in power? Lukas suggests that Ambassador Lane was not the right man to be in Warsaw at the critical time: 'What the United States needed in Poland was a more imaginative and flexible man who, by being sensitive to the political and economic nuances of postwar Poland, could exploit various opportunities to American advantage'.

Lukas gives an adequate account of the course of postwar relations between the two countries and the factors which influenced American policy. Whether different policies on the part of the United States could have significantly altered the pattern, however, is more doubtful. Is it really likely that even if the Polish authorities had wanted to respond to a more sympathetic American line, they would have been allowed to do so? Sandwiched between the Soviet Union and East Germany, Poland was in no position to take the more independent line of a country like Yugoslavia.

University of Dundee J. M. JACKSON

The End of an Alliance: James F. Byrnes, Roosevelt, Truman and the Origins of the Cold War. By Robert L. Messer. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 1982. 292pp. Index. £14·00.

THE historiography of the cold war seems to have recovered from its factiousness of a decade ago. Professional historians no longer seem so obliged to apportion blame or to seek villains and heroes in the aftermath of the Second World War. Robert Messer, in a short but stimulating account of James F. Byrnes' role in foreign policy in the period 1945–6, has desisted from trying to settle old scholarly scores and instead has recreated the story of a political partnership—or rather two political partnerships—between president and foreign policy adviser. Although the outline of his story is a familiar one, Messer makes his subject come alive by recognizing the force of public presentation in foreign affairs. Messer appreciates that political forces embrace not only constituency pressures but also the prejudices and self-imposed personal styles of the main protagonists. His *dramatis personae*—Roosevelt, Truman and Byrnes—were, above all, political figures who could not divorce diplomacy from either partisan politics or their own sense of self-esteem. Byrnes, who travelled to Yalta and later became Secretary of State, brought to bear on his office his experiences as a South Carolina politician, troubleshooter for Roosevelt and his unconsummated vice-presidential and presidential ambitions. Byrnes deliberately cultivated a reputation for diplomatic accommodation, and when such a reputation ceased to be suitable, he could not cast it off. As long as faith in the Yalta agreements lasted, Byrnes was happy to be associated with those agreements—especially since Roosevelt himself wished to sell a selective version of Yalta to the public and chose Byrnes as his salesman. But Byrnes did not know everything about Yalta; he was excluded from the secret sessions on the Far East and had actually left the conference by the time the crucial decisions on Poland were taken.

Byrnes' expositions on Yalta, according to Messer, resulted in the creation of a 'Byrnes myth'. According to this myth, he had been Roosevelt's trusted lieutenant; in reality he had been assigned to muster domestic support for the president. Messer possibly overestimates the extent of the 'myth'. It is an imaginative conceit for assessing Byrnes' diplomatic impact, but it does not accurately reflect his subsequent reputation. Byrnes' undoing, in the final analysis, was his inability to reflect the growing disenchantment at home with postwar Soviet policy. His protracted absences from the United States insulated him from the hardening of public opinion and he was unable to convince the public that he too had changed. In Messer's words, Byrnes 'fell victim to history not repeating itself'. Byrnes also fell victim to a poor judgement that many of his contemporaries shared: he underestimated Truman's stubborn determination and his forever tightening grip on the presidency. His successors, George Marshall and Dean Acheson, learned quickly that Truman did not want an *eminence grise*. Truman liked subordinates and Byrnes did not cherish the role. His career was brought to an end, and the lesson, no doubt, was not lost on the Politburo.

University of Keele R. A. GARSON

Gandhi: A Memoir. By William L. Shirer. London: Sphere. 1981. 255pp. Index. £1·75. A$5.95. (First publ.: USA, Simon & Schuster, 1979.)

Memories for Tomorrow. By Dorothy Hogg. London, New York: Regency. 1981. 316pp. £5·00. $17.00.

WILLIAM SHIRER, a distinguished American journalist, was sent to India by the *Chicago Tribune* on two occasions, first in 1930 and again in 1931. On the latter tour he met Gandhi and gained not only his confidence but also that of other prominent members of the Indian National Congress. Thus he is in an excellent position to give an inside report on the events of this important year in the history of the Indian nationalist movement. He draws on his own notes and papers to provide a shrewd, perceptive and lucid account of how Gandhi pursued his objectives in very different settings: he deals with the agreement between Gandhi and Lord Irwin, the Governor-General, which led to the suspension of the Civil Disobedience movement; with the subsequent Congress session at Karachi; with the talks in Simla between Gandhi and Lord Willingdon, who succeeded Irwin as Governor-General; and with the Second Round Table Conference in London (which he covered from his post in Vienna later in the same year), where Gandhi demanded total independence rather than dominion status for India. Having taken pains at the time to isolate the main points at issue from the Congress

point of view, he can write about the strategic and tactical considerations with admirable clarity and subtlety. However, the book also contains many intimate recollections of Gandhi, and Shirer's eye for circumstantial but telling detail and his ability to describe settings (especially the Simla of the time) bring the period very much to life.

Shirer came to know Gandhi when he was at the centre of national politics; Dorothy Hogg's acquaintance with him began in 1934, when he was more engaged in social work at the local level and she was in India with Muriel Lester on one of the latter's missions for the International Fellowship of Reconciliation. At that time, Gandhi was preoccupied with a campaign to persuade Hindus to abolish the practice of untouchability: moving from village to village, he would address several meetings a day, appealing for an end to the exclusion of untouchables (whom he called Harijans, or Children of God) from drinking wells, temples and the living areas of caste Hindus. Miss Hogg worked with Gandhi in Bihar, after the earthquake disaster, and also studied the principles of his Constructive Programme. The core of her book is a discussion of what Gandhi represented as a spiritual leader and social reformer (her exposition of his notion of a village-based society is especially detailed) but she also describes the part which he played in national politics during and after the Second World War.

At a personal level, Gandhi had an extraordinary ability to convey his religious and ethical views in clear and homely language, and to elicit and respond to the views of those who were attracted to him. Although Shirer and Miss Hogg differ in their attitudes to Gandhi, it is clear that they both felt that a spiritual bond had been established with him and that the relationship was grounded on trust as well as sympathy. Gandhi made no pretence that there were not mutual advantages in such relationships (for example, Shirer's despatches to the *Chicago Tribune* were also distributed to other American newspapers through a syndicated news service, and Gandhi undoubtedly appreciated their value as a means of putting the Congress case to an international audience), and by the 1940s his range of personal connections must have been much more extensive and more varied than those of all the other Congress leaders combined.

Both authors also make interesting observations on the nature of Gandhi's informal household, consisting not only of his wife and sons but also of his devoted secretaries (Mahadev Desai and Pyarelal) and a number of followers, such as Madeleine Slade (Mira Behn), who were accepted as close disciples. This household formed the core of the much larger organizations which were built up during Gandhi's campaigns, and helped him not only to maintain his contacts but also to exist within a small but vital area of privacy.

Together, these books throw light on the varied aspects of Gandhi's personality and on his ability to influence events. That he possessed a remarkable political intelligence and capacity for judgement comes across very clearly in Shirer's account of his energetic leadership at the Karachi session of the Congress of 1931, but it is equally clear that he can never be understood if we concentrate on his political record alone. In spite of the great amount already written about Gandhi as a political personality, a spiritual leader and a social reformer, he still remains an enigma, and the books under review help to establish the correspondence between these aspects of his personality a little more clearly.

University of Sussex B. D. GRAHAM

Western Europe

The Second Enlargement of the EEC: The Integration of Unequal Partners. Edited by Dudley Seers and Constantine Vaitsos with Marja-Liisa Kiljunen. London: Macmillan. 1982. 275pp. Index. £25·00.

THIS book is the second in a series of works investigating the issues posed by the planned second enlargement of the European Community to embrace, after Greece, Spain and Portugal. In this volume enlargement is assessed in terms of the anticipated impact it may have on the structure of Western Europe, the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), the European Monetary System, industry and the European Community's poor regions, the Maghreb, Mashreq, African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries and the newly industrializing states of Asia.

A useful introduction to enlargement is provided by Seers, who rightly stresses the role of West Germany in mobilizing support for the enlargement. Indeed, placing the European Community's enlargement within the wider context of the future economic fortunes of Europe, he ascribes to West Germany a pivotal role in integrating Europe. While one might take issue with his view that German convergence will continue to facilitate eventual reunification which he agrees 'is still some decades away' (p. 19), and while the notion of the Finlandization of central Europe is raised periodically and is enjoying another revival in West Germany, the requisite political will on the part of national governments is clearly absent. Yet, as the contributors to the volume correctly and convincingly argue, continued myopia could prove disastrous, not least because the balance of economic power and dependence in Europe will be profoundly altered by the second enlargement of the European Community.

Although it may be true that there are parallels between the second and the first enlargement in terms of the impetus both were expected to have on Community institutional relations, the second enlargement has to be seen in terms of changing attitudes to foreign economic investment, international economic development, and to the criteria by which development is measured. Enlargement will exacerbate structural disparities and agricultural, regional and industrial problems, and will underscore the urgency of structural reforms, if necessary, according to Musto, by means of a 'partial regionalisation or renationalisation of problem-solving mechanisms' (p. 87). Regionalization itself would, however, demand a reallocation of resources, reform—or, as Ritson suggests, renationalization of parts (p. 106)—of the CAP, and a vast increase in funding: all of which are obviously impossible in the absence of political will. As Secchi argues, enlargement may disproportionately benefit the core and increase the size of the periphery, thereby worsening the chances of redressing the problems of unequal development. Equally serious difficulties may ensure for the ACP's trade balances with the European Community. While the Mashreq's needs may be more easily met, problems arise *vis-à-vis* the Maghreb. Moreover, as Vaitsos argues, 'the Community's policy instruments are inadequate to handle the issues' (p. 252) raised by this second enlargement. Clearly, if the European Community fails to adjust in the light of changing international economic circumstances, the outlook is grim.

Quibbles aside, it would have been useful to include some detailed attention to the strategic implications for NATO of enlargement. This stimulating volume highlights the difficulties and challenges facing the European Community and is a worthwhile and welcome addition to the literature in this field.

University of Hull JULIET LODGE

Approaches to Industrial Policy within the European Community and its Impact on European Integration. By Fritz Franzmeyer. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1982. 167pp. Index. £16·00.

BRITISH readers should benefit from reading this account of the attempts to arrive at a common industry policy, in which the United Kingdom's actions and reactions are given the same weight as those of Luxembourg, Denmark or Italy, instead of the usual home-made scenario in which Britian is seen fighting against hopeless odds. The study begins by defining structural policy, and then considers the problems encountered as a result of policy divergences, the situation in the member countries, and the role of the Community institutions. The main focus of the work is on public sector activities 'which directly or indirectly affect the productivity, structure and international competitiveness of industry in individual countries' (p. 1). Policies on prices, wages, finance and credit have been omitted as being concerned with cyclical phenomena. Regional, social and environmental policies are not treated in any detail. The policy options open to the Ten are examined in relation to the factors affecting growth, employment and investment needs. The conclusion that Britain, along with Ireland and Italy, cannot use 'the exchange rate instrument as an alternative to the application of an industrial policy' (p. 35) because of the impact on inflation and retaliation by trading partners, has considerable topical interest in the light of the differences in party policy on this subject in Britain.

Franzmeyer regards two approaches to industry policy as basically possible in present conditions. Industrial strategy can be defensive, that is, designed to protect existing industries,

including those in decline from foreign competition; or positive, that is, prepared to transfer resources into capital intensive production involving a relatively high level of investment, education and training. He accepts that it may be necessary to transfer production of certain goods abroad 'to countries with lower costs levels' (p. 36), while recognizing that such a prospect will be strongly contested by interests determined to protect domestic employment. Community attempts to agree on policies for steel, textiles and shipbuilding are described at length and the reasons for lack of success analysed. In considering these three cases Franzmeyer summarizes the inherent causes of misunderstanding as 'the French passion for administration'; 'British anti-continentalism, which has given rise to the chauvinistic attitude over oil and the dislike of "Brussels-bureaucracy"'; 'the political pragmatism of the Italians'; and 'German federation' (p. 98).

The striking conclusion which emerges from the study is that the Community has been no more successful in its attempts to encourage innovation and coordinate activity in new industries at the European level than in dealing with those in decline. The failure of Euratom was an early demonstration of the way in which individual countries can paralyse common policies when they believe them to be against their own interests. The Airbus project, generally regarded as a Community success, showed how disagreement can arise from commercial as well as political considerations.

Although parts of the text have inevitably been overtaken by events, this study presents a valuable analysis of a problem which has received too little attention in this country.

RICHARD BAILEY

Agriculture in Western Europe: Challenge and Response 1880–1980. 2nd edn. By Michael Tracy. London, Toronto: Granada. 1982. 419pp. Index. £12·00.

URGENT and immediate though the problems of European agriculture might seem to the Farm Ministers of the EEC gathered for the night around the Brussels conference table, or to the farmers blocking the roads outside with their tractors, they are in fact centuries old, and both their causes and their solutions are equally rooted in the past to an extent that must bring a measure of both comfort and despair to those confronting them afresh.

Michael Tracy's excellent study of the development of European agriculture goes back beyond 1880—its nominal starting date—to the Carolingian kings, the land tenure systems of feudal Europe, and the ways in which agricultural policy evolved through war and peace in the various Western European countries, including the UK. In each the pattern was slightly different, reflecting differing systems of land ownership and degrees of consolidation and enclosure of that land as well as the impact of the industrial revolution on the farm population and on the trading strategy of the nation. The result, the starting point of the book, was the variegated pattern of production and protection which prevailed a hundred years ago, ranging from the interventionist French on the one side to the free-trading British on the other.

The first half of the book is devoted to a detailed analysis, country by country, of the way in which Europe responded to the depressions of the 1880s and 1930s, and the manner by which continental Europe established a system of state intervention and protection for agriculture immune to economic theories of free trade, from which the Common Agricultural Policy of the postwar European Community was a logical, almost evolutionary development. Continental Europe was only partially joined in this trend by Britain which moved in the 1930s to a system of imperial preference rather than full-scale protection. Membership of the Community and the CAP since 1973 has arguably had more impact on British agriculture than any single event, including war, in the last century, reversing a very long-term decline and reliance on imports and raising the ratio of self-sufficiency in wheat alone from 45 per cent in 1968–9 to 80 per cent by the end of the 1970s, with a continuing upward trend. If there is a criticism to be made of Mr Tracy's study it is that he does not make enough of this sharp change of direction, which stands in contrast to the pattern of continuity in the rest of the EEC.

The second half of the book is concerned with the progression of the CAP from the early 1950s and the factors, within the overall context of the move to European integration and general worldwide surpluses of tradeable agricultural output, which have conditioned its

development and created the complex, overweening structure which dominates all discussion of future of the European Community.

It is logical and fitting that Mr Tracy's study ends with a chapter on West European agriculture in the world context and an examination of world markets—markets which will both determine the future costs to the Community of agricultural support, through the price mechanism, and the potential for disposing of the surpluses which generous pricing policies are creating. In a tense and competitive trading environment, Europe cannot ignore the reactions of other traders, especially the United States, to its internal and external marketing policies for agricultural products.

Given the paucity of objective effort devoted to the study of agricultural trade relations outside the United States this book is particularly welcome. It will be of value not only to those directly involved in agriculture but also to historians, especially economic historians and the growing ranks of European specialists.

Chatham House NICK BUTLER

Japan and Western Europe: Conflict and Cooperation. Edited by Loukas Tsoukalis and Maureen White. London: Pinter. 1982. 222pp. Index. £16·50.

IN the light of the growing arguments over trade between Japan and the European Community, this is a timely and important collection of essays. It results from a conference held at Oxford in 1980 but the present work includes papers not presented on that occasion. The volume is divided into fourteen relatively brief essays dealing with the background to and the nature and dimensions of Japan's leading role in the world's economy with particular reference to Western Europe over the past two decades. The first essay inevitably gives rise to some sadness, as it is one of the last contributions from Professor Richard Storry, who died early in 1982. It is a characteristically stimulating review of the European impact on Japan from the sixteenth to the twentieth century and contains many perceptive observations. Full tribute is paid to Japanese inventiveness and industry, the only partial failure being the inability to achieve the full quality of 'Scotch' whisky (p. 5)! Jean-Pierre Lehmann provides a useful assessment on the not unfamiliar theme of 'mutual images'.

Andrea Boltho, James Abegglen, Kazuo Nukazawa, and Wolf Mendl pursue respectively the character of the Japanese economy in the 1980s, Japanese industrial policy, the making of foreign economic policy, and changing perspectives of foreign policy. Dr Boltho sees Japan confronted by the dilemma of its own efficiency, which has accentuated demands in Europe for protectionist measures against which Japan would have no adequate redress if implemented. Protectionist policies could accelerate a downward economic trend throughout the world with dire consequences. Dr Nukazawa supplies a lucid .ccount of the subtle processes whereby foreign economic policy is determined: the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) is more 'liberal trade-oriented', since the industries under its jurisdiction would be adversely affected by protectionist measures (pp. 64–5). Dr Mendl gives an admirable account of the character of Japanese foreign policy from the San Francisco conference to the beginning of the 1980s; the nature of the Japanese relationship to the United States, which has been so fundamental to decision-making in Tokyo, is fairly depicted.

Benedict Meynell, Masamichi Hanabusa, Geoffrey Shepherd, John Pinder, and Sueo Sekiguchi discuss respectively the European Community's relations with Japan, a Japanese view of the trade dispute, Japanese exports and Europe's problem industries, lessons Europe can derive from contemplating Japan's adjustment, and Japanese direct investment in Europe. Mr Hanabusa provides a capable defence of Japan's recent policies, as one would expect from his past eloquent contributions. Mr Shepherd identifies the central features of the 'Japanese export cycle' and the positive contribution this has made: 'This export success, even if many feel it to be too rapid to be socially acceptable to Western Europe, has introduced better methods and better and lower-cost products to the world at large. Japan is probably now playing the single most important role of any of the industrialized countries in introducing technical change in products and processes across a broad range of manufacturing industries' (p. 150). Professor Sekiguchi points out that as regards individual countries in Europe, the largest proportion of Japanese investment has consistently gone to the United

Kingdom (p. 172). Yukio Satoh and Christian Sautter review opportunities for closer cooperation and a European policy of competitive cooperation.

Professor Tsoukalis rounds off the volume with a sober assessment of the principal themes examined and concludes with a reiteration of the perils of protectionism. This work is valuable as a source of basic information and analysis and it is to be hoped that policy-makers in Brussels, London, Paris, Bonn (and Washington) will benefit from it.

University of Manchester PETER LOWE

Elites in France: Origins, Reproduction and Power. Edited by Jolyon Howorth and Philip G. Cerny. London: Pinter for the Association for the Study of Modern and Contemporary France. 1981. 253pp. Index. £13·95.

THIS is a useful, if at times a little academic, collection of essays by a number of British, French and American experts under the sponsorship of the Association for the Study of Modern and Contemporary France. Its thirteen contributions provide a useful survey of the field for the beginner, and an equally useful commentary on the existing literature for the more informed. Students of Ezra Suleiman and Pierre Birnbaum will not find many of these chapters entirely new—though some of the later chapters criticize Suleiman's excessive preoccupation with the administrative elite as the single pinnacle of French power.

One underlying theme, appropriate to an association whose president is Professor Douglas Johnson, is the continuity of French elites and of the historical traditions which have created and sustained them: 'The close connection between state employment and social prestige clearly predated the Revolution . . . The existence of an administrative elite, whose establishment had been facilitated by centralization, dates back to the ancien régime, to the grands commis of bourgeois descent with whom Louis XIV surrounded himself to weaken the nobility and to increase the personal power of the monarch' (Michalina Vaughan, pp.94, 98). The postwar establishment of the *École nationale d'Administration* was presented as a democratic reform; but it in no sense questioned the need for a close-knit elite, only the social composition of its recruitment. *Plus ça change* . . . The socialist administration which took power in 1981, its intentions only foreshadowed in this book, has sought once again to widen the base for ENA's recruitment, without touching other aspects of its position or role.

Different contributions provide distinctive illustrations of the nature of the French elite, its career patterns, social composition, and the interlocking of administrative, political and industrial elites. We learn, for example, that six per cent of the Deputies of the 1978–81 National Assembly were *énarques*, and that eleven out of twenty ministers in President Giscard's last government had administrative links and training. Political clubs and socialist ginger groups, ministerial cabinets and senior management positions, all have been colonized—and some controlled—by this state-oriented elite with its accumulation of success.

Several contributions raise the question of the definition of elites in French terms. Jean-Pierre Rioux provides a definition which fits the French situation extraordinarily well: 'an elite is made up primarily of those who define themselves as the best, and who are able to maintain that conviction' (p. 86), with the acquiescence of the population as a whole. The French education system, France's intellectual and statist traditions, provide the basis for a continuing elite which legitimizes itself by rigorous training, competent administration, and service to the state. A fascinating chapter by William R. Schonfeld explores 'the closed worlds of Socialist and Gaullist elites': exploring the extent to which the different party leaderships, in particular in the PS, close themselves off from knowledge about or debate with their political opponents. I would like to have seen some further exploration of the phenomenon of self-closure among the French elite, evident also in the absence of open debate on French defence and foreign policy. I would also like to have seen rather more on the links between national and local elites, on how the majority of French outside Paris and their local notables link into the dominant Parisian groups.

These criticisms are minor, however. This is a well-integrated collection of essays, which adds to our understanding of the most powerful element in French society.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

The French Paradox: Understanding Contemporary France. By F. Roy Willis. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 151pp. Index. $9.95.

DESPITE its general sounding title, this book is concerned primarily with French foreign and defence policy, with special treatment of France's relations with sub-Saharan Africa, the Moslem world and the communist powers. However, the main concern is with France's relations with the United States. The author's 'paradoxical' thesis is that France's pursuit of a policy independent of the USA has helped NATO generally and the United States in particular more effectively than if it had been an unassertive partner, the implicit comparison being with the United Kingdom. As such, Willis is essentially preaching to his countrymen the lesson that the 'irritating' and 'troublesome' French have served American policy objectives whilst apparently pursuing their own national interests with single-minded devotion.

The best evidence for this thesis is undoubtedly the effective *gendarme* role France has played in Francophone black Africa generally and not just in its former colonies. As a former French foreign minister in the Giscard presidency put it, Africa is 'the only continent which is still the right size for France, still within the limits of its means. The only one where it can still, with 500 men, change the course of history'. Although France became involved in some unsavoury scrapes as a result of this policy, it has been able at low cost to retain substantially greater influence in black Africa than has the United Kingdom. Willis, in his role of advocate to the US government, plausibly urges that 'Greater support—political, financial and logistical—for French actions could enable the United States itself to avoid the entanglement in internal African politics that could backfire, while safeguarding American interests on that continent, although at the risk of the French being considered America's Cubans!' (p. 62). While the French policy of working closely with the Federal German Republic has been largely successful, its broader EEC policy, its pretensions to a special role in the Middle East and a special relationship with the Soviet Union have been more or less embarrassing failures.

As a brief survey of French foreign policy in the 1970s, this book has the virtue of few recent competitors. Despite the occasional howler or misprint, e.g. 'Giscard's party (the UDR)' (p. 41), it is a reliable if derivative study of the French scene by a contemporary historian who was not able to take cognizance of the change of president of the republic in 1981. However, this is less serious than it sounds, since—despite initial US anxieties—surprisingly little has changed in French defence or foreign policy as a result of the Left coming to power. France seems destined to remain a paradox, at least in American eyes. If this book persuades its American readers, France will however appear as a benevolent rather than a malevolent paradox.

University of Hull JACK HAYWARD

Germany Transformed: Political Culture and the New Politics. By Kendall L. Baker, Russell J. Dalton and Kai Hildebrandt. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1981. 381pp. Index.

West Germany: A Contemporary History. By Michael Balfour. London: Croom Helm. 1982. 307pp. Index. £14·95.

Modern Germany: Society, Economy and Politics in the Twentieth Century. By V. R. Berghahn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1982. 314pp. Index. £20·00.

THESE three books represent different approaches to the subject of contemporary German politics. The books by Baker *et al.* and by Berghahn are exercises in political history, and attempt to use the past to understand the present. The book by Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt is more of an attempt to understand West German politics 'in its own terms': in particular, the focus is on electoral sociology and the use of an impressive array of survey data. The books appear, therefore, to complement one another. The broad historical perspectives of Balfour *et al.* and Berghahn are enriched by the detailed treatment of contemporary political culture and election results by Baker and his colleagues.

The historical perspectives offered by Balfour and by Berghahn are different. As one would expect from his earlier writing, Balfour opts for a broad-brush perspective that emphasizes the roots of twentieth-century German politics in medieval history. The chapter 'From Tribe to National State' is a useful short account for students who are being introduced to German politics for the first time. Although the chapter on the Second Reich is both

informative and readable, it fails to convey to the reader the important controversies that have been sparked by rival interpretations of the nature of the political system of the Third Reich. The most useful section of the book covers the postwar settlement, 1943–5 and the evolution towards two Germanies after 1945. By contrast, the chapters that deal with the successive governments of West Germany are disappointing. They are strong on description, short on analysis and seem to be written as an appendage.

Berghahn confines his historical interpretation of contemporary Germany to the period after 1900. The book begins with a chapter on Wilhelmine Germany, 1900–14, which outlines the framework within with Berghahn analyses German political development. The focus is on the very rapid industrialization which Germany experienced during this period and which led to a destabilization of the social and political system 'from below'. The emphasis is upon the character of economic and social change, its impact on (divergent) ruling elites and the responses of these elites. The approach is persuasive, and some of the sections (like that on the Prusso–German political system) are excellent. More disappointing is the section on rapid industrialization and its impact on society, from which an account and analysis of the role of banks and bankers in German industrialization is missing. There is ample material on the power of the banks in Wilhelmine Germany, so the omission of their role is rather surprising. Berghahn goes on to provide a balanced and accurate treatment of the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich before he looks at the period of occupation and division and aspects of contemporary life in the two Germanies. Berghahn's analysis of postwar German politics is sound and lively and consolidates one's view that his book provides an excellent historical account of modern Germany.

Baker *et al.*'s *Germany Transformed* summarizes the enormous amount of electoral research in West Germany, the depth of interest in which is to be understood against the background of continuing concern about the democratic quality and resilience of German political culture. This research has tended to support the view that West Germany has developed a 'modernized' political culture that provides considerable support for the liberal democratic regime of the Bonn republic. West Germany emerges as a politicized 'participation-oriented' country. Whilst the book provides a useful summary of such conclusions, it lacks the historical perspective against which to assess the degree of change in political attitudes. More especially, the emphasis on mass research distracts attention from the role of elites. It would be useful to know more about elite attitudes and about the impact of socialization on these elite attitudes. It is, of course, important to know that broad support for the regime exists; but it is also important to know something about the character of elites and about the factors that are likely to condition their responses to the changing political agenda. One emerges from a reading of this book with a conviction that the empiricism of survey research needs to be tutored by the critical perspective that can be offered by history.

University of Bradford KENNETH DYSON

USSR and Eastern Europe

USSR: Secrets of a Corrupt Society. By Konstantin Simis. London, Melbourne: Dent. 1982. 216pp. Index. £8·95.

ARTICLES in the Soviet Press, speeches by political leaders (for example, the recent Brezhnev exhortation on corruption) and exposés by Soviet emigrés and foreign journalists have made most scholars in the field of Soviet studies aware of the existence of many illegal and semi-legal practices, ranging from petty bribery to large-scale organized crime. Simis, a recent emigré and a former practising and academic defence lawyer who dealt with cases all over the Soviet Union, therefore does not, as the title of the book claims, reveal many secrets. The significance of the book lies in the author's effort to bring together for the first time all this disparate and dispersed information by describing and documenting in great detail corrupt practices throughout Soviet social, political and economic life. What comes as a revelation to the reader is the alleged ubiquity, the scale and the thorough integration into Soviet life of these corrupt practices.

How seriously do we have to take Simis's claims? There are several reasons for taking note of them but there are others for scepticism. His account is persuasive, firstly because his

professional position as a defence lawyer gave him privileged access to records of criminally corrupt activities; secondly, most of his allegations are carefully documented, often giving precise details of time, place and names of people involved. Lastly, many details of his accounts tally with information from other sources. On the other hand, the whole style of the book is that of a sensational piece of investigative journalism rather than an academic exercise, witness for example choice of title, chapter headings (e.g. 'District Mafia', or 'Justice for Sale') and the frequent disclosure of salacious details. The author's professional focus on the criminal side of Soviet society may, over the years, have convinced him that *all* of society functions in this way. It is certainly the work of a totally disillusioned individual with no sense of balance.

The most controversial and important issues raised by Simis are whether or not this corruption is 'the organic and unchangeable essence of the Soviet regime' (p. 210) and, if so, what features of this system are engendering it. For Simis, it has two basic roots. Firstly, the high concentration of power in the Party *apparat* and the total absence of any independent check on it invite the misuse of this power. While those at the lower bureaucratic levels resort to corrupt practice to supplement their inadequate legal income, those at the top, already enjoying extensive privileges, turn to corruption in order to acquire wealth not tied to their office and therefore freely transferable to heirs. The supremacy of the Party in the political ideology and system has made it difficult effectively to expose and punish corruption among its members for fear of simultaneously destroying the charismatic quality with which the Party has become endowed. Secondly, corruption is generated by the chronic malfunctioning of the centrally planned economic system which forces both producers and consumers either to create alternatives outside the system or to improve their command over, and access to, desirable but scarce commodities, such as higher education or good health care. In addition, the low pay in many lower-level jobs encourages the pursuit of illegal gain.

Moreover, says Simis, these two basic features inherent in the structure of Soviet society have created a moral climate where high-minded attitudes become regarded, at best, as stupid and, at worst, as dangerously deviant. A very bleak picture thus emerges from his analysis.

It would be difficult to show that these two features of Soviet society do not encourage anti-social and anti-socialist attitudes and behaviour. But to accept Simis's argument that corruption is, therefore, endemic in the system one would need convincing by a more objective and balanced commentator that criminal practice is, indeed, as ubiquitous and ingrained in Soviet society as Simis claims it is.

University of Aston in Birmingham CHRISTEL LANE

Ideology of a Superpower: Contemporary Soviet Doctrine on In ernational Relations. **By R. Judson Mitchell.** Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 159pp. Index. $10.95.

PROFESSOR MITCHELL provides in this book a useful, though sometimes prolix, account of Soviet doctrine on international relations. He argues that in the 1970s Soviet theorists formulated a new doctrinal synthesis, which stressed that the world correlation of forces had shifted significantly in favour of the socialist camp, and that the Soviet Union had become the political centre of the world, as a result of growing Soviet power. International relations were being restructured, and the momentum of change would continue as long as the socialist camp remained united. Because Soviet power had grown, realistic leaders in the imperialist world could accept the process of change. This, says Mitchell, is the ideology of a superpower seeking to consolidate its power and status, with the ultimate aim of unifying the world under its own control.

Mitchell shows clearly, I think, that Soviet theorists and political leaders have been able to give, in the language of Marxism-Leninism, a coherent and realistic view of what is happening in the world. This view is not without its ambiguities and omissions, however. The role of revolutionary violence in transforming world politics is not spelled out clearly, for example. Moreover, the doctrine is couched in very general terms. Nevertheless it does provide, as Mitchell says, some insight into the motives and intentions that lie behind Soviet policy.

In Mitchell's view, the reformulation of doctrine was set in train by the Czechoslovak crisis, which exposed serious weaknesses in the socialist camp; by the sharpening rift with

China in 1969, which opened up the fear of geographical encirclement; and by the growth of Soviet power, which (in Soviet eyes) made detente possible. The doctrinal synthesis expressed two purposes: consolidation and cohesion within the socialist camp, and expansion of Soviet power beyond. In fact the two are related, Mitchell says, because expansion legitimates the internal structures of power. Hence there are domestic reasons for trying to alter the strategic balance with the United States and to increase Soviet influence in the Third World.

Mitchell overplays, I think, the novelty of some elements of the doctrinal synthesis, and its significance as a whole. Soviet theory expounds current policy and the considerations behind it, as well as providing a framework in which policy can be formulated. If Andropov or his successor were to decide on a shift of priorities, on consolidation abroad and reform in the bloc, this policy too would receive the appropriate formulation. Such a *volte-face*, though unlikely perhaps, is not inconceivable, for Soviet policies in the 1970s did not achieve their goals. The Polish crisis has shown up serious strains in the socialist camp. Soviet policies have drawn the United States and China together. The Western powers have not acquiesced uncomplainingly in Soviet efforts to restructure international relations. Soviet doctrine in the 1970s looks like the ideology of an over-optimistic and over-ambitious superpower.

University of Edinburgh DAVID HOLLOWAY

Soviet Strategic Power and Doctrine: The Quest for Superiority. By Mark E. Miller. Washington, DC: Advanced International Studies Institute for University of Miami. 1982. 298pp. Index. Pb.

THIS is a better book than most of those published by the Advanced International Studies Institute, because it does more than string together quotations from Soviet sources. Miller examines the development of Soviet strategic forces as well as Soviet writings about military strategy, and has a chapter on the weapons acquisition process. He tries to give a rounded picture of Soviet strategic policy.

Miller traces the growth of Soviet strategic power through several phases: the Stalin years, 1945–53; a transitional period, 1953–64: from inferiority to parity, 1964–72; towards superiority, 1972–81. He argues that Soviet strategic policy can be understood only if it is seen as an attempt to acquire the forces necessary for fighting and winning a nuclear war, and that the outlines of Soviet strategy can be discovered from Soviet military writings. The basic thesis of the book is evident from its subtitle: Soviet policy has been directed at attaining the superiority required to implement this strategy.

Miller argues that it is only in the light of Soviet military writings that Soviet strategic policy can be properly understood. He is surely right in this. But when he comes to the most recent period he has to dismiss as 'disinformation' the statements of Brezhnev, Ustinov, Ogarkov, and others, who have asserted that superiority is not the goal of Soviet policy. He claims that the Soviet leaders are hardly likely to have abandoned the strategy they adopted in the early 1960s and portrays such statements (as most American specialists do) as part of a campaign to deceive the West about Soviet intentions. But some elements of these doctrinal formulations look new only if earlier Soviet thinking is interpreted in a one-sided way. Even the commitment to parity has its forerunner in Soviet espousal of the idea of 'equal security' in the 1960s as the basis for arms control. How parity is to be defined in practice is, of course, another matter.

The most novel element in recent formulations is the Soviet pledge not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Miller rightly notes the stress put on preemption by Soviet strategy; and some major strategic systems (for example, the SS–18 ICBM) seem to make sense only if intended for preemptive use. The 'no first use' pledge was greeted with scepticism in the West because it seemed to contradict a key element of Soviet strategy. The pledge may indeed mean nothing: perhaps a preemptive strike against an enemy preparing to attack with nuclear weapons is viewed as retaliation and not as first use. But preemption is a very risky strategy, for an enemy attack may be difficult to anticipate, as it proved in 1941. Like most writers on Soviet strategy Miller views preemption as unproblematical. While Soviet statements about 'no first use' can hardly be taken at face value, the whole issue of preemption in Soviet strategy deserves more careful study.

The chief defects of Miller's book are too great a willingness to squeeze ambiguous evidence into the overall interpretation, and an occasional carelessness—as, for example, on page 42, where he writes that the SS-4 and SS-5 were deployed in 1955, whereas they entered service in 1959 and 1961 respectively. The book's chief virtue is that it attempts to trace the history of Soviet strategic policy in terms of weapons programmes and strategic writing. There is a great deal that seems to me debatable in Miller's analysis, but this is a useful and provocative book that should stimulate the reader to counterargument.

University of Edinburgh DAVID HOLLOWAY

East European Military Establishments: The Warsaw Pact Northern Tier. By A. Ross Johnson, Robert W. Dean and Alexander Alexiev. New York: Crane, Russak. 1982. 182pp. Index. $19.50.

IN sheer destructive potential the Warsaw Pact is one of the two most powerful alliances in the history of the world. Indeed, so great is that power that civilization could not survive the test which would determine whether it or NATO was actually *numero uno*. In the light of this, there has been a remarkable dearth of relevant literature. Until fairly recently there was only one book, Robin Remington's important *The Warsaw Pact: Case Studies in Communist Conflict Resolution* (1971), but even that rather ignored the soldiers.

The situation has changed somewhat in the last year or so, though we still do not have a comprehensive study of the Pact in its military and political dimensions. In addition to the book under review, two others have attempted to add something to the jigsaw: Christopher D. Jones's *Soviet Influence in Eastern Europe: Political Autonomy and the Warsaw Pact* (1981) and the volume edited by Robert W. Clawson and Laurence S. Kaplan, *The Warsaw Pact: Political Purpose and Military Means* (1982). The strength of the volume by A. Ross Johnson and his colleagues is that it adds significantly to our understanding of an underworked aspect of this underworked subject, namely the armed forces of the three major non-Soviet members of the Pact. The book is well researched, well written, and well presented. It is also short, and its discussion and conclusions can be digested readily, something which is not always the case with literature about alliances.

After a brief history of the Warsaw Pact, the book examines the armed forces of Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland according to a common framework: doctrinal and organizational evolution, party control, military professionalism, crisis behaviour, role and reliability, etc. From this emerge three quite distinct national histories, a fact which must always be kept in mind when drawing conclusions about the opportunities for and constraints on the Soviet ability to utilize the armed forces of its 'northern tier' allies. The dangers of generalization are rightly stressed, but several overall conclusions are evident: the commitment of the military and political leaderships of the northern tier countries to rapid, massive, and offensive strikes into NATO territory in the event of war; the general underestimation by Western sources of their importance to the Soviet Union in any unreinforced attack; their improved combat capability; the challenge which modernization and professionalization has posed to Party control; and the continuing domination by the Soviet Union of the working of the Pact, but its concern about the reliability of some of its allies in some circumstances, notably those of a prolonged war against NATO or an intra-bloc 'policing' action. These and other general points become apparent in the course of what is essentially an education in the individuality of the three armies under consideration. After reading this book one should grow accustomed to thinking at least twice before speaking about the 'northern tier' forces, let alone those of the 'Warsaw Pact'.

In sum, this is an important little book which should be read by all those interested in the military confrontation in Europe. Obviously it should be read with some scepticism, for prewar/pre-crisis/pre-intervention profiles of armed forces are notoriously unreliable, as the authors would admit and as the histories of intelligence testify. Having said that, the hunches of Johnson and his colleagues seem more solidly based than most, and their analysis can be relied upon to raise anyone's uncertainty about European security to a new level of sophistication.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth KEN BOOTH

The Afghan Syndrome: How to Live with Soviet Power. By Bhabani Sen Gupta. London: Croom Helm. 1982. 296pp. Index. £12·95.

THREE years after Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, there has been little or no progress towards their removal. Bhabani Sen Gupta presumably would not be surprised by this, since his book demonstrates the extent to which regional and extra-regional powers have been able (or been forced) to come to terms with the Soviet intervention. This book is not, then, another attempt to explain the reasons for the intervention in Afghanistan, but is an examination of the response made by neighbouring powers such as India, Pakistan, Iran and China. The author also describes the way in which Moscow itself has sought to portray and explain its involvement with the Kabul regime, and provides us with details of the US government's reaction to Moscow's expansion outside the Soviet bloc in the context of the USSR's emergence as a global superpower.

Considerable efforts are made in this work to show the diplomatic attempts that have been made either to find the conditions for Soviet withdrawal, or to prevent further destabilization within the region. Pakistan, for example, first tried to gain a firm military commitment from the United States, then sought a limited accommodation with Moscow, and finally chose to elicit the support of the Islamic world. India, however, sought to diminish the threat that the crisis posed to its regional preeminence, by trying to localize the effects of the intervention and by portraying it as a defensive action of limited geopolitical import. A harsher reaction would have led to the United States arming Pakistan to an unacceptable degree, and to the extension of a new cold war to Asia.

The author is particularly clear and confident when he is explaining the response of the two adversary powers in the Indian subcontinent; but the real strength of this book lies in his ability to bring together an enormous amount of press and secondary material from and about the countries immediately affected by the crisis after the events of December 1979. If it has any weakness, it is in the author's attempts to link the Soviet intervention to a potentially much deeper analysis regarding the Soviet Union's international role following its emergence as a global superpower. A systemic change of this magnitude requires an occasion other than the events in Afghanistan to do the argument full justice.

One other cause for regret is that the book has been poorly proof-read. A less ambitious and better presented book would have made this an excellent contribution to the literature on Afghanistan; nevertheless, though, a real contribution is being made here.

University of Sussex ROSEMARY FOOT

The Dragon and the Bear: Inside China and Russia Today. By Philip Short. London, Sydney: Hodder and Stoughton. 1982. 519pp. Index. £10·95.

ACADEMICS and journalists can be cheap and nasty when reviewing each others' books. Academics are said to write with jargon and abstrusely, while journalists are said to be glib and superficial. Far be it from this reviewer to descend to those depths, although the nit-picker could certainly point to inaccuracies in Philip Short's book. It is much more crucial to point out that the author is to be counted among the better examples of the recent spate of authors of general books (mostly by journalists) on post-Mao China. Short's effort is even more striking for its largely successful attempt to compare various aspects of politics and social life in China and the Soviet Union.

Philip Short was the BBC correspondent in Beijing from 1977–81 and figured quite prominently in several of his colleagues' books on the period. There can be little doubt that he has a 'good feel' for China, and indeed that is one of the strengths of his book. It is subtle and sophisticated in covering most aspects of Chinese life, although the undue emphasis on political dissidents (the book is dedicated to one in the Soviet Union and China) is probably due to the author's specific period of time in China. The problems of personal bias are not fatal, but in comparison to the book by his *New York Times* colleague, Fox Butterfield (*China*, New York Times Books, 1982), Short's effort is distinctly patchy. Much of Short's problem lies in his poor organization and far too gentle copy-editing. Perhaps the BBC did not give him enough air time.

The most fascinating aspects of the book are the comparisons between the Soviet Union and China. This is a difficult task, and once again the nit-pickers could have a field day. Comparisons between Stalin and Mao are absurd, and between Deng Xiaoping and

Khrushchev only somewhat less so. But more interestingly he suggests that while Russians are stubborn, Chinese are pliant; While Russians are ruled by power, Chinese are ruled by precept; while Russians see a split between good and evil, Chinese see them both as extremes of a shaded spectrum. Even more aptly, Short suggests that the Chinese are to the Russians as the Europeans are to the Americans in their subtlety. His emphasis on the social and cultural roots of politics is particularly well developed. In sum, the glib and superficial title of the book should not put academics off, even though it does conform to the stereotype.

University of Leicester GERALD SEGAL

The Sino–Soviet Conflict—a Global Perspective. Edited by Herbert J. Ellison. Seattle, London: University of Washington Press. 1982. 408pp. Index. £24·50. Pb.: £10·50.

MUCH has changed in the Sino–Soviet relationship since the quarrel began in the Fifties as 'a somewhat esoteric and highly personalized dispute between Mao and Khrushchev' (p. 51). Furthermore, the 1970s witnessed developments in internal and international affairs crucial to its evolution, such as the death of Mao, the rise of Deng Xiaoping and the Chinese economic and diplomatic reorientation on the one side, and the Soviet desire to play the role of global superpower, backed by seemingly relentless military expansion, on the other. Given that the dispute is no longer a sectarian wrangle or even 'just' a border conflict it is fitting that papers presented by a team of accomplished scholars at a conference entitled 'The Sino–Soviet Conflict: the Seventies and Beyond' and held under the auspices of the newly-established Centre for Sino–Soviet Studies at the University of Washington should now appear in print. The contributions have been grouped into three parts. The first deals with the domestic political scene in both countries, seen from the points of view respectively of internal politics, foreign policy and economic affairs. The second examines the impact of the dispute elsewhere in the world, both globally and in specific areas, including Eastern and Western Europe, the Middle East, Japan, Vietnam, Afghanistan and the Indian subcontinent. In the third section, consideration is given to Western interpretations of the Sino–Soviet conflict, trends in the 1970s are summarized, and an attempt is made to look ahead to the 1980s.

The resulting volume appeals at several levels and will satisfy different kinds of curiosity. It provides the specialist with ample data and analysis, but the general approach adopted is far from esoteric and the less knowledgeable can find valuable background information, both in Herbert J. Ellison's introduction and also in the text as a whole. To those in search of a concise and lucid summary of the Sino–Soviet relationship in the 1970s Harry Gelman's 'overview' can be recommended; those wishing to be guided through the existing scholarly and journalistic literature on the subject will benefit from the essay by Donald W. Treadgold, while those who cannot resist a broader historical analysis and an equally wide-ranging journey into the realm of the possible will be stimulated by Professor Seton-Watson's closing exercise in thinking 'irresponsibly but seriously about future prospects' (p. 385). Perhaps the most arresting thesis of all is advanced by Dwight Perkins concerning China's economic future: in a world encircled by economic gloom it seems implausible that any country should be confidently expected to grow at an annual rate of at least 5 per cent in the coming decade.

The contributors to the symposium were obliged by their terms of reference to predict developments in the coming decade as well as to analyse those of the last. Parts of this collective work will doubtless be overtaken by events, but the remaining parts will continue to provide an authoritative basis for an understanding of the story so far.

University of Hull M. C. CHAPMAN

Middle East

Change and Development in the Middle East. Edited by John I. Clarke and Howard Bowen-Jones. London: Methuen. 1981. 322pp. Index. £18·50.

Saudi Arabia: Rush to Development: Profile of an Energy Economy and Investment. By Ragaei El Mallakh. London: Croom Helm. 1982. 472pp. Index. £16·95.

THE book edited by Professors John Clarke and Howard Bowen-Jones, a Festschrift in honour of Professor W. B. Fisher, the renowned inspirer of geographers of the Middle East,

consists of twenty-one valuable contributions by some of his colleagues and former students. This is on the whole a lucid collection of original articles which should prove interesting and informative for students of the contemporary Middle East and North Africa. The topics covered are wide-ranging, focussing on environmental and geographic aspects and including the kind of subjects in which geographers can excel: assessment of surveys of renewable natural resources, management of water resources, irrigation, pastoral nomadism, population growth dynamics, urbanization, offshore sovereignty issues, and other themes setting out overviews of the region in the first section of the book. The second section consists of twelve 'case studies', not in the sense that they are necessarily based on the findings and methods of the overview articles, but rather in the sense that they happen to be cases which have interested the contributors: geomorphology of the Arabian Gulf, fisheries of the Arabian peninsula, a rural community project in Oman, agricultural development in Turkey, a Turkish orchard, the settlement of Armenian refugees in Syria and Lebanon, labour mobility in Tunisia, the industrialization of Libya, social change in Tunis medina, urban planning in Iran, the political geography of Cyprus, provincial delimitation in Saudi Arabia. In effect each of the twenty-one articles spells out a theme sufficient for a book, and it is rewarding to feel how much the reader can get from these short contributions. If there is any one 'message' or conclusion to be drawn from such richness and diversity in scholarship, it is perhaps how little awareness of this valuable research is after all implicit in the plans and policies of the countries of the region. (The causes of this shortcoming may be complex, but the least that could be expected in the short run is that no team of social, economic or local planners should be without an appropriately trained geographer.) Perhaps this statement from the volume's first contribution would better describe the spirit and concern of the book: 'Of relevance here is the fact that much contemporary development thinking is vitiated by the over-simple acceptance of uniformitarian theories of social response to change and the lack of appreciation not only of the spatial and functional variety of process operation but also of the fact that much of this variety is rooted in fundamental differences in resource-use opportunity' (p. 11). If the reader finds the language of this quotation difficult or obscure, he should rest assured that practically all the contributions are eminently readable.

The book on Saudi Arabia's rush to development is the outcome of 'seven years of research, data collection and interviews' (Foreword) by the author, and as such must be appreciated especially by those who have found this kind of scholarly activity difficult and frustrating in Saudi Arabia. The volume consists of eleven chapters covering the main sectors of the economy: oil, agriculture and water, industrialization, planning, public finance, money and banking, international trade, and Saudi foreign aid, almost all tailored as teaching aids. The final chapter, business trends and potential, seems to be aimed at the business executive. The author has obviously amassed considerable data, mostly from 'unquestioned' Saudi sources, which he has used to describe and rationalize the Saudi economic efforts and view of their economic problems, projects, plans and policies. This may indeed be a valuable exercise in itself, but too much of the book reads like a semi-official compendium or progress report on the Kingdom's economy rather than a critical analysis of the data and of the 'rush to development'. 'Profile' is indeed an apt description of the subject-matter and style. Any critical comment or remark tends to be too short or cryptic to affect the tenor of the work as a whole. Although published in 1982, practically all the comments on recent developments relate to 1978 or 1979 at the most recent. The reader can hardly help feeling that the volume must have been written in something of a hurry in circumstances of rapid change; there is minimal integration between the chapters and a tendency towards repetitiveness rather than synthesis. Nonetheless, readers interested in simply ascertaining the official Saudi view of their economic world would do better to read this book rather than perhaps get lost in a mass of government reports and statements.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London A. K. Selby

Saudi Arabia in the 1980s: Foreign Policy, Security and Oil. By William B. Quandt. Oxford: Blackwell for the Brookings Institution. 1982. 190pp. Index. £17·50.

This study is a welcome addition to the volumes of literature published on the Middle East for two reasons. First, the author is among the few American scholars whose understanding of the area and analytical skills are first-rate. Dr Quandt, having served twice in the National Security Council as an expert on the Middle East, has the rare credentials of scholarly training and habits plus experience of practical policy planning. Second, the subject of this

book itself generates immense interest. Following the West's discovery of its critical dependence on the region's oil, the Middle East has acquired a status of paramount importance in Western strategic calculations. Moreover, the 1979 Iranian revolution has added a new dimension to the significance of the area in world politics, particularly in symbolizing Islam as a potent factor in international relations and a challenge to the existing international order.

The central focus of this book, despite its title, is not on Saudi Arabia itself but on US–Saudi relations, and it is addressed primarily to American policymakers, scholars and readers. It is aimed at improving 'the basis for American policy toward Saudi Arabia by analyzing the threats to the Kingdom and the capabilities of the Saudi regime to deal with these threats'. The work is organized in three sections.

The first deals with the setting of Saudi foreign policy and threats to its stability in a general overview of the regional environment and Saudi foreign policy direction. However, more detailed and in depth analysis would have greatly enhanced this section. For instance, Saudi Arabia's links with the Islamic world—its interests in, and concerns about, countries like Iran (during the Shah's period and now under Khomeini) and Pakistan—are far too great and complex to warrant the mere four pages of coverage which they receive. Similarly, Saudi links with the Arab world demand a more thorough examination than is given. Reading this section one gets the impression that the author is racing against time as if in the fear, common among Middle East analysts, that events in the region will overtake him. However, the second part, dealing with the Saudi royal family, personalities, the decision-making mechanisms and the structure of the Saudi political hierarchy, contains excellent insights and is perhaps the best in the book.

The third section, under the heading of the 'American Connection', examines Saudi–US relations. Here Dr Quandt explicitly states that although the vital interests of the United States and Saudi Arabia converge, there remain serious differences over important issues, such as the Palestinians, oil prices and the question of how to respond to the Soviet challenge. Indeed, the symptoms of policy discord between Riyadh and Washington have become apparent in recent years. For instance, the Saudis have openly criticized the US-sponsored Camp David accord between Egypt and Israel and did not hesitate to join the 'rejectionist group' at the 1978 Baghdad Conference; they have become leading advocates of the Palestinian homeland cause; and have not responded positively to the Reagan administration's (presently shelved) concept of 'strategic consensus'.

The crux of Saudi–American disagreements lies in diverging perceptions of threat. The United States believes that the Soviet Union is the major threat to the region, its allies and interests. The Saudis on the other hand consider the Soviet threat as secondary to that from Israel. For many years the Saudis have argued that it is the United States' unequivocal support for Israel that emboldens it to do as it pleases; this in turn encourages forces within the Arab world to become more militant and radical. According to Dr Quandt, the Saudis are less worried about military conquest by powerful neighbours or by the threat of Soviet invasion than they are by internal conditions such as subversion, ideological warfare, terrorism, blackmail and propaganda. I agree that the discord in Saudi–US relations will persist, and perhaps even intensify, as long as Washington remains insensitive to these political dilemmas and security concerns of Riyadh. The United States as a senior partner in this relationship must take the lead in safeguarding the interests of its oldest and, perhaps, most reliable friend in the Arab world.

SHAFQAT A. SHAH

Egypt: Politics and Society 1945–1981. By Derek Hopwood. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 194pp. Index.

The Transformation of Egypt. By Mark N. Cooper. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 278pp. Index. £12·95.

EGYPT's last two rulers had only hazy ideas of where they intended to take Egypt, but they shared a firm and ruthless belief that they, and they alone, had the right to take her there. More grandiosely, both came to believe that Egypt's destiny was theirs, and theirs Egypt's, and they used the vast powers at their disposal to ensure that this should be as much the case in reality as it rapidly became in official mythology. For both, as for many of their predecessors, bankruptcy and sudden death were waiting to reward such *hybris*.

The most successful chapters of Derek Hopwood's *Egypt: Politics and Society 1945–1981* deal with the effects of this abuse of power: 'ideology' became little more than a stratagem serviced by hacks of one sort or another to extend power seized and uneasily retained by force; a suspect Egyptian vision of Arab unity was pursued by paradoxically—and fatally—exploiting inter-Arab feuds; meanwhile truly creative Egyptians, denied free public expression, resorted to confused allegories to capture the disappointments of lives made bleak by an uncontrollable state. This was only marginally less the case under Sadat than under Nasser, although the main emphasis in this book is on the latter.

Unfortunately these interesting themes are not sustained throughout. Hopwood states rather diffidently at the outset that this short book could be called 'a work of "vulgarisation" with not much to say to the specialist'. It does indeed read like a text-book introduction to recent Egyptian history. As such it has the virtue of clear narrative, but is necessarily limited in scope. Since this is a book which is meant to stimulate people into further reading in Egyptian history it is a pity that it is not bolder in its arguments, and more provocative in its explanations. Narrative pure and simple makes for a rather dry read.

At the same time, of course, historical narrative is never as simple as all that. There are the pitfalls of omission, selective emphasis, and 'hidden' explanation, all of which mar this book to some degree. These faults are most noticeable respectively in the scant treatment given to economic history, in the superficial chapter on Sadat's presidency, and in the sometimes curious leniency shown towards Nasser. In the latter case, although there is justified criticism of the repressive aspects of his rule, it is strange that when disaster looms—most noticeably in June 1967—Nasser is depicted as something of a victim: 'forces were dragging him. . .', 'it seemed he felt impelled to utter threats. . .'. This is noteworthy because in other respects Nasser is portrayed as the supreme agent which he so exerted himself to be. A more critical view of Nasser and of the responsibilities he must bear would have been more helpful for those using this book as an introduction to Egyptian politics—particularly as a kind of muddled nostalgia for those pre-Sadat days is one of the more obvious currents in the present Egyptian political mêlée.

The nostalgia in Mark Cooper's *The Transformation of Egypt* is of a different order entirely: it concerns not so much a period of Egyptian history as an era of once fashionable historical explanation. Ostensibly the book is an account of how the bankrupt and repressive state which Sadat inherited from Nasser was transformed into the bankrupt and repressive state which Mubarak inherited from Sadat. This irony is not greatly emphasized by Cooper, in part, it must be admitted, because he is mainly concerned with the years 1970–7—the last five years of Sadat's presidency receive very cursory treatment.

The reason for Cooper's concentration on these years is due to the chief purpose of his book: to use that period as a case study of an experiment in 'liberalization'. Thus, while the first part of the book is a competent, if disappointing, account of Nasser's legacy and its transformation, the second part is devoted to the institutions of Sadat's Egypt. One approaches this section of institutional analysis with a sinking feeling caused by the increasing appearance of diagrams, flow charts and tables. This is where the nostalgia comes in, since it soon becomes clear that the dead hand of the American 'functionalist' school lies heavy on the work. This takes hilarious form in the earnest 'advice to "liberalizers"'—the aims of which are so inappropriate to Sadat's vision of politics that to regard him as a failed would-be 'liberalizer' is to have misread him entirely.

The serious point here is the simple irrelevance of such functional analysis to much of Egyptian political life. The location of real power, and thus its explanation, seem to elude Cooper. As in a shadow play, one is treated to a minute examination of intricate shadows, but left in ignorance of the forces manipulating them.

International Institute for Strategic Studies, London CHARLES TRIPP

Iran since the Revolution. By Sepehr Zabih. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 247pp. Index. £12·95.

Iran Between Two Revolutions. By Ervand Abrahamian. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1982. 561pp. Index. £31·80. Pb.: £10·30.

EXPLANATIONS of the root causes of the Iranian revolution are in plentiful supply but few so far present as balanced and comprehensible a view as that offered by Sepehr Zabih. He sets

out to show how Ayatollah Khomeini took on the role of head of the revolution against the Shah and his government before consolidating his position as undisputed arbiter in the new Iran. There is a plausible and systematic analysis of the various components of the revolution, beginning with the author's view of the reasons behind the success of Khomeini *vis-à-vis* the Shah's regime before going on to look at events since February 1979. He is much exercised by the furore surrounding the occupation of the US embassy in Tehran and its role in the attempt of the radical Left to slow down the creation of a formal constitution. Dr Zabih thereafter leads his readers through evidence that would suggest that the Islamic Republican Party gradually, if erratically, established itself against both the radicals within its own ranks and challenges from outside led, among others, by former President Bani Sadr.

The important message that Dr Zabih seeks to purvey is that any opposition to the regime must operate in future without a secure base in popular support. New structures established in Iran since the revolution have succeeded in giving a pre-eminent place to the Islamic Republican Party and its supporters. It is also suggested that social revolution, including the elimination of significant sections of the former elite groups, will make easy overthrow of the regime extremely unlikely.

If there is any caveat to be placed on this analysis of Iran since 1979 it applies to the economic rather than the political field. The author ignores the economic situation of Iran since the revolution, and turning a blind eye to Iran's economic problems weakens the potency of his political argument.

Ervand Abrahamian's *Iran Between Two Revolutions* looks at the period 1905 to 1979 in considerable detail. Professor Abrahamian proposes that a neo-Marxist approach to contemporary Iranian history is the only one compatible with persuasive socio-political analysis. His work is dedicated to a modified class-oriented review of political events and the personalities involved in them since the constitutional revolution of the early twentieth century. Abrahamian's work is far from crude in its analysis. His class-based discussion is softened by cross-linkages to tribal, linguistic, ethnic and religious affiliations of Iranian families and groups. There is value in having a new book on recent Iranian history that takes a sympathetic view of the activities of the *Tudeh* (Communist Party). He articulates well the role of the *Tudeh* in the oilfields area in the years following the Second World War, an area generally poorly covered elsewhere in the literature. The part played by the left-wing factions in the various revolts against the Shah is also covered with some skill. This volume may not be counted as a major analytical study of Iran to the extent that its author would have his readers believe. The stance is already familiar from the outpouring of Persian language writers during and since the revolution of 1978–9. But the book does provide a well-organized and scholarly review of the repressed political life of the intellectual Left in Iran during this century without resort to political jargon.

Both these books are consistent and thorough in their respective approaches. Structures and use of language are excellent. Sepehr Zabih avoids forcing his prejudices on his readers and eschews the aggressive approach taken up by Iranian political commentators in recent years. Professor Abrahamian is less even-handed in his views. His readers are never allowed to forget that Marxist views prevail. He seeks out Persian language sources even where better Western language materials exist for the early period of his study. He is too dismissive by far of other scholarly offerings such as Cottam (1964) and Zonis (1971) on the nature of Iranian political life. But these blemishes should not deter students of Iranian history and politics from reading this long and useful contribution that ends in February 1979. Dr Zabih takes the story from that date into 1982 and, taken with his other books, this work gives an imaginative and workmanlike analysis of events following the overthrow of the Shah.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London KEITH MCLACHLAN

Israel and the Arabs. 2nd edn. By Maxime Rodinson. Trans. by Michael Perl and Brian Pearce. Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin. 1982. 364pp. Index. Pb.: £3·50.

Zionism and Arabism in Palestine and Israel. Edited by Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim. London: Cass. 1982. 255pp. £22·00.

Palestine and Israel in the 19th and 20th Centuries. Edited by Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim. London: Cass. 1982. 278pp. £22·00.

THE first edition of Maxime Rodinson's historical survey of the conflict between Arab and Jewish nationalisms in the Middle East came out just after the Six-Day War of 1967. It thus

ended with the devastating defeat and humiliation of the Arabs, or some of them, and with the question: what next? This edition reprints the original text unchanged, save for some new paragraphs in the expanded 'Conclusion', and three long new chapters considering the emergence of the various Palestinian groups and their assumption of a leading role in inter-Arab politics; the developments that pushed Sadat into the 'desperate remedy' of his 1973 attack across the Suez canal; and 'Steps towards Peace?' (this last by Olivier Carré). The final note thus remains one of interrogation, though the author does not deny himself the occasional guarded prophecy.

Rodinson's general position might be defined as strongly but realistically pro-Arab. He sees no reason to regard the origin and development of the Jewish national home as anything but a colonialist-settler enterprise, favoured and fostered by British imperialism for its own ends. 'But the Zionists were unlucky . . . Zionism began as a living force in the era of nationalism, of which it was itself a manifestation, and it pursued its career during the era of decolonization . . . the conscience of the world now supports peoples fighting to defend their identity' (pp. 320–1). The Arabs of Palestine were unluckier still. The author does not eschew a moralizing tone where he deems it appropriate, and his judgment that few if any of the Palestinians' critics are in a position to cast stones will be endorsed bv such British readers as pause to reflect on their countrymen's reactions to alien immigration—by settlers with no corporate political ambitions, most desiring only to be accepted by the host community and conform to its laws and customs—during the past 25 years.

By devoting what seems at times disproportionate space to inter-Arab rivalries and squabbles the book may appear to imply that the Palestinian issue has been the sole or principal reason for the dismal and tedious bickering that takes up a large part of its central chapters, though it is fairly clear that this is not the author's intention. In contrast, great power involvement seems at times rather inadequately dealt with. On the 'Islamic revival' Rodinson has not chosen to qualify his 1967 view that 'real faith in the religious message of Mohammed is everywhere in decline' (p. 110); in the new chapters he seems to regard religious ideology mainly as being a useful card in the Saudi hand, and he makes only the most cursory reference to the possible significance of events in Iran. In secular politics he records the fading of pan-Arab dreams and the onset of 'a sort of ideological temperance', which prompts the suggestion that since 'economic interest determines to a large extent and, in the long run, completely, civic and political attitudes' a rapprochement may develop between the commercial middle classes of Egyptian, Syrian and Israeli entrepreneurship. 'The temptation to create a commonwealth of all the countries of the Eastern seaboard of the Mediterranean will become still stronger, to counterbalance the dependence of these countries on the Gulf states' (p. 294).

As suggested, the book seems rather diffuse in the central parts, and it is not always easy to be sure precisely what, in particular contexts, is meant by 'the Arabs'. But this is a powerful and stimulating book, written with a strongly individual approach by an exceptionally well-qualified expert in his subject. The translator of the new material, like his predecessor, has produced a clear and stylish English text.

The other two books under review consist of articles, nearly all by Israeli scholars, accepted for publication in *Middle Eastern Studies*. The twelve in *Palestine and Israel* are reprinted from that journal, but the editors decided that the ten items in *Zionism and Arabism* might more usefully appear together in book form, and they are now published for the first time. (A brief introductory discussion of 'Arabism' as a concept, attempting to define just what it means, or meant at relevant moments in the past, would have been a useful adjunct to the book; the word seems to be gaining in popularity but is not yet so generally intelligible as 'Zionism'.) All but three of them deal with the Mandate period; the exceptions are Yaacov Ro'i's 'Jewish Emigration and Soviet–Arab Relations, 1954–67', Ibrahim A. Gambari's 'Development of African–Israeli Relations to the Yom Kippur War: Nigeria as a Case Study', and 'Integration of Arabs in an Israeli Party: The Case of Mapam, 1948–54' by Yael Yishai.

Of particular interest are Neil Caplan's long paper 'The Yishuv, Sir Herbert Samuel, and the Arab Question in Palestine, 1921–25', which, like his book *Palestine Jewry and the Arab Question, 1917–25*, vividly illustrates the characteristically 'white settler' attitudes of the Jewish community, understandably convinced that its paramount claims had been underwritten by London, to troublesome natives and weak-kneed colonial administrators alike;

and Shai Lachman's study of the career and influence of the exiled Syrian Imam Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, who has become a quasi-mythical figure in some Palestinian circles, between the 1929 riots and his death in battle with the police while preaching *jihad* six years later. Aaron Klieman's 'The Arab States and Palestine' (covering 1936–9) briefly discusses matters that were examined in much greater detail, and rather more from the standpoint of British policy-making, by Professor Kedourie in his recent book *Islam in the Modern World.* (In passing, one must question Klieman's assertion, on p. 118, that 'until 1936 the Palestine problem had been dealt with by the British mandatory power as an essentially local issue confined to the Arab and Jewish communities inside Palestine', which surely fails to do justice to the forces that compelled the MacDonald government to execute its graceless U-turn in 1931). Other papers deal with the Zionist reaction to the Anglo–American commission of 1945–6 and the British decision to abandon the mandate in the following year.

The articles reprinted in *Palestine and Israel* include Emile Marmorstein on 'European Jews in Muslim Palestine' which has interesting material of the Young Turk period from the diaries of Artur Ruppin, Mayir Vereté's influential 'The Balfour Declaration and its Makers' of 1970, and Yaacov Ro'i's 'Zionist Attitudes to the Arabs, 1908–1914', as well as three whose primary interest is demographic or economic.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

The United States in the Middle East: Interests and Obstacles. By Seth P. Tillman. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press. 1982. 333pp. Index. $22.50. £13·50.

THE appearance of yet another book on the Arab-Israeli conflict must inevitably be viewed with some trepidation. What, one must wonder, is there left to say? Despite serious limitations of both an intentional and unintentional nature, however, this book is both well written and coherent and it deserves a careful reading by the narrow audience directly addressed by the author.

It should be made clear at the outset that the subject matter of the book is rather more narrowly focussed than its title might indicate. It is less a study of American foreign policy in the Middle East than a primer on the motives, goals and behaviour of various actors in that region, particularly Saudi Arabia, Israel, the Palestinians and the Soviet Union, during the period since Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. Only one chapter directly addresses American interests and goals, and other Arab participants are discussed only peripherally. The title also perpetuates the familiar Washington practice of using 'the Middle East' to refer to just the Arab–Israeli conflict, an annoying semantic quirk that may well reveal a serious constriction of policy outlook.

Clearly, this book was not written for the specialist on the Middle East, nor is it a scholarly treatise on the nature of American foreign policy or on foreign policy making in general. Rather, it appears to be directed at an audience that is not entirely unfamiliar with the basic terrain but still requires considerable briefing on the complexities of the problem. In short, Tillman, formerly on the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and at present Adjunct Professor of International Relations at Georgetown University, appears to be addressing the same audience with which he has dealt for much of his career, i.e. Capitol Hill. This realization does much to explain the narrow timespan considered, the limited nature and extent of sources used, and the emphasis on current policy issues.

The result is an extremely detailed account of the words and actions of many of the participants in and observers of the Camp David process. It appears that many of the basic sources on the Arab-Israeli conflict were not consulted and consequently Tillman relies principally on American newspapers and Congressional prints, as reflected in the nearly 1,000 footnotes. Not unexpectedly, then, the author appears far more familiar with certain aspects of his subject, such as the interplay of American interests and constituencies and Israeli politics, than with others, including both Arab and Soviet internal and foreign policies. This should not obscure the fact that the author has obviously tried very hard to be evenhanded and objective in his handling of an intensely emotional subject and that he has achieved a laudable success. The sheer amount of detail provided by the extensive documentation provides the reader with a useful and handy source of reference for recent events and statements. Furthermore, the book's essentially descriptive nature results in a clear, readable narrative.

Only in the short concluding chapter does Tillman turn from description to prescription. There he argues that the outlines of a comprehensive Arab–Israeli settlement are already well known and that a consensus on its terms exists among moderates in the Arab world, the United States and Europe. Key elements must include Palestinian self-determination on the West Bank and Gaza, unconditional recognition of and cooperation with Israel, and some form of Arab sovereignty over the Islamic holy places of Jerusalem. This cannot be achieved, he reasons, without the application of firm American pressure on Israel at some point. Here Tillman makes the distinction between mediation and arbitration, and notes that the practical limits of America's role as mediator may have been reached in achieving the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty. In the future, it may be necessary for the United States to return to the more forceful role of arbiter, directly exerting its influence over Israel, much as Eisenhower did during the 1956–7 Suez crisis.

College of William and Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia J. E. Peterson

Food, Development and Politics in the Middle East. By Marvin G. Weinbaum. Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1982. 205pp. Index. £13·95.

Much has been written about the implications for energy production and consumption of the oil price rises of the 1970s, but scant attention has been paid to the consequences for the world food equation. The oil exporters of the Middle East, as Marvin Weinbaum shows, have become major food importers and the region as a whole has a large and growing food deficit. The purchasing power of the OPEC states in international food markets is as much a force to be reckoned with as their strength in the energy field. Prospects for Middle Eastern agriculture remain poor, yet rapid population growth and steadily rising living standards suggest that import dependence will increase until the end of the century and beyond, and the goal of regional self-sufficiency in agriculture will remain more remote than ever.

Although most of the Middle East's food imports come from the West, particularly the United States, Weinbaum criticizes as naive those who believe that food sanctions could ever be used as a countervailing threat to the so-called oil weapon. In a particularly interesting chapter on the politics of food aid, trade, and development assistance, he shows how United States grain supplies to Egypt under the Public Law 480 programme gave only limited leverage over Nasser, whose policies were frequently blatantly anti-American. Equally ineffective from the point of view of securing political influence was aid by the Arab oil-exporters to Sadat's government, which failed to prevent the conclusion of the Camp David accords and the peace treaty with Israel.

The author examines at some length the place of the agricultural sector in development policy in the Middle East. He shows how policies went through similar phases in virtually all the countries of the region, to a large extent independently of political ideology. With the emphasis on industrialization for much of the period, the rural sector suffered from relative neglect, apart from the structural changes brought about by land reform. The internal terms of trade moved against agriculture to keep down food prices for industrial workers, and the gap between urban and rural living standards widened. Class inequalities became more pronounced as a result, as Weinbaum shows in a chapter which draws on a wealth of secondary source material.

The lack of price incentives is cited as a major cause of poor agricultural output performance. Few savings can be made to finance farm improvement, while the incentive to invest with low prices is minimal in any case. Most of these agricultural problems discussed by Weinbaum will of course be all too familiar to those concerned with development studies, but it is useful to have them illustrated in a specific context. The author can of course be criticized for trying to cover too wide a geographic area, but in many cases the intra-regional comparisons and similarities are extremely revealing. Weinbaum has considerable field experience in Iran, Egypt, Afghanistan and Pakistan, and his work drawing on this is worthy of attention by those involved in Middle Eastern studies as well as agrarian specialists.

University of Durham Rodney Wilson

Africa

A Constitutional History of Nigeria. By B. O. Nwabueze. London: Hurst. 1982. 272pp. Index. £12·50.

IN this learned commentary on Nigeria's 'staggering number of constitutional instruments' (p. vii) issued between 1849, when a British consulate was established in what was to become Nigeria, and 1976, when transitional arrangements were decreed following the creation of more states, bringing the total to nineteen (in 1983 the recommendations call for forty states—and Abuja Federal Capital Territory to boot), Nwabueze magisterially surveys the orders-in-council, letters patent, royal instructions, acts, laws, decrees and edicts which for 130 years have conditioned and controlled Nigeria's legal existence.

But of course, being the distinguished constitutional author and authority he is, Nwabueze does far more than just this. He adds keen analysis to conscientious cataloguing. He discusses the source of each instrument and undertakes a critical appraisement of the merits and demerits of them all. He sticks scrupulously to his lawyer's role: the constitutions and their supplementary legislation are his boundary; not for him the political influences, agitation or events which precipitated the change from one instrument to another. His footnotes confirm his profession, of legal academic rather than political historian: law reports abound, references to standard historical works are few and far between. Particularly interesting are some of the less obvious constitutional phenomena discussed, for instance, the legal implications of the Biafran secession of 1967; whether the name 'Nigeria' should be changed to 'Songhai', as was suggested in the early aftermath of independence (for once Dr Nwabueze's meticulous exactitude of sources seems to have failed him in his sloppy footnote (p. 87, fn. 43)); and the *de jure* 'handover' and *de facto* 'takeover' of the civilian government shortly before noon on 16 January 1966. Nwabueze is ready to congratulate as well as to condemn where it is necessary. He censures the Cabinets under the successive constitutions of the First Republic for their 'record of irresponsibility and indiscipline among ministers' (p. 268); he queries the 'doublespeak' in the Federal Military Government's rationalization of its revocation of Ojukwu's appointment as military governor of the East-Central state, and exposes the fallacy in the court's decision to declare the Biafran currency illegal in 1968. It would have been valuable to have had Nwabueze's learned opinion of the legal implications of the aborted Aburi accord of 1967, but this would be outside his brief, for the proposals agreed by the military governors were never translated into law.

St Antony's College, Oxford A. H. M. KIRK-GREENE

The Long Transition: Building Socialism in Tanzania. By Idrian N. Resnick. New York, London: Monthly Review Press. 1981. 304pp. Index. $18.00. £10·00.

THIS is a useful, serious and different book on Tanzania. It is a left-wing radical critique of Tanzania's 1967–76 (largely 1967–72) process of change in Tanzanian (not global model) terms, in the Tanzanian (not Central European or East Asian) context, and as a process carried out by people living in and affected by it (not an 'experiment').

It has limits, including some factual errors—for example, use of relative agricultural prices as policy instruments was not unknown before 1975. More critically, its whole 1967–76 overview of rural development is right (if incomplete) in detail, but out of focus. 'Villagization' over 1973–6 had far more popular input and support than stated. The moves—and subsequent village stability and self-development—simply could not have been achieved primarily by force (especially the larger 1975–6 move after the centre's consistent rejection of force was imposed on local Party cadres.)

Presentation of Tanzania's transition in its own context and terminology with specific attention to the actual form of contradictions and class conflicts is refreshing and revealing. So is a coherent analysis of why a sector by sector, dialectical step by step strategy, avoiding both the use of force and violent class confrontations was followed—and was probably the only potentially viable approach.

Resnick's presentation of the low, but rising, levels of class consciousness and conflict has several insights. It is crucial to realize that the political, managerial, official and intellectual sub-classes engaged in defensive struggle over authority-status attitudes to workers and peasants rather than maintaining, let alone expanding, personal economic privilege or power.

Their commitment to nationalism and egalitarianism and quite real efforts (in most cases) to implement socialism despite not being socialists are the surprising elements.

However, he underestimates how much authoritarianism has retreated since 1966. Peasants and workers do secure policy and personnel changes; officials and managers have had to alter procedures (and sometimes attitudes). Nevertheless, the problem he cites remains: that the lower officials (who have nothing except status) are far less open to participation or to respecting workers and peasants. While Village and Workers' Councils and Party Branches have substantially reduced their freedom to oppress, their response is often saying yes to all and doing nothing (oppressive or supportive, leading or responding).

Perhaps understandably, Resnick fails to see that the basic reason a number of 'progressives' remain outside the main political process is their 'left authoritarianism'. Their claims to power on the basis of knowledge and of knowing the 'true consciousness' of workers and peasants better than workers and peasants or those elected by them has caused (and made easy) their exclusion.

That the transition in Tanzania has been endangered by the (largely externally caused) economic crisis since 1978 (*pace* Resnick, 1976–7 was a boom not a crisis period) is clear. Step by step change and limiting losses at any one time to officials, managers and businessmen while building up basic services and productive forces requires economic growth. Resnick's stress that both the record over 1967–76 and the prospects for sustaining forward progress are mixed is quite correct, even if some of his particular interpretations and generalizations are highly contentious.

Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex R. H. GREEN

Papers on the Economy of Botswana. Edited by Charles Harvey. London, Nairobi: Heinemann Educational. 1981. 276pp. £12·50.

THIS excellent collection is written by economists, but not only *for* economists. The papers are clearly written, using mercifully little technical language, and are obviously intended to be comprehensible to the non-economist without any loss of rigour or explanatory value. In this aim they fully succeed, with the exception of perhaps two papers on highly technical subjects. My only adverse criticism of the book is that it lacks a consolidated bibliography, but that is more a criticism of the publisher than of the editor.

Botswana has been an economic success story, in which the greatest single factor has been the development of mining since independence. Nevetherless, the economy is vulnerable. Over half the population is under twenty years of age; about half the population increase between 1964 and 1978, as Dahl points out in a useful background paper, gravitated to the townships, where unemployment has grown apace; the great growth in the national herd has increased the danger of disaster in times of drought and rendered more than ever necessary the construction of a second abattoir (a subject which Hubbard's paper discusses in detail). Furthermore, diamonds are not unequivocally a country's best friend. On the one hand they are, as Lewis says, like an annual gift of completely untied foreign exchange, but on the other there are dangers, which Botswana is avoiding more successfully than other mining countries, in diamond-dependent development. (The papers were, of course, written before the recent collapse in the diamond market, though several refer to it as a possibility, albeit a remote one.)

The first mining operation was the vast copper/nickel enterprise at Selebi–Phikwe and Lewis gives an admirable account of its extraordinarily complex financing arrangements (much simplified in the 1978 restructuring) which involved refining in the USA and the sale of the refined metals in Germany. Economic activity in construction, banking and electric power has forged ahead, as have export earnings and revenue from SACU. There is however, as Gaolathe says, a need to maximize the value retained in Botswana by promoting localization of personnel (because, as several contributors point out, the need for expatriates has increased and their salaries are high) and introducing backward linkages, like the local manufacture of miners' helmets.

Though mining dominates the economy, cattle are still foremost in the minds of many people, including politicians. Hudson shows that cattle farmers are highly subsidized and pay little tax, indeed he thinks as many as seven out of eight of those who should be taxed

in fact escape. Meanwhile, as Jones argues, arable agriculture could be promoted and so reduce the country's dependence on food imports.

Other papers include valuable sections on the operation of SACU (Hudson) and the possible routes for a trans-Kalahari railway (Green); there are also excellent case studies by, among others, Harvey, the book's editor, and Moyo—the latter being one of the less inhibited contributors when he touches on political matters. In short, this is a collection which any student of southern Africa will wish to read for its intrinsic interest, and keep for reference. The lessons to be learned from Botswana should also, as President Masire says in his introduction, be of relevance to many others who are interested in the developing world.

University of York CHRISTOPHER R. HILL

Changing South Africa: Political Considerations. By Sam C. Nolutshungu. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1982. 219pp. Index. £19·50. Pb.: £6·50.

The Children of Soweto. By Mbulelo Vizikhungo Mzamane. Harlow, Essex: Longman. 1982. 246pp. Pb.

SAM NOLUTSHUNGU says of this very well-produced book that he has written an essay to define the place of politics in the problems which surround change in South Africa. The essay is divided into three parts. The first is a discussion of political ideas. While recognizing the social and political importance of economic structure, this seeks to show that politics is neither merely instrumental to economic ends nor economically determined. The second part examines the possibilities of 'elite accommodation' (or the 'neo-colonial solution') which is now advocated by some whites and in some sections of the South African Government. Part three looks at the Black Consciousness Movement as an example of black resistance to racial discrimination.

As this is an essay it assumes background knowledge of both South African politics and political science literature generally. Personally I found the first part, which is divided between 'Liberal Democratic Themes' and 'A Marxist Perspective', confused and confusing. Whether the fault lies with me or Sam Nolutshungu must be an open question, but I felt he failed to clarify many of the major concepts he uses, is misleading about 'liberalism' and in places confuses it with 'conservatism', and while saying that Marx had no theory of politics proceeds to speculate about what he might have thought. I accept Nolutshungu's point that politics has a distinctive place in social change and is not a passive instrument of economics; but it was never clear to me what he meant by 'freedom' and 'self government', which he says are the main political aims of the black South Africans, other than in the terms in which they are used in Western capitalist states which he appears to reject. I was also confused when Nolutshungu claimed that Marx did not disregard politics but instead demonstrated 'the need, within the framework of his general theory of social change, for a fresh and open minded investigation of the politics of each country in concrete, historical distinctiveness' (p. 47). How can the investigation be both 'open minded' and within the framework of a general theory?

In contrast to the first part, I found the second and third sections of the book stimulating and well argued. In these he is dealing with actual political developments in South Africa and is much more convincing. While it is impossible to note other than a few of the themes he discusses, among those he handles well are the importance of the state machine and the interests it creates, including those of the 'bureaucratic bourgeoisie', the way in which apartheid has stifled the emergence of a strong black middle class with whom 'accommodation' could have been sought by the whites, and more generally his discussion of the Black Consciousness Movement which is among the best I have read.

Mention of the Black Consciousness Movement leads into Mzamane's book. This too is divided into three parts—a trilogy in which 'The Day of the Riots' and 'The Children of Soweto' are the most striking and politically relevant. The book is autobiographical but told in a novel form. It is compelling but sad reading telling of a society which (as Nolutshungu's analysis had indicated) is bitterly divided by race and by class within the races.

University of Durham JAMES BARBER

South African Politics. By Leonard Thompson and Andrew Prior. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1982. 255pp. Index. £17·50.

The West and South Africa. By James Barber, C. R. Hill and Jesmond Blumenfeld. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1982. 106pp. Pb.: £3·95.

THE first of these two books is an introductory textbook. Its central concern is with 'political power as it actually operates' in South Africa (p. ix). It is a good introduction and will serve undergraduates well. As one expects of work associated with Leonard Thompson, this book is well organized and clearly written and each stage of the argument is supported by appropriate evidence and illustration. The historical, 'demographic' and 'economic' contexts of the political system are first briefly sketched, and then the following chapters deal with the institutional framework of the political system, the politics of the system ('how it works'), internal and external opposition. There is a lot to cover and I think the authors have got the balance about right, for introductory purposes. I have, however, two main reservations. First, there is some foggy use of such concepts as caste and class (which are important for the general argument of the book that South Africa is divided on primarily racial not class grounds, p. 17), plus some very traditional (but hardly useful) discussion of such things as 'political socialization' and 'interest articulation and aggregation', which are in practice divorced from any explicit connection with the political economy and social structure of South Africa. Secondly, the book assumes 'politics' to be concerned primarily if not entirely with the *institutions* through which formal power is exercised. Hence the strongly institutional focus of the approach, and the relegation of economic and social factors to the background, as not intrinsic to politics. Such an approach is a narrow one. For politics is not only found in the institutions of government, but in all the activities of cooperation and conflict whereby groups of people go about using, producing and distributing resources in a society, and in the relations between such groups in the course of this. This covers a much wider range of relations than this book suggests. For this reason the book is best thought of as an introduction to *government*, rather than *politics*, in South Africa. As such, it can be recommended to anyone commencing the serious study of South Africa for the first time.

The second book, by Barber, Hill and Blumenfeld, is a lot slimmer (and rather pricey at that) and is a much more mixed bag. It is concerned with the question of the relations between South Africa and the West and what pressure the latter can or should exert upon South Africa. Its central conclusion (which is hardly new, see for instance the Report of the Study Commission on US Policy toward South Africa, set up by the Rockefeller Foundation, called *South Africa: Time Running Out*) is that there should be a two-pronged strategy: to loosen Western dependence on South Africa (especially in respect of certain important minerals), while at the same time encouraging Western companies (by firmer and if necessary mandatory means) to press for improvements in the conditions and rights of African employees in South Africa. Most of the work which justifies this conclusion comes from the best part of the book by Jesmond Blumenfeld. He provides useful evidence about the economic interdependence of the West and South Africa and thus shows how potentially costly it could be (to Britain, for instance, but surely not the United States?) to sever all economic links with South Africa. He also argues cogently that the effects of such actions are very uncertain inside South Africa and do not necessarily guarantee their objectives. However, whether Western governments (such as those currently in office in the United States or Britain) either wish to or can influence their multinational companies to act in the way Blumenfeld suggests is much more debatable. There is little historical precedent for them to act in such a way, and involve obscure long term incentives as against very lucrative short-term ones. Nevertheless, Blumenfeld's argument is clear and deserves fuller exposition elsewhere. It certainly saves the book from being rather lightweight. This is the tone of the first section where Barber and Hill briefly review the diversity of Western (British, US, French and German) attitudes to South Africa, and the possibilities of tension within that alliance because of the differences; the necessary balancing of interests between South Africa and the rest of Africa; and the uneven and ambiguous character of Western security interests in South Africa. They conclude that the worst case for the West would be civil or revolutionary war in South Africa and hence that the West should do whatever it can to pressure South Africa into reforms that might prevent that, but in a way that would not

endanger Western interests. There is little new or hard evidence or argument here and much of the time the section seems to flutter round the edges of 'official thinking', using broad and insubstantiated general phrases like 'taking a considered view', 'political judgement', 'influential strand of local opinion' (who? when? where? how?), and 'giving discreet encouragement to the *verligte* elements . . .'. Both these authors have written important stuff on South Africa, but these few pages are not of their best. Lawrence Freedman, who 'edited' these papers for Chatham House should be censured for allowing the authors to publish work which is so clearly below their former high standards.

University of York ADRIAN LEFTWICH

Asia

China's Foreign Relations: New Perspectives. Edited by Chün-tu Hsüeh. New York: Praeger. 1982. 148pp. Index. $17.95. Pb.: $7.95.

THIS survey of China's foreign relations is probably as good an account within a condensed framework as one could hope to find. It has all the necessary detail, with up-to-date information on the latest developments, and its span is wide. The scene is well set in the editor's introductory chapter. The perspectives are those of strategy and security, discussed in terms of national interests. There is little comfort here for those who would like to find a more ideological colouring; not that this is discounted as an ingredient of policy formulation, but simply that there is an endorsement here, particularly in view of the developments of the past decade, of what 'classic writers in the field of diplomacy have maintained with considerable consistency, that the foreign policies and external activities of any country, but especially those of a great power, are likely to be explained best in terms of the struggle for survival, the maximising of power, and the defence of national interests'. (p. 25–6).

China's most important relationships are naturally with the two superpowers, who some may like to call the First World. There is a useful historical *résumé* and background, but we are more enlightened to learn of the recent evidence that the editor, who seems very much on the ball, has gleaned from his meetings with top people. The Sino–Soviet dispute is by now well-charted, and we knew of Mao's remark in 1962, 'We spent the whole of 1960 fighting Krushchev', but it takes matters a lot further to be informed that the Soviet Union's 'unreasonable demands' in 1958 had included the permanent stationing of Russian troops in Manchuria, a joint fleet under Soviet command, a Soviet sphere of influence in Sinkiang, exclusive Soviet radio facilities on Chinese soil, and an economic relationship based on Chinese agriculture and Soviet industry (p. 3 and fn.) This goes far to explain, as do Dr Kissinger's recently published memoirs, the turnaround in relations with the United States.

Other chapters deal with relations with the Third World (Korea, ASEAN and Latin America), and the Second World, which is taken to include Japan, West and East Europe. France, interestingly, gets a chapter to itself, perhaps because, in the view of the editor, 'Unlike the British, who had resigned themselves to their loss of influence after World War II, the French have not lost their historic sense of grandeur' (p. 5). China's much improved relations with Western Europe as a whole, particularly in the context of her worsened relations with the USSR, are a significant new factor in world politics. This trend is reinforced by the needs of modernization and the purchase of arms and technology from the West. This thought-provoking book illustrates the extreme fluidity characterizing China's present foreign relations, and the possibility of development in almost any direction.

University of Hull VICTOR FUNNELL

The Search for a New Order: Intellectuals and Fascism in Prewar Japan. By William Miles Fletcher III. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press. 1982. 262pp. Index. £18·00.

IT has often been stated that the support for 'right-wing' policies during the latter 1930s from Japanese intellectuals formerly of left-wing persuasion signified little short of apostasy. The basic theme of Fletcher's book is that such intellectuals' advocacy of fascist ideas, their support for a new political order and an Asian economic bloc under Japanese leadership, in

fact marked a logical step in their intellectual development and expressed a fundamental desire for economic and political justice and efficiency. Fletcher traces the development of the thought of three leading intellectuals of the period—the economist and journalist Ryū Shintarō, the political scientist Rōyama Masamichi, and the philosopher Miki Kiyoshi. He looks at their involvement with the Shōwa Research Association, which had close connections with Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro, and their attempts to promote a radically new political and economic order, which they believed would cope with the problems produced by industrialization and war, and which ultimately failed to get off the ground. The account is a detailed one based on comprehensive research into Japanese and Western sources. The argument mostly avoids becoming submerged in the somewhat unrelenting minutiae and there is a valuable and readable conclusion.

As indicated by the subtitle, the author is concerned with the attempts of intellectuals to adapt fascist thought to Japan. He argues that in Japan intellectuals viewed—and view—themselves as a distinctive social group, and that the crises of the late 1930s provided them with the opportunity for political influence without political involvement, and, indeed, without political responsibility. So far so good, but what about the fascist side of the equation? Many of the ideas these men espoused were embraced by the fascist ideologies of Mussolini's Italy and Nazi Germany, but Fletcher's introduction lacks detailed comment on the usefulness of fascism as an analytical concept in the case of Japan. Most of the brief discussion of this crucial question is relegated to footnotes at the end of the book. This includes the view that while the Japanese state itself was not fascist, the New Order Movement constituted a failed attempt at a fascist movement, an opinion challenging much prevailing orthodoxy. It transpires from the conclusion that what makes the New Order Movement fascist is its advocacy of a single mass party/national organization, of state control over the economy and of a national service ethic. Such an argument proves quite tenable, but the thesis should be explicitly stated at the outset. The author has full confidence in his assertions and it is to be regretted that he has not always accorded them due prominence. Detailed information must be justified by the conclusions and implications which are drawn from it.

Increasing attention has recently been paid to political and economic thought in interwar Japan, and to the Shōwa Research Association, recognition of whose significance is conspicuously lacking in contemporary Western writings on Japan's 'new order'. This book marks a valuable contribution to this area and will be read with interest by those working on Japan in this period. Nevertheless, it reflects a weakness common to many academic books on Japan. In the United Kingdom in particular, Japan rarely receives its due measure of academic attention and is rarely integrated into more general historical, political and economic studies. Here we have a subject potentially of interest far beyond the narrow field of Japanese studies, and an author manifestly capable of tackling the wider implications of his theme. Yet, sadly, we are left with another highly competent monograph aimed almost exclusively at those who already specialize in Japan.

London School of Economics JANET HUNTER

Unconditional Democracy: Education and Politics in Occupied Japan 1945–1952. By Toshio Nishi. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 367pp. Index. $19.95.

EVER since the restoration of Japan's sovereignty researchers have been fascinated by the occupation years. Some have sought the origins of Japan's economic growth in postwar social reform while others have been intrigued by the early background of the alliance between Washington and Tokyo. Historical research has also been inspired by mountainous American documents which have been rapidly opened for scholarly use. Toshio Nishi's study of democratic re-education is a refreshing and important addition to occupation literature which describes previously unknown aspects of Japanese–American relations. This work's value is further heightened by the author's direct experience of reformed postwar education and his sensitivity to the subtle shadings of Japanese life.

In a vivid and witty prologue Dr Nishi describes the powerful elements of hierarchy, collectivism and occasional violence which characterized his own formal and informal education in Japanese schools and colleges. The contrast between classroom ideals of democracy and the muscular discipline of a student athletic club dramatizes the many

ambiguities of postwar social change; but the author emphatically admires the extension of personal and educational opportunity which was brought about by MacArthur's many reforms.

Despite its autobiographical opening this work utilizes innumerable archives and explores a vast educational landscape. It surveys prewar Japanese politics and intellectual training but largely neglects islands of autonomy and academic independence which at times existed. Its main concern is the burden of orthodoxy which typified most school and university life. Against this background America's aim of re-educating the entire Japanese population appears understandable if arrogant. Perhaps the greatest strength of Nishi's work is its emphasis upon the broad interdependence of several fields of American policy. Thus he sees the new constitution as a means of political education as well as a blueprint for a democratic state. MacArthur's initiative in drafting a constitution was provoked by the conservatism of Japanese ministers the Imperial Rescript on Education and the notion of National Polity (*Kokutai*) were supported by Japanese conservatives well after their military surrender. However, Nishi's revisionism is not confined to clarifying the power of Japanese tradition. He also demonstrates that American emancipation was often stained with compromise. MacArthur was quickly disillusioned by the attitudes of liberated Japanese journalists and he soon tightened his press code and apparatus of censorship. This left many Japanese bewildered as to how to respond to their first breath of liberty.

In discussing the reform of Japanese schools and universities, Nishi implicitly criticizes the insensitivity and heavy-handedness of both Americans and Japanese. Robert King Hall and the United States Education Mission unsuccessfully sought the total abolition of Chinese characters and the isolation of the Japanese from their earlier culture. In the Ministry of Education Japanese officials were often tortuously obstructive in negotiations with the well-meaning Americans. Perhaps the most ironic aspect of MacArthur's crusade was his frustration at spontaneous responses to liberty: when he imposed elected school boards on the Ministry of Education, he was surprised to find that communists and men of property were the most conspicuous candidates.

American idealism was often flavoured by parochialism and arrogance, but this difficult encounter engendered lasting friendships and surprising mutual respect.

University of Sheffield GORDON DANIELS

Nationalist China at War: Military Defeats and Political Collapse 1937–45. By Hsi-sheng Ch'i. Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press. 1982. 309pp. Index. $20.00.

THE argument of this well written and important work is much broader than its title suggests, since it deals not merely with the inability of the regime of Chiang Kai-shek to impose any real unity on unoccupied wartime China but also with deficiencies that were evident in the Kuomintang movement since the death of Sun Yat-sen. Indeed, it is Professor Ch'i's thesis that the virtual collapse of the Kuomintang regime by 1945 was the direct legacy of a belief that developed in the 1920s in the efficacy of military solutions to China's problems, and more especially from the tactics of the northern expedition of 1927, which gave China a tenuous unity but only at the cost of fatal compromise with the forces of warlordism and regionalism.

In 1937 the Kuomintang regime could only be said to rule the provinces of Kiangsu and Chekiang; the fierce defence of this area following the Japanese invasion deprived the regime of its only reliable territory and its elite troops. The removal of the capital to Chungking brought it to a region in which Kuomintang control had only ever been nominal. With few real tasks allotted to it other than moralistic propagandizing, and with no funds, the Kuomintang party put down no local roots, members often being drafted on the basis of military or bureaucratic posts they already held, and although Chiang showed some awareness of the need to reorganize the administration of the country as a foundation for national resistance, neither the new *hsien* movement of rural self-government and self-help, nor the revised systems of conscription, grain acquisition, and taxation ever existed much beyond paper. Professor Ch'i convincingly shows how obsessed the *Generalissimo* was with seeking military solutions, with the consequence that resources and manpower were not consistently devoted to any other task. But in the military sphere Chiang was unable to move beyond the relationships of the 1920s which had left the Kuomintang in uneasy cooperation with

warlords and former warlords, large numbers of whose ill-equipped troops were often of only doubtful loyalty. To keep his regime in being Chiang was forced to require a double role of his own forces, whose divisions never amounted to more than one quarter of Chinese under arms. They were needed effectively as an army of occupation in areas where large regional forces were present as an offensive force, and consequently they could not be concentrated or moved effectively, thus making them vulnerable to enemy attacks. Whatever hope Chiang had had of weathering the wartime storm with any real power base was destroyed by operation Ichigō in 1944 in which the Chinese suffered more than 300,000 casualties.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne JAMES COTTON

Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Superpowers. By Stanley Wolpert. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1982. 222pp. Index. £10·50.

THE title of this book gives fair warning that its author is a historian bent on demonstrating the significance of the past to an understanding of current political issues. More precisely, Professor Wolpert, who is well known as the writer of several works on recent Indian history, seeks to demonstrate to American public opinion at large that United States policy towards southern Asia has in the past been poorly conceived and executed, and to plead that in future it should be informed by a greater awareness of the region's complex history. In 200 pages of text, he sketches the historical record from earliest days to the present, discusses the nature of Hindu and Muslim value systems, and puts forward specific proposals for American policy.

It would be impossible for such a book to succeed completely, but Wolpert's attempt at a grand policy-oriented synthesis fails more badly than it need have done. His early chapters on Hinduism and Islam appear to be setting the scene for a broad discussion of the dynamics of regional politics, but thereafter it is difficult to see what principle of organization is at work. There are some useful sections which would indicate to the general reader the genesis in the colonial period of present tensions in the region, but taken overall, though the book strives for comprehensiveness it achieves only superficiality. On important points the material is rather scant. It seems odd, in a work occasioned by the new Soviet presence in the region, to find no mention of the work by M. E. Yapp on British frontier policy, or that by Selig Harrison on Baluchistan. There are also a number of factual errors, some inconsequential but others positively misleading. We are told, for example, that 'most Afghans are Pashtu-speaking, orthodox Muslim Pathans' (p. 3), a statement that would lead the innocent to suppose that Afghanistan is a homogeneous state with only marginal minority problems. Morarji Desai would be surprised to find himself described as a member of the Jan Sangh, and former president of India N. Sanjiva Reddy even more so at his elevation to Brahman status. On the only map in the book, New Delhi appears to have migrated southwards almost to the latitude of Karachi, while Islamabad and Rawalpindi have changed places.

The last chapter of the book discusses the present state of American policy towards the region. Concluding that it has failed to serve either American or South Asian interests, Wolpert calls for the cessation of American arms sales in the area as a whole, and their replacement by new forms of economic aid intended to encourage regional cooperation. Within such a framework, he hopes, South Asian countries might be willing to look to Washington as 'an impartial mediator or arbitrator' (p. 197) over such issues as Kashmir. Wolpert seeks to disarm criticism by admitting that this is a long-range goal, but even though greater regional cooperation in South Asia may well be a future development, one may still wonder whether there is likely to be a direct role for America.

This is clearly an American book for an American audience, and an English reviewer perhaps ought not to object to the rather folksy style, although surely Kabul need only have been referred to once as Afghanistan's 'mile-high capital'. It seems out of place, however, to refer to the late Mr Bhutto as Zulfi.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London DAVID TAYLOR

North America

The Dynamics of Human Rights in U.S. Foreign Policy. Edited by Natalie Kaufman Hevener. New Brunswick, N.J., London: Transaction. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Holt Saunders, Eastbourne.) 374pp. Index. £29·25.

THIS book, the result of colloquia held at the University of Southern California, features different explanations of the workings of US human rights policy, as emphasized in the early Carter administration. It covers the political, economic, social and legal aspects of US human rights policy and contemplates related issues such as arms control, the protection of minorities, and so on. Invariably, there is some overlap and the book could perhaps have been structured differently; for instance, Part IV, 'The Formulation and Implementation of US Human Rights Policies' more logically following Part I, 'Introductory Perspectives'. The book includes contributions by a number of outstanding scholars in the field of international law.

The dilemmas inherent in US human rights policy and the fluctuations in official behaviour are reflected throughout the text. Richard Falk, perceptive and critical in his study of the ideological patterns in the US human rights debate 1945–78, is basically pessimistic but correct in his assessment that abandonment of the Carter emphasis would entail a setback for the cause of human rights. Borosage, more caustic in his approach, sees no guarantee of fundamental economic rights in the face of continuing economic difficulties. Sohn rightly favours the use of multilateral channels and UN machinery in particular for dealing with various human rights issues and calls for US ratification of several human rights instruments, a precondition for effective US participation in the international human rights system, a point underscored by Bruno Bitker's limited historical survey and his conclusion that the history of US ratification of human rights treaties 'reflects a classic case of schizophrenia'. 'The leader in support of all the treaties within the United Nations, frequently the principal drafter of the documents . . . the United States has been the outstanding laggard when it comes to signing on the dotted line' (p. 88).

Concerning self-determination, Walker Connor argues that the United States should support self-determination and liberation from situations characterized by genocide and 'help minimize the sufferings accompanying a self-determination effort'. But 'where the United States has no plans to proffer assistance it should carefully eschew encouraging the national aspirations of peoples' (p. 116–7); a relatively familiar idea. Connor also justly condemns the manipulation of dissident ethnic minorities by foreign governments and their subsequent sacrifice, as in the case of the Iraqi Kurds abandoned by the Shah in 1975 with US connivance.

The issue of apartheid, perhaps the most persistent and intractable problem of our time, is assessed by C. Clyde Ferguson. Ferguson briefly considers the debate as it has developed in the UN, the limited Anglo–American responses because of constraints arising out of Western economic interests in South Africa, and wisely concludes that the US position on this issue will result in 'a continued deterioration of US prestige and effectiveness at the UN and in the international community at large' (p. 213).

The concluding articles pinpoint the various interest groups acting to influence US foreign and human rights policy, the role of Congress and finally the US contribution to the promotion and protection of international human rights.

On a whole the contributions here have reflected a serious and rigorous attempt to come to grips with the whole panoply of issues involved in US human rights policy. The pleadings here remain good as history if of little immediate relevance in view of the Reagan administration's downgrading of the subject. But even then, rather than justifying the bubbly optimism and 'safe' prediction by Kattenburg that human rights would be in the future 'an integral component in the conduct of US foreign relations' (p. 27) this has reflected the accuracy of Falk's conclusion that 'Carter's experiment on human rights diplomacy . . . revealed the basic dynamic of the American political scene, and is unlikely to persist, much less prevail, because of the character of this dynamic' (p. 50).

Emmanuel College, Cambridge CALEB M. PILGRIM

The United States and Asia: Changing Attitudes and Perspectives. By William Watts. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 121pp. Index. £13·50.

THIS study has an important message for Europeans as well as Americans. Among other things the author, a scholar and former diplomat, demonstrates that many Americans are ill-informed about the countries and peoples of Asia, and often hold inaccurate or untenable views about important issues relating to these countries. These and other conclusions are drawn from the results of a nationally representative sample survey conducted by the Gallup Organization in 1980, and from interviews with academics, government officials and other professional people who have direct contact with one or more Asian countries and their peoples. Recent events, including the election of a President from California with an administration concerned to improve the economic and trading position of the United States, do not suggest that this situation has changed very much.

While the author sets out to argue a particular case, his analysis of the data is both thorough and dispassionate. He shows that attitudes towards particular countries are not uniform or static, and indeed can change very quickly, as was the case with respect to general attitudes towards the People's Republic of China once the United States gave it formal diplomatic recognition in 1979. He expresses concern, however, at the dominant images held by many Americans regarding the vast majority of Asian countries (Australia and Japan excepted) as overcrowded, underdeveloped, and politically unstable, in marked contrast to the views and attitudes of those who had professional links with many of these countries.

As a result of this analysis, Watts sets out an agenda for the future consisting of a set of specific proposals which he believes would help to remedy this dangerous imbalance in attitudes. He lays heavy emphasis on the need for initiatives by the President and the State Department in an attempt to change internal attitudes and priorities, and to give a clear indication to the countries of Asia that the United States has fundamental economic, political, and security interests in the region. He also indicates how rather different approaches might be made to countries like Cambodia or Thailand from those made towards China or Japan. He also believes that the media and educators, as well as businessmen, need to demonstrate the advantages of greater trade, economic and cultural cooperation with Asian countries rather than resorting to protectionist policies or transmitting information which reinforces existing misconceptions. There are also suggestions about actions which Asian governments themselves might consider, and indeed Asian businesses selling goods to the United States.

Overall, the study is clear and concise in its objectives, but its message is directed almost exclusively at an American audience. To this extent, while it is noteworthy for European observers, how significant it is may depend on whether the Reagan administration ultimately tires of its European allies and begins to look more directly to Asia for political and other support. Until then the financial cost of this short but perceptive study may deter all but the most devoted student of American affairs.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

A U.S. Foreign Policy for Asia: The 1980s and Beyond. By Ramon H. Myers. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 144pp. Index. $10.95.

Asia and U.S. Foreign Policy. Edited by James C. Hsiung and Winberg Chai. New York: Praeger. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 263pp. Index.

MYERS' volume is a collection of essays derived from a conference at the Hoover Institution on war, revolution and peace in April 1981. The papers are well written and cogently argued and the seven contributors consider US policy in Asia with regard to geographical subdivisions stretching from Turkey to New Zealand. The authors, who include Ray S. Cline, formerly a deputy director of the CIA and director of Intelligence and Research at State, generally agree that US policy has failed since the 1970s because it was based on Europe first, reliance on China as a counter-weight to the Soviet Union, and on attempts to build up friendly states through programmes of economic and military assistance. A measure of this failure has been increased Soviet penetration throughout Asia as a whole: in the 'arc of crisis' in South-west Asia stable and friendly regimes have collapsed; the Indian subcontinent is uneasy in the wake of events in Afghanistan; Soviet influence in Vietnam unbalances South-east Asia and China experiences Soviet pressure on all its borders. The contributors suggest, and

Myers admirably summarizes their position in his introduction, that the importance of Asia should receive equal recognition with that of Europe in American foreign policy thinking; that India should be accepted as having a role equal at least to that of China; and that a web of bilateral relationships with Asian and Pacific basin countries should be constructed together with a strong American naval and air presence in the Indian and Pacific oceans, hopefully in the context of military cooperation with allies, to guarantee freedom of the seas.

Despite the emphasis on flexibility, there continues to be an assumption that somehow the United States is responsible for the pattern of events in the past decade, and a continuing belief that if only the United States can get its policy right its security interests will be assured. The dilemma for policy-makers is that, although such assumptions may be dangerous, and too precise a definition of strategy may result in the loss of flexibility, aims and objectives must be articulated and policies formulated. In that process the clear thinking contained in this volume has to be relevant.

The proceedings of an International Studies Association conference held the previous year anticipate many of these themes although in a broader historical context. The tone of the Praeger volume is a little more strident in its discussion of the expansion of Soviet military power and projection of a Soviet threat to American interests, but it has a similar area focus. There is danger in the tendency to view Asia as 'a coherent whole' (p. 3) but certainly any analysis of US foreign policy must have regard to the global strategic map. Contributions can be valuable without necessarily being new, and although a number of the essays printed here develop the sub-macro terminology, they do not significantly depart from the earlier and traditional country and regional approaches that are decried.

Peter Berton's opening chapter is a useful summary of post-1945 US foreign policy thinking, and provides a contextual structure for the area chapters that follow. Each of these short statements is informative and clearly expressed. There is emphasis throughout on the fluid nature of international politics, and on the need for strong US strategic and tactical forces, but also on the impossibility of externally imposed American solutions to Asian problems. James Hsiung concludes the final chapter with the admirable thought that 'the time to convert a deadly competitive game into a cooperative game is no more compelling than it is now' (p. 245). The Great Game has perhaps been restored to our vocabulary, and that may be progress.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

Coping with U.S.–Japanese Economic Conflicts. Edited by I. M. Destler and Hideo Sato. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1982 (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 293pp. £18·50.

Polish–U.S. Industrial Cooperation in the 1980s: Findings of a Joint Research Project. Edited by Paul Marer and Eugeniusz Tabaczynski. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press. 1982. 409pp. £15·00. $31.25.

THE titles of these two books may seem paradoxical. Whereas the United States sees itself as a bastion of the free world against the advance of communism, we read of opportunities for economic cooperation with a country of the Eastern bloc and conflict with a partner in the free world. Nevertheless, in economic terms this is easily explained. Japan is an advanced industrial nation and well placed to compete with the United States in the latter's home market as well as in third countries. With the United States economy showing some of the weaknesses that have beset Britain, it is not surprising that American interests have reacted sharply to increasing Japanese competition. The Polish economy is at a different stage of development and opportunities for cooperation exist which do not pose a serious threat to American economic interests.

The first of these books is a collection of case studies which examines some of the conflicts which have occurred in recent years between the United States and Japan. It deals with the clashes over increasing exports of Japanese steel and cars to the United States, and over the American demands for opening up the Japanese market to imports of agricultural goods and telephone equipment, as well as over macroeconomic issues including the big Japanese trade surplus with the United States. The emphasis in this study is on the way the conflicts were handled on both sides. We see, for example, how pressures arose from American producers for protection from growing Japanese imports and for the opening up of markets in Japan. There is a similar analysis of the opposing pressures in Japan and of the way the conflicts

were handled at governmental level: in both Japan and America the government did not always give unqualified support to the demands of its own producers.

With a clear emphasis on the process of conflict and its resolution, there is little discussion of substantive economic issues. We may be told of the belief of American producers about the detrimental effects of increasing imports, or the views taken by government departments, but there is no analysis of whether or not there was a serious detrimental effect. Only in the case of steel do we get a clear impression that Japan had a significant comparative advantage—a case which illustrates the arrogance of the United States in the economic field with its refusal to accept the obvious cost advantage of Japan without the disclosure of detailed information that could have been seriously harmful to Japanese producers.

The second of these books is very much concerned with the *economics* of industrial cooperation. Parts III and IV contain papers given at two conferences and the ensuing discussions. A set of papers was given by American contributors in Warsaw and a set of papers by Polish contributors in Bloomington. The issues are discussed at a fairly general level, but the understanding of them is greatly helped by the detailed case study in Part II of the working of the agreement between International Harvester and BUMAR.

International Harvester (IH) stood to gain access to markets in Eastern Europe and in Third World countries where the Poles might be at an advantage. There was a transfer of technology to the Poles, and IH received royalties on machines produced by the Poles for sales at home or in third countries. Apart from the Polish production of complete machines, Poland could be used as a source of cheaper components for IH factories in other parts of the world. The Poles gained by the acquisition of IH technology for the production of machines for their home market and by opportunities to gain foreign exchange by sales of IH design machines in other markets and from the sale of components to IH.

Although such cooperation offers advantages to both sides there are difficulties. There is a close analysis of some of these problems, including the organizational structures of an American multinational and a communist state bureaucracy. If the Polish partner is too successful in exporting finished goods to the United States there is the danger of complaints of dumping, and this creates special problems in view of the pricing and exchange rate fixing procedures of a non-market economy.

Both books are useful, but there is a danger that they are already dated. Continuing world depression is likely to add to the chances of economic conflict between America and other advanced industrial countries, whilst the continuance of martial law in Poland is unlikely to be conducive to any big increase in industrial cooperation.

University of Dundee J. M. Jackson

Public Values and Private Power in American Politics. Edited by J. David Greenstone. Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press. 1982. 286pp. Index. £14·00.

The charge of 'private affluence and public squalor' became part of the political lexicon of American politics more than twenty years ago. It found its place in the ideas and the programmes of John F. Kennedy's 'New Frontier' in American politics. Since then, the American academy has devoted a useful portion of its energies to exploring and analysing the implications of that early electoral slogan. The title of the book under review is of the essence. Eight papers by American political scientists address themselves to different facets of the tension, and sometimes the conflict between private power and the public interest. National political institutions—with the inevitable essay on the presidency—and public policy-making are examined to show the complexities of the problem, and to anatomize the growth of corporate power. One dominant concern is to show how the possession and wielding of this power bring new threats to minority rights, and thus subvert the democratic process. The old assumptions of American pluralism are shown to be shopworn within the traditional texts of political science. To this extent, then, the essays make a valuable contribution to an important area of debate. Specialists in particular areas of policy-making and policy analysis can turn with profit to such items as urban bureaucracy, highway politics, organized labour and the more pervasive problems of federalism and economic development.

This granted, and the seriousness of purpose of the contributing political scientists duly recognized, some bees in the reviewer's bonnet may be allowed a short flight. The prose style of the essays is less than pellucid. Consider the first sentence of the editor's introduction:

'Perhaps the most enduring feature of American domestic politics during recent decades has been the continuing ideological struggle over the passage and implementation of redistributive, egalitarian welfare-state policies'. For readers who survive that sentence, the next hurdle begins at the immediately following sentence: 'Yet this broad programmatic cleavage . . .'. Thus are we launched into the dense verbiage of American political science. More trials are in store: for example, 'Although his empirical analysis emphasises a pluralistic account of interest-group activity, his normative position views that pluralism as fatally private regarding'.

Do American (and some European) political scientists really have to surround themselves with this opaque jargon? Not all of them, clearly. There are American writers—including some on public policy and public finance—who convey their arguments with grace, precision, and style. We owe a great debt to such scholars as Seymour Lipset, Aaron Wildavsky, Hugh Heclo and Nelson Polsby. In neighbouring disciplines, Daniel Boorstin, Arthur Schlesinger and John Kenneth Galbraith vie with Samuel Beer and the late Richard Hofstadter to provide beacons of light, beckoning the faithful across the Serbian bogs of American social science.

Yet there are still times when one could hope that the University of Chicago Press might produce a sister volume to its excellent *Manual of (Typographical) Style*. In a sense Fowler has already done it with *The King's English* but that title, if not that work, is not likely to find favour in the windy city whose mayor once threatened to 'punch King George the Fifth on the snout'. Such a manual might do something to wean fledgling scholars away from PhD prose, however, where the ruling principle seems to be never to use words of one syllable when four or five will do the trick. We might thus be spared essays such as the one in the present work which bears this title: 'The Conflictual Evolution of American Political Science: From Apologetic Pluralism to Trilateralism and Marxism'. This reviewer shied at the first fence and baulked at the terrors beyond.

University of York EDMUND IONS

Latin America and Caribbean

Latin American Populism in Comparative Perspective. Edited by Michael Conniff. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 1982. 248pp. Index. $19.95. Pb.: $9.95.

WHEN Torcuato di Tella applied the term 'populism' to post-1945 mass movements in Latin America he presented other political scientists and sociologists with a difficult conceptual problem, which the popularity of the term has tended to exacerbate rather than to alleviate. The movements so termed did not, of course, designate themselves as 'populist'. Worse still, their supporters tended indignantly to reject the label. A conference of scholars from many areas and disciplines held in London in 1967 was agreed that the term was useful, and that it had an identifiable meaning and utility. But in both the papers and discussion of that conference it was clear that there was a fundamental difficulty in resolving that meaning, and that the root cause was that the word already designated two very different sorts of political movement: the populism of the short-lived People's Party in the United States and *narodnichestvo* in late nineteenth century Russia.

Michael Conniff maintains the link between the term and its exemplars by counterposing to his six contributions on Latin America two more on Russia and the United States, and he links and analyses the material thus presented in his own contributions. The book is, therefore, a serious and well-constructed plan to order a fundamentally divided subject. However, there remain difficulties. In the Latin American context 'populism' is, as Conniff defines it, 'urban, multiclass, electoral, expansive, "popular" and led by charismatic figures' (p. 13). But the two exemplars were, on the contrary, rural and anti-urban, and, in the Russian case, not electoral. On this last point, Alison Blakely, in her contribution on Russia, treats 'populism' there as a movement extending well into the present century, and it is on this, the 'electoral' period, that her article is focussed. While this is in line with the views of some Soviet scholars, it does not, surely, eliminate the objection that it might very well be the very absence of *effective* electoral expression that is the linking as well as the distinguishing factor.

The six individual case studies from Latin America contain much that is interesting. Argentina is represented twice: once in a comparative study of Yrigoyen and Perón by David Tamarin, and once in a study of Evita's charismatic leadership by Marysa Navarro, which helps explain Perón's fall as much as his rise to power. Michael Conniff's own study of Brazil between 1925 and 1945, Steve Stein's of APRA and Steven Ellner's of Betancourt all cover areas already identified as 'populist' and gain new insight from the overall framework. The surprise, however, is Jorge Basurto's study of Echeverría in Mexico, whose career, he argues, is a 'late populism' seeking to revive the Cardenas coalition, but frustrated by the growth of Mexican bureaucracy and the resulting imprisonment of the Presidency. Other writers have in effect already challenged Echeverría's right to appear in such company, and it may indeed be many years before we can be certain who was right.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

Politics and Social Change in Latin America: The Distinct Tradition. 2nd rev. edn. Edited by Howard J. Wiarda. Amherst, Mass.: University of Massachusetts Press. 1982. 386pp. Pb.: $9.95.

Democracy in Latin America: Promise and Problems. By Robert Wesson. New York: Praeger for Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 201pp. Index. $26.95.

WHY has not Latin America—which in so many important ways is a transplanted European civilization, albeit with more than a few roots embedded in the soil of the Third World—developed the kind of stable democratic record which much of Europe and North America has somehow managed to create and maintain over a long period of time? The question is certainly not posed out of a complacent sense of European superiority. Europe's own lapses, this century, have been dreadful by any standard. No Latin American tyrant has been as bad as Adolf Hitler; and we cannot be other than acutely conscious of the fact that democracy in some form or other might well be flourishing in Eastern Europe today were it not for an external constraint more comprehensive, whatever the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the revolutionary left may claim, than anything Latin America has ever had to face. No: the question is more a genuine puzzle, to which the two books under review here address themselves—one by implication, the other directly.

Very obviously, Latin America's past, and in particular what can loosely be called the region's 'cultural matrix', provide a promising place to begin looking for explanations. The useful collection of reprinted articles and papers put together by Howard Wiarda repays close attention from this point of view. Several of the contributions are already very well known; indeed, some go back to the early 1960s. Nevertheless, Wiarda has chosen the various essays carefully, and there is much of interest in this book. Charles W. Anderson's paper 'Towards a Theory of Latin American Politics' (1964) is a minor classic that deserves to be regularly re-read by Latin Americanists. Similarly, Claudio Véliz' meditation on the importance of the centralist tradition (1968)—recently expanded by him into a full-length book—is, at the very least, thoughtprovoking, though 'centralism' is certainly a slippery and capacious category. Other essays in this admirable volume—Glen Dealy's, for instance, on Latin America's 'monistic' approach to democracy, or Richard Morse's idiosyncratic excursions into the region's intellectual inheritance—are almost equally stimulating. Wiarda himself opens and closes the collection with a couple of new essays, stressing Latin America's distinctive historical and cultural background, and claiming persuasively that the Iberian impact laid 'a base that was Catholic, corporate, stratified, elitist, authoritarian, hierarchical, and patrimonialist to its core' (p. 329). To its core? Possibly Wiarda exaggerates. Hispanic patrimonialism is undoubtedly an important layer in Latin America's definitely multi-layered cultural matrix, and we certainly need to be reminded of its existence; but it cannot explain everything. The nineteenth century liberal tradition, it seems to me, made deeper inroads into Latin America than Wiarda (or the other contributors) will really allow, and much of the region's subsequent political history can legitimately be seen as a rough counterpoint between 'old' authoritarianism and the newer liberal thrust.

Robert Wesson's extended essay, in a Hoover Institution series on Latin American politics edited by Wesson himself, is based on a wide variety of secondary sources. It confronts the issue of democracy head-on, but reaches no very firm conclusions about its future prospects in Latin America; though he speculates towards the end of the book that 'semicorporate

authoritarianism' of the Mexican or Brazilian sort (p. 187) may be to the fore in the immediate future. We shall see. Wesson's discussion is at its best when he surveys some of the major impediments to smoothly-functioning democracy—geographical and cultural difficulties, excessive dependence on various external forces, the widespread glaring social inequality—and it is hard to dissent seriously from his conclusions here. In so far as the book has an argument, it focusses on the rise and fall of Latin American populism—political movements and regimes adjusting to the emergence of new social groups and to the extension of the franchise. Populism, claims Wesson, opens the way sooner or later to symptoms of uncontrollable extremism, which in turn produce an inevitable authoritarian (usually military) reaction. Unfortunately, populism is an even more slippery and capacious category than centralism. It has to accommodate the Mexican revolution and Peronism, Juscelino Kubitschek and Salvador Allende. The further a category like this is stretched, the less explanatory power it contains. Thus Wesson's account—which does have the merit of being clearly written and refreshingly free from social science jargon—conveys, in the end, an unavoidable impression of vagueness.

Wesson's grasp of Latin American history is at times somewhat loose. It is distinctly odd to see Spain described as one of 'the leading areas of modernization in the fifteenth century' (p. 97); the Spanish American empire was nowhere near as militarized as is implied on p. 161; nor is it true that the Spanish Inquisition was 'less restrained' in America than it was in Spain (p. 3)—there were far fewer burnings at the stake in America. Simón Bolívar, one might add, did *not* believe in monarchy (p. 85); Argentina's baleful General Rosas was *not* a 'rough gaucho' (p. 12); and so on. Some statements about more recent times border on the naive. It is perfectly true that President Ibáñez 'tried to halt inflation' (p. 46); but so did every other Chilean president, and Ibáñez' record in this respect was easily the most dismal of any prior to the 1970s. Similarly, it is true that 'Many Argentine generals . . . have been the sons of immigrants' (p. 165)—but how does that distinguish them from rather a lot of other twentieth century Argentines?

University of Essex SIMON COLLIER

Communism in Central America and the Caribbean. Edited by Robert Wesson. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 177pp. Index. $10.95.

1982 witnessed the unveiling of President Reagan's Caribbean Basin Initiative and the publication of a lengthy report on that region by the UK House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, so the Hoover Institution's publication of a book on communism in Central America and the Caribbean is timely. The introduction and conclusion are weak, and the footnotes and text rarely go beyond 1980—a disappointing but not crippling deficiency given the static nature of most of the societies. However, the essays contributed are generally balanced, well informed, succinctly written and liberal in tone.

A major justification for examining the ministates of Central America and the Caribbean together is, as the book's title implies, the United States' fear of communism in its 'backyard'. The big issue is, of course, whether communism in the Caribbean Basin is a response to indigenous structural inequalities and the suppression of civil rights or whether it results from subversion by Cuba at the instigation of Moscow. William Leogrande speaks for most of the contributors when he wisely observes: 'Cuba may stoke the fires of Central American revolution, but Cuba did not light them, and Cuban inaction would not lead to their dying out' (p. 48).

As these essays show, Marxist regimes in the Caribbean Basin have never been preceded by a period of liberal democracy. The Sandinistas in Nicaragua and the People's Revolutionary Government in Grenada represent, respectively, reactions against decades of suppression by the Somoza family and against rigged elections and tyranny by Eric Gairy. They have their roots in the very same soil of dictatorship as did the Batista regime which Castro overthrew with cataclysmic effect in 1959.

Leogrande's essay on Cuba argues that the United States ought not to insist on ideological conformity to its own values among its neighbours in Middle America. He notes that many Central American and Caribbean countries prefer not to choose between the United States and Cuba: they need United States aid, yet Cuba's assistance programme speaks directly to their social and economic problems.

None of these essays provides new insights for the initiated, but for the layman they successfully chart the complexities of the Central American and Caribbean scene. They suggest that a swift revolutionary takeover is unlikely to be achieved in either El Salvador or Guatemala, yet a caveat is also entered with reference to Jamaica's switch from democratic socialism to a capitalist path to development. The consensus view of the authors is that the United States should develop a policy towards the Caribbean Basin based on conciliation, economic aid and far greater ideological neutrality than it has achieved in the past hundred years. As W. Raymond Duncan concludes, 'we can only hope that Soviet policy in the region will at least stimulate the U.S. to innovative rather than counter-productive responses' (p. 24).

Jesus College, Oxford COLIN CLARKE

The Struggle for the Falkland Islands: A Study in Legal and Diplomatic History. By Julius Goebel. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1982. 482pp. Index. £10·00. Pb.: £5·95. (First publ. 1927.)

WHOEVER in Yale University Press took the decision (and before the recent conflict) to republish Julius Goebel's study of the Falkland Islands must be congratulating himself. This detailed and learned account of the legal and diplomatic history of the dispute to 1833 was first published in 1927. Its publication caused a stir at the time—enough of a stir for the Foreign Office to prompt an adverse review in the *British Yearbook of International Law* in 1928, although as in so much of the history of the Falklands, the islands themselves were subsidiary to more important issues of international politics—at that time the debate over isolationism in the United States. The republication of the book has also produced a few ripples to judge from contrasting reviews by H. S. Ferns in *The Times Literary Supplement* ('intellectually naive and priggish') and Malcolm Deas in the *London Review of Books* ('the best guide in English'). Certainly it is difficult after reading this book to accept the statement by Professor Metford in his introduction (p. xxii) that 'there is no doubt as to the international legality of the British title'. The Foreign Office at least seems to have had its private doubts. Nor is Professor Metford a particularly sure guide to Argentine history and politics: a rather condescending tone does not help the reader to understand that curious and complicated country.

Julius Goebel's account is long and detailed and at times, it must be said, rather tedious. But the argument over sovereignty is important and his version of it, at least up to 1833, is the most serious and scholarly one, even if not all his conclusions have to be accepted. Goebel argues that discovery is irrelevant for the purposes of sovereignty—not that the issue of who actually discovered the islands is ever likely to be settled. He further contends that the British claim to have retained sovereignty, by leaving a plate and a flag when abandoning the islands in 1774, is not grounded on the then current international law.

The reader will have to unravel a long and complicated line of reasoning to follow Goebel's contention that 'the right of the Argentine nation to stand in the place of Spain with reference to the sovereignty over the Falklands was established by the successful revolution and by the assertion and maintenance of sovereignty over the Falklands as against Spain. When Great Britain seized the islands in the year 1833, the legal consequences were the same as if the islands had never passed out of the hands of the Spanish crown' (p. 468). Perhaps long possession of the islands since 1833 has altered the legal basis of the claim to sovereignty—and perhaps not. These are areas full of pitfalls even for those trained in international law. But the original history of the dispute is not irrelevant to an acceptable solution and it is no service to British interests in the area to behave as if all Argentine claims were hollow and intended only to deflect attention away from pressing domestic issues.

St Antony's College, Oxford ALAN ANGELL

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The Year Book of World Affairs, 1982. Edited by George W. Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger. London: Stevens for the London Institute of World Affairs. 1982. 277pp. £16·50.

THE latest *Year Book* is mainly devoted to global and African themes, although there is an article on Northern Ireland. The distinguished contributors include Richard Falk, Wayland Young, Eugene Rostow and Colin Legum. Although it contains precisely the same number of pages as last year's issue, the price has risen by three pounds.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

The International Who's Who 1982–83. London: Europa. 1982. 1460pp. £40·00.

THE 46th edition of this standard reference work follows the pattern established in previous editions. A listing of the world's reigning monarchs together with the immediate members of their families precedes an obituary section devoted to notables whose death occured since March 1981. The alphabetical section has been revised and expanded to include 750 new entries, particularly in the political sphere. Public figures included range from the President of Iran Hojatoleslam Ali Khamenei, Argentina's former President General Leopoldo Galtieri, to America's National Security Adviser William Clark and Ken Livingstone, Leader of the Greater London Council. Existing biographies have been brought up to date and revised to include the latest information. Entries are clear, succinct, clearly set out. An essential reference tool.

Chatham House Library

Annual of Power and Conflict, 1981–82. London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. 1982. 506pp. £30·00.

SUBTITLED 'a survey of political violence and instability', the *Annual* consists mainly of brief country reports, each followed by a chronology; only a few trouble-free states escape inclusion. The international causes and repercussions of domestic troubles are emphasised, and a preface by Lord Beloff meditates on terrorism and repression. Appendices list hijackings and embassy occupations.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1982. London: Taylor and Francis for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 1982. 517pp. £22·50.

Now in its 13th year, covering developments to January 1982, the *Yearbook* is a standard source of information on military production, trade, expenditure and control. This issue deals especially with Europe and Latin America; it also includes a chapter on the environmental effects of the Vietnam war. The introduction strikes a slightly more optimistic note than usual.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

The Middle East and North Africa 1982–83. London: Europa. 1982. 1013pp. £35·00.

THIS is the 29th edition of this authoritative guide to Middle Eastern society, politics and economics. Part one is devoted, under the heading 'General Survey', to articles dealing with the latest developments in the region, specific problems such as the Jerusalem issue, the arms trade with the Middle East and North Africa, together with the text of relevant documents on Palestine.

Part two chronicles the activities of international organizations and their agencies in the area, including the UN, the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf, the Islamic Conference, OAPEC and OPEC.

Country surveys in alphabetical order make up part four. The pattern remains the same as in previous editions of the work, providing economic, social, statistical and factual up-to-date information. A final reference section includes who's who in the Middle East and North Africa, bibliographies of books and periodicals, and a worldwide list of associations and research institutes studying the region.

An indispensable and probably the best volume reference book on the Middle East and North Africa.

Chatham House Library N.G.

Africa South of the Sahara 1982–83. London: Europa. 1982. 1399pp. £40·00.

THIS is the most comprehensive up-to-date guide to African countries and organizations; it contains statistics and addresses, descriptive and narrative sections written by specialists, a who's who, and other material. Format and coverage are unchanged from the 11th edition.

Chatham House Library

The Far East and Australasia 1982–83. London: Europa. 1982. 1410pp. £45·00.

THIS annual reference work subtitled 'A survey and directory of Asia and the Pacific' is in its 14th edition.

The countries of Asia, including the Soviet Union in Asia, Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific Islands, are covered. The volume follows the pattern established in previous editions, with, in part one, a general survey of political, sociological and economic developments in the entire area together with a calendar of major events. Part two includes an extensive listing of regional organizations such as the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Asian Development Bank, the Asia Foundation. Their structure, activities and membership are described, regional projects and publications listed.

Over 1,000 pages are devoted to a 'country by country' geographical, historical, political and economic survey, from Afghanistan to Western Samoa. Up to date (mid 1982) demographic economic and financial statistics are included. Directories of the government, trade and industrial organizations and banks, are provided. The final section is a who's who of the geographical area as a whole.

The only criticism to be levelled at this otherwise excellent reference work is the scarcity of maps.

Chatham House Library N.G.

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Books Reviewed, Spring 1983

Correspondence

From Professor W. Hager

Dear Sir,

I agree with Professor Hindley in one essential point: I don't like the implications of my own arguments. A world where blocs of nations bargain over market shares, with bureaucrats in charge of the bargaining, is not an attractive one. I also understand his passion in defending an intellectually and morally attractive utopia. I used to believe in it myself. But I find it disappointing that even in an institution like the Trade Policy Research Centre, whose raison d'être is the propagation of free trade, there is not the tiniest little doubt raised by any of my arguments—in contrast to a lot of thoughtful people who also wish it were not so.

Hindley first criticizes my view that Community (plus EFTA) protectionism would prevent Western Europe from sliding further into intra-regional protectionism. He thinks that protectionism is an ideology, which, once adopted, will spill over into the Western European free trade area. I see protectionism as an *inevitable* response to certain fundamental and structural market disequilibria. These disequilibria are rooted in basic socio-economic arrangements. Trade promotes convergence of these arrangements as much as micro-economic adjustment. Convergence between Britain and Germany is painful but within the range of the possible. Convergence to, for example, South-east Asian practices is not.

The standard free-trade political economy of protectionism sees it as a consequence of constituent politics (p. 85), a craven betrayal by politicians of the public interest which is entrusted to their care. Although most of them do not seem aware of this, free trade economists argue very much like Hayekian conservatives, with their contempt for democracy and their wish to put the levers of economic policy (e.g. monetary control) outside the reach of politicians. I, on the other hand, see the selfish clamouring of special interest groups for protection as a kind of invisible hand which keeps society on an even keel. Some of the outcomes are absurd, like the CAP, and I would join Mr Hayek if I thought these would not be corrected in time. Similarly, trade unions have won widely uneconomic concessions for their members, especially in Britain, with lasting damage to their income. Democracy provides for periodic backlashes, like Thatcherism, which tries to put things back into proportion. But in our societies, proportion implies that the market is a tool, not a dictator.

Hindley totally misses the point about labour (in my analysis a shorthand for socially imposed costs on industrial production) by reducing the problem to one of 'pliant trade unions' in Japan and 'truculent' unions in Europe. I do not think, as Hindley implies, that workers in the LDCs live in conditions of slavery, and that we have the 'right to require our trading partners to have aggressive trade unions'.

The stark fact to be faced is that the labour market in the Third World in the aggregate is as close as makes no difference to being a free market; and it is, for the foreseeable future, in heavy surplus, which means very low wages indeed. Western Europe went through 150 years of misery, most of them in most countries requiring political repression of the kind which still is and always has been 'normal' in men's affairs, to create an unfree labour market. This goes well beyond wage levels, but includes highly disfunctional regulations concerning child labour, guaranteed holidays, job security, safety legislation, and so on. The allocation of a substantial part of national savings to social infrastructure, rather than to industrial purposes, is part of the same process. In a crass sense, all this is rather inefficient. But it does spare us the universal fate of a police state.

Free trade, I argue, risks re-importing the nineteenth century by the back door. We know from Walras that the integration of one factor market, capital, and of the goods market, leads to the integration of the other factor market, labour. Because of market imperfections, including protectionism, this single labour market makes itself felt only gradually. Hindley fails to mention, and hence to criticize, my argument, that *de facto* integration of world goods and capital markets is a new phenomenon: there are no lessons from the past.

In this partially integrated international labour market there are, as in any market, price and quantity adjustments. In Europe, price adjustment, i.e. a lowering of real wages, cannot

(never mind whether it should) go far enough to prevent quantity adjustment (unemployment).

Free traders implicitly acknowledge this argument when they suggest that our workers should move into production areas where the international market cannot function, that is, where technology and capital requirements, market vicinity, etc., create natural monopolies for the advanced countries. I argue at length why I think there are not enough of these shelters. Hindley fails to mention this argument.

Instead, he produces statistics which show the small share of Japan and NIC exports in Community GNP. First, such figures are no surprise given that the NIC phenomenon and Japan's entry into the European market are recent events. Secondly, I always include in my argument Eastern Europe, with its established claim on the Western European market for precisely the middle-range industrial goods which cause the problem. I also argue not about 1979, but about the medium-term future, which includes second-generation NICs, India recently turned from import substitution to export promotion, and further down the road, China. Lastly, I mention the fact that import shares are less important than world market shares in manufactures, in which all newcomers together have captured 20 per cent. The significance of this otherwise encouraging development is that it confers price leadership on these low-cost challengers of the oligopoly of high-cost countries.

I have argued in my paper that this leads to de-industrialization by different routes (foreign investment to match costs; doing without profits and investments to match prices) or to the spread of state intervention. Some firms, quick off the mark, manage to adjust in the textbook fashion. But the basic economics of the matter—genuine higher cost—cannot make this a successful strategy for the majority. Talk to industrialists, or at least observe what they do.

Perhaps we could salvage the idea of a once-off adjustment effort, after which nations trade according to comparative advantage, if the allocation of capital in LDCs (and, for that matter, in Eastern Europe) corresponded to factor scarcity criteria. There is an extensive literature to show that (a) capital is subsidized by LDCs and Western suppliers; and (b) its allocation is governed, in the more 'capitalist' among the newcomers, by a strategic consensus of bureaucrats and entrepreneurs. Hindley meets this awkward fact by imputing to me the view that such industrial strategies have 'a malign intent'; and that I might think that capital should be allocated 'by popular referendum'. Not at all. I was thinking of old-fashioned free market capitalism, which tends to produce gradual rather than stochastic changes in production structures. It is typical of Hindley (and of the recent Chatham House book on the NICs by Louis Turner and Neil McMullen) that they flatly ignore the man-made nature of contemporary shifts in competitive advantage.

In this connection, as in others, Hindley cites Hong Kong as a sort of continuous red herring. It so happens that Hong Kong is the only country in the world which corresponds to the assumptions of classic economic models: it has both free markets for allocating real capital and a free labour market. For the rest of the world, where labour and/or capital markets are not allowed to operate, there arises a problem of coordination. In a world of Hong Kongs, trade theory can generate propositions about equilibrium and welfare optimization. In a world of mixed economies it can do neither. More practically, the evidence is all around us that both the United States and Europe are abandoning their role as residual adjusters, a role which at least assured equilibrium in the goods (if not the factor) markets.

My proposition, then, is to save a very large chunk of international trade, i.e. the Western European regional trade, from the corrosive impact of individual countries' policy responses to the disequilibrium properties of the international trading system. Here, again, Hindley imputes to me banal Europeanist views: as if the political goal of European integration could justify suboptimal economic strategies and damage to the interests of our trading partners. If I am a European nationalist, it is with regard to European society, of which, after first-hand knowledge of the alternatives, I think rather highly and which I don't want to adjust to 'best international practice'. But I don't need this normative element to make my case.

The point is not to adopt a protectionist ideology, as Hindley suggests, but to remove incentives for national governments to adopt underhand forms of protectionism *erga omnes*, including financial protectionism (subsidies) which undermine our free market system and free trade area. Hindley fails to see how this would benefit European industry and/or welfare. First, it would help to preserve a large market. Secondly, as we might learn from

Japan, the expectation of secure home markets and profits would get European and foreign firms to invest, and hence allow them to compete abroad. Look at what happened to the US textile industry under the MFA.

In the neat little models, which substitute for observation in much of contemporary economics, devaluation is the better strategy. Has Hindley noticed that exchange rates nowadays are determined by relative prices in the short-term money markets? And that countries like the Philippines lower real wages if the exchange rate shows the slightest sign of removing their competitiveness?

Observation of one country after another shows proposals or actual practice which add up to a double mercantilist scramble, which on the one hand pours society's resources into investment of tradeables—in the face of a global glut of productive capacity; and on the other reduces real wages. In the nineteenth century, with much less government intervention, this sort of mismatch between capital and effective demand caused decade-long recessions. We are merrily re-creating a world where basic human needs go unsatisfied while capital and labour go idle. It is re-entry to this classical world, by the back door of that most orthodox branch of economics, trade theory, which is being proposed to us.

Hindley misses both my fundamental points. One is to deny the equilibrium properties of man-made markets for labour and real capital and hence to call for explicit coordination—management, which allows different societies to work out politico-economic equilibria which suit them without impinging on those of others. The other is to reduce the need for coordination to a minimum for the highly complex and (still) pluralist economies of Western Europe by maintaining as large a space for free trade as is feasible. Note that I am entirely pessimistic on that score. International reform requires joint and simultaneous learning experiences by all participants. Only disaster can provide that.

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Professor Hager's article 'Protectionism and autonomy: how to preserve free trade in Europe' appeared in *International Affairs*, Summer 1982, and Dr Hindley's response, 'Protectionism and autonomy: a comment on Hager' in the Winter 1982/83 issue.

Can NATO survive?

Stanley Kober*

America's relations with its European allies are going through yet another period of crisis. NATO has been a 'troubled partnership' ever since its inception, and observers may be forgiven if they view the current difficulties with a sense of *déja vu*. Nevertheless, there are indications that the present crisis may be significantly different from those that preceded it. In the past, troubles in the alliance stemmed from national resentment by the Europeans of American dominance. But even though the French went so far as to adopt a 'tous azimuths' doctrine, there was no widespread sentiment that the US nuclear umbrella was more of a threat to Europe than a guarantee of its security. What is distinctive about the present crisis, therefore, is that even while Soviet troops ravage Afghanistan and threaten Poland, there are mass demonstrations in Western Europe condemning America's nuclear presence as a threat. How has this come to pass, and what can be done about it?

Prelude to discord

NATO was formed in response to the fear that the Soviet Union constituted a real and immediate military threat to the security of Western Europe. Realizing that Western Europe could not successfully defend itself against Soviet invasion, and believing a free Western Europe to be vital to American security, the Truman administration broke with tradition and committed the United States to its first 'entangling alliance' outside the Western hemisphere. And although the Soviet Union did not attempt an actual invasion of Western Europe, the Korean War, the suppression of the Hungarian uprising, and the Berlin crises served to unite NATO through the early 1950s. The Suez crisis was the first serious crack in the alliance, and subsequent French dissatisfaction with American leadership ultimately led to France's withdrawal from NATO's integrated military structure. Additional strain resulted from the MLF fiasco and the general European disapproval of the American intervention in Vietnam.

More important than any of this in the long run, however, was a change in Soviet policy that began in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis and gained momentum when Brezhnev replaced Khrushchev. Addressing a military audience in July 1965, Brezhnev stated that:

> We shall always remember our great leader's instruction that preparing the country for defence requires 'not a burst of passion or a shout' but 'prolonged, strenuous, highly persistent and disciplined work on a mass scale'. The Party is sacredly fulfilling these behests of Lenin.[1]

This statement is significant for two reasons. First, it reflects Brezhnev's awareness that Khrushchev's boasts about the Soviet Union's military prowess and his attempts to resolve international disputes, such as the one over Berlin, through coercive

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1. *Pravda* and *Izvestia*, 4 July 1965, in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, 28 July 1965, p. 5.

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threats had been counterproductive for Soviet foreign policy. Instead of splitting the alliance, he had inspired greater unity. In a major speech to European communists in 1967, Brezhnev explained the need for a softer public line towards the West:

> What does this experience teach us? Specifically, it teaches that the situation of 'cold war' and the confrontation of military blocs, the atmosphere of military threats, seriously hinder the functioning of the revolutionary, democratic forces. In the bourgeois countries in a situation of international tension reactionary elements become active, the military clique raises its head, and anti-democratic trends and anti-communism in general are intensified.
>
> Conversely, recent years have demonstrated particularly clearly that in a situation of reduced international tension the needle of the political barometer shifts to the left. The advances achieved in the relations between communists and social-democrats in certain countries, the noticeable decline of anti-communist hysteria and the growth of the influence of the West European communist parties are connected in a most direct way with the reduction of tension that is beginning to be felt on the European continent.[2]

The second significant point about Brezhnev's 1965 speech is that it gave notice of the steady Soviet military build-up that was already under way. Although Khrushchev had talked loudly, he had resisted building up the Soviet big stick, leading ultimately to the humiliation of the Cuban missile crisis. Brezhnev, on the other hand, believed that 'the foreign policy of the Soviet Union . . . rests on its economic and defence might'.[3] Enhanced military strength would broaden the options available to Soviet policymakers while raising the risk to their adversaries, and in general would make the Soviet Union more respected and feared internationally. In the words of Boris Ponomarev, head of the Soviet Communist Party's International Department (roughly the equivalent of the US National Security Council staff): 'The stronger the economic and defence might of the Land of the Soviets, the more they are forced to reckon with us throughout the whole world.'[4]

Brezhnev's policy, in other words, was just the opposite of Khrushchev's: he spoke softly while building up the Soviet Union's big stick. This policy of calculated ambiguity has confounded the West's response. Everyone agrees that the Soviet Union engaged in a massive build-up under Brezhnev, but the absence of belligerent statements from the Kremlin has led many people, including some not sympathetic to the Soviet Union, to conclude that the build-up is the result of a paranoid insecurity, rather than a calculated drive to achieve a military advantage.[5] It is only natural for people who feel this way to urge their own governments not to respond with their own countervailing build-up, but instead to take the initiative in breaking the cycle of the arms race. It is also natural for such a sentiment to be widespread in Europe, which has suffered the devastation of two world wars and which would be the likely battleground of a third.

2. L. I. Brezhnev, *The CPSU in the struggle for unity of all revolutionary and peace forces* (Moscow: Progress, 1975), pp. 28–9.
3. L. I. Brezhnev, *Leninskim kursom* (Following Lenin's course), Vol. 3 (Moscow: Politizdat, 1972), p. 182.
4. *Pravda*, 13 February 1979, p. 2. Besides heading the International Department since 1955, Ponomarev is also a candidate member of the Politburo and a Secretary of the Central Committee.
5. Stanley H. Kober, 'Causes of the Soviet military buildup' in *The Soviet Union: what lies ahead* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office) forthcoming.

The task before American diplomacy, therefore, is to allay West European fears while at the same time responding to the ongoing Soviet military build-up. Unfortunately, the Reagan administration came into office with a fundamental misperception of the situation in Europe, having taken too much to heart the neutron bomb debacle of the Carter administration. To the Reagan team, this episode demonstrated that what the Europeans wanted was firm leadership in countering the Soviet build-up. Accordingly, the new administration began trumpeting its intention to increase massively the US defence budget to close the 'window of vulnerability'.

The administration's emphasis on the military dimension of East–West rivalry had the opposite effect to that intended, however. Instead of falling in line behind this firm American leadership, Europeans began to wonder if all the talk about war indicated that a war was coming in the near future. The administration's decision to proceed with the production of the neutron bomb was especially damaging. The explanation that weapons already assembled could be sent to Europe faster could only make people wonder at the need for such urgency. Moreover, the administration's explicit indifference to European concerns only reinforced fears arising from the realization that those with the power to devastate Western Europe do not live there. Given the absence of similar statements from Moscow, the United States began to appear to many as the more dangerous superpower. Realizing this, the administration began to emphasize its interest in arms control in November 1981, with President Reagan personally proclaiming US support of the zero option. This proposal, combined with the imposition of martial law in Poland, led to a decline in the activities of the peace movement. This decline was only temporary, however, and consequently the United States is once again confronted with growing opposition to its policies in Europe.

NATO's present crisis

In December 1979 NATO adopted the twin-track decision: to negotiate with the Soviet Union about the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe while at the same time preparing to deploy Eurostrategic missiles. This approach both responded to the growing theatre nuclear threat from the USSR and reflected the realization that unless NATO had systems to trade for Soviet systems, negotiations about arms control would be fruitless. Not only is it unreasonable to expect any country to give up something for nothing in arms control negotiations, history has demonstrated that unless the United States has systems to trade, arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union are unsuccessful. In 1967, for example, Secretary of Defense McNamara pleaded with Premier Kosygin at the Glassboro summit to forgo development of an ABM system, but his effort was unavailing. The following year, Congress approved funds for an American ABM system, and immediately Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko expressed the USSR's interest in negotiating limits on such systems. In this instance, the United States was able to exert leverage with its ABM programme to obtain not only a limit on ABMs, but also a freeze on offensive systems. On the other hand, when the Carter administration proposed deep cuts in 1977, its overture was rejected out of hand, for the United States did not have the systems in hand, or even close at hand, to trade against the Soviet heavy missiles.

Unfortunately, this eminently sensible approach to the subject of arms control was shunted aside in favour of a dogmatic theory of deterrence. According to this theory, unless NATO possessed nuclear capabilities across the entire spectrum of conflict, there was a risk of decoupling the American nuclear deterrent from Europe's defence, particularly since the codification of strategic parity in SALT cast doubt on the credibility of extended deterrence. As Helmut Schmidt explained in 1977:

> . . . strategic arms limitation confined to the United States and the Soviet Union will inevitably impair the security of the West European members of the Alliance *vis-à-vis* Soviet military superiority in Europe if we do not succeed in removing the disparities of military power in Europe parallel to the SALT negotiations. So long as this is not the case we must maintain the balance of the full range of deterrence strategy. The Alliance must, therefore, be ready to make available the means to support its present strategy, which is still the right one, and to prevent any developments that could undermine the basis of this strategy.[6]

This risk of decoupling was probably exaggerated. Deterrence is the result not of the certainty of nuclear retaliation, but of the uncertainty that there will not be retaliation in the event of aggression. Given the destructiveness of the superpowers' huge arsenals, that uncertainty does not have to be very high to be effective. Thus, if extended deterrence appears riskier for the United States in conditions of nuclear parity than it did before, it is still doubtful that the Soviet leadership feels it could unleash an attack against Western Europe confident that the United States would refrain from escalating to central nuclear exchanges, especially in view of the continued presence of hundreds of thousands of American troops in Europe.

Nevertheless, even if one accepts that the risk of decoupling has been exaggerated, Schmidt's call for building up NATO's theatre nuclear forces to match the Soviet Union's forces is unobjectionable. What happened, however, is that the Eurostrategic weapons began to take on a life of their own as American officials, who have lately been excessively running down US defence capabilities, insisted that NATO required these missiles to plug a gap in the deterrent spectrum. These sentiments cast doubt on American sincerity in pursuing the arms control track of the 1979 NATO decision, an impression that was reinforced by the administration's initial resistance to the zero option. Even the Secretary-General of NATO felt compelled to admonish Washington that 'it has allowed the impression, albeit false, to grow that it is reluctant to pursue [arms control] and is preoccupied with the pursuit of military supremacy'.[7]

To its credit, the Reagan administration listened to these criticisms and, reversing course, publicly embraced the zero option. This shift in policy was a clear response to European concerns, and initially the zero-option proposal was well received. In the year and a half since the proposal was made, however, European opinion has continued to shift, so that an offer that looked forthcoming in autumn 1981 appears intransigent in spring 1983. This change in European sentiment has placed the Reagan administration in a difficult position. If it weakens its negotiating position to respond to every shift in European opinion, it establishes a pattern that gives the Soviet Union little incentive to moderate its own position. On the other hand, if

6. Helmut Schmidt, 'The 1977 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture', *Survival*, Jan./Feb. 1978, p. 4.
7. *New York Times*, 1 Oct. 1981, p. A4.

the United States appears inflexible, it endangers the European political consensus that is essential to the credibility of its negotiating posture.

Clearly, then, the United States cannot afford either extreme, but instead must choose a middle course of reasonable flexibility. In this regard, the United States is fortunate to have Paul Nitze as its chief negotiator in the INF talks. Mr Nitze's credentials as a 'hawk' are impeccable, yet he has also demonstrated, especially through his endorsement of the SALT I agreements, a convincing belief in the utility of arms control as a means of reducing the possibility of nuclear war. Perhaps most important, Mr Nitze has an understanding of the essential *political* aspects of this negotiation. Accordingly, he should be given the negotiating leeway he deserves, so that if these talks do not produce an agreement before the time for deployment of the Euromissiles arrives, no one will be able to entertain any reasonable doubt that this result is not the fault of the United States. It is, therefore, encouraging to note that President Reagan recently affirmed that 'ours is not a take-it-or-leave-it proposal,' adding that 'Ambassador Nitze has been instructed to explore in Geneva every proposed solution consistent with the principles to which the alliance subscribes'.[8]

Even so, it is possible that all of this will prove unavailing, and that the Europeans will still resist the deployment of the Euromissiles. In that case, Europe should be aware that if these negotiations have failed to produce agreement by December 1983, when deployment of the Euromissiles is scheduled to begin, the United States will almost certainly regard European willingness to accept these weapons in line with the December 1979 decision as a referendum on the continuing viability of NATO. The Alliance, after all, is founded on a shared perception of a Soviet threat. If the Europeans by 1983 are unwilling to accept these weapons despite a lack of progress at Geneva, it will mean that the basis of NATO has collapsed, and the United States at that point will be compelled to reassess its commitment to the defence of Europe.

Pressures for disintegration

The prospect that the United States might actually abandon Western Europe is shocking both to Europeans and to Americans. The ties that have bound the great industrial democracies throughout the postwar era have become so ingrained in the minds of many people on both sides of the Atlantic that they simply cannot conceive that the United States could just pick up and leave. It would be a mistake, however, to believe that NATO can survive any strains in Atlantic relations; in particular, it would be a mistake to exaggerate the importance of Western Europe to the security of the United States. Unfortunately, some Europeans have come to believe that the United States will defend them no matter what. As a Dutch politician told an American journalist in explaining his (and presumably others') unwillingness to accept basing of American cruise missiles in Holland: 'You need Rotterdam as badly as we do, so you'll help if we need it, cruise missiles or not'.[9]

But is it true that the United States, because of such mercenary calculations, is compelled to defend Western Europe? To be sure, the United States values its trade relations with Western Europe, but that is not the reason it puts its own territory at risk for the sake of its allies. Although a Soviet military conquest of Western

8. *Washington Post*, 23 Feb. 1983, p. A12.
9. *New York Times*, 28 May 1981, p. A5.

Europe might deprive the United States of European markets (which, incidentally, is not certain, since every country in the Soviet bloc is anxious to trade with America), the damage this would cause the United States is nothing compared to the suffering it would endure by participating in Europe's defence in the event of war.

Nor does Western Europe make an indispensable contribution to US security, a widely misunderstood point. The threat to the United States stems from Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities, and to a lesser extent from the Soviet navy. However, Western Europe adds nothing to America's nuclear deterrent, and its navies are much too limited in size and capability to provide more than modest assistance to the United States in patrolling the sea lanes outside the NATO area (for example, in the Persian Gulf). Indeed, since America's membership of NATO forces it to spend more on the army than would otherwise be necessary (for even in the most extreme scenarios, one cannot imagine Soviet troops landing on American shores, and the United States does not need sixteen divisions for a Rapid Deployment Force), it might even be argued that NATO has weakened the US ability to deal with direct threats to its own national security.

Still, if Western Europe fell under Soviet domination, would not the addition of its industrial and scientific capabilities to the Soviet Union's already formidable might shift the balance of power against the United States? The traditional answer to this question is that it would, but the traditional answer may well be wrong. For all its industrial might, Western Europe would add little to the USSR's strategic nuclear capabilities, which are far more advanced than the British or French forces. Nor would the addition of West European armies add to the Soviet Union's conventional military strength, for it is doubtful whether it could use them elsewhere, just as it has been unable to use East European forces to any meaningful extent on the Chinese border or in Afghanistan. To be sure, Western Europe's industry could facilitate the production of Soviet weaponry, just as Polish shipbuilding frees Soviet shipbuilding to produce more warships, but this poses no threat to the territorial integrity or national survival of the United States (whereas, to repeat the essential point, a war fought for the defence of Europe to prevent such an eventuality does).

In short, Soviet domination of Western Europe does *not* mean that Western Europe's wealth and might will be added to the USSR's the way one would transfer money from one person's account to another's. On the contrary, if historical experience is any guide, it is more likely that the addition of Western Europe to the Soviet empire would be a liability rather than an asset for the Kremlin. Although American foreign policy has followed a policy of containment since the late 1940s, it is important to recognize that virtually every country that has entered the Soviet bloc in the postwar era has become either an economic liability (for example, Eastern Europe, Cuba) or a bitter political adversary (the PRC, Albania).[10] Why should Western Europe be any different in this respect? Is it unreasonable to presume that the people of France would be as resistant to Soviet domination as the people of Poland, or that the Soviet Union might end up subsidizing West Germany

10. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 'in 1981 the Soviet Union was having to meet costs per day of $12m to support Cuba, $3–5m each for Vietnam and Ethiopia and $55m or more for subsidies to Eastern Europe—to which must be added the undoubtedly heavy cost of supporting the Soviet forces in Afghanistan and the Kabul regime'. *Strategic Survey 1981–1982* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1982), p. 47.

just as it now has to subsidize East Germany? In short, if Soviet difficulties in Eastern Europe are any indication, the accumulation of sullen and unwilling 'allies' may not be advantageous to the USSR in the long run.

Why, then, has the United States extended its protection to Western Europe, and why should it continue to do so? Because it does not wish to see free peoples, with whom it shares long historical ties and enduring political and cultural values, fall under the domination of a foreign and oppressive power—and because the peoples of Western Europe have asked it to participate in their own defence. It is this last point, however, that has now come into question. Even though the Euromissiles were a response to European concerns and not an American initiative (indeed, the United States initially resisted the idea), by accommodating the demands of one set of Europeans, the United States now finds itself accused of monstrous designs by another group of Europeans. To some degree, of course, this reflects the natural give and take of democratic politics. What disturbs many Americans, however, is that the most vocal Europeans are those who believe the US military presence in Europe is a threat to, rather than a guarantee of, their security.

It is this perception that gives rise to a growing unease in the United States concerning the American military presence in Europe. Although Americans are reassured by their government that those condemning the United States are a minority, these assurances lose credibility when they are unaccompanied by vocal European support of the US presence. If the Europeans want continued American protection, they must say so—publicly. Similarly, if European governments think the Euromissiles are necessary for their security, it is they, and not the US government, that must explain the reasons to their peoples. Although the US government has an obligation not to complicate their task, it cannot, and should not, decide the defence needs of Europe. This is a task for the Europeans. The United States, for its part, should stand ready to assist them so long as they are willing to share fully the expense and risk of defending their territory.

This, however, leads to an additional objectionable aspect of the Dutch politician's statement, and indeed of the entire opposition to the Euromissiles, that must be addressed: namely, the question of sharing the risks and benefits of the American nuclear umbrella. The opposition to the deployment of the Euromissiles has been based on the belief that in the event of war, these weapons would be the object of Soviet nuclear strikes. As the Dutch politician's statement makes clear, some Europeans believe there is no reason for Western Europe to assume this risk, that the United States will assume all the risk of nuclear war because it has to, allowing the European NATO members to enjoy only the benefits of the American nuclear umbrella.

The point must be made bluntly: if this is an accurate assessment of the European interest in NATO, there is nothing in the alliance for the United States. It is all the more necessary to make this point firmly because many Europeans have accused the United States, quite unfairly, of planning to sacrifice Europe in a limited nuclear war while American territory remains untouched. The major evidence for this calumny is President Reagan's remark on 16 October 1981 to a gathering of newspaper editors:

> Q: I guess I think that some of the people in Europe who are opposed to some of our policies are afraid that they may wind up as kind of proxy victims in a war between us and the Soviet Union which—a fear that may be a little more,

> seem a little more plausible because of all the conversation about integrated battlefields and limited use of nuclear weapons. And I wonder—we must think about this—*do you believe that there could be a limited exchange of nuclear weapons between us and the Soviet Union or that it would simply escalate inevitably?*
>
> A: I don't honestly know. I think, again, until someplace—all over the world this is being, research going on, to try and find the defensive weapon. There never has been a weapon that someone hasn't come up with a defense. But it could—and the only defense is, well, you shoot yours and we'll shoot ours. And if you still had that kind of stalemate, *I could see where you could have the exchange of tactical weapons against troops in the field without it bringing either one of the major powers to pushing the button.*[11]

It should be obvious that there is nothing in this statement that can reasonably be construed as an American intent to fight a total nuclear war limited to Europe. Moreover, the President's reply says nothing that is new: even under the doctrine of massive retaliation, no American official ever suggested that the United States would automatically unleash strategic forces in response to any Soviet use of tactical weapons, no matter how limited. Indeed, one wonders what the President could have said that would have been more sensible. Would anyone really have preferred him to respond by saying that if the Soviet Union uses any nuclear weapon, he would automatically order the USSR's (and thus Europe's) complete destruction? Could anyone have found that kind of reply saner and more reassuring? (To be sure, President Brezhnev did state his view that no nuclear war could be limited, but if he truly believed this, one wonders why the Soviet Union recently deployed over 300 SS-20 missiles, which cannot reach the United States.)

In short, just as the Europeans were understandably upset by the US administration's initial insensitivity to their interest in arms control, Americans can be forgiven if they are offended by European accusations that they are planning to sacrifice Europe to save their own skins in the event of a conflict with the Soviet Union. The United States, after all, is the country that rescued Western Europe financially with the Marshall Plan and protected it during the Berlin crises. There are hundreds of thousands of American troops in Europe, many with their dependants, to assure Europeans that the United States cannot stand aside in the event of Soviet aggression. These facts should count for something, and Americans are justifiably angered when they are completely overlooked, and the United States instead is accused of the most base and selfish motivations in its policy towards Europe.

Redefining the alliance

In summary, it is clear that if NATO is to endure, both the United States and its European allies must make a better effort to understand each other. The Americans should recognize that beating the drums about the Soviet military threat is counterproductive: it certainly alarms the Europeans, but about the United States, not the Soviet Union. Instead, Mr Reagan should follow the advice of one of his Republican predecessors, Teddy Roosevelt, and speak softly while rebuilding the American big stick.

11. *New York Times*, 21 Oct. 1981, p. A5. Emphasis added.

For their part, the Europeans should understand that allegations about American designs to sacrifice Europe in a limited nuclear war are not only unfounded, but deeply offensive to Americans. More importantly, however, Europeans (and American Atlanticists) should not believe that the American commitment to the defence of Europe is absolute. Too often, the opinion is put forward that the United States would not dare to withdraw its troops from Europe because that would be against its own best interests. As we have seen, however, American participation in NATO is not indispensable to the national security of the United States. *Even if one does not agree with this argument*, one must recognize that such sentiments will gain increasing force in the United States if Americans come to feel that the Europeans want to reap the benefits of the American nuclear guarantee without taking any of the risks. Atlanticists should not be deluded by a belief that American decision-makers will behave 'rationally' simply because they always have in the past. The 'rational actor' model of decision-making is simply not applicable in this case, for the values that carried the day before are simply not as widely shared today. In the words of Howard Baker, the Senate Majority Leader:

> I've thought about taking up the cudgels of the Mansfield amendment [which called for halving the number of US troops in Europe], but the situation is too serious for that. When Mansfield was doing it [in 1971], there was virtually no support for that position in the Senate. Were I to do it, I'm afraid it would start a fire I couldn't put out.[12]

In line with this, it is worth repeating that NATO was founded on a shared perception of a Soviet threat. Both sides must recognize that the consensus on which the alliance was founded has changed over time. Although some evolutionary change probably would have occurred in any event, the process was accelerated by Brezhnev's adoption of a policy of detente, which has had far more impact in Western Europe than in the United States. Not only has detente been more successful in Europe in improving the Soviet Union's image, it has also provided the Europeans with more tangible benefits that they do not want to relinquish. Nowhere is this more evident than in West Germany. Although the Bonn government has been exemplary in meeting its military obligations under NATO (at least until recently), and although the West Germans joined the United States in boycotting the 1980 Moscow Olympics, West Germany simply feels too dependent on the benefits of detente—both in terms of trade and improved contacts with East Germany—to do anything that would threaten the improved relationship with the East except under the most extreme provocation.

Recognizing that the consensus on which NATO was founded has changed, the leaders of the alliance should attempt to find a new consensus for a period of detente. The first order of business should be the achievement of a common interpretation of the nature of the Soviet threat. NATO was originally designed to counter the threat of a Soviet invasion of Western Europe. This threat may have appeared reasonable at the time of the Berlin blockade and the Korean War, when the US nuclear stockpile was small and the countries of Western Europe had not recovered from the Second World War. At the present time, however, such a possibility must be considered extremely remote. Even if one attributes the most malevolent intentions to the Soviet leadership, the fact nevertheless remains that the

12. *New York Times*, 7 Dec. 1981, p. A22.

countries of NATO possess many thousands of nuclear weapons. Nobody but a madman would initiate hostilities willingly in the face of such firepower.

Thus, although it is still necessary for NATO to be concerned about the highly implausible possibility of a massive Soviet attack against Western Europe, it is more important at this time for the alliance to reach an understanding on how it should deal with less drastic Soviet threats that do not involve direct aggression against a NATO member. The necessity for such an understanding is highlighted by different perceptions of recent events in Afghanistan and Poland. Whereas the United States has viewed Soviet actions as evidence of the fundamental emptiness of detente, the Europeans have generally been unwilling to interpret Soviet behaviour in this way. The result is that each side increasingly views the other's motives with suspicion. More precisely, the Europeans view the Americans as hypocritical because the United States is more critical of Soviet repression than it is of repression by right-wing regimes, and because it justifies its own trade with the USSR while condemning Western Europe's. Complicating matters further is a growing European tendency to view any American efforts at leadership as more evidence of an overbearing arrogance that Europeans, out of respect for their own interests, have an obligation to resist as proof of their independence and equality. The United States, for its part, views the Europeans as selfish because they take it for granted that the United States should risk nuclear annihilation and expend tens of billions of dollars annually for the security of Europe, but are unwilling to join the United States in foregoing some of the benefits of detente when the Soviet Union suppresses the freedom of some of its neighbours that do not happen to be members of NATO.[13]

The question, therefore, is whether NATO can deal effectively with the Soviet threat in the 1980s. If its members view the threat solely in terms of a massive Soviet attack against Western Europe, the alliance will appear increasingly irrelevant by its concentration on the most implausible scenario. On the other hand, if they view the threat more broadly, they must reach an agreement on what that threat is and how it should be resisted; otherwise, the alliance will collapse in recrimination and bitterness. Events in Poland and Afghanistan have demonstrated that this is not an issue that can be resolved by *ad hoc* consultation during a crisis. Rather, it is a fundamental problem that goes to the heart of the continuing viability of NATO. The questions must be put bluntly: has the Soviet policy of detente, with its more ambiguous challenges to Western security, succeeded in undermining the foundations of the alliance? For if the allies cannot agree on the nature of the Soviet threat and their response to it, what can they agree on?

NATO has been around so long that it is difficult to contemplate the possibility that it could disintegrate. Indeed, the Atlanticist bias of political leaders in both Europe and the United States is so strong that they doubtless will make every effort to preserve the alliance, no matter what the strain. At the same time, however, it should be recognized that this bias is not so widely shared by their publics, which may constrain their freedom of action. In addition, the next generation of leaders cannot be assumed to share this Atlanticist bias, since it does not have the historical memory of the Marshall Plan and the cold war. Instead, its formative experiences are occurring now, and consequently the manner in which the present strains in the alliance are handled will have an impact transcending their immediate importance.

13. Admittedly, however, Washington's objections on this point ring very hollow given the extension of the grain agreement.

It is this consideration, perhaps more than any other, that makes it necessary to redefine the nature of the threat and the purpose of the alliance, instead of assuming that the momentum of history that has carried the alliance forward so far will carry it indefinitely into the future. For NATO, the wolf may not yet be at the door, but it is coming pretty close.

The Pentagon negotiations March 1948: the launching of the North Atlantic Treaty*

Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman†

> Actions of the Soviet government in the field of foreign affairs leave us no alternative other than to assume that the USSR has aggressive intentions. It seems clear that there can be no question of 'deals or arrangements' with the USSR. That method was tried once with Hitler and the lessons of that effort are fresh in our minds.[1]

By the signing on 4 April 1949 of the North Atlantic Treaty by their respective secretaries of state for foreign affairs, twelve Western nations agreed that an armed attack against one or more of them would be considered an armed attack against them all. In the event of such an armed attack every nation that had signed the treaty would '. . . assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic Area'.[2] In practice this mutual assistance pledge meant that the United States promised to come to the assistance of the West European signatories to the treaty in the event of an armed attack by the Soviet Union on one or more of them. Now, thirty-four years later, this agreement is still the formal basis of Western defence.

According to official NATO historiography, the negotiations that led to the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty started on 6 July 1948 in Washington.[3] However, for a few years it has been known that negotiations on a security treaty between the United States and West European nations had already been conducted before that date. Those negotiations took place at the end of March 1948 in utmost secrecy between the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada at the Pentagon in Washington. One of the participants in those secret deliberations refers to 'the crucial (and secret) "Pentagon" talks in March 1948 during which the North Atlantic Treaty was effectively conceived'.[4] The purpose of this contribution is to supplement

* The authors would like to thank Ambassador Theodore C. Achilles (Washington), Robert Cecil (Hambledon, Hants), Lord Gladwyn (London), Ambassador John D. Hickerson (Washington), Professor John W. Holmes (Toronto) and Escott Reid (Ste Cécile de Masham) for their comments on an earlier version of this article. All, except for John W. Holmes, were involved in the Pentagon negotiations. The authors, of course, remain solely responsible for the opinions expressed.

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1. John D. Hickerson, quoted in Daniel Yergin, *Shattered peace: the origins of the cold war and the national security state* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1978) p. 257.

2. See for the complete wording of Article 5, and the rest of the North Atlantic Treaty, *United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 34* (New York: United Nations Organization, 1949), pp. 243–55.

3. 'Preliminary talks opened in Washington on July 6, 1948, between the State Department and the Ambassadors of Canada and of the Western Union Powers'. See *NATO Facts and Figures* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1981), p. 21.

4. Lord Gladwyn, review of Escott Reid, *Time of fear and hope* in International Journal, Winter 1977/78, Vol. 33, No. 1, p. 248. Reid, who was himself closely involved with the Pentagon negotiations,

0020–5850/83/3/0351—13$03.00©1983 International Affairs

the official NATO historiography by showing that as early as March 1948 there was a fairly substantial consensus of opinion between representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada on the wording of the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed a year later. First the previous history of the Pentagon negotiations is briefly reviewed, followed by an outline of the plans and ideas of the three delegations before they went to Washington. After that the actual negotiations in Washington are described, with special attention to four crucial issues: namely, the mutual assistance pledge; indirect aggression; the territorial scope of the treaty; and membership. To conclude, we show why, in spite of the fairly substantial consensus of opinion between three of the principal signatories to the treaty and in spite of the sense of urgency which was felt by the three delegations, it took another three months before, on 6 July 1948, the official negotiations started.

Preliminary developments

On 15 December 1947 the Council of Foreign Ministers, the periodical conference of the 'big four' (the United States, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France), broke down, it having proved to be impossible in London to reach agreement on a joint policy for Germany. It was to be the last such conference for the time being.

This rupture between the three Western states on the one hand and the Soviet Union on the other had in fact been in the offing ever since the Potsdam Conference of July–August 1945. Earlier in 1947 the declaration of the Truman doctrine and the Marshall Plan by the United States and the formation of the Cominform and its own aid programme for the Eastern European states by the Soviet Union had already split Europe into two camps. The fact that no agreement was possible on Germany, the most crucial issue in Europe, proved that the rupture between East and West was complete.

On the same day that the Council of Foreign Ministers broke down, Ernest Bevin, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, proposed to his American colleague George Marshall 'the formation of some form of union, formal or informal in character, in Western Europe backed by the United States and the Dominions'.[5] It was not the first time that someone had put forward such a scheme. During the Second World War the Norwegian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (later Secretary-General of the United Nations) Trygve Lie had pressed for an Atlantic alliance.[6] Winston Churchill, in his famous Fulton speech on 5 March 1946, had already proposed an association of the English-speaking peoples, and the Canadian Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Louis St Laurent suggested in his speech to the General Assembly of the UN on 17 September 1947 'an association of democratic and peaceloving states willing to accept more specific international

maintains that the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada 'drafted the general outlines of the treaty in very secret three-power talks at the end of March, 1948'. See Escott Reid, *Time of fear and hope: the making of the North Atlantic Treaty 1947–1949* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), p. 11.

5. Theodore C. Achilles, unpublished draft memoirs, 1975, p. 412G. On 17 December 1947 Bevin expressed himself in similar terms to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Georges Bidault. Foreign Office—General Correspondence, Political (henceforth *FO 371*), File 67674, Z11010/25/17G, Minute of Conversation Bevin–Bidault, 17/12/1947 (Kew: Public Record Office (henceforth PRO). All quotations from documents in the PRO appear by permission of the Controller, HMSO.)

6. See for Lie's ideas Olav Riste, 'The genesis of North Atlantic defence co-operation: Norway's "Atlantic policy" 1940–1945', *NATO Review*, April 1981, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp. 22–9.

obligations in return for a greater measure of national security'.[7] However, prior to December 1947 these schemes for an alliance between Western nations had not been elaborated. Bevin used the failure of the Council of Foreign Ministers to propagate the idea of such an alliance with renewed vigour.[8]

Marshall's response to Bevin's propositions was cautious. He was very anxious not to endanger the appropriation by Congress of the Marshall funds (the European Recovery Program). But despite this lukewarm American reaction, plans for an alliance now went ahead. On 13 January 1948 Bevin sent a memorandum to Marshall in which he informed him of his intentions to conclude treaties of alliance with the Benelux countries. That would be the first step on the road leading to a Western alliance supported by the United States and the British Dominions.

On 22 January 1948 Bevin disclosed his intentions to the public in a speech in the House of Commons:

> The time has come to think of ways and means of developing our relations with the Benelux countries, to begin talks with these countries in close concord with our French ally. Yesterday our representatives in Brussels, the Hague, and Luxembourg were instructed to propose such talks. I hope treaties will be signed with the Benelux countries making, with our treaty with France, an important nucleus in Western Europe.[9]

The negotiations on Bevin's proposals started on 4 March and on 17 March 1948 the Treaty of Brussels was signed by the United Kingdom, France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg.[10]

In the meantime the British Foreign Office continued pressing the American State Department to conclude an alliance, but the Americans would not commit themselves to anything more than verbal support for the plans. Events in Czechoslovakia then played into the Foreign Office's hands. The communist takeover in Prague on 25 February led to a period of increased tension. Bevin broached anew his ideas about an alliance. On 11 March he submitted three proposals to the State Department and the Canadian Department of External Affairs (DEA):

(i) the United Kingdom–France–Benelux system with United States backing;
(ii) a scheme of Atlantic security, with which the United States would be even more closely concerned;

7. For Churchill's Fulton speech see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Mar. 9–16, 1946, pp. 7770–2. For the passage from St Laurent's speech see Reid, *Time of fear and hope*, p. 33.

8. It appears from the contacts between the State Department (John Hickerson, director of the Office of European Affairs) and the Canadian Ambassador to Washington, Hume Wrong, that at the end of October 1947 the Americans expected very little of the Council of Foreign Ministers: '. . . he (Hickerson) expected failure'. The plans for an alternative security system had to wait on this failure. See *Escott Reid Papers*, MG 31 E 46 (henceforth Reid Papers) Vol. 6, File 12, Wrong to Reid, 27/10/1947 (Ottawa: Public Archives of Canada (henceforth PAC)).

9. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, Jan. 24–31, 1948, p. 9062. The treaty with France to which Bevin refers is the Treaty of Dunkirk of 4 March 1947. Simultaneously with Bevin's memorandum to Marshall, Attlee sent an identical memorandum to Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister. See PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Attlee to King, 14/01/1948.

10. See for the complete wording of the Treaty for Collaboration in Economic, Social and Cultural Matters and for Collective Self-Defence, known as the Treaty of Brussels: *United Nations Treaty Series*, Vol. 19 (New York: United Nations Organization, 1948), pp. 51–63. The core article of the Treaty is Article IV: 'If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Contracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the Party so attacked *all the military and other aid and assistance in their power*'.

(iii) a Mediterranean security system, which would particularly affect Italy.[11] Bevin suggested that negotiations on these proposals be started at the soonest possible date.

This time both Mackenzie King, the Canadian Prime Minister, and Marshall reacted favourably. The latter proposed starting negotiations in Washington as soon as possible. This positive attitude on the part of the American administration was reinforced by a speech made to Congress by President Truman on the day the Treaty of Brussels was signed in which he said:

> I am confident that the United States will, by appropriate means, extend to the free nations the support which the situation requires. I am sure that the determination of the free countries of Europe to protect themselves will be matched by an equal determination on our part to help them to protect themselves.[12]

The various options

Agreement to start negotiations on an alliance did not, however, mean that the three countries concerned were in agreement as regards the form and substance of such an alliance. The Canadian delegation brought the most elaborate ideas to Washington. From as far back as the summer of 1947 the DEA had been working on an alternative security system, alongside the United Nations. That is apparent from, *inter alia*, the speech of St Laurent to the General Assembly and from the text of the draft 'Treaty for Greater National Security', prepared as a result of this speech by Escott Reid, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs.[13]

In consequence of Bevin's proposals of 11 March Reid redrafted this treaty into a new one, intended for Lester B. Pearson (Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs), who was to be the Canadian representative in Washington. From the attached memorandum it is clear that Reid was an advocate of a worldwide treaty. For example, he was in favour of the accession of Finland and all British Dominions to the new treaty. Pearson rejected this view; he maintained that the Soviet Union 'would be more impressed by a quick business-like arrangement between UK–US–Canada cum France and the Western Union . . . than by an amorphous conglomeration which included Finland, Italy, Portugal and Pakistan.[14] Such an 'arrangement', then, was what Pearson wanted to accomplish in Washington.

From the end of 1947 onwards the main aim of the Foreign Office was to tie the security of the United States to the security of Western Europe. The Treaty of Brussels was simply a first step in that direction.[15] The sought-for tie could be accomplished by US accession to the Treaty of Brussels or the creation of a new

11. *Record Group 59*, General Files of the Department of State (henceforth *RG59*), Confidential File 1945–1949, Box C-509, 840.20/3–1148, Bevin to Marshall, 11/03/1948 (Washington, DC: National Archives (henceforth NA)); PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Attlee to King, 10/03/1948.

12. Harry S. Truman, *Years of trial and hope 1946–1952* (New York: Doubleday, 1965) p. 279.

13. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Treaty for Greater National Security to Supplement the Charter of the United Nations, 04/11/1947. The State Department, through John Hickerson, and Under-Secretary of State Gladwyn Jebb on behalf of the Foreign Office reacted with approval to St Laurent's speech. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Wrong to Reid, 27/10/1947, and Ignatieff to Reid, 22/11/1947.

14. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Reid to Pearson, 18/03/1948 plus attached memorandum by Pearson.

15. Lord Gladwyn (Jebb) called the Treaty of Brussels an attempt '. . . to encourage Hercules to come to the help of those who were prepared to help themselves'. Lord Gladwyn, review of Reid, p. 251.

Atlantic alliance. This course of action is reflected both in Bevin's proposals of 11 March and in the instructions to Gladwyn Jebb, the principal British negotiator in Washington. First of all, Jebb had to ascertain the extent of the State Department's willingness to support the Treaty of Brussels—Bevin's proposal (i)—or even to accede to the Treaty. But what the British were really aiming for was a new Atlantic treaty of alliance—Bevin's proposal (ii)—with accession confined to states bordering the Atlantic. This was apparent on the one hand from the omission of Luxembourg and Italy from the list of possible members of the new alliance and on the other hand from Bevin's proposal (iii) for a separate Mediterranean security system.[16]

At the end of 1947 the State Department too was thinking about an alternative security system, as is apparent from certain remarks of John Hickerson and Dean Rusk (Director of the Office of United Nations Affairs) in conversations with Canadian diplomats.[17] However, divisions within the State Department on the issue prevented further elaboration of plans at this stage. These divisions were reflected in the reactions of Hickerson and George Kennan (Director of the Policy Planning Staff in the State Department) to Bevin's proposals of 13 January. Hickerson supported Bevin's ideas and wanted the United States to participate in a new alliance while Kennan rejected US involvement.[18] The same division surfaced again in the different reactions in the State Department to Bevin's 11 March proposals. Rusk's UN section appeared to be in favour of a 'treaty of reciprocal military assistance' based on Article 51 of the UN Charter. Hickerson's European section supported a 'North Atlantic–Mediterranean regional defense arrangement' based on Articles 51 and 52 of the Charter. The National Security Council (NSC) and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) both advocated a unilateral guarantee by the United States to the states who were party to the Brussels Treaty.[19]

In spite of this division concerning the most desirable policy on the eve of the negotiations, the American delegation did represent a certain tendency in the State Department. Hickerson and Theodore Achilles (Chief of the Division of Western European Affairs)—both avowed advocates of an Atlantic security treaty—were both members of the American delegation and their position was reinforced by a Policy Planning Staff (PPS) report of 23 March 1948. In this report the PPS opted for an extension of the Treaty of Brussels with some selected European countries and the creation of a new security treaty to which the United States should adhere. This report laid down future American policy. Kennan was at this moment in Japan; in his memoirs he expressed his discontent at this report of his PPS, in which recommendations were made which Kennan himself had always opposed.[20]

16. PRO, *FO 371*/68067, AN 1196/1195/45G, Sargent to Bevin, 15/03/1948. That separate Mediterranean system for Italy is dropped in the instructions to Jebb in favour of a possible Italian accession to the Brussels Treaty. See also PAC, *Hume Wrong Papers*, MG 30 E 101 (henceforth *Wrong Papers*), Vol. 4, File 25, Reid to Wrong, 14/03/1948 and *Brooke Claxton Papers*, MG 32 B 5, Vol. 111, File Washington Meeting March 1948 + Western Europe, Vol. I, Pearson to St Laurent, 22/03/1948.

17. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Wrong to Reid, 27/10/1947 and Ignatieff to Reid, 22/11/1947.

18. NA, *RG 59*, Confidential File 1945–1949, Box C–507, 840.00/1–1948, Memorandum John D. Hickerson, 19/01/1948 and 840.00/1–2048, Memorandum George F. Kennan, 20/01/1948.

19. NA, *RG 59*, Confidential File 1945–1949, Box C–507, 840.00/3–1948, Memorandum George Butler, 19/03/1948. Also PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Pearson to Prime Minister, 27/03/1948 and *Wrong Papers*, Vol. 4, File 25, Wrong to Pearson, 13/03/1948 and Memorandum Hume Wrong, 18/03/1948. Copies of the treaty texts proposed by the UN section and the European section can be found in NA, *RG 59*, Records of Harley A. Notter, Box 10.

20. George F. Kennan, *Memoirs 1925–1950* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), p. 409. For the discussions leading up to PPS 27 see NA, *RG 59*, Policy Planning Staff Files, Box 32 and Records of Harley A. Notter, Box 10.

The Pentagon negotiations

The negotiations between the delegations of the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada started on Monday 22 March 1948 and continued until Thursday 1 April. The American delegation was headed by the American Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Lewis Douglas. Their main spokesman was John Hickerson; other members of the American delegation were Achilles and Alfred Gruenther (Director of the Joint Staff, JCS). The British delegation was headed by the British Ambassador to the United States, Lord Inverchapel, with Gladwyn Jebb as main spokesman. Other participants on the British side were Donald Maclean and Robert Cecil. The Canadian delegation was headed by Lester Pearson during the first four meetings and thereafter by the Canadian Ambassador to the United States, Hume Wrong.

France did not participate in the Washington discussions. On 15 March it seemed likely that the French would be invited to participate,[21] but the invitation was blocked by the American delegation, which declared that the French required consideration as a security risk.[22] The argument advanced by Jebb in his memoirs seems more plausible. He maintains that the State Department did not want French participation because 'the French had not been seeing eye to eye of late with the "Anglo-Saxons", more especially as regards Germany, and that it might therefore be better at least to get some sort of understanding with the British on general policy before tackling them'.[23]

The negotiations themselves consisted of six meetings, which can be divided into two stages. The first stage comprised four meetings between 22 and 25 March. At the first of these the delegations discussed the three possibilities for a Western alliance: extension of the Brussels Treaty with the United States and Canada; a new Atlantic alliance; and a worldwide treaty.[24] At the second meeting the first and third of these propositions were dropped, as was the idea of a guarantee to the Brussels signatories by means of a unilateral US presidential declaration; and the decision to create a new 'Western Mutual Defense Pact' was taken.

It was then decided that for the third meeting each delegation should draft a working paper covering the steps necessary to effect such a pact, and discussions continued at the third meeting on the basis of these three working papers. Subsequently Achilles, Jebb and Pearson drew up a joint draft paper, the purpose of which was 'to recommend a course of action adequate to give effect to the declaration of March 17 by the President of the United States of support for the free nations of Europe'.[25] The first stage of the discussions was concluded with a plenary discussion of the draft paper on 25 March, whereupon it was decided that the respective national capitals should be consulted.

Six days later, on 31 March, the second stage of the negotiations started. The American delegation was alone in proposing extensive alterations to the draft paper agreed on 24 March; Hickerson rewrote the draft twice. The final version, the so-

21. Reid, *Time of fear and hope*, p. 53. Hickerson thought at that moment that it would be difficult to keep France out of the conversations; see PAC, *Wrong Papers*, Vol. 4, File 25, Wrong to Pearson, 15/03/1948.

22. NA, *RG 59*, Confidential File 1945–1949, Box C-509, 840.20/3–3148, Minutes of the First Meeting of the US–UK–Canada Security Conversations, 22/03/1948.

23. Lord Gladwyn, *The memoirs of Lord Gladwyn* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1972) p. 215.

24. By this last possibility was meant a new collective security pact, based on Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, to which every state could accede.

25. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Draft of Pentagon Paper, 24/03/1948.

called Pentagon Paper, was endorsed by the three delegations on 1 April 1948.[26] The negotiators agreed that the Pentagon Paper was to be considered an American document; Pearson commented that, if the document should leak out, 'it will not appear to other governments as having already been discussed with two other governments. It was felt that this was important in order to meet the sensitiveness of the French and possible others'.[27]

The Pentagon Paper listed eight items which the new treaty must cover. Among these were such non-controversial issues as the preamble, a reference to the UN Charter and the duration of the treaty. Three of these items, however, led to many disagreements both at this and subsequent stages, and it is to these, along with the question of prospective membership of the treaty, that attention will now be given. They are: the mutual assistance pledge; indirect aggression; and the territorial scope of the treaty.

The mutual assistance pledge

The crucial article in the North Atlantic Treaty is Article 5 (as cited in the introduction), the mutual assistance pledge. During all of the negotiations this was the issue which caused most of the differences of opinion, the Pentagon negotiations being no exception. These differences were apparent at the outset in the three working papers discussed at the third meeting. The British were prepared to make the most binding mutual assistance pledge. They proposed 'some wording based on Article IV of the Treaty of Brussels', which amounts to an obligation to give military and all other aid in the event of an armed attack. The Canadian proposal was somewhat more cautious, namely Article 3 of the Rio Inter-American Treaty, which compels every party to the treaty to come to the assistance of a member state under attack in order to help it resist that attack. The American delegation was even more cautious, suggesting the phrase 'to take armed action' in the event of an armed attack on one of the member states, on the condition that every nation may determine for itself whether an attack really constitutes an armed attack.[28] This condition was omitted from the joint proposal in the draft paper. The three delegations agreed on the formula that in the event of an armed attack on one of the parties to the treaty every other party would give 'all the military, economic, and other aid and assistance in its power' to the party so attacked.[29] During the plenary discussion on 25 March Douglas raised some objections. He wanted either a definition in the text of the treaty of 'armed aggression' or that it should be made explicit that every party would determine for itself whether an attack was an armed attack to be covered by the mutual assistance pledge.[30] At the same time he asked whether every nation would be obliged to send troops to the location where the attack took place.

26. *Foreign Relations of the United States* (henceforth *FRUS*) 1948, Vol. III, Western Europe (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1974) pp. 72–5.

27. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Pearson to Prime Minister, 27/03/1948.

28. See for the desired mutual assistance pledge: PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, United Kingdom Draft 23/03/1948; Canadian Draft 23/03/1948; and United States Draft 23/03/1948. The Rio Treaty, from which the Canadian delegation wanted to adopt the mutual assistance pledge, is the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance between the United States and all the Latin American states except for Nicaragua and Ecuador, signed at Rio de Janeiro on 2 September 1947.

29. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Draft of Pentagon Paper, 24/03/1948.

30. NA, *RG 59*, Confidential File 1945–1949, Box C–509, 840.20/3–3148, Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the US–UK–Canada Security Conversations, 25/03/1948 and PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Pearson to Prime Minister, 27/03/1948.

In the ensuing discussions it became evident that the other delegations were reluctant to make definitions, feeling that to do so would play into the hands of a potential aggressor. However, all delegations agreed that each party could determine for itself whether an attack constituted an armed attack to be covered by the mutual assistance pledge. Douglas was also reassured as regards the obligation to send troops, in that every nation is to be free to determine for itself what sort of aid and assistance it will provide. Pearson gave this example:

> If, for example, there were an attack on Belgium, Canada's assistance to Belgium might conceivably take the form of moving troops to Fort Churchill [at the Hudson Bay] in the first instance, and, in the long run, might take the form of concentrating on industrial production.[31]

Nevertheless, Inverchapel reported to London after this plenary meeting that the draft paper 'will on reflexion be considered to be too potent a draught, which, even though swallowed, may have to be watered down very considerably'.[32] His fears proved to be correct: at the fifth meeting Hickerson propounded a fundamental change in the mutual assistance pledge which had been agreed upon. In his new proposal every nation was to determine for itself 'whether there has occurred an armed attack within the meaning of the agreement' and what kind of aid will be provided. Hickerson declared that this change was the result of the suggestions made by Douglas at the last meeting and of 'indirect soundings concerning the probable attitude of Congressional leaders'.[33]

In spite of the reassuring words of Pearson and Jebb to Douglas during the discussion on the draft paper, it appeared that the State Department still wanted an explicit reference to the fact that every nation may determine for itself whether an attack is an armed attack under the terms of the agreement and what kind of aid is to be provided. Jebb commented that this amendment was a 'considerable watering-down of obligations under the proposed Atlantic treaty', but the British and Canadians were compelled, reluctantly, to concur.[34] As they were asking the Americans for help, they were in no position to make demands. In fact, both delegations agreed with the Americans, but would have preferred the treaty to remain vague on these issues. Pearson commented: 'I realize that the determination of whether an armed attack has in fact taken place is the right of the individual signatories but surely that can be left implicit rather than be made explicit'.[35] The State Department, however, insisted, and the text of the mutual assistance pledge in the Pentagon Paper fully reflects the American standpoint:

> Provision that each Party shall regard any action in the area covered by the agreement, which it considers an armed attack, against any other Party, as an

31. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Pearson to Prime Minister, 27/03/1948.
32. PRO, *FO 371*/68067, AN 1326/1195/45G, Inverchapel to Bevin, 25/03/1948.
33. NA, *RG 59*, Confidential File 1945–1949, Box C-509, 840.20/3–3148, Minutes of the Fifth Meeting of the US–UK–Canada Security Conversations, 31/03/1948 and PRO, *FO 371*/68068A, AN 1411/1195/45G, Jebb to Bevin, 31/03/1948 and Prime Minister's Office—Correspondence and Papers (henceforth *PREM 8*) File 788, PM/48/38, Minute by Jebb, 06/04/1948.
34. PRO, *FO 371*/68068A, AN 1411/1195/45G, Jebb to Bevin, 31/03/1948.
35. PAC, *Wrong Papers*, Vol. 4, File 25, Pearson to Wrong, 01/04/1948. Bevin held the same view concerning the mutual assistance pledge. He pointed for example to Article IV of the Brussels Treaty and stated that 'the determination whether such an armed attack has in fact taken place—in other words the determination of the *casus foederis*—is ultimately left to the individual judgement of each signatory though this of course is not expressly stated'. See PRO, *PREM 8*/788, PM/48/38, Bevin to Attlee, 06/04/1948.

armed attack against itself and that each Party accordingly undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter.[36]

Indirect aggression

In the draft paper of 24 March 1948 there is a paragraph concerning consultation if one of the parties feels a threat to its political independence or territorial integrity. Behind this wording lies the hidden struggle between the British delegation on one side and the American and Canadian delegations on the other about the incorporation of 'indirect aggression' in the text of the treaty.

From the working papers of 23 March it appears that the State Department wanted provision for consultation in the event of 'indirect aggression', defined as: 'an internal *coup d'état* or political change favourable to an aggressor, or the use of force within the territory of a State against its Government by any persons under direction or instigation of another Government or external agency other than the United Nations'.[37] The resistance against the incorporation of 'indirect aggression' in the text of the treaty came from the British delegation. They had not incorporated this term in their working paper, and in response to the American proposal to come to a definition of the concept and incorporate it in the text of the treaty, Inverchapel suggested that this could be considered to be an interference in the internal affairs of other states. He pointed to the fact that

> we had great difficulty in dissuading the Americans from introducing a long and elaborate provision defining indirect aggression, and it was only on our informing them that the French were violently opposed during the earlier stages of the Brussels negotiations to any such thing on the grounds that it would tend to reconstitute a 'holy alliance' that they abandoned their proposal and were content with the reference to indirect aggression as it now appears.[38]

British resistance led to the above-mentioned general wording of the paragraph on consultation in the draft paper. However, the struggle had not been won by the British delegation: it can be seen from the Pentagon Paper that the State Department, through Hickerson, carried the day. The wording of the relevant paragraph reads: 'Provision for consultation between all the Parties in the event of any Party considering that its territorial integrity or political independence is threatened by armed attack or indirect aggression in any part of the world'.[39] In this wording, consultation is—in principle—always possible.

The territorial scope of the treaty

The draft paper of 24 March mentions a 'Security Pact for the North Atlantic Area'. This last word 'area' was added in order to enlarge the territorial scope and to make the accession of countries like Italy and Switzerland possible, whereas in his original

36. *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. III, p. 74. From this it appears clear that every state now decides for itself whether an armed attack has occurred ('which it considers an armed attack') and that there is no longer any obligation to give armed support ('assist in meeting the attack').

37. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, United States Draft, 23/03/1948. This wording is adopted almost entirely from the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Molotov, who proposed this wording in 1939 during negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom on a Treaty of Mutual Assistance. See PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Pearson to Prime Minister, 27/03/1948. With this wording the activities of the parties linked in the Cominform also fall under the consultation paragraph.

38. PRO, *FO 371*/68067, AN 1315/1195/45G, Inverchapel to Bevin, 24/03/1948.

39. *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. III, p. 74.

proposal Bevin had wanted only states which bordered the Atlantic Ocean to be eligible.[40] A specific territorial delimitation was, however, absent from the draft paper and on 25 March Douglas proposed to specify the terms of eligibility. The British and Canadian delegations objected, again arguing that specific delimitation plays into the hands of a potential aggressor. At this meeting the subject was dropped and Inverchapel reported to London that 'It is the intention, however, not (repeat not) to define the geographical area in the instrument by reference to lines of latitude or to States possessing an Atlantic seaboard'.[41] However, on 31 March, at the fifth meeting, the discussions returned to this subject. Again it was not possible to reach agreement, although all three delegations agreed that Alaska and Greenland should be covered by the mutual assistance pledge. In the Pentagon Paper the issue was finally resolved by the stipulation that the mutual assistance pledge should cover 'the continental territory in Europe and North America of any Party and the islands in the North Atlantic whether sovereign or belonging to any Party. (This would include Spitzbergen and other Norwegian Islands, Iceland, Greenland, Newfoundland and Alaska.)'[42]

Owing to the range of the American strategic bombers of that time, the islands between North America and Western Europe (the so-called 'stepping stones') had to be included under the auspices of the treaty. The limitation of the proposed area to be covered appears to have been introduced in order to meet the wishes of the small states, because it was expected that they 'would be hesitant about signing an agreement which would automatically involve them in war if there were trouble between the Great Powers in Asia'.[43] Between the three delegations there exists however the tacit agreement that if a war did start between the great powers in Asia, the agreement would be certain to come into operation, as attacks in the North Atlantic area would inevitably take place. The three delegations also agreed that even if Iceland and Portugal did not become parties to the treaty, the agreement should nevertheless come into operation in the case of an armed attack on one of them, owing to their very important strategic position.

Membership

As we have seen, Bevin's idea of an alliance restricted to states bordering the Atlantic Ocean was dropped. There was rapid consensus on the accession of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Iceland and Ireland to the 'Security Pact for the North Atlantic Area'; problems, however, arose over the possible accession of Switzerland, Portugal, Spain and Italy.

The British delegation was opposed to an invitation to Switzerland, being convinced that the Swiss were certain to insist on remaining neutral. The British stated that: 'The utmost we can expect from Switzerland is continued participation in ERP and we do not wish to scare her off that'.[44] In the case of Portugal, Pearson pointed to the disadvantage of the accession of this country 'from the ideological point of view but it was felt that this disadvantage was more than neutralized by the

40. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Pearson to Prime Minister, 27/03/1948.
41. PRO, *FO 371*/68067, AN 1315/1195/45G, Inverchapel to Bevin, 24/03/1948.
42. *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. III, p. 74.
43. PAC, *Wrong Papers*, Vol. 4, File 25, Wrong to Pearson, 02/04/1948.
44. PRO, *FO 371*/68067, AN 1315/1195/45G, Bevin to Inverchapel, 25/03/1948.

strategic advantage of Portugal's membership in the Pact'.[45] Switzerland and Portugal were nevertheless incorporated in the list of possible member-states, as was Italy, although the British and Canadian delegations were strictly speaking against Italian participation. Bevin wrote: 'I am doubtful regarding the propriety of including this Mediterranean country in an "Atlantic" system. I should prefer to deal with Italy after the elections and to restrict her participation to the Brussels Treaty'.[46] However, the situation in Italy was regarded as too unstable, owing to the strong position of the Communist Party, to keep it outside the new treaty. The British and Canadian delegations succeeded only in preventing—on account of ideological considerations—an invitation to Spain, of which the Pentagon was in favour.[47]

With regard to Switzerland, the British delegation stuck to its guns and as a result of British pressure it was decided on 31 March not to invite Switzerland. Instead, the Swiss government was to be told informally that the country could accede on its own initiative.

Two further things are worth mentioning. The delegations remained in favour of extending an invitation to Sweden, although no delegation expected that Sweden would accept. It is also noteworthy that Canada alone among the participants proposed to include in the treaty text an accession clause through which 'among others, Western Germany and Western Austria might join'.[48] This proposal was adopted in the Pentagon Paper on the strictest condition that it remain absolutely secret.

The delay

In spite of all the disagreements, on 1 April 1948 the three delegations agreed unanimously on the recommendations in the Pentagon Paper. At the same time they drafted a tight timetable for the implementation of these recommendations, by which the negotiations on the new 'Security Pact for the North Atlantic Area' were to start in May 1948.[49] The 'tightness of the timetable and the need for quick results' were, according to Wrong, the most important reasons for drawing the Pentagon negotiations to a close even though the delegations had not reached agreement on all items.[50] Despite this aim, however, the next round of negotiations did not start until 6 July 1948. We consider the most important reasons for this delay to have been the internal differences of opinion within the State Department and the efforts to unite Congress behind the plans. For instance, Inverchapel mentions on 31 March 1948 that 'there were signs that Hickerson had been encountering resistance to his idea of a Pact during soundings of his colleagues in State Department'.[51] Bevin was aware of these difficulties and on 6 April 1948 wrote to Attlee that 'the

45. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Pearson to Prime Minister, 27/03/1948.

46. PRO, *FO 371*/68067, AN 1315/1195/45G, Bevin to Inverchapel, 25/03/1948. The Italian elections to which Bevin refers were held on 18 April 1948.

47. 'We had some difficulty with the Americans here since they are under the strongest possible pressure from Forrestal and their Service Chiefs to make provision for the admission of Spain here and now in any community of Western Nations'. See PRO, *FO 371*/68067, AN 1315/1195/45G, Inverchapel to Bevin, 24/03/1948.

48. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Canadian Draft 23/03/1948.

49. PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Memorandum Collective Defense Agreement for the North Atlantic Area, 01/06/1948.

50. PAC, *Wrong Papers*, Vol. 4, File 25, Wrong to Pearson, 02/04/1948.

51. PRO, *FO 371*/68068A, AN 1412/1195/45G, Inverchapel to Bevin, 31/03/1948.

chances of eventual agreement by the U.S. Government on proposals for a Treaty are now reckoned as little better than fifty-fifty', and further that 'we shall be lucky if the President and the American senatorial leaders pronounce in favour of a Treaty binding the United States for the first time in history to accept positive obligations in the way of the defence of her natural associates and friends'.[52]

As stated above, the three delegations agreed to regard the Pentagon Paper as a purely American paper. The State Department was to take the initiative in implementing the recommendations. Hickerson stated at the last meeting that in order to accomplish the objectives of the Pentagon Paper, the approval of Under-Secretary of State Robert Lovett, Marshall, the NSC, Secretary of Defense James Forrestal, Truman and the Congress (especially Senator Vandenberg) would be required.[53] Hickerson added to this that the British and Canadian delegations 'could by no means assume that the idea of a Pact would be approved by the authorities mentioned'. He warned Jebb and Pearson that 'we must realize that some Presidential declaration might in practice be all that the Americans would have to offer. Much would depend on whether some fresh Soviet action maintained the present tense atmosphere. If complete calm prevailed it would be so much more difficult to sell the idea of a pact to the Senatorial leaders'.[54]

Lovett, who was not present in Washington during the Pentagon negotiations, was doubtful about the desirability of an Atlantic Security Pact. Inverchapel, for instance, reported on 31 March 1948 to London that 'even Lovett himself is not altogether convinced of the necessity for a treaty'.[55] Lovett's doubts were increased by the resistance of Kennan and Charles Bohlen (Counsellor of the State Department) to such an alliance. Kennan had already shown himself to be opposed to an alliance before the start of the Pentagon negotiations and Bohlen maintained the same position. Neither considered an alliance necessary and opted instead for arms deliveries to the West European countries—a military Marshall plan.[56] Their main opponents in the State Department were Hickerson and Achilles. Ever since the first proposals made by Bevin in January they had strongly supported an Atlantic alliance. This struggle was only decided in favour of Hickerson and Achilles in the summer of 1948, when Kennan abandoned his resistance and Bohlen was sent to Paris as adviser of the American delegation at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

There was also resistance within the National Security Council to an alliance such as that proposed in the Pentagon Paper. The Joint Chiefs of Staff maintained that a pact of this kind could provoke the Soviet Union to an attack and were in favour rather of negotiations with the Brussels powers on defence coordination. On this point they had their way and in July 1948 the American services started to participate in the military talks of the Brussels signatories in London. Their

52. PRO, *PREM 8*/788, PM/48/38, Bevin to Attlee, 06/04/1948.

53. NA, *RG 59*, Confidential File 1945–1949, Box C–509, 840.20/3–3148, Minutes of the Sixth Meeting of the US–UK–Canada Security Conversations, 01/04/48. Vandenberg had to be approached for that reason owing to his chairmanship of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

54. PRO, *FO 371*/68068A, AN 1431/1195/45G, Jebb to Bevin, 01/04/1948 and PAC, *Wrong Papers*, Vol. 4, File 25, Wrong to Pearson, 02/04/1948.

55. PRO, *FO 371*/68068A, AN 1412/1195/45G, Inverchapel to Bevin, 31/03/1948.

56. Bohlen maintained: 'the mere presence of United States troops in Germany, pledged to remain there indefinitely, already ensured that the United States would automatically become involved as a belligerent if the Soviets were to make an aggressive thrust towards the West'. See PAC, *Reid Papers*, Vol. 6, File 12, Wrong to Pearson, 08/05/1948.

resistance to an alliance, however, proved ineffective, and on 25 June the NSC decided that: 'the U.S. Government should discuss with the parties to the Brussels Treaty some form of association by the U.S., and if possible Canada, with them along the line recommended in the Senate Resolution'.[57]

The Senate Resolution referred to here is Resolution 239, better known as the Vandenberg Resolution. This resolution transpired during several talks which Lovett held with Vandenberg at the beginning of April 1948. The object of these talks was to get Vandenberg behind the idea of an Atlantic alliance. The core of the resolution, which was adopted on 11 June 1948 in the US Senate by sixty-four votes against four, was the following recommendation: 'Association of the United States, by constitutional process, with such regional and other collective arrangements as are based on continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, and as affect its national security'.[58] Although it is generally postulated that this resolution cleared the way for the negotiations on the Atlantic Treaty,[59] it is more correct, in view of the Pentagon negotiations, to state that it merely aimed at lining up Congress behind a State Department policy which had already been decided on in March 1948. In this way the State Department was securing an *ex post facto* legitimation of the results of the Pentagon negotiations.[60]

At the end of June 1948 the situation was as follows: the resistance within the State Department to an Atlantic alliance had almost vanished, the NSC was unanimously in favour and the Vandenberg Resolution meant that the American administration could safely start negotiations on an Atlantic alliance. These negotiations started on 6 July 1948 under the leadership of Lovett, and now with the additional participation of France, Belgium and the Netherlands.

Epilogue

The Pentagon negotiations were held in the deepest secrecy. The Western allies who in July 1948 participated in the later negotiations were not informed of their existence, nor of that of the Pentagon Paper.

It is worth mentioning that the Soviet Union, against which the Atlantic alliance was directed, must have been fully informed of the events in Washington in March 1948. A member of the British delegation was the late Donald Maclean, who in 1951, after spying for years for the Soviet Union, defected to Moscow. Therefore it is probably not a coincidence that on 4 April 1948 the Polish newspaper *Zycie Warszavy* published an article on the 'Sojusz pólnokno-atlantycki' (North Atlantic Alliance) containing a description of possible Anglo-American plans.[61] It is hardly surprising that a Foreign Office internal memorandum comments that the Polish article 'did sail pretty near the wind'.[62]

57. *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. III, p. 141.
58. *FRUS*, 1948, Vol. III, pp. 135–6.
59. See, for example Alfred Grosser, *The Western Alliance: European–American relations since 1945* (London, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1980), p. 85 and Stephen E. Ambrose, *Rise to globalism: American foreign policy 1938–1980* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1980), p. 148.
60. Reid, *Time of fear and hope*, p. 70.
61. PRO, *FO 371*/68068A, AN 1730/1195/45G, Warsaw Chancery to Foreign Office, 23/04/1948. To speculate a little further: the Polish article mentions twice the British Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Mr Mayhew. It is interesting to note that at the beginning of 1948 one of Mr Mayhew's assistants was Guy Burgess, another Soviet spy. See Lyn Smith, 'Covert British propaganda: the Information Research Department 1947–1977', *Millennium*, Spring 1980, Vol. 9, No. 1, p. 80.
62. PRO, *FO 371*/71504, N 4605/2710/30G, Henderson to Foreign Office, 07/04/1948.

Interdependence: a drug of addiction?

JAMES CABLE*

Interdependence is the convenient slogan commonly employed today to explain and justify Britain's external policies—economic, military and political—the euphemism that masks the reality of dependence and of the progressive, if still partial, surrender of British sovereignty.

The word can, of course, be given other meanings. One of them is an equilibrium in which, for any given state, the dependence of national decisions on foreign views is balanced by the dependence of foreign decisions on national views. An equilibrium, however, can only be distinguished from qualified independence, on the one hand, or qualified dependence, on the other, if the point of balance can be accurately determined. In the rough relativities of politics a concept so absolute and so imprecise as interdependence is as hard to establish in principle as it is to attain in practice. It is at best an aspiration (as in de Gaulle's proposal for an American–British–French directorate of the Alliance) and more often an excuse.[1]

Interdependence can also be regarded as describing one of the characteristics of international society. As Macaulay put it, in 1842:

> in order that he [Frederick the Great] might rob a neighbour whom he had promised to defend, black men fought on the coast of Coromandel, and red men scalped each other by the Great Lakes of North America.[2]

The significance of this interdependence, however, derives not from its objective nature, but from the differing responses of particular states. We are all individually dependent on electricity, but for some of us this is a luxury that operates the television set; for others it is so vital that we instal an emergency generator—if we can afford it; while some aged pensioners can neither pay the quarterly account nor change a bulb without assistance.

Dependence and independence are more useful concepts. Neither is ever absolute, but they provide the two ends of a scale which offers one way of comparing the nations of the world. Near the middle, of course, the gradations are often too small to be read with much precision or objectivity, but nobody would deny that the Soviet Union is more independent than Gibraltar. The test is perceived vulnerability to the external environment and the methods chosen for reducing that vulnerability. Neither is objectively determined. It could be argued, for instance, that the Soviet leaders perceive their country as more vulnerable than it really is. Their preference for self-reliance as the appropriate response is, however, matched by Switzerland, for whom even membership of the United Nations seems an unacceptable derogation from independence.

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1. As such it can be employed by both parties to a dependent relationship: 'for those who wish the United States to retain world leadership, interdependence has become part of the new rhetoric, to be used against economic nationalism at home and assertive challenges abroad'. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and interdependence* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), p. 7.

2. Thomas Babington Macaulay, *Frederick the Great* (London: Longman, Brown, Green & Longman, 1855), pp. 30–1.

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Naturally objective factors do influence any choice between the advantages ; constraints of external assistance on the one hand and the freedom and cost self-reliance on the other. The conventional wisdom, for instance, regards dependence so characteristic of Britain's postwar policies as an inevitable respo: to objectively established changes in the international environment. An alternat view, which this article seeks to explore, is that dependence, dignified with name of interdependence, was an option which Britain, together with some ot: countries, happened to prefer. There were strong arguments to support the choi but they were neither universally accepted nor everywhere carried to such extre conclusions.

France, for instance, does not rely on anyone else for her nuclear weapons; all foreign military bases on her territory; commit her forces to foreign command; ı to the International Monetary Fund for loans with strings; often conform decisions reached without her consent; or send her prime ministers and oppositi leaders to kiss hands in Washington on the occasion of their appointment.

France, admittedly, is now a richer country than Britain. Is this cause or effe The attraction of external assistance is that it reduces the need for domestic effc a therapeutic effect which may be indispensable if the effort in question is manifes impossible, but which can become habit-forming when it is not.

Britain's need for external assistance has naturally varied from one period, a one contingency, to another, but has tended to increase as fast as its strength relation to other countries has diminished. The root cause seems to have bı relative economic decline. That process began over a century ago. Some of reasons were external and obvious, such as the maturing industrialization countries with larger populations and greater natural resources. The internal reaso generally agreed to have been no less important, are more controversial. Scient principles suggest that preference should be accorded to those explanations f advanced as predictions rather than to retrospective analysis.

In 1870, for instance, Lyon Playfair warned the Philosophical Institution Edinburgh that 'this country is losing her position among manufactur nations—the industrial supremacy of England is endangered for lack of knowled in spite of the practical aptitudes of her people'.[3] He had profited from the grow importance of his public position to disseminate similar warnings ever since 1! and he continued to do so until his death in 1898. His words were not unheed but they evoked insufficient response from their complacent audience. In 18 after all, the British output of pig iron exceeded that of the rest of the world.[4] E then, however, steel was becoming more important and the following ra illustrate Britain's relative decline: United States, Germany, Britain (1880) 1 (1900) 10:6:5; (1913) 4:2:1.[5] What was even more important was that the technology industries (into which Britain might have diversified) were | increasingly developed abroad: chemicals, automotive propulsion, electricity, s tific instruments, new inventions. Playfair had all too much reason for his que (to the British Association for the Advancement of Science in 1885): 'how is it

3. Lyon Playfair, *Subjects of social welfare* (London: Cassell, 1889), p. 307. Lyon Playfair (181 a Scot, was Edinburgh Professor of Chemistry, a protégé of the Prince Consort, a constant gadl MP, a minister and ultimately a peer.

4. Sir Robert Ensor, *England 1870–1914* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1936), p. 106.

5. Ensor, p. 227; Andrew Shonfield, *British economic policy since the war* (Harmondsworth, M Penguin, 1958), p. 255.

we find whole branches of manufacture, when they depend on scientific knowledge, passing away from this country in which they originated, in order to engraft themselves abroad, although their decaying roots remain at home?'[6] In 1983 his question can still be asked and still awaits an answer, though Playfair had indicated his own in 1870: 'let me ask you seriously whether you think that this country can continue in a career of prosperity, when she is the only leading state in Europe that is neglecting the higher education of the working classes, and of those men above them whose duty it is to superintend their labour?'[7]

Playfair's prescription may have been incomplete—historians have retrospectively suggested additional remedies—but the accuracy of his prognosis has received a confirmation too melancholy to bear recapitulation.[8] Nor did he confine his view that 'the competition of the world has become a competition of intellect'[9] to the purely economic sphere. Although personally hostile to the very idea of war and even to defence expenditure, he attributed the outcome of the Franco-Prussian War to the fact that illiteracy in France was 28 per cent, but in Germany only 3 per cent. 'Knowledge is as important as valour in modern combats'.[10]

It would be going too far to argue that, from the final quarter of the last century, Britain had a real choice between a domestic process of drastic modernization and an external process of alleviating her difficulties through the acceptance of increasing dependence. Choices do not exist in practical politics unless those who have to make them clearly perceive the necessity, the nature, the extent and the feasibility of the choice. There was such a perception at much the same period in Japan. So there was, after 1917, in Russia. In both countries, however, only exceptional circumstances permitted so decisive a preference for social transformation. It would thus be unfair to judge British governments by such examples, not least because of the exorbitant cost in human suffering of Soviet independence. Moreover, for most of the twentieth century (the two world wars excepted) it was usually possible for British governments to take the comfortable view that Britain's problems were sectoral, transitional and of external origin and that they themselves were already doing as much as could reasonably be expected to solve them.

Between the Boer War and the Great War, for instance, the army and navy were extensively modernized, education was improved and certain social reforms initiated. Nothing was done about the economy (by 1902 Britain was importing steel), but this was not then accepted as a governmental responsibility and reforms in other fields encountered so much opposition as to suggest that more were politically impracticable. Only during the two world wars did widespread support exist for drastic change and even this was narrowly focussed on the immediate objective of military victory. Nor did Playfair's successors, any more than Playfair himself, usually advocate comprehensive reforms. They wanted changes unacceptable to the conventional wisdom, but they too tended to adopt a sectoral approach. Keynes, for instance, invited as chairman of an official committee in 1930, 'to review the present economic condition of Great Britain', came up with the short-term expedient of 'a revenue tariff . . . because it will give us a margin of resources and a

6. Playfair, p. 234.
7. Playfair, pp. 335–6.
8. See, for instance, the brilliant if profoundly depressing book by Corelli Barnett, *The collapse of British power* (London: Methuen, 1972).
9. Playfair, p. 141.
10. Playfair, p. 283.

breathing-space, under cover of which we can do other things.'[11] The revenue tariff was eventually adopted and proved beneficial, but the 'other things' (Keynes had written as early as 1919 of Britain's need for 'a new industrial birth')[12] were naturally not done.

Imposing a tariff or seeking a foreign loan may alleviate only the symptoms of disease, but do offer a 'quick fix'. Radical reform is usually open to the objection that its results will be slow to appear. Moreover, it often seems easier to persuade other governments to acquiesce in an executive decision or even to take one of their own, than it is to mobilize an entire people for new and socially disturbing exertions. Britain's increasing resort to external assistance for the solution of problems that, to the retrospective gaze, now appear as the progressive symptoms of domestic national decline, may have been regrettable, but it was always understandable.

The first step had the innocent, almost therapeutic character so familiar in the case histories of addiction: the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of 1902. There was a strong case for it: the four British battleships and sixteen cruisers on the China Station were not enough to maintain British interests in the Far East against a potential Franco-Russian combination in those waters of nine battleships and twenty cruisers. The Japanese alliance did not merely obviate the need for British reinforcements or for new docks at Hong Kong: it eventually permitted the withdrawal of those battleships to strengthen the fleet in home waters. Even the Kaiser, that harsh critic of British policy, conceded that 'at last the noodles have had a lucid interval'.[13] Naturally there was a price to pay, as various admirals and other awkward characters argued at the time: the British position in the Far East was henceforth dependent on Japanese goodwill and (after the victory of Tsushima in 1905) without any corresponding Japanese dependence on British goodwill. Britain's first experience of the drug had nevertheless been reassuring. The second Anglo-Japanese Alliance was concluded in 1905 and the third in 1911. The side-effects took another decade to reach a level then judged to be unacceptable.

It was under the influence of the initial euphoria that the various arrangements were made that led to British continental commitment in European war. This was a major departure from the British tradition of financing other people to do the fighting. Whether or not the process was avoidable, a point which will continue to be debated until the arrival of the Third World War, the outcome was profoundly damaging and revived a form of dependence unknown to Britain since the seventeenth century: on foreign, in this case American, economic assistance.

In the aftermath of the First World War Britain was confronted with a curious dilemma. Her two naval rivals were the United States and Japan; alliance with the first as insurance against war with the second was unattainable and the opposite combination seemed undesirable. Yet Britain could not match the formidable building programme threatened by the United States against—it was scarcely concealed—Britain herself. The Great War had proved as profitable to the United States as the Napoleonic Wars had to Britain and the economic ratio between the two countries was 3:1 in favour of America. The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 rescued Britain from an arms race, but at the price of conceding naval dominance

11. R. F. Harrod, *The life of John Maynard Keynes* (London: Macmillan, 1951), pp. 426–30.

12. John Maynard Keynes, *The economic consequences of the peace* (London: Macmillan, 1919), p. 238.

13. Ian H. Nish, *The Anglo-Japanese alliance* (London: Athlone, 1966), p. 221.

in the Far East to a Japan whose goodwill had to be sacrificed with the alliance that had proved so useful in the First World War. That was the worst kind of dependence, for British exposure to Japan was not compensated by even a promise of American support. But the alternative proposed in 1920 by Jellicoe (who regarded war with Japan as inevitable) was more than a declining British economy could support: a Far Eastern Fleet of eight battleships, eight battle-cruisers and four carriers. And nobody seems to have suggested abandoning such commitments as could no longer be defended.

Britain's economy continued to languish. The rejection in 1930 of the proposals put forward by Mosley (then a Labour Minister) for its regeneration through planned foreign trade, public direction of industry and credit-financed expansion was, as A. J. P. Taylor says, 'a decisive, though negative, event in British history'.[14] The natural sequel in 1931 was Britain's first peacetime acceptance of economic and political dependence. On 23 August Messrs J. P. Morgan & Co of New York informed the British government that American bankers would consent to rescue the pound provided that the political terms already tentatively accepted by a reluctant cabinet also 'had the sincere approval and support of the Bank of England and the City generally'.[15] The future still had similar humiliations in store for Britain, but this was the last occasion on which shame actually brought down a British government.

So far open dependence (for anyone reluctant to adopt a statistical approach to hypothetical questions) had been confined to periods of crisis. The turning point was the Second World War, not just because of the sheer extent and range of Britain's dependence on the United States, but because, for the first time, the British people were taught to regard such dependence as natural, lasting and even virtuous. Admittedly the Churchillian rhetoric was primarily intended for the Americans, but the idea was disseminated in Britain as widely as jeeps in the British army. 'Give us the tools, and we will finish the job'[16] was a fine phrase for public consumption, but Churchill knew as well as anyone else that a great deal more than Lend-Lease would be required before Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States could defeat a self-reliant Germany. She had, after all, drastically transformed her own economy and society for the specific purpose of war during those 'locust years' which Britain frittered away in self-deluding reliance on imperial preference, the League of Nations, collective security and the French army. It is unfortunate that those nations who pull themselves up by their own boot-straps so often do so from reprehensible motives, but need the Devil have all the best tunes?

By 1945 the British had come to take Lend-Lease so much for granted that they were genuinely shocked at its termination, resented the 'strings' attached to the subsequent American Loan and accepted Marshall Aid as no more than their due. Britain became, and has remained, a client of the United States.

What is a client state? In Britain's case it means, first, dependence on the United States for the management of the British economy. The extent of that dependence was most brutally illustrated in 1956, when the withdrawal of American goodwill resulted in a run on sterling, the refusal of assistance by the American-dominated IMF and the abandonment of Britain's Suez adventure (in which France had been

14. A. J. P. Taylor, *English history 1914–1945* (London: Pelican, 1970), p. 360.
15. Harold Nicolson, *King George V* (London: Constable, 1952), p. 463.
16. BBC radio broadcast, 9 February 1941.

willing to persist). The circumstances were then admittedly exceptional, but th loans and credit facilities (together with their political conditions) actually obtaine by Britain in 1957, 1961, 1967 and 1976 from the IMF were no less dependent o American goodwill. So was management of the British financial crises of 1964 an 1966 or the devaluation of 1967. In many of these instances much emphasis wa given at the time to multilateral cooperation in rescuing Britain from her temporar financial difficulties. Efforts were made to represent these transactions as no mor than the give and take inseparable from a universal and inevitable 'interdependence in international financial relations. From time to time examples were produced o British cooperation in smoothing out the transitional exchange problems of othe countries. It never happened, however, that Britain had a decisive voice in the gran of financial assistance to another important country; that she was able to impos political conditions (not even to prohibit the purchase of arms with British mone by Argentina in 1983); that the United States—or France, Germany, Japan or dozen other countries—were dependent on British goodwill. It was always a one sided relationship.

Part of the price was British deference towards American policies in general South-east Asia provides an interesting example. From 1954 onwards successiv British governments doubted, on different grounds and with varying degrees o conviction, the wisdom of the American adventure in Indo-China. Only Ede risked open, if limited, opposition at the Geneva Conference of 1954 and he pai for his temerity at Suez in 1956. The lesson was learnt and later British reservations even when fuelled by the strong feelings of the Labour Party between 1964 an 1970, never found more overt expression than the pinpricks, not even intended a such, of the futile Wilson 'initiatives'.

Meanwhile Britain was involved in a South-east Asian conflict of her own— Confrontation with Indonesia from 1963 to 1966. This eventually proved to be th most successful limited war anyone had fought since 1945—a three-year total o casualties less than that of one day's fighting in Vietnam or the whole of the muc briefer Falklands War. It also produced a peace settlement that has so far laste seventeen years. At the time, however, the American preference for appeasin Sukarno (then regarded in Washington as a potential anti-communist leader) wa vigorously pressed on the British government at every level. Even the author use to be telephoned at home before breakfast by the United States Embassy. That wa what interdependence meant in the 1960s.

Of course, Britain's dependence on the United States was qualified. Wherea Australia had to send troops to Vietnam and France could voice open disapprova of American policy, Britain occupied a middle position. In Vietnam she got awa with expressions of sympathy and gestures of non-military support. Malaysia wa encouraged to respond to American initiatives and to take part in futile negotiations but British troops continued their defence of Borneo. Such compromises are onl sensible in peripheral issues. It is when American policies impinge on vital Britis interests that the exertion of British influence in Washington needs to be uninhibited. Unfortunately this is a condition subject to more than economic constraints.

Since 1939 it has been not merely the management of Britain's economy, but it defence against external military challenge, that has depended on American goodwill. This military dependence has, to a considerable degree, been imposed by circum- stances beyond Britain's control: the emergence of the Soviet Union as an unfriendl superpower with resources that no British effort could have matched. Britain's onl

alternative to dependence on allies was the neutrality preferred by Sweden or Switzerland. This was not an option acceptable to British public opinion in the postwar era, nor were other allies of any value then available. Reliance on the United States was, therefore, initially almost inevitable. It has nevertheless proved so habit-forming that this dependence is now more extensive than was originally foreseen. The constraints it has imposed on Britain's policy and strategy, no less than on the structure, deployment and equipment of Britain's own forces, have actually reduced Britain's chances of responding effectively to certain kinds of threat below the level of total war.

For instance, British nuclear weapons offer a chance of excluding the British Isles from the nuclear battlefield in a territorially limited nuclear war, because the Soviet Union might hesitate to risk the loss of Moscow by bombarding Britain, if they expected the United States to respect the immunity of Soviet territory as long as the continental United States remained similarly inviolate. This chance, however, can only be diminished by the presence of American nuclear weapons, particularly those intended for limited war, in the British Isles. Deterrence demands an ability to reward abstention that is no less assured than the capacity to punish aggression. Without a British monopoly of nuclear weapons in the British Isles the British government can scarcely count on being considered in Moscow as *un interlocuteur valable*. Unfortunately, British dependence on the United States for ballistic missiles and other essential components of the British nuclear deterrent makes it difficult for Britain to exclude American nuclear weapons under American control or to close any of the sixty-four American military bases that make the British Isles such an obvious target for those Soviet missiles which cannot, in any case, cross the Atlantic.

France, having herself developed a truly independent deterrent, has no such inhibitions and can cheerfully support the deployment of American missiles anywhere outside France. Her chances of escaping the direct impact of territorially limited nuclear war are undiminished—and greater than Britain's. This too was predicted:

> Late in 1947, when it was suggested that Britain might rely on the United States for the maintenance of her nuclear striking force, Lord Tedder, Chief of the Air Staff, voiced a general feeling when he replied that this would involve a close military alliance with the United States in which Britain would be merely a temporary advance base, would involve complete subservience to United States policy and would render Britain completely impotent in negotiations with Russia or any other nation.[17]

Military dependence is most obvious in nuclear strategy, because the decision to launch American missiles or aircraft, wherever they are stationed, will inevitably be taken in Washington. No government, when faced by the mortal choice of nuclear war, can be expected to subordinate national interest to foreign wishes, whatever undertakings may previously have been given.[18] In 1973, for instance, in the course

17. Margaret Gowing, *Independence and deterrence: Britain and atomic energy 1945–1952. Vol. 1: policy making* (London: Macmillan, 1974), p. 185.

18. These undertakings, as described to parliament by Mr Heseltine on 1 February 1983, are not, in any case, of a particularly impressive character. President Truman reaffirmed in 1952 'the understanding that the use of these bases in an emergency would be a matter for joint decision of Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government in the light of circumstances at the time' (*The Times*, 2 February 1983).

of a dispute with the Soviet Union not involving the rest of NATO but concerning the Arab–Israeli War, United States forces throughout the world were placed on the alert (DEFCON III except for the Sixth Fleet, which went to DEFCON II, the highest grade short of war). According to American sources the three US Air Force strike bases and the Polaris submarine facility in Britain were placed on the alert before responsible British authorities were even informed, let alone consulted.[19] As long as there are American nuclear weapons in the British Isles, British survival will continue to depend on decisions taken in Washington, perhaps in the course of quarrels to which Britain is not a party.

Britain's other commitments to NATO are usually represented as no more than her share of an interdependence common to all the Allies. In fact, of course, some members of NATO are more equal than others. As Alliance strategy is ultimately dependent on an American threat to employ nuclear weapons, the United States have a power of veto, as well as a capacity for initiation, which is not generally shared. France is best placed to abstain from any conflict which, in her judgement, does not directly threaten French interests. Britain's dependence is perhaps the greatest of all, for she not only has foreign bases on her soil, but the bulk of her army and much of her air force in Germany. There may never be a crisis in which Britain wants to disengage from NATO, nor would this necessarily be in her interests, but she would undoubtedly find the process more difficult than would some of her allies.

It can, of course, be argued that any threat to any member of NATO must be a general threat, as dangerous to Britain as to anyone else; that such threats can only be deterred or resisted by a united Alliance; and that unity depends on locking all the members into a permanent framework of deployment and command as well as treaty obligation. In the somewhat masochistic language of the Ministry of Defence 'it is politically important that all allies should share the risks and burdens of providing for deterrence and defence'.[20] The assumption may be correct, but it is worth noting that nobody else is so deeply committed to the practical application of the British conclusion. Even the Germans deploy their forces only to defend their own soil.

In the terms of the conventional wisdom the defence of Britain is 'subsumed'—always a suspect verb—by the collective strategy of NATO. 'The direct defence of the United Kingdom base', for instance, 'is obviously vital' as 'a forward base for operations in the Atlantic, a main base for operations in the Channel and North Sea and a rear base for operations on the Continent'.[21] This curious conception of one's own country would be hard to match elsewhere in the world. Perhaps in East Germany?

The Falklands War may seem an exception to the general principle of British military dependence, but did not invalidate this concept. It would never have happened if the defence of British interests had not been subordinated to the requirements of NATO. Secondly, it could only be fought because the reduction of the Royal Navy to the 'small ASW force destined to protect the first European

19. Michael M. Harrison, *The reluctant ally: France and Atlantic security* (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), p. 179.

20. *Defence in the 1980s: Statement on the Defence Estimates 1980. Vol. 1* (London: HMSO, Cmnd 7826–1, 1980), p. 9.

21. *Defence in the 1980s*, p. 32.

resupply convoy',[22] which was how Sir John Nott seems to have interpreted the requirements of the American Supreme Commander, had not then been completed. Thirdly, the process had gone far enough to make the war a 'near-run thing' in which Britain might not have succeeded without the rather bare minimum of American goodwill which the operation actually enjoyed. Military action in support of British national interests—even for the maintenance of internal security in Northern Ireland—usually requires the diversion of forces committed to NATO and trained and equipped for the needs of the Alliance.

The conflicting requirements of national and collective purposes usually become obvious only in time of crisis. Then the forces of political dissent may be stimulated by the conditions of an IMF loan or by plans for the installation of new American missiles. What is more important is the intellectual conditioning which forty years of dependence have imposed on successive generations of British politicians, military leaders, officials and the entire establishment, many academics included. During the Spanish Civil War, when Britain was still a great power, one Spanish captain related how often his confrontations with the Royal Navy brought tears of rage to his eyes and how he nevertheless had to tell his officers: 'we must be prudent, we cannot worsen our relations with England'.[23] He has had his revenge. Whitehall and Westminster have long been dominated, to an extent that has to be experienced to be appreciated, by the primacy of good relations with the United States.

This 'special', 'natural', 'close' (there are fashions in adjectives) relationship is unequal. The United States are not dependent on Britain. Naturally it is convenient to have bases and facilities without tiresome strings. A second fiddle can often usefully enhance the harmony of the American theme. There are advantages to the United States worth their cost, as there are for the Soviet Union in keeping Cuba afloat. Prudential considerations are reinforced by custom, tradition, the ties of a common language and cultural history. The influence of association, on a footing of notional equality, during the Second World War is not quite dead. Britain may now seem less important in Washington than Germany or Japan or even that awkward customer, France, but she still gets more consideration than, strictly speaking, she deserves. So, in Moscow, does Finland, who shows greater deference than Britain, but makes fewer material concessions.

British dependence is real, but is it also desirable or even inevitable? There can be no undisputed answer to these questions. In 1945 opponents of the American Loan denounced its acceptance as 'an economic Munich', to which Keynes retorted that the alternative was 'starvation corner'. Today's advocates of greater economic independence are accused of proposing a 'siege economy'. At any given moment there is a choice, even if this is not always perceived as such, between the immediate benefits of foreign goodwill and its ultimate cost. Moreover, this choice is always complicated by political and sentimental considerations of a different kind from what some regard as the strictly economic or military arguments.

For instance, many of today's British supporters of autarky are much influenced by their anxiety to introduce or, in some cases, to resist certain social changes in Britain. It is partly because they expect their internal measures to lead to the loss of foreign confidence and goodwill that they want, so far as possible, to free the

22. Captain John O. Coote RN, 'Send her victorious' in *Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute*, January 1983, p. 40.
23. James Cable, *The Royal Navy and the siege of Bilbao* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 180.

British economy from foreign constraints and to insulate it against international repercussions. Their opponents, on the other hand, are not only more impressed by the strength of these constraints and by British vulnerability to repercussions: they also regard the existence of constraints and the danger of repercussions as buttressing the kind of social structure and domestic political orientation they prefer for Britain. The old-fashioned patriots who resent British dependence on foreigners are balanced by those representatives of a more recent conventional wisdom, who deprecate nationalism and see dependence as leading to the ideal of interdependence and the greatest good of the greatest number. Neither those who consider dependence undesirable nor those who accept it as inevitable are always actuated solely, or even mainly, by anxiety to strengthen Britain's international position.

Confusion is further compounded by the interaction of economic and military arguments cutting across the natural division between nationalists and internationalists. Some of the former would be glad to see Britain out of the European Community and paddling her own commercial canoe, if they did not fear that this would lead to withdrawal from NATO, to neutralism and eventually to People's Democracy. Some of the latter regard the nuclear strategy of NATO as exposing Britain to needless danger and to involvement in conflicts unrelated to her own survival, yet see Community membership as so vital for Britain's future that concessions may have to be made to the strategic views of its more important members. There is, at present, no important political support for the idea that Britain should be able both to operate her own economy and society as she wishes and also to attempt her own defence, let alone for the drastic internal changes such objectives might require. Perhaps (the point will be further considered) this is an impossible ideal, but the absence of a comprehensive strategy is worth noting—and not only by advocates of independence. Even a genuinely internationalist course would require an integrated approach to economic, military, political and social problems not now reflected in the spectrum of British party conflict.

Compromise is as traditionally British as its results are historically unsatisfactory, but compromise there is obviously going to be. How might it be slanted? It would clearly be unrealistic, in view of the present fragmentation of British political attitudes, to expect much support for arguments that dependence was intrinsically either desirable or undesirable. Dependence can only be judged by its contribution, whether positive or negative, to some objective generally accepted as possessing overriding importance. The obvious candidate is the survival of the British people.

Survival is not exposed to any direct economic threat in the time-scale of politicians and their voters. Even if 'it is inevitable that the decline of British economic power will continue unabated',[24] it will long be possible to argue that decline as a nation compared to other nations, even absolute decline over five or ten years, masks actual improvement in the living standards of the British people compared to those of their parents and grandparents. The efforts of economists to sound a tocsin have fallen on deaf ears and are unlikely to command a popular audience in the foreseeable future.

The threat of war is quite another matter. This already arouses sufficient apprehension to constitute a significant factor in British politics. It is a threat which could become immediate at very short notice. If it did, as Magnus Clarke argues

24. M. W. Kirby, *The decline of British economic power since 1870* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), p. 136.

convincingly in *The nuclear destruction of Britain*, the survival of the British people would be at risk and, in some circumstances, improbable.[25] There is thus a strong case for holding that dependence is desirable for Britain if it reduces the threat of war, undesirable if it increases that threat.

In principle, of course, it can do either; in practice, the problem is to select the most advantageous position on the sliding scale between the dependence that helps to deter some threats and the independence that helps to escape exposure to others. This demands a difficult and uncertain judgement of the likely nature of the threat. It can be argued, for instance, that any war threatening the survival of the British people would necessarily be total and general. If that assumption is correct, it does not matter that dependence on the United States has made the British Isles a more obvious target for attack and largely transferred to Washington what might otherwise have been a British choice between accepting national destruction and making concessions. Nobody in the northern hemisphere would escape the consequences of total and general war, so Britain's only hope is that the retaliatory power of the United States will deter the Soviet Union from initiating holocaust. Similar conclusions could be drawn from the assumption that Britain is so natural a focus of Soviet hostility that only the fear of American retaliation has prevented the Soviet Union from exercising her undoubted capacity to destroy the British Isles.

These are somewhat improbable assumptions. So is the opposite view that Britain would be immune from all risk of destruction or coercion if she adopted the neutrality preferred by Austria, Finland, Sweden or Switzerland. The British people lack the disciplined self-effacement needed for genuine neutrality and Britain, even in decline, is still too important a country for her alignment to escape the interest and competing pressures of both superpowers and the resentment, even the active resentment, of one or other of them.

Between these extremes a third view is more plausible. The history of the last thirty-seven years suggests that limited war and coercive diplomacy are more likely threats than total and general war. Britain is perhaps over-committed to deterrence of the gravest but least likely threat, under-insured against lesser but more probable contingencies. Dependence is not a serious handicap for the former, but it is for the latter and for reasons that are two sides of the same coin: dependence could suck Britain into limited American quarrels that would not otherwise concern her, yet restrict British freedom of manoeuvre in those quarrels which did not engage the full power of the United States. Switzerland, for instance, has preserved as much freedom as anyone can to avoid involvement in the quarrels of others, but has taken active steps to reduce their repercussions on herself. Swiss precautions against nuclear fall-out are greatly superior to British.

For Britain, however, a better example is France, who has paid a smaller premium for the deterrence of total war and preserved her right of choice in limited war. The appropriate British compromise would be: no foreign bases in the British Isles; a limited but independent nuclear deterrent; an improved capacity for the conventional defence of the British Isles and Narrow Seas; a contingent, predominantly maritime and not irrevocable commitment to NATO. In the game of international poker Britain needs to be able to raise the ante to significant levels, but can expect no profit from a permanent commitment to the maximum stake.

25. Magnus Clarke, *The nuclear destruction of Britain* (London, Canberra: Croom Helm, 1982), passim.

Could this be done? It was certainly once possible, as Britain demonstrated by her reaction to the McMahon Act of 1946, by which the United States repudiated its wartime agreements and prohibited the exchange of atomic information with Britain. Not only did Britain then proceed to the independent development of nuclear weapons, but she became the first country in the world to use nuclear power to generate electricity for public consumption. Indeed, the postwar decade in Britain was remarkable for its initiative and innovation. Seeds of many kinds were sown for a national renaissance which never came to full fruition; perhaps this was because dependence on the United States continued unabated in other fields. It is tempting to regard the Suez fiasco of 1956 as the turning point in Britain's destiny, for Britain and France were to draw opposite conclusions from that humiliating experience: Britain that she could no longer afford the assertion of independence; France that she must create the basis for it. In 1958, for instance, the French prime minister, the travails of the Fourth Republic notwithstanding, signed the order for the independent production of a French atomic bomb, while de Gaulle's latest biographer describes the humiliation of Suez as helping to create the conditions for the General's later return to power.[26] The British prime minister, on the other hand, agreed in 1957 to the installation in East Anglia of American THOR missiles, and in 1958 the repeal of the McMahon Act enabled Britain to resume nuclear dependence on the United States.

In the light of subsequent French achievements, at home and abroad, economic as well as military, it is difficult to argue that it was economically impossible for Britain to pursue a more independent policy after Suez. In 1957, after all, Britain's gross national product was 50 per cent greater than that of France. Dependence was a British choice, a political preference.

It would be foolish to suggest only one cause for so complex a phenomenon, but it is reasonable to put much of the blame on the addiction to dependence acquired by Britain's rulers—and by the whole of that numerous class of young administrators, civil and military, who would later become rulers or advisers to rulers—during the Second World War. The ability to retain American goodwill was then and thereafter often a condition for promotion. French experience was different, thanks to General de Gaulle, who always asserted French independence in the face of greater obstacles and without regard to the fury of his more powerful and indispensable allies. His example was not forgotten even amid the divisions and dependence of the Fourth Republic and it was entrenched for his successors by what he achieved for France after his return to power. 'President Mitterrand's Socialist government is adhering to the main lines of de Gaulle's foreign and defence policies. The basis of them is national independence'.[27]

Can the British leopard now change its dependent spots? So far the only serious attempt has been to replace dependence on the United States by dependence on Europe. People forget—indeed many of them now wish to—how far-reaching were some of the ideas considered in British political and official circles a dozen years ago: European political union, European defence cooperation, a common foreign policy, Anglo-French nuclear collaboration. Behind them all lay the hope that Britain could recover, as a leading member of a united Europe, some of the relative power, prosperity and influence she had lost as an American client. Little progress

26. Bernard Ledwidge, *De Gaulle* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982), p. 227.
27. Ledwidge, p. 383.

was made in these directions even under the initially optimistic Heath administration. The high water mark (not a spring tide) was perhaps the lead taken by Britain in stimulating resistance to the hegemony sought by Kissinger in his notorious Year of Europe in 1973. Enthusiasts in Britain hoped for more than Europeans were ready for, but the American-oriented British bureaucracy imposed a constant check on even such progress as might have been possible. Their resistance was greatly strengthened in 1974 by the return of a Labour government suspicious of Europe and preferring reliance on the United States. All that remained was the hope that membership of the European Community would somehow revive the British economy as—so it was suggested—it had revived those of Britain's European competitors.

Whether European success was due to association or to national effort is a question too complex and controversial for discussion here. The former theory, however, was assumed to be correct, applicable to Britain and made the subject of a prediction duly falsified by experience. In 1971 the British government of the day declared that 'membership of the enlarged Community will lead to much improved efficiency and productivity in British industry, with a higher rate of investment and a faster growth of real wages'.[28] The following table shows roughly what happened.[29]

Table 1

Output, investment and income 1960–80

	1960	1970	% increase 1960–70	1980	% increase 1970–80
Output per person employed (1975 = 100)	74	94·2	27	108·7	15
Gross domestic fixed capital formation £m 1975 prices	11905	19460	62	20761	6
Real personal disposable income £m 1975 prices	11488	15313	33	20891	36

It may well be argued that this comparison, quite apart from any statistical fallacies it may embody, is not a fair test because it takes no account of the world depression that developed between 1970 and 1980. On this point the verdict of foreign experts is instructive.

> There were three seismic shocks to the world economy: the breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system from 1971 to 1973; the explosive rise of world prices of raw materials from 1972 to 1974; and the oil crisis in 1973–74. Very likely the deterioration in Britain's economic performance is related to these external shocks. As already noted, all industrial countries were adversely affected, but the United Kingdom more so than the others. Why? It was not

28. *The United Kingdom and the European Communities* (London: HMSO, Cmnd 4715, July 1971), para. 56.

29. Compiled from the relevant tables in *Economic trends—annual supplement 1982* (London: HMSO for Central Statistical Office, 1982).

just the occurrence of shocks but British reaction to them that seemed to matter.[30]

This brings us back to our starting-point: the significance of interdependence does not derive from its objective nature, but from the differing responses of particular states. British responses to the challenges, whether economic or military, of the external environment have been more dependent than those of other states. They have also been less successful. Britain has, for twenty years, fared worse, by every economic test, than France, West Germany and Japan, the last being the outstanding example of the independent pursuit of economic success by a country needing to import most of its energy and raw materials. Those smaller European countries which avoided economic dependence—Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland—have long enjoyed higher per capita incomes. Germany and Japan, admittedly, have for years been militarily dependent, but Germany, at least, may claim to gain more than she gives. Montgomery's boast, in 1948, 'at last we had achieved that for which I had been fighting—a decision that in the event of war the British Army would fight on the Continent of Europe'[31] may, thirty-five years later, strike some of his countrymen as a more doubtful benefit.

The economic and military history of nations in any way comparable to Britain exhibits considerable and idiosyncratic differences, but there is little evidence to support any general rule that the acceptance of interdependence, even in the most euphemistic sense of the term, is more rewarding than national exertion animated by national purpose. This proposition, so cautiously advanced for other nations, may be more confidently asserted of the British. It is not merely that their fortunes have declined in step with their acceptance of dependence: this could be considered a chicken and egg argument. British exertions have also been proportional to the national character of their endeavour. Their finest hour was in the summer of 1940 and the British have never since been so united or so ardent. Even the Falklands episode of 1982—though war is repugnant and that war was peculiarly unnecessary—brought a pale reflection of the same spirit. The British like to do their own thing.

They have been offered few opportunities in recent years. NATO and the EEC are little less alien and uninspiring to the British than the IMF or GATT. If there is to be a British recovery in international terms, this will have to start at home and be fuelled by a sense of national purpose animated by a leadership perceived as specifically British.

It is not obvious who could provide that leadership. More than one British politician would dearly like to stage a return from Colombey les deux Eglises, but freedom from foreign allegiances and the support of an organized party do not seem to go together. Nobody could achieve full success without a comprehensive programme for drastic domestic change and a Gaullist readiness to run risks abroad. Any realistic prediction[32] must be that the British will continue to accept the

30. Richard E. Caves and Lawrence B. Krause, *Britain's economic performance* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1980), p. 11.

31. Field Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, *Memoirs* (London: Collins, 1958), p. 505.

32. The addiction, if this is not too strong a word, of this article to the outcome of predictions as the test of argument should not be construed as unreserved endorsement of the scientific approach to political problems. This has pitfalls which even Lyon Playfair did not escape, as in his comment on the great Irish famine of 1847–8: 'As the population lessened, the production of potatoes per acre decreased . . . The reason for the decline is curious . . . the best manure for any crop is the refuse of the animal

supplementary benefits, and accompanying servitudes, of interdependence rather than launch themselves into the adventure of independence.

It is, of course, possible to envisage a more modest reduction in dependence through the adoption of a deliberately national approach to the conduct of Britain's external relations. The multiplier effect this can have is well illustrated by the example of France. It was the style imposed by General de Gaulle in 1940 which made that country what it is today. The deference which dependence has bred in British governments has increased their dependence. A quarter of a century ago, for instance, Mr Macmillan ensured that American missiles in East Anglia were equipped with the dual-key system for which Mrs Thatcher is now reluctant even to ask.

Nevertheless, before ministers are seduced by the idea of exploiting Britain's nuisance value and relying on the doctrine of '*l'intendance suivra*', they should reflect on another essential ingredient of French success. This was consistency of purpose and uniformity of approach. Intransigence over milk makes little impact when combined with acquiescence on missiles. Style is more important than is understood in Britain, but it must reflect rather than replace policy. It must also at least be followed by concrete measures.

Apprehension about the prospects of national survival and disillusionment with external economic palliatives may conceivably provide a political base for a new leadership to impart a different slant to compromise. The chances of success are slender, for the time has clearly not yet come for heroic remedies, but both leaders and led will deceive themselves if they imagine that Britain's addiction to dependence can even be controlled, let alone reduced, without experiencing some of the unpleasant side-effects of withdrawal.

which lives upon it . . . when the people emigrated they took their manurial value with them, and the diminished population did not supply sufficient manure for the crops'. Thomas Wemyss Reid, ed.: *Memoirs and correspondence of Lyon Playfair* (Jemimaville: P. M. Pollack Science Reprints, 1976), p. 100.

Some reflections on the Sino-Vietnamese conflict over Kampuchea

PAO-MIN CHANG*

The conflict between China and Vietnam over Kampuchea reflects, in essence, two divergent patterns of relationship between Kampuchea and its two communist neighbours that have been wrought by geography and history. The resulting differences in perception and policy were reinforced by a profound sense of mistrust between Kampuchea and Vietnam and between Vietnam and China after 1975 as a result of the changing political situation in Indochina. What had been an old problem of security and survival for Kampuchea alone therefore assumed a new magnitude out of proportion to its original significance. The armed conflict in Kampuchea in fact soon became an index, if not also a function, of Sino-Soviet rivalry. By virtue of its political and security ramifications, it also quickly came to entangle other countries in South-east Asia, both diplomatically and militarily. Precisely because of the growing complexity of the Kampuchean issue and its long-term implications, the conflict is no nearer to solution today than it was four years ago, and the shock waves it has generated continue to reverberate throughout the entire region.

At the centre of the Sino-Vietnamese conflict lies a fundamental clash between two sets of outlooks and goals. Geographically and historically detached from Kampuchea, China has traditionally viewed it with a degree of apparent indifference and a sense of detachment. With a distinct political and cultural identity of its own, and having evolved as an independent nation after 1954, Kampuchea from the Chinese point of view should at least be entitled to a status equal to the other two Indochinese states. This basic approach of supporting Kampuchea as a separate, independent entity, which has been the cornerstone of Beijing's Kampuchea policy, was cemented by a relatively long-standing friendship developed over the last twenty-five years between Beijing and Phnom Penh. Throughout the alliance, Beijing by and large played the role of a benevolent bigger brother and never assumed a domineering posture in its dealings with Kampuchea. In fact, China was both unable and reluctant to exert a measure of influence on Kampuchea greater than that which Phnom Penh had actually solicited. Clearly aware of the limits of its own power, Beijing from time to time even displayed a conspicuous degree of aloofness from Kampuchea's often openly pro-China leadership and policies, and was apparently quite satisfied with a non-communist but neutral regime in Phnom Penh. Indeed, in a region which has generally been hostile to Beijing, a Kampuchea free from foreign domination though not necessarily subordinate to Beijing serves China's interests adequately. Hence China's consistent and even enthusiastic vocal support for the independence, neutrality and territorial integrity of Kampuchea, and its unfailing backing for the intractable Prince Sihanouk as its leader even after 1975.

Vietnam's perceptions of and goals in Kampuchea, however, have represented a sharp contrast to China's. If Kampuchea was until recent decades peripheral to

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China's vital interests, it has always been an immediate and paramount concern of Vietnam, not only because the two countries share common borders but also because historically Kampuchea was the only potential source of threat to the security of Vietnam other than China. By virtue of its clearly superior power and status among the three Indochinese nations, with a historical relationship of suzerainty over Phnom Penh, and having repeatedly intervened in Kampuchean affairs since the fifteenth century, Vietnam has considered it a matter of course to enjoy a special status in its relationship with Kampuchea and to expect a Khmer regime more or less amenable to her wishes. This basically paternalistic attitude of Vietnam towards its smaller neighbour has been reinforced by Hanoi's undisputed leadership and almost total domination of the prolonged struggle of the Indochinese communist movement, including the crucial years of 1970–5. It has also been clearly shown in Hanoi's apparent lack of enthusiasm before 1970 to commit itself to the territorial integrity and political independence of Kampuchea, and in its constantly recurring references to the 'militant solidarity and fraternal friendship' between Vietnam and Kampuchea since then. The demand for a Kampuchea at least friendly, if not also closely allied to Vietnam became all the greater after 1975 precisely because of their far from amicable relationship during the 1950s and 1960s. Indeed, in view of this recent history of enmity between the two nations, a completely independent Kampuchea from Hanoi's perspective is all but synonymous with a hostile neighbour and could only constitute a constant irritant and source of trouble. Therefore, whereas China is willing to tolerate a neutral but not necessarily pro-China Kampuchea, Vietnam's peace of mind could not be guaranteed by anything less than a special relationship with Kampuchea.

Vietnam's insistence on a friendly Kampuchea, however, is certainly compatible with China's desire for an independent and neutral Kampuchea. Prior to 1978 at least, Beijing had neither the intention nor the capacity to turn Kampuchea into a forward base against Vietnam. Nor did the Vietnamese quest for a special relationship with Kampuchea necessarily entail an overt Vietnamese occupation before the autumn of 1978. Indeed, judging from the disparity in population and power between the two countries and the pervasive influence Vietnam had developed within Kampuchea during the war years, it should not have been difficult for Hanoi to assume a degree of political control over Kampuchea similar to that which it had achieved in Laos. However, the emergence of an ultra-nationalistic and vehemently anti-Vietnamese new Khmer regime after 1975 upset whatever plans Vietnam might have had for Kampuchea by destroying the delicate balance between the three communist nations maintained since 1970. Precisely because of the dominant role Vietnam had played in Kampuchea during the war, coupled with its openly overbearing attitude towards Kampuchea, the new Khmer leaders saw the persisting Vietnamese influence in Kampuchea as an immediate threat to their country's security and a close relationship with Hanoi as only a prelude to eventual Vietnamese domination. In order to keep Vietnam at bay, it became necessary not only to carry out extensive purges within all sectors of Kampuchea's power structure and to expel Vietnamese nationals *en masse*, but also to adopt a deliberately hostile policy towards Hanoi.

Such anti-Vietnamese measures, however, were simply unacceptable to Hanoi. Coming immediately after a victory that could not have been won without Vietnamese assistance, they were viewed by Hanoi as a clear and unforgivable manifestation of sheer ingratitude. They certainly dashed all Vietnam's hopes for a

Kampuchea responsive to Hanoi's overtures and wishes. To the extent that the new Khmer regime openly aspired to regain control of territories in the Mekong River delta which had long been ceded to Vietnam and was actually responsible for many of the border incidents during 1975–7, the Kampuchean regime was not merely an irritant to Vietnam but had become a real threat to her stability and integrity. In the face of the growing hostility of Kampuchea, the task of bringing about a friendly regime in Phnom Penh became all the more urgent. As repeated initiatives made with a view to changing Phnom Penh's policy failed to strike a responsive chord and the long-standing territorial dispute was being exacerbated by Kampuchea's ultra-nationalistic zeal, Hanoi had to step up its military and political pressures in the course of 1977 as the only alternative to attain its goals in Kampuchea.

What ensued was a chain reaction which gradually embroiled all the nations in the region and steadily magnified the significance of the Kampuchean–Vietnamese conflict. Although Vietnam's decision to get tough with Kampuchea in 1977 was probably at that stage not directed against China, it inevitably had the effect of driving Phnom Penh closer to Beijing and also alarming the latter as to Hanoi's intentions. Kampuchea, having been so jealous of its newly won political independence as to adopt an isolationist policy even towards China during 1975–6, apparently began to realize by early 1977 the mounting cost of the confrontation with Vietnam and, as in the past, turned once again to Beijing as the only major power able and willing to provide assistance. For its part, China, clearly aware of the traditional fears Kampuchea had of Vietnam and having served as the principal ally of the country for twenty years, considered it only natural to persist in its established policy of buttressing the economic and military bases of Kampuchea. Moreover, by late 1977 the situation along the Vietnam–Kampuchea border was such as to identify Vietnam clearly as the aggressor. Hence the escalation of Chinese military aid and a growing Chinese presence in Kampuchea in the course of 1978, which would not have been possible without the initiatives of an otherwise fanatically independent-minded regime in Phnom Penh. Nevertheless, the material support China was rendering Kampuchea during 1975–8 and particularly after 1977 did not signify a real change in China's Kampuchea policy or an increase in its ability to control events in the region. If the overt neutrality China had attempted to maintain up to the end of 1977 had not sufficiently revealed its reluctance to intervene directly in a situation largely beyond its control, its repeated hints throughout the second half of 1978 on the limited extent to which it would go to help Kampuchea, as well as the pessimism it openly expressed about the regime's future, should have clearly indicated the degree of aloofness, or rather powerlessness, on the part of China with respect to the Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict. Beijing apparently believed that a combination of open diplomatic commitment and material assistance to Phnom Penh should be sufficient to deter Vietnam from any rash action against Kampuchea, thereby preserving the independent status of the latter.

However, China's calculations turned out to be too optimistic. Although Phnom Penh's anti-Vietnamese stance was neither attributable to Chinese instigation nor necessarily supported by Beijing, and China's military aid to Kampuchea was at most limited in quantity and aimed only at strengthening the defence of Kampuchea, the very fact that China after 1975 continued to stand behind a regime intensively hostile to Vietnam and openly sided with Phnom Penh in late 1977 when Kampuchean–Vietnamese relations were rapidly deteriorating was unmistakable proof to Hanoi of collusion between Beijing and Phnom Penh against Vietnam. Indeed, as

Vietnam saw it, Phnom Penh could not have dared to turn against Vietnam so violently and suddenly without Chinese encouragement and support. A Kampuchea hostile to Vietnam was unacceptable though still manageable; a Khmer regime openly backed up by Beijing in its anti-Vietnamese policies was a serious challenge to Hanoi's security and therefore could only represent a sinister scheme to sabotage Vietnam's long-term goals in Indochina. When Phnom Penh intensified the border fighting in 1978, apparently as a result of Chinese assurances of support, the threat posed to Vietnam by the Sino–Kampuchean alliance became an overwhelming one. This is why Vietnam has vehemently and repeatedly accused China of seeking to divide and dominate Indochina. Also, as any determined move against Kampuchea necessarily required a condemnation of China, too, so it became necessary for Vietnam to request an increased Soviet presence. From then on, what had been originally a localized border war between Kampuchea and Vietnam was transformed into a contest between China and the Soviet Union for pre-eminence in Indochina.

Whether or not the Soviet–Vietnamese Treaty of Alliance of November 1978 had been entirely a product of Vietnamese initiatives, its conclusion following extensive Soviet military assistance throughout the year clearly removed whatever constraints Vietnam might have had in dealing with Kampuchea. As Hanoi's repeated attempts at replacing the Khmer regime with one more amenable to its wishes had all failed and there was no prospect for an early victory in the border war, a swift military takeover of the entire country became the most enticing, though not the only alternative for Hanoi to attain its objectives in Kampuchea once and for all. In moving into Kampuchea, Vietnam had certainly anticipated China's strong condemnation. However, Beijing's proven inefficacy in the other areas of dispute with Hanoi, plus its openly expressed reluctance to commit itself fully to the defence of Kampuchea in late 1978, must have convinced Hanoi that only a limited risk was involved in putting its plans into effect. In view of its far superior military strength and the short distance between Phnom Penh and the Vietnamese border, Vietnam also believed that the military operation would be a very brief one, with token resistance from the Kampucheans and entailing minimal cost to itself. Once a *fait accompli* had been achieved, China would have no choice but to acquiesce in the new situation in Kampuchea. Hence the confident posture which Vietnam assumed when launching the invasion and the haste with which Hanoi formalized its special ties with Kampuchea following the capture of Phnom Penh.

However, on both counts, the Vietnamese had clearly miscalculated. Not only did the Khmer Rouge put up a stubborn resistance by adopting the very guerrilla tactics Vietnam had used successfully against the United States, thereby prolonging the military conflict, but also China intervened on a totally unexpected scale. In fact, Hanoi's invasion of Kampuchea constituted the turning point in Beijing's Vietnam policy, which hardened conspicuously after December 1978. Occurring after the drawn-out territorial dispute and the mass exodus of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam, this Vietnamese adventure represented the culmination of a long series of unfriendly acts against China, and also supplied the ultimate rationale for Hanoi's anti-China stance and activities. With 200,000 Chinese refugees already in China and a steadily deteriorating situation along the Sino–Vietnamese border, an act of open aggression against a declared Chinese ally could only reflect insatiable Vietnamese ambitions that had to be arrested at some point and by someone; the flagrant manner in which Vietnam entered and occupied Kampuchea made the humiliation to China all the more intolerable. The result of Vietnam's action was

also such that any measure less extreme than direct reciprocation could not have demonstrated effectively China's protest over Hanoi's policy in general and its actions in Kampuchea in particular. Indeed, in launching its own invasion of Vietnam, Beijing did not seek so much to fulfil its pledges to Kampuchea as to penalize Vietnam for its wilfulness and arrogance; not so much to rescue Kampuchea from Vietnam's conquest, which was after all probably beyond China's power, as to restore China's own position in a hitherto losing battle with Vietnam. Only in this context does the bitter and strongly didactic tone of China's accusations make some sense to lay ears.

However, China's armed intervention was not merely a reaction to an accumulation of its own grievances against Vietnam and the situation in Kampuchea. It also served the larger purpose of meeting the more serious Soviet challenge the Vietnamese adventure was believed to have symbolized. It was this greater menace that actually pushed China over the brink into war. Although the steady Vietnamese tilt towards the Soviet Union after 1975 did not necessarily represent a deliberate anti-Chinese policy, Beijing could not have viewed it as anything other than an ominous sign of growing Soviet penetration on China's southern flank. To the extent that Moscow did side openly with Hanoi on all the bilateral issues of dispute between Vietnam and China as early as 1975, China saw in Vietnam's increasing hostility towards itself an unmistakable Soviet hand. With massive amounts of Soviet military hardware pouring in, Vietnam was emboldened in its quarrel with China. The conclusion of the Soviet–Vietnamese Treaty which formalized the Moscow–Hanoi alliance against Beijing only confirmed China's worst fears and further alarmed it as to the degree of Soviet influence in Indochina. From Beijing's point of view, Hanoi would certainly not have committed an open act of invasion against Kampuchea without Soviet sanction. Viewed in this light, the Vietnamese invasion was not merely an aggression against a smaller neighbour, but also a calculated joint Soviet–Vietnamese undertaking to contain and encircle China in South-east Asia. Hence the vehement Chinese charges of Soviet–Vietnamese collusion in pursuit of their hegemonistic designs. The extent of Soviet involvement in the Vietnam–Kampuchea conflict was such that China felt more obliged to support Phnom Penh and more justified in toughening its stance towards Hanoi. In restraining Vietnamese hegemonism, China believed that it was not only checking the regional ambitions of a smaller state, but also containing the global threat of a superpower. Indeed, the degree of preparedness on China's part to cope with the contingency of a full-scale war with the Soviet Union during the 1979 border war could not have been made merely for the purpose of resurrecting the Pol Pot regime.[1] And Chinese leaders after the war were frank enough to admit that 'a lesson for Vietnam is also a lesson for the Soviet Union'.[2]

The Chinese invasion, however, did not render the conflict over Kampuchea more amenable to settlement, but rather perpetuated the Vietnamese military occupation by providing it with both a pretext and a real reason for remaining in

1. To counter a possible Soviet attack, China in early February 1979 put her troops along the Sino–Soviet border on an emergency war footing, set up a new military command in the remote Xingjiang Region, and evacuated 300,000 civilians from the exposed areas along the border. *The Straits Times*, 6 February 1979, p. 28; 22 February 1979, pp. 1, 26. Deng Xiaoping said openly in late February that China was prepared for a possible war with the Soviet Union. *The Straits Times*, 28 February 1979, p. 1. See also *The New York Times*, 12 February 1979, p. 7.

2. *The Straits Times*, 6 March 1979, p. 1.

Kampuchea. If the belligerent position China had earlier taken on the territorial dispute and the ethnic crisis was at least expected and understandable—as these issues directly affected China's sovereignty and territorial integrity—Beijing's military intervention in support of Kampuchea, a country somewhat off the bounds of China's sphere of influence, was from Hanoi's point of view unwarranted and presumptuous. That China should have launched a large-scale war against Vietnam, not as a result of the territorial dispute, nor following the refugee crisis, but only after the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, could not but reflect China's own hegemonistic designs against Vietnam in particular and her ulterior motives in the region in general. Indeed, had it not been for China's material support, the Khmer Rouge would not have continued to survive the massive Vietnamese onslaught. By consistently obstructing the pursuit of what was viewed as legitimate Vietnamese interests, China in the eyes of Hanoi thus constituted not only the greatest threat to Vietnam itself, but also the major source of instability in the entire region. It is thus no wonder that Hanoi has repeatedly declared that the purpose of its intervention in Kampuchea was to counter the Chinese threat, and also made the withdrawal of its troops conditional upon the removal of such a threat. China having decided to stay in the war, Vietnam has found it all the more necessary to persist in its policy of occupation. In doing so, Hanoi seeks not only to ensure a Kampuchea subservient to Vietnam but also to put a permanent end to the interference of large powers in Indochinese affairs.

The conflict between China and Vietnam over perceptions of and goals in Kampuchea is also reflected in the different strategies and postures they have adopted since the 1979 war. Since Hanoi sees Kampuchea as an integral part of the larger entity of Indochina and its own military intervention as ordained by history, once in there Hanoi considers the entire issue closed. This is why Hanoi has been so adamant in insisting that there is no Kampuchean question and in refusing to participate in any international conference or forum to discuss Kampuchea. By the same token, Hanoi has persistently urged other countries to abide by the principles of non-aggression and non-interference with respect to Kampuchea. Already in control of the country, Hanoi sees no need to make any concessions to anyone. Hence its repeated and blatant assertion of the irreversible nature of the Kampuchean situation. Convinced that the Khmer Rouge could not turn the tide militarily even with all the help it could get from outside sources, and that time is on the Vietnamese side politically, Hanoi has in fact rejected outright any political settlement that falls short of full recognition of the status quo. Even when Vietnam found it necessary to take the initiative in selling the Heng Samrin regime to the international community after 1980, the approach it adopted was still within a local framework, and all the peace offers it has since made have been aimed at undermining the international pressure and keeping the entire issue out of reach of China. While such a strategy is perhaps the only feasible one in order to reduce the Kampuchean question to manageable proportions and to resolve it on Hanoi's terms, it also reveals Vietnam's essentially paternalistic attitude towards its Indochinese neighbours and Hanoi's determination to keep Kampuchea within its private domain.

China, on the other hand, has never recognized Vietnam's inherent right to dominate Kampuchea and therefore has viewed the Vietnamese intervention in and occupation of the country as a blatant act of aggression not to be condoned. This explains why Beijing has insisted on treating it as a serious matter of international

concern and on seeking an international framework for the solution of the problem. Unable to provide military assistance to the Khmer Rouge on a large scale owing to the geographical distance involved, and aware of the vast disparity in military strength between the Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese army of occupation, China also considers the mobilization and maximization of international political pressure as essential to sustaining the resistance movement and jacking up the cost of Vietnam's occupation. By keeping the entire issue under the international spotlight as much and as long as possible, Beijing clearly expects to defeat Hanoi's initiatives towards a bilateral peace settlement and therefore to prevent Vietnam from legitimizing its conquest. Moreover, in order to ensure continuing support for its Kampuchea policy, China has not only undertaken to promise military assistance to all the ASEAN countries and to promote a united front of all anti-Vietnamese forces, but also has gone out of its way to arm all the non-communist resistance groups and to pledge support for a non-communist regime after Vietnam's withdrawal. These measures have perhaps all been necessary to buttress the diplomatic position and fighting power of the resistance forces and therefore increase the chances of their eventual victory; they certainly show China's determination to obstruct Vietnam's aims in Kampuchea. But the flexibility they reflect in China's strategy also suggests Beijing's readiness to accept a Kampuchea of almost any colour so long as it is free of Vietnamese domination.

As the situation stands, there is little prospect of an early solution to the conflict over Kampuchea. Convinced that the Vietnamese occupation is merely a concrete manifestation not only of Vietnam's regional ambitions but also of Moscow's global hegemonistic designs, China considers its policy of containing Vietnam in Kampuchea as a matter of principle not to be negotiated or changed. Having been on the defensive in its territorial and ethnic disputes with Hanoi, Beijing could not retreat on the Kampuchean question without conceding total defeat in its drawn-out conflict with Vietnam. Moreover, already extensively committed to the cause of the resistance movement, China could not afford to abandon the Khmer Rouge without seriously damaging its own image. This is so particularly at a juncture where the delicate balance of forces on the battlefield could well be tipped in Hanoi's favour by any sign of vacillation from Beijing. Therefore, in spite of the little progress made in reversing the military trend in Kampuchea, China's position on the entire issue has remained adamant and consistent since 1979. As late as 5 November 1982, Chinese premier Zhao Ziyang told Sihanouk in Beijing: 'China will as always support the Kampuchean people in their struggle against Vietnamese aggression *until they win final victory*'.[3] In fact, since the formation of the coalition government in June 1982, Beijing has stepped up its financial and military aid to the resistance forces.[4] As long as the Kampucheans are willing to fight the Vietnamese, China is determined to stay in the war.

Although China does not expect to achieve a miracle by suddenly turning the tide of the war in Kampuchea, it is at least prepared to wear Vietnam down through a protracted guerrilla war. By continuing to bleed the Vietnamese for as long as possible, China presumably hopes to make the Vietnamese occupation militarily so costly as to render it politically untenable, thereby ushering in a change either in

3. *Beijing Review*, 29 November 1982, p. 7. See also *Xin Hua News Agency* (Beijing), 20 July 1982.
4. *The Straits Times*, 24 June 1982, p. 1; 29 October 1982, p. 9; 22 November 1982, p. 38; 14 December 1982, p. 1.

Hanoi's basic policy towards Kampuchea or in its leadership structure which would eventually also bring about policy reorientation. At the same time, by maintaining the credibility of the anti-Vietnamese resistance movement and expanding its political and operational bases as much as possible, China also seeks as an immediate aim to ensure that the military situation in Kampuchea will not become so unfavourable as to lend any credence to the legitimacy of the Heng Samrin regime. This is why China has shown such enthusiasm about a coalition government and such generosity in giving military aid to all anti-Vietnamese forces as long as they pledge not to sabotage the entire resistance effort. In fact, as a result of such a strategy, Vietnam had to increase steadily its troop strength in Kampuchea, from 100,000 in January 1979 to 200,000 in 1981, in addition to the massive build-up along the Sino–Vietnamese land border. Indeed, from the Chinese point of view, as long as fighting in Kampuchea is not over and Vietnam's control over all Kampuchea remains a goal, not a reality, China is still in the process of administering lessons to Vietnam.

If China could not afford to retreat from Kampuchea without serious repercussions for both the fate of the Khmer Rouge and its own international standing, Vietnam certainly sees no reasons why it should surrender its gains which are all but firmly secured. Although Vietnam may have been taught a lesson or two, it is not likely, in view of its prolonged and successful struggle against French and American imperialism, to be subdued by a militarily less powerful China or to feel compelled to hasten to change its internal or external policies. Indeed, without a clear victory in Kampuchea or an all-out war against Vietnam, and short of military conquest, China cannot expect to bring Vietnam to its knees. Thus, in spite of the continuing stalemate in the battlefield, Vietnam's basic position on the Kampuchean issue has not changed since the occupation began in January 1979. In fact, Le Duan in his political report to the Fifth Congress of Vietnam's Communist Party in late March 1982 proclaimed: 'The special Vietnam–Laos–Kampuchea relationship is a *law* of development of the revolution in the three countries . . . and a firm guarantee for the cause of defending the independence and freedom and successfully building socialism in each country on the Indochinese peninsula'.[5] On 21 July Vietnam's Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach reiterated in Singapore Hanoi's well-known position that Vietnam would not withdraw its troops from Kampuchea unless and until China signed a treaty of non-aggression and non-interference with all three Indochinese nations, which would be tantamount to a *de jure* recognition of the Heng Samrin regime.[6] As late as October 1982, Hanoi's ambassador to the United Nations told the General Assembly: 'The rebirth of the Kampuchean people is irreversible'.[7] Vietnam apparently believes that by staying in Kampuchea, it is sure to emerge victorious in its contest of will and power with Beijing and eventually to turn a *fait accompli* into a legitimate possession of territory.

Hanoi's determination to hold on to Kampuchea and to wipe out the resistance forces by all available means is clearly shown in its increasingly indiscriminate use of chemical weapons during the past year or so against both the civilians under the influence of the Khmer Rouge and the guerrillas themselves—this in spite of the

5. British Broadcasting Corporation, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part III, The Far East, No. 6993 (1 April 1982), p. C/46.
6. *The Straits Times*, 21 July 1982, p. 40. Also, 24 July 1982, p. 36.
7. *The Straits Times*, 28 October 1982, p. 40.

growing international concern over the matter.[8] Since January 1982, Hanoi has also thrown additional troops into the fighting in western Kampuchea and has launched sustained attacks on all the guerrilla strongholds, including those of the non-communist Son Sann forces.[9] As the dry season of 1983 approaches, there is every sign that the Vietnamese are about to launch an all-out assault on all the Khmer resistance forces in order to achieve a breakthrough in the four-year-old war.[10] But that is not all. In order to expand and consolidate its grip on both Kampuchea and Laos, Hanoi has since late 1981 stepped up its colonization campaign, launched in the spring of 1979.[11] Although the precise scale of Vietnamese settlement since the initial influx of 250,000 in late 1979 cannot yet be ascertained, the nature and momentum of such population migration is revealed at least in part by the removal of the Heng Samrin regime's number two man, Pen Soven, from power in December 1981, allegedly owing to his opposition to Vietnam's colonization policy.[12] In the light of all this, the original French concept of an Indochina Federation has indeed already 'passed into the history' and lost its appeal to Hanoi, for after this drawn-out military conflict, Hanoi is apparently no longer satisfied nor feels secure with anything less than a more integrated entity in the form of a greater Vietnam.

As neither China nor Vietnam is prepared to make any concessions, the outcome of the Sino–Vietnamese conflict over Kampuchea depends to a large extent upon the ability of the Kampuchean resistance forces to withstand Vietnam's growing military pressure and to continue to expand their base of popular support. It also depends upon the successful cooperation of all anti-Vietnamese forces, which is crucial to retaining at least the international diplomatic support the resistance movement has enjoyed. So far, the Khmer Rouge have repeatedly thwarted Vietnam's dry season offensives, thereby demonstrating their political resilience and military credibility. However, the intense mistrust between the Khmer Rouge and the anti-communist Son Sann group may inhibit real progress in the operation of the newly formed coalition government. If the Khmer Rouge can keep up their military performance for another few years, and if the united front between the Khmer Rouge and other anti-Vietnamese forces can be sustained, the political fortune of the Kampuchean resistance movement could well witness a dramatic turn for the better. Conversely, it is also quite clear that failure to attain both of the above two goals will seriously erode the legitimacy and international support of the Khmer Rouge, if not also jeopardize the very survival of the entire resistance movement. But whatever the eventual outcome might be, the relations between China and Vietnam will remain strained for a long time, since a final Vietnamese victory over the Khmer Rouge would be a humiliating defeat for China after so many years of commitment and investment, whereas an ultimate victory for the Khmer Rouge would deny Vietnam a valuable piece of territory essential to the formation of a Vietnam-dominated Indochina.

8. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 15 January 1982, pp. 22–3; *The Straits Times*, 7 November 1981, p. 40; 31 January 1982, p. 2; 15 March 1982, p. 3.

9. *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 January 1982, pp. 14–15; 26 February 1982, pp. 14–15; 5 March 1982, pp. 12–13.

10. *The Straits Times*, 4 November 1982, p. 40; 17 November 1982, p 3.

11. BBC, *Summary of World Broadcasts*, Part III, No. 6887 (23 November 1981), p. A3/6; *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 January 1982, p. 13.

12. *Ibid.*; also *The Straits Times*, 5 November 1979, p. 32; 8 December 1981, p. 18.

Argentine approaches to the Falklands/Malvinas: was the resort to violence foreseeable?

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During and after the 1982 Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falklands/Malvinas, several British pronouncements seem to have resulted from the perverse persuasiveness of the assumption that Argentina had always had a warlike approach to the conflict. Mrs Thatcher publicly argued, during an interview on BBC's *Panorama* as well as in the House of Commons, that signals from Argentina had always been warlike, even while negotiations had been cordial and successful. In a private communication with the author Mr Healey said he regarded Argentine behaviour in 1976 and after as warlike. In recent articles in *The Guardian*[1] Martin Walker stated that President Perón had ordered a march on the islands on 12 August 1948 and that events in 1966 would be regarded as warlike and serious. The disclosure of documents under the thirty-year rule also led to a reconstruction of events and words of 1951–2 which presents Perón as belligerent then. Lord Shackleton regarded the 1976 incidents as warlike. Finally, the Franks report has failed to analyse Argentine politics adequately, in spite of the unprecedented range of information at the disposal of the committee.

Contrary, however, to this apparently prevalent British assumption, contemplation of the use of force has not been a permanent feature of the approach of the various very different Argentine political regimes to the dispute in the South Atlantic. The consequence of this mistaken assumption was an inability to notice the crucial differences between the signals coming from Buenos Aires early in 1982 and those of earlier years.

Formal notes protesting at Britain's occupation of the islands were a constant feature of Argentine foreign policy even in the nineteenth century. The landowners who ruled Argentina between 1860 and 1916 were most concerned with nineteenth century notions of progress in their scarcely populated state (1 million according to the 1860 census); their highest priorities were immigration, railway building by the state, port building and dredging, setting up an army in undisputed control, pushing back and exterminating the Indians and financing mandatory primary education. Britain's position as Argentina's most important trading partner and provider of credit meant that the latter's claim to the islands was asserted only by means of protest notes, which were loftily ignored by the British Foreign Office. After 1916, however, the advent of wider franchise and improved—but not perfect—democratic practices, led to a variety of publications from many sources, some of them as well researched as Julius Goebel's *The struggle for the Falkland Islands*, in particular that by Groussac, covering most aspects of the Argentine claim and the dispute.[2]

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1. *The Guardian*, 19 June 1982, 14 Sept. 1982.

2. See Paul Groussac, *Las Islas Malvinas* (Buenos Aires, 1936); Ricardo Caillet-Bois, *Una Tierra Argentina, las Islas Malvinas*, (Buenos Aires: Peuser, 1952); more recent publications have continued this tradition: Ricardo Zorraquín Becú, *Inglaterra prometió abandonar las Malvinas* (Buenos Aires: Platero, 1975).

0020-5850/83/3/0391—13$03.00©1983 International Affairs

Perón: his policies, practices and pronouncements

When Perón was elected for the first time in 1946, these dispersed assertions of the Argentine claim were merely mentioned more often, official thinking still being that the 'Malvinas' would eventually be Argentine. Perón never overtly or covertly called for military action. His economic policies could certainly be regarded as anti-British. They were, however, directed at redressing decades of excessive British influence during the periods of electorally fraudulent conservative rule in Argentina. These policies were both Perón's electoral platform and the mandate of the electorate. The result was that British control over public utilities, offensive to the Argentine electorate, was ended. Nationalization with compensation from Argentine credits resulting from UK imports during the war coincided with the requirements imposed by British postwar indebtedness.[3]

Let us see what Perón did and said in 1948, according to *La Nación.*[4] First, the significance of the date in Argentina is explained with the following customary rhetorical flourishes:

> The Argentine people celebrate today, with great shows of civic feeling, another anniversary of the Reconquest of Buenos Aires in 1806, the first stage of a glorious enterprise completed by the defence of the city [against the British], in 1807. The *traditional* [emphasis added] feeling with which the event is remembered . . .[5]

Concerning the march supposedly ordered by President Perón that very day, *La Nación* states that army lorries were to carry large torches lit from the so called 'eternal fire' close to San Martín's tomb in the cathedral. These torches were to reach the capital cities of all Argentine provinces. One of these was to await in Usuahia, Tierra del Fuego, the day in which the 'Malvinas', as well as the sector of the Antarctic claimed by Argentina, would come into Argentine possession. We also learn that the torches bore the following inscription which is significant as an indication of the aims and achievements of the controversial Perón regime: 'The spirit of San Martín presides over the reconquest of Argentina *for the Argentines*' [emphasis added].[6]

As this makes clear, the President read a short speech which contains no reference to the 'Malvinas'; no march was ordered; no threat was made. No indication was given that military action to recover the islands was even being contemplated. The episode patently cannot be put on the same level with Argentine political statements from late 1981. Either Mr Walker and Mrs Thatcher got it wrong, or they are intent on exploiting Perón's anti-British reputation in the United Kingdom.

The second instance of a British misreading of Argentine policies revolves around events in 1951–2. There may have been a degree of *ex post facto* interpretation when

3. See Jorge Fodor, *Perón's policies for agricultural exports, 1946–1948: dogmatism or commonsense* in David Rock, ed.: *Argentina in the twentieth century* (London: Duckworth, 1975).

4. A conservative newspaper, owned by the Mitre family, normally regarded as the mouthpiece of the landowners. Until the 1930s it took a pro-UK stance, and since then normally agrees with US policies. Along with *La Prensa*, which takes a more doctrinaire view, *La Nación* is regarded as a reliable newspaper of record. It is accordingly used here as a source of what was said and by whom in Argentina.

5. *La Nación*, 12 Aug. 1948, p. 4. It should be noted that a) *La Nación* would print a presidential speech in full, and, b) I have read all editions of August 1948 and no mention was made of any metaphorical or real march on the islands.

All texts from Spanish have been translated by the author. The full text of speeches, press releases, etc. is not provided for the sake of brevity, but is available on request.

6. *La Nación*, 12 Aug. 1948, p. 4.

British government papers were released under the thirty-year rule, as a consequence of which Peter Hennessy stated that Sir Winston Churchill feared that President Perón 'was preparing to invade the islands'.[7] A detailed study of Argentine sources shows Perón in quite a different light, placing his trust in time; and, just as his widow was to do in 1976, his administration, after the incident in Bahía Esperanza (Hope Bay), instructed Captain Emilio Díaz, the commander of the Argentine task force, 'not to oppose resistance'.[8] When the task force left, Díaz recalls that he received no special instructions. In other words, the use of force was not being contemplated inasmuch as the commander of the 1951–2 Antarctic Campaign was issued with the same instructions as his predecessors and as those he received in 1954–5. The scare within the Churchill administration, therefore, would appear in retrospect to be unwarranted.

On seeing the ships off President Perón's views were that:

> time offers men the best form of justice. We must, therefore, confidently wait because, if at this point what justly belongs to us is not acknowledged as ours, the progressively greater power of Argentina and time will form the undisputable basis of our rights. Some day, probably, if justice does not prevail, we shall make Argentine rights prevail, if necessary by the use of force.[9]

However, an important qualifier is placed by Perón on the use of force in the same speech:

> The Argentine government has the firm intention of reaffirming Argentine rights with vigour by an effective exercise of sovereignty. It is simultaneously necessary to establish permanent scientific bases . . . We have agreements not to occupy these areas in the Antarctic with forces. Argentine scientific expeditions, which will successively and progressively occupy the Antarctic, will be the only force we will use, for the time being, in the Antarctic.[10]

The composition of the 1951–2 Argentine task force would indicate a willingness to comply with an agreement not to have an abnormal concentration of warships in the area: two transport ships, *Bahía Buen Suceso* and *Bahía Aguirre*; the fuel carrier *Punta Ninfas*; and two tugs, *Chiriguano* and *Sanavirón*. The Argentine Air Force contributed with several aircraft—mainly for extensive aerial photography—operated from Río Gallegos, and successfully contacted the army element of the task force in Bahía Margarita. In addition, Captain Díaz said that 'of course' no armed vessels were included in this task force.[11]

The annual campaign by the three services of the Argentine armed forces resulted in this year in an incident with a British ship, the *John Biscoe*. Captain Díaz recalls that the incident took place on 1 and 2 February, 1952. After noting that the *John Biscoe* was in the area, Díaz says it was clear that a base of some sort was about to be built, given the material being unloaded. Díaz ordered that the captain of the *John Biscoe* should be informed that he was on Argentine territory and that the new installation would not be tolerated. For two days work came to a halt; Díaz speculates that this was probably while instructions were being sought. Then work

7. *The Times*, 3 Jan. 1983, p. 3.
8. Interview with Captain Emilio Díaz, 14 Mar. 1983.
9. *La Nación*, 13 Feb. 1951, p. 4.
10. *La Nación*, 13 Feb. 1951, p. 4.
11. *La Nación*, 21 Dec. 1951, p. 2; also private communication between the author and Captain Emilio Díaz.

resumed and consequently Díaz resolved to inform the British, through an officer, that unless building was stopped, force would be used.

Captain Díaz—who, having been on five Antarctic expeditions, one with Admiral Byrd, was no newcomer to the area—ordered some of his men on shore, and, once again, had an officer request the termination of building activities. Only then, remembers Díaz, were shots fired, and these were well above the heads of the British men; the latter then withdrew, leaving the Union Jack flying. Díaz says he had it brought down and returned to the British ship.

According to Díaz, this incident may have caused the British to use force a year later when the Argentine base in Decepción was burnt down. British forces destroyed other Argentine installations on other occasions: in 1961 and, more recently, in Southern Thule.[12]

After the task force had been back in Buenos Aires for over a week, Rear-Admiral O. Olivieri, the Minister for the Navy, summarized the accomplishments of the expedition and listed its many scientific activities. President Perón congratulated Captain Díaz and, once again, stated the policies of his administration: 'Argentine sovereignty will have to be re-stated every year with a new effort'.[13] A few weeks later, Perón again made a statement which does not seem to have been fully understood in Britain, or which would again seem to have been subjected to *ex post facto* analysis in 1983. However, Sir Henry Mack, the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires in 1952, seems to have read Argentine political signs correctly, as he wrote to the Foreign Office that President Perón 'was comparatively mild and even resigned'.[14] The portion of the speech which fully validates such a view reads as follows: 'We defend our rights and time will confirm them. We have no undue haste . . . We must therefore wait with confidence and launch generations of Argentines towards the Antarctic . . . secure of the protection of God, of justice and of time . . .'.[15]

With regard to the 1951–2 Antarctic campaign and Perón's policies it can therefore be concluded that, contrary to the views of Peter Hennessy and Robert Cecil (head of the Foreign Office's American Department in 1952), Perón was certainly not contemplating the use of force within the near future.

Policies and events during civilian and military administrations

At no point in the ebb and flow of civilian and military administrations between 1955 and 1973 did any relevant Argentine political actor call for military action on the issue of the islands. The Radical administration of Dr Arturo Illia (1963–6) sought to profit from the then prevailing tide of formal decolonization to have the UN General Assembly discuss the issue: hence the 1965 mandate to negotiate.

Chronologically the next two instances which have been reported in Britain as purporting Argentine warlike intent took place in 1966. At this time a farcical attempt was made by a private group led by Dardo Cabo to land on the islands. Cabo and his accomplices were arrested. The other incident in 1966 was a rattle of bullets against the facade of the British Embassy in Buenos Aires during Prince Philip's stay on 29 September 1966. Having been in Buenos Aires during 1966 I

12. See *Polar Record*, Sept. 1961, p. 623, and Sept. 1958, p. 225.
13. *La Nación*, 26 Apr. 1952, p. 1.
14. See Richard Norton-Taylor, 'Secrets of the Falklands 30 years on', *The Guardian*, 3 Jan. 1983, p. 11.
15. *La Nación*, 22 May 1952, p. 1.

cannot take too seriously the view that both the attack on the British Embassy and Cabo's *Condor* operation were supported by members of the Onganía military regime. Nor would any well-informed commentator on Argentine politics assign any plausibility to a Cabo–Onganía collusion. Indeed, the whole question of Argentine warlike gestures prior to 1982 hinges on an ability to understand Argentine politics and discourse. It is equally important that such different political regimes as existed during this period should not be grouped together. The administration of Dr A. Illia (1963–6) was cut short by a military coup which installed General J. C. Onganía as *de facto* president. The new regime regarded itself as quite different in its aims and methods to the constitutional regime which it had replaced in order to avoid elections scheduled for March 1967. These differences meant that elections were out of the question and that international business could come to Argentina on its own terms. In foreign policy, and specifically in pursuing the Argentine claim to the Falklands/Malvinas, the policy of the new regime was still to negotiate.

Given the nature, features and genesis of the military regime ruling from 1966, if the views voiced by official spokesmen are taken into account, along with the declarations by the metalworkers union to which Cabo, his father and members of the *Condor* expedition belonged, politically alert British observers might—at *most*—have concluded that Onganía and his Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, may have welcomed the *Condor* operation. The innate adventurism of the Cabo operation contrasted with the 'responsible' negotiating image which the regime wished to create. The *Condor* farce and the inexcusable attack on the British Embassy can be regarded, at best, as a covert threat by anti-regime individuals, as well as private and corporate bodies, with the aim of forcing Britain to negotiate meaningfully. However, messy as the incidents were, the Onganía regime never issued the kind of warnings which alerted and alarmed most observers in Buenos Aires during January and February 1982. In addition, the Onganía regime was not in desperate straits.

There is another reason which makes it possible to classify the 1966 events as clumsy but not as warlike: a knowledge of what Cabo stood for and his opposition to the military regime of General Onganía. The Montoneros, the guerrilla group to which Cabo belonged, was ideologically opposed to that military regime. Cabo was convicted for the hijack and, years later, edited a militant magazine connected with guerrilla action. The possibility of a joint Cabo–Onganía-regime action cannot, therefore, be taken seriously.

Walker has argued[16] that *Crónica*, a Buenos Aires tabloid, was involved with the *Condor* group and that, significantly, the newspaper carried the news before the DC4 even landed. However, other newspapers were also able to print the news since the radio connection with the Buenos Aires airport was left open by the pilot once the hijack began, so as to pass information on to Buenos Aires without the knowledge of Cabo and his accomplices.[17]

To confirm how different the situation in 1966 was from that of 1981–2 Costa Méndez's press release is worth quoting at some length:

> My country trusts that this dispute will be definitively solved as soon as it is practicable and that it will be possible to inform the General Assembly that the

16. Private communication with the author.
17. *La Nación*, 29 Sept. 1966, pp. 1, 10 and 30 Sept. 1966, p. 6.

> peaceful and permanent solution envisaged by resolution 2065 of the Twentieth Assembly has been achieved. The issue of the Islas Malvinas is a substantial issue for my country as a portion of its territory is involved. However, faithful to its historical traditions, Argentina seeks a peaceful solution through negotiations.[18]

It should be noted at this point that Dr Nicanor Costa Méndez was again made Minister of Foreign Affairs as from 22 December 1981. By February of that year, he was saying things which were quite different to the line he took between 1966 and 1969, when the first military regime he served was secure. The post-1976 military regime was, by the close of 1981, neither confident nor secure.

Policies during the 1973–6 Perónist administrations

Crónica again became involved with the 'Malvinas' when it sponsored a public subscription on 16 December 1975 to finance an invasion of the islands—its second attempt to use the issue to boost circulation and corner the popular market. For its efforts the newspaper was provisionally closed by the administration of Mrs Perón for 'endangering peaceful relations with foreign countries',[19] and legal proceedings were initiated according to the Penal Code and Law 20,840. A week later, a federal judge on hearing the case agreed that there had been an infringement of Article 219 of the Penal Code. Sr Héctor Ricardo García, the editor, was only released after paying a high sum and the case continued its normal procedural course.

Indeed, contrary to Mr Walker's assertion, Perón's return in 1973 and his re-election did not produce any warlike gesture or any statement that military action was being contemplated. Till Perón died, on 1 January 1974, the regime was stable and did not require diversions to consolidate its hold on power. The first two years of the Perón regime were taken up by much more pressing domestic problems. The main foreign policy preoccupations were connected with Uruguay, Paraguay and Brazil (mostly concerning hydroelectric projects) and with the promotion of exports in Argentine manufactures. This lead to the breaking of the US-imposed blockade on Cuba with a US$1 billion credit, a move which the US State Department tried to block.

On the issue of the islands the new, initially democratic, Perón regime simply re-asserted the claim through Alberto Vignes, the Foreign Minister from 25 May 1973 to 10 July 1975, who took the traditional Argentine line:

> Mr Vignes also spoke about the Malvinas issue before foreign newsmen. He repeated that the only admissible solution was the return of the islands, adding that Argentina has decided in this case, even though there is usurpation, to continue to negotiate according to the Argentine pacifist tradition in the solution of international controversies.[20]

Clearly a tough or, at most, an uncompromising negotiating stance, but certainly qualitatively different from the words of the military regime early in 1982. It is also relevant to any sophisticated political assessment that the regime, even with Perón dead, was not—initially—fragile. The views of the political parties, the unions and

18. *La Nación*, 30 Sept. 1966, p. 6. Costa Méndez was in New York for the General Assembly.
19. *La Nación*, 3 Jan. 1975, p. 1.
20. *La Nación*, 3 Jan. 1975, p. 1.

the armed forces did not change until Mrs Perón and her supporters became guilty of gross mismanagement after June 1975.

Concerning the attitude of the Argentine government during the last chaotic days of Mrs Perón's presidency, there certainly was a shoot-out between the Argentine destroyer *Almirante Storni* and the RRS *Shackleton*. The regime explained the situation thus: 'In spite of a request of the Command of Naval Operations the Navy was not allowed to take more drastic action'.[21] The official press release explains the *Storni–Shackleton* incident. It is pointed out that in a letter to the British Embassy of 14 November 1975, a warning had been issued that Argentine law would be applied. This meant that a ship in Argentine waters would have to be inspected and visited. The said letter warned that the right would be exercised if the UNESCO sponsored explorations went ahead.

Ted Rowlands, explaining the incident in the British parliament, said that the incident imperilled the very nature of Britain's relationship with Argentina.

None of the declarations connected with the naval incident, which predictably re-stated the Argentine claim, ever threatened or indicated that any military action was being contemplated. Dr Angel F. Robledo[22] has told me that no plans for an invasion were drawn up by the armed forces during 1973–6. General Alberto Numa Laplane, General Commander of the army,[23] also assured me that no plans were drawn up by the army, or by either of the other two services, during or prior to his period in office.

After the incident and the exchange of reciprocal protest notes, Raúl Quijano, the Foreign Minister, stated in a speech to the UN in New York that Argentina would not oppose drilling, arguing that, even should oil be found, companies would not wish to invest and that the solution was compromise and understanding with Argentina.[24] Earlier, in replying to the United Kingdom, Quijano welcomed the latter's new-found willingness to negotiate within the framework of the UN.[25] Such negotiations between Argentina and the UK took place during Quijano's stay in New York. Along with C. Ortiz Rozas, then the head of the Argentine mission to the UN,[26] Quijano met Ted Rowlands. Argentine reports of this new round of talks stated that the United Kingdom had requested the meeting to exchange information and to discuss forms of renewing discussions on the islands, adding that the UK representatives had given assurances that the *Shackleton* would soon be leaving the islands and would not operate in areas under Argentine jurisdiction.[27] Rowlands, questioned in parliament on such reports, replied that no such promises had been made. The result was that Argentina requested that the ambassador in Buenos Aires, Derek Ashe, should be recalled.

21. *La Nación*, 6 February 1976, pp. 1, 16.

22. Minister of Defence from 25 May 1973 to August, 1974, briefly Minister of Foreign Affairs (July–August, 1975) and subsequently Minister of the Interior till January 1976. Interviews with the author in Buenos Aires, September and October 1980 and over the telephone, May 1982.

23. Constitutionally the commander-in-chief is the president. During the last Perónist administration the heads of each service were known as general commanders. Numa Laplane was head of the army from March 1975 to September 1976 when General Videla forced his retirement; the latter and General Viola, along with the head of the navy, Admiral Massera, executed a coup on 24 March 1976.

24. *La Nación*, 12 Feb. 1976, p. 3.

25. *La Nación*, 11 Feb. 1976, p. 2. Quijano obviously had in mind the UK refusal to negotiate between 1834 and 1964.

26. When the military regime and the UK Conservative administration decided to upgrade their diplomatic contacts, Ortiz de Rozas was the Argentine ambassador in the UK until 3 April 1982.

27. *La Nación*, 17 Feb. 1976.

The Argentine version of the background to the *Storni* crisis and the downgrading of diplomatic relations may be found in an article by Santiago Ferrari, *La Nación*'s correspondent in New York,[28] which contains a lengthy recapitulation of the uneasy relationship between the two parties. Ferrari first states the traditional Argentine view on the lack of negotiations and the lack of progress in them, once begun. He says that during the nineteenth and most of the twentieth centuries Britain had refused to negotiate. The argument concerning the self-determination of the inhabitants, consistently used by the United Kingdom once forced into negotiations by the UN resolution, is dismissed by Ferrari, who asserts that such a population was the result of forcible British occupation after 1834. He then reports on a speech by the Argentine representative before a plenary session of the UN General Assembly, which he describes as something between a report and a 'denunciation' to the General Assembly. This speech by Ortiz de Rozas contained what Ferrari regarded as a very significant sentence, which is quoted: 'The limits of our patience and tolerance must not be underestimated should we be confronted with an obstinate and unjustified refusal to negotiate'.

When the Argentine Foreign Ministry finally registered in January 1976 that the mission headed by Lord Shackleton was actually to take place, it was felt that the British refusal to negotiate nothing but issues relating to economic cooperation, and the British position that negotiations on the issue of sovereignty were 'fruitless', were unacceptable to the Perón administration.[29] However, this administration, which all relevant political actors in Argentina regarded as being on its way out, did not use the issue to improve its position. Instead, it effectively weakened its standing with a Navy anxious to 'take more severe action', and merely restated dissatisfaction with the turn negotiations had taken.

The return of the military, 1976 and after

It would appear that something changed after 1976: namely, the political circumstances. The military regime repressed guerrilla activitv and simultaneously embarked on economic policies which multiplied the foreign debt by a factor of four, reduced the purchasing power of the salaried and wage earning sectors by 40 per cent, abolished tariffs and allowed interest rates to reach ruinous levels. Industry, left unprotected, deprived of its internal market and with the peso overvalued by 70 per cent, operated at only 60 per cent of its capacity. Hence the bankruptcies following the financial crash of April 1980. With such a dismal economic record, the military knew they had no chance of surviving democratization, given the pressure of the human rights groups. Here the 'Nuremberg mentality' operated. Desperate to reestablish their standing, the armed forces began planning the adventure when Galtieri finally forced President Viola out of office on 22 December 1981. According to General Juan Guglialmelli, the editor of *Estrategia*, the new junta under Galtieri 'took the decision to occupy the islands in January 1982'.[30] Guglialmelli only voiced what any well-informed and politically aware Argentine knew and read in his quality newspapers. Plans were apparently laid down in 1978 for the first time by the original junta (General J. R. Videla, Admiral

28. *La Nación*, 12 Dec. 1975, p. 2. I am grateful to David Stephen for pointing out this important qualitative shift in Argentine diplomatic discourse.
29. *La Nación*, 14 Jan. 1976, p. 1.
30. See *The Times*, 3 Feb. 1983, p. 6. Guglialmelli was subsequently interviewed on BBC Radio 4, *The World Tonight*.

E. E. Massera and Brigadier O. Agosti). The earlier 1977 incident during Mr Callaghan's premiership was different in terms both of events and statements from 1982. In addition, the new junta was not secure, and in 1977 there were no indications in the Argentine press that force would soon be used.[31]

It was under the military regime from 1976 onwards that the change took place and commentators began indicating that spectacular and unprecedented action on the 'Malvinas' could be expected to rid the regime of its political and economic embarrassments. Warnings were issued in plenty by the Argentine press and by a specialized journal, the *Latin American Weekly Report*, which itemized and analysed the policies of the Argentine military regime. In the British press no such warnings were reported. *The Observer* informed its readers of trouble in the South Atlantic on 28 March. *The Times* and *The Sunday Times* covered Argentina more thoroughly, but their writers seemed to prefer to cover the *Beagle* dispute, Argentine trade agreements with the USSR, the economic crisis in Argentina, the support given by the Argentine military to the Salvadorean regime of N. Duarte and Argentine pressure to remove Mr Theo van Boven as Director of the UN Human Rights Commission as well as the fate of the 'disappeared.'[32] It is only in early March that *The Times* and *The Guardian* pick up what the Thunderer, rather predictably, refers to as 'sabre rattling' in Buenos Aires. However, the British press made no analysis which would put the 1982 signals coming from Buenos Aires into some perspective.[33]

The first indication that changes were afoot came from a quasi-military agency, the 'Islas Malvinas Institute', whose chairman, Rear-Admiral Jorge Fraga, issued a statement requesting that the 'endless rounds of negotiations be ended'. The United States was sharply criticized for not backing Argentine claims more actively and more drastic measures to secure the devolution of the islands were called for.[34] Later in January all Buenos Aires newspapers carried the news that the Argentine ambassador in London, Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, had been called to Buenos Aires for consultations. These consultations were shown clearly to be important to the regime by the fact that he conferred with President Galtieri; ordinarily an ambassador would confer with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is reliably reported that Ortiz de Rozas provided a comprehensive report on the 'Malvinas' issue.[35]

Also in January, the authoritative columnist of *La Prensa*, Jesús Iglesias Rouco, wrote that *the possibility that the islands would be recovered by military action was virtually certain.*[36] Echoing the new terms of the debate in Buenos Aires, on 29 January 1982 the *Latin American Weekly Report* indicated that Argentina would be presenting Britain with an ultimatum, calling for more frequent talks and for a firm timetable on the return of the islands. The source mentioned is Iglesias Rouco,

31. In a private communication with the author, who had pointed out the above differences in a letter, Mr Rowlands said: 'The points you make seemed to me to reinforce the basic fundamental case that I believe is valid—that the Government should have taken pre-emptive action to avoid the situation'. Also see Mr Rowland's article in *The Times*, 15 Jan. 1983, p. 6.

32. See *The Observer*, 28 Mar. 1982; *The Times*, 23 Jan. 1982, p. 4; 26 Jan. 1982, p. 1; 5 Feb. 1982, p. 10; *The Sunday Times* 7 Feb. 1982, p. 12; 25 Feb. 1982, p. 6; 14 Feb. 1982, p. 8.

33. See *The Guardian*, 3 March 1982, p. 1, which picks up the Buenos Aires communique after the talks in New York but fails to notice how unprecedented the wording was. Also see *The Times*, 4 Mar. 1982, p. 8.

34. See *Buenos Aires Herald*, 3 Jan. 1982.

35. See *La Prensa*, *Clarín*, and *La Nación*, 19 Jan. 1982.

36. See *La Prensa*, 24 Jan. 1982, p. 1.

according to whom, should Britain fail to comply, negotia[illegible] [illegible]ding off, and '*the government will consider military action*' (empha[illegible]

Early in February came another indication that sectors with[illegible] not unwilling to support action which transcended the traditional [illegible] the Argentine claim exclusively through diplomatic means. *Convicción*[illegible] the navy's mouthpiece, requested more drastic action on every aspect of[illegible] arguing that: 'for 149 years the usurpers have enjoyed nothing but advan[illegible] By 12 February 1982, such views seemed to have been fashioned into a dipl[illegible]atic strategy which did contain new elements in the form of a military threat:

> Argentina will set a series of pre-conditions before continuing talks with Britain on the future of the Malvinas/Falklands islands . . . If these (conditions) were not met, the paper said, *other forms of action, including recovery of the islands by military means would be considered* (emphasis added).[38]

Other reports continued to lend credence to the view that plans for the Argentine 'repossession' were regarded as plausible in early 1982. The *Latin American Weekly Report* states that during a visit to Uruguay, Galtieri obtained from his fellow dictator, General Gregorio Alvarez, assurances that in the event of Argentine military action Uruguay would remain neutral.[39]

After the conclusion of the talks on the islands in New York, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, again in the hands of Costa Méndez, was not slow to let its views be known, confirming that, as usual, Iglesias Rouco had foretold what the regime would do. Other Buenos Aires newspapers also reflected the change:

> On Monday 1 March, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the delegation in New York proposed to the UK that the meetings on the restitution of the national heritage of the Malvinas should take place on a monthly basis.
>
> It was also stated that such talks should have a previously agreed agenda and should be manned by officials of the highest rank so as to solve the dispute promptly.
>
> The press release stated that Argentina had negotiated for more than fifteen years with the UK, with patience, loyalty and good faith and within the framework of the UN and had proposed a new mechanism for negotiations which is to include the Southern Georgias as well as the Sandwich Islands. If there was no agreement, Argentina retains the right to terminate the function of such a negotiating mechanism and to resort to whatever procedure is commensurable with the interests of Argentina. This last paragraph obviously does not exclude the possibility of military occupation of the islands.[40]

37. See *Convicción*, 5 Feb. 1982.
38. See *Latin American Weekly Report*, 12 Feb. 1982, p. 10. It is also worth mentioning the unique position not only of *La Prensa* but of Iglesias Rouco. The Buenos Aires daily opposed the military regime, advocating the proscription of Peronism. Since Iglesias Rouco, previously correspondent in Madrid, was recalled to Buenos Aires, he has proved to be uncannily well informed as to the internal debate of the regime. Along with Manfred Schönfeld he exposed military corruption—for which Schönfeld was beaten up—and the two have acquired a reputation which knows no precedent in Argentina; nor can it be likened to the position of any newspaper or journalists in Europe. The point is that whoever ignores the copious information mingled with political analysis which both Schönfeld and Rouco produce, runs the risk of being uninformed, at least of the concerns of the military regime.
39. See *Latin American Weekly Report*, 19 Feb. 1982.
40. See *Clarín*, 2 Mar. 1982.

As usual, such views were echoed soon after by the *Latin American Weekly Report*, which, yet again, informed its readers at some length of ominous and unprecedented developments:

> Talks held in New York on 26–27 Feb. were described in a joint communique as 'cordial and positive', . . . the only sign of a change was that the Argentine negotiators had requested monthly meetings to speed up the process.
>
> The sting in the tail came a few days later, with an uncompromisingly worded statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires. This pointed out that: 'Argentina had been negotiating with Britain for fifteen years, but had little to show. Unless a solution was achieved quickly, talks would be broken off; Argentina would consider itself free to choose the procedure which best suits its interests'.
>
> The Argentines are considering a wide range of options for 'unilateral action', according to sources in Buenos Aires, if Britain fails to make concessions. These include initiatives in the UN, a break of diplomatic relations and, in the final analysis, *an invasion of the islands*. The link with internal politics is clear . . . Government officials feel that the international repercussions of a hard line against Britain will be manageable . . . in the light of Washington's preoccupation with security in the South Atlantic, . . . [Washington] . . . would be happy to see the issue settled. It could then open the way to the installation of US military bases in the South Atlantic . . . a development over which there has been much speculation in Buenos Aires since Galtieri took power . . .[41]

As if all these warnings had not been enough, just as before the German invasion of Norway, the invader-to-be tested the airfields. An Argentine Air Force Hercules made an unscheduled landing on the strip in Port Stanley.

> Strange landing in Port Stanley of an Argentine Air Force Hercules C–130, allegedly due to an emergency. Buenos Aires observers said it was planned . . . rumours of invasion of the islands . . . testing probability of landing troops . . . Alejandro Orfila (Argentine career diplomat, presently Secretary General of the Organization of American States, with good connections with the military and with Peronism, rumoured to be the presidential candidate favoured by the military regime) said that 'the Argentine flag will soon fly over the Malvinas'.[42]

Finally, later in March, the same publication speaks of the political consequences of the prevailing 'Nuremberg mentality' among Argentine officers. They feared for their careers, given the political weight of the human rights lobby and the calls for an explanation made by the Church, the political parties and the trade unions.[43]

Other political developments are also detailed, all of them indicating that something unprecedented was afoot. For example, there was a report that despite the tight budgetary policies of the then Minister for the Economy, Dr Roberto T. Alemann, who, besides advocating cuts in public spending, had a reputation for not being prepared to compromise, military outlays had increased.

41. See *Latin American Weekly Report*, 12 Mar. 1982, p. 5. It is clear that the above refers to the same press release earlier paraphrased and quoted by *Clarín*.
42. Reported as usual by *Latin American Weekly Report*, 19 Mar. 1982.
43. See *Latin American Weekly Report*, 26 Mar. 1982, p. 6.

After the Argentine invasion the *Latin American Weekly Report* published a useful summary of all significant developments. It pointedly asked its readers if they could have predicted the invasion.[44]

Conclusions

It can be concluded, then, that something unprecedented was being said and planned in Argentina from early 1982. A policy of negotiation had come to be regarded as fruitless. Agendas were being mentioned for the first time, there was talk of a previously unthinkable unilateral termination of talks, of an ultimatum, and, above all, the repeated mention of military action, current in Buenos Aires in early 1982.

The conclusions of the Franks report[45] and a good portion of its references to events in Argentina constitute the latest instance of what we might term as the inability of the British establishment to analyse Argentine politics and political discourse. The evidence in terms of Argentine politics marshalled by the Franks Report should have led to the conclusion that a military establishment which obtained power illegitimately, secretly and treacherously could not be expected to be predictable, let alone openly to admit its intention to invade. The wholesale endorsement by Franks of the gradualist approach which the FCO expected the crisis to take is equally inconsistent with the behaviour of the military, their beleaguered position and with the weather. To expect an invasion in July, given the weather at that season, hardly merits discussion. It is interesting that, according to Franks, British officials in Buenos Aires, though buying the unlikely July date, did inform Whitehall of the views being aired in the Argentine press. How strongly they argued their case is not too clear.

Iglesias Rouco, reviewing the Franks Report in *La Prensa*, wonders why his articles of February and March were quoted and why it was that no effort was made to ask him—'as they could have done'—his reasons for saying what he said in early 1982.

Unless furthering a claim by diplomatic means is regarded in itself as constituting a warlike act, Mrs Thatcher's explanations to the Commons, and later to the public on *Panorama*, Mr Healey's privately expressed view, the Franks Report, and Martin Walker's *Guardian* articles are not consistent with the explanation of historical fact provided here. The inexcusable Argentine use of force bred animosity; Argentine's longstanding claim to the islands and the entirely justifiable anti-British policies of President J. D. Perón had probably lent credibility to such views in the eyes of the British public. Now is the time to re-examine such views as dispassionately as possible.

The confrontation between Argentina and Britain clearly resulted first, from a conflict, second, from the misunderstanding over the negotiations, and third, from British hesitations and difficulties given the existence of a politically influential lobby operating within Westminster—influence which was undoubtedly increased by the racial pull of a small white population. All these factors clearly played a role in the making of the conflict.

44. See *Latin American Weekly Report*, 9 Apr. 1982, p. 11.

45. *Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors*, Chairman The Rt Hon. The Lord Franks, Cmnd 8787 (London: HMSO, 1983).

When the Argentine regime came to contemplate military action to extricate itself from its internal difficulties, this was the first time since 1834 that such action was explicitly mentioned. War, however, broke out because of the politically mistaken assessments made by the Argentine regime and, within it, the errors of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Even under the present restrictions of an embarrassed military regime, portions of the secret Calvi report have been published. The first item of the six leaked dwells on the mistaken international political assessments made by the military regime under Galtieri, noting that the whole operation had been thought of and implemented within a frame of reference which turned out to be absolutely false. The published version of the Calvi report says that General Mario Benjamín Menéndez was told that he would be appointed governor only forty-eight hours before the invasion, and, furthermore, that the then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Nicanor Costa Méndez, was supervising the operation, and that the latter had solved all probable difficulties at the international level. General Menéndez is reported to have been told that according to Costa Méndez's negotiations the vote in the United Nation's Security Council would be favourable to Argentina by a wide margin: nine to seven. He was also told that should the outcome of the vote be different, the veto of the USSR was certain. According to the report drawn up exclusively on army operations by General Edgardo Calvi, officers and NCOs were told that the whole operation would be practically symbolic, that no enemy reaction was expected. The leaked version of the report also covers other items which dwell on organizational and command failures.[46]

An elected civilian administration will surely go beyond these findings. Political commentators repeatedly argue that both the invasion itself and the internal reasons of the military regime for ordering it are consequences of authoritarianism. It is clear, however, that for the conflict to break out there had to be, in addition, a monumental failure of British political intelligence to perceive the straits of the regime and to take its threats seriously.

The future development of the Hong Kong and Gibraltar negotiations, the Argentine determination to continue to press its claim, and indeed, the possibility of further hostilities within the coming decades make better political intelligence almost an imperative. This spectacular failure of British political intelligence has temporarily been concealed by the equally spectacular success of the professionalized British armed forces, aided by the inefficiency of their politicized Argentine counterparts.

46. See *Clarín*, *La Prensa* and *La Nación* between 27 Sept. and 3 Nov. 1982.

Sovereignty and the Falklands crisis

PETER CALVERT*

On 6 November 1982 the General Assembly of the United Nations voted by a large majority, ninety votes to twelve, with fifty-two abstentions, to request 'the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to resume negotiations in order to find as soon as possible a peaceful solution to the sovereignty dispute relating to the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)'. The resolution was co-sponsored by one of the parties to the dispute, namely Argentina, and may therefore be regarded as evidence that that country regards its claim to the territory in question to be a strong one. Mr Francis Pym, the British Foreign Secretary, on the other hand has stated publicly (4 May 1982) that Britain has no doubts, and never has had, as to the validity of its claim. As Peter Beck has recently shown, historically this is not absolutely true. The Foreign Office has on a number of occasions since 1910 been the scene of doubts about the validity of Britain's case in international law[1] and in fact the grounds on which Britain has based its claim have been changed not once but twice during the period. Moreover, Argentina has not been historically as resolute in pursuing its claims as it would like people to think. The claims on both sides are based on historical facts that are by turns vague, confused and disputed, and if there is to be any resolution of the question a great deal of homework will have to be done first by both parties.

This, then, is a contribution to the debate. First of all, an outline of the problem.

The historical dispute to 1833

The Falkland Islands consist of two large islands, East and West Falkland, and a number of smaller ones, which lie in the South Atlantic some 300 miles east of the island of Tierra del Fuego at the southern tip of the South American continent. They had no human inhabitants before the age of exploration. It is possible that they were sighted before 1592, when the captain of the English ship *Desire*, John Davis, reported 'certaine Isles never before discovered by any knowen relation lying fiftie leagues or better from the shoare East and northerly from The Streights',[2] and it is certain that the outlying islands were sighted by the Dutch sailor Sebald de Weert of the *Geloof* in 1600, after which they were included under the name of the Sebaldines on Dutch charts. Considerable uncertainty about their whereabouts persisted for decades, however, and the first recorded landing was not made until 27 January 1690, by the crew of the British ship *Welfare*, whose Captain, John Strong, named the sound between the two islands after Viscount Falkland, the Treasurer of the Royal Navy.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century, the accession of the Bourbons to the throne of Spain opened up new opportunities for their ships to trade in the formerly

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1. Peter J. Beck, 'Cooperative confrontation in the Falkland Islands dispute', *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, February 1982, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 37–58.

2. Julius Goebel, *The struggle for the Falkland Islands* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1982), p. 35.

0020-5850/83/3/0405 $03.00©1983 International Affairs

closed Spanish colonies. French sailors from St Malo in Brittany who called at the islands named them the Iles Malouines, subsequently Hispanized into Islas Malvinas. After the close of the Seven Years War, Louis Antoine de Bougainville, acting on the authority of Louis XV of France, sailed to colonize the Falklands, which were seen as the key to the Pacific route. After reconnoitring the shore line and founding a settlement at Port St Louis on East Falkland, he took formal possession of the island on 5 April 1764 on behalf of France and sailed for home. News had already reached Spain from Montevideo of the expedition, and protests were made, as a result of which the French claim was formally transferred to Spain on 25 February 1767, in return for an indemnity equivalent to £24,000.

Meanwhile, however, in conditions of great secrecy, a British expedition to colonize the Falklands had also been fitted out in the spring of 1764 before news of the French settlement was known in Europe. On 12 January 1765 Commodore John Byron of HMS *Dolphin*, having located the islands and sailed along their coasts for over 400 miles without seeing any trace of habitation, had taken formal possession of the islands in the name of King George III and founded a settlement, Port Egmont, on Saunders Island off West Falkland. The settlement was occupied on 8 January 1766 by a fresh expedition, and, like the rival French settlement, which they were unable to locate, on a permanent basis.

In due course the Spanish, having taken possession of the French settlement, made protests in London; however, finding that the French were unwilling to support them in war, it was not until 1770 that, acting on the orders of the Captain General of Buenos Aires, a Spanish force under Don Juan Ignacio de Madariaga, with four frigates, an xebec and 1,400 men arrived at Port Egmont, and ordered the settlers to leave, which they had no alternative but to do. When news of the action reached Britain a strongly worded diplomatic protest brought the two countries to the brink of war. After long negotiation, however, the government at Madrid agreed to disown the action, to return Port Egmont to Britain and 'to restore all things precisely to the state in which they were before the 10th of June, 1770'.[3] Such action, the Spanish Ambassador declared on behalf of his sovereign, 'cannot nor ought in any wise to affect the question of the prior right of sovereignty of the Malouine Islands, otherwise called Falkland's Islands'. No corresponding declaration was made on behalf of King George III.

Three years later the settlement at Port Egmont was withdrawn, a plaque being left behind on its site recording that the islands were the property of King George III. The Spanish presence on East Falkland lasted until the collapse of the Spanish empire in the Indies. In 1776 the islands were included in the jurisdiction of the Viceroy of Buenos Aires. But in 1811, a year after Buenos Aires had created its own government, the Spanish garrison at Port Louis (then called Puerto de la Soledad) was withdrawn on the orders of the Governor of Montevideo and the islands left uninhabited.

On 6 November 1820 a frigate, the *Heroína*, under the command of Colonel (*sic*) Daniel Jewitt, arrived at the Falklands and claimed to take possession of the group in the name of the government of the United Provinces of the Rio de la Plata, giving notice to the masters of more than fifty ships that he found there that the United Provinces prohibited all fishing or hunting on the islands. Subsequently the government at Buenos Aires in 1826 chartered a French merchant from Hamburg,

3. Goebel, p. 359.

Louis Vernet, to establish a settlement on the islands, naming him governor in 1828, and in a decree of 10 June 1829 formally claimed that Buenos Aires had succeeded to the claims of Spain at 25 May 1810. This claim was firmly disputed on behalf of Great Britain by its consul general, Woodbine Parish, shortly afterwards. Vernet was recalled to Buenos Aires when he seized three United States ships fishing off the islands, and in 1831 the Captain of the USS *Lexington* in reprisal destroyed the settlement, deported the settlers, and declared the islands again free of all government.

At this point the British government decided to reassert its claim to the islands, and dispatched HMS *Clio* and HMS *Tyne* to enforce it. On 2 January 1833, *Clio* arrived at Soledad, and its Captain, J. J. Onslow, informed the fifty Argentinians there under the command of Captain J. M. Pinedo of the Argentine schooner *Sarandi* of his orders to 'exercise the rights of sovereignty' over the islands. At 9.00 a.m. the next day, 3 January, Onslow raised the Union flag on the shore and delivered that of his opponent to him politely wrapped up in a bundle. From that date until 2 April 1982 the islands were peacefully and continuously administered as a British colony, though in the first year there was trouble with some escaped convicts who were still at large, and the first agents of the colony were murdered before the convicts were rounded up.[4]

The emergence of rival claims

It is directly from this action in 1833 that the current dispute stems. In order to determine the rights and wrongs of the matter, however, it is necessary to answer several questions. How did the Spanish and British claims to sovereignty arise? Did the British claim survive the period from 1774 to 1833? How was the Spanish claim transmitted to Argentina? Who had the better claim in 1833? What changes, if any, have been created by Britain's possession of the islands since 1833, and what, if any, by other changes in the nature of the international community and international law?

Between 1833 and 1842 there were several protests about the events of 1833 from the government at Buenos Aires. Later in the nineteenth century the protests were renewed, while a substantial literature began to develop in Spanish over the question. It was only after 1945, however, that Argentina, representing the question as one of decolonization, took up the matter within the context of the United Nations, and consolidated it with other claims to the Falkland Islands Dependencies and Antarctica which are not the subject of this paper. Today, following the war of 1982, the situation is that Britain continues to hold the islands and to exercise over them all the rights of sovereignty, and Argentina, refusing to negotiate a formal end to hostilities, has made it quite clear that it intends to continue to press its claims. The question is, therefore, very much a live political issue, and the political questions involved tend to make it very difficult to discern the true legal position, if, indeed, one exists. What makes it particularly difficult to the general public is the fact that the argument ranges back and forward over some 400 years of history. Though this is the inevitable consequence of the basic principle of international law that title is determined by the state of international law at the moment of acquisition of territory, this moment in itself and its circumstances are in dispute.

4. Peter Calvert, *The Falklands crisis: the rights and the wrongs* (London: Pinter, 1982), p. 7.

There is no known historical evidence of any formal claim to possession being made to any of the islands before 5 April 1764, and consequently it has been assumed that they were previously *res nullius*. If so, the declaration and occupation of East Falkland by the French would have had the effect of constituting that island, at least, as territory of the King of France, by right of occupation. Here, however, such certainty as exists evaporates. Goebel argues[5] that the declaration makes the subsequent British act of annexation invalid and of no legal effect. But the very fact that the British settlement took place unhindered is the clearest possible evidence that French occupation was not effective over other islands in the group, and, given the numbers involved, probably not as far as the island of East Falkland itself was concerned.

At first sight the transfer of the French rights in the islands to Spain on 25 February 1767 seems to have been a straightforward act of cession, enabling Spain thereafter to assert title in the islands, and to reinforce it by their own act of occupation. Again, unfortunately, the facts are not so simple, for Spain did not choose to regard the actions of 1767 *at the time* as an act of cession. Its protest to its ally, France, at the occupation rested on two grounds. One was purely political: that by making such a settlement the British would be impelled to follow suit and make settlements of their own. The other was the legal argument that the islands were in fact already part of the Spanish dominions by geographical proximity. The agreement between France and Spain for the release of the islands does not confirm that France accepted the grounds for the Spanish claim, but it does serve as evidence that they did accept the claim itself, for Bougainville is paid compensation for his personal expenses '*pour équipements et fondation de ses établissements illégitimes dans les Iles Malouines appartenant à Sa Majesté Catholique*'.[6]

At that time there were no Spanish settlements on the mainland of Patagonia, and indeed no settlements were made there until well on in the nineteenth century.[7] Even if there had been, however, the distance of the islands from the continent make it most improbable that the claim of geographical proximity would have been generally recognized in Europe at that time as valid. Today, of course, it is no longer recognized as a valid principle in international law, though it is still used by politicians, for example, by Sukarno in the case of West Irian.

When Spain protested to Britain at the British settlement, interestingly enough, quite a different argument was used: that settlement in the area by Britain was an express violation of Article VIII of the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht. This Article is long and complex. It establishes first that 'there be a free use of navigation and commerce between the subjects of each kingdom', i.e. Spain and Great Britain, 'as it was heretobefore in time of peace and before the declaration of this late war, in the reign of Charles II of glorious memory, Catholic King of Spain, according to the treaties of friendship, confederation and commerce which were formerly made between both nations . . .'. In fact this limited the use of the seas around Spanish possessions in the Indies to the carrying of slaves, and, as the Article later specifically confirmed, thereby excluded 'the French or any nation whatever' from trafficking with the Spanish colonies. Lastly:

5. Goebel, passim.
6. Goebel, p. 228.
7. J. C. J. Metford, 'Falklands or Malvinas? the background to the dispute', *International Affairs*, Summer 1968, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 463–81.

> . . . neither the Catholic King nor any of his heirs and successors whatsoever, shall sell, yield, pawn, transfer or by any means under any name alienate from them and the Crown of Spain to the French or to any nations whatever any lands dominions or territories or any part thereof belonging to Spain in America. On the contrary, that the dominions of Spain in America may be preserved whole and entire, the Queen of Great Britain engages that she will endeavour and give assistance to the Spaniards, that the ancient limits of their dominions in the West Indies be restored and settled as they stood in the time of the abovesaid Catholic King Charles II.

Now as Goebel, who is in no way a writer sympathetic to the British case, points out, Spain itself had accepted as early as 1648 that actual possession was the mark of ownership of land in the Indies, and 'by no perversion of fact is it possible to regard the Falklands as part of the Spanish dominions as they existed during the reign of Charles II'.[8] Hence, if the French settlement was valid, Spain could only obtain title by cession; if invalid, then the British settlement of 1766 constituted occupation of a *res nullius*. The documents are quite clear that the French settlement was relinquished as invalid and that no cession took place. A British claim by right of occupation seems incontrovertible.

It does not appear, however, that this claim was made, at least initially. Captain Hunt, commander of Port Egmont, in his confrontation with the Spaniards, claimed the islands for his sovereign on the grounds of prior discovery by John Davis in 1592. Neither he nor the British government could have been aware at the time that the transfer of the French settlement to the Spaniards was not regarded by either as an act of cession. In discussions of the declaration, moreover, Lord North seems to have rejected a Spanish counterclaim to prior discovery, so it seems clear that even at this late date the Spaniards were still using these archaic grounds as a basis for their own claim, rightly or wrongly. In also denying the Spanish right by occupation, North did, then, at least implicitly, make this claim on behalf of his own Crown.

As for the Treaty of Utrecht, the British simply did not regard it as applicable. In this, amusingly enough, they were at one with the French minister Choiseul, who had told the Spaniards as much. Moreover (a significant point, in view of the controversy over whether they should have done the same with Argentina in 1947), the British government offered to submit the matter to arbitration together with another issue troubling the two courts at the time. The offer was not accepted, no reply was made, and, for internal reasons, it was not until 25 February 1768 that orders were sent to Bucareli, the Captain General of Buenos Aires, to 'expel by force' any English settlements he might find. This, as noted above, he eventually did, bringing the two countries to the verge of war, a threat only finally averted by the joint declarations of 22 January 1771.

Of themselves, these declarations did nothing to alter the existing position with regard to sovereignty. What it has been claimed *did* is the fact that the negotiations were concluded only after the prime minister, Lord North, had verbally agreed to the proposal of Francés, the French chargé in London, that, if the satisfaction asked for were given, the ministry would agree subsequently to evacuate the islands.[9] It was therefore not solely on account of the expense of the colony, as was stated at

8. Goebel, p. 268.
9. Goebel, p. 308.

the time, but in fulfilment of this secret promise, that the settlement at Port Egmont was withdrawn in 1774. It would indeed be an irony if, two hundred years after losing for Britain the American colonies, Lord North should also be found responsible for losing the Falklands.

As far as international law is concerned, however, the existence or nonexistence of the secret agreement does not change the situation. The Spanish sources themselves make it quite clear that in agreeing to evacuate the islands the British government did not thereby renounce its claims, and consequently that its evacuation was *sine animo derelinquendi.* Thus, at a conference on 22 April 1771, the Earl of Rochford, the Secretary of State, made it quite clear that the ministry would deny any promise, and that in their view 'the reciprocal abandonment of the Falklands was a matter different from the question of right, which had never been settled, and even if they abandoned they could always return and occupy them reciprocally in case of dispute . . .'.[10] The leaving of the plaque of lead on the site of Port Egmont made this distinction quite clearly. What is more interesting—and is not mentioned by Argentinian publicists—is the fact that the withdrawal was, as the French mediators had originally proposed, to be reciprocal, and if this was the agreement that Spain did not comply with it. It is at least possible, therefore, that Britain's agreement to withdraw from the islands, precisely because of the political necessities of the day, was induced by considerations which afterwards were not fulfilled.

The Argentine claim—an anachronism?

If, then, Britain had a good claim to sovereignty in 1774, did this case survive the years until 1833? In the nature of intertemporal law this is very hard to answer. If Spain's claim had been decisively overcome before 1774 it almost certainly would have, though the only precedent then available was the involuntary abandonment of St Lucia in 1640, which had been occupied by the French within months. In the face of the evidence comprising the maintenance of the claim and the plaque, a long period of time—how long cannot now easily be determined—would have been needed to give Spain a title by prescription. As time went by, however, a contemporary arbitrator would inevitably have inclined towards Spain, and might well have considered (assuming that he thought Britain had a case in the first place) that the British claim had lapsed through neglect. By 1811 Spain had exercised all the rights of sovereignty in the islands for thirty-seven years, and by the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790 Britain had appeared to recognize this fact. Then, on the orders of the governor of Montevideo in what is now Uruguay, not only the garrison, but the entire settlement on East Falkland was withdrawn.

We must ask, therefore, how the Spanish claim to the islands passed to Argentina. The Argentinian publicists are surprisingly vague on this point. As one puts it: 'On November 6, 1820, the Provinces of the River Plate (Argentina) took possession of the Malvinas Islands as heirs to the Spanish possessions and proceeded to colonize them (*sic*)'.[11] The self-contradictory nature of this statement admirably illustrates the dilemma which Argentines face in making any claim whatsoever to

10. Goebel, p. 405.

11. *The ISDET Faculty's perspective* (Buenos Aires: Instituto Superior Evangelico de Estudios Teologicos, 1982), mimeograph.

the Falklands, and of which they have for a century and a half been resolutely and remarkably unaware.

Once again we must disregard modern notions of state succession and identify the international situation as it actually existed at the time. In 1810, there was as yet no generally accepted right for new nations to come into existence. Spain, having striven for three centuries to establish her colonial empire, was in no hurry to give it up, and had not as yet recognized the independence of a single one of its American territories. The Falklands had been abandoned in 1811 under pressure of military necessity and not with any intention of handing them over to Argentina, which in any case did not formally proclaim its independence until 1816. That independence was not recognized by Spain until 1859, twenty-six years after the Falklands had come back under British control, and involved no explicit transfer of sovereignty over the islands.[12] No act of cession or 'quasi-cession'[13] of rights in the Falklands took place, and, as Judge Huber remarked in the *Island of Palmas arbitration*, 'it is evident that Spain could not transfer more rights than she herself possessed'.[14]

If Argentina acquired sovereignty over the Falklands in 1820, therefore, as the act of formal possession purports to claim, it cannot be by transfer from Spain, but only by occupation, the only other of the accepted modes of acquiring sovereignty open to it at the time. No actual occupation took place until 1826, but this in itself is not an important consideration on this point, although it is in another respect, since it meant that in 1824 Britain's recognition of Buenos Aires did not include the Falklands. What is directly relevant is the question of whether the islands were *res nullius*. For this it would not in any way be sufficient to show that there had been an act of dereliction by Britain, which as we have seen cannot be proved, and which is denied by British publicists. It would also be necessary to prove that there had been an act of dereliction by Spain. There is no evidence that this is the case. Indeed, Spain's refusal to recognize the new state of affairs in the Americas, and in particular her attempt in the 1820s to reconquer the Rio de la Plata itself, is strong supporting evidence to the contrary. If, therefore, Spain was the sovereign power in the Falklands in 1811, it was still the sovereign power in 1820, and, for that matter, in 1833, for the brief period of Argentine occupation was much too short to enable Argentina to gain a title by prescription, even in the absence of Spanish protests.

But, it has been argued, the law of state succession is well established: 'In the matter of territory the sovereignty of the new state extends to those regions which in fact it controls successfully against the parent state. If this is not settled by treaty, the *de facto* exercise of sovereignty is the decisive factor. The question of succession to territory is therefore merely a question of power as between the new state and the parent state'.[15] If Goebel means by this to demonstrate the validity of the Argentine claim to the Falklands, at least four points must be made about it.

First of all, he is putting the cart before the horse; at best the view represents the state of the law at the end of the nineteenth century, not at its beginning—the result

12. Metford, pp. 468–73.
13. Michael Akehurst, *A modern introduction to international law. 3rd edn.* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1977), p. 141.
14. R. Y. Jennings, *The acquisition of territory in international law* (Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press), 1962), p. 16.
15. Goebel, p. 467.

of the experience of Latin American independence and not its antecedent. In 1810, in 1820, and for some indefinite period after the first international recognition of a Latin American state by the United States in 1823, there can be no doubt that under the rules of the prevailing international order Spain was the sovereign authority in the Americas.

Secondly, even today the position with regard to seceding states is not as clear as he seems to suggest. 'One of the peculiarities of secession is that an effective territorial entity can subsist for a period of time without any, or with only a provisional, legal status. If the entity subsequently establishes itself as a state, problems of commencement, continuity and responsibility arise'.[16] In his further discussion on these points, Crawford makes it clear that international law, intending to apply retroactively the effects of recognition to the earliest moment at which a recognizable entity could be discerned, does so only as a presumption; it will not act to ' "validate" governmental or state acts in the sense of curing any illegalities involved'.[17]

Thirdly, therefore, while it is undoubtedly true that in 1848, at the Congress of Lima, the Latin American states that then existed agreed among themselves to recognize in the fixing of boundaries the principle of *uti possidetis*, taking as reference the Spanish administrative boundaries of 1810, this decision inevitably recognized changes made since that time. Hence, though Argentina claimed the territory of the former Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires, both Paraguay and Uruguay, which had previously formed part of that entity, were recognized as separate states. This decision is of particular relevance, since the independence of Uruguay in particular involved not merely Spain and Uruguay, but a third state, Brazil, which annexed the disputed territory, thus constituting it for the first time and, as it proved, permanently as a distinct entity. Yet the historical fact is that hardly a single boundary in Latin America has survived unchanged since 1848, and that, despite the decision of the Congress, succession to territory in the Americas has depended almost wholly on power, not as against Spain, but as against one another, regardless of the principles involved, which, in any case, do not apply to outside states, Britain included.

Lastly, in view of the habit formed long afterwards of referring to 'Argentina' as an international actor in this early period, it must be stated as a matter of historical fact that in 1820 'Argentina' simply did not exist, and the 'United Provinces' were wholly disunited. It is not likely to be generally known, for example, that in claiming sovereignty over the Falklands in 1820, Colonel Jewitt acted effectively not on behalf of the Government of the United Provinces, since it did not exist, but the municipal government of the province of Buenos Aires.[18] Buenos Aires was independent of the rest of the provinces of 'Argentina' for much of the nineteenth century, before being finally joined with it. The point is, however, that in no way can we regard its colonial jurisdiction (as opposed to that of the Viceroyalty of the same name) as having extended to the Falklands, and consequently this act was invalid. Similar considerations apply to the other acts undertaken before 1829.

16. James Crawford, *The creation of states in international law* (Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press), 1979), p. 270.

17. Crawford, p. 388.

18. Thomas B. Davis, Jr, *Carlos de Alvear: man of revolution* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1955), p. 18.

Subsequently the events of 1831 and 1833 demonstrated clearly the ineffectiveness of the purported occupation of the islands.

We turn lastly to the British occupation of the islands in 1833. This action, as we have seen, followed British protests at Argentine activities on the islands, in which it was formally asserted that British claims had not been relinquished in 1774 since 'marks of possession had been left and all the formalities observed which indicated rights of ownership as well as an intention to resume the occupation'.[19] As we have already seen, there are good grounds for believing that those claims were valid, and that by protest and the dispatch of the *Clio* Britain revived them. I have also demonstrated that if this is not the case, the power alone able to assert sovereignty in the Falklands with any conviction was not Argentina, but Spain itself. The actions of Argentina in the 1820s, given Spain's prior claim and in the absence of evidence of her abandoning it, were therefore only those of squatters. As Palmerston told the Argentine Minister in London, Don Manuel Moreno, 'the Government of the United Provinces could not reasonably have anticipated that the British Government would permit any other state to exercise a right as derived from Spain which Great Britain had denied to Spain itself'.[20] It is the ultimate irony in the whole long story that in 1910, in a completely new age of international law, the British Foreign Office should have suddenly developed doubts about the grounds for its historic claim, which, after 1933, it was to seek to reinforce by adding new grounds for its claim of prescription.[21] After 1945, under the Charter of the United Nations, the Falklanders could finally claim, as Argentina had been one of the first to do, what was by now known as the 'principle of national self-determination'. But as in so many other cases, it was the earlier beneficiaries who now denied the same right to the later, and it was power that decided the question once more in 1982.

19. Goebel, p. 442.
20. Goebel, p. 457.
21. Beck, p. 53.

Self-determination and the Falklands

Denzil Dunnett*

'The sticking point for us is the right of self-determination.' Mrs Thatcher thus described the issue at the height of the Falklands crisis, speaking on the BBC *Panorama* programme on 26 April 1982. She went on to give some elucidation of the meaning of self-determination:

> The Falklanders' loyalty to Britain is fantastic. If they wish to stay British we must stand by them. Democratic nations believe in the right of self-determination. . . . The people who live there are of British stock. They have been for generations, and their wishes are the most important thing of all. Democracy is about the wishes of the people.

Speaking in the House of Commons, Mrs Thatcher did not use the word self-determination, but was clearly affirming the same general position: 'The people of the Falkland Islands . . . have the right to determine their own allegiance' (3 April 1982). Referring to 'the efforts we are making for a diplomatic solution', she said 'That solution must safeguard the principle that the wishes of the islanders shall remain paramount. . . . We have a long and proud history of recognizing the right of others to determine their own destiny' (14 April 1982).

Not everyone in the House, even on the government side, took exactly this position. Mr Edward Heath, while generally giving the government full support for its policy on the Falkland Islands, took, or implied, a different line over self-determination:

> Can one imagine an islander settling down in the Falklands in the future, and not asking himself, 'Will I at any moment again be invaded?' From that point of view, the situation can never be the same again. Therefore, in confirming these negotiations, the Foreign Secretary is right to say that the wishes of those in the Falkland Islands must be given full consideration, but not to resume our previous position, which was certainly adopted by the Government of 1970 to 1974, that they could veto any solution that was put forward.

Mr Ivor Stanbrook:

> Would my right honourable friend say that the principle of self-determination, which is one of the major principles of the United Nations Charter, should not apply to the Falklands?

Mr Nicholas Winterton:

> That is exactly what he is saying.

Mr Heath:

> Yes, we have said that before.

It has to be recognized, then, that not everyone, even at home, appreciates the axiomatic force of Mrs Thatcher's position. Abroad, the non-aligned countries who constitute the great majority at the United Nations have long recognized and

* Denzil Dunnett, CMG, OBE, was in the Diplomatic Service for thirty years. He is now retired.

recently (in March 1983 at the non-aligned summit meeting in Delhi) reaffirmed their support for Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falklands. Our closest allies press us, at least with their votes, to 'negotiate'. It is not, then, superfluous to consider whether Mrs Thatcher's or Mr Heath's position—or perhaps an alternative—is the soundest one to stand on.

At some risk of over-simplifying, Mrs Thatcher's position, in so far as it involves an appeal to self-determination, may be presented as resting on the following points:

1. Self-determination is universally approved as an imperative, not least in many solemn documents and declarations of the United Nations.
2. Self-determination means 'Let the people decide their destiny'.
3. The people means the inhabitants.
4. The inhabitants of the Falkland Islands have declared their firm wish to remain under British sovereignty.
5. Therefore the world, and in particular the United Nations, must approve the maintenance of British sovereignty over the Islands.

The fourth and fifth points may stand on their own. At least for domestic purposes it may be sufficient to assert and stand by these points, and for some it may seem to smack of disloyalty even to suggest that this position may need justification.

Nevertheless internationally we have at least in part rested our case on something like the first three points. Sir Nicholas Henderson effectively invoked self-determination in his television appearances in the United States. Some examination of the strength and implications of this appeal is worth attempting. I shall first mention some reasons for thinking that none of these three points is so clearly established as one might at first suppose. From this, I would like to proceed to offering a profile of the main rival views of self-determination (principally at the United Nations) and then consider whether any wider consensus of what it means is in sight, and whether this might have a bearing on the Falkland Islands issue.

The first point concerns the scope of self-determination, the second and third its meaning.

The first point—that self-determination is universally approved and universally applicable—is certainly lodged in Anglo-Saxon minds, even if its significance is not very clearly apprehended. However, so far from being universally approved, self-determination has inspired strong reservations even at the height of its success. President Wilson, the first and foremost exponent of the concept, and one who as arbiter of many destinies had unique opportunities for applying it in several continents at the end of the First World War, enunciated it thus in his Mount Vernon speech of 4 July 1918:

> What we seek is the rule of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind. Peoples are not to be bartered from sovereignty to sovereignty—as if they were mere chattels and pawns of a game. Every territorial settlement involved in this War must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the population concerned. Self-determination . . . is an imperative principle of action.

It is worth noting that Wilson spoke of the *interest*, not of the *wishes*, of the population.

Wilson's Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, wrote thus in his diary:

> The more I think about the President's declaration as to the right of 'self-determination' the more convinced I am of the danger of putting such ideas into the minds of certain races. It is bound to be the basis of impossible demands at the Peace Congress and create trouble in many lands. The phrase is simply loaded with dynamite. . . . What a calamity that the phrase was ever uttered!

While Lansing was conscious of the practical difficulties, there were also theoretical objectors, of whom perhaps the pithiest was the British constitutional authority Ivor Jennings, who commented thus on the 'doctrine' of self-determination: 'On the surface it sounded reasonable: let the people decide. In fact it was ridiculous because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who are the people'.[1] A more recent relevant reservation about self-determination was expressed in the historic resolution of the Organization for African Unity at its first Assembly at Cairo in July 1964 (with the significant dissenting voice of Somalia) affirming the maintenance of African frontiers as at the date of independence. This was in effect a decision not to allow self-determination to apply to Africa.

The above reservations of very different kinds about the applicability of self-determination were not made in a United Nations context. I shall consider below some other reservations which a majority at the United Nations have recognized. For the present these examples may suffice to show that self-determination is not universally accepted as an imperative in all cases.

The second leg of the argument was that self-determination means 'let the people decide'. There are various more sophisticated definitions of self-determination; but this is the essence of the matter. The dictionary definition, 'the independent determination by a state or community of its own policy' (OED), omits perhaps, by referring only to 'policy', the prior determination of the community whether to establish itself as an independent entity or throw in its lot with others. But this is not very different. The rapporteur of the relevant committee of the San Francisco Conference where the Charter was drafted in 1945 recorded that it was there made clear that an essential element of the principle of self-determination 'is a free and genuine expression of the will of the people'.

This definition—'let the people decide'—does not take one very far. It says nothing about the matters to be decided or the decision-making process—whether it has to be democratic or not—and the word 'let' cloaks the fact that someone outside the people in question, however delimited, has, as Ivor Jennings pointed out, to make positive prior arrangements. But it has the essential point.

The third part of the argument was the proposition that 'the people' means 'the inhabitants'. Here various distinctions must be drawn. Several United Nations texts (including the 1960 Declaration on a Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the International Covenants on Human Rights) affirm that 'all peoples have the right to self-determination'. In this sense self-determination is to be exercised by 'a people' meaning a considerable population who could contemplate constituting an independent state. Very small countries have certainly been given independence but it is doubtful if the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands would be considered to be 'a people' in this sense.

1. Ivor Jennings, *The approach to self-government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), pp. 55–6.

Even in cases where the population in question is fairly clearly 'a people' it is not necessarily coextensive with the inhabitants. Two examples may illustrate the difficulties. In the case of the Western Sahara, does 'the people' include the descendants of those who during the period of Spanish rule moved out, under whatever pressures, into adjacent Morocco? And given that the population is largely nomadic, with a high proportion at any given moment outside the area of the Western Sahara, shepherding their herds perhaps a thousand miles away across the desert, how many of these are to be included? Depending on how the criteria are chosen, the population whose self-determination is in question may be estimated at anywhere from 70,000 to at least 700,000. Another case was that of Djibouti where the outcome of any vote on its future largely depended on the period of prior residence to be required as a qualification for voting—were all the Somalis who had moved in quite recently to be admitted or not?

There is another way in which it is a mistake to speak as if 'the people' means the same as 'the inhabitants'. Even if they are co-extensive, we are referring to different things in the two expressions. 'The people' refers, or may refer, to a group. 'The inhabitants' refers to a set of individuals. The importance of the distinction emerges if we were to imagine the Falklands either incorporated into Argentina with the islanders—assuming that democracy was then functioning in Argentina—enjoying the vote in Argentine elections, or alternatively incorporated into the United Kingdom and enjoying the vote in British elections. If under these conditions decisions about the future of the islands were taken by the Argentine, or the British, parliament, one might judge that the islanders as individuals were enjoying about as much participation in the decision of their future as the size of modern states allows. The inhabitants might be said to be enjoying democratic rights. But 'the people' would not be enjoying self-determination. (This incidentally illustrates the need for care in speaking as if democracy and self-determination coincided).

The three points, then, on which I presented the standard position as resting are on inspection an imperfect structure. Self-determination is on all sides subject to reservations and limitations. Its meaning is fairly enough given as 'let the people decide', but this does not get one far when so much obscurity surrounds who 'the people' are, and in particular the identification of 'the people' with the inhabitants is dubious. One might conclude that self-determination is best left on one side, and that Mrs Thatcher was well advised not to refer to it explicitly when speaking in the House of Commons. But we can hardly leave the matter there. The reservations about the scope of self-determination which I have cited so far were not voiced in a United Nations context. To the extent that we regard that forum as the main focus of world opinion, it is important to establish to what extent doctrine and practice at the United Nations would regard self-determination as applicable to the Falklands.

The Charter mentions self-determination twice, first in Chapter I (Purposes and Principles) which in Article 1 declares that the purposes of the United Nations are:

1. To maintain international peace and security.
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.

The other reference is in Chapter IX (International Economic and Social Co-operation) which begins:

> With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the United Nations shall promote: (a) higher standards of living, full employment . . . (Article 55).

In the vast acreage of documents produced by the United Nations in the following years on the general principle (or 'right') of self-determination, the following landmarks may be identified:

1. The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This is the key text.
2. The Covenants on Human Rights.
3. The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (adopted without vote in the General Assembly on 4 November 1970).

I shall concentrate on the first, making only incidental reference to the other two.

The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples was adopted without a dissenting vote on 14 December 1960 (Resolution 1514(XV)). Two paragraphs may be singled out:

2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
6. Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

1960 was the year in which seventeen new members, all but one from Africa, were admitted to the United Nations. One of these countries, the Congo, now Zaire, was the scene of a tragedy which dramatized the issues confronting the newly independent African states. That these countries should wish to use the United Nations as a vehicle for their aspirations was anticipated not least by the Soviet Union, which sought to put itself at the front of this movement by proposing a text calling for the ending of all colonialism by 1962. However, the members of the Afro-Asian bloc were not prepared to have the ball taken away from them and it was their text which emerged as the Declaration cited above, while the Soviet proposal was not adopted.

Six issues

While the Declaration was accepted without a single opposing vote, the abstention of the United Kingdom and other administering powers reflected various reservations which they had expressed over similar wording during the previous years, for example in the discussions of the various drafts of the Covenant or Covenants on Human Rights. The points on which the main administering powers were generally agreed (as conveniently summarized for example in the report on the Third Committee discussions in the United Nations Yearbook for 1952) were:

1. The right of self-determination must be subordinate to the maintenance of world peace.

2. There was discrimination against certain states, i.e. the administering powers, in the text proposed.
3. Obligations were imposed which were not laid down in the Charter.
4. The Charter, while imposing a 'sacred trust' on administering powers, recognized the need to take into account a people's capacity for full government, i.e. for gradual advance.
5. The administration of non-self-governing territory fell within the domestic jurisdiction of the state responsible.
6. No definition had been established of such terms as 'peoples', 'nations' and 'the right of self determination'.

Some comment on each of these may clarify the nature of the general confrontation between the positions of what one may for convenience call the administering powers and the anti-colonialists.

The first point was that the exercise of the right of self-determination must be subordinated to the maintenance of world peace. The text of the Charter would seem to support this view, but it did not prevail. The Articles of the Charter quoted above clearly place self-determination in the context of contributing to peaceful and friendly relations among nations. But the United Nations was to see a dramatic reinterpretation of this. The majority swung to Krishna Menon's doctrine that 'colonialism constitutes permanent aggression' (the Indian case for the occupation of Goa). Firstly, various resolutions (e.g. 2621XXV) 'reaffirmed' that 'all peoples have the right to self-determination and independence and that the subjection of peoples to alien domination constitutes a serious impediment to the maintenance of international peace and security'. Peoples under colonial domination were therefore entitled to restore the right of self-determination to themselves 'by any means at their disposal' (2949XXV). This was specified as authorizing, for example, the supply of arms from abroad to 'freedom fighters'.

Another corollary was to approve the claim of prisoner-of-war status for any captured freedom fighters (Resolution VIII of the 1968 Conference at Tehran to review the progress made in twenty years on the universal Declaration of Human Rights). Along the same road was the resolution condemning France for 'aggression' in organizing a referendum in one of the Comoros Islands, Mayotte, in which its inhabitants voted overwhelmingly to remain attached to France rather than throw in their lot with the other Comoros Islands which had asserted their independence.

On the subordination of self-determination to the maintenance of world peace, the administering powers may thus be thought to have lost the argument in the 1950s and 1960s. But one result of the 1982 Falklands episode may be to show that even non-aligned countries who had supported Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falklands were made nervous by Argentina's resort to force. They were not prepared to take the line that 'colonialism is permanent aggression' and any action against it is therefore self-defence. The pendulum has swung back, but not, it is worth noting, exactly to the original position of the administering powers. It is no longer a question of weighing self-determination against world peace, but of de-colonization against world peace, and it is appreciated that in cases like the Falklands the causes of self-determination and decolonization are not at all the same thing. I shall return to this point below.

The second of the reservations of the administering powers referred to their complaint of being discriminated against by the text originally proposed (in the

recommendations of the Commission on Human Rights on international respect for the self-determination of peoples)—a discrimination which an amendment proposed by Mrs Roosevelt would have corrected, but her proposal was rejected.

It is a larger question than can be dealt with here how the force of the anti-colonialist drive, dressed in the language of self-determination, came to be directed almost exclusively at the already half-dismantled empires of European powers, and not at other, no less—many would say far more—suitable targets. My comments are confined to drawing attention to some United Nations texts exhibiting how what was known in Whitehall as the Salt Water Fallacy was quietly adopted. The Salt Water Fallacy was the doctrine that to control territory from which you are separated by salt water is wrong; otherwise it is all right.

The key text to which all appealed was the 'domestic jurisdiction' clause, Article 2.7 of the Charter: 'Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state . . .'. This was firmly invoked by the Soviet Union to prevent discussion of matters internal to its frontiers and, less successfully, in various degrees by the administering powers to restrict discussion of their non-self-governing territories.

United Kingdom spokesmen did, of course, draw attention to the apparent Soviet inconsistency. Mr Godber for example, as he then was, as Minister of State, pointed out to the Assembly in 1961 that the Soviet Union since the Second World War had seized 200,000 square miles of territory in which they had established bases and held the population in subjection by armed force. He mentioned that they had submitted no information about the Kurile Islands which they annexed in 1945. In the following year Sir Patrick Dean also pointed out in Plenary Assembly that 'in 1815 the whole of Ceylon came under British rule, at the same time as Azerbaijan was being occupied by Russia. Ceylon achieved independence in 1947: when, may one ask, can we hope to see Azerbaijan independent?'

Nevertheless, majority opinion in the United Nations agreed with the Iraqi delegate who in the 1952 Assembly expressed the view that Article 2.7 of the Charter could not be applied in respect of territories geographically removed from the sovereign state responsible for their administration. The convenient converse of this was that this article *can* be invoked in cases where territories are *not* geographically removed from the states responsible for their administration. Perhaps the Iraqi delegate had the Kurds in mind.

Paragraph 6 of the 1960 Declaration, already cited, may at first sight seem equally innocuous: 'Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.' It will be necessary to come back to this key passage in connexion with territorial integrity, but it may be seen in the present context as a subtle affirmation of the Salt Water Fallacy in so far as it implies a vision of a world of homogeneous geographically cohesive states.

The United Kingdom and other Western powers abstained in the vote on the 1960 Declaration. Perhaps for this reason various states required an additional 'safeguard' when it came to what might be called the tidying-up exercise of the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States. This safeguard clause, tabled by the United Kingdom[2]

2. Sir Ian Sinclair, 'Principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states' in *Essays in international law in honour of Krishan Rao* (Delhi: Thompson, 1975).

(and the feats of draftsmanship involved are considerable) played a vital part in enabling this Declaration to be adopted without dissent. It reads: 'States enjoying full sovereignty and independence and possessed of a representative government, effectively functioning as such with respect to all distinct peoples within their territory, shall be considered to be conducting themselves in conformity with this principle (i.e. self-determination) as regards these peoples.' Perhaps one can cling to the reference to representative government and claim that thereby the game was not quite given away, but this text must be taken to seal away the prospect of invoking the principle of self-determination against aspects of the Soviet system.

To sum up on this point, one can say that the administering powers were discriminated against, but perhaps now that so little remains of their empires the issue is on the way to being obsolete. The Soviet presence in Afghanistan has been a reminder that the decolonization drive might have other objects worthy of its continued attention. The Helsinki agreements included references to 'self-determination for all peoples' and mark a shift away from the implication of some of the United Nations texts that only those living under colonial or racist regimes were intended to benefit from it. The pendulum has moved perceptibly back.

The third point of the administering powers was that obligations were being imposed which were not laid down in the Charter. There is little point in labouring this issue at this stage. There were several weaknesses in the position. The administering powers had themselves initiated changes in the structure envisaged by the Charter—for example, the experience of the Soviet veto in the Security Council had prompted the Uniting for Peace resolution which allowed the General Assembly to approve action to deal with threats to the peace and thus contributed to a progressive (though at times halted or even reversed) decline in the Security Council's authority.

The anti-colonial group sought over the years to establish the view that the various United Nations resolutions and declarations on self-determination themselves added new positive obligations to existing international law and in particular to the Charter. While this did not impress the legal advisers of the administering powers, it elicited from the Office of Legal Affairs of the UN Secretariat the opinion that the various UN declarations 'may by custom become recognised as laying down rules binding upon States' (Memorandum of 2 April 1962). Some Western authorities of some weight were also inclined to recognize the legal content of the principle of self-determination.[3]

The administering powers' fourth point was that the Charter emphasized the 'sacred trust' resting with administrative powers to lead their dependent territories to self-government, thereby recognizing that there had to be stages to the achievement of self-government. On this issue, the opposite positions were miles apart. The United Kingdom, claiming credit for a broadly successful management of the transformation of its empire into independent states, felt that its experience demonstrated the need for stages: for the progressive construction of institutions able to bear the weight before independence was conferred. If this had proved the justified course even in countries as advanced as India, how much more so in, let us say, New Guinea or other places which had yet to learn about the wheel? In shaking their heads over the events in the Congo from 1960 onwards, many were

3. See for example Dr Ian Brownlie, 'Essay on the history of the principle of self-determination' in *Grotian Society Papers, 1968*.

apt to put the blame on Belgium for failing to go through the necessary stages of preparation for independence.

The anti-colonialists, on the contrary, blamed precisely the imperialist presence for the relative backwardness of dependent territories: the first condition of progress was to remove that presence. This line was laced with the Marxist analysis of 'imperialism as the final stage of capitalism' which claimed that that exploitation of dependent territories, principally by harnessing their economies to the requirements of the industrialized world, was what had kept capitalism going, and that terminating this dependence would therefore have two beneficial results; first, the restoration of the natural growth of these territories' economies, and secondly the acceleration of the general crisis of capitalism.

There was little meeting of minds on this issue. The majority in the United Nations took the second view and expressed it in the third point of the Declaration: 'Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational prepared-ness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.' Subsequently, however, there has been increased appreciation that it is not necessary to insist on full independence even for small and remote Pacific Islands. At one time a UN sub-committee recommended that Britain should give independence to Pitcairn Island with its eighty-seven inhabitants. More recently—beginning perhaps with the acceptance of the voluntary association of the Cook Islands with New Zealand in 1965—there has been general acquiescence in the attachment of such small territories to larger entities. In other words, some recognition has crept back of the need for 'viability', a concept at variance with the doctrine of the Declaration of 1960.

The fifth point of the administering powers (the invocation of Article 2.7 exempting 'matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states' from United Nations intervention) has already been touched on in the context of the Salt Water Fallacy. The question has become largely irrelevant. As mentioned below, the Western powers have accepted the description of self-determination as a right, for example in the International Covenants on Human Rights and in the Declaration on Principles of 1970. To the extent that it has been accepted in that context that one state may concern itself with the performance of another state in human rights matters, it is difficult, now that we have accepted that self-determination is a kind of human right, to invoke the domestic jurisdiction clause of the UN Charter against external attention to the measure of self-determination operative within territory for which a state is responsible.

The definition of self-determination

The sixth and final criticism of the administering powers was that the right of self-determination could hardly be asserted as a positive legal obligation when no definition had been established of such terms as 'people', 'nation', and 'the right to self-determination'. In 1958 the United States had managed to secure approval in the Economic and Social Council for a proposal to establish an *ad hoc* commission to conduct a thorough survey of the concept of self-determination. But this proposal was rejected when it came before the Third Committee. Various grounds were given by the anti-colonialists for rejecting this proposed study, for instance that it would serve only to delay still further the active exercise of the right to self-determination.

A more subtle objection was voiced by the Pakistani representative and constitutes a continuing strand in anti-colonialist thought:

> The international community has reached a sufficient degree of maturity to be able to distinguish between genuine self-determination and self-determination used as a cloak for secession. In the last analysis could it not be said that the expressions 'people' and 'nations' are purely legal concepts independent of political, social and economic factors? Could it be said that any attempt at definition might prove dangerous to subject peoples by providing those who govern them with pretexts for denying them self-determination?[4]

Thus the anti-colonialists wished to reserve it for the 'mature' judgement of the international community, whether in any particular case a group is to be recognized as a people entitled to self-determination. Before dismissing this as transparently placing in the driving seat the 'non-aligned' majority at the United Nations in the guise of the 'international community' we might recall that the numerous academic efforts to define 'people' and 'nation' have been inconclusive. None of the suggested criteria of language, race, culture or common history has more than limited validity, and one is left with the circular statement that a people is a group which considers itself to be a people.

In one way the administering powers were quite reasonable in saying that, while 'principles' can be expressed in general terms, before you make something into a legal 'right' you should define its terms. But if they implied that an agreed definition of 'people' and 'nation' might be reached by further study, they were perhaps over-optimistic. One must also distinguish the problem of defining the term 'a people' from identifying and defining a people in a concrete case. No doubt an answer to the first problem would be helpful in dealing with the second. But not perhaps indispensable. An elephant may be difficult to define but fairly easy to recognize.

Ivor Jennings suggested that self-determination was 'ridiculous' because somebody has to decide who the people are. It is true that in many cases this may be a difficult decision (as for example in the instances of the Western Sahara and Djibouti which I have mentioned) and that someone outside the population that is to exercise self-determination has to set the scene. These are limitations which should give pause to any who exalt self-determination into an absolute value, but they do not make it ridiculous or unimportant. To put it at its lowest, the technique of plebiscites has worked in providing accepted solutions in what might have remained very difficult situations (e.g. in the Saar and again in 1961 in the British trust territory of the Cameroons, whereby the Northern Region of that territory joined Nigeria and the Southern Region joined the Republic of Cameroon).

There is much else that could be said about the definition of self-determination, but in so far as the lack of a definition was a bone of contention, one might say that there is little reason for it to be so still. It was a divisive issue at one stage because the anti-colonialists regarded it as important to their cause, that the grant of self-determination should be made legally obligatory for administering powers, and the latter resisted this on the ground that while self-determination was clear enough in principle, it could not be made a legal right unless it was more accurately specified. The heat has gone out of the issue for many reasons, including the fact that the

4. The version quoted is that given in the Report on the Right of Self-determination by Mr Aureliu Cristescu, special Rapporteur of the Sub-commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities set up by the UN Human Rights Commission at its 30th session in February 1974.

United Kingdom and other Western powers have accepted the description of self-determination as a 'right' (e.g. in the International Covenants on Human Rights).

On all six of the old divisive issues, therefore, the scene has changed and the grounds for disagreement have been reduced.

Territorial integrity

Over the shoulder of the domestic jurisdiction question, however, the related issue of 'territorial integrity' has even more conspicuously emerged as a central difficulty in dealing with the main colonial problems still confronting the United Kingdom and the United Nations. It is another interesting case of the transformation of a phrase's meaning. The Charter's words (Article 2.4: 'All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state') seem to refer to the existing territorial pattern. Those words are at first sight merely echoed in the Declaration of 1960 (para. 6: 'Any attempt at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations') but they have been given a totally different twist. The Argentine Foreign Minister quoted this passage of the Declaration as meaning that 'in certain situations the applicable principle is that of territorial integrity and not that of self-determination'. The doctrine was spelt out in Resolution 2353 (XXII): 'any colonial situation which partially or completely destroys the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter.'

Of course one might say that to apply these words as Señor Aguirre Lanari did begs in the first place the question of sovereignty, the question of what the territory is. But again there has been an implied shift in the meaning of 'territorial integrity'. References by various Latin American speakers to the continental shelf and 'facts of geography' suggest that 'territorial integrity' might mean something like 'geographical cohesion'. Señor Aguirre Lanari quoted some cases in which he claimed the General Assembly had 'determined' that the exercise of self-determination 'should yield to other rights which, as is the case with territorial integrity, more adequately respond to the specific problems posed in connection with certain territories which are subject to colonial domination, such as the Malvinas Islands, Gibraltar, Mayotte, the Malagasy Islands and the Islands off the coast of Namibia'.

In the case of Gibraltar it is true that Spain claimed that self-determination did not apply. It is not clear that even the majority in the General Assembly who voted in a pro-Spanish sense recommending negotiations intended to endorse this Spanish position. Mayotte has been mentioned above. The other instances cited by Sr Aguirre Lanari are minor and unresolved, but certainly illustrate his point. Sr Aguirre Lanari did not mention other more considerable cases which might have reminded some among the non-aligned group of issues which had divided them.

The most relevant case is one involving Indonesia. When the United Nations discussed the future of Western New Guinea (West Irian) prior to the Dutch withdrawal in 1963, the main body of Indonesia's supporters (including India, Japan, Malaysia and many Arab countries) took the line that the issue before the Assembly was not one of self-determination but of affirming the national unity and territorial integrity of Indonesia. Nevertheless the resolution eventually adopted did refer to self-determination: the inhabitants were to exercise their right of self-

determination before the end of 1969 and decide whether they wished to remain with Indonesia or sever their ties with it. An 'act of free choice' eventually took place. The Secretary-General's representative reported that 'with the limitations imposed by the geographical characteristics of the territory and the general political situation in the area, an act of free choice has taken place in West Irian, in accordance with Indonesian practice—in which the representatives of the population have expressed their wish to remain with Indonesia'. He added some serious reservations. A number of African countries expressed their view that the people of West Irian had *not* exercised their right to self-determination.

Another relevant example is Hong Kong. There was no opposition to the Chinese request that Hong Kong be omitted from the list of territories to which the 1960 Declaration applied. The implication of this was that there should be no question of applying the normal de-colonization processes to Hong Kong: to put it another way, the territorial integrity of China would take absolute priority over any question of self-determination.

There is no point in not recognizing that the United Nations has on occasion allowed precedence over self-determination to other considerations, in particular territorial integrity. It is rather something to be built on. It is in line with a traditional British position, reflected in the Charter's words, that self-determination may have to be subordinated to the requirements of world peace. It is in line with the position that self-determination is a principle rather than an absolute right. All this can be said objectively without trying to score points or claim posthumous victories in long-past controversies. On this kind of basis it should be possible in due course to construct a revised doctrine of self-determination giving it high but not supreme importance in the scale of social or political values.

Another important point which emerges from the speeches by many Third World countries both during the debates on the Falklands and in earlier debates, for example that on West Irian, is that even in cases where 'territorial integrity' is held to prevail over self-determination importance is attached to the expression of the wishes of the population. If this point has embedded itself in world thinking from all the discussions of decolonization and self-determination, it is something to cherish.[5] The problem is to find a proper place for this previous element, without either making it into an absolute imperative or relegating it to insignificance.

Here I suggest drawing something from recent philosophical thought and in particular from Isaiah Berlin's fruitful distinction between positive and negative liberty.[6] Positive freedom is 'being one's own master' or at least identifying oneself with those exercising mastery. Negative freedom consists in the absence of restrictions, 'is not being prevented from choosing as I do by other men'. Thus, positive freedom might exist in a community subject to a detailed and rigorous code of rules. Negative freedom might exist in a community subject to an almost totally inactive monarch. Isaiah Berlin identifies self-determination with positive liberty. While he holds the balance fairly even between the two kinds of liberty, he

5. At the non-aligned summit meeting in Delhi in March 1983 a declaration was adopted backing Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands but insisting that the wishes of the islanders should be considered in any negotiation. According to *The Times*, 10 March 1983,'informed sources said that the Argentine delegation had tried to have the provision concerning the islanders' wishes deleted, but had failed to muster enough support'.

6. See Isaiah Berlin, 'Two concepts of liberty' in *Four essays on liberty* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969).

recognizes that the positive conception has lent itself as a matter of history to the splitting of human personality into two, to theories of 'higher' or 'real' selves (since positive liberty might mean mastery over one's 'lower' self) and hence to various forms of authoritarianism. He clearly prefers negative to positive liberty.

Isaiah Berlin enables us to recognize that self-determination is not identical with every kind of liberty. To the extent that a population identifies itself with its government it may be said to enjoy positive liberty. On many grounds it is unreasonable to imply (as perhaps Mrs Thatcher's words might suggest) that only countries with democratic institutions in our sense can really know what self-determination is. But furthermore he enables us to appreciate that liberty of this kind is not the one and only valuable quality of a society: another kind of liberty is at least as precious. Self-determination emerges as a valuable but not an absolutely supreme principle.

To come down to earth and back to the Falklands, it may now be easier to arrive at an answer which respects the wishes of the inhabitants as being very important but not necessarily paramount to the extent that no other consideration has any weight against them.

There is no need for Britain to place itself in the position of France in whose constitution there is a provision that no change in French territory (including overseas territory) can be made without the consent of the population.[7] Perhaps France has been haunted by Rousseauesque doctrines of a general will, which is a version of Isaiah Berlin's positive liberty. At all events this provision in the constitution has occasioned considerable difficulties for France when disposing of territories like Pondicherry, Djibouti, and now Mayotte.

One can believe the wishes of the population to be very important—important enough to fight and die for—without having to assert that they are absolutely paramount.

One partly imaginary illustration may show how, while men and land may be incommensurable in value, it is not necessarily foolish in making political decisions to allow weight to other factors than the human. At the turn of the century Chile and Argentine referred to the United Kingdom the delimitation of the frontier between the two countries in a part of the very far south of the continent. The British teams went to great lengths to determine for example where the watershed lay. On such geographical considerations, I understand, the adjudication was arrived at. The area in question was virtually uninhabited, although squatters from both Argentina and Chile had lodged themselves in some of the valleys. Would it have been sensible to determine the frontier by asking them which country they wished to belong to?[8]

7. Constitution of 4 October 1958, Article 53: '*Nulle cession, nul échange, nulle adjonction de territoire n'est valable sans le consentement des populations intéressées*'.

8. The geography is very contorted, with rivers at some places drawing their waters from the east-facing slopes of the peaks but flowing round through valleys to discharge into the Pacific, so that balanced judgements had to be made involving the division of some valleys between the two countries.

A similarly disputed stretch of the Andes further north (the Puna de Atacama) was referred by Argentina and Chile at the same time to the adjudication of the American Minister in Buenos Aires: 'Accordingly Mr Buchanan with two colleagues—who represented Argentine and Chilean interests respectively—evolved a theoretical boundary by the simple process of drawing straight lines on a map from point to point.' See Col. Sir Thomas Hungerford Holdich, RE, *The countries of the King's Award* (London: Hurst & Blackett, 1904).

The delegate of Zaire in the General Assembly debate on the Falklands in November 1982 asked whether the question was about people or about land. The answer must be that it is about both, and there is no need to seek to give absolute importance to one or the other. On both aspects the British title is strong, though not at present generally accepted. To gain the wider support for it which we may need over the years, we should avoid taking up extreme positions for which there is no clear case, but seek rather to enlarge the possible area of agreement on the scope and meaning of self-determination, recognizing some limitations on it.

Britain's Antarctic dimension

Peter J. Beck*

During the decade or so prior to the Falklands War of 1982 there were clear signs that British governments were losing interest in the South-west Atlantic region as a whole, and consequently in the future of the British possessions located there, that is, the Falkland Islands, the Falkland Islands Dependencies (South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands) and British Antarctic Territory (South Orkneys, South Shetlands and the mainland sector centred upon Graham Land between 20° and 80° W). However, this situation was transformed by the Falklands War of April–June 1982, since this Anglo-Argentine conflict, which embraced both the Falklands and the Dependencies, resulted in the adoption of a more positive and committed British policy towards not only the islands regained from Argentine occupation but also the neighbouring British Antarctic Territory.

There are, nevertheless, several elements of continuity in British policy towards Antarctica, including the maintenance of territorial claims to British Antarctic Territory, support for the continued development of the Antarctic Treaty system and an interest in the scientific research conducted by the British Antarctic Survey.[1] But since the Falklands War the South-west Atlantic has become an area of higher priority in official thinking, and this transformation of attitude has been accompanied by a large increase in the level of Britain's material commitment towards the Falklands, the Falkland Islands Dependencies and the British Antarctic Territory.

Such developments offer a marked contrast to the position at the close of 1981 and during the early months of 1982, when the British government's policy towards the South-west Atlantic region was being criticized both in parliament and in the mass media for its lack of commitment to the area. For example, on 5 November 1981 Michael Shersby, a Conservative backbencher, expressed his concern on the matter, while a fuller debate and critique took place in the House of Lords' discussion inaugurated by Lord Morris on 16 December 1981.[2] On 15 December an Early Day Motion was tabled in the House of Commons to the effect:

> 'That this House declares its determination that the Falkland Islands and Dependencies shall remain under British rule in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders and that British interests in the South Atlantic and in the British Antarctic Territories shall be protected and advanced; draws attention to the importance of preserving the international cooperation enshrined in the Antarctic Treaty . . . and calls upon Her Majesty's Government to demonstrate its commitment to maintaining a tangible presence in the area.[3]

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1. Peter Beck, Memorandum on 'Britain and Antarctica', 4 Dec. 1982 in *House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence: 13 December 1982*, pp. 109–12.

2. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 12, cols. 177–81, 5 Nov. 1981; *Hansard* (Lords), Vol. 426, cols. 208–37, 16 Dec. 1981.

3. Keith Speed, *Sea change: the battle for the Falklands and the future of Britain's navy* (Bath: Ashgrove, 1982), p. 117.

Such motions, while rarely debated, provide the opportunity for the expression of backbench opinion, and within a short period some 170 MPs had signed. Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, was concerned about the views embodied in the Early Day Motion and the Lords debate, and was led to discuss the implications with John Nott, the Minister for Defence.[4] Parliamentary criticism was reinforced by articles and letters in the press in favour of the maintenance of British interest in the Falklands and Antarctica.[5] The parliamentary and media critics of British policy concentrated upon what Lord Morris described in December 1981 as 'the uninterest of successive Governments . . . there are indications of increasing uninterest by Her Majesty's Government in maintaining and encouraging developments in that part of the world' (i.e. the South-west Atlantic).[6]

This point had been highlighted by the failure of both Labour and Conservative governments to implement some of the more significant recommendations of the 1976 Shackleton Report[7]—a detailed two-volume survey of the economic prospects of the Falklands. Although quantitatively most of the report's proposals were acted upon, the 'most important' ones, such as the recommendation to extend the runway at Stanley, were shelved, as the revised Shackleton Report of 1982 noted bitterly at the start of its survey.[8] Cost was given as the prime reason for non-implementation, for, as Anthony Crosland, the Foreign Secretary, stated in February 1977, 'we cannot at this time accept the more costly recommendations . . . there are more urgent claims'.[9] Fiscal allocations reflect policy priorities, and the low political significance of the South-west Atlantic region could not be disguised.

In addition, the anxiety to cooperate with Argentina—and certainly not to provoke its antagonism—was interpreted as further evidence of Britain's lack of conviction about its role in the South-west Atlantic area—even if it might be regarded also as more the result of a realistic appreciation of the geopolitical and other realities, which rendered the region's economic development a function of Anglo-Argentine cooperation. Crosland implied this in February 1977, when he asserted that 'it is cooperation not confrontation . . . which we seek to achieve', and during the succeeding period the continuing Anglo-Argentine impasse over the sovereignty of the Falklands and Falklands Dependencies contributed to an official reluctance to pump development aid into the region.[10] In December 1980 Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the Conservative administration, claimed that the future of the islands was 'blighted' by the sovereignty dispute; thus, the islands suffered from a process of economic and demographic decline in spite of references to their offshore resource potential. 'It has not proved possible under the Government of either party to exploit those resources, either of fish or oil, because of the deadhand of the dispute with

4. *Falkland Islands Review. Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors*, Chairman The Rt Hon. The Lord Franks, Cmnd. 8787 (London: HMSO, 1983), p. 34.

5. For example, see letter from Sir Vivian Fuchs (ex-head of the Survey) and E. G. Irving, *The Times*, 26 Oct. 1981; Lesley Garner, 'What is red, white and blue with black prospects?', *The Sunday Times*, 1 Nov. 1981; Admiral Sir Edmund Irving, 'Does withdrawal of *Endurance* signal a Falkland Islands desertion?', *Geographical Magazine*, January 1982, Vol. LIV, No. 1, pp. 3–4.

6. *Hansard* (Lords), Vol. 426, cols. 208–209, 16 Dec. 1981.

7. Lord Shackleton, *Economic survey of the Falkland Islands*, Vols. 1–2 (London: Economist Intelligence Unit, 1976); Lord Franks, *Report*, p. 12.

8. Lord Shackleton, *Falkland Islands. Economic study 1982* (London: HMSO, 1982), p. 5.

9. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 925, cols. 550–552, 2 Feb. 1977.

10. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 925, cols. 550–552, 2 Feb. 1977.

Argentina. We are seeking to find a solution in order to make that possible'.[11] The resulting desire 'to work with the countries of the region', especially Argentina, prevailed into 1981–2.[12]

It was, however, the British government's commitment to respect the principle of self-determination—the islanders' desire to 'keep the Falklands British'—in conjunction with all-party backbench support for the islanders, which prevented any real progress in the annual rounds of Anglo-Argentine sovereignty negotiations. The lack of achievement, and particularly the failure of the February 1982 discussions held in New York, served not only to increase Argentine impatience on the sovereignty issue but also to reinforce, on the Argentine side, the case for a military solution.

Argentina was already in occupation of part of the Falkland Islands Dependencies—Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office regarded the establishment of the scientific station in 1976 as an illegal act and as part of an escalating and aggressive Argentine policy centred upon the acquisition of the Falklands but covering also other British possessions in the South-west Atlantic region.[13] Although the British government complained to Argentina about the Thule occupation and pressed for evacuation, no other attempt was made to remove the base from an island group visited only rarely by British ships and treated officially as of marginal scientific and economic value. A British naval task force had been sent secretly to the South Atlantic in November 1977, but this was intended to cover only the eventuality of Argentine moves against the Falklands themselves.[14] The British government's *public* attitude did little to incline the Argentine authorities to assume that much importance was attached in London to the South Sandwich Islands, especially as the Thule occupation was not made public until May 1978.[15] In *private*, more official concern was expressed about the occupation, but the British government feared that any attempt to remove the base might cause retaliatory Argentine moves against British Antarctic Survey personnel on South Georgia or Survey ships.

Britain's low-key response to the Thule occupation, and its clear preference for negotiation, encouraged Argentina to believe that the Falkland Islands Dependencies as a whole might be within its grasp, especially as the episode appeared to fit into an overall pattern of British withdrawal from the South-west Atlantic region. This assumption was reinforced by developments in South Georgia. During the late 1970s and early 1980s the fiscal problems of the British Antarctic Survey, which arose primarily out of years of level funding and of escalating logistical costs (for example, for fuel, aircraft, ships and bases) became more serious, and resulted in the curtailment and rationalization of its research programmes as well as in staffing reductions. Inevitably, this caused a diminution in Britain's presence in the areas of British Antarctic Survey activity, that is, in the British Antarctic Territories and South Georgia; one consequence was a serious decline in the number of BAS

11. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 994, col. 200, 2 Dec. 1980. See Peter J. Beck, 'Cooperative confrontation in the Falkland Islands dispute: the Anglo-Argentine search for a way forward 1968–81', *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, February 1982, Vol. 24, No. 1, pp. 37–56.

12. *Hansard* (Lords), Vol. 426, col. 235, 16 Dec. 1981.

13. Edward Rowlands, 'Five years before the invasion: Why the Navy went to the Falklands', *The Times*, 15 Jan. 1983.

14. Edward Rowlands, *The Times*, 15 Jan. 1983; Lord Franks, *Report*, p. 18.

15. *Hansard* (Lords), Vol. 391, cols. 976–982, 10 May 1978; *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 950, cols. 1549–1551, 24 May 1978; Lord Franks, *Report*, pp. 14–15, p. 18.

personnel not only *in toto* from 357 in 1973–4 to about 300 in 1982–3 but also, of those staying in Antarctica all the year around, from 83 in 1980 to 58 in 1982.[16] The need for BAS to operate 'within strict financial and staffing limits' led in 1981 to a discussion about either the closure or the transfer to a smaller building of the Grytviken base on South Georgia. In the event, the base remained open, albeit only 'at a reduced level' and with the help of Falkland Island Dependency funds, while the episode merely confirmed Argentine confidence about Britain's basic lack of commitment to the region.[17]

In its analysis of 'British Government policies which may have served to cast doubt on British commitment to the (Falkland) Islands and their defence', the 1983 Franks Report identified the significance of two events in mid-1981.[18] The first was the publication of the British Nationality Bill which included provisions depriving the islanders of full British citizenship, while the other—probably the most influential signal received in Buenos Aires—was the decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance* in 1982. This ice patrol ship had been threatened in various previous defence reviews, and its forthcoming demise as part of the 1981 Defence Review was interpreted both in Britain and abroad as a major portent of a lack of serious British interest in the South Atlantic region. *Endurance* had, through its hydrographic activities, its contribution to certain BAS research programmes (for example, seal and penguin counts) and its general support function,[19] played an important role there. In particular, *Endurance* had fulfilled occasional rescue activities for the Antarctic Survey, and during the 1980–1 season it had towed one of the latter's ships, RRS *John Biscoe*, over 1,600 kilometres for repairs in Montevideo. But the ship's major contribution derived from its symbolic role in terms of providing a regular British physical presence in the Falklands and Antarctic region. According to Lord Shackleton, it was clear that flying the flag, the white ensign, was 'the most obvious and vital symbol at stake'.[20] *Endurance*'s withdrawal was bound, he feared, to be interpreted as a relaxation of Britain's Falklands and Antarctic vigil, and 'it is not without significance that I have been approached by friends on the Argentine side, who have asked whether that means that the British were thinking of changing their posture generally'. The preceding speaker, Lord Morris, remarked that the decision had been 'greeted with unalloyed joy in the Argentine press', a point verified by the Franks Report.[21]

In this manner, the future of *Endurance* proved to be the main focus of the House of Lords debate, a significance heightened by a general appreciation of the ship's symbolic value as well as by the fact that previous governments had always decided against its proposed withdrawal upon political grounds. In October–November 1977, for example, the Labour government argued against the Ministry of Defence's plan to scrap *Endurance* on the grounds that 'for us to announce the paying off of the *Endurance* will be seen by the Argentines as a clear indication that our withdrawal from the South Atlantic was under way'.[22] Similarly, in 1981 the

16. British Antarctic Survey, *Annual Report 1979–80* (Cambridge: BAS, 1980), p. 6; *Annual Report 1981–82* (Cambridge: BAS, 1982), p. 1; memorandum by the British Antarctic Survey, 6 Dec. 1982, in *House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence: 13 December 1982*, pp. 87–9.
17. *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes*, 13 December 1982, p. 93; Lord Franks, *Report*, p. 35.
18. Lord Franks, *Report*, pp. 76–8.
19. See note 5.
20. *Hansard* (Lords), Vol. 426, col. 211, 16 Dec. 1981.
21. *Ibid*, col. 209; Lord Franks, *Report*, p. 34.
22. Edward Rowlands, *The Times*, 15 Jan. 1983.

decision to withdraw *Endurance* was taken as part of the Defence Review, and was maintained in spite of the concern expressed by Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, in June 1981.[23] Parliamentary criticism evoked no change of line either, and, at the close of the House of Lords debate on 16 December 1981 in which *Endurance* had figured prominently, Lord Skelmersdale's response for the government reaffirmed the 'economic [and] political reality' of previous decisions towards the South-west Atlantic regarding such matters as the runway extension at Stanley, *Endurance* and the importance of Anglo-Argentine cooperation.[24] Such aspects served to qualify the force of his reassurances regarding the continued maintenance of British interests in the region.

The *Endurance* controversy prevailed, and on 9 February 1982 James Callaghan, who as Prime Minister until 1979 had supported the retention of the ship, challenged his successor on the matter. 'Is the Prime Minister aware that the Government's decision to withdraw and pay off HMS *Endurance* when she returns from the South Atlantic is an error that could have serious consequences?'. Mrs Thatcher's response followed on naturally from previous policy decisions; thus, 'there are many competing claims on the defence budget' and the government 'felt that other claims on the defence budget should have greater priority'.[25] Similarly, *Endurance* figured prominently in the House of Commons defence debate held on 15 February 1982. An influential Conservative backbencher and former minister, Julian Amery, devoted his whole speech to a call for the ice patrol ship's retention, and his arguments were supported strongly by Keith Speed, who had been dismissed as Navy Minister in 1981 for opposing naval reductions.[26] But the government refused to alter course. Significantly, the junior defence minister stated: 'we plan to withdraw *Endurance* from service when it finishes its present tour in the South Atlantic . . . We would have wished to keep *Endurance* in service if we could have afforded to do so. It was . . . a question of *priorities*'. Lord Carrington was concerned about the implications of withdrawal, and continuing parliamentary criticism prompted him to write to John Nott, the Secretary of State for Defence, on 22 January 1982 and again on 17 February, in an attempt to reprieve *Endurance*, albeit in vain.[27]

The basic conclusion, therefore, of any survey of British policy prior to the Falklands War of 1982 must be that the public decisions taken by British governments, at least since the late 1970s, indicated a diminution of interest and commitment towards the South-west Atlantic region, (indeed, from the mid-1960s onwards, the British government began to assume a more flexible stance on the future of the Falkland Islands and Dependencies and had even considered the closure of the British Antarctic Survey). During this period, domestic problems and international concerns nearer home relegated the problems of the South-west Atlantic to an increasingly marginal role in the political as well as in the geographical sense. The refusal to extend the runway at Stanley in order to allow access to intercontinental jets served to confirm Britain's isolation from its possessions in that part of the world, while by 1981 the preservation of *Endurance* was apparently not deemed worth £3 million, which was reputed to be its yearly cost. The Foreign Office's

23. *Sunday Times*, 16 Jan. 1983; Lord Franks, *Report*, p. 33.
24. *Hansard* (Lords), Vol. 426, cols. 228–235, 16 Dec. 1981.
25. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 17, cols. 856–857, 9 Feb. 1982.
26. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 18, col. 27, 15 Feb. 1982; Keith Speed, *Sea change*, pp. 117–120.
27. Lord Franks, *Report*, pp. 34–36.

case for its maintenance was overruled; even the rapid deterioration of Anglo-Argentine relations during early March 1982, when South Georgia proved the focus of difficulties, failed to elicit any kind of reprieve.

Nevertheless, on 20 March 1982 the government, lacking any other ships in the area, did instruct *Endurance* to proceed to South Georgia to follow developments, which tended to deteriorate from the British point of view with the receipt of intelligence regarding the escalation of Argentine military activities around the Falklands and South Georgia. As a result, on 29 March Mrs Thatcher and Lord Carrington decided to send three submarines to the area, albeit too late to halt the impending invasion. It was perhaps significant that such a decision was taken while the two ministers were *en route* to Brussels for an EEC meeting, and the escalating Falklands crisis failed even to persuade Lord Carrington against continuing on 30 March via London with his scheduled trip to Israel. Europe and the Middle East still constituted the central preoccupations of the British government, even at an acute phase in Anglo-Argentine relations.[28]

Similarly, on 29 March the House of Commons debated Britain's strategic nuclear deterrent, and John Nott, the Defence Secretary, refused to be deflected into a debate on the South Atlantic on the grounds that the nuclear question was 'too important to be diverted into a discussion on HMS *Endurance*', even though the Cabinet had noted on 25 March, in the absence of Mr Nott at a NATO meeting, that the position of the ship would have to be reconsidered.[29] At last the reality of events and an appreciation of *Endurance*'s on-the-spot value, rather than parliamentary and media criticism, prompted a reappraisal of its future, thereby preparing the way for its eventual reprieve. It was announced on 30 March that *Endurance* would remain on station for as long as was necessary, while on 1 April the Defence Committee 'agreed that HMS *Endurance* should not be withdrawn as earlier planned, but for the time being should remain on station in the South Atlantic'.[30]

Apart from the *Endurance* issue a further cause of British policy weakness derived from the manner in which the government had reached a virtual dead-end in its negotiations with Argentina over the Falklands and the Dependencies. The failure of the lease-back scheme in 1980–1 had led to the adoption of a policy of maintaining the status quo indefinitely and of keeping the negotiations going.[31] The British ambassador in Buenos Aires protested strongly to the Foreign Office on 2 October 1981, that in effect Britain had no strategy at all 'beyond a general Micawberism', and, as the Franks Report concluded, 'the Government were in a position of weakness . . . the effect . . . was to pass the initiative to the Argentine Government', whose impatience and interpretation of the signals emanating from London were inclining it towards a forceful solution.[32]

Another pre-1982 failing concerned the imperfect official understanding of the manner in which the various issues were part of one basic equation. Lord Shackleton proved a prime advocate of the need to fit *Endurance*, the Falklands, British Antarctic Territory and the British Antarctic Survey into a single whole, so that any change in one component would possess wider implications. 'We are talking about the South-west Atlantic and one of the problems is in getting people to

28. Lord Carrington, BBC television, *Panorama*, 5 April 1982.
29. Lord Franks, *Report*, p. 56; Hansard (Commons), Vol. 21, col. 27, 29 Mar. 1982.
30. Lord Franks, *Report*, p. 69.
31. Lord Franks, *Report*, pp. 27, 77; Peter Beck, 'Cooperative confrontation . . .', pp. 54–56.
32. Lord Franks, *Report*, pp. 29–30, 79.

understand that this is not a single issue. It is not just the Falklands; it is not HMS *Endurance*; it is not South Georgia and it is not oil on the Burdwood Bank. It is a complex which needs to be looked at in a totality, because these issues are all very closely related . . . the British Antarctic Territory is a place to which the cold war has never come . . . It is in this context that Lords and Members in another place have been critical of the decision to scrap HMS *Endurance* . . . I am sorry to say that no Government has ever really understood this issue . . . what is at stake . . . is peace and the continuation of the status quo in the Antarctic and the adjacent islands'.[33] As a result, *Endurance* was 'part, but not an isolated part, of the general picture in the Antarctic and the sub-Antarctic area'. This view was supported by another peer, Lord Buxton, who took a close interest in the affairs of the region.[34] 'What concerns me about our Antarctic policy, our Falkland Islands policy and about our attitude to the Argentinian problem, is that several left hands do not seem to know what several right hands are doing, and I do not believe that these decisions have been carefully considered in the round, taking into account all aspects and interests . . . they are short-sighted and (dare I say?) appear unpatriotic'.[35] Thus, even if Lord Carrington was aware of the wider policy issues his views were overruled by other ministers.

It was against such a background that Argentina decided to invade the Falklands and South Georgia, and it is clear that pre-April 1982 trends in British policy performed a significant role in encouraging Argentina to believe that its invasion would prove successful. In the event, the resulting war gave rise to a range of political pressures and emotions which served to challenge existing official perspectives upon the South-west Antlantic region, including British policy towards Antarctica. The military conflict focussed British attention upon Antarctica, albeit only indirectly, and for the first time many people, including some politicians, realized that Britain possessed territory there. For example, maps used in the media to show the location of the Falklands and Dependencies often ranged southwards to embrace Antarctica, while during the early days of the conflict fears were expressed in certain quarters that the war might spread to the British Antarctic Territory, another area of Anglo-Argentine rivalry. There were repeated suggestions that the issue of sovereignty extended beyond the Falklands and South Georgia to include the wider matter of Antarctica, even if it proved difficult to define the precise nature of the threat to British territory there.[36] On 3 April 1982 Lord Shackleton reminded the government that in the war 'there is much more at stake than the question of sovereignty of the Falkland Islands. . . . What is at stake and what undoubtedly is in the minds of the Argentines is not just the Falkland Islands but their claim to Antarctic territory'.[37] A concern about Argentine aggressive ambitions in the wider region prompted one MP, Christopher Murphy, to enquire on 7 April whether any defensive measures were being taken to protect British Antarctic Territory against possible Argentine action.[38]

33. *Hansard* (Lords), Vol. 426, cols. 210–211, 16 Dec. 1981.
34. Lord Franks, *Report*, p. 39.
35. *Hansard* (Lords), Vol. 428, col. 220, 16 Dec. 1981.
36. Pearce Wright, 'The Antarctic dimension: Britain and Argentina vie for a natural laboratory', *The Times*, 22 April 1982.
37. *Hansard* (Lords), Vol. 428, col. 1585, 3 Apr. 1982.
38. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 21, col. 342, 7 Apr. 1982; C. Murphy to the author, 23 Dec. 1982.

While it is true that Argentina tends to interpret its territorial claims to the Falklands, the Dependencies and *Antártida Argentina* as part of one policy, it is possible that such fears reflected an exaggerated view of the military threat, as well as an inadequate understanding of the manner in which Antarctica is both governed and protected by a separate treaty system centred upon the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 (which came into effect in 1961), which was designed to place the sovereignty disputes in a state of suspended animation in the interests both of international stability and of the promotion of scientific research.[39] In particular, the treaty established that 'Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only' and prohibited 'any measures of a military nature'.

In the event, Antarctica retained its immunity from military conflict, a feature accentuated by the fact that the projected Antarctic meetings scheduled for Hobart in May–June 1982 and for Wellington in June on marine and mineral resource questions respectively proceeded as planned. Although Argentina and Britain were both represented, there were no political complications arising out of the current Falklands War, and consequently there was little media coverage of either session.[40] Dr Beltramino, the leader of the Argentine delegation, stressed in Wellington that 'we are here to discuss Antarctic matters only'.[41]

This separation of the Falklands and Antarctic sovereignty problems has not, however, hindered the tendency in British official circles both during and after the 1982 war to follow the pre-war advice provided by Lord Shackleton and others, that is, to take more interest in a region of which the component parts—the Falklands, the Dependencies and the British Antarctic Territory—should be identified as part of one problem. An appreciation of the common element of Anglo-Argentine rivalry running through each of these territories contributed to this trend, which was helped also by the way in which, according to Sir Hermann Bondi, chairman of the Natural Environment Research Council, 'the fighting in the South Atlantic has concentrated people's minds on the potential of the Antarctic and the surrounding oceans'.[42] The resulting public and official awareness of the wider Falklands region, and particularly the need to relate future policy developments to the changed domestic and international political situation caused by the Falklands War, influenced policy discussions conducted during summer 1982, and inevitably the postwar military and diplomatic lines of policy were dominated by the assumption of a substantial defence commitment for the Falklands and by the decision to maintain control over the Falklands and Dependencies for the foreseeable future. In turn, their sovereignty was to be treated as non-negotiable.

The economic guidelines for future British policy were to be suggested by an up-dated version of the 1976 Shackleton Report, and at the end of May 1982 Lord Shackleton was invited by the government to submit a revised Economic Study of the Falklands and Dependencies and 'in the light of: (a) the changed circumstances of the Falklands arising from the Argentine invasion and occupation, and its military consequences; and (b) the changed world economic environment'.[43] The resulting

39. F. M. Auburn, *Antarctic law and politics* (London: Hurst, 1982), pp. 48–61; evidence by Guillermo Makin, *House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence: 22 November 1982*, p. 71. The text of the Antarctic Treaty can be consulted in Auburn, pp. 298–303.

40. C. Beeby, 'Towards an Antarctic mineral resources regime', *New Zealand International Review*, 1982, Vol. VIII, no. 3, pp. 8–10.

41. *The Times*, 15 June 1982.

42. *The Times*, 27 Oct. 1982. The NERC is the BAS's parent body.

43. Lord Shackleton (1982 Report), p. 1.

report was published in September 1982, and recommended a series of measures to foster the islands' economic development through the expenditure of about £30–35 million over a period of five years. For example, proposals were advanced to diversify a monocultural economy centred upon wool, to enhance the islanders' involvement in economic questions, and to improve external and internal communications, along with other aspects of the islands' economic and social infrastructure.

One of the most interesting aspects of the Report was its adoption of a regional approach, that is, its stress on the importance of interpreting the Falkland Islands in a wider regional perspective. Shackleton was therefore able to give more effective expression to his long-held views concerning the uninterested and piecemeal approach of British governments over a relatively long period. A further background factor in favour of a regional emphasis was the realization that the long-term resource potential of the Dependencies and the Antarctic Territory was more promising than that of the Falklands, whose intrinsic economic value remained more debatable. In addition, the exploitation of resources in South Georgia or the British Antarctic Territory might provide a more convincing rationale for continued British control over the Falklands. 'While naturally our major concern has been the Falkland Islands, we have sought to draw attention to wider and longer-term issues in the South Atlantic and the Antarctic. . . . Although the Falklands are now the focus of political attention, South Georgia may in the long run be of greater importance to the future development of the potential wealth of the South-west Atlantic and the Antarctic than the Falkland Islands'.[44] South Georgia and the area southwards to the Antarctic Territory was identified by the Shackleton Report, as well as by a Foreign Office *Background Brief* issued significantly in May 1982, as a major area for marine resources, especially krill, while the interconnection of South Georgia and the British Antarctic Territory was encouraged by the former's inclusion as part of the Antarctic ecosystem covered by the provisions of the 1980 Antarctic Marine Living Resources Convention.[45]

With respect to the region's hydrocarbons potential the Shackleton Report advised that both the Malvinas Basin and Antarctic seas were still unknown; thus, oil and gas could be presumed to exist in these zones, but precise assessments were difficult.[46] Additional constraints derived from costing, exploitation technology and conservation problems. In 1974 the US Geological Survey produced a highly optimistic *statistical* estimate of Antarctica's oil and natural gas potential, but pending further research and exploration most British experts adopt a far more conservative view, which has been reflected in the Shackleton Report. 'While there is a reasonable probability that hydrocarbons exist in certain offshore areas of Antarctica . . . there is insufficient evidence to make an overall prognostication over the mineral resources of the Continent'.[47] In fact, such comments recall an observation made some twenty-five years before by the American polar explorer,

44. Lord Shackleton (1982 Report), p. 3.

45. Lord Shackleton (1982 Report), p. 78; F. M. Auburn, *Antarctic Law and Politics*, p. 323; Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Brief, *The economic potential of the Falkland Islands and Antarctica* (London: FCO, May 1982).

46. Lord Shackleton (1982 Report), pp. 95–7, 129–131; memorandum on 'Hydrocarbon prospects in the Falkland Islands Dependencies and British Antarctic Territory' by Professor D. H. Griffiths and Dr P. Barker, 1 Dec. 1982, in *House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence: 13 December 1982*, pp. 100–4.

47. Lord Shackleton (1982 Report), p. 131.

Laurence Gould: 'it is unwarranted to assume that there are great riches . . . it is equally unwarranted to assume that there are none. We just don't know'.[48]

Antarctica possesses little current economic value (its main current worth is scientific), and the continent is seen essentially in terms of future worth, a point illustrated by a *Sunday Times* headline on 13 February 1983 which referred to 'the "gold rush" for South Pole wealth'. The desire of governments for control over or access to any resources found there in commercial quantities explains not only the research activities of the Antarctic Treaty powers but also their constant search for a minerals regime agreement. The original treaty of 1959 failed to cover resource questions, and during the past decade or so the Antarctic Consultative Parties have become anxious to fill this gap before exploitable minerals are actually found, thereby rendering the problem more unmanageable. The minerals question, while touched upon in the 1970s, was taken up in earnest at Wellington in June 1982, and the objective was to draft a minerals convention to regulate exploration, exploitation, licensing and conservation questions *within* the Antarctic treaty system.[49] The discussions were continued at Wellington in January 1983 and further sessions are scheduled for Canberra in April and Bonn in July 1983.

On several occasions the British government has reaffirmed its view that 'we envisage that such a regime can be agreed without modifying the treaty', and the strength of British support for the successful outcome of these negotiations reflects the more traditional policy of favouring the relative permanence of the Antarctic treaty system, and thus to oppose any idea of seeking a review of the treaty arrangements during or after 1991 (Article 12).[50] Although several commentators have suggested that the Antarctic Treaty lasts for only thirty years, there is in reality no termination date, and the British government's belief in the durability and adaptability of the treaty system means that any alternative proposals for the control of Antarctica, such as those involving the United Nations or the creation of an international regime modelled on the International Seabed Authority, exert little attraction in London. Although the discussion of alternative regimes for internationalizing Antarctica has become a popular preoccupation in academic journals, the British government has maintained its preference for the existing treaty system, and thus Mrs Thatcher's rejection of other possibilities in 1982 was in line with a long-standing point of view, previously expounded in 1977.[51]

> If the Antarctic were brought under the control of a world-wide agency, possibly within the UN, it would be far more difficult to achieve the level of cooperation that has been possible within the Antarctic Treaty framework. Because of the sovereignty complication and the possible extension of the common heritage concept to resources, an Antarctic Authority could prove even harder to set up than a Sea-Bed Authority. An ill-functioning international arrangement might tempt countries active in the Antarctic to act unilaterally with possible risks for the environment and with damaging effects for Antarctic scientific cooperation. The vast investments required to exploit Antarctic

48. Laurence Gould, *The polar regions in their relation to human affairs* (New York: American Geographical Society, 1958), p. 13.
49. C. Beeby, 'Towards an Antarctic mineral resources regime', p. 8.
50. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 31, col. 55, 8 Nov. 1982; *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 37, col. 366, 21 Feb. 1983.
51. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 25, col. 189, 14 June 1982; Foreign and Commonwealth Office Background Brief, *International interests in Antarctica* (London: FCO, September 1977).

> resources would be made in the medium term only if clear cut and stable regimes were seen to be operating. Whatever new arrangements are made, the fact remains that the real problems of exploiting Antarctica's resources are practical rather than legal. It is not the restrictive nature of the Antarctic Treaty so much as the physical restrictions of the Antarctic environment that have made it possible for only a small group of nations to undertake exploration and research in the area.

In fact, the current difficulties surrounding British adherence to the Law of the Sea Treaty reinforce the impact of these arguments.

For the present, Britain stands by the Antarctic treaty system. Of course, it is possible to foresee a situation when the continuing mineral regime negotiations end in deadlock, thereby leading to a serious dispute between the Consultative Parties themselves, perhaps involving also non-treaty powers, over such questions as resource benefits and Exclusive Economic Zones. In practice, this problem might prove difficult to contain, particularly as the Antarctic Treaty offers little remedy in such cases. A further threat to stability concerns the increased pressure on the Antarctic club from non-signatories, such as India and Malaysia, who view the continent as a 'global common', which is part of a world heritage for all to share. Only time will tell whether the Antarctic Treaty powers are capable of resisting the external pressures to open up the process of decision-making and thus of securing sufficient time to conclude a workable minerals regime. To some extent, progress in the mineral talks will depend upon how far the Consultative Parties are prepared not only to reconcile their own divergent views but also to adopt a global perspective in order to instil confidence into non-signatories that their interests will be fully considered. The British government has already displayed an appreciation of this point: at Wellington in June 1982 the British delegation's speeches contained references to 'the common interest' and 'the general good' as essential elements of 'an acceptable minerals regime'.[52] In particular, it was asserted that the latter had 'to carry sufficient weight with states outside the Antarctic Treaty to have a chance of dissuading them from attempting to usurp the role we have assumed under the Antarctic Treaty'.

The mineral regime negotiations are, therefore, very important, partly because of the resource aspect and partly because a successful outcome will serve to consolidate the Antarctic treaty system. But it is also of interest to place the Antarctic region within a world context, by relating it for example to a recent article in this journal by Professor Russett of Yale University.[53] He examined the implications of the international search for control over raw materials, and while the article ignored the Antarctic perspective, his basic conclusions may offer a guide to a future scenario for the southern continent:

> The risks of international great power confrontation stemming from economic causes will be critical in coming years . . . major powers will seek assured access to vital raw materials [and] may set off a scramble for assured access to

52. Statement by Arthur Watts for the UK delegation, June 1982, Special consultative meeting on Antarctic mineral resources, Wellington 14–25 June 1982. See also on the global common aspect: M. J. Peterson, 'Antarctica: the last great land rush on earth', *International Organization*, 1980, Vol. 34, No. 3, p. 398; Per Magnus Wijkman, 'Managing the global commons', *International Organization*, 1982, Vol. 36, no. 3, pp. 532–34.

53. Bruce Russett, 'Security and the resources scramble: will 1984 be like 1914?' *International Affairs*, Winter 1981–2, Vol. 58, No. 1, pp. 42, 57.

> the remaining raw material sources and economic disaster for all who lagged behind in the scramble.

The possible extension of the 'resource war' to Antarctica has already become a matter of concern.[54]

The impact of these varying resource considerations, together with the political consequences of the Falklands War, provide the foundation for the emergence of a more positive political and economic stance on the part of the British government towards the Falklands in particular and the South-west Atlantic region in general. This adoption of a regional perspective served both to reflect and to pave the way for a major transformation in British policy towards the area. Inevitably, this was expressed mainly in terms of the acceptance, not only of a long-term commitment to defend the Falklands—'Fortress Falklands'—but also of the main recommendations of the 1982 Shackleton Report.[55] However, Antarctica and the Falkland Islands Dependencies, while attracting less political and media attention than the Falklands themselves, were not entirely neglected. Nevertheless, the postwar interest in the Dependencies and the Antarctic Territory has largely been a by-product of Britain's Falklands policy, particularly as some commentators believe that Antarctica can provide an additional rationale for the retention of the Falklands, which would serve as the key base for British activities in the British Antarctic Territory and the surrounding oceans. Lord Carrington and Lord Kennet, for example, have regarded the Antarctic Treaty as offering a possible way out of the present Anglo-Argentine diplomatic impasse over the sovereignty of the Falklands,[56] and it has been suggested that the sovereignty problem might be brought within the Antarctic treaty framework, thereby freezing the dispute and facilitating the normalization of Anglo-Argentine relations.

However, the superficial attractions of such a proposal conceal the basic difficulties. The serious tensions aroused during the Falklands War will not be assuaged quickly, and thus there is a danger that the Falklands question will add a destabilizing factor to the Antarctic area. Hitherto the latter has remained relatively free from serious international discord, even during the nearby Falklands War of 1982, but Antarctica can only stay insulated from extra-continental conflicts if such contentious issues as the Falklands are kept separate. In any case, the Antarctic treaty system has its own difficulties to overcome, including the minerals issue, and any additional burdens should be avoided.

Britain's future Antarctic presence will benefit from the reprieve of HMS *Endurance*, for, as Lord Carrington indicated to John Nott in June 1981, the ship's activities 'over a wide area of the British Antarctic Territory were an important aspect of the maintenance of the British claim to sovereignty'.[57] However, the most significant Antarctic decision was announced on 8 November 1982: with effect from 1983–4 the British Antarctic Survey will secure an additional £4 million.[58] Subsequent announcements during January and February 1983 resulted in the addition

54. M. J. Peterson, 'Antarctica . . .'.

55. Military costs incurred in the 1982 war and for future defence comprise £2,000 million plus, while the government has accepted a commitment of over £30 million for economic development, of £10 million for civilian rehabilitation and an undetermined amount for Stanley airport: *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 31, col. 149, 16 Nov. 1982; *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 33, cols. 859–860, 8 Dec. 1982.

56. *The Times*, 20 Jan. 1983; Lord Kennet, 'Let's put the Falklands on ice', *The Times*, 8 Feb. 1983.

57. Lord Franks, *Report*, p. 33.

58. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 31, col. 42, 8 Nov. 1982; *New Scientist*, 18 Nov. 1982, p. 406. The Survey's previous budget was £5.7 million; cf *The Economist*, 7 Aug. 1982, p. 78.

of £0.5 million to Survey revenue for the fiscal year 1982–3, while stating that for 1984–5 and 1985–6 the extra £4 million would become £5 million.[59] Although such sums pale into insignificance in contrast to the sums allocated to the Falklands, the additional allocation for 1983–4 represented a 70 per cent increase in the Survey's budget. The financial position of the British Antarctic Survey today therefore contrasts markedly with the serious funding difficulties it experienced prior to April 1982 as a result of some fifteen years of level funding. When asked by the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee about the reasons for 'such an increase at a time when the government is cutting back most of its other expenditure', Sir Hermann Bondi, chairman of the Survey's parent body, responded that 'we are very happy to get money for scientific research' but that 'this is really a question more to the FCO'.[60]

In fact, the Survey, which constitutes Britain's physical, administrative and scientific presence in the British Antarctic Territory and South Georgia, offered the only manner in which a reorientation of British Antarctic policy could be expressed, a reorientation involving not so much a change of basic aims but rather a change of emphasis with regard to the enhancement of the policy and fiscal priorities of these objectives.

The 'Falklands factor' has therefore been the predominant motive for recent developments in British Antarctic policy. Other considerations, however, have served to reinforce the case for increased Survey funding. These additional policy influences included the desire to compensate the Survey for the damage inflicted during the Argentine invasion of its base on South Georgia, the need to protect Britain's Antarctic interests at a time of growing international interest in the continent's resource potential and the appreciation of the value of a sound scientific research programme as a foundation for rational policy decisions on Antarctic resource issues, and especially to guide the mineral negotiations. In fact, a general stepping up of national research programmes by such countries as the Soviet Union, France and Australia, has compelled other governments, including the British, to do the same if they wish either to maintain their standing in Antarctic decision-making or to benefit from future resource exploitation. Additional pressure has derived from the way in which several governments stress the inter-connection between research and sovereignty. In 1981 an Australian parliamentary report on Australian Antarctic Territory argued that 'as long as it remains our national policy that we have sovereignty over the Australian Antarctic Territory, in international terms it is important that we should exercise it to an appropriate degree in technological terms. Our presence and our stations are evidence of our assertion of sovereignty'.[61] Like Australia, other governments such as Argentina, Chile and France, place an overt emphasis upon research and sovereignty. Britain, by contrast, has traditionally adopted a more low key approach, preferring to talk about research rather than sovereignty and ignoring the sovereignty-related activities of Argentina and Chile within the British Antarctic Territory. However, in practice, the

59. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 35, col. 103, 18 Jan. 1983; *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 36, cols. 123–124, 2 Feb. 1983.

60. *House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence: 13 December 1982*, p. 93.

61. *Australian Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Report on the Redevelopment of Australian Antarctic Bases: Parliamentary Paper 115/1981*, p. 9. See *New Scientist*, 21 Oct. 1982, p. 140; *New Scientist*, 6 Jan. 1983, p. 4.

British government is as sovereignty-conscious as these other governments; the decision on Survey funding has merely served to confirm this.

As a result, the 1980s will be characterized not only by increased activity on the part of the Survey but also by a greater emphasis on its political role. The British Antarctic Survey, whose scientific independence is guaranteed by charter, seems likely to retain its autonomy, but this may be partially qualified by another interesting development prompted by the Falklands War. This concerns the formalization of the hitherto informal links between the Survey and the Foreign Office, which will appoint henceforth an assessor on the National Environmental Research Council for Antarctic matters, a move paralleled by official encouragement and pressure on the Survey to devote extra funding to research programmes of direct resource relevance, that is, to the earth and marine life sciences.[62] According to the Survey, 'the major thrust in the Earth Sciences concerns research in geology and geophysics to solve fundamental problems related to geological processes. It also involves resource-orientated research, including land, marine and air surveys to provide information for an appraisal of the offshore hydrocarbon and terrestrial mineral potential of the Falkland Islands Dependencies and British Antarctic Territory'. Obviously, the stress will be on 'resource-orientated' research, which applies also to the marine life sciences. 'In addition to its academic interest, research in Life Sciences provides essential information to enable the Antarctic ecosystems to be properly managed . . . studies of the marine ecosystems are linked with future exploitation of krill and fish resources'. The atmospheric sciences have also been designated as a priority research area because of Antarctica's unique value for the study of such problems.

Clearly the extra funding allocated since November 1982 will allow the British Antarctic Survey programmes in these priority research areas to be stepped up, thereby serving to compensate and remedy some of the deficiencies and curtailments of its research plans as well as the staffing reductions consequent upon pre-1982 financial constraints. The 70 per cent increase in revenue will not cause a similar rise in the level of Survey research, since part of the extra £4 million will be employed merely to reverse previous cuts. In addition, much of the additional funding will be devoted to an enhancement of the Survey's logistical support capability, for, as Bondi has argued, Antarctic research is rather like space research: 'you spend an awful lot of money to get there and that is when the science begins'.[63] Thus there are plans to increase the number of its aircraft from two to four, to charter a ship for marine research, to purchase a small trawler, to improve satellite communications and to develop facilities at the Survey's Cambridge headquarters. In turn, such improvements will provide a sound foundation for future research thrusts. The resulting expansion of the Survey's scientific research in British Antarctica as well as in South Georgia will represent both a quantitative and qualitative increase in Britain's scientific, administrative and *physical* presence in Antarctica, particularly as British Antarctic Survey personnel provide the basis for British administration in these territories through service as magistrate, postmaster and so on. However, the extent of this advance needs to be interpreted in the context of the enhancement of other governments' scientific programmes in Ant-

62. *House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Minutes of Evidence: 13 December 1982*, pp. 89, 93.

63. *Foreign Affairs Committee Minutes, 13 December 1982*, pp. 89, 93.

arctica as well as of the Survey's contribution to such international research projects as the *BIOMASS* (Biological Investigations of Marine Antarctic Systems and Stocks) programme.

Conclusion

During 1919–20 the British government, influenced by Britain's prominent role in the exploration of Antarctica and particularly by the advocacy of Leopold Amery at the Colonial Office, decided that 'it is desirable that the whole of the Antarctic should ultimately be included within the British Empire, and that, while the time has not yet arrived that a claim to all the continental territory should be put forward publicly, a definite and consistent policy should be followed of extending and asserting British control with the object of ultimately making it complete'.[64] This policy was developed in the succeeding period, and thus in 1928 Campbell, the head of the Foreign Office's Western department, admitted that 'it is a fact that we are trying to paint the whole Antarctic red as the result of a deliberate and settled policy', which had been endorsed in 1926 by the Imperial Conference.[65] However, by the late 1920s various factors, including the opposition of the French, Norwegian and American governments, combined to hinder the pursuit of this policy. Even so, by the early 1930s Britain and the dominions of New Zealand (1923 Ross Dependency) and Australia (1933 Australian Antarctic Territory) claimed about two thirds of the continent as the result of an Antarctic policy which had been constructed upon the basis of Britain's pre-existing control over the Falkland Islands Dependencies (Letters Patent of 1908 and 1917) and had originated out of an appreciation both of Antarctica's then resource value for whaling and of its fishing and mineral *potential*.[66] Amery believed that 'all real estate was potentially valuable' and that, if resources were to be found, Britain should profit through its control.[67] In the event, whaling has declined and Antarctica has yet to fulfil the initial hopes concerning its resource potential, although Britain has maintained an almost continuous research presence on the continent, through the Discovery Investigations of the inter-war period and the British Antarctic Survey.

During the 1980s Antarctic resource questions have re-emerged as a significant international preoccupation, although the failure to implement the Antarctic policy adopted in 1919–20 has meant that the British government has been compelled to deal with such matters in negotiation with a range of other governments, and especially the signatories of the 1959 Antarctic Treaty. Nevertheless, Britain's historic role in Antarctic exploration, research and resource matters needs to be considered as an influence upon current British thinking upon policy towards the British Antarctic Territory, albeit in conjunction with a range of other factors such as the pressures emanating from the 'global commons' lobby or from the heightened international interest in the continent. However, the Falklands War of 1982 has proved the most influential motive underlying and precipitating British government decisions respecting Antarctica during 1982–3. The implementation of these decisions will result in an increased British presence and visibility in Antarctica.

64. Peter Beck, 'British policy in Antarctica in the early 20th century', *Polar Record*, 1983, Vol. 21, No. 134, p. 475.
65. Peter Beck, 'British policy in Antarctica', p. 481.
66. Peter Beck, 'British policy in Antarctica', p. 479.
67. Peter Beck, 'British policy in Antarctica', pp. 479–80.

But while it is possible to interpret this as evidence of a 'new departure', it remains still a matter of conjecture as to how far recent decisions have inaugurated a *durable* future policy. For example, will British Antarctic policy revert eventually to the pre-April 1982 position of apathy and low official priority, especially as one can imagine difficulties arising out of the discrepancy between the short-term perceptions of politicians and the long-term realities of Antarctic resource benefits? In addition, Britain's current emphasis upon Antarctica has proved more a function of policy towards the Falklands than the result of the government's regard for the intrinsic value of Britain's role in the continent's future. Inevitably, any eventual scaling-down of British interests and commitments is likely to exert a similar effect upon the British Antarctic Territory and the Falklands Dependencies. Another discouraging factor concerns the British government's concentration upon the Falklands and Antarctica only during 1982–3. In contrast, and surprisingly in the context of the Shackleton Report's emphasis on the resource value of South Georgia, the latter has received relatively little official interest and money, as evidenced by the negative government statements made in February 1983.[68]

It remains, therefore, debatable whether the government will adhere to the course advocated by such Antarctic enthusiasts as Lord Shackleton, whose assertion made in December 1981 forms an appropriate closing comment.[69] 'We still carry some traditions and duties. This is something which we can afford because our future in the Antarctic is very important. I am not talking about the next year or two but about the next twenty or thirty years'.

68. *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 36, cols. 123–124, 2 Feb. 1983; *Hansard* (Commons), Vol. 37, col. 366, 21 Feb. 1983.

69. *Hansard* (Lords), Vol. 426, col. 214, 16 Dec. 1981.

Bridgehead revisited: the literature of the Falklands

LAWRENCE FREEDMAN*

My objective in this article is to provide a survey of the material now available for a serious study of the Falklands War of April–June 1982. Although my survey covers only material available in Britain, this is, as will soon be seen, substantial; in certain important areas the serious study has begun. As any visitor to a bookshop will be aware, the size of the Falklands literature is now enormous. Even when one excludes books whose impact is primarily visual,[1] a large amount of shelf space has to be taken up. Readers of military journals have been receiving a digest of first hand accounts and evaluations of weapon performance. And so intensive has the publishing effort been that a full survey of the literature should even include some of the better reviews.[2] The flow of publications has yet to be stemmed.

There are three obvious explanations for the size of the literature. The first is that during the conflict itself hard news was a rare commodity; this generated an interest in what had 'really been going on' behind the scenes. The public (or at least the media) appetite for news was hardly satisfied by the terse one-liners from official spokesmen and so had to be met by a huge army of unofficial commentators. The need to fill the information gaps and correct the speculation left over from the war has created an incentive to tell the 'real' story as soon as possible. Moreover, the conflict had developed a large following over the summer (almost like a television serial) and this interest was readily sustained. Unlike much else in the modern world, this was a story that could be readily understood by a wide audience with their interest already fully engaged.

A second and related reason is that many of the correspondents assigned to the British Task Force had a frustrating time. They were subject to strict and unusually effective censorship and suffered long delays in getting out their despatches. Moreover, as the actual policy on release of information was controlled from London, it was actually the London-based correspondents who often got the news first. Not surprisingly a number of the journalists have decided to ensure that they get at least some benefit from the experience by writing books.

The most obvious reason of all for the volume of publications is that Britain won and there is always an interest in stories in which the 'good guys' come out on top! A more painful outcome might have produced a longer and more pointed official inquiry, but there would not have been the same market for detailed dissections of the course of the campaign.

Not surprisingly, much of the material already in print consists of eyewitness reports. Two of these are outstanding. The first is by BBC correspondent Robert Fox, who had what is known as a 'good war' in that he was close to much of the important action and was even awarded an MBE for services rendered to the Task Force. He sticks in his reporting largely to what he saw and he is extremely successful in conveying the 'feel' of the land campaign.[3] The second of these reports is based on the letters of Lieutenant David Tinker, who was killed in the closing stages of the war on HMS *Glamorgan*. One feature of the British campaign was that whereas all reports by the correspondents were carefully censored, this

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1. Pictures can explain a lot, not only of the physical character of a war but also of the terrain and climate in which forces have to operate. The best collection is by the *Sunday Express Magazine* team, *War in the Falklands: the campaign in pictures* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1982).

2. Christopher Wain's in *The Listener*, 3 March 1983, corrects a couple of common inaccuracies. Another interesting review is that by Neal Ascherson in the *London Review of Books*, 18 Nov.–1 Dec. 1982.

3. Robert Fox, *Eyewitness Falklands* (London: Methuen, 1982). Another readable account, though slighter, is provided by Patrick Bishop of *The Observer* and John Witherow of *The Times*, *The winter war* (London: Quartet, 1982). Robert McGowan and Jeremy Hands offer 'the human story of what it was actually like to live and fight in those bleak islands' in *Don't cry for me, Sergeant Major* (London: Camron Design, 1983). This is a fairly trivial pot-boiler.

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was not true of the letters home from members of the task force. (At least one of the few serious 'leaks' of information—on the helicopters lost in South Georgia—during the campaign came from such a source.) David Tinker hardly fitted a military stereotype: the eloquent son of an eminent liberal scholar with a taste for poetry, he responded with unusual sensitivity and ultimately extreme distaste to the events unfolding around him. The publication of his letters home is a necessary corrective to the forgetfulness about the individual tragedies of war (it is all too easy to write 'the British *only* lost one killed . . .') and also a valuable source of uninhibited comment which has already been drawn upon in more recent accounts of the fighting.[4]

The bulk of the eyewitness accounts is not readily available but is to be found in the service journals. In *The Wire* (Royal Signals), *Flight Deck* (Fleet Air Arm), *Globe & Laurel* (Royal Marines), *The Gunner* (Royal Artillery), *Pegasus* (Parachute Regiment) and so on, are to be read the reports from the fighting men back to their colleagues. These reports provide the basic detail upon which future military histories will be based. The style tends to be borrowed from schoolboy essays on holidays, attempting awkwardly but honestly to describe difficult and complex emotions.[5] The accounts are cheerful and matter-of-fact with a hurried but respectful passage by death. Later editions of these journals provide extremely full accounts of the action. The Spring 1983 edition of *Flight Deck*, for example, carries reports from many of the key ships in the Task Force.

These individual accounts from the participating units will be invaluable in putting together a proper military history of the campaign, but they largely tell how it looked from the bottom up rather than from the top down. We are now getting some direct reports from the higher command of the campaign. After the fighting was over, many of those who had been closely involved either in Whitehall or with the Task Force were in great demand on the lecture circuit. The most notable double act was by Rear-Admiral Sir John Woodward and Major-General Sir Jeremy Moore, the former Commanders of the Naval Task Force and Land Forces Falkland Islands respectively. Their presentation to the Royal United Services Institute in October 1982 is printed in the Institute's journal and provides a compressed but lucid account of the operation from the top. Inevitably the account is somewhat diplomatic in that there are no reports of divisions among the planners on the most appropriate course of action and each step now appears to have a logic that may not have been so apparent at the time. Nevertheless, the Woodward/Moore presentation provides us with a framework for analysing the campaign.[6]

Other journals with close connections with the military or the defence industries have also been carrying full descriptions of the campaign, often with an emphasis on the performance of individual items of equipment. Some of the companies have produced their own accounts of how their merchandise fared. British and French manufacturers have been waging a commercial war via leaks to such journals as the American *Aviation Week & Space Technology* in an effort to demonstrate the superiority of their merchandise. Advertisements with the 'proven in combat' headline have already appeared and some rather dubious methods have already been used to undermine or substantiate some claims (such as the French manufacturers of the Roland surface-to-air missiles and Mirage fighters suggesting that the British were lying about the numbers of Harrier aircraft shot down in order to obscure the real success of French systems).[7]

4. Hugh Tinker, *A message from the Falklands: the life and gallant death of David Tinker, Lieut. RN, from his letters and poems* (London: Junction, 1982; now also available in Penguin).

5. To give the flavour, here is a passage, chosen almost at random, from an anonymous reminiscence from HQ Company of 40 Commando: 'Do you remember our stay in *Fearless*, the kindness shown by everyone on board; the passageways stacked with kit, the "haute cuisine", the ant-like procession as we staggered our way to the tank deck early on in the morning of the 20 May, cheered by the cries of 'Good luck Royal, keep your head down' from the ship's company as we snaked along the passageway; the feelings and emotions experienced during the transit to the beach—fear, apprehension, tiredness, seasickness; the thoughts of "Is it going to be an opposed landing?", or "Christ I won't be able to move with this lot on my back, let alone fight" or perhaps the question that often comes to mind in such situations, "What the hell am I doing here?"' (*Globe & Laurel*, Sept./Oct. 1982, p. 321.

6. Woodward and Moore, 'The Falklands experience', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies*, March 1983.

7. In *Aviation Week & Space Technology*, 1 Nov. 1982 and 6 Dec. 1982. As an example of a company report see the P&O booklet on the experience of *The Canberra* entitled *The great white whale*).

To a large extent the specialist journals have reworked the basic information and, with a few exceptions, do not add very much to the story in the areas of either diplomacy or military organization and tactics. Where they can add a new slant is on the role of the hardware when their authors already have an understanding of the capabilities of the equipment they are describing or have been fed interesting snippets from their contacts. The best such accounts have been those in the *International Defence Review* and in a special issue of the magazine *Defence*. The latter examines in detail specific aspects of the military effort, such as the conversion of merchant ships to cope with aircraft and the attacks on Port Stanley airfield by the Vulcan bombers (in their first and last act of war since they became operational in 1957).[8]

The *IDR* reports draw carefully on a wide variety of sources to provide a reasonably complete, preliminary examination of the performance in combat of systems. Their readers will be as familiar with the biographies and essential characteristics of these systems as readers of other magazines are with Royal babies or hi-fi.[9]

These and other accounts in the defence journals sound, and often are, extremely authoritative, but it must be remembered that their reporters were suffering from many of the same disadvantages as were others who were following the war as outsiders. To the collections of *Hansard*, official briefings and press cuttings were added useful contacts in industry and the military, but these contacts were rarely disinterested. Accordingly, while this material is valuable, one has to listen for the sound of axes being ground. Moreover, given the general objective of packing as much detailed information as possible into a small space, there are obviously going to be mistakes, and with references rarely provided, they are not always easy to identify. Between one magazine and another there can be great variations on, for example, lists of participating military units. In the absence of official material, the specialist journals are normally the best alternative sources on basic statistics or technicalities, but they are very much second best.

Although some of the specialist material has now been packaged for a wider audience,[10] most people will rely on the books by journalists which are both physically and stylistically more accessible. The first to reach the bookshops was by the *Sunday Times* 'Insight' team, led by Paul Eddy, Magnus Linklater and Peter Gillman.[11] Much later Max Hastings of the *Evening Standard*, whose reporting from the Falklands virtually swamped that of his fellow correspondents, and Simon Jenkins, political editor of the *Economist*, produced their version.[12] Both books are extremely readable and particularly interesting on the diplomatic side. There is no doubt that, however irritating it must have been to watch the competition win the race for publication, Hastings and Jenkins were wise to take their time and get a firm grip on their story. Theirs is really a superb piece of journalism and if only one book on the subject were to be read, this must be that book. The descriptions of the fighting are vivid and lucid while that of the political and diplomatic activity is fascinating and plausible.

As a journalist friend would put it, the authors have succeeded in the basic objective of their craft in producing a 'first draft of history'. But it *is* still a first draft, and while it will be difficult to surpass in the telling, *The battle for the Falklands* cannot be considered definitive. The method of both the Hastings/Jenkins and 'Insight' books was to interview as many of the key participants as possible while memories were still fresh. As they were both produced before much written evidence was available, this was the only way to gain new material and the authors might argue that it will be many years before what they were told unofficially in private can be released officially. Furthermore, any description of high-level decision-making can only be enriched by interviewing those who have just made the decision.

The trouble is that accounts in which interview material predominates are inevitably unbalanced. Journalists of the calibre of those writing these books will know enough to

8. 'A job of work', *Defence*, Nov. 1982.

9. *International Defence Review*: 'Fallout from the Falklands: a preliminary assessment', June 1982; 'The air war', Aug. 1982; 'Missile operations', Sept. 1982; 'Naval operations', Oct. 1982.

10. For example, Antony Preston, *Sea combat off the Falklands: the lessons that must be learned* (London: Willow, 1982). Osprey have produced three books in their 'Men-at-arms' series on *The battle for the Falklands*: W. Fowler, *Land forces*: A. English and A. Watts, *Naval forces*; R. Braybrook, *Air forces*. See also B. Perret, *Weapons of the Falklands conflict* (Blandford, Dorset: Blandford, 1982).

11. *The Sunday Times* 'Insight' team, *The Falklands War: the full story* (London: Sphere, 1982).

12. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *The battle for the Falklands* (London: Michael Joseph, 1983).

make allowances for vanity, grudges, confusion and other human failings and will undoubtedly have cross-checked where they can and rejected juicy material that cannot be corroborated. But there is a limit to what can be done without documentary evidence to jog memories, confirm facts and sort out sequences. The difference of opinion between Lord Lewin, former Chief of Defence Staff, and Dr David Owen, former Foreign Secretary, over what really happened in the mini-crisis of 1977 illustrates the problem. Interviews carry with them their own temptations: to use the quotable, whether apt or not; either to ignore or to play up the mischievous or malevolent comment according to personal sympathies. However many of the participants are caught in the interviewer's net, some will escape and these are the ones who are likely to come off worst in the narrative!

Lastly, one can never be sure that one is not being told what someone else wants it to be thought rather than what needs to be known. With a question as politically charged as the Falklands War and involving questions as sensitive as that of the conduct of individual units in such a major military operation, ties of loyalty and friendship and a general sense of propriety are often likely to overcome a desire to help a journalist write his book.

One senior officer described to the author an early version of Hastings' account of the campaign which had appeared in the *Observer* as being like a patchwork quilt put together in the dark in which all the pieces could be recognized but not the overall pattern. The analysis was improved in the finished book, but the point remains that one is forced to take a particular version of events, based on a composite of reminiscences, on trust. There are few references to follow through. All this is not to criticize the authors, for they do not claim to have written an academic history. The point is only that there is still work to be done, especially as new material becomes available.

Neither the 'Insight' nor the Hastings/Jenkins book was able to take advantage of the official material released since they went to press. The major new source, of course, is the Franks Report.[13] Messrs Hastings and Jenkins had enough confidence in their own work to issue a press release pointing out some gaps in the Franks Report that had been filled in their account. Certainly their Latin American sources allow a much better feel of the development of the crisis from both sides. Franks is also rather delicate in his treatment of the undistinguished role played by parliament. In many ways the Hastings/Jenkins account rings more true; the reasonableness of the committee blunted its cutting edge. Nevertheless, we have still been provided with a fascinating insight into the workings of the government machine moving from complacency to emergency with alarming speed. There is a wealth of information and a clear chronology for the crisis, at least from the British side.

Another official source which also helps to sort out the chronology is the Falklands White Paper from the Ministry of Defence of December 1982.[14] The White Paper gained most publicity for its concluding announcements on plans to replace lost equipment and changes to defence policy made in the light of the experience of the war. Although the description of the actual campaign is terse and familiar and the discussion of the 'lessons' somewhat anodyne, the White Paper contains the basic statistics of the campaign and a couple of useful maps. It also tells what the government would like us to think the forces were up to during the campaign. A final official source on the details of the fighting is the supplement to the *London Gazette* with the Falklands Honours and Awards. The 140 citations are full of interesting incidental detail.[15]

There were aspects of the campaign, such as the handling of the media, where the government has been asked to explain its activities in more detail than it might otherwise have preferred. However, the nature of the diplomacy during the crisis is an area where we are still heavily dependent on the unofficial accounts. There is still the White Paper released by the government on 17 May which was an attempt to show Britain at its most conciliatory for the benefit of world opinion and provides a reasonable indication of just how far the government was prepared to move to achieve a settlement before having to approve a landing.[16]

13. *Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors*, Chairman The Rt Hon. The Lord Franks, Cmnd 8787 (London: HMSO, 1983).

14. The Secretary of State for Defence, *The Falklands campaign: the lessons*, Cmnd 8758 (London: HMSO, 1982).

15. Supplement to the *London Gazette*, Friday 8 October 1982.

16. *Falkland Islands: negotiations for a peaceful settlement* (London: FCO, May 1982). Sir Anthony Parsons provides a valuable first-hand account of 'The Falklands Crisis in the United Nations' in *International Affairs*, Spring 1983, pp. 169–78.

The Stationery Office has also brought out an extremely handy digest of Commons debates from 2 April to 15 June 1982. It is unfortunate that debates from the Lords are not included and also that the record does not start early in March so that we could watch the developing crisis as it appeared in parliament, especially as the statements dragged from ministers during March appear to have had a significant and unfortunate effect on the perception of the crisis in Buenos Aires.[17]

To understand the crisis diplomacy it is also necessary to look at foreign capitals, where the local interest in the events has yet to justify a massive publishing effort.[18] As we now expect, the United States exposed much of its internal wrangling to public view, so we know all about the divisions between the Europeanists and the Latin Americanists, and the specific arguments between Secretary of State Haig and Ambassador Kirkpatrick at the UN. Elsewhere, including in the UN, diplomats have remained more taciturn. We are still remarkably ignorant not only of the international machinations designed to stop Britain and Argentina fighting, and then to pull them apart once they had started, but also simply what the diplomatic community thought of it all.

Completing our survey of the basic sources on the conflict are the newspapers. Early attempts to use a large cuttings file to obviate the need for further research and win the race to the bookshops are best forgotten and illustrate the limits of reliance upon the press.[19] Furthermore, the subsequent publicity about the problems faced by the media may have created the impression that few stories of lasting worth appeared. Nevertheless, while the details of the military action released at the time were limited, much of the diplomacy was played out in public. Furthermore, a sense of the movement of public and elite attitudes can only be gained by reading the press of the time. Both the BBC and ITV have produced videos on the conflict which serve as reminders of how much this was not a television war. The BBC has also published the collected despatches of its two reporters, Brian Hanrahan and Robert Fox, taking as the title Hanrahan's most memorable phrase after the first raid on Port Stanley.[20]

The actual performance of the media has been subjected to intense scrutiny. So serious were the arguments between Whitehall and the media during the course of the conflict, with accusations flying backwards and forwards—of the press giving aid and comfort to the enemy and of the Ministry of Defence practising the most sinister techniques of disinformation and manipulation—and so great was the furore, that the House of Commons Defence Committee decided to investigate this issue as its first major postwar inquiry. The result is an unusual and significant archive. The committee received evidence from most of the journalists who had been with the Task Force as well as from the major news agencies, papers, the BBC and ITV. All the frustrations of the previous few months were poured out. The Ministry of Defence was then given a chance to answer all the criticisms which, by and large, it did quite well. However, overall it is clear just how much the handling of the media reflected official instinct, which is rarely loquacious, rather than any deliberate or considered policy. The naturally restrictive approach demonstrated an extremely narrow view of the proper goals of an information policy. At least the complaints were put into some sort of perspective.[21]

The overall impression is that the media are not very good at reporting on themselves, in that they often have an exaggerated sense of their own importance and the inconveniences that others should accept, even when fighting a war, to accommodate the pressures of deadlines and Fleet Street rivalries. Robert Harris, drawing very much on the evidence given

17. *The Falklands campaign: a digest of debates in the House of Commons, 2 April to 15 June 1982* (London: HMSO, 1982).

18. The exception, of course, is Buenos Aires; for Argentine literature see the article by Simon Collier on pp. 459–64 of this issue. An interesting account of how the war looked to a number of young Argentine conscripts has been published in Britain: Daniel Kon, *Los chicos de la guerra* (New English Library, 1983). An important description of the fighting from an Argentine perspective but written by an American is Robert L. Scheina, 'The Malvinas campaign', *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute*, Spring 1983.

19. C. Dobson *et al.*, *The Falklands conflict* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1982). This came out even before the fighting was over!

20. Brian Hanrahan and Robert Fox, '*I counted them all out and I counted them all back*': *the battle for the Falklands* (London: BBC, 1982).

21. First Report from the Defence Committee, *The handling of press and public information during the Falklands conflict*. 2 vols, session 1982–3 (London: HMSO, 1982).

to the Defence Committee, has produced a readable account of the 'media war', looking with a properly jaundiced eye at the rather undistinguished role of the *Sun*, whose most infamous headline provides the title of the book.[22]

A lot of the trouble between the military and the media stemmed from the assumption by many servicemen and officials that in some way the American media had been responsible for 'losing' the Vietnam War by eroding popular will through a daily diet of lurid TV pictures. This explains to a large extent both the relief that it proved impossible to organize live TV coverage and the apprehension that bad news would damage popular morale. (The evidence for the assumption of the negative media role in the case of Vietnam is flimsy to say the least.)

The importance of domestic factors in the conduct of the war is surprisingly neglected.[23] It might have been expected that Simon Jenkins would have done more on this aspect of the campaign but he had his work cut out making sense of what was going on in the higher levels of decision-making.[24] One of the main insights to emerge from the Jenkins/Hastings book is the role played by the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach, in convincing the Cabinet of the practicability of sending a large naval Task Force. A major incentive was to demonstrate the capability and the importance of the Royal Navy in contradiction to the general defence policy line set out in the White Paper of June 1981 which argued for substantial cuts in the Navy's combat vessels. The intermingling of the conflict with a general debate over the future of the Navy also comes out in an interesting combination of memoir and advocacy from Keith Speed, the former Navy Minister who resigned in opposition to the naval cutbacks.[25]

Otherwise, the discussion of the politics of the conflict is left to the opponents of the war. Anthony Barnett and Tam Dalyell both provide spirited critiques of what they obviously see as a reversion to the habits of empire.[26] Both deal at length with, but have difficulty in getting over, the fact that the war was willed by parliament as much as by the government itself, and that a key factor in parliament was the role of the Labour front bench. It was not, in this sense, really 'Mrs Thatcher's War'. Tam Dalyell is convinced that a settlement could have been secured had not the Prime Minister consistently escalated the fighting just as mediators looked like succeeding. The relationship between the course of the fighting and the diplomacy is somewhat more complicated, as Jenkins and Hastings amply demonstrate. Barnett's account is more composed and organized than Dalyell's and raises an interesting but in the end slightly implausible thesis about the importance of Churchillian symbols as a means of maintaining national unity.

It is notable that among the authors whose works have been mentioned thus far, academics are conspicuous by their absence. Scholarly work on the Falkland Islands dispute has hardly been a prominent feature of British university life. Those few academics who were interested in the matter have either concerned themselves with the general question of British–Latin American relations or with the particular question of sovereignty over the islands.[27] During the crisis the

22. Robert Harris, *Gotcha!—the media, the government and the Falklands crisis*, (London: Faber, 1983). Some further material, and more background on the force's public relations efforts and general relations with the media is to be found in Alan Hooper, *The military and the media* (Aldershot, Hants: Gower, 1982).

23. Best ignored is a self-conscious attempt to get intellectuals to say something useful on the subject, which fails miserably: Cecil Woolf and Jean Moorcroft Wilson, *Authors take sides on the Falklands* (London: Cecil Woolf, 1982).

24. He did, however, with Robert Worcester, write a brief article on the development of public opinion up to the end of May: 'Britain rallies round the Prime Minister', *Public Opinion*, June/July 1982. I am not aware of a more recent article which brings together the poll evidence for the whole of the conflict.

25. Keith Speed, *Sea change: the battle for the Falklands and the future of Britain's navy* (Bath: Ashgrove, 1982).

26. Anthony Barnett, *Iron Britannia* (London: Allison & Busby, 1982). Tam Dalyell, MP, *One Man's Falklands* (London: Cecil Woolf, 1982). Another left-wing critique, published before the war's end, is Anthony Arblaster, *The Falklands: Thatcher's war; Labour's guilt* (London: Socialist Society, 1982).

27. J. C. J. Metford, 'Falklands or Malvinas?: the background to the dispute', *International Affairs*, Summer 1968; Peter Beck, 'Co-operative confrontation in the Falkland Islands dispute—the Anglo-Argentine search for a way forward, 1968–1981', *Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs*, Feb. 1982, pp. 37–58.

Royal Institute of International Affairs produced a quick survey covering a variety of questions. This succeeded in getting a number of academic specialists to commit themselves to paper while events were still unfolding.[28] Inevitably some of the judgements did not pass the test of time. It is interesting to note the general pessimism and distaste for the military option and hope that a peaceful settlement could be achieved through the exertion of economic and diplomatic means of pressure. Nevertheless the authors did succeed in throwing light on aspects of the affair that were neglected at the time—in particular the actual and likely reactions of those not directly involved in the conflict—and which have not been fully discussed since.

Since the end of the war the only book by an academic has been by a Latin Americanist who demonstrated commendable enterprise and speed in getting his manuscript to the printer—and still remembered the footnotes![29] Peter Calvert's discussion of the months of April to June does not add a great deal but it is helpful to have the conflict placed in a Latin American as much as a British context. The running is still being made by those interested in the Latin American or sovereignty aspects of the issue. Thus, a special 'Falklands' issue of the journal *Millenium* contains, out of seven articles, three on the question of sovereignty and two on Latin America. It is of note that those on sovereignty do not give much support to the British claim to the islands, although the Argentine counter-claim is not desperately impressive either.[30] As Dr Beck suggests towards the end of his piece, in the end power rather than legal argument appears to be decisive. However, it might also be the case that in terms of the public debate, the question of whether a claim to the Islands can be established that is watertight in international law is less important than the principle of self-determination. Jeffrey Myhre devotes only a paragraph to this principle along with the contrary principle of decolonization, because he doubts its legal validity. Yet the political importance of this principle is considerable and a thorough analysis, pointing to the inevitable limits on its application, would be welcome.

Two further essays in the *Millenium* collection put the crisis in a historical context. Guillermo Makin places the Argentine invasion at the end of a long history of political instability and offers little prospect of the 'Malvinas' issue removing its hold on Argentine politics. Peter Calvert explains the importance of General Galtieri's government in the development of US policy towards Latin American policy prior to the crisis and the subsequent attempts by Washington to mend its broken fences.[31]

The final two essays bring us to more general issues. Many of those who opposed the war in Britain argued that there were alternative forms of pressure available which could have forced Argentina off the islands without bloodshed. Most of the histories see the economic sanctions move in symbolic terms rather than as a practical method of shifting the occupying force. Margaret Doxey justifies scepticism as to the general value of economic sanctions. Finally, Philip Windsor investigates 'one of the very few wars in history in which one nation had no real intention of invading, and the other fought for territory which it had spent twenty years saying it did not really want'. He develops the compelling case that it was the nature of American conduct in the crisis that made matters worse rather than better.[32] In an article in *The World*

28. *The Falkland Islands dispute: international dimensions* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1982).

29. Peter Calvert, *The Falklands crisis: the rights and wrongs* (London: Pinter, 1982).

30. Peter Beck, 'The Anglo-Argentine dispute over title to the Falkland Islands: changing British perceptions on sovereignty since 1910'; Jeffrey D. Myhre, 'Title to the Falklands-Malvinas under international law'; Alfredo Bruno Bologna, 'Argentine claims to the Malvinas under international law', all in *Millenium*, Spring 1983. The last of these is by an Argentine author and is translated from the Spanish. See also Malcolm Deas, 'Falklands title deeds', *London Review of Books*, 19 Aug.–2 Sept. 1982. The classic text on the matter, highly disapproved of in London, is Julius Goebel, *The struggle for the Falkland Islands*, written in the 1920s and recently republished by the Yale University Press. The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee has been taking evidence on this (as well as on such matters as the future economic viability of the islands). Among the expert witnesses discussing the sovereignty question are Beck, Deas and Professor James Fawcett. The report has not been published (though it was substantially leaked to *The Times*) but the Minutes of Evidence are being published under the heading of *Falkland Islands*.

31. Guillermo Makin, 'The military in Argentine politics: 1880–1982'; Peter Calvert, 'Latin America and the United States during and after the Falklands crisis', both in *Millenium*, Spring 1983.

32. Margaret Doxey, 'International sanctions: trials of strength or tests of weakness?'; Philip Windsor, 'Diplomatic dimensions of the Falklands crisis', both in *Millenium*, Spring 1983. For a useful survey of

Today Phil Williams demonstrates how the basic conditions for successful crisis management were not met in this case.[33]

The weaknesses of the economic sanctions, the confusion of American diplomacy as well as the inability of both belligerents to compromise on the principle of sovereignty, meant that the issue (at least in the short term) was decided by force of arms. And so we had the unusual and wholly surprising spectacle of a limited war in the South Atlantic. Inevitably, as such conflicts are few and far between (though less so than they used to be) the conflict has been picked over by strategists for clues as to the nature of modern warfare. The general consensus appears to be that it is very dangerous to draw too many lessons too quickly and that what lessons are to be drawn are less to do with equipment than with the more timeless features of armed conflict. Most would agree with Jeffrey Record: 'In sum, the general military lessons of the Falklands War are for the most part affirmations of old truths and established trends, whatever the new conclusions that may emerge about the performance of specific technologies. War is still first and foremost a human encounter, and the intangibles of leadership, training, strategy, tactics, and cohesion under fire are still as decisive as they were in the days of Alexander the Great.'[34] This conclusion is most valid when considering the land war. Those studying the air and sea wars find technology looming larger in their analyses, though again the skill and determination with which weapons are used can still mock the manufacturer's specifications. For airmen the question is one of what can be achieved at the limits of aircraft range;[35] for sailors the questions turn on the best means of air defence and the role of the carrier (an issue which ensured that the conflict was analysed with special care in the United States).[36] A nervousness that unwarranted conclusions, primarily of a broad strategic nature, might be drawn for future defence policy is also to be found in articles on the relevance of the conflict for future British defence policy.[37]

As can be seen from this survey the Falklands War has already stimulated a rich and varied literature which, given the speed of its production, is of a generally high quality. More is still needed from the Argentine side and to fill in the gaps on the diplomatic activity. For most of the questions that need asking some information of a reasonable reliability is now available.

the economic measures taken against Argentine, see Joan Pearce, 'Economic measures' in *The Falkland Islands dispute* (RIIA). See also M. S. Daoudi and M. S. Dajani, 'Sanctions: the Falklands episode', *The World Today*, April 1983.

33. Phil Williams, 'Miscalculation, crisis management and the Falklands conflict', *The World Today*, April 1983.

34. Jeffrey Record, 'The Falklands War', *Washington Quarterly*, Autumn 1982. See also articles by Edward N. Luttwak and Michael Moodie in the same issue. The line taken by Record is similar to one that I took in 'The Falklands War of 1982', *Foreign Affairs*, September 1982. See also A. M. Cordesman, 'The Falklands crisis: emerging lessons for power projection and force planning', *Armed Forces Journal International*, Sept. 1982.

35. Air Commodore R. A. Mason, 'Hurray for the hobby horses: reflections on the air war in the South Atlantic 1982', *Journal of the Royal United Services Institute*, Dec. 1982. See also the chapter by Air Vice Marshal M. J. Armitage in M. J. Armitage and R. A. Mason, eds: *Air power in the nuclear age: theory and practice* (London: Macmillan, 1983).

36. Admiral Thomas H. Hoover and Alvin J. Cottrell, 'In the wake of the Falklands battle', *Strategic Review*, Summer 1982; John O. Coote, 'Send her victorious . . .', *Proceedings of the US Naval Institute*, Jan. 1983.

37. All the articles seem to have the same title: Bruce George and Michael Coughlin, 'British defence policy after the Falklands', *Survival*, Sept.–Oct. 1982; Lawrence Freedman, 'British defence policy after the Falklands', *The World Today*, Sept. 1982; Peter Foot, 'British defence: the Falklands and after', ADIU Report, July/Aug. 1982.

How frank was Franks?

William Wallace*

Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Chairman: The Rt Hon. The Lord Franks. Cmnd 8787. London: HMSO, 1983.

> 'For various political reasons we were asked to attempt the impossible; to accept criticisms without accepting them, to have a public inquiry which is not public.'[1]

The Franks Report is an extraordinary document. On a rapid first reading—all that was possible in the immediate debate which followed its publication in January 1983—it exonerates the government in office from all blame. A more leisured re-reading, some months later, provides a very different perspective. The report's often-quoted conclusion (para. 339) that '. . . we would not be justified in attaching any criticism or blame to the present government for the Argentine Junta's decision to commit its act of unprovoked aggression in the invasion of the Falkland Islands *on 2 April* 1982' (italics added) must be balanced against the indications, scattered throughout the report, that a confrontation of some sort, quite probably military, was already considered highly likely at some point during that year. What criticism there is of the British government is directed most clearly at the Joint Intelligence Organization (paras 316–19). Yet the Report carries repeated evidence that Britain's intelligence-gathering machinery worked well throughout the years, months and weeks before the invasion, and that accurate assessments of the shifting situation were available to ministers at all times. One must conclude, as Professor Bill Mackenzie concluded of the Plowden Report, that we are faced with a coded document, and that cryptographic skills are needed to read between the lines.

The report is a major document for students of foreign policy in several respects. For the first time, so far as I am aware, the British government has lifted the curtain of secrecy surrounding its intelligence apparatus, and outlined its structure in print. The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), the Current Intelligence Groups which prepare assessments for the JIC, the Assessments Staff which services them and provides their chairmen: all appear in the report, and are briefly described in Annex B. The Cabinet's Defence Committee, its core membership, the frequency of its meetings, are all admitted; and the student of foreign policy-making can gain a good sense of the flow of memoranda around Whitehall, the relationship between Cabinet ministers and junior ministers, and much else.

The substance of the report is of course more important than the insights it gives on the process of British government; unless we conclude that: 'Unluckily, it turns out that the real problem is about the nature of government in general, and of British government in particular. This is what we are discussing, but of course we have to wrap it up in Mandarin prose.'[2] The key to the code, perhaps, is to juxtapose the careful phraseology of para. 339 with the injunction in the Committee's terms of reference to take account not only of the immediate weeks before the invasion but 'of all such factors in previous years as are relevant', and to observe that the report's more general conclusions—which are far more critical—are to be found in paras 278–92. These present a much more sobering picture of the drift of British policy from 1977 to 1982: of a succession of 'signals that could be read by Argentina as evidence of diminishing British interest in protecting its sovereignty in the area' (para. 279), of 'other British policies which may have served to cast doubt on British commitment to the Islands and their defence' (para. 280), of repeated but inconclusive discussions with Argentina 'in which the negotiating options were progressively eliminated' (para. 282), 'against the background of a general belief [within the intelligence agencies, the Foreign and

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1. W. J. M. Mackenzie, 'The Plowden Report: a translation', para. 1. Originally published in *The Guardian*, 25 May 1963; reprinted in Richard Rose, ed., *Policy-making in Britain* (London: Macmillan, 1969) pp. 273–82.
2. 'Plowden Report', para. 30.

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Commonwealth Office, and the British Embassy in Buenos Aires] that time was running out and that Argentine impatience was growing' (para. 289).

For reasons which the Committee does not however make entirely explicit, Lord Carrington did not accept the advice of his Minister of State, then Nicholas Ridley, and of the officials concerned at a crucial meeting on 30 June 1981, that

> the only feasible option was leaseback preceded by an education campaign, both in the Falklands Islands and at home (para. 289) . . . Lord Carrington told us that, in his view, there was no prospect of 'selling' leaseback at that stage. It did not have support in the Islands, in the House of Commons, or amongst his own Ministerial colleagues in Government . . . The Government was thenceforth left with no resort other than attempting to keep negotiations going by some means or other, and they were in the position of having nothing to offer Argentina other than what the islanders dictated . . . We conclude that the Government were in a position of weakness, and that the effect of Lord Carrington's decision was to pass the initiative to the Argentine Government (para. 290).

The history of the dispute, which provides the context for this apparently helpless drift from the summer of 1981 until a confrontation which was repeatedly predicted as looming ahead in the course of 1982, is set out in the first two chapters of the report. It is difficult to read it without some sympathy for, and understanding of, Argentine impatience, as well as deep sympathy for the frustrations of a Diplomatic Service which had done its best over the years to present the choices to ministers, and had seen those choices repeatedly avoided. By the time the invasion took place, we were faced, as Mrs Thatcher put it in opening the parliamentary debate on the report, with a 'fundamental dilemma': 'The inherent contradiction was evident. No solution which satisfied the Argentine demand for sovereignty pure and simple could possibly be reconciled with the wishes of the islanders or of this House.'[3]

But the Argentine demand had *not* been, at the outset, for sovereignty 'pure and simple', and the wishes of the islanders—though not of the small but active Falklands 'lobby' in the House of Commons—had not always been so adamant. If, by the end of March 1982, there was, for both Argentina and Britain, no apparent alternative to confrontation, it was because diplomacy had failed, and failed largely because of the contradictory signals given over the previous two years by the British government. A combination of continuing cuts in defence (and in the British Antarctic Survey), apparently deliberate reduction of the islanders' status, and continuing neglect of the islands' economy, with an apparent immobilism towards negotiations on sovereignty, persuaded some within the Argentine government that confrontation—and, if necessary, occupation—would resolve the dilemma without too sharp a reaction from an embarrassed but only half-committed British government.

By March 1982 discussions between the United Kingdom and Argentina about the disputed status of the Falklands had been under way for sixteen years. After some preliminary manoeuvring, 'in March 1967 the British government for the first time stated formally to Argentina that they would be prepared to cede sovereignty over the Islands under certain conditions, provided that the wishes of the Islanders were respected' (para. 22). In August 1968 a Memorandum of Understanding was agreed by officials of both sides, in which the UK government agreed 'as part of a final settlement' to 'recognize Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands', while recognizing the need to take full account of the *interests* of the islanders and that—for Britain—the islanders themselves must be the final judge of where those interests lay. Adverse reaction in both Houses of Parliament after Lord Chalfont, then an FCO Minister of State, had visited the Falklands, however, led the government to abandon this attempt to reach a settlement; though it was already recognized, now some fourteen years before the invasion, that 'failure to reach an understanding with Argentina carried the risks of increased harassment of the Islanders *and the possibility of an attack*' (para. 25; italics added).

From 1969 to 1979 negotiations alternated with periods of tension. Argentina made a number of gestures towards economic cooperation in their early stages, hoping no doubt to link the islanders more closely to the substantial British community in Argentina and so to create the right conditions for an overall settlement (as para. 89 admits). The Argentine authorities themselves built the first airstrip, as part of a package of measures to improve

3. *Hansard* (Commons), 25 January 1983, col. 795.

communications with the mainland agreed between 1971 and 1974. In contrast, the British government provided no additional resources for economic development. The recommendations of the Shackleton Report, commissioned in 1975 'as a result of growing concern about the decline of the Falkland Islands' economy and the Islands' loss of population' (para. 34), were rejected by Mr Crosland in a statement in February 1977 in which he announced the resumption of the interrupted negotiations on 'the possibilities of cooperation between Britain and Argentina in the region of the South West Atlantic' (para. 58). When, six years later in early 1981, the FCO began to look in detail at civil contingency plans 'in the event of Argentina's withdrawing the services it provided', it noted that there was no practical alternative way of providing an air service, and that the Islands depended on Argentina for their supplies of fuel and freight, for educational facilities and for emergency medical services (para. 108)—that is to say, that the Falklands had become even more dependent on Argentina, despite the sharpened misgivings of the islanders about association with Argentina since the return to a military regime in 1976.

In 1974 the Cabinet's Defence Committee had agreed to explore the idea of condominium as the basis for a settlement; the islanders were cautious, but did not veto an initial exploration, though the government decided that without their active participation it could not pursue matters further (para. 30). In 1975 the Argentine government proposed 'the possibility of a transfer of sovereignty followed by simultaneous leaseback for a period of years' (para. 33). Its accusations, in the United Nations General Assembly and elsewhere, that the British government was not prepared to negotiate seriously were backed up by a warning of more direct action, with an Argentine destroyer firing shots at an unarmed research ship, the RRS *Shackleton*. This and other developments led to 'a major review of policy' in March 1976, after which the government informed Argentina that it was 'prepared to resume negotiations, *including discussion of sovereignty*' (para. 48, italics added). This interaction between negotiation and threatened confrontation continued through 1977 and 1978, with Argentina testing the British with landings on one of the Falkland Islands Dependencies, and the British government at one point moving a naval force (one nuclear-powered submarine and two frigates) to the area as an available deterrent if matters should get worse.

Three points from this period stand out. First, for the British, 'the negotiating options gradually narrowed'. Secondly, the British government stalled, and the Argentinians correctly concluded that 'the British were using pretexts to delay progress' (para. 62). 'Although transfer of sovereignty combined with leaseback had come to be regarded by the British Government as the most realistic solution, the leaseback proposal was not discussed with Argentina'; indeed, 'Mr Rowlands'—now in charge, as Minister of State—'was able to avoid proposing leaseback' during the discussions (paras 67, 70). Third, Argentina saw military pressure as the most effective means of pushing Britain into making progress with negotiations; and the report indicates that Britain did modify its attitude to negotiations under military pressure. A JIC Assessment of November 1977 noted, in phrases repeated in later Assessments in 1979 and 1981, that

> as long as [Argentina] calculated that the British Government were prepared to negotiate seriously on sovereignty, it was unlikely to resort to force. If negotiations broke down, or if Argentina concluded from them that there was no prospect of real progress towards a negotiated transfer of sovereignty, there would be a high risk of its then resorting to more forceful measures, including direct military action (para. 63).

This, then, was the situation which faced the incoming Conservative government in May 1979. It was evident that there was a potential for military confrontation; one may surmise from the careful prose that the Labour government had now appreciated its dilemma, and had intended a new initiative of some sort after the election. 'A full range of policy options' were thus presented to the new government; Nicholas Ridley, the last but one of the long succession of Ministers of State who had to grapple with this *dossier*, visited the Islands in July, and 'was handed a toughly-worded communiqué' after his talks with the Argentine deputy foreign minister in Buenos Aires (paras. 71–2). The sense of urgency to find a coherent policy is evident in the memoranda which Lord Carrington sent his colleagues in September and October 1979. 'The Prime Minister decided, however, that discussion of the Falkland Islands by the Defence Committee should be postponed until after the Rhodesian issue had been settled', and in consequence Mr Ridley declined an Argentine invitation 'for

a further informal exchange of views' (para. 76). Further pressure from Lord Carrington achieved discussions within the Defence Committee in January, July and November 1980. The first of these authorized further 'exploratory' talks, and the third agreed to Mr Ridley again visiting the Islands to see if the Falklanders could be persuaded to support 'a solution of the dispute on the basis of a leaseback arrangement' (para. 80). 'Islander opinion appeared to be divided, with a substantial minority opposed to it *and the majority undecided*' (para. 81; italics added). But the reaction of a small group of MPs of all parties, almost all of whom were members of the lobby entitled the Falkland Islands Committee, was uniformly hostile. The Cabinet subsequently 'noted that . . . the Islanders' hostility to Mr Ridley's approach seemed to have been exaggerated' (para. 82).

The Cabinet nevertheless allowed this parliamentary reaction to foreclose any further efforts to persuade the islanders that their interests might best be served by such a solution, *without* apparently accepting that this foreclosure had consequences for the British government's negotiating position and for the predictable (and often predicted) reaction of the Argentine government. The FCO tried hard to square the circle, at both ministerial and official level. Mr Ridley held further talks with the Argentines in February and June 1981. Repeated indications of Argentine impatience led to a crucial meeting within the FCO on 30 June, under Mr Ridley's chairmanship, for which our Ambassador in Buenos Aires and the Governor of the Falkland Islands returned to London. Their conclusions were that there was no practical alternative to leaseback, that the negotiations could not be stalled for much longer, that Island opinion 'had not hardened irrevocably', and that 'a much more active campaign to educate Islander and British public opinion' was therefore necessary (paras 90, 98). Lord Carrington however rejected this in September, on the grounds that 'such a campaign would not have been agreed to by his [Cabinet] colleagues'; 'he did not seek a meeting' with the Prime Minister, though he sent her a sombre minute pointing out the consequent prospects for a developing confrontation, at first most likely as a withdrawal of the services Argentina provided. He added that 'supplying and defending the Islands would be both difficult and costly' (paras 99, 100).

The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires justly described this as a decision 'to have no strategy at all beyond a general Micawberism' (para. 104). From then onwards, ministers allowed the situation to drift towards a confrontation which their officials had repeatedly warned them would come—without taking measures to strengthen the defence of the Islands (apparently accepting that they were, in effect, indefensible) or make it clear to the Argentine government that any attempt at invasion would be repelled. On the contrary, in the course of the 1981 Defence Review the decision to withdraw HMS *Endurance*, the lightly-armed guard ship for the Falklands and its Dependencies, was announced—against the repeated representations of Lord Carrington, Nicholas Ridley, and FCO officials.[4] The British Nationality Bill excluded the Falkland Islanders from an automatic right to British citizenship. Britain continued to sell arms to Argentina, and to provide training facilities in the UK for Argentine military personnel. The planned cuts in the Royal Navy, in particular the planned sale of HMS *Invincible*, indicated that after the summer of 1982 Britain's capacity to react to Argentine military action would almost have gone. The government had boxed itself in, and compounded its error by publicly indicating to the Argentine government its lack of interest in the Falklands and its declining concern to defend them.

The report tells us all this; and tells us, if we look very carefully, where it considers the responsibility to lie—if we are prepared to follow Professor Mackenzie's approach, and look to 'studied omission' as an indicator of what the careful reader can discern.[5] It contains only the briefest of references, in the text, to the parliamentary exchanges of December 1980; yet they are printed, in full, in the five pages of Annex F. The Falkland Islands Committee appears even more obscurely, in a footnote on p. 6; thereafter we are provided only with occasional references to 'domestic political constraints'. Richard Luce, who was unfortunate enough to have been the Minister of State left holding the *dossier* when the confrontation took place, gently suggested in the parliamentary debate on the report that

4. 'An intelligence report in September 1981 quoted an Argentine diplomatic view that the withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* had been construed by the Argentines as a deliberate political gesture; they did not see it as an inevitable economy in Britain's defence budget since *the implications for the Islands and for Britain's position in the South Atlantic were fundamental*' (para. 116, italics added).

5. 'Plowden Report', para. 19.

> successive governments could have been more vigorous in inviting Parliament to face more sharply the options that confronted us . . . had we had the present kind of Select Committee system in the 1970s—a Select Committee that looked sharply at the options—. . . at least there might have been greater understanding between the government and parliament.

Andrew Faulds, interrupting him, put the point more bluntly:

> First, there is a staggering degree of ignorance about South America in all quarters of the House. Secondly, the problem is that no government had the guts to direct British public attention to the need for the problem to be solved rationally.[6]

Left in the dark, the only information available to MPs came from the Falkland Islands Committee: an interested party with links not only to the islanders themselves but to the Falkland Islands Company—which, Julian Amery claimed in the same debate (col. 854), 'tried to repatriate as much' of its profits as it could instead of reinvesting them in the Falklands. 'I am not aware of any attempt to engage in dialogue with members [of the Committee]', asserted a contrite Liberal MP who had taken part in the December 1980 exchanges; 'no Minister from any government has appeared willing to engage in a dialogue with us' (col. 966). After the event, MPs of all parties appeared a little shamefaced at their neglect of the underlying issues: 'every hon. Member, past and present, has some responsibility', one leading Conservative backbencher admitted (col. 829). It would, of course, have been a departure from the traditions of secrecy embedded in British government for ministers to have taken time to educate and inform MPs. But why did Lord Carrington not press further with the strong recommendations of his Minister of State and his officials for just such a campaign of education, both with MPs and with the Falklanders, while there was still time?

The report suggests that its authors understood very well why Lord Carrington held back, and why 'Government policy towards Argentina and the Falkland Islands was never formally discussed outside the Foreign and Commonwealth Office after January 1981' (para. 291). It does not attach the main responsibility to officials. Though it suggests 'that they should have drawn Ministers' attention more effectively' to the deteriorating situation (para. 302), it makes it clear throughout that accurate information and assessment, with a due sense of urgency, was provided throughout. 'Officials in both the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Ministry of Defence were looking to Ministers', and

> in our view, it could have been advantageous . . . for Ministers to have reviewed collectively [in September 1981] or in the months immediately ahead, the current negotiating position; the implications of the conflict between the attitudes of the Islanders and the aims of the Junta; and the longer-term policy options in relation to the dispute' (para. 292).

Ah, but 'the time was never judged to be ripe' (para. 291).[7]

The Prime Minister's reference to Rhodesia (para. 76) as a justification for postponement suggests one reason for this judgement—as well as for Lord Carrington's reluctance to 'seek a meeting' with her on the issue in 1981. Against the instincts of many within the Conservative Party, including those who most strongly supported Mrs Thatcher, Lord Carrington had carried through a settlement of the Rhodesian dispute in a time-consuming series of negotiations in 1979–80, culminating in the unanticipated victory of Robert Mugabe—regarded by many Conservatives as virtually a communist—in the elections which followed. The Foreign Secretary had carried his Prime Minister, her Cabinet, and their party along with him down a road which represented to many the abandonment of their kith and kin to an uncivilized regime. The time could hardly be ripe, within the same parliament, to suggest—even under a long-term leaseback—the abandonment of other kith and kin to an

6. *Hansard* (Commons), 26 January 1983, col. 942.

7. Those unfamiliar with the common rooms of Oxford or Cambridge may well miss this reference to 'the principle of unripe time', used by generations of dons to block decisions on proposals for innovation or action. 'Time, by the way, is like the medlar; it has the trick of going rotten before it is ripe.' F. M. Cornford, *Microcosmographia Academica* (Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1908; ninth impression, 1973), p. 16.

uncivilized regime of the right, with the prospect of attack from the Labour front-benchers as well as from its own party.

Two other interrelated points are oddly underplayed in the Report. The then Defence Minister, John Nott, had been put there by the Prime Minister to carry through economies, particularly in the surface navy, which she felt his predecessor had been insufficiently determined in pursuing. The run-up to the Falklands invasion coincided with the run-up to the Budget, with Treasury ministers reasserting their own and their Prime Minister's determination to reduce public expenditure against the protests of their colleagues. The strength of their commitment to that overriding objective might well be expected to make them less open to representations which implied the need to retain ships or to spend money on marginal and remote Dependencies. As late as 29 March 1982, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury refused to give Lord Carrington financial approval 'to carry forward civil contingency plans to replace air and sea services to the Falklands' and to meet the costs from the Contingency Reserve (para. 188). It is hardly surprising, therefore, that 'there was no enthusiasm in the Ministry of Defence for detailed contingency planning' (para. 113); in the midst of bitterly fought defence cuts, with operational costs being reduced to the bone, it must have seemed unlikely in the extreme that any such plans would have been approved.

Annex B lists all the ministers and officials cited in the Report, and describes their responsibilities as they related to the Falkland Islands. All the officials are listed by name as well as title, as are all the ministers except two: the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Chief Secretary to the Treasury, despite his earlier appearance, is entirely absent. Now what would Professor Mackenzie have made of that?

The First Falklands War? Argentine attitudes

Simon Collier*

La batalla de las Malvinas. By Leo Kanaf. Buenos Aires: Tribuna Abierta, 1982. 212 pp.

La guerra austral. By Manfred Schönfeld. Buenos Aires: Desafios Editores SA, 1982. 382 pp.

Los chicos de la guerra. Hablan los soldados que estuvieron en Malvinas. By Daniel Kon. Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1982. 222 pp.

Los nombres de la derrota. By Néstor J. Montenegro and Eduardo Aliverti. Buenos Aires: Nemont Ediciones, 1982. 111 pp.

El otro frente de la guerra. Los padres de las Malvinas. By Dalmiro Bustos. Buenos Aires: Ramos Americana Editora, 1982. 219 pp.

Después de Malvinas, qué . . .? By Roberto Roth. Buenos Aires: Ediciones La Campana, 1982. 165 pp.

In the months since the war in the South Atlantic—that extraordinary episode recently described by Jorge Luis Borges as a quarrel between two bald men for possession of a comb—there has been a steady accumulation of British literature on the subject. Indeed, some of the examples of 'instant history' stimulated by the conflict (and discussed in this issue by Professor Lawrence Freedman) have been, by common consent, of unusually high quality. But what, meanwhile, of the corresponding literature on the Argentine side? How have Argentine writers perceived and evaluated the Falklands war? The first half-dozen or so Argentine books to be published since the war do not afford a comprehensive answer to this question, but they are valuable nevertheless in helping us to assess certain distinctively Argentine attitudes to the events of 1982. Since this Argentine literature is almost certainly unfamiliar to most British readers, a brief description of each item in the present small (and, it may be assumed, preliminary) 'sample' is perhaps in order.

Of the six books under consideration here (and all of them were in fact published within four months or so of the end of the war) only one, Leo Kanaf's *La batalla de las Malvinas*, can really be said to fall into the category of instant history, and it is in no sense a rival to books in this genre that have now appeared in England. Published in August 1982, it bears all the signs of having been compiled in haste, and is less a coherent or connected narrative than a scissors-and-paste job consisting of brief extracts from press reports, additional comments from Kanaf himself, and numerous explanatory notes (some of them almost miniature essays) on a variety of assorted matters supposedly connected with the conflict: there are sketches here of the Battle of the Falklands in 1914, the Battle of the River Plate in 1939, the rise and decline of the British empire, and the Welsh colony in Patagonia—settlers who, in Kanaf's words, 'completely integrated themselves into the Argentine Nation' (p. 54). Kanaf's account (if that isn't too strong a word) of the war itself is fairly straightforward. He tends to exaggerate the extent of British losses—claiming, for instance, that the attack on the *Sir Galahad* left 'hundreds of dead' (p. 201)—and presents no serious analysis of either Argentine or British strategy. Some of his numerous 'asides', however, are moderately revealing.

Manfred Schönfeld's *La guerra austral* does not even pretend to be instant history. It is simply a collection of the articles he wrote, day by day throughout the crisis, for the distinguished Argentine newspaper *La Prensa*. These articles are what Americans call 'think-pieces' and hence add little or nothing in the way of hard information. Nevertheless, Sr Schönfeld is a veteran journalist of undeniable distinction; the way in which this intelligent Argentine commentator saw the conflict developing is interesting in its own right. The tone is very distinctive. Sr Schönfeld's opinions—amply and most lucidly articulated in what is by

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0020-5850/83/3/0459—06$03.00©1983 International Affairs

any standard a remarkable sequence of articles—are firmly and coherently nationalist; 'liberal-nationalist', he himself would claim. He sees the recovery of the Malvinas as nothing less than 'the nation's encounter with its national destiny' (p. 101). It must be said at once, however, that Sr Schönfeld's variety of nationalism has little in common with the more extreme and semi-hallucinatory obsessions that luxuriate among certain sections of the Argentine military. He takes a high-minded and at times rather touchingly oldfashioned attitude to the war—at one point he strongly advocates a formal declaration of war—and cannot, at the end of the day, conceal a bitter dissatisfaction when his compatriots fail to live up to the heroic role in which he has cast them.

Two of the books in this set are the texts of interviews; both have, for different reasons, acquired a certain instant fame. Daniel Kon's *Los chicos de la guerra*, an Argentine bestseller which has now been translated into English (New English Library, 1983) seems likely to become a minor classic of its kind. Its eight long interviews with soldiers returning from the Falklands stand not merely as yet another gloss (if such were needed) on the 'pity of war', but also as a comprehensive indictment of the failures of the Argentine military machine. It is a moving and revealing book. The same cannot be said of the interview presented by Néstor Montenegro and Eduardo Aliverti under the title of *Los nombres de la derrota*. This short book caused a considerable stir in Argentina even before it appeared on the kiosks of Buenos Aires, for the authors claim to have interviewed 'a fundamental protagonist of the war' (along with 'others less important but equally vital', whatever that may mean), and it seems probable that the 'fundamental protagonist' concerned is no less a figure than General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri himself. Galtieri is referred to in the third person throughout; but the answers set out here do undoubtedly combine the authoritativeness and also the evasiveness (at times a rather shifty evasiveness) that might be expected from the recently deposed dictator. Galtieri is certainly the only person who could have answered some (though not all) of the questions here in the way they are in fact answered. But the book contains no really startling revelations, whatever clues it may give to the mentality of Argentina's rulers at the time of the war.

Largely unconcerned with matters of high policy or military strategy, Dalmiro Bustos' *El otro frente de la guerra* nevertheless affords some fascinating insights into one small corner of the Argentine 'home front' during the war. Dr Bustos, a psychiatrist and author whose son Fabián was one of the conscripts sent to the Malvinas, was instrumental in setting up a 'Group of Soldiers' Parents' in his home town, La Plata, the capital of Buenos Aires Province. The aim was to provide moral and practical support to the soldiers stationed in the islands. Among other things, the Group organized a nightly radio programme, broadcast to the Falklands from a local station, Radio Provincia. Bustos' book is an account of this venture; it also includes eyewitness accounts of the war (letters from, and interviews with, returning soldiers) which can usefully be compared with those provided by Daniel Kon.

The final work in this 'sample', Roberto Roth's impassioned essay *Después de Malvinas, qué . . .?*, deals with the war itself only in an opening chapter—and this is a devastating general analysis of the Malvinas campaign, which Roth describes as 'an obscene parody of patriotism' (p. 7). He does not mince his words as far as the army and navy are concerned, but he is much more complimentary—as well he might be—about the air force, the 'only arm whose combatant personnel were totally professional'; in the air force, at least, there were 'no fat brigadiers' (pp. 21–2). The rest of this forceful and stimulating essay contains Sr Roth's reflections on how Argentina might set its house in order in the future. This is not a theme that can be dealt with here, and I must limit myself to saying that his ideas, expressed with what can only be described as courageous frankness, are trenchant, to the point, and highly unlikely to be assimilated by any military regime in Argentina.

It is probably fair to say that the South Atlantic crisis took most Europeans and North Americans completely by surprise. For the public, there was little or no forewarning of the conflict. (Given the long historical background to the Anglo-Argentine dispute, European or American experts on Latin America might well have predicted its outbreak; it is a matter of record that none of us did). The first impression one derives from the literature covered here is that this was also true for most Argentines, despite their greater familiarity with the issue—a familiarity instilled in lessons learned in every Argentine schoolroom. The *recuperación*, when it came, came like a bolt from the blue. One of the conscripts interviewed by Kon was fast approaching the end of his military service at the time; when told that his

return to civilian life was being delayed, his first thought was of a possible coup d'état, not of the Malvinas (p. 201). Dr Dalmiro Bustos was on one of his regular trips to São Paulo, Brazil, when the story broke. 'I was always aware of our rights,' he tells us, 'but . . . the news of the taking of the Malvinas found me totally unprepared' (p. 22). Most other Argentines seem to have been in the same position. The precise reason for the timing of the invasion is not a matter on which any of these books throws much light. The 'protagonist' interviewed by Montenegro and Aliverti claims that the timing was dictated by the South Georgia incident of March 1982 (p. 17) and indignantly rejects (p. 23) the idea that growing public discontent with the military regime prompted the invasion as a diversionary tactic. That some such Argentine move was contemplated for later in 1982 has now become a commonplace of discussion about the background to the Falklands War, but on this the 'protagonist' is silent. Roberto Roth, however, sees the whole adventure as designed to shower glory on Galtieri—to prepare the ground for his candidacy in a later presidential election (pp. 15–16).

Once the die was cast, to what extent—and the question seems an obvious one—did Argentines expect a strong response from Great Britain, following the seizure of the islands? In retrospect, the 'protagonist' of the Montenegro-Aliverti interview recognizes that his greatest mistake was in underestimating 'the real magnitude of the British military reaction' (p. 88). Indeed, if this interview is to be taken at face value, Galtieri realized the mistake at an early stage and advocated immediate compliance with UN Resolution 502, only to be overruled by his colleagues in the junta, whose argument was that public opinion would never tolerate a climbdown of this sort (p. 36). Reading this interview, one is given a strong impression of events rapidly becoming uncontrollable. The 'protagonist' claims, for instance, that the 2 April invasion was in essence designed to 'shock' Great Britain into negotiating more seriously about the Falklands (pp. 41–2). If so, it was surely a remarkably blunt instrument for the purpose. There were several less comprehensive steps (cutting communications with the islands, for one) that might have been taken without recourse to an invasion. A full-scale occupation was difficult to rescind once the crowds in the Plaza de Mayo had had their say. In Alexander Pope's words,

> The ruling Passion, be it what it will,
> The ruling Passion conquers Reason still.

Nevertheless, the literature under examination here does lead one to believe that at the start of the conflict a good deal of Argentine faith was pinned on the likelihood of British acquiescence in a *fait accompli*—the idea being that the case of the Falklands in 1982 was or would be essentially similar to that of Goa in 1961. No Argentine leader, according to Sr Roth (p. 19), actually believed that Argentina would have to fight. Most (though not quite all) of Daniel Kon's conscripts were convinced that a diplomatic settlement would swiftly ensue. 'I thought', says one of them, 'that we would arrive there and that the whole thing would then get sorted out' (p. 84). Another soldier, interviewed by Dr Bustos, recalls the general feeling of those in his position: 'We all said, "Nothing will happen here; nothing *can* happen here"' (p. 172). On purely military grounds, also, it was evidently believed in many circles that geographical considerations alone would dissuade the British from a serious attempt to repossess the islands. Leo Kanaf (p. 121) cites the views of General Luciano Benjamín Menéndez (not to be confused with the General Menéndez who became governor of the Malvinas) as very typical of those early days of the crisis: 'All England can do is protest at the United Nations, since in military terms she is in a very inferior position . . . England will not react. And if she does, she will go down to tremendous failure . . .'. This illusion does seem to have been very widely shared—and was it really such an illusion? Mrs Thatcher seized on the dispatch of a task force with alacrity; not all British prime ministers would have done the same.

There were, of course, a number of Argentines who did not share Menéndez's confidence. Dr Bustos, for instance, had lived in the United States and had known many Englishmen. 'As a good Argentine intellectual', he writes, 'I had great admiration for British culture. I knew that it would not be easy for them to stand idly by' (p. 23). Sr Schönfeld, too, did not entirely discount the possibility of a British expedition, though he thought it would be on a small scale (p. 27), and was inclined to interpret the slow advance of the task force as psychological warfare, a bluff based on 'the quasi-mythical aura that would surround the appearance over the horizon of the majestic silhouettes of a squadron of warships' (p. 43).

He might have reflected, perhaps, that the carrying out of long-range operations has always been very much part of the Royal Navy's intensely-felt historical traditions.

As it turned out, of course, the British were not bluffing on this occasion. To judge from these books, this seems to have puzzled certain sections of Argentine opinion. Given that most Argentines, whatever their attitude to the Galtieri regime, accepted that the cause was historically justified, the British determination to recapture the islands seemed to call for explanation—especially when, as Sr Schönfeld was not slow to point out, Great Britain had abandoned countless colonial territories since 1945 without much struggle. Why this over-reaction? Why *were* the British making such an effort? Leo Kanaf tells us that there was a good deal of speculation on this point, that a whole series of more or less fanciful hypotheses were brought into play: 'metaphysical explanations of protestantism and catholicism, the North–South confrontation, oil, [British] undervaluation of Argentines, irreverent suggestions about the menopausal state of the prime minister' (p. 171). Sr Schönfeld was nearer the mark, perhaps, when he claimed, early on in the crisis, that the sending of the task force was 'an escape valve for British feelings' (p. 38). It must be conceded without demur that basic feelings of wounded national pride were well to the fore on the British side; one need do no more than recall the far from phlegmatic House of Commons debate of 3 April. (It may also be true, more narrowly, that the political need to save face entered into the calculations of the Conservative government—not a point Sr Schönfeld picks up, though he might easily have done.) But it is also accurate to say that for many Britons—not to mention millions of others around the world—a key issue throughout was the position of the admittedly tiny Falklands population. Argentina's intentions towards the 'kelpers' may well have been entirely generous and altruistic, but, as Sr Schönfeld accepts, such attitudes were unlikely 'for the moment' to be reciprocated by the islanders (p. 151). One of the conscripts interviewed by Kon became very friendly with one particular 'kelper' while working at the post office in Port Stanley: 'I began to feel bad about some of the things he said to me: "You've ruined our lives . . ., nothing can ever be the same again". I felt very bad when he said this. I didn't like to feel that I had done this to anyone . . . We did not talk about it again.' (p. 205). No doubt there is some force to Sr Schönfeld's argument that the Falklanders had to some extent become isolated in time as well as space—'stuck in the period of nineteenth century colonialism' (p. 151)—but the spectacle of a distinctive culture being forcibly terminated is not, even now, one that is to everybody's taste.

For the plain fact is that whatever the rights and wrongs of the respective Argentine and British claims to sovereignty over the Falklands archipelago—and the historical antecedents of Argentina's position cannot simply be swept aside—the action of 2 April 1982 looked uncommonly like a smash-and-grab raid. Sr Schönfeld's eloquent arguments that this was in no sense aggression—and here he simply reflects the official stance of the Argentine regime—was not found convincing in the outside world. Sr Roth is in no doubt on this score: 'for the rest of the world', he writes, 'we were the aggressors, for the fact that precipitated the war was indisputably our landing in the Malvinas' (p. 23). It seems very clear that Argentina's substantial diplomatic isolation stemmed above all from this international perception. The positions taken up by the European Community and, later on, the United States (the American posture seems to have been more resented by some Argentines than British 'aggression' and is described by the 'protagonist' of the Montenegro–Aliverti interview on page 48 as a 'betrayal' to be remembered for 'generations') were not really compensated for by Latin American support for Argentina, which was neither universal nor especially tangible. Leo Kanaf invokes history in chiding the Latin American countries on this score: 'The country that sent its soldiers across the Andes to die for the liberation of other subjugated nations deserved something rather more than this in the present emergency' (p. 116). For his part, Sr Schönfeld is sure that European and American attitudes derive in part from Argentina's poor international 'image'. (Certainly one of the more extraordinary side-effects of the Falklands war was to allow Conservative MPs to use the term 'fascist' almost as liberally, and inaccurately, as their Labour opponents.) Had the Galtieri regime taken the advice earlier proffered by Sr Schönfeld—to set about the restoration of the rule of law—then 'it would', he thinks, 'have been less easy for Margaret Thatcher to incite the whole world against Argentina' (p. 327). One cannot help wondering, of course, whether a more democratic Argentina would ever have undertaken the Falklands venture in the form it was undertaken in April 1982.

The whole world against Argentina! At least two writers—Sr Kanaf and Sr Schönfeld—try at times to invest the war with a deeper significance than that afforded by a simple struggle for territory. It is possible, I think, to see in certain Argentine perceptions of the war a reflection of deep-rooted themes in Argentina's national culture. 'An advanced nation, though with one foot still in the "third world"', writes Sr Kanaf, 'is challenging the world's third greatest power, backed by the world's greatest' (p. 81). While such a description is somewhat flattering to Great Britain's present position in world affairs, it obviously pleases Sr Kanaf to think of his country locked in battle with a mighty adversary. He takes definite satisfaction from the thought that his country is 'now in the world news, is a recognized factor in the world balance' (p. 128). Some such notion (in cruder form) was evidently in the mind of one of the soldiers interviewed by Dr Bustos—a man 'proud that the world would see that we Argentines were not falling behind' (p. 173). For Sr Kanaf, the war is also, hopefully, a means of correcting British misperceptions of Argentina. The British, he writes *à propos* the destruction of HMS *Sheffield*, will now learn that they face a 'fearsome enemy' rather than 'barefoot natives' (p. 157). Sr Kanaf, in fact, is convinced that the British are inclined to stereotype Argentines incorrectly. (He forgets, of course, that two Argentine footballers have been among the most popular, familiar practitioners of that sport in England in recent years.) Early in May, Yorkshire TV, in a hook-up with Channel 10, Montevideo, brought an Argentine panel face to face with a British audience—the proceedings moderated by the inevitable David Frost. Sr Kanaf here comments that British viewers were much impressed by 'the physical aspect of the Argentine panellists, all of whom had European faces and were well-dressed . . . The public had expected redskins or Aztec natives' (p. 162).

Sr Schönfeld, however, is less concerned with British misperceptions, and is more interested in situating the conflict in a correct international framework. He sees Argentina as championing Latin America against the massed forces of Anglo-Saxondom, and also, more universally still, as defending the rights of all middle-ranking powers against the 'big battalions' of world politics (p. 269). Leaving aside wide-ranging concepts of this sort, both Sr Schönfeld and Sr Kanaf are inclined to lay stress on the essentially Western context of the conflict. The very fact that Argentina is fighting, says Sr Schönfeld, signifies that 'we exist, that we are a living presence within the Western world, and that we shall teach that world to respect us' (p. 185). Sr Kanaf at one point lets slip the revealing remark: 'The West is waging a civil war in the South Atlantic' (p. 172). Comments of this kind cannot simply be dismissed as the fanciful effusions of patriotically embattled scribblers; they stem from a fundamental aspect of modern Argentina's national psychology: its entrenched admiration for, and reliance on, Western European models. (It is an aspect to which the splendid metropolis of Buenos Aires, easily the most European city on the American continent, bears outward and monumental witness.) The attraction of Europe has always (and for solid historical reasons) been overwhelming for Argentines. Indeed, Sr Schönfeld sees the rooted anglophilia of 'certain sectors' as inducing an unjustifiably defeatist attitude to the war. Having lived for several years in England (where he was a well-respected figure in journalism and broadcasting) he is at pains to assure his readers that 'the old England which he loved . . . no longer exists'. Sketching in a brief account of British post-imperial decline, he comments: 'A nation like that cannot defeat a young and thrusting country like Argentina' (p. 192). Yet, as Sr Schönfeld himself is well aware, Argentina, too, has also had to live with a conscious sense of national decline over recent decades.

The Argentine soldiers who confronted the advancing British troops on the Falklands themselves were, it is fair to say, somewhat less impressed by considerations of British decadence. Following the surrender by General Menéndez on 14 June, many of them came into prolonged contact with their British opposite numbers. They were, as Daniel Kon's admirable interviews make clear, generally impressed by the 'organization' and, on most occasions, friendliness, of their captors, one of whom (and this rings very true) 'spent his time singing "Don't Cry for Me, Argentina!" and asking us about Evita' (p. 214). Often in war, the men who have to pay for the politicians' mistakes bear relatively little animus towards their immediate enemy; this seems to have been true in the Falklands.

It finally remains to ask what light these half-dozen books throw on Argentine attitudes at the end of the war. For some Argentines, it is very clear, the surrender at Puerto Argentino is very far from being the last word on the subject. The 'fundamental protagonist' of the Montenegro–Aliverti interview displays, on this question, a possibly predictable

defiance: 'Argentina has not been defeated, and I, of course, have not surrendered' (p. 95). Argentine soldiers, for their part, were willing enough to accept that a war had been lost: 'They beat us fair and square', says one of the men interviewed by Dr Bustos, 'because they were better than us' (p. 175). Dr Bustos himself, however, is concerned that a variety of official euphemisms may conceal the true nature of what occurred in the islands, and asks his compatriots to recognize that 'it was a war, not just an armed conflict, a defeat, not just a tactical withdrawal' (p. 97). How widely such views are shared in Argentina in the aftermath of the war is very hard to say. Roberto Roth, in a dramatic phrase, refers to the conflict as 'the First Malvinas War' (p. 12). Is there to be a second? On the strength of these six books, British opinion should be left in no doubt that the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the Falklands will continue to be pressed. By whatever means it may be pursued—and at the time of writing, the regime of General Bignone has still not announced a formal cessation of hostilities—it is bound to remain high on the agenda for any Argentine government in the near future. In the opinion of Sr Schönfeld, for whom the 'humiliation' of 1982 is roughly equivalent to the Fall of France in 1940, with no obvious De Gaulle in sight (p. 320), it is axiomatic that the islands must at some stage be reconquered 'by force of arms' (p. 374), and maybe he is not alone in that view. Both Dr Bustos and Sr Roth, in their different ways, see internal renovation as the prime task for Argentina, as an essential condition for the recovery of the Malvinas. Sr Roth summons up the image of an 'Argentina of poets and writers, of men of work and thought, effort, humility, nobility' (p. 148). Dr Bustos calls for the abandonment of triumphalist attitudes, and genuine national renewal of a democratic kind, so that 'some day we can show the world that the islands belong to us—but that the rest of the country belongs to us, too' (p. 212).

It remains to be seen, of course, whether the trauma of 1982 will bring about the national regeneration longed for by Sr Roth or Dr Bustos—or, in his very different way, Sr Schönfeld, whose palpable yearning for seriousness in the conduct of his country's affairs stamps him as a genuinely patriotic figure, worthy of our admiration, however unpalatable some of his ideas may seem to the average Briton. The alternative to regeneration, alas, is a continuation of the tragic cycle of militarism and ineffective democracy that has so inexplicably marred recent decades of Argentine history. Argentina's future moves in respect of the Falklands must, therefore, remain decidedly unpredictable until (and perhaps even after) the country's internal political configuration becomes more clearly defined. On the British side, Thatcherian triumphalism has for the moment precluded serious diplomatic initiatives. Unquestionably, a high degree of imaginative statesmanship will be required to bring about a lasting solution of a problem which should never have led to war in the first place. The United Nations Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, was reported as saying at one point during the war that the Falklands dispute could be sorted out in ten minutes, given willingness on both sides. In the short term, the war has made such a ten-minute session seem improbably remote. Those who love both Great Britain *and* Argentina (as I do) can perhaps console themselves with the thought that this will not always be so. Time, geography, changes of political regime in both countries: these factors will play their part. And if someone can be found to cut the Gordian knot, there may be no need for a Second Falklands War.

The Carter years

TOM MCNALLY*

Keeping faith: memoirs of a president. By Jimmy Carter. London: Collins. 1982. 622pp. Index. £15·00.

Crisis: the last years of the Carter presidency. By Hamilton Jordan. London: Michael Joseph. 1982. 431pp. Index. £12·95.

BETWEEN 1933 and 1961 the United States had three presidents. It is now on its sixth since 1961. During this latter period, Jimmy Carter is the only president who has both entered and left the White House via the ballot box—and the present incumbent came very close to reinforcing those statistics. Yet it could be argued that the sixties and seventies, with all their turmoil and violence, underlined the basic strength of the American system. The murder of one president was followed by a smooth succession, as laid down by the Constitution, and the criminal activities of another did result in his eventual removal from office.

Jimmy Carter's story, therefore, is not only interesting in itself, as any account of the stewardship of the American presidency must be; but also because his term of office can be seen as a test of the system in as near 'normal' conditions as we have had in recent times. Even that normality was to be perverted by the extraneous distortion of the Iranian revolution and the seizure of American embassy officials by a group whose fundamentalism put them out of reach of the machinery of ordinary diplomacy. The Iranian crisis dominates the latter part of the Carter memoirs and is the central theme of the Jordan book. How much it should have been allowed to dominate Carter's final year is discussed below; the fact remains that it did. Future historians will be able to judge these, and other events dealt with by Carter, with the perspective of a longer-distance view. They will, however, undoubtedly find the more immediate personal recollections invaluable, not only in determining the facts but also in assessing the character and motives of the men and women who made some of the key decisions of that time.

The styles of these two books are in vivid contrast. Carter's is presidential, for the record and for history. Hamilton Jordan's is written with a pace and style which will make it a ready best seller at airport newstands. I say that in no belittling way, for it transmits the flavour of the Carter White House in a way that escapes the former president's more sanitized version.

My own dealings with the Carter presidency were during my years at 10 Downing Street with Jim Callaghan. I did not keep a diary of those years and in any event there are no 'conversations with Carter' to add spice to this review. I did, however, sit in on numerous meetings during the period that the Carter presidency and the Callaghan premiership overlapped. I recall my initial puzzlement at this man of apparent deep sincerity and conviction, who was willing to talk about certain values, about God and the family and the American pioneer spirit and to talk about national and international problems in ways which would have been mawkish and embarrassing coming from other lips. In the end, I came to the conclusion that Carter was for real; but I can well understand how he unnerved some of the old Washington professionals.

Jordan I cannot recall having had any detailed conversation with, though we sat across the same table often. How much his high exposure during the Carter years was the misjudgement of someone plunged into very high national office with little preparation and how much it was that he was simply the lightning conductor for a gossip-hungry Washington press corps faced with a boringly 'Simon Pure' president, I cannot tell. What is certain is that he retained the confidence of his boss, not only in terms of Party and political organization, which had been his road to Washington, but also in the sensitive diplomatic negotiations which form the basis of his book. That having had such vast experience at such an early age, there is now

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0020–5850/83/3/0465—05$03.00©1983 International Affairs

no indication that he thinks in terms of elected politics or of serving in any other administration is one of the curiosities and the contrasts of the American system with our own.

I did have the opportunity to meet with a number of other members of the Carter team. By far the most attractive was Fritz Mondale. That is probably because his interests and educational background enabled him to switch very easily into European politics in general and British politics in particular. Since his student days in Britain he had always taken an interest in the Byzantine complexities of the various power struggles in the TUC and the Labour Party and was always interested to hear the latest gossip. Zbigniew Brzezinski I had come across at a number of international conferences during the 1970s. Hamilton Jordan is wrong in claiming any originality for the nickname 'Dr Strangelove' for Brzezinski—it was general currency for many years. At conferences his intensity of presentation, which seemed to reduce every political problem to that of a finely balanced mathematical model, often left some of the grubbier practitioners of the art of the possible with the feeling that we had seen the approach somewhere before. Jordan is right, however, in dismissing the 'Strangelove' tag as unfair and unrepresentative. Whenever I saw Brzezinski in action he invariably took a strong position based on deep thinking about the problem at hand. He often seemed extremely hard-line to my Social Democratic ears and was likely to leave out the 'buggers' muddle' factor which a Denis Healey would never do. In private though, as Jordan recalls, he was charming, with a dry sense of humour. After Carter's defeat in 1980 Brzezinski attended a foreign policy conference in Southern Portugal and travelled by presidential plane. He announced to the conference that he had arrived in Lame Duck One!

Of the rest of the Carter team I had met Andy Young and David Aaron before because of a common interest in African matters and particularly in a resolution to the problems of Rhodesia. Some of us hoped that the Carter administration would give high priority to the Rhodesia problem. Certainly, first Tony Crosland and then David Owen worked hard at maintaining a joint Anglo–American initiative. It comes as a salutory lesson about differing perspectives that in his *Memoirs of a president* Jimmy Carter makes only two references to Rhodesia: first in terms of a general briefing when he first came to Washington, and then secondly in recounting how he had listened, without trying to dissuade him, to Senator Hayakawa's advocacy of the recognition of the Smith regime. The story is only told to explain that the good Senator's vote was needed for the Panama Canal Treaty.

One of the great values of the Carter book is that it sets out very clearly the problems and the priorities as he saw them and how different some of them clearly were from those of his European partners. Too often the Americans and the Europeans assume an identity of purpose and are then doubly shocked when problems and disagreements arise. The Carter memoirs relegate Euro–American affairs to the margin: a word of praise for Giscard at one point, a note of irritation at Schmidt's behaviour at another; but nowhere any feeling that the president had any broad view of how Euro–Atlantic relations should be developed. Even in the crucial area of arms control and disarmament one always felt that the American approach was that to include the Europeans in the central negotiations would over-complicate matters.

At times there was some irritation at the thought that America could not be trusted to look after European interests. Nor was there much patience with European domestic factors, whilst Europeans had to understand the realities of mid-West farm votes or Texan oil money. On the question of the deployment of enhanced radiation weapons, the so-called neutron bomb, for example, Carter records sending David Aaron to Europe to ascertain positions. Aaron's visit resulted in a report by Brzezinski that 'the British surprisingly turned out to have a lot of trouble with publicly supporting a decision to produce and deploy. They said that the arms control linkage concept helped; but the cabinet would have to face up to this issue. They implied that the Labour Party was split and ministers would prefer to avoid a decision'. The assessment was absolutely accurate; but one which would seem to be so obvious as hardly to require a special visit by the Assistant National Security Adviser. Likewise, and perhaps more seriously, after Helmut Schmidt had sweated blood to get a decision in the Bundestag on the neutron bomb, Carter decided not to proceed. He notes Schmidt's displeasure and then with masterful understatement goes on to say: 'Although some confusion was generated within the NATO alliance, under the existing circumstances my final decision not to produce neutron weapons was the proper one'. So the right decision

was made; but with maximum misunderstanding of European realities and a scar on Carter's personal credibility which lasted a long, long time.

Even American Senators and Congressmen with the reputation for expressing an interest in matters European showed alarmingly simplistic views about the complexities of European politics. That is why I believe that the Kissinger 'Year of Europe' concept should be revived so that minds can be concentrated on bringing together policy, not only on defence and strategic matters, but political cooperation and trade relations. Euro–Atlantic relations cannot be taken for granted. They have to be worked at constantly. Otherwise we may continue to assume identity of purpose or interest where they do not exist.

Such an effort is important for the Americans so that they do not have to expend precious energy on mending fences and smoothing ruffled feathers. I know it must at times seem an added burden. I still have memories of an obviously weary Henry Kissinger calling in to Downing Street after a session in Moscow to brief the British prime minister on the progress of talks. No amount of weariness, however, prevented Kissinger giving his own sardonic assessment of the nature of the problems or the men we were dealing with in the Kremlin!

For Western Europe, the importance of ensuring that the Alliance is in good shape at all levels, military, political and economic, is even greater. Simply because there is no 'Mansfield resolution' on the agenda for the moment and any isolationist pressures seem weak does not mean that it will always be so. I see as one of the primary dangers of the next decade a drifting apart of European and American perspectives about defence and disarmament priorities. This could be coupled with increasing strains on economic relations as pressures build up on both sides of the Atlantic for easy redemption from recession via increased protectionism. In these circumstances, I am not sure that the existing machinery will prevent further misunderstandings and disagreements between the United States and Europe.

We are already beginning to see something of this gap in respect of disarmament. Jimmy Carter makes it very clear that in dealing with the arms race and the nuclear threat a personal commitment is required from the president if momentum is to be maintained. It is to his credit that during his presidency he did keep pushing and probing for further advancements in disarmament. The chapter in his book on the nuclear threat makes very useful reading for anyone following the present nuclear debate. With good Georgian simplicity he puts his finger on what I would call the 'multilateralists' dilemma':

> In both countries the military-industrial complex is extremely powerful and constantly pushing for larger defense budgets. New weapon systems are always being conceived; they pass through research, design, and testing, and then perhaps go on to deployment. This process can take as long as ten years, and once it gains momentum, it is almost impossible to stop. Throughout the protracted negotiations, even more advanced weapons are being born and must somehow be accommodated within the convoluted language of the agreement. Each group of negotiators is, in effect, trying to put its mark on a rapidly moving animal without hog-tying it first—and by the time it is finally branded, it must have changed into some new and unrecognizable form, even wilder and more uncontrollable than before.

That seems to me to put in a nutshell the argument for the 'freeze' option. It would, in Carter's graphic phrase, 'hog-tie' the nuclear arms race whilst negotiators could deal with existing problems. The critics of the freeze always complain that it would build-in a Soviet superiority. Carter comments: 'To oversimplify a very complicated comparison: we have more warheads with higher average accuracy, and the Soviets have more launchers with greater total explosive power'. And: 'There is another imbalance which American negotiators do not like to discuss. We prefer to talk only in terms of an equal ratio between the United States and the Soviet Union. From Moscow's perspective, however, there is a much more formidable array—not only from the United States and our allies, France and Great Britain, but also from a seemingly implacable Chinese adversary'. I do not suggest that Carter advocates in his book a nuclear freeze. I do suggest that his arguments answer some of the wilder attacks on the notion.

I have always considered that the growth of the CND and the peace movement was a direct reaction to the commitment to disarmament of the government of the day. CND grew in the 1950s when Dulles held sway and faded in the 1960s as first Kennedy and Macmillan and then Brandt led the way in trying to find a positive approach to East–West relations. It is significant that since detente and the SALT process lost momentum and voices in the West

have become more strident that another generation has seen the peace movement as its only hope. This is not to ignore the Soviet Union and its activities; but it is one of the ironies of contemporary affairs that in the battle for hearts and minds politicians nurtured in 'communications' societies seem crude and cumbersome. The peace movement is strong today in the West not because we suddenly have a generation of Soviet dupes and pawns; but because there is a gut feeling among many ordinary people that for some present leaders of the Western alliance multilateralism is merely a fig-leaf to cover their real intentions of escalating the arms race. The peace movement will lose its momentum not when it is 'educated' into the reality of Soviet intentions, but when it is convinced that Western leaders are giving high enough priority to practical disarmament initiatives. The section on disarmament in the Carter memoirs is all too short from a president whom I feel history will judge to have been ahead of his time, and certainly of his Congress, on this vital issue.

My remarks above about differences in perception between Europeans and Americans become more understandable when one examines the domestic burdens placed on the president. We often used to bemoan in Downing Street the load we place on our prime minister. He or she must not only be head of government, but also an active member of the House of Commons, often voting at unearthly hours of the morning, and a diligent constituency member dealing with individual and local cases. Through Number Ten pass the decisions of government, placing on the prime minister an enormous work load through the famous red boxes. On top of that, however, are the briefings for meetings, for foreign visits and for the receiving of delegations and foreign visitors. The American structure does not place the formal parliamentary burden on the president; but throughout Carter's memoirs there is logged the grinding trench warfare by which a president gets his legislation through Congress. Individual Congressmen are telephoned, invited in, lunched and dined, flattered and cajoled to ensure their votes. This must demand an immense amount of emotional energy on behalf of the president which in the British system is carried by a more disciplined whipping system. Likewise, although it is not totally unknown for a British prime minister to telephone a journalist, the Carter memoirs indicate a far greater direct involvement on the part of the president with key journalists and opinion formers—all demanding time and energy.

Where the Carter memoirs have a flaw is not in attempting to hide the wheeler-dealer, pork barrel side of Washington government; but in trying to present it all in too mellow a glow, with crusty old Tip O'Neill causing the odd problem or the House being a little slow to understand the true worth of the president's proposals. That is not how even the occasional visitor to Washington remembers the Carter years. Carter caught the full back-lash of a Congress that had decided that it had ceded too much power during the 'imperial' presidencies of Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon. Added to that were the slights, real and imagined, which the old Democratic establishment felt at the hands of the new men at the White House.

Given that the Washington press corps still had the taste of Watergate on its lips one could argue that the Carter team passed a very close scrutiny with very few black marks. Hamilton Jordan's high profile may have added a needless burden from time to time—Tip O'Neill constantly referred to him as Hannibal Gherkin—but the mistrust on the Hill went far deeper than that and the Carter team left Washington, as they found it, as outsiders.

This mistrust and antagonism made battles for such legislation as the Energy Bill more difficult; but the memoirs also show the power of the presidency at work. This is nowhere more apparent than in the detailed accounts Carter gives of his battle for the Panama Canal Treaty and for the Camp David agreement between Begin and Sadat. The Panama Canal Treaty may seem of minor importance from this side of the Atlantic, although we in Britain may ponder how we discharged a not dissimilar problem at Suez. Camp David was something more. It was a great effort of personal diplomacy on the part of Jimmy Carter and one which will, I think, be seen as the high point of his Presidency. His admiration of the courage of President Sadat is one of the few times when he allows himself to extol the virtues or condemn the vices of any of the politicians and statesmen with whom he worked. His more restrained comments about Mr Begin are, we are told, to be expanded upon by Mr Brzezinski in his memoirs (*Power and principle: memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–81*, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1983).

Before Mr Brzezinski slips from view, at least in this review, let me say that I also think that Carter plays down the difficulty caused if the National Security Adviser assumes too

high a profile. His indulgence of the high Brzezinski profile (with its echoes of Kissinger) is justified by his perception of the Department of State as 'a sprawling Washington and worldwide bureaucracy, with compartmentalized regional and national desks. Although I rarely received innovative ideas from its staff members about how to modify existing policy in order to meet changing conditions, the advice was generally sound, the information thoroughly researched, and the public statements mild and cautious'. One might almost imagine our own prime minister penning those words about the FCO. The error is that if you are going to have 'a worldwide bureaucracy' then those working within it must have the confidence and their clients must have the confidence that their man is boss and their organization is the lead organization.

Of course, the very nature of international diplomacy involves heads of government to a much greater degree than ever before in foreign affairs. The President of the United States attends NATO and Economic Summits in addition to numerous bilaterals (too numerous if Carter's record is anything to go by). So too does our prime minister, with the added regular European Community meetings to take on board. There are also the regular and special sessions of the United Nations. All of this means that heads of government meet much more often than hitherto; nevertheless, the temptation to emasculate the Foreign Service in favour of instant decisions close to the seat of power is fraught with dangers.

This brings me to the final chapter in the history of the Carter presidency: the Iranian hostage crisis, which dominated the final year of his presidency. That it cost Carter the presidency is debatable, given the existing dissatisfaction on the domestic front which he plays down in his memoirs. The hostages were bound to be an issue. It was Jimmy Carter's choice to make them *the* issue. Hamilton Jordan records how he was mainly responsible for persuading the president not to go to Canada two days after the hostages had been seized. He then very honestly assesses the result of his success: 'Months later, when we were bogged down in what the press labelled our "Rose Garden strategy", unable to bring the hostages home and committed not to campaign until the crisis was resolved, I kept remembering that incident. It was the first time we had placed Iran above everything else in Carter's presidency, and I felt largely responsible for the public trap we later found ourselves in'. Trap it certainly was, for although Carter denies it in his book, many Americans had the suspicion that he was not above manipulating the hostage situation for domestic political advantage. Many Kennedy Democrats were convinced that the decision to stay in the White House sprang from a fear of debating the domestic issues with their man rather than any high-minded concern for the hostages. The story of the many diplomatic attempts to free the hostages is told in detail in both books. Like all diary-based memoirs, Hamilton Jordan's account tends to put the author more at the centre of the stage than do the Carter memoirs. Both books fail to explain what, besides desperation and frustration, provided the justification of or expectation for the incredible attempt to rescue the hostages which ended in such a tragic fiasco. I am not a military man, far less one of the SAS variety, but even reading with hindsight Carter's version of what it was hoped would be achieved, it was a gamble of mammoth proportions. This was no raid on Entebbe, far less an ending of an embassy siege. It is hard to agree with Carter that 'the cancellation of our mission was caused by a series of mishaps—almost completely unpredictable'. On the contrary, the mission would have needed a whole series of good fortunes not to have ended in even greater loss of life. As it was, it undoubtedly cost Jimmy Carter much personal grief; it also cost him his Secretary of State.

Ronald Reagan never allowed the hostages to become a campaign issue. To the very end, Carter could not understand Reagan's lack of interest in the issue. It was left to Hamilton Jordan to put it bluntly as Air Force One took the defeated entourage back to Georgia: 'Those hostages are *your* hostages, Mr President'.

Carter's book is a sincere one, written by a sincere man. I have no doubt that beyond the earnestness and simplicity there is a politician who, in the words of Colonel Beckworth, the leader of the ill-fated rescue mission, 'is as tough as woodpecker lips'. For the time being he will probably be satisfied with the toast proposed by Fritz Mondale at the farewell dinner given by his team: 'You kept the peace, you obeyed the law, you told the truth, you did your best for the American people'—not all his predecessors could sit at such a toast without a blush.

Book reviews

Chatham House books

India's emergence as an industrial power: Middle Eastern contracts. By Richard Thomas. London: Hurst; Hamden, Con.: Archon, for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1982. 160 pp. Index. £11·50.

INDIA, we have been told rather often recently, is the world's tenth largest industrial power. Given that her population is larger than the combined total of the four largest powers, this figure in one way only highlights the enormity of the gulf between the world's rich and poor; but what is probably more important than the simple volume of production is the fact that major qualitative changes have taken place in India's industrial sector. The cumulative effects of some thirty years of planning and investment are now manifest in the existence of a manufacturing capacity across a very wide range of consumer and capital goods and of a scientific and engineering base which is capable both of independent research and development and of the creative absorption of imported technology.

Richard Thomas's monograph does not provide comprehensive coverage of India's recent industrial performance, but its relevance is much broader than might be inferred from the subtitle's reference to Middle Eastern contracts. What Thomas shows, in fact, on the basis not just of official statistics but of personal information gathered both in India and in the Middle East, is how India's impressive ability to win contracts in the Gulf and elsewhere in the region is evidence of its maturity in a wide range of activities.

However, the prospects for the next decade are not uniformly favourable. India is likely to be disproportionately affected by political upheaval in the Middle East both because of her relatively greater commitment there and because of her substantial dependence on imported oil. There are also a number of possible constraints on the supply side, although Thomas is cautiously optimistic about the domestic situation. The present government is certainly committed to export promotion, but as the pace of growth in the Middle East slows and the type of work required becomes more specialized, the somewhat stately progress of the Indian economy may not be sufficient to enable it to match competition from both the established and other newly industrializing countries. Individual Indian firms will continue to be active, but the breakthrough to coordinated diversification in the export field may be a long way off.

The lesson that Thomas draws from his analysis is that there is considerable and so far largely unrealized scope for mutually profitable co-operation between Indian firms and their counterparts in the West, particularly in Britain. He discusses existing economic ties between India and Britain and argues for a substantial development of joint ventures in third countries in which India would not simply be a supplier of labour and of unsophisticated supplies. Such proposals are likely to be received with some caution by Indians who may see them as a subtle attempt to limit their independent expansion or who may, more fundamentally, worry about the technological priorities that export-led growth imposes. It seems more likely, however, that the dialogue will not get to the stage of serious discussion because of British reluctance to look beyond the short-term difficulties that such collaboration would undoubtedly encounter to a consideration of the longer-term benefits. Thomas acknowledges the difficulties but makes a strong case for an imaginative approach.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London DAVID TAYLOR

Communism in Kerala: a study in political adaptation. By T. J. Nossiter. London: Hurst for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1982. 426 pp. Index. £18·50.

WHEN elections in the state of Kerala in south-west India in 1957 brought a communist government to power some commentators claimed that Kerala had become India's Yenan and prophesied that it would become a base for the spread of communism throughout India. Although ousted from office in 1959 and despite a damaging schism between the Communist

Party of India (CPI) and the more leftist Communist Party (Marxist) (CPM) in 1964, members of both parties have participated in a series of united front governments in Kerala since 1967. As Dr Nossiter shows in this study, the region's communist leaders have, in fact, pursued a generally moderate and parliamentary path and have owed part of their success to their (especially the CPM's) identification with regional aspirations and antipathy to the central government. The communists' greater attachment to administration than to agitation is attributed to the practical constraints of the established electoral and parliamentary system, the complexities of a highly fragmented political spectrum that has tended to blunt class and sectional divisions, and the interventionist powers of the central government in state affairs. Sympathetic to the situation of Kerala's communists, Nossiter sees them as making 'a creative contribution to the "pool" of applied communism' (p. 106), but also makes clear the difficulties they have had in attempting to implement reforms, even in the vital area of land reform. Moreover, Nossiter sees the long-term prospects of the communists in Kerala as bleak. The CPM, as the more radical party, has faced growing competition from the Congress for the support of the poorer sections of the electorate, especially as education, new sources of wealth, and aspirations for upward social and economic mobility have contributed to the deradicalization of all but the poorest in Kerala.

Aided by copious analytical maps and tables, Nossiter painstakingly leads us through the maze of Kerala's politics: it is expressive of the subject's complexity that an appendix lists more than thirty regionally operative parties and coalitions. But it is regrettable that in a work of this length and detail the author gives so much space to the analysis of election results and state-level political manoeuvres to the comparative neglect of the organizational and ideological links between the party leaderships and their supporters. What did communism mean to those who voted the party into power in 1957? What does it mean to the electorate now? To what extent does the CPM retain a distinctive image among the poor of Kerala? These issues receive all too little attention. Nossiter's study of communism in Kerala is an invaluable account of the career of the state's anti-Congress parties and of Indian communism's process of adaptation in government and opposition; but on the role and appeal of the CPI and CPM as mass movements and mass organizations rather more needs to have been said.

University of Lancaster DAVID ARNOLD

The newly industrializing countries: trade and adjustment. By Louis Turner, Neil McMullen et al. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1982. 290 pp. Index. £18·00.

The newly industrializing countries: adjusting to success. By Neil McMullen. London: British-North American Committee. 1983. 124 pp. Pb.: £3·50. $7.00.

SINCE the mid 1960s a relatively small group of Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) have shown remarkable success in fostering economic development through rapid growth in their exports of manufactures: the precise classification of NICs is subject to some variation, but is here defined to include Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and India. Their success has been the more noticeable since it has coincided with a period of slow growth and generally poor economic performance amongst the advanced industrial countries (AICs).

The experience of the NICs has led to a series of questions. How can their success be explained? Is it likely to continue? Will it generalize to include other 'second tier' countries? How has their emergence affected the AICs, and how have AICs responded? Is the fundamental pattern and structure of world trade likely to be changed permanently as a result of the further evolution of NICs? How best should AICs deal with the problems that NICs create for them? Are these problems industry-specific and do similar circumstances apply to all industries where NIC penetration is seen as a problem? At what point do NICs cease to be LDCs? The list goes on.

The purpose of the two books reviewed here is to examine these and related questions. They are therefore very timely. The books are themselves quite closely related. That by Louis Turner, Neil McMullen and others represents the results of a large scale research project carried out jointly by the Royal Institute of International Affairs and the National Planning Association. The meat of the book is a painstaking investigation of a number of

important industrial sectors, (textiles, clothing, consumer electronics, automobiles, petrochemicals and steel) in which NICs have begun to be significant, and the ways in which the industrialized world has reacted in terms of trade policy and adjustment. The case study approach clearly reveals the marked diversity of experience and the errors that will be made if all instances of NIC penetration are assumed to be similar. Particularly interesting is the observation that textiles and clothing, often quoted as a typical example of NIC penetration, are far from typical and constitute in many ways a special case from which it would be unwise to draw too many general conclusions. Indeed, the very aggregation of textiles and clothing suggests similarities that do not exist; clothing has been far more affected by competition from the NICs.

Neil McMullen's book is much shorter and far less detailed, but does inevitably draw heavily on the Chatham House study. Not surprisingly the basic analytical approach and the conclusions reached are the same in both books. However they do meet different needs. Anyone wanting a quick resumé of the issues and something that can be read in a couple of hours is advised to turn to McMullen. The specialist will welcome the extra detail and precision provided in the larger book, but will have to invest at least a couple of days to read it.

Turning to one of the central questions raised earlier, on the basis of the analysis contained in the two books it seems unlikely that there will be an explosion of countries into NIC status. While this may well be a valid conclusion there is a problem associated with *ex post* theorizing. The books confirm that it is rather easier to explain the growth of NICs now than it was to predict it in 1960. There is a strong temptation simply to list all the characteristics of all the NICs and imply that this in some way 'explains' the NIC phenomenon. It does not. Indeed these books show that there is no single simple explanation.

Turning to a second crucial question, the two books should finally dispel the myth that NICs are in some exclusive sense responsible for the entire range of macroeconomic and microeconomic problems being experienced amongst industrial countries. Certainly at an industrial level the emergence of NICs has been and will continue to be significant and to create problems for AICs, but the effects are unlikely to be widespread. Unfortunately a lot of policy seems to be based on just such largely groundless fears. What is required is a more positive response by the AICs to the challenge of adjustment. It is to be hoped that in the future the AICs will come to terms with the real causes of their problems and that there will be a lower propensity to take the easy way out by simply blaming the NICs.

What emerges is that as special cases both of development and of market penetration and industrial change, NICs are worthy of investigation. But as a fundamental global phenomenon that will completely alter the structure of world production and trade their importance is frequently greatly exaggerated. Only time will tell conclusively whether Messrs Turner and McMullen have got it right. Either way the books make a significant contribution to our knowledge and deserve to be widely read.

University of Surrey GRAHAM BIRD

National laws and international commerce: the problem of extraterritoriality. By Douglas E. Rosenthal and William M. Knighton. Routledge & Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1982. 96 pp. Pb.: £3·95.

INTERNATIONAL commerce has, since the Second World War, greatly increased economic interdependence. The objectives of economic interdependence are political as well as economic—the unity of the Western Alliance as well as the international division of labour. It was never part of the intention to make businessmen engaged in international trade and investment the victims of a conflict of laws, forced to be in breach in one country or another. Yet that is what has happened. Solutions are the more difficult in that laws are likely to express attitudes congenial to the society that creates them and are not made to be broken. When one of the countries involved is the United States, with its enormous power, political, military and economic, and its own special attitudes to the role of law, we have a problem.

These are not by any means conflicts in which reasonableness is all on one side. On the contrary, everyone is trying to be exceedingly reasonable by the light of their own law. It is not surprising that Americans should be concerned about the effects on their policies and economy of actions taken outside the USA by foreigners. It is not surprising that something of the effects doctrine should be creeping into European Community law. But by the light

of this universal reasonableness we will all in the end be damned. For if resolutions are not found to extraterritorial conflicts, they will increasingly impede international trade and investment, and will thus become a further factor in the erosion of the open trading system. European countries will not go on welcoming inward American investment if it is to be subject to American extraterritorial jurisdiction. Only recently the Monopolies Commission recommended against an American takeover of a British company in part because it would thereby become subject to provisions of US extraterritorial legislation.

Thus the problem of extraterritoriality is not a detail which can be left to the experts. But it is of enormous value to have two experts collaborating in this way to define the scope of the problem and possible ways to its amelioration, particularly when the two experts concerned come from either side of an international divide. Rosenthal, an American lawyer, was involved in the Department of Justice in the extraterritorial enforcement of US law. Knighton, a British civil servant, has for several years had responsibility with respect to the British response to American extraterritorial claims.

Together they analyse the nature and extent of the conflicts with skill and clarity. When I was Secretary of State for Trade, Knighton briefed me on these questions. Now my successors have a brief which incorporates American, as well as British, insight and experience. I hope that the mutual understanding thus generated helps towards a solution. But the authors themselves say that things are getting worse not better.

The solution seems to lie in even more reasonableness. But as they themselves demonstrate only too convincingly, in this field, one man's reasonableness is another man's aggressive extraterritorial claim. They say: 'There is a clear and present threat that increasingly broad assertions of extraterritorial jurisdiction by national courts, and escalating retaliatory legislative and judicial orders by foreign governments, will get out of hand' (p. 80). Reasonableness, I fear, will not serve unless it be the reasonableness not of the law but of diplomacy.

EDMUND DELL

US monetary policy and European responses in the 1980s. By Kenneth King. London, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1982. 55pp. Pb.: £3·95.

KENNETH KING's brief paperback is really a tract about the European Monetary System; but whereas much of the literature on that subject often concentrates to excess on the institutional and the technical and, above all, on the intra-European relations involved, this rightly puts the emphasis on the external context. The argument is that the United States chooses its monetary policies for domestic reasons and is likely to go on doing so. Yet, in the present state of monetary anarchy these policies set off shock waves through the whole worldwide monetary system—and not least in Europe. The result before October 1979 was to exaggerate the divergence between weak and strong European currencies. Since that time the dollar's strength has allowed the EMS an easy ride, but at the expense of introducing interest rates on both sides of the Atlantic that were both high and volatile. Rapid fluctuations in the prices of new dollar bond issues have not only discouraged long-term investors but have had an indirect impact (for which there is no purely *economic* justification) on European exchange rates. The EMS in consequence has become a system in which other currencies are effectively pegged (though only for as long as they can manage) to the Deutsche Mark, as the strongest and best managed of the major EC currencies. The prospects for any radical change or improvement are therefore highly limited. Coordinated market intervention to achieve more than 'smoothing'—given the size of the Euromarkets—is beyond the power of European central banks to manage without American help. All the Europeans can do is appeal to the United States to take greater account of the external consequences of domestic policy and to cheer on any moves in Washington towards lower and more stable interest rates while working harder to develop a consistent European policy towards the dollar.

King is neither a politician tempted by such dilemmas into flights of empty rhetoric, nor an academic economist anxious to discover abstract theoretical explanations of matters so subject to unpredictable and changeable responses both of governments and markets. He is a financial official turned merchant banker and his comparative advantage is consequently that he can explain clearly and authoritatively how market operators have in fact responded first to US policies and then to their consequences in Europe. Even if papers such as this are

necessarily ephemeral, this is very helpful to anyone seeking to grasp the underlying causes of our present ills. As might be expected of a banker, however, King is a trifle cavalier about the consequences for trade and employment of what he himself terms the irresponsibility of the United States. He says that companies dealing with foreign markets have adapted well (and at comparatively low cost) to volatility in exchange rates, and even in interest rates. But he overlooks the fact that these defensive strategies are not so easily available for small companies, whether exporting or importing, nor to small, poor countries outside Europe. The increase in risk and uncertainty which King so well describes must surely be contributing to the rise in unemployment. And his other blind spot, naturally enough perhaps, is defence. The only thing that might persuade the Americans, more forcefully than any appeal to their better nature, to moderate their monetarist insensitivity towards the difficulties of the EMS would be a European decision to relieve them of at least some of the burden of Europe's defence. That in itself would help reduce the US deficit and make it less necessary to keep the dollar strong by paying over the odds for US government borrowing.

London School of Economics SUSAN STRANGE

International relations and organizations

The dynamics of interdependence. By Andrew M. Scott. London: University of North Carolina Press. 1983. 254 pp. Index. £17·25. Pb.: £8·65.

PROFESSOR ANDREW M. SCOTT has made important contributions to the study of international relations, in particular with *The revolution in statecraft* in 1965. A new book by him therefore stimulates pleasurable expectations. *The dynamics of interdependence* in some degree disappoints, and it does so, I think, primarily because of its ethnocentrism, which appears in two quite different ways.

In the first place Professor Scott demonstrates to an unusual degree the prevalent American unawareness of European writing in the field of international relations. Most of the more significant advances in the study of the subject in the past three decades have indeed come from the United States, but Americans have not held a monopoly, and the very fact of a lower degree of insulation from the effects of external interactions and linkages on the part of Europe as compared with the United States has meant that the phenomenon of interdependence has commanded a good deal of attention. Among the questions that have been raised is the validity of the central assumption of Professor Scott's book (which he does not examine)—that interdependence is increasing, and that the variables affecting it operate consistently and in one direction only. The well-known reservations to the Meadows' *Limits to growth* argument are hardly noticed, and the danger of the assumption is perhaps illustrated by the implicit expectation of 'a continued increase in oil prices' (p. 32).

The second manifestation of ethnocentrism is quite different in nature. The historic experience of the United States is of great opportunities and great problems, triumphantly seized and mastered by the purposeful application of energy and intelligence. Americans commonly expect that difficulties can be surmounted, and that benevolent purposes can be advanced by intelligently chosen action. If matters turn out badly there must have been malevolence at work somewhere. European experience leads to rather different conclusions. Europeans are inclined to give credence more to the cock-up than to the conspiracy theory of history. They are familiar with the complexity of interactions within a closely-confined arena, and any schoolboy who has read about the origins of the First World War will recognize the notion of the unintended consequences of actions. Thus the main thesis that Professor Scott is concerned to develop—that growing complexity of interactions at the global level leads to systems developing internal dynamics that operate through 'apurposive' processes leading to outputs unintended by any actors in the systems—is more easily acceptable and less unfamiliar to the European reader than it may be to the American.

This thesis Professor Scott develops with a wealth of illustration and well-mobilized argument, occasionally using the technique of carrying forward the discussion through linked propositions, as he did so successfully in *The functioning of the international political system*. Some of the revisions that he suggests to the concepts of power and the national interest perhaps relate to somewhat old-fashioned definitions of those concepts, and it is a pity that his proof-reader lets autarchy go through when autarky is meant, but the book as a whole,

in Professor Scott's characteristically lucid and succinct style, makes a valuable addition to the growing body of literature on the evolution of international systems in the twentieth century as it moves towards its close.

University of Lancaster P. A. REYNOLDS

Biopolitics, political psychology and international politics: towards a new discipline. Edited by Gerald W. Hopple. London: Pinter. 1982. 195 pp. Index. £14·75.

THIS collection sets out to survey and to illustrate some of the major components of what is claimed to be a 'new discipline'. Whether or not one agrees with that claim (and it seems to this reviewer to be somewhat inappropriate), it is clear that the study of psychological and physiological factors in the conduct of international politics has attracted a good deal of attention in recent years. Hopple and his contributors have the specific aims of reviewing theories available in the area, of assessing the methodological problems encountered by such a novel field of study, and of exploring the policy relevance of what has been produced. In general, they succeed in demonstrating the vitality and academic rigour of their activities, but leave the reader with a few doubts about its relevance or utility to policy-makers.

The book (after a brief introduction from Hopple) begins with an impressive review of the field and of its promise from Charles and Margaret Herrmann. As a statement of the kinds of problems encountered by many attempts to penetrate international actions and behaviour, this is pertinent and contains many useful insights. In particular, the Herrmanns point to the difficulties of gathering meaningful data about human motivations and assigning responsibility for actions or events—two central elements in a political psychology approach—and they suggest a number of possible strategies for surmounting the obstacles.

It is this constructively critical assessment of research strategies and methodologies which permeates many of the later chapters in the book—indeed, the various authors provide a rich supply of evidence about their own progress and the pitfalls they have encountered, as well as about the problems of the 'new discipline'. In chapter 2, G. Matthew Bonham and Michael J. Shapiro alert the reader to the promise of a 'cognitive process' perspective on planning and policy analysis; Hopple himself, in chapter 3, assesses the role played by elite values in foreign policy-making; whilst in chapter 4, Andrew K. Semmel provides an interesting treatment of the effects of small group interaction on risk-taking behaviour. Perhaps the most illuminating piece is chapter 5, by Stephen G. Walker, in which the author explicitly and self-critically evaluates the progress he has made in the application of a variety of research strategies: this could stand as an example for all scientific investigations of foreign policy behaviour. Thomas C. Wiegele's examination of biological perspectives (chapter 6) is a little disappointing by comparison, but is dealing with an area in which much less is known; even so, his assessment of crisis behaviour contains important insights.

The book concludes with a rather speculative chapter by Judith Ayres Daly about the possible policy relevance of the political psychology approach. This is enlightening in the sense that it gives a practitioner's perspective on the remainder of the material (and incidentally reveals the changing techniques of policy analysis and evaluation within official circles). Perhaps inevitably, it tends to become a review of possibilities rather than firm indications of applications or uses, but it provides a useful extra dimension to what is a very stimulating collection.

Coventry Polytechnic MICHAEL SMITH

The community of states: a study in international political theory. Edited by James Mayall. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 203 pp. Index. £15·00.

IN 1978 Michael Donelan of the LSE published *The reason of states*, which he edited, consisting of papers written by himself and eleven other British university teachers who called themselves the international political theory group. Despite the fact that one of the group's most revered intellectual ancestors, the late Martin Wight, achieved some fame by an article called 'Why there is no international theory', the group made their focus the quest for ordered thought about the world of states. In the present study one of the group, James Mayall, also of the LSE, has brought the team on to the field again, with some changes in its composition, to have another look at the subject from a slightly different perspective.

The twelve essays all have as their focus that elusive thing, the sense of participation in the society, or community, or system, or whatever, formed from separate states, and kept alive in the teeth of the facts of international conflict, ideological warfare and the dogged pursuit of national interest. We feel, or most of us feel, a sense of responsibility for the foreigner's hardships and joys, but where does it come from and what sort of basis does it provide for the more united world we have always been longing for? This book looks at the question on three levels, true to the threefold beat of the academic heart: diplomatic structure and idiom, as Cornelia Navari calls it, the vocabulary and images of world politics, with essays on sovereignty and on nationalism by Christopher Brewin and Brian Porter respectively; the 'conventional morality of states', that is, the habitual folk-ways of governments in their relations *inter se*, such as international law (Hidemi Suganami), *Realpolitik* (John Vincent), nuclear and other sorts of deterrence (Barrie Paskins), liberal economic philosophies (James Mayall); and the prospects of alternative bases of international order, such as a community of individuals rather than states (Peter Butler), the strengthening of human rights (Zdenek Kavan), the notion of a global community of mankind (Michael Donelan), the spread of a sense of international responsibility (Moorhead Wright), and language as a factor in the creation of a world culture (Alan Pleydell).

Much thought has gone into the making of this book, and much will it stimulate. Possibly for that reason, the style is not always easy to follow: one is invited to labour through sentences like 'in contrast to the tendency towards cultural solipsism which arises from excessive dependence on the always necessary, identity-forming substantive aspect of our language, it is the formal aspect which may generate political community within a culture, and civilise it' (p. 171). Academic in-words abound, like 'structure', 'structural', 'legitimization', 'consensus', 'institutionalization'; the ghosts of Hobbes, Kant, Locke, Vattel, are pitifully overworked, though yearning for peaceful interment. For all that, Mayall's collection, like Donelan's, grows in appeal as it ponders the familiar, but still captivating mysteries of the co-existence of states. Nor does it overload the reader with too many keys to their secrets.

London School of Economics F. S. Northedge

The conservation of enemies: a study in enmity. By Frederick H. Hartmann. Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood. 1982. 258 pp. Index. £23·95.

The growing interest in enemies and enmity as aspects of global security has not, it seems, been matched by any comparable depth of understanding. Their crucial role in formulating foreign policy may have been suspected, but no one got around to treating it seriously. Frederick Hartmann, of the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, rummages through a large body of literature to rectify this situation. He does it with learning and authority, but the overall effect is one of limited success only.

The book's central—rather strange—thesis is that there is a constant (sic) amount of enmity in the state system and that this quantity is transferred or redistributed among states through their policy actions. Prudent policies reduce the number of one's potential enemies; imprudent policies maximize differences and lead to violent confrontations.

Professor Hartmann begins his study by considering the subject and dimensions of enmity and showing how it has been treated in history and literature. Succeeding sections deal with the nature of policy-making, with policy-makers' efforts to control the number of enemies they may face and with the rules which the international environment sets forth for defining enmity or identifying enemies (e.g. containment, balance of power, collective security). The book concludes with a discussion of the historical and cultural influences on a series of policy choices.

Although the book is lucidly written, carefully argued and refreshingly jargon-free, it is not without weaknesses. It is an intentionally old-fashioned book arguing in conventional philosophical terms. It purports to grasp a complex phenomenon, but the discussion lacks a sense of connection with the social-psychological literature which has so much to say about this very problem. Its interpretation of reality is anchored to a 'billiard ball' model of state behaviour and its appeal for a different security policy is based on a somewhat questionable deterministic model (enmity→tension→war) and rational calculations of power. It melts the fluidities of the external reality into a simple unity and offers some truisms as if

they were a reflection of creative observation (e.g. 'every nation's view of its present and future is heavily influenced by its past', p. 110). Some matters that require a thorough examination are given only a vague account, while others are presented in a strangely unfamiliar fashion, for example, third party influence in terms of spatial locations. To be sure, interesting ideas abound, but the book wanders around the theme of enmity and Hartmann's efforts to resurrect it don't quite come off.

Despite these lacunae, this is a useful and occasionally thought-provoking book. It is a literate, fair, astute and, on the whole, helpful work. Its weaving of historical examples and political philosophy into a coherent mosaic is both industrious and ingenious. Thanks to Professor Hartmann we have a fuller sense of one of the important dimensions of international relations. The book—and the subject it introduces—deserve to be debated.

University of Canterbury JACOB BERCOVITCH

The art and science of negotiation. By Howard Raiffa. Cambridge, Mass., London: Harvard University Press. 1982. 373 pp. Index. £16·00.

THIS handbook on negotiating, which is based upon the author's course on Competitive Decision Making at the Harvard Business School, successfully blends analytical sharpness with empirical application. Th· various case studies demonstrate that an identical structure of decision-making can be discerned in laboratory conditions and in real life, not only in business but also in diplomacy; insights from the theory of games, on which the author is a prominent writer, and from conflict resolution approaches are applied to real negotiations without being either unrealistic or abstract. Professor Raiffa does not claim that analysis provides a panacea in all situations (page 224) but regards it merely as a means for breaking up complex and intractable issues into parts, helping to bring to light the crucial differences between the judgements of the parties about uncertainties and between their evaluations of the payoffs.

The basis of the approach is simple and practical—to build exclusively upon the self-interests of the parties and to proceed as far as possible towards the transformation of conflicts into partly cooperative interaction—as the theory of games puts it, of zero-sum into non-zero-sum games. To explain the basic procedure at the simplest, 'two parties one issue', level, the parties are first induced to articulate as clearly as possible their 'reservation prices', that is, the lowest acceptable outcomes which they would prefer to no agreement at all; for this, the clarification of the best available alternative is essential. The next steps are towards establishing a region in which positive joint gains over the minima acceptable can be achieved, aiming at the largest possible joint gain. The author deals with the tricky issues of the truthfulness of the disclosures and of the distribution of the joint gain with admirable lucidity and practicality. From the large number of case studies analysed it seems obvious that a structured negotiation has generally a much better chance of being successful and of securing larger gains for both parties than an unstructured one.

As Professor Raiffa proceeds with the analysis of 'two parties many issues' and, ultimately, 'many parties many issues' situations, the complexities of the cases grow immensely, although the basic structure of negotiations remains identical. Solutions are generally facilitated by introducing third parties in various roles: linkage, contingency payments, or guarantees. These expedients are analysed within the contexts of the individual case studies, rigorously but without making demands upon non-numerate readers. Three international relations cases are analysed in which diplomacy has been directly aided by theory: the Panama Canal negotiations, in which the United States enlisted the aid of a consulting firm to formalize the negotiating strategy; the Camp David Agreements which were made possible by the device of the 'single negotiating text', as suggested by the Harvard Professor, Roger Fisher; and the Law of the Sea negotiations in which the single negotiating text for the seabed regime was formulated around a computer model produced at the MIT by a team led by J. D. Nyhart. It seems plausible to think that systematic analysis on the lines discussed could make a real contribution even to such intractable continuing sets of negotiations as those over the CAP and the budgetary contributions in the EEC and over arms controls and disarmament.

As the author convincingly shows, the analysts not only help the parties to analyse their interests and their prospects more clearly but also introduce impartial outside criteria of justice and fairness; these are not based upon ethical principles which can be readily countered

by other principles but upon neutral mathematical formulations of bargaining positions and of payoffs. These are more readily acceptable to the parties as being objective; moreover, they also appear to be fair. One striking example out of several is the seabed regime proposal of a 'parallel system' in which applicants for concessions have to divide the prospective area into two parts, with the Seabed Authority choosing the one to keep and the one to offer. Although the author does not mention it, this expedient can be regarded as the application of the subtle well-known theory of justice recently advanced by Professor John Rawls: one should strive to establish a system in which one would be happy to accept *any* position.

University of Southampton JOSEPH FRANKEL

The rise of the international organisation: a short history. By David Armstrong. London: Macmillan. 1982. 166 pp. Index.

DURING the past thirty or forty years, states have found it increasingly desirable to use multilateral channels—usually of an established, organizational, kind—to conduct their business. Yet over the same period international organization has become a less prominent feature in university and polytechnic courses leading to degrees in international relations. One reason for this may be due to the fact that the subject has often been written about, and taught, in a less than enthralling way, with an emphasis on institutional structures and procedures. In view of this, Dr Armstrong's book is particularly welcome, as it keeps such material to a necessary minimum and instead concentrates on international organizations as 'first and foremost, the creatures and instruments of states' (p. vii). Thus it will be a most valuable introduction to the subject for students of international politics, and may well whet their appetite for more.

The first two chapters, as befits a book which is historical in orientation, deal with the origin and operation of the League of Nations. Its links with nineteenth-century developments are set out, but nonetheless its creation is declared to have been 'an extraordinary event' (p. 1). The next two chapters deal with the UN in world politics and the European Community, the latter being seen as 'an agency for co-operation amongst sovereign states, not a means of eroding sovereignty' (p. 97). Then regional organization outside Europe is dealt with: the Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, and the Association of South-East Asian Nations. Finally, a chapter on international regimes discusses the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea, human rights, international terrorism, and the New International Economic Order.

Each of these chapters is clearly written and reflects much careful research. Complex events have been summarized very satisfactorily, and those who wish to explore further receive adequate guidance in the footnotes and bibliography. There are one or two minor slips, and when Dr Armstrong discusses legal matters his touch is sometimes a bit unsure. It is also a pity that the book's overall structure and state-centred approach results in little specific attention being given to the role of organizations in the process of international change. This point certainly emerges from the author's account of many individual episodes, but could have received greater general emphasis—perhaps in a brief concluding chapter. However, there is no doubt that the large and difficult task which Dr Armstrong set himself has been very well done. His book is an excellent and apposite addition to the publisher's valuable series on 'the making of the twentieth century'.

University of Keele ALAN JAMES

Oxford and the idea of Commonwealth: essays presented to Sir Edgar Williams. Edited by Frederick Madden and D. K. Fieldhouse. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 167 pp. £11·95.

The unofficial Commonwealth: the story of the Commonwealth Foundation 1965–1980. By John Chadwick. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 266 pp. Index. £15·00. $37.50.

AMONG the many distinguished members of the University of Oxford who have been associated with the Commonwealth is Sir Edgar Williams, Warden of Rhodes House from 1951 to 1980, and an expert in nineteenth-century colonial history. It is therefore fitting that his retirement should be honoured by a *Festschrift* which takes as its theme the particular

contribution which Oxford has made to the idea of the Commonwealth and to the writing and teaching of Commonwealth history.

Three general essays form the first part of the book. Frederick Madden's study of the development of Commonwealth history since the foundation of the Beit professorship in 1905 is neatly complemented by Ronald Robinson's critical examination of the unity of ideas which Oxford has held about the Commonwealth. In respect of India, Richard Symonds shows us that although Oxford's primary contribution was in the training of India's rulers and administrators this is not the whole story, and that there are many facets worthy of further investigation.

The second part of the book is devoted to four 'special cases': people whose names will always be linked with Oxford and the Commonwealth. Colin Newbury cuts away myths surrounding Cecil Rhodes, arguing that the genesis of his scholarship scheme lay in the 1890s rather than in his undistinguished Oxford student days. He also shows how, until 1917, most of the funds of the Rhodes estate were directed towards political purposes rather than to education. The high-minded missionary zeal with which some have dedicated themselves to the Commonwealth is represented in Deborah Lavin's study of Lionel Curtis—the 'prophet and evangelist' (p. 97) of the new, multiracial Commonwealth—and Anthony Kirk-Greene's study of Margery Perham—'builder of Empire-builders' (p. 140) and exponent of indirect rule. Finally, Colin Newbury assesses Keith Hancock's contribution to Imperial economic history and the particular importance of his examination of the genesis of the Ottawa system and the structure of the West African export trade.

Each of these essays is, in its own right, an interesting addition to knowledge. Together they have a high degree of coherence and are a testimony to the high standard of Oxford scholarship. They add greatly to our understanding of imperial vision, imperial administration, and the interrelationship between the academic world and the British Commonwealth.

Another person who believes in the value of the Commonwealth and who has served it well is John Chadwick, Director of the Commonwealth Foundation from its establishment in 1966 until his retirement in 1980. The 'Unofficial Commonwealth' with which his book is concerned is that of the professional organizations which the Foundation was set up to assist. According to the 'Agreed Memorandum' of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference of 1965, the Foundation was instructed to strengthen the links within the Commonwealth between professional associations and to increase interchanges between professional men and women.

Chadwick describes how, with an initial staff of three (including himself) and the guidance of a distinguished board of Trustees representing twenty Commonwealth countries, the Foundation set about using its initial annual income of £250,000 to translate into action the remit set out by the Commonwealth premiers. But the ever present financial constraints dictated that the Foundation's funds had to be directed to a large extent towards its two major achievements: the establishment of a network of professional centres with shared facilities for associations which could not otherwise afford them and the creation and support of professional pan-Commonwealth associations.

Throughout his directorship Chadwick was constantly encouraging open discussion and examination of the Foundation's priorities and seeking new ways of developing functional co-operation within the Commonwealth. One suspects that the Foundation's success was in no small part due to Chadwick himself. Chadwick's frank description of the working of the Foundation offers a most valuable picture of contemporary Commonwealth cooperation in a spirit of partnership. It should go a long way towards overcoming what he sees as one of the problems facing the Foundation—its failure to publicize itself.

University of Keele LORNA LLOYD

How wars end: the United Nations and the termination of armed conflict, 1946–1964. By Sydney D. Bailey. 2 vols. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1982. 1119 pp. Index.

As Bailey pertinently observes in this work, many factors in a decision to go to war are under the control of the party initiating the use of force, whereas termination of conflict involves external considerations which it may have been possible to disregard in earlier stages. He is also correct in noting the relative neglect of the question of war termination in the literature (some important contributions in English are noted on pages 11–14).

Bailey's study amounts to more than his hoped-for 'modest contribution'. Not only does it compile and review detailed factual data on the seven cases selected—Indonesia, 1947–8

and 1948–9; Kashmir, 1947–9; Palestine, 1947–9; Korea, 1950–3; Sinai–Suez, 1956–7; Cyprus, 1964—it also offers sharp practical comments on this varied experience, and breaks down its forbidding complexity into manageable subdivisions. Each substantive chapter in volume one is again referred to in the final chapter, 'Mnemonics for peace-builders'. Thus, we are taken from procedural steps, 'Preliminaries in the Security Council', through consideration of Council diplomacy, to problems in the field, and finally to humanitarian questions. Check-lists of key questions for diplomats, international officials, commanders of observer groups or peacekeeping forces relate back to more extended treatment of each issue in the substantive chapters which have followed the same sequence. For blow-by-blow accounts of the occurrence and handling of such issues, we turn to the case studies in volume two.

The Soviet delegate said in the Security Council in 1954: '. . . life does not call for resolutions; it calls for decisions which can promote the settlement of important international questions'. The statement came in a debate on Israel's complaint about the Egyptian blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba. The USSR vetoed a resolution calling on Egypt to comply with the Council's 1951 decision because the resolution failed to deal with 'the basic question of Palestine', and was an attempt to impose a solution rather than to encourage direct negotiation. The statement and the whole episode epitomize the severe limitations within which the Security Council must work in trying to bring about a solution to persistent and entrenched conflicts of interest, which periodically erupt into hostilities.

A short review can only illustrate one or two of the issues treated. The chapter 'Problems in the field' offers insight into the sort of matters which appear first to be minor procedural problems capable of solution by reasonable people anxious to progress to a more stable situation than that which led to the conflict, but which ripen, with or without fertilization from either party, into major irritants which all too often bear the seeds of the next round of fighting. Demarcation of ceasefire lines is one such matter. Some lines drawn on maps after Suez–Sinai 1956 had still not been marked on the ground by 1963. Some followed changing water courses; others had been drawn with thick wax pencil, the lines representing from six to forty metres on the ground. Further examples come from the policing of demilitarized zones, the functions of UN observers or forces, and such acute problems as freelance guerrillas who are farmers by day and fighters by night, and the presence of armed police from one of the contesting states. Bailey comments too simplistically that in an ideal world policing of demilitarized areas would be done by UN personnel but that 'an ideal world would be one large non-military area and policing would be unnecessary' (p. 254). We can surely envisage progress from present arrangements to a position in which UN personnel are given police functions. Such functions remain necessary even in non-military areas, so long as these are inhabited.

Bailey's work cries out for judgement by a senior officer with recent field experience with a UN or foreign observer group or peacekeeping force, who could assess the extent to which the lessons of the early years have been learned, problems foreseen and provided for, and the prospects for effective peacekeeping thereby enhanced. Experience had clearly taught, even by 1964, that while a supervision force can contain and settle minor violations of a ceasefire, a deliberate major breach by one party, intent on gaining further advantage, cannot be deterred by observers or even a peacekeeping force. The rapid decline in the degree of compliance with the 1949 Middle East armistices is viewed as inevitable, given the political context and the refusal of the Arab states to recognize Israel.

Bailey cannot be optimistic about the future. His approach is long on practical issues and ways of tackling them, and short on theoretical evaluation. Such general conclusions as he permits himself are tucked away in the Introduction (pp. 2–7, 15) and at the start of the 'Mnemonics' chapter (pp. 339–43). He has certainly fulfilled his declared aims of providing data for others to analyse, and the check list of recurring problems; indicating what procedures have been relatively effective, and suggesting some improvements which might help the Security Council to discharge its heavy responsibilities more effectively.

University of Manchester GILLIAN WHITE

The UN Conference on the Law of the Sea: a negotiating exercise. By Masood Hyder and Helen Wallace. Sunningdale Park, Berks: Civil Service College. 1982. 135 pp. £2·75.

THIS publication is a very welcome addition to the armoury of those who employ simulations in the teaching of international relations. The authors have compiled a comprehensive set of

briefs which would enable groups otherwise unfamiliar with UNCLOS to play the simulation. Good negotiating simulations are hard to find in this field, and this one is additionally welcome because it focusses on the increasingly important and interesting business of negotiating under consensus rules.

The UNCLOS simulation is centred on the issue of an international regime and machinery for mining the deep seabed. It re-creates the situation as it was in 1979, when negotiations on this issue were being pursued in the Working Group of twenty-one, and it confronts the players with the task of reaching agreement on a controversial set of eighteen draft articles.

The simulation can be played by between eleven and forty-six participants, and can be run either in one day or over several days. The briefs cover the background to both UNCLOS and the issues at stake in the Working Group of twenty-one. They give ample technical information, and a very useful background on all the actors in the simulation, including nineteen countries. Some general instructions are given on how to run the simulation, but these assume previous experience with simulations on the part of the organizer, and would not suffice for a novice.

For the most part, the briefs are accurate and clear, and strike a good balance between brevity and depth. There are some notable errors in brief II on the history of the Seabed Committee and the first two sessions of UNCLOS, but these will not disturb the simulation. In general, the quality of information is high.

Given its genesis as an exercise for experienced civil servants, I have some unease about how appropriate this simulation would be for undergraduates. By its nature as a negotiating simulation it requires more preparatory work by the participants than does a conflict simulation like the Open University's 'Bosnian crisis'. For this reason, it would best be used for upper-year students taking courses on international cooperation. For lower-year or less specialized students, the UNCLOS simulation would work best in the context of a weekend seminar, where an appropriate level of commitment to it could be built up.

University of Warwick BARRY BUZAN

Defence and disarmament

The causes of wars. By Michael Howard. London: Temple Smith. 1983. 248 pp. £10·00.

PROFESSOR HOWARD's new book consists of fifteen articles and lectures with a substantial introduction. It includes obituaries of Liddell Hart and Montgomery, a review of Henry Kissinger's memoirs, lectures on 'War in the making and unmaking of Europe' and 'The use and abuse of military history' as well as the 1974 Neale Lecture at University College, London on 'The British way in Europe'. However, the main theme of most of these essays is the strategic, political and moral problem of thermonuclear war.

Michael Howard's strategic thinking is in the tradition of Clausewitz and is worthy of the master: there is the same lucidity of argument and style, the same refusal to be swayed by emotion, so that the intellectual analysis deals with the real world, equidistant from what Professor Howard calls 'the divergent and equally misguided courses charted by the Committee on the Present Danger in the United States . . . and the Campaign for European Nuclear Disarmament' (p. 6). Starting from the assumption that 'It is hard to deny that war is inherent in the very structure of the state' (p. 25), Professor Howard is concerned to see what the moral and practical implications of this are in a world much of the resources of which are being devoted to military expenditure, and in which governments with nuclear weapons are 'proposing to incur for the peoples for whose safety they were responsible a holocaust of horror inconceivably greater than anything suffered by the far more disciplined and cohesive societies which had entered the two World Wars' (p. 92). Thus more than ever before the social dimensions of war have become as important as operational, logistical and technological considerations. This leads to the paradox which Michael Howard expresses as follows: 'The political credibility of nuclear strategy indeed decreased in the indirect ratio to its technical credibility, for it was precisely those technologically advanced societies best able to build sophisticated weapons-systems whose social and political structure made them least likely to endure, or even seriously to contemplate, the cost of nuclear war' (p. 92).

Michael Howard is sceptical about attempts to predict how a war might start and about trusting in lessons from history. On the other hand, he is doubtful about the value of the

British independent nuclear force, mainly because it uses financial resources which would be better devoted to conventional armaments. He is equally unconvinced of the need for cruise missiles, the introduction of which is, he believes, 'unnecessary, expensive and most unlikely to stabilize a balance which is . . . far more stable than either E. P. Thompson or "the hard men in the Pentagon" believe' (p. 130).

Michael Howard's is a rational voice in an irrational world; some may find that his rationality only serves to demonstrate the madness of the system which he takes for granted, but as long as we are obliged to operate within this system, then it is to be hoped that those in authority will take some notice of him.

JAMES JOLL

The geography of warfare. By Patrick O'Sullivan and Jesse Miller. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1983. 172 pp. Index. £12·95.

THIS book's size and structure are deceptive. Physically it is slim, and accordingly appears outrageously expensive, especially as it seems on first sight to be aimed largely at a student readership. Its list of contents also seems conventional: the title itself is redolent of the boring banality of military geography as it was taught in military academies certainly before 1939.

Fortunately there is more to it than at first meets the eye. The authors deal not only with tactics and strategy but also with intelligence, and end with a chapter entitled 'Zones of conflicts and rumours of war'. In general, however, the best features are the specific examples. Under the not so obviously indicative heading of 'Logistics' there is a concise account of the nature, purpose and problems of the proposed American Rapid Deployment Force (RDF). While this short passage by no means disposes of the evident weaknesses of such a strategy, it does raise most of the important questions. On the basis of the facts provided here, this illustrates dramatically that the geographical factors of distance and access to bases are still of paramount importance. 'By 1987' the authors write, '13,000 men could be flown in within a week to man the 300 tanks and other hardware from the ships. The mechanised units could be landed within two weeks and the armour in a month' (p. 43). Is this much of an advance on the tardy Suez operation in 1956? What comes through as much as anything else is that the Americans are beginning to see a need to follow the Russians in adopting the old British practice of showing the flag in the Indian Ocean.

While it is a pity that the timing of the publication causes it to stop short of anything other than a passing reference to the British South Atlantic operation, it is up-to-date in its description of what it designates 'the realities of the friction offered by the earth's surface to military manoeuvring' (p. 45). The section on 'Geopolitics and grand strategy' considers the Russian strategy in the widest sense and comes to the conclusion that the Soviet leadership since Khrushchev, while seeking 'to discomfort the capitalist order, has limited action to relatively inconsequential places and sought stability in really dangerous settings like the Middle East' (p. 107). 'The Soviet Union' the authors conclude, 'remained wary of guerilla war'. They nevertheless see the intrusion of the Soviet Union on this basis in Southern Africa as sustaining a distinct possibility of direct conflict between the United States and the USSR (p. 158).

Each chapter in the book is headed by a quotation from Sun Tzu or another eminent Chinese authority, and the whole work will prove a mine of pithy quotations for undergraduates in need of a short cut. Where else will they find within one set of covers the framework and illustrations for all their essays in strategic studies? It is, however, this very quality which also makes *The geography of warfare* an interesting and informative work for the general reader who wants a framework for a more systematic approach to an important aspect of world politics.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

Defence technology and international integration. By Trevor Taylor. London: Pinter. 1982. 218 pp. Index. £15·00.

THE subject area of this book is not as the title suggests; it is about cooperation between the Western Allies in the acquisition of weapons systems. The axle around which the discussion

revolves is that of equipment standardization and is expressed in terms of objectives, requirements and allied experience. To take the metaphor further, the oil to help the progress of the discussion is a rather heavy—even crude—injection of simplified international theory, with a conclusion to suggest in which direction the whole is turning. As such, the work is not really about defence, technology, or international integration, and only has tenuous relevance to international political economy, of which the book is meant to be one in a series of studies.

Had Trevor Taylor stuck to his subject, and subjected standardization to thorough analysis, the book would have earned distinction; he obviously knows his stuff, but has failed to get his message over by attempting too much with the sources at his disposal. The trouble is that he tries to make a relatively narrow interpretation of international collaboration and cooperation—i.e. standardization—do more than was prudent to ask of it, both from a theoretical standpoint and as a prescription for future policy. Indeed, the topic became overloaded to the extent that what should have been a relatively simple concept clearly analysed became complicated and, regrettably, confused. Even a lengthy, and by his own admission (page 144), unhelpful and even irrelevant discussion of integration—even international relations theory—failed to bring light to an increasingly confused picture.

What went wrong? First, the author lost sight of his objectives and failed to differentiate relevant from irrelevant evidence. Second, he frequently shifts ground from technology to weapons acquisition, from alliance interests to European interests, from international considerations to national ones, and from empirical observation to *a priori* prescription, often apparently without realizing what he was doing. And, third, he was not consistent in his approach, despite a rather painstaking outline in his introduction. The book, he states, 'endeavours to integrate many relevant considerations including the political, the bureaucratic and the technological', to which he added three lines further on: 'economic, social, cultural, historical and technological factors, as well as political system characteristics'. On top of all this must be added his theoretical indulgence in chapter 5, a forty-six page *tour d'horizon* of international relations theory. It was all too much.

The book contains nothing new of either a theoretical or an analytical nature and contains no new data. On standardization, alliance politics, weapons acquisition, political economy and defence technology, no fresh or novel insights are offered. Indeed, there are more illuminating studies available to which he makes no reference. In all, this is a disappointing book which missed the great opportunity of grasping the nettle and really getting to the heart of the issue whether or not defence and technological issues, as handled within a regional alliance structure (NATO), actually further, or retard, the goals of European political and economic integration. Instead one is left with an impression of muddle or, perhaps, in view of a clumsy and unattractive written style, a strong impression of a first draft, put to press before it was properly ready.

University of Lancaster MARTIN EDMONDS

Militarization and arms production. Edited by Helen Tuomi and Raimo Vayrynen. London: Croom Helm. 1982. 310 pp. £15·95.

Armed forces and the welfare societies: challenges in the 1980s. By Gwyn Harries-Jenkins. London: Macmillan. 1982. 214 pp. Index. £20·00.

EDITED volumes generally come in two varieties: those that are collections of conference papers cobbled together by the editor into an order which has the appearance, at least, of some form; and those in which the editor, in a sense, commissions from known experts contributions which, with luck, make up the separate parts of what becomes a coherent whole. Over the former the editor has limited control, though good fortune plus a selection of papers of quality that are addressed to the conference theme may create a worthwhile and cohesive work; over the latter there is much more control, providing there is agreement at the start between the editor and contributors about method, objective and contribution. Regrettably, neither of these books displayed luck or discipline, and each manifested a tenuous and contrived coherence and cohesiveness, despite the manipulations and word-spinning of the editors. Both volumes, in other words, were collections of often disparate contributions of varying relevance and quality covering an eclectic range of topics, the papers lacking connectedness and, not infrequently, an even barely relevant link with the book's

title. In all, these are two very expensive books which in tone had more in common with journals.

Militarization and arms production had the laudable, if ambitious, objective of 'sharpening our analytical tools and deepening our understanding of the disarmament/development relationship in various types of countries to encourage us in our search for a more secure, socially just and less militarised world'. It was evidently thought that this would be achieved by holding an international conference under UN auspices to establish contact between specialists in disarmament/development issues. Specialists would present papers (forming the contents of the book), though surely of more value than simply the papers themselves would have been the exchanges prompted by the papers on that occasion, and the conclusions drawn from them for further study and new overall approaches to the subject. Of the real value of the conference the book makes no mention; and the couple of 'extra' papers considered by the editors as 'fruitful' are not identified, either, by content or treatment.

The Tampere Peace Research Institute which initiated the conference has in common with SIPRI a concern for what is referred to as 'the militarization process' in both advanced and developing countries. The argument, which is given, is that the two processes are interrelated to the detriment of world security, human progress and the ultimate objective of universal justice. The difficulty with this book is the varying uses of the central concepts, such as 'militarization', 'development', and 'disarmament', by the different authors to the extent that it can only be assumed there was a form of unquestioning consensus that each was writing about the same thing, or at least they all agreed about the direction on which the world should be going. Some individual contributions did stimulate further interest—though not immediately on disarmament/development themes—but others really were an ephemeral and burdensome read.

Armed forces and the welfare societies was different, but just as wanting. Aside from the obvious fact that the five countries which provided the case studies for the book (plus a brief introduction and postscript by the editor) are barely welfare societies as such, the focus of the contributions was on the personal, and, one suspects, idiosyncratic interests and expertise of the authors, rather than on armed forces, *per se*. Defence economics and policy options in Britain; trades unions and 'democratization' in Holland; German conscription; Swedish 'model' armies; US all-volunteer forces: each of these focal concerns was packaged in a thinly-disguised genuflection to the editor's catch-all (except for internal security threat perception) introduction. That the contributors were not, or could not be, disciplined (since when has the IISS taken SOWI studies as a basis of its own?) the editor, to whom some sympathy must be accorded, obviously found a postscript also necessary. Almost predictably, after a noble attempt to pull the threads together—arguably many of them gold plated—he had to conclude, 'what we wish to emphasize in other words is what is good for the United States is not necessarily good for West Germany'. With that, he ended—probably in desperation or, even, relief.

No matter how reputable the contributors, laudable the objectives, challenging the title, or authoritative the contributions, the worth of a book is not necessarily the sum of the parts. The parts of both these books warrant, in many cases, separate attention: the books as a whole do not, and definitely not at the price.

University of Lancaster MARTIN EDMONDS

The arms race in the 1980s. Edited by David Carlton and Carlo Schaerf. London: Macmillan. 1982. 338 pp. Index. £25·00.

Nuclear deterrence: implications and policy options for the 1980s. Edited by M. R. Dando and B. R. Newman. Tunbridge Wells: Castle House. 1982. 249 pp. £15·00.

CONFERENCES on war and peace issues are proliferating at an alarming rate, and with the eager cooperation of publishers, proceedings of these conferences are finding their way onto booksellers' shelves almost as fast. The present two collections stand out from the ordinary in that the conference organizers in each case have tried—entirely commendably—to mix the academic equivalents of oil and water.

Carlton and Schaerf try to mix experts from East and West—with near disastrous results. The Soviet and East European contributions are beyond parody in their lack of originality, stuffiness and exquisite carefulness to say nothing that will get them into trouble back home.

The Western contributions are naturally better, although here too originality is beginning to suffer as material starts to wear thin after too much exposure at too many conferences. But this collection is saved by an excellent handful of papers on nuclear non-proliferation questions.

In the first of these Ian Smart argues powerfully that multinational consortia for uranium enrichment and plutonium separation are the best way to ensure supplies and to limit proliferation risks. Pierre Lellouche on the other hand warns that nuclear suppliers should not look too much like a cartel if they wish to stay on good terms with their customers. And Lellouche, starting from the observation that the upshot of the Carter administration's attempts to restrict the extraction of plutonium from spent reactor fuel was to make one rule for the nuclear powers (who were allowed to do it) and another for the non-nuclear weapon states (who were not), shows how as a consequence nuclear relations between France and West Germany have suffered. Looking more from the customer end of the nuclear business, Felix Calderon, a Peruvian diplomat, perhaps in reaction to a surfeit of Mexican nuclear-free rhetoric, contributes a refreshingly realistic piece on the Latin American nuclear-free zone, and this is complemented by a thoroughly level-headed analysis by Platias and Rydell of the prospects for a nuclear-free zone in the Balkans.

Dando and Newman attempt a different sort of emulsification and try to mix Western contributors operating from within two different paradigms. In paradigm one there are those who believe that if you wish for peace, prepare for war and in paradigm two those who believe that if you prepare for war, war is what you will get. In this instance the blending process works surprisingly well—tempers seem to have been kept and nearly all the contributors manage to say something interesting.

For instance, members of the Bradford School of Peace Studies, from paradigm two, throw a good deal of light on that under-researched topic, civil defence in Britain. There is, however, an oddity in their treatment, in that attacks of 200 megatons and above are all that the Bradford scholars appear willing to contemplate, as if fearing to speak of smaller attacks lest they make civil defence appear feasible. Yet Dan Smith's carefully costed plea for a non-nuclear and minimally conventionally armed Britain, from paradigm two, does not read at all awkwardly alongside Roger Beaumont's historically allusive treatment of new conventional weapons from paradigm one.

Of course, what separates the paradigms in practice is a difference in judgement about how the Soviet Union would respond if Britain by disarming and/or leaving NATO deliberately made herself militarily weaker than she now is. As the Carlton and Schaerf book unintentionally reminds us, one way not to discover the answer to this question is to invite Soviet spokesmen to read papers to academic conferences.

University of Lancaster IAN BELLANY

Nuclear proliferation in the 1980s: perspectives and proposals. Edited by William H. Kincade and Christoph Bertram. London: Macmillan. 1982. 272 pp. Index. £20·00.

THE problem of containing nuclear proliferation remains among the most difficult on the international scene, and new ideas are eagerly sought after. This book is the product of a conference held to air the work of young scholars in this field, in the hope that they might provide some fresh approaches.

Part one examines why nations go nuclear. Part two reviews the candidates for the nuclear club, dividing them into 'garrison' states and 'prestige' states. Part three analyses the limitations of current approaches, and part four considers alternatives for the future, including the future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the view of proliferation as seen from the Third World, and the impact of the commercialization of nuclear power in the developing countries.

There is much sound analysis to be found here. Lellouche on the garrison states, and Duffy and Lester on the NPT are particularly good value. Lellouche, in particular, has a grasp of technical and political detail, coupled with analytical skills, that make his arguments both subtle and authoritative. To take but one example, he shows persuasively how the security incentives for Taiwanese nuclear weapons depend more upon the erosion of American security guarantees than upon the development of Chinese nuclear weapons. At the same time, the vulnerability of Taiwan even to conventional attack would place a high potential cost upon attempts to acquire a nuclear arsenal.

One subject that is missing is a detailed discussion of the safeguards system and of the technical and political conditions which the breaking of safeguards agreements would require. Another defect is that the book has a distinctly dated air. The conference on which it is based appears to have taken place in 1979, but the publication date was late November 1982. Much that may have been novel in 1979 is no longer so. Hence, the otherwise useful bibliography lacks several important books published in the last three years, although, less accountably, it also fails (as do the authors of the chapters on why the existing weapons states went nuclear) to refer to Professor Gowing's volumes of 1974 on the British decision. In addition, there are more typographical errors than one would expect from such a distinguished publisher. Finally, the touch of the editors and some of the contributors is not altogether sure in places, especially on the more technical aspects of the subject. Why, for example, is the safeguards system said only to apply to nuclear *power* reactors (page xi) and not to research reactors also? Why is plutonium recovered from the lightwater fuel cycle described as weapons-*grade* rather than weapons-*usable* (p. 246)? And should a statement that the France–Pakistan reprocessing deal had *not* been cancelled (as it was, in effect, in 1978) have escaped the editorial net (p. 236), not to mention a misprinted reference on the same page to plutonium-238?

University of Manchester PHILIP GUMMETT

Security policies of developing countries. Edited by Edward A. Kolodziej and Robert E. Harkavy. Lexington, Mass: Lexington. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 393 pp. Index. £27·50.

THE declared intention of this book to examine 'the security policies of several important developing countries' in the light of 'some indexes of developing state power' (p. 1) and of 'nine dimensions of security policymaking' (p. 13) is to some extent vitiated by the choice of cases. Cuba, India, Israel and South Africa, for example, may each have some or all of the characteristics of a developing country but in reality they have not much in common. It is not surprising, therefore, that the editors are disappointed with their own conclusions, though they are perhaps unduly pessimistic. Do 'we know even less how to control or manage armed conflict, to lower threat levels, and to resolve differences short of hostilities' (p. 364)?

One reason for the editors' disappointment is that they seem always to want to discover permanent comprehensive solutions to the problems that lead to conflict; another is that in the face of the evidence they tend to belittle the role of economic forces. At a time when the world is more aware than ever of the dilemma posed by economic cooperation, whether on an East–West or a North–South basis, they choose to assume that some kind of watershed is not approaching.

The authors of the various country studies are mostly either Canadian or American based: there are two Israeli contributions and one British, from Peter Lyon of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London. His chapter on Indonesia is clear and informative and firmly explores, through the particular example, the potential emergence of a regional power. The emphasis on regionalism in general is the strongest element in the book, but it is a matter of regret that the authors' brief or guide (p. 13) did not specifically insist on the exploration of regional peacekeeping arrangements or security agreements. The potential of Nigeria in this respect is not elaborated nor is the historic French role in the West African region. On the other hand, the handling of the question of South Africa's possible nuclear capability is on the whole sensitive and relatively objective.

The value of this expensive book lies not so much in the thesis which it seeks frustratedly to develop and integrate but in the detail of the individual studies. There is plenty of information here on military and security matters even if many of the facts are derived from publications of the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Its main achievement is to demonstrate the variety of security policies prevailing in the world today and the dangerous proliferation of the power to initiate an embroiling local conflict.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

The Warsaw Pact: arms, doctrine and strategy. By William J. Lewis. Maidenhead, Berks: McGraw-Hill for Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. 1982. 471 pp. £24·95.

IN a number of important respects the Warsaw Pact has long been and still continues to be *terra incognita*. While the flood of material on NATO and its assorted problems never seems to abate, reputable and reliable studies of the Warsaw Pact amount to no more than a mere dribble. Professor Robin Alison Remington's study published in 1971 (*The Warsaw Pact: case studies in communist conflict resolution*, MIT Press) still retains its value and validity, though organization and armament have marched on since then. Two recent works have substantially advanced our knowledge of the inner workings of the Pact: A. Ross Johnson *et al.*, *East European military establishments: the Warsaw Pact northern tier* (The Rand Corporation/Crane Russack, 1980, 1982) and a compendium edited by Robert W. Clawson and Lawrence S. Kaplan, *The Warsaw Pact: political purposes and military means* (SR Inc., 1982), not to mention the various contributions by Christopher D. Jones, but much remains to be explained about the actual military capability of the Pact, particularly the relationship of its Soviet and non-Soviet components. It is this aspect which William J. Lewis addresses both directly and expertly.

Hitherto the best guide has been the late Friedrich Wiener's *Die Armeen der Ostblockstaaten* and the joint Wiener–Lewis publication *The Warsaw Pact armies*. The present volume updates and expands these earlier works, utilizing five chapters to set out the details of Pact organization (structure, command and staff, the Military Council and deployment), the armed forces of the Pact (Soviet and non-Soviet), tactical doctrine, the profile of a possible land campaign in central Europe and finally an illustrated catalogue of weapons and equipment, beginning with small arms and moving through armour to amphibious transporters and trucks. Although much of the material on the Soviet forces may be familiar, the same cannot be said with any confidence for the non-Soviet military establishments, which are frequently ignored, dismissed, derided or simply lumped together as an aggregate tally of men and munitions. Not the least valuable of Mr Lewis's contributions is the assembly of order of battle information, identifying both Soviet and non-Soviet deployments, starting with GSFG (Group of Soviet Forces/Germany). There have, of course, been changes in both tactical air organization and air defence systems throughout the Pact but these do not invalidate the general argument and assumptions about availability. The same can be said for command appointments (General Krivda is now in the Far East, no longer GOC Soviet Southern Group/Hungary) but this merely presages revision in a subsequent edition. Nor is the section on weapons and equipment, admirably furnished as it is with photographs and diagrams, simply raw data; it includes well informed commentary on operational employment, so that it can and should be used in conjunction with the elaborate chapter on tactical doctrine.

In sum, this work can be used with every confidence either as a text or as a handbook on Pact affairs: it certainly involves quite a price but it manifestly packs quite a punch.

University of Edinburgh J. ERICKSON

Politics, economics and social

Foundations of social and political processes: the dynamics of human behaviour, politics and society. Vol. 1: theory. By Johan K. De Vree. Bilthoven, Netherlands: Prime. 1982. 446 pp. Index. DFl 58·00.

THIS first volume presents an *informal* description of Professor De Vree's theory—a second volume will present the formal mathematical treatment together with a discussion of the operationalization of the theory and measurement problems. The author's account of the genesis of his book is instructive. His earlier work on international organization and integration had revealed linkages with diverse other topics and thus convinced him of the need for a general theory of social systems. The complexity of the field and the ambiguities of natural language made mathematical formulation imperative. The resulting theory is intended to be explicit, rigorous, and systematic.

In the theory itself, social systems are viewed as information- and energy-processing structures. A basic distinction is made between 'atomic' and 'compound' systems. The theory for *atomic* systems is a combination of decision theory and learning theory; while the theory

for *compound* systems envisages subsystems influencing one another by offering 'rewards' and 'punishments'. Interaction between systems is determined by (and determines) such relational properties as distance, harmony, dependence and power. At the systemic level, these power relations determine the system's 'capacity': '[this concept] brings us to the heart of the theory of social or political integration and development, as well as of revolution and warfare' (p. 31).

The dynamics of a social system are characterized by occasional periods of equilibrium, which are disrupted by changing relations between subsystems. This initiates a social process which leads to a new equilibrium, the intensity of the process being a function of the capacity of the system. These abstract notions are applied to such social processes as 'trade', 'cooperation and aid', 'violence and subversion', 'diplomacy, negotiation and intelligence', and 'consumption and investment'. Chapters on culture and institutionalization lead up to the final discussion of 'The evolution of society' in terms of the interaction between the 'capacities', relationships and interactions of the systems involved.

The above theory draws on an impressive range of disciplines. The nature of the selection from these disciplines is necessarily constrained by the desire for a theory which is general, which takes a 'macro' view, which can be expressed in mathematical terms, and which is a genuine theory rather than merely a conceptual framework. The consequences are that some of the detail and conceptual sophistication within each discipline have been lost; and the more easily mathematicized aspects have gained unusual prominence.

Until volume two is available, some aspects of the theory will remain unclear. To what extent is this a single *integrated* theory? Which parts of the discussion lie outside the formal model? What is the precise relationship between variables? What problems remain with the mathematical formulation of the theory (e.g. see pp. 56, 60)?

Despite these reservations, this book represents an advance on earlier systems approaches in this field. As a sympathizer of more formal approaches to theory, I found this volume provided an impressive combination of formality and breadth. The presentation was crisp, and the diagrams provided useful overviews.

The Open University GORDON BURT

Reconstructing public philosophy. By William M. Sullivan. Los Angeles: University of California Press. 1982. 238 pp. Index. £15·00. $25.95.

IN this book William Sullivan addresses the dissonances contained in the operation of liberal ideology and the maintenance of a cohesive social order. Sullivan, writing primarily as a philosopher, seeks to expose the corrosive impact of liberal individualism on the workings of the US political process and upon the stability of the social structure.

In common with other writers such as Daniel Bell, Sullivan blames liberal capitalism for destroying the underlying moral structures that bound US society together. He claims that the ideals of Jeffersonian democracy—personal economic independence and political freedom—have been mislaid. We cling, he says, to notions of the moral strength of acquisitive individualism that bear little resemblance to the actual working of present-day American society. Jeffersonian democracy, based upon the small community, in which the economic independence of the farmer and artisan produced, it is said, a healthy self-regulating policy, has been outmoded for the past hundred years.

Economic liberalism, it used to be thought, formed the basis for a smoothly functioning political system by injecting moral qualities into the organization of social life. This, Sullivan says, is now hopelessly untrue. 'The peculiarly honorific status of acquisitiveness in the moral order of liberal capitalism has been based on an assumption that egoistic competition could be fostered and extended to many areas of social life without harm being done to the larger non-competitive context of (social) solidarity' (p. 38). Liberalism, having been emancipatory, now produces decadence because of its role as a solvent of traditional social restraints.

This analysis is now fairly standard. Daniel Bell's *The cultural contradictions of capitalism* made this point in a rather more interesting fashion. But Sullivan manages to update the corpus of American anti-liberal thinking by showing how Rawls and Nozick are very much in the mainstream of American liberalism rather than placing them, as they usually are, well outside the current consensus. Sullivan, in my opinion correctly, points to the astonishing

uniformity of the underlying ideological premises across the American political spectrum. Social policy is invariably conceived of as being solely concerned with individual advancement in the competitive economy.

But Sullivan's recommendations, springing from a viewpoint closely tied to Michael Harrington's democratic socialism, are lamentably weak. Calls for a 'new ordering of the ecology of social relationships' are unlikely to spark an immediate surge of support. Almost equally vague proposals for more democracy and participation and for increased public ownership strike me as nothing more than catchwords with little relevance to Sullivan's concerns for compatibility of the economic and political worlds. Sullivan's eyes are firmly fixed backwards on the past decade when the conflict between economic and political developments became acute. If he were to have looked forward instead, he might have seen some hopeful signs. It is surely now well recognized, even amongst the most fervent apologists for capitalism, that the economic system has to be made to accord better with popular notions of justice, fairness and responsiveness.

The decline in the importance of very large manufacturing companies, the growth of economic decentralization, the new stress laid upon delivering satisfaction from work and the use of Japan as role model in economic life all point to a growing realization that the ideology of unvarnished liberalism is an inappropriate counterpoint to the individual's demand for dignity and order. The development of a European-style conservatism inside the Republican party, full of concern for tradition and well-established social orderings, will be the logical next step. Sullivan might have written a more complete book if he had spent more time analysing how capitalism may adapt itself, rather than adding to the stock of pessimism about the state of the American system.

CHRIS GOODALL

Self-determination in law and practice. By Michla Pomerance. The Hague: Nijhoff. 1982. 195 pp. Index. $39.50.

The principles of non-alignment: the non-aligned countries in the eighties. Edited by Hans Köchler. Vienna: International Progress Organization. 1982. 281 pp. £10·00.

THESE two books are both concerned with certain aspects of the Third World in international relations but are written from entirely different perspectives. The first argues that the Third World's attempt to raise the principle of self-determination to the supreme norm of international politics is contradictory at best and dangerous at worst. The second sets out to record the progress made by the non-aligned movement since 1961 and is generally sympathetic to their aspirations.

In *Self-determination in law and practice*, Michla Pomerance launches a sustained attack on the legal concept of self-determination. In particular he is severe on what he terms the New UN Law of Self-Determination which he claims lacks the status of law and is morally suspect. At the centre of the book is a denial of the claim made by some, mainly Third World states, that the principle of self-determination has the status of *jus cogens*.

Pomerance begins his study with a discussion of the principle of self-determination as conceived by Woodrow Wilson and pinpoints the dilemmas surrounding its application to post-1918 Europe. Almost all the important questions regarding the theory and practice of self-determination were present from the outset. These include the definition of the 'self'; the difficulty of choice between competing 'selves'; the relationship between external self-determination, internal self-determination and representative government; and the process by which the wishes of the 'self' are to be made known. Although it is widely accepted that Wilson and the peacemakers at Versailles failed to provide adequate answers to these questions it is often thought that UN theory and practice have been able to resolve the attendant dilemmas. Pomerance asks the crucial question: 'have the problems of the double standard, of inconsistent application based on *ad hoc* political and expediential considerations, been sharpened rather than alleviated during self-determination's new dawn?' (p. 8) and supplies several answers, all in the affirmative. He challenges the new concept of self-determination by arguing that its legal premises are shaky, first because although claiming to follow Charter provisions it is in fact a deviation from them and, secondly, questioning the legislative competence of the General Assembly. Further, in examining the scope of the principle, the methods of self-determination and the relationship between external self-determination, internal self-determination and representative government,

he shows with reference to numerous cases the existence of a double standard and political rather than legal reasons for the admission of certain claims and the rejection of others by the proponents of self-determination. He also demonstrates that the principle is in conflict with other Charter principles, namely those of sovereign equality, non-intervention and the non-use of force in international relations. On this latter principle there is, he argues, a grave danger of undermining attempts to prohibit the use of force. This is an interesting if unfashionable book, which should be taken seriously particularly by those who do not share the author's conservative approach to international law.

The collection of papers edited by Hans Köchler, *The principles of non-alignment*, is a timely and important book. The outcome of a conference held in Baghdad in May 1982, it is to some extent a celebration of the first twenty-one years of the non-aligned movement since the first summit conference in Belgrade in September 1961. Since then the movement has undergone many developments and the concerns of the member states have shifted in response to changes in the global environment. Further, its membership has grown from twenty-five at the first Belgrade Conference to ninety-six by 1982.

The contributors are unanimous in seeing the non-aligned movement as being a movement of peoples as well as governments, dedicated to change—to struggle against colonialism, imperialism and racial discrimination. They stress the positive aspects of the movement in enunciating principles to govern the relations of all states; measures to curb conflict between non-aligned states and the support for the creation of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) and a New International Information Order (NIIO). This is in contradistinction to received wisdom that the non-aligned movement is essentially negative, evading entanglement in the East–West conflict and trying to use non-alignment as a lever to increase aid receipts. A crucial question concerning the non-aligned movement relates to its continued existence in the face of severe tensions among its members. Two papers in this volume—by S. U. Kodikara, 'Non-aligned institutional forms and democratization of international relations' and Karl P. Sauvant, 'Organizational infrastructure for self-reliance: the non-aligned countries and the Group of 77'—go some way towards providing an answer to this question. A plethora of overlapping institutional mechanisms has served to preserve joint action as much as any underlying philosophies and unity of purpose.

For an understanding of the non-aligned movement's self-perception of its evolution, current concerns and future developments, this book will be of tremendous value to students of international affairs.

University of Sussex MARC WILLIAMS

Human rights in the world: an introduction to the study of the international protection of human rights. 2nd edn. By A. H. Robertson. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1982. 243 pp. Index. £17·50.

DR ROBERTSON suggests that we are in the middle of a process of change from the traditional position whereby human rights had no legal support at the international level to 'a new doctrine which recognises that international standards concerning the fundamental rights of the individual have been established by international law, and that international remedies are available if those standards are not respected' (p. 2). There can be no doubt about the first part of this claim. Indeed, it is underlined by the very publication of the book under review, as it has been made necessary just ten years after its first edition on account of the numerous legal developments which have taken place regarding human rights. Thus Dr Robertson surveys, in his careful and authoritative manner, the coming into force of the two UN Covenants which were approved by the General Assembly in 1966, and the consequential arrangements for the protection of the rights with which they deal. He examines European developments, and while, naturally, concentrating on the European Convention, he also considers the effect of the Helsinki Agreement of 1975. He looks at the American Convention on Human Rights, which came into force in 1978, the Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights, and the proposed African Commission. He concludes with a chapter on humanitarian law, which he sees as a branch of the law of human rights.

However, the second part of Dr Robertson's claim—that we are well on the way to the establishment of international remedies for the breach of human rights—is much less cogent. Without question, the region where rights are best protected is Western Europe, as certain

authorities in Britain are discovering. But the author himself points out that the issues arising here are of marginal significance when compared to the massive and flagrant violations which occur so frequently in other parts of the world. And elsewhere there is little by way of effective international protection. The UN system has not got far; the inter-American arrangements are not much better; the Arabs are far more willing to focus on the territories occupied by Israel than their own countries; and although the author is not so incautious as to say it, little can be hoped of Africa in the foreseeable future.

Nevertheless, a beginning has been made. The issue of human rights is now firmly on the international agenda in a way which would have seemed inconceivable at the start of the century and surprising just a generation or two ago. As Dr Robertson recognizes, further developments will take time, for the idea of the international protection of human rights does not go down well in most states, and international organizations cannot exercise greater powers than their member states are prepared to allow. But things are on the move, however slowly, and this book is a most valuable guide to the current position.

University of Keele ALAN JAMES

A contemporary crisis: political hostage taking and the experience of Western Europe. By Clive C. Aston. Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood. 1982. 217 pp. Index. (Contributions in Political Science, No. 84.) £21·95.

IN the early hours of 5 September 1972, an extremist group of Palestinians attacked the Olympic Village in Munich, killing two Israelis and taking nine more hostage. They demanded to be flown to Egypt with the hostages, who were to be released once 200 Palestinian prisoners in Israel had been set free. A negotiating team was set up to deal with the incident but it soon became apparent that neither Israel nor Egypt would cooperate. The Tunisian government expressed a willingness to take the captors and the hostages but the offer was rejected. Instead it was decided to kill the Palestinians. In the resulting gun battle, five of the Palestinians and all the hostages were killed.

Clive Aston uses this incident to illustrate his general thesis that taking hostages for political purposes precipitates a crisis which can be analysed in the same terms as international incidents such as the Berlin Wall crisis or the Cuban missile crisis. In the Munich crisis, as in the earlier international incidents, there was a pre-crisis build up when the German authorities failed to take steps which could have avoided the *débâcle*. The incident itself was of extremely short duration—under 24 hours—during which time both parties involved were placed under intense pressure. Finally, once the incident itself was over, it continued to have consequences which reverberated round the international system.

In making this comparison between international crises and hostage-taking Aston fails, however, to observe important differences. For example, the Munich incident ended in tragedy and yet is still identified as a crisis. Historians would not have referred to events in Cuba in 1962 as a 'crisis' if the United States and the Soviet Union had launched missiles at each other. In the second place, much of the literature suggests that international crises act as a substitute in a nuclear era for overt conflict. Hostage-taking does not perform a similar function in the relationship between terrorists and governments. Finally, the antagonists in an international crisis operate within a symmetrical relationship while the relationship between a government and a terrorist group is asymmetrical. In looking for similarities, Aston has forgotten to examine the implications of the dissimilarities.

The book also contains a more general analysis of hostage-taking. Aston examines 127 occasions in Western Europe between 1970 and 1980 involving political hostages. He classifies these and argues that his classification is helpful in deciding how hostage incidents ought to be handled by the authorities. It is doubtful, however, if the authorities would in practice find the classification useful. Moreover, it is equally doubtful whether the framework used for analysing the Munich crisis could be extended to many of the other incidents identified by Aston. In a great many cases, for example, no political demands were ever issued.

Although Aston's analysis is lively and his comparison between international crises and hostage-taking is intriguing, he failed to convince me that hostage-taking constitutes our 'most serious threat to world peace'. According to the data, only thirty-four people have died in Western Europe over a ten-year period as the result of being taken hostage. Terrorism is undoubtedly a problem, but it is not helped by hyperbole.

University of Lancaster RICHARD LITTLE

New international communism. By Lawrence L. Whetten. Lexington, Toronto: Lexington. 1982. 262pp. £21·00.

PROFESSOR WHETTEN has produced, in collaboration with several other hands, a comparative study of the foreign and defence policies of four Latin communist parties (French, Spanish, Portuguese and Italian). His starting point is the highly plausible belief that such policy 'plays the dominant role in the legitimation of non-ruling communist parties' (p. 9). After a short historical introduction, the book treats each national party in turn and then two concluding chapters draw together the threads of a comparative analysis. At times military–strategic considerations bulk much larger than general considerations of foreign policy—a reflection perhaps of the author's previous experience as an analyst with the US air force.

The fortunes of the parties are followed in a painstaking, well-documented way, albeit in somewhat leaden style. The book brings out clearly the dilemma of the Latin parties: with the weakening of détente and the seeming end of the eurocommunist phase, there is less and less room available for such parties to manoeuvre towards a 'new internationalism', caught as they are between historic loyalties to the USSR and their varied attempts to seek national legitimation in their own policies. Many observers will agree with the author that the French and Portuguese parties tend more towards a pro-Soviet alignment (even at high domestic cost), while the Italians and Spaniards are more attracted to autonomous positions. Although the tone of the book is classically Atlanticist, there is the odd glimmer of understanding for the difficult position of these parties and for their attempts to seek original solutions. One point made very strongly—and not always brought out in this sort of analysis—is the extent to which sheer lack of technical expertise in military matters has influenced party policy.

The book disappoints in its failure to relate the parties more to their national contexts: all too often it seems as if Mediterranean politics is a game played between the local communists, NATO and the USSR. Other domestic forces, especially social democracy, receive scant notice. This robs the treatment of the Portuguese party, especially, of much of its value. On a more abstract level, it is unfortunate that though dealing with Latin parties the author provides no theory of a common Latin political culture, against which national variants might be set—surely a necessary task in a study that aims above all to be comparative? On a more detailed level, some assertions strike one as peremptory, such as the alleged uninterest of the French public in high policy (p. 192); and other insights badly needed developing. Surely one needs more than the half-sentence on page 142 to deal adequately with the importance to the Portuguese party of its links with Marxist ruling parties in the former Portuguese colonies?

Although a conscientious effort to sift through foreign language material seems to have been made, the presentation of the text lacks similar care. Mis-spellings are embarrassingly frequent; sometimes the English is slipshod: the first line of the last paragraph on page 214 should obviously read 'invokes', not 'involves'. Such carelessness does nothing for the book's credibility, but it remains a work that brings some useful information to the non-specialist, without being very original. One cannot help thinking, though, that it is devoting a lot of effort to parties which are not likely to exert great influence on their countries in the foreseeable future. Other parties, notably social-democratic ones, are real candidates for power. The need for a comparative study of the 'high policy' of these latter seems greater than ever.

University of Reading DAVID HANLEY

The left, the right and the Jews. By W. D. Rubinstein. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 234pp. Index. £11·95.

THIS book seeks to make two main points: first, that since 1945 'virtually the whole of western Jewry [has] moved into the upper middle-class' (p. 9, Introduction), and has taken on a conservative political outlook; second, that the principal source of contemporary antisemitism is to be found on the left wing rather than on the right, contrary to the prewar situation. The first assertion must be heavily qualified, certainly in the case of Britain, where at least five per cent of Anglo-Jewry was in 1975 reported to be living at or near subsistence

level. Since then, this proportion must have increased. Moreover, the large number of small businessmen, shopkeepers, and clerical workers hardly qualify for membership of the upper middle class. In France, impressionistic evidence suggests that the Jewish community—the largest in Europe and composed in the main of refugees from the former French empire in North Africa—also does not qualify for inclusion in the upper middle class. Still, even if the picture of Jewish affluence must be considerably revised, it remains true that there has been a considerable upward economic mobility on the part of western Jewry. It is also true that the main thrust of contemporary antisemitism emanates from the left, as, for example, in Soviet Russia and other communist states. This is all the more so since the Zionist issue became involved with the struggles of the various 'national liberation' régimes against their former rulers. Rubinstein's documentation of these phenomena is impeccable and valuable, as is his documentation of the Jewish rightward political stance. Indeed, his book makes a definite contribution to the anatomy of western Jewry. But what is the relationship between the conservatism of Jews, the antisemitism of the left and nationalist movements, and Jewish economic advance? Here the touch is less sure and when Rubinstein writes that 'Jews can be "at home" on the political right for the first time in modern history' (p. 134), there seems to be a disregard of the fact that the traditional Jewish political alignment is a commitment to the status quo, qualified by an inclination towards moderate change in a liberal and secular direction. Disraeli, for example, correctly argued that the remarkable participation by Jews in the revolutions of 1848–9 signified a perversion of their innate conservatism, founded on a respect for tradition, private property, religion and monarchical institutions, all Tory principles. This book has much to commend it as a contemporary comment on the status of western Jewry, but it lacks the historical dimension.

University of Warwick LIONEL KOCHAN

The rise and decline of nations: economic growth, stagflation, and social rigidities. By Mancur Olson. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1982. 273pp. Index. £8·95.

WHILE the majority of British economists remain locked in the traditional quarrels between the neo-Keynesians and the monetarists, to the non-economists their expertise is becoming increasingly suspect: neither their analyses of the roots of the present depression nor the remedies they respectively propose are plausible. Professor Mancur Olson's book is refreshingly different: his theory is both parsimonious and comprehensive, both impeccably logical and pragmatic; moreover, it is modest in its claims to offer an explanation and in its policy suggestions. For the specialists, the theory has great heuristic promise and produces a firm base for comparisons; for the non-specialists, it sets out a number of obscure economic problems in an astonishingly clear and non-technical fashion.

In contrast to the traditional schools, the author's theory firmly links macroeconomics with microeconomics. It is fundamentally very simple. Professor Olson hypothesizes that the key to economic growth lies in the maximum freedom from restraints and that the major—though by no means only—obstacle is found in organizations and collusions pursuing their special interests to the detriment of society as a whole and, therefore, ultimately of their own members. Developing the argument of his well-known earlier book, *The logic of collective action* (1965, 1971), the author analyses the paradox of the powerful interest groups acting against their own interests. He discusses in some detail nine major logical implications. To summarize, these groups flourish in societies in proportion to the length of uninterrupted stability in the latter—hence the depth of the 'British disease'; they hamper optimum production and technological innovation, largely by slowing down decision-making and by impairing the nation's capacity for adaptation and change; they distort distribution and increase complexity of regulation; they evade political control.

All these phenomena have been previously observed, but the author combines them into a powerful logical theory which is applied to a wide range of intriguing historical growth phenomena. His primary original contribution is found in his analysis of contemporary involuntary unemployment and stagflation but his theory is fully consistent with events widely dispersed in time and in space. While allowing for the idiosyncrasies of each individual case, the author finds his theory compatible with the rapid economic growth of the NICs, of the six founder members of the EEC, of Germany and Japan in the nineteenth century, and of the Netherlands, Britain and—less clearly—of France earlier in the modern period;

with the slow growth in contemporary Britain and the United States and with the decline of the cities early in the modern period; with the stagnation in China and in India. His theory offers a convincing starting point for the study and comparison of such disparate phenomena as the economic consequences of the class structure in Britain, the castes in India, and apartheid in South Africa, or of the modern trade unions and the late medieval guilds.

Professor Olson is a firm but not bigoted advocate of economic freedom and he accepts the need for governmental intervention. He firmly believes that the only promising way of getting out of the present stagflation must be sought in curbing the position and the activities of the obstructive special interest groups. This does not amount to a simple support for the present Conservative trade union policy in Britain; Professor Olson suggests (p. 143) that combinations of firms and within professions are also extremely costly to society and, moreover, he deplores the monetarist attitude to large-scale unemployment. In view of the vested interests so strongly entrenched in both the Labour and the Conservative Parties, a radical curbing of *all* special interest groups would, of course, be politically very difficult and unlikely. Nevertheless, it offers an extremely attractive direction: if undertaken on a broad front rather than only against the trade unions it is ideologically neutral and is likely to command really strong and broad popular support; it does not require any massive expenditure of resources; finally, although the author does not mention it, because it does not depend upon external factors, it can be fully attained by a national effort alone.

University of Southampton JOSEPH FRANKEL

Equality, the Third World and economic delusion. By P. T. Bauer. London: Methuen. 1982. 293pp. Index. £5·95.

IN this collection of fifteen studies written over the past ten years, Professor Bauer continues his stimulating, but sometimes exhausting examination of political and economic mythology. The book, as the title suggests, is divided into three parts—Equality; The West and the Third World; and The state of economics. Each part is self-contained but the studies all relate to the central theme, 'the conspicuous and disconcerting hiatus between accepted opinion and evident reality' (p. 1). Bauer examines the confusion of thought revealed by the pursuit of 'the unholy grail of equality' (p. 8), and decides that society is much safer acting on Dr Johnson's maxim that 'there are few ways in which a man can be more innocently employed than in getting money' (quoted on p. 9) than trusting to policies for the redistribution of wealth. In the second chapter, 'Class on the brain', he considers the view, apparently held by ex-Chancellor Helmut Schmidt amongst others, that economic progress in Britain is held back by our 'damned class-ridden society' (p. 26). Against this Bauer argues that Britain has an open society with no identifiable class barriers preventing the upward progress of the industrious and enterprising. The last four prime ministers, along with a glittering array of talent from industry, commerce and elsewhere, are cited as having made their way without upper-class advantages. However, progress at one end of the scale is matched by regression at the other. Society is becoming less open and flexible than it was because of the effects of economic and social policies on mobility.

In part two, 'The West and the Third World', Bauer turns to the population explosion, foreign aid, commodity stabilization and aspects of Britain's colonial record. Chapter 9, 'British colonial Africa; economic retrospect and aftermath', is especially interesting in the light of recent events in West Africa. In part three, 'The state of economics', Bauer discusses the two dollar problems, first scarcity then surplus, Sir John Hick's book 'A theory of economic history' and 'reflects on the time-honoured quest for a general theory of history' (p. 221); and the investment fetish. In the final chapter, 'Reflections on the state of economics', Bauer sets out to demonstrate that the disquiet expressed in earlier essays at the present state of economics is not peculiar to him. After calling in evidence statements by Professor Wassily Leontief and others he concludes, not surprisingly, on a pessimistic note summed up in his final sentence: 'The exposure of economics to political influences and to intellectual fashion is likely to ensure the persistence of its confused state, in which there will continue to flourish side by side genuine advances of knowledge, meretricious displays of technique, and crude lapses which acquire a life of their own' (p. 266). He can rest assured that he is by no means alone in taking that view.

RICHARD BAILEY

Nuclear power in the developing world. By Daniel Poneman. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 254pp. Index. £14·95.

Despite his title, Mr Poneman's object is not to describe but to explain: 'to explore why developing country governments choose the nuclear policies they do' (p. 3). Only at the end is the scope expanded to embrace a short list of recommendations on 'how to confront the dilemma between providing generous access to civil nuclear technology and safeguarding it against abuse for military purposes' (p. 232). As his codicil reveals, the author is concerned to explain the developing to the developed world, rather than to itself, in the hope of informing the attitudes of industrial countries towards nuclear trade and technology transfer. In that connection, his original insistence on the need to consider the different motives for pursuing or rejecting nuclear development is finally weakened by asserting that capability must be the ultimate index of intention—since manifestos may be insincere or motives mutable. Nevertheless, the initial urge to understand the reasons for what Third World countries have done (or not done) about nuclear power is wholly laudable.

Mr Poneman, at the admitted risk of over-simplification, divides developing countries into three groups: the 'independent', seeking nuclear self-sufficiency, the 'dependent', relying on safeguarded imports, and the 'non-nuclear', not yet committed to building nuclear power plants. As respective exemplars, each meriting a chapter, he takes Argentina, Iran and Indonesia. Thereafter, he discusses reasons for choosing one of the three courses, under the headings of security, economics, domestic politics and foreign influence. Problems of categorization and exemplification aside, it is not always clear whether his case studies constitute only illustration, or are also the major part of his data base. Confidence in the conclusions would be all the greater if the three cases had obviously emerged as truly representative after an equally thorough scrutiny of alternatives. Against that, the decision to include an inquiry into the motives of countries which have chosen *not* to use nuclear power—'the dogs that did not bark'—is as welcome as it is uncommon.

A more serious limitation is that the chapters on reasons for embarking on nuclear power development are discursive, rather than analytical. Mr Poneman may be right when he says that the crucial determinant of nuclear policy in the Third World is political will, and that efforts to link nuclear activity to economic (or other) indicators are futile. It would be helpful, however, to have that view supported by a more systematic examination of factors such as varied diplomatic relationships and alignments, on the one hand, or fluctuating growth rates, external balances and financing costs, on the other. Yet that is only to say that this is less an exhaustive anatomy than an extended essay. The approach and the final recommendations are eminently sensible. If the total effect is to advance a thesis, while indicating areas in which more intensive study might test its validity, that is by no means to the author's discredit.

Ian Smart

Nuclear power in developing countries: an analysis of decision making. By James Everett Katz and Onkar S. Marwah. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 372pp. £22·50.

The main body of this book consists of case-studies of nuclear development in fifteen developing countries. Although the editors tried to steer the authors away from discussing the politico-military aspects of nuclear power—they were instructed to give their main attentions to nuclear energy as an electricity producer—they were none too successful, fortunately for the reader but not always for the authors, some of whom received threats to their careers and safety when preparing their chapters. As the analysis of decision-making was identified as one of the main justifications for assembling the book, it was inevitable that a broader view had to be taken, particularly when considering countries like Argentina, Brazil and India whose nuclear fuel-cycles have been designed to fulfil both civilian and military purposes.

The countries under scrutiny are these three plus China, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, South Korea, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Taiwan, Turkey, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. In most cases the authors are nationals (or ex-nationals) of the countries they discuss, the rest being

covered by American academics. The standard of authorship is generally high. Particularly good are the studies of Brazil, Egypt, Indonesia and the Philippines, the last consisting of a stunning exposé of the deception and intrigue surrounding the export of a US reactor to the Philippines. It is hard to fault the authors on grounds of accuracy, although is it really true that, as the Egyptian study suggests, Sadat decided to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty thinking that Egypt would thereby be better placed to acquire the technologies and materials needed to provide a strategic counterweight to the Israeli nuclear capability? Besides the multilateral restrictions placed on NPT members, would Egypt have opted for the light water reactor, which is usually regarded as the poorest plutonium-producer, if this were indeed the case?

If there is a criticism that can be levelled at this mostly excellent book, it is that the editors missed an opportunity to draw general conclusions from the wealth of case-study material they had assembled. Three introductory chapters give overviews of the subject under discussion but are not clearly related to the studies that follow. Ian Smart's chapter consists of a clear and interesting survey of the problems and opportunities a developing country faces when launching a civil nuclear programme; Marwah examines evidence for the costs of nuclear power (and makes rather dubious comparisons between Indian and US experience in the process); and Katz considers the role of scientists, politicians and other groups in the formation of nuclear policies. A final chapter that helped the reader to structure the many impressions gained in reading the country studies would have been most useful.

Some discussion of the consequences of the downturn in nuclear demand in the Third World would also have been valuable. The degree of institutional commitment to nuclear development in industrializing countries is apparent throughout the book. What is now going to happen to the surplus intellectual and industrial capacity? Is there a danger that it will seek to defend itself by encouraging politicians to consider military options?

This is nevertheless an important book that should be in the libraries of all those concerned with nuclear affairs in the developing world.

University of Sussex WILLIAM B. WALKER

National economic security: perceptions, threats and policies. Edited by Frans A. M. Alting von Geusau and Jacques Pelkmans. Tilburg: John F. Kennedy Institute. 1982. 253pp. DFl 25·00.

FIFTEEN authors from eleven countries contributed papers to a colloquium in Eindhoven in 1980 on external threats to national economic security. The main themes can be found in chapters 2 and 3 of this volume. In the former, national economic security is thought 'to be at stake when external parameters change in such a manner as to cause a breakdown of the preferred socio-economic order'. In other words, the major industrial countries were reluctant to adjust themselves to outside events in the 1970s. Chapter 3 gives as one of the reasons the ever-increasing internal rigidities in those countries. They saw economic security as dependent on the ability of governments to maintain and develop the preferred socio-economic system and its welfare goals. The more resources were pre-empted for such purposes, the less the room for manoeuvre in dealing with outside events. Yet increasing international economic dependence had made those countries more vulnerable to such events. The troubles of the 1970s started with the crop failures early in that decade. If some knew how to respond, the industrial countries did not. The reasons given are their ageing populations, the then growing rigidities in their labour markets, and state intervention. Governments fostered infant high technology industries and provided comforts for the shareholders of senescent ones. The outcome was neo-protectionism, designed to minimize internal disruption. Moreover, while the tariffs of the past had been non-discriminatory between firms in the protected industry, the new policies were selective between firms facing different adjustment problems in the same industry (pp. 42–6). Given such internal pre-occupations in an interdependent world, the choice between power to influence external events and domestic welfare would become ineluctable (chapter 4).

Several case studies follow in which, inevitably at the time, energy problems were given pride of place. In the final summing up, the approach of chapter 2 predominates. The definition of the problem, as quoted early in this review, is amended to: 'National economic security is at stake whenever the survival of the citizens or the state as such is at stake; or

whenever the socio-economic system as preferred by the majority of citizens and/or the regime is at stake' (p. 247). Threats to major sectoral interests are not necessarily seen as equally important. The second theme seems to be defined away, and with it the chance of relating cause to effect. Curiously, the exchange rate issue is omitted from consideration. Perhaps it was not yet so clear in 1980 how central this would become to the welfare versus power issue, and that its inclusion could have provided a link between the book's two main themes. What was clear then, was that internal welfare and external power had become incompatible short-term aims of policy, and that we then sought new ways of safeguarding security which would not involve a return to protection.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

Economic Sanctions. By Robin Renwick. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University. 1981. 118pp. (Harvard Studies in International Affairs, No. 45.)

AFTER his exertions at Lancaster House and with Lord Soames in Salisbury, Robin Renwick of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office took a sabbatical year at Harvard. He used his time profitably in writing a study of economic sanctions, with particular reference to 'the two major cases of sanctions enforcement under international auspices'—those against Italy in 1935–6, and against Rhodesia from 1965 to 1979.

Mr Renwick's historical approach pays off. In a brief 'prelude' to his two principal case studies he shows how the problems inherent in any policy of economic sanctions were already demonstrated in the eighteenth century—in the cases of the American non-importation campaign of the 1760s, the general embargo of 1807–09, and the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809–12. He defines these difficulties as those of 'enforcement, of the redirection of trade, of the domestic opposition likely to be aroused, and of the disjunction between the political and economic effects' (p. 8). Reaching the twentieth century, his analysis of the League of Nations and the Abyssinian crisis amplifies and expands this list of difficulties.

With regard to sanctions against Rhodesia, Mr Renwick comments sombrely that 'by the time of the second great sanctions experiment the lessons of the first had been forgotten almost in their entirety' (p. 18). In comparison with Italy in the 1930s, Rhodesia in the mid-1960s should have been a relatively easy nut to crack. A small, land-locked country heavily dependent on London for capital and on Britain for manufactured imports, nearly half of its GNP in 1964 was exported, mainly to Britain. A third of all export earnings came from the tobacco crop, on which the livelihood of the politically significant white farmers seemed largely to depend. A British colony far removed from the cold war battle lines, Rhodesia had little scope for counter-measures, except against Zambia, and no political friends, apart from South Africa and Portugal. Why, then, did sanctions not produce the effect desired in Rhodesia any more than they had done in Italy?

Three factors seem to have been crucial. (1) As in the Italian case, the impact of sanctions on politically significant sections of the population in Rhodesia was limited: although the tobacco farmers lost two-thirds of their income by 1968, living standards among the three-quarters of the white population who lived in the towns were hardly affected. 'Mr Smith had come to power precisely by defeating the Rhodesian "establishment": it was from the relatively less well-off members of the white community that the Rhodesian Front derived most of its support' (p. 34). Rural blacks were eventually the worst affected: the main long-term importance of this was to become apparent in the 1970s, with the growth of guerrilla warfare. Apart from this, 'Rhodesia could take it'.

(2) Rhodesian 'natural resources and technical skills' were sufficient to counteract most of the short- and medium-term effects of sanctions. The assumption of wide economic controls by the Rhodesian government, as by Mussolini, baffled the impact of sanctions: petrol procurement was coordinated and supplies were rationed; import controls conserved foreign exchange; manpower and prices were controlled—'government permission was required for an enterprise to go out of business' (p. 33). Rhodesia's default on debt repayments, and the suspension of remittances, meant that 'in the short term, financial sanctions actually worked to Rhodesia's advantage . . . the ability of the Rhodesian authorities . . . to make adequate credit available, whether for the diversification of agriculture or for new manufacturing production, was of great importance in enabling the Rhodesian economy to withstand the effects of sanctions' (p. 37). When the Rhodesian economy went through a bad patch in 1968

there was no weakening of Ian Smith's negotiating position at the *Fearless* talks. Paradoxically, it was because sanctions in the 1960s had had so little effect on Rhodesia's links with the world economy that the country was as vulnerable as it was to the international economic collapse after the Yom Kippur war (pp. 47–9). 'Overall, despite some intensification of international sanctions enforcement, Rhodesia to the end experienced little difficulty in finding a market for most of its products' (p. 52). The moral seems to be that sophisticated countries can find ways of coping with sanctions, while unsophisticated ones can also hope to get by, either by intensifying repression or by fanning the flames of political mobilization in the face of outside pressure.

(3) As with Italy, so in the Rhodesian case, the wider political setting was crucial. South Africa felt able to stand by Rhodesia in the 1960s. The Portuguese followed suit. World-wide economic pressures thus largely lost their effect in the Southern African political setting—until that changed with the revolution in Lisbon, the growth of black terrorism, and the consequent agonizing reappraisal in Pretoria. After that 'it was the war, not sanctions, which was exerting the real pressure on the economy' (p. 52).

Mr Renwick does not, however, draw from his case studies the conclusion that economic sanctions are an expense of spirit in a waste of shame. His bleak picture of the ineffectiveness of sanctions in his two case studies is reinforced by his brief survey of some other modern instances—American sanctions against Japan in 1940–1, 'economic warfare' against Germany, American economic pressures on Britain and France over Suez, sanctions against Cuba and Iran ('the trade sanctions imposed against Iran appear to have had only a limited effect', p. 69). Nevertheless, he concludes that 'there are international circumstances in which sanctions may be a necessary action to take'. This is, he insists, because sanctions must be judged not only with respect to their effect on the behaviour of the target country: there are other values which may be applied to produce a more positive verdict.

Sanctions, Mr Renwick insists, can have significant economic effects—especially in the longer term (pp. 76–7, p. 89). But their real importance in international relations lies rather in their *demonstrative* and *punitive* effects. 'In a good many cases the demonstration of disapproval appears to have been the main purpose of applying sanctions' (p. 85); 'even where their interests are not directly threatened there will continue to be circumstances in which governments will feel it necessary to declare their position by something more than words alone' (p. 90). The idea of sanctions 'conceived in piety as a bloodless substitute for war' has turned out to be a fallacy. Perhaps it is not too cynical to conclude that it is precisely for this reason that the world is likely to see increasing resort to 'sanctions' in the future.

ROBERT JACKSON

Conflicts of national laws with international business activity: issues of extraterritoriality. By A. H. Hermann. London: British–North American Committee. 1982. 95pp. Pb.: £3·00. $6.00.

DR HERMANN, the legal correspondent of the *Financial Times*, has written this paper at the instigation of the British–North American Committee. The issues raised by the extraterritoriality of national legislation form the setting for the paper. The problem has been a fruitful cause of misunderstandings and of abrasive disagreements between states, not least among the common law countries, namely, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and the United States.

The method adopted by the writer has been to examine briefly what he calls 'conflicts of legislative jurisdiction' in certain specific areas, namely, state trading (pp. 19–29); trading with enemy legislation (pp. 31–5); trading in securities legislation (pp. 37–40); anti-bribery laws (pp. 41–3); and 'long-arm anti-trust laws (pp. 45–67).

Dr Hermann sets out, very lucidly, the ways in which the different types of extraterritorial legislation, particularly, but not exclusively, the US anti-trust legislation and judicial decisions, harm business, operate unfairly and cause international friction of some sharpness. The offending US legislation is comprised mainly in the Sherman Act, 1980, the Trade Commission Act, and the Clayton Acts of 1914.

After treating each of the species of legislation, the author offers his own conclusions on them. These conclusions are mainly critical, but he points out that the United States is far

from being the main offender. He then examines the various remedies that have been used and proposed, hitherto mainly on the national level by the state harmed.

Finally, he offers his own remedies. These, it must be stated, are not as convincing as his criticisms of those that have been tried and proposed to date. He sees the solution not in national 'blocking' legislation, such as the UK Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, recently invoked in response to the US embargo on supplies for the Soviet gas pipeline, but in the gradual working forward to some form of international agreement, negotiated in the first instance between the common law countries. Later, this agreement could be extended to the civil law countries, and so on to a general convention open to all interested states.

This convention would, in the writer's view, have to be monitored by some form of international tribunal to which states might have resort by reference to it of decided cases, or for opinions in hypothetical cases. This is an ambitious, not to mention optimistic, proposal. The climate of acute political disagreement from antitrust laws operating in another country is not conducive to the climate required for negotiating an international agreement between the states concerned until all of them find some benefit in most of it. Moreover, acceptance of international jurisdiction is not noticeable at the present time. If acceptances by states are required for the 'automatic jurisdiction' of any such tribunal, and reservations to such acceptances are permitted, then the famous US 'domestic' reservation to article 36 of the statute of the International Court of Justice may be a stumbling block: what is 'domestic' is defined in the US reservation as what the United States considers to be 'domestic'.

This is a valuable and percipient paper which will be of great use to businessmen, lawyers, economists and students of a number of disciplines. Much is contained in a narrow compass, with a cogency and an economy of language which is both refreshing and stimulating.

G. I. A. D. DRAPER

New theories of the multinational enterprise. Edited by Alan M. Rugman. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 303pp. Index. £14·95.

Multinational enterprise and economic analysis. By Richard E. Caves. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 346pp. Index. £20·00. $34.50. Pb.: £7·50. $9.95.

THESE are two useful books thrown up by the current wave of theoretical writing about the multinational company phenomenon. Both are firmly in the 'post-product cycle' school. Caves follows what he calls a 'transactional' approach. The Rugman volume concentrates quite heavily on the related 'internalization' thesis. Forget the jargon. These are both substantial contributions to the literature.

As its title suggests, the Rugman volume is trying to test various theories which have developed to replace the Vernon one based on the international product cycle. Most of the contributions concentrate on the internalization thesis, or John Dunning's more elaborate structure of the eclectic theory. Dunning himself joins with McQueen to test this theory on the international hotel industry, and other contributors look at relatively under-studied industrial activities and sectors such as the multinational food and fish industry (Rutenberg), foreign bank entry into Japan and California (Tschoegl) and the location of regional headquarters (Grosse).

This volume is not perfect. The 'new theories' of the title basically boil down to the internalization/eclectic approach. The few attempts to look at wider theories come over as pretty unsystematic. However, if this is not breaking much new theoretical ground, it is pushing the testing of these theories into new sectors, not often touched by theorists, who have concentrated primarily on the manufacturing or resource sectors. It is precisely through its interest in things like the service sector or office location that this volume gains its value.

Caves has written an essential contribution to the multinational literature. This is a masterly review of the literature concerned with the economics of these companies. The ideas about which he is writing are not always easy to grasp, but his clear style and laconic wit combine to make him a masterly expositor of the issues. The organization of the contents is much that one would expect. There are chapters on the microeconomics of the multinationals; the interplay of these companies with macroeconomic theories; organizational issues; income distribution and labour market effects; the impact on competition; investment behaviour; technological issues; taxation and economic welfare; public policy concerns; and the interaction of these companies with the Third World.

I learned a great deal from this book. First, the author really has done a thorough job of reviewing the literature. Apart from the fact that he clearly has little time for the dependency theorists, there are virtually no gaps in his analysis. Secondly, his chapter on the interaction of multinationals and the wider macroeconomic debate is the best and clearest I have yet seen on this issue. Thirdly, throughout the book, he is scrupulous in first identifying the theoretical issues before going on to look at the empirical evidence which bears on these.

These are both books aimed primarily at economists, rather than policy-makers or practising managers. However, this is not to say that the alert practitioner will not benefit from reading these books—particularly the one from Caves. To take but one issue, where the latter alerted me to a range of issues about which I had not previously thought: his chapter on taxation really rams home the point that differing tax rates between home and host economies significantly distort optimal investment flows. He also spells out with some clarity how different approaches to the problem of reconciling home and host tax demands (tax credits versus deductions) make a great deal of difference to multinationals' investment strategies. Since these are issues of great public policy importance, this kind of analysis shows that Caves has written an important book which can be read profitably by anyone concerned with the economic issues thrown up by the multinational phenomenon.

London Business School LOUIS TURNER

OPEC behaviour and world oil prices. By James Griffin and David J. Teece. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 231pp. Index. £15·00. Pb.: £5·95.

Policies for coping with oil-supply disruptions. Edited by George Horwich and Edward Mitchell. Washington, London; American Enterprise Institute. 1982. 188pp. Index. $15.95. Pb.: $7.95.

The impact of rising oil prices on the world economy. Edited by Lars Matthiessen. London: Macmillan. 1982. 211pp. £17·50.

THE first of these books is a collection of papers given at a conference held in 1981 entitled 'The future of OPEC and the long-run price of oil', and attempts to compare and contrast various views of OPEC's behaviour and thereby 'gain insights into the price path for oil over the next two decades'. The editors, Professors Griffin and Teece, begin the collection with an introduction which sets out concisely the historical origin and development of OPEC and the economic theory of pricing of non-renewable resources. Thus the book is made accessible to readers without a specialized background in economic theory. The question 'What is OPEC?' is then examined and four theories are put forward. The discussion continues with the view of OPEC as a cartel analysed by Professor Adelman; then an alternative view of its behaviour is given, based on the postulation of a moving target revenue perspective. The implications of constructing a behavioural model of OPEC are then analysed and various models are presented and discussed. The final contribution is a paper outlining a 'cooperative energy strategy for oil importers'. This illustrates the vulnerability of the consumer and sets out an agenda for cooperation for oil importing countries to counter the potential threat posed by OPEC. In conclusion the editors outline the common views held by the various contributors and comment that 'the price uncertainty experience in the 1970s will undoubtedly continue into the 1980s and beyond', but state that 'reductions in the real price of oil are as likely as further increases'. This book in no way answers what the long-run price of oil will be, but as is stated in the introduction, the 'analytical process by which one reaches such conclusions is as essential as the conclusion itself'. The authors have adequately illustrated the various analyses of OPEC's behaviour and indicated future possibilities, linking the varied papers well. Inevitably, as in all works of this kind, the current market situation can distort the analyses; thus the editors' forecast of Saudi Arabia's resistance to a production level below 7 million barrels per day (p. 211) has proved unfounded. However, the forecast of a substantial downward price movement, given the recent $5bbl cut in the IOEC marker price, seems shrewd prediction.

The second book, *Policies for coping with oil-supply disruptions,* is also a collection of papers, this time given at a conference in September 1980. The inevitable time lag in publishing such a work has, however, exacerbated the shortcomings of the conference approach far more than with the above-mentioned work. The major international political upheavals of the Iran–Iraq war, the conflict in the Lebanon and the imposition of martial law

in Poland are not covered in the analysis; as these occurrences have inevitably impacted on the current oil supply situation, especially with regard to the security of supply, the work is severely limited. Where it is of benefit, however, is in the analysis behind the setting up of the US Strategic Reserve. A US government report has recently stated that 'uncertainty about future oil supply disruptions isn't a valid reason to avoid advance planning for alternative Strategic Petroleum Reserve use'. Thus, although this could have been a useful analysis of current thinking as supply channels change along with long-term energy demand, so these plans must also change to take into account the new environment. The limited view of future developments expressed in this book has therefore made it of limited use and interest.

The final work under review is again an assortment of papers—on the impact of rising oil prices in the world economy. Once again the current market reversal has devalued the varied analyses. The first half of the book contains six papers which are generally devoted to empirical assessment of the impact in various respects of rising oil prices. Anne Carter uses the UN world model to analyse the effects of energy conservation. The next two papers are concerned with the American economy, the relationship between energy costs and industrial productivity, and the effects of US energy price decontrol. The macroeconomic effects of the 1979–80 oil price rise on four Nordic economies is then covered by Ian Lienert. This links with the paper by J. F. R. Fabritius and Christian Ettrup Petersen, which covers the effects of OPEC's re-spending and the oil price increase on the international economy. The final paper in the first section deals with the MARKAL Model used by the IEA.

The second half of the book contains six papers of a mainly theoretical nature, all however analysing aspects of the effect of rising oil prices. Therefore, although this work has many interesting, if very specialized, papers heavily weighted on the effects on the Nordic economy, it provides relatively little insight into the present energy environment and gives no pointers as to the future structure of the international oil industry.

The past decade has witnessed two momentous price increases which have given rise to much analysis and postulation on the future of OPEC and the international oil industry. However, it can readily be seen from current events with the reversal in OPEC's oil pricing policy that an analysis of past events, no matter how thorough or accurate, may not necessarily lead to accurate forecasting of future trends.

C. P. L. PARSONS

After the second oil crisis: energy policies in Europe, America and Japan. By Wilfred L. Kohl. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath/Gower. 1982. 297pp. £23·50.

THE organizing theme behind the fifteen contributions in this volume was the oil supply effects of the overthrow of the Shah of Iran. The book's title, and its emphasis on the term crisis, reflects the essentially developed-consumer-country orientation of the western literature. Fadhil Al-Chalabi's largely token producer (OPEC) contribution—token in the sense that the tension between its viewpoint and that of the consumers was not picked up and discussed by other contributors—saw the period, however, not as one of crisis but as continuing the longer term adjustment process in the energy market.

Nevertheless, within the consumer framework that it adopts the volume has much to offer. The quality of the contributions is generally high. In the eight chapters dealing with country energy policies, the approaches adopted are shaped by the different backgrounds of the authors—Schmitt's thoughtful analysis of German policies contains the common German plea for understanding that the extensive government interventions in the energy section in that country are really 'market oriented'—but taken together, these chapters provide a valuable coverage of individual country policies. Lucas' discussion of Britain's policies, for example, contains some new perspectives, including the heavy burden of unnecessary investment costs imposed on the coal industry in their legally required meeting of British industry's needs, arising from the substantial overestimate, by the using industries, of future requirements for coal; Helliwell discusses perceptively the ambiguity of self-sufficiency and self-reliance objectives illustrated in the Canadian policy context. Four other chapters deal with specific energy sectors—oil, coal, nuclear power, and alternative energy technologies. A further chapter, by Lauber, has a better than usual discussion of energy politics and its links with public participation.

In the present context, more attention to the international relations aspects of energy would have been welcomed. An interesting chapter by Basile on US energy policy points to the problems of determining what US policy objectives should be; even so, although noting the traditional State Department view (if not that of the Justice Department) that energy policy goals are foreign policy goals, Basile uses the US global role too casually to dispose of the widely held view that the United States is insensitive to the urgency of the energy concerns of çountries such as Japan, France and Germany. Similarly, unlike those on other countries, the chapter on Japan is written not by a national but by an American. Although Morse's analysis is a skilful one, the perception difference is large. Thus, to view the Japanese as seeing little value in cooperation among major oil consuming nations is a particularly US view of the complex Japanese reactions to both US oil multinationals and the confrontational American approach in the international energy field.

These are mainly quibbles, however, which do not detract significantly from the value of a useful collection of essays.

Australian National University STUART HARRIS

U.S. international monetary policy: markets, power, and ideas as sources of change. By John S. Odell. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1982. 387pp.

Government support for exports: a second-best alternative. By Penelope Hartland-Thunberg and Morris H. Crawford. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 104pp. Index. £13·00.

HERE are two books on what has influenced or may influence US economic foreign policy. John Odell sets out to place international monetary policy within the theoretical analysis of foreign policy generally, and to integrate the latter with national policy objectives. His methodology was to interview participants in policy-making in order to discover why particular policies were chosen in the 1960s and 1970s. Although much weight was given to market conditions and the international power structure at the time, even more important appears to have been the influence of ideas. Keynes's dictum that 'the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas' is amended only to the extent that this encroachment was not gradual but came in a rather lumpy and jerky manner (p. 368). By contrast, domestic policy pressures and administrative reorganization are shown to have played only a minor part in effecting policy changes.

Three major changes in US foreign monetary policy are examined. The first was the abandonment of a rigid gold–dollar exchange standard through the introduction of SDRs in the late 1960s, the second the suspension of convertibility and devaluation in 1971, and the third further devaluation and subsequent floating of the dollar in 1973. Market conditions alone are thought to provide an adequate explanation of the switch from defence of the currency to devaluation in 1971, but not of the other two policy changes. Nor do they explain the abrasiveness of the 1971 policy change. In the author's interpretation of events, market conditions are shaped by, rather than shape, power politics and policies. Security and power must be taken into account, though these too are considered insufficient by themselves. The relative decline in US economic power in the 1960s may help to explain the shift from a dollar-based to a SDR-based international currency system, but does not explain why the United States still preferred an internationally negotiated response to an unilateral one. The further erosion of US hegemony by the early 1970s may help to explain her unilateral posture at the time, but alternative courses of action would have been possible. The severity of the response can be regarded as out of line with the change in the power structure. After all, the United States had not become a mini-power. The author attributes the nature of the US response mainly to the changed circumstances of the 1960s and to the influence of Triffin's writings on the decision makers of the time. By the 1970s, Friedman's views on the desirability of a free market of the time. By the 1970s, Friedman's views on the desirability of a free market in foreign exchanges carried the day.

With Friedmanite money supply targets, there can be no exchange rate target. And when the exchange rate floats downwards, the economy is protected by monetary means. Depreciation then pulled the economy in the opposite direction to that intended by the tariff reductions which continued to be made. In consequence, arguments for protection through

subsidies, other fiscal means and even countervailing tariffs are no longer so much at variance with all aspects of US foreign economic policy as they were before 1971.

The second book under review falls into this line of thinking. Its argument for protection is presented as a kind of infant industry case and it admits that it is a second best. But the infant to be shielded turns out to be US hegemony in intensive R & D activities. Although we are in the authors' debt for their comparisons of R & D efforts and export finance in a number of countries, they miss the significance of intensive trade in R & D for international relations. They come close to it when they quote that 'the US R & D effort must be co-operative with other countries' (p. 39) but the point is not followed up. Intra-industry specialization, the increasing interdependence of industrial activities and the consequent cessation of hegemonial position are not considered. Instead, we are told that foreign technology is replication. It could not have got where it is without government subsidies to producers and exporters. The United States should counter with appropriate duties and subsidies of her own in order to ensure the predominance which would be hers in the absence of such foreign subsidies.

The authors will find few takers for their argument outside the United States; whether they will find many *in* the US is also open to doubt. For they reach their conclusions relating to R & D intensive activities by trying to force such problems into the Procrustean bed of a received theory which relates to inter-industry trade in products with given production functions. Since the purpose of R & D is to alter production functions, and trade in such products is increasingly intra-industry trade, the facts do not fit their unamended model. Inevitably, then, their argument is less convincing than Odell's. The latter derives his theory from the facts or amends received theory to fit those facts and so adds to our tools of analysis. But the other two authors seem to fit horseshoes on to motor cars.

University of Exeter F. V. MEYER

A poor harvest: the clash of policies and interests in the grain trade. By Richard Gilmore. Harlow, Essex: Longman. 303pp. Index. £18·00.

THIS is the most comprehensive survey of the international grain trade published for many years, and the only substantial book available on the grain traders, the six companies who dominate the world market, apart from Dan Morgan's entertaining but journalistic *Merchants of grain*. In its style and breadth of coverage it carries an echo of the books on the oil industry by Peter Odell and others published at the end of the 1960s before oil became a matter of daily headlines.

Mr Gilmore covers a good deal of ground—from the marketing and trading systems of the various grain exporting and importing countries, to the diplomatic and political influences on the grain trade. It is written from an American perspective, and a summary of the development of American farm policy from the 1930s onwards emphasizes the extent to which exports have become an essential factor in the maintenance of farm income sustaining the essentially expansionary nature of the agricultural policy of successive US administrations. Trade has been created, fostered and sustained by the grain companies—secretive, privately owned trading houses dealing worldwide in a commodity essential to human survival and to the improvement of diet and living standards central to the concerns and to the survival of so many governments.

The book as a whole is of greatest value in giving specialist and non-specialist alike a view of the way in which the grain companies operate and the extent to which the current trading system depends upon them. Its weakness lies in the attempt to combine the fruits of detailed research with a polemic against the companies and a prescription for reform, set out in a single final chapter. Regrettably this chapter detracts from the rest of the book by leaving the impression, which the detail of earlier chapters does not confirm or justify, that the problems of the international agricultural trading system lie in the companies and that control and reform of those companies could eradicate those problems.

Mr Gilmore's own evidence undermines that contention. The companies are powerful, and do indeed need to be regulated and controlled. The real problems, however, of instability of misallocated resources, and of underdeveloped agriculture in the Third World, are rooted in the policies of various governments—in Washington, in Europe and in the Third World itself. The companies undoubtedly operate within the pattern of existing national farm

policies to their own advantage. They are allowed to do so because they help to sustain those policies. Their secrecy, and, one presumes, their profitability, are small costs to pay for that support. Governments, including the US government, could certainly end the freedom of operation of the grain traders if they wished. Mr Gilmore, in arguing for reform of the imperfect international trading system we now have, fails to ask himself why they do not, and therefore to a large extent is left taking aim at the wrong target.

That criticism apart, however, this is a valuable book, and should help to encourage research and public debate in a seriously neglected area.

Chatham House NICK BUTLER

Economic analysis of agricultural projects. 2nd edn. By J. Price Gittinger. London, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 1982. 505pp. Index. £28·25. $48.75.

THIS book is likely to be read by two groups of people: those who regard it as an 'instruction manual' and those who would prefer to substitute a different set of instructions. With this substantial volume in his baggage the twentieth century agricultural improver is likely to descend on his appointed developing country ready to assess the financial and economic implications of his favoured project. As a result, it is hoped, the all too scarce resources available for development will be used to best effect.

The first test of any manual must be its clarity. This one scores in two vital matters. The writing is clear, the terminology carefully explained, the assumed degree of economic sophistication modest and the illustrative examples frequent; and the contents pages, the organization of chapters and the glossary-index make it easy for the user to find his way about the text. These qualities are especially valuable in a book which deals in detail, and therefore at some length, with many complex issues involved in project appraisal.

A second test must be whether the instructions offered adequately anticipate all the problems the user is likely to encounter. At this level the writer of the manual faces a severe problem in assessing the degree of economic sophistication he can reasonably assume among his readers and balancing instruction in basic theory with material about its application in the context. Gittinger's book does well on this scale, too, although the more knowledgeable reader may recognize, in some of the excellent but simple explanations of theoretical concepts, pitfalls which are not fully explored.

Many who criticize this book are likely to be unhappy about the way it treats the effects on income distribution of agricultural projects. The methods used here explore projects in terms of the return they are likely to generate for the economy as a whole. Subsequently judgements may be made about how competing projects affect the income of the poorest members of the country concerned. There is danger in this procedure. It is possible that a project which scored well on the methods used here would provide most of its benefits to a small group who were already wealthy, whilst not helping or even making worse the situation of many poor people. To implement such a project would, for many people, not be development in any worthwhile sense. To avoid this the impact of the proposed activity on income distribution needs to be incorporated in the process of appraisal from the outset. Gittinger recognizes this concern. He directs the reader to standard texts where it is expounded; however his own and the World Bank's approach continues to rely on retrospective subjective judgement to allow for the impact of projects on income distribution.

This is very much a 'professional's' book. It will, however, find a place on the reading lists of those who teach agricultural development and project appraisal in universities. For this purpose its breadth of illustrative material, derived from the large range of projects in which the World Bank has been involved, is itself an important asset. For the student it is clear from the outset that what is at stake is not just academic hair splitting but practical arguments relating to decisions which will affect the welfare and even the survival of many poor people. This concern will make a 'heavy' book, in both senses, attractive and effective in an educational role.

JOHN S. MARSH

University of Aberdeen

Measurement of agricultural protection. By John Strak. London: Macmillan for the Trade Policy Research Centre. (Commercial Policy Issues No. 6). 1982. 120pp. £15·00.

AT fifteen pence per page this is a disappointing book—a thesis essentially concerned with the technicalities of measuring agricultural protection which fails to relate its conclusions to the central issue of agricultural trade—the comparative levels of protection offered by different producers and their impact on the volume and direction of commodity flows.

Mr Strak's view, with a few qualifications, is that British agriculture taken as a whole has enjoyed a greater degree of protection since accession to the European Community a decade ago; but that the protection has been concentrated at the frontier, on barriers to imports and the encouragement of exports, rather than on measures to support production or enhance marketing. The fact that protection at the frontier keeps up prices of commodities which would otherwise face international competition means that producers of animal products, further down the food chain, pay higher prices for their inputs (animal feed) and establishes differential rates of protection between one product and another. Agricultural protection is not a homogenous phenomenon. In a complex production system, 'a subsidy given to one section may be a tax on others'.

The argument is empirically convincing but leaves too many questions unanswered. In trade terms the degree of protection is always a relative quantity (not least because world prices against which support is measured are themselves artificial products of the interplay of protection in various countries), and it is difficult to believe that one country can usefully be considered in isolation. Agricultural policy, though it is made at the national and not at the international level, is in large part a response to decisions taken elsewhere and the degree of protection commonly adopted. British policy is the result not just of Community decisions but also of the national response to the actions of competing producers in Europe and elsewhere. Rates of effective protection, the key concept in this study, have to be considered and calculated on such an international basis if one is to begin to understand the international distribution of output and its trade implications.

At the technical level Mr Strak has developed some useful tools for measuring agricultural protection and its consequences. Purely national studies, however, can make only inadequate use of such tools, and we must hope that the Trade Policy Research Centre will direct its attention in the future to international, and not simply national trade policy issues.

Chatham House NICK BUTLER

History

Italy and the approach of the First World War. By Richard Bosworth. London: Macmillan. 1983. 174pp. Index. £12·00. Pb.: £4·95.

'WHAT Italy is pursuing', wrote Sir Robert Vansittart in May 1930, 'is a policy of prestige in order to satisfy her self-importance as one of the great victorious Powers of Europe, and all her more or less incoherent strivings in foreign affairs are directed towards this goal'. Dr Bosworth has reached a very similar conclusion with regard to the foreign policy of Giolittian Italy. In this monograph, the latest addition to Macmillan's series *The making of the twentieth century*, Dr Bosworth conveniently summarizes and supplements his more detailed examination of Italy's pre-1915 diplomacy, *Italy, the least of the great powers* (Cambridge, 1979). He postulates that a liberal Italian state had been founded during the *Risorgimento* 'on the concept, the false concept, that Italy was a serious Great Power' (p. 34), and that this helps to explain the twists and turns of Italy's diplomacy in the following decades. Thus, he argues that the leaders of an Italy which was inferior to the other major powers in economic and military resources, and whose citizens and institutions were often held in contempt by other Europeans, sought to prove their country's worth through opportunism and the expansion of its political and cultural influence in the Mediterranean and east Africa. 'In the final analysis', Dr Bosworth claims, 'Italy entered the First World War quite deliberately because not to do so would have been to admit her pretensions to being a Great Power were false, and therefore, by implication, that her pretensions to liberalism, parliamentarism and a constitutional centralised monarchy were equally false' (p. 34).

Dr Bosworth supports his thesis with a careful consideration of Italy's relations with her neighbours, the origins of the Libyan war, and the domestic influences on her foreign policy.

Giolitti's Italy, he suggests, was a land of many paradoxes. Its parliamentarians enthused in Rome about their liberties, but acquiesced in the repression of workers and peasants in the provinces; its diplomatic service was progressively weakened and made more traditional by southernization; and its armed forces, unaware of the exact terms of the Triple Alliance, planned for military and naval collaboration with Germany and Austria-Hungary at the same time as they engaged in an arms race with the latter power, whose hold upon Trent and Trieste impeded the completion of the work of the *Risorgimento*. Nevertheless, Dr Bosworth rejects any notion of Italy's statesmen seeking to escape from domestic discord through an assertive foreign policy, or of their actions being determined by a military-industrial complex. Foreign policy was a matter for the king and his closest advisers. It was San Giuliano who was largely responsible for Italy's neutrality in August 1914, and Salandra and Sonnino who chose the moment, perhaps the wrong moment, for Italy's entry into the war in 1915.

This is a concise, informative, and lively account of Italy's role in international relations in the years immediately preceding the First World War, and should be of particular value to students of twentieth-century international history.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth K. A. HAMILTON

French war aims against Germany 1914–1919. By D. Stevenson. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1982. 283pp. £19·50.

THIS is an important book for historians of France and contemporary Europe in that it provides for the first time a succinct yet comprehensive examination of the 1919 peace settlement in the context of a long French debate about hopes and fears generated by the fluctuating fortunes of the First World War. The book is of interest on three levels. First and foremost is the evolution of ideas and policies in successive French governments as to the most preferable outcome of the war. The author's investigations lead him to conclude that it was 'on a restricted circle of no more than thirty politicians and officials that the burden of decision rested' (p. 11), and it only surfaced occasionally to public view in the shape of a specific claim to Alsace-Lorraine decorated with allusions to other territorial, economic and colonial aims codified in terms such as essential 'guarantees' and 'indemnities' (p. 17). The complex and largely secret discussions that produced these aims between 1914 and 1918 make up two-thirds of the book.

The second level of interest is the relationship between the peace negotiations in 1919 and French conceptions of acceptable peace terms during the war. Studies of 1919 hitherto have focussed on Clemenceau as a new leader using personal diplomacy to adapt to unexpected requirements arising from the sudden end to the war in November 1918. While allowing for these important influences on the peace settlement this book reduces the emphasis on personality and conjuncture by relating Clemenceau's problems and aims to the terms of reference adopted by his predecessors. The period from the Armistice to the peace treaties occupies the last third of the book.

The third level of interest is the transformation of the French international position in 1917 due to the exit of Russia from, and the entry of America into, the war. All subsequent problems for France arose from the difficulty of adjusting to the unexpected shift from a tradition of eastern continental allies to membership of an Atlantic alliance. Dr Stevenson rightly describes this period as 'the watershed' of the war; his discussion of the efforts for a negotiated peace in 1917 concludes with the view that there was 'no middle way' between negotiating a bad peace due to a disadvantageous military position and pressing on to a victory determined ultimately by allied efforts and a peace involving considerable dependence (p. 93). One might go further and relate the predicament of 1917 to the frustration of all subsequent French attempts to seek independence through a new bridge to eastern Europe such as in 1934, 1944 and 1966.

The book is effective in taking into account the research of other historians into French aims in the Rhineland and the colonies. Dr Stevenson's clear analysis of evidence and brief suggestion of broad issues make this a useful book, particularly the appendices on frontier controversies, though one would have appreciated an introductory discussion of the various motivations for discussion and definition of war aims, particularly as a means to influence colleagues, allies and public opinion.

University of Reading NEVILLE WAITES

The twilight of Comintern, 1930–1935. By E. H. Carr. London: Macmillan. 1982. 461pp. Index. £25·00.

THE master craftsman is dead. This, *The twilight of Comintern*, is, however, only his penultimate work; a further volume—on the Comintern and the Spanish Civil War—was in the last stages of completion when E. H. Carr finally died, at the age of ninety, obsessively absorbed in the writing of Soviet history to the last.

'The twilight of Comintern' was, in fact, the title Carr gave to an article in *The Fortnightly* in February 1938, and a re-reading of that elegant piece testifies to the extraordinary continuity and consistency in Carr's thinking over nearly half a century of writing. When asked, during the course of composing *The twilight*, whether he had changed his mind about any of the issues (particularly Germany 1930–3) as a result of his researches, he wryly replied: 'You should know better than to ask *me* that!' Yet it is extremely difficult for any Soviet specialist—to outsiders it might appear easy—to take the evidence he offers in his scrupulously annotated footnotes and to interpret it in any way other than Carr presents it. A prime example is his treatment of the rise of Nazism in Germany and the role of the KPD and Comintern in this fascinating but alarming process: here he relentlessly presses home the argument that almost no one took Hitler seriously at the time and that Moscow behaved no differently in this respect. 'It was only in retrospect that Hitler's appointment as chancellor on January 30th, 1933, was seen as the decisive date in his ascent to power', Carr writes (p. 83), evidently drawing on his own memories of his period at the Foreign Office as well as the documentation in his hands at the time of writing.

Finding the diplomatic maze too familiar to be worth greater attention, Carr has deliberately focussed on the less known and more intricate complexities of Comintern politics. As a result he sometimes fails to look hard enough at the diplomatic scene and while clearly revealing the disagreements over strategy and tactics in the Comintern, glosses over similar rifts within the Soviet state apparatus on diplomatic matters; the claim in the preface that the volume 'involves a study of the interaction between Comintern and the Soviet Foreign Office' is thus oddly overstated. Yet Carr's description and analysis of the Comintern at work make rewarding reading. He ranges from Western Europe to the Far East, showing an unequalled confidence in dealing with both, matched by total mastery of the material, an enviable historical imagination and his usual lucid prose.

Some reviewers have chided Carr for spending his time on such an obscure subject. But surely all those concerned about the development of Fascism in Germany and Europe's reaction to it, all those absorbed in the origins of the Second World War, which cannot be studied purely in terms of diplomatic machinations, will, for some considerable time to come, have to turn to Carr's penultimate volume for further enlightenment.

University of Birmingham JONATHAN HASLAM

Great Power rivalry at the Turkish Straits: the Montreux Conference and Convention of 1936. By Anthony Deluca. Boulder, Col.: East European Quarterly. (Distrib. by Columbia University Press, NY.) 1981. 261pp. Index. $20.80.

THE decline of the Ottoman Empire in the nineteenth and early twentieth century made the control of the Turkish Straits one of the most sensitive issues in international politics. Although much has been written about the 'Straits Question' in its classical phase, there is no recent study of its final chapter, the Montreux Convention of July 1936. This monograph is the first full study of the subject. The analysis is firmly anchored in an impressive documentation drawn from American, British, French, German, Soviet and League of Nations material. Of the major international treaties of the 1930s only the Montreux Convention remains in force today. Annually, two United States destroyers enter the Black Sea in accordance with the rights of passage guaranteed under the Convention. The 1936 treaty restored Turkey as the guardian of the Straits, abolishing the demilitarized zones and the International Commission set up under the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. Montreux, in restoring Turkey's sovereign rights, gave her considerable freedom in the interpretation of the rules of passage for foreign warships. The treaty was the first major attempt since Versailles to implement treaty revision through peaceful procedures. However, it was no more than an attempt. The author clearly rejects the view that Montreux represented a victory for the League and collective security. He writes: 'instead of sanctifying the agreements for mutual

and regional assistance, the Convention . . . so conditioned their application as to strip them of much of their value . . . as to the real crux of the revisionist position in inter-war Europe, Montreux contributed very little because it failed to address the problem of territorial readjustment' (p. 134). In a final chapter the author assesses Turkey's interpretation of the rules of passage during the Second World War and the failure of the great powers at the end of the conflict to reach any agreement on a fundamental revision of the Convention. In 1946 Turkey, backed by Britain and the United States, blocked Soviet ambitions to acquire a say in the control of the Straits. With Turkey's adhesion to NATO in 1952 the Straits Question lost much of its traditional importance.

University of Loughborough ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

Lord Swinton. By J. A. Cross. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1982. 338pp. Index.

LORD SWINTON enjoyed an extremely long and varied ministerial career and around 1930 was regarded as a potential Prime Minister, yet today, a decade after his death, his appointments and achievements are remembered only by a few historians and Conservative Party faithfuls. He first entered the Cabinet under Bonar Law in 1922 at the age of thirty-eight and for the next sixteen years he was almost continually in high office in Conservative and National governments. After a brief retirement he returned to hold useful second-rank appointments in the Second World War, including that of Resident Minister in West Africa, and ended his ministerial career as Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations from 1952 to 1955.

Perhaps Swinton simply had too many names to be memorable. He began as Philip Lloyd-Greame, changed his name to Cunliffe-Lister in 1924 and (unwisely in terms of his political career) accepted a peerage in 1935. Also, although an able, energetic administrator, he seems to have lacked any original ideas or unusual personal traits that would have enhanced his appeal to party leaders, cartoonists and biographers. According to Professor Cross, Swinton's two volumes of recollections are both unrevealing and inaccurate.

By making a thorough use of hitherto little-used private papers, supplemented by interviews with Swinton's former colleagues, Professor Cross has produced a worthwhile biography. Whether anyone could have written a scintillating study of Swinton is doubtful, but Professor Cross has not helped his cause by concentrating rather narrowly on administrative history with a minimum of biographical material.

Professor Cross rightly devotes two chapters (out of a total of seven) to what proved to be the peak of Swinton's political career, namely his period as Secretary of State for Air between June 1935 and May 1938. As students of British defence policy will already be aware, Swinton made an outstanding contribution to air rearmament at a vital time. He played an important part in the establishment of shadow factories and encouraged the rapid development of radar, championing Tizard against Lindemann in the process. An abrasive and sometimes tactless overlord, Swinton clashed with men of similar temperament like Lord Nuffield, but nevertheless got his way on most—if not all—issues. More seriously, in his single-minded drive to expand the RAF, Swinton alienated the Treasury, the Labour Party and some of the aircraft manufacturers. Inadequately defended by his deputy in the House of Commons against largely undeserved criticisms, he became a political liability and was duly sacked by Neville Chamberlain. Professor Cross does well to show in detail that, though understandable, this was an unfortunate end to a highly successful tenure of office. Civil servants and senior airmen were aware of his achievements at the time, though only his collaborator, Lord Weir, resigned in sympathy. But the most memorable tribute was paid by Sir Maurice Dean, the doyen of Air Ministry civil servants, who concluded that 'Swinton's name towers above those of all other Ministers who have served the RAF'.

King's College, London BRIAN BOND

The putsch that failed: Munich 1923—Hitler's rehearsal for power. By J. Dornberg. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1982. 385pp. Index. £10·95.

AGAINST a background of soaring inflation with the official exchange rate reported to be DM630 billion to one US dollar, when a loaf of bread cost DM32 billion and a litre of beer DM42 billion, Adolf Hitler, in November 1923, attempted his 'beer-hall putsch' in Munich.

Hitler hoped that his Nazi party would take over the government of Bavaria, topple the Weimar republic, and found the new Reich. The *New York Times* described the failed *coup d'état* as 'Bavarian Opera Bouffe' and misspelled Hitler's name (p. 338). But, Dornberg argues, this setback, if anything, increased Hitler's confidence that he was destined to be the Führer of Germany: 'facing the facts of his tactical and strategic errors by no means implied that he had abandoned his quest for power or tempered his messianic, pseudo-Napoleonic sense of mission' (pp. 331–2). Eight-and-a-half months' reflection in the Landsberg prison, while starting to write *Mein Kampf*, apparently led Hitler to the conclusion that it would be more effective to subvert and undermine the state by using the freedoms of speech, election, and parliamentary procedure instead of attempting to overthrow it by force.

Dornberg attempts to recreate those few days in November 1923 from the perspective of the various participants. His principal aim seems to be to tell a vivid and exciting story in the social context of the time: Thomas Mann was reading the proofs of *The Magic Mountain; Fidelio* was on at the National Theatre. Attention is paid to the personal quirks and preferences of the participants: the discomfort of Hitler, a non-smoker, is imagined in a room filled with cigar and cigarette fumes; Göring's concern to keep his wife informed is recounted. The emphasis is on trying to give a blow-by-blow account of what happened. Where the evidence is markedly contradictory, as to the varying claims over who fired the first shot, the police or the marchers, various eye witness accounts are given.

The story is constructed from the records of the trials of the conspirators, police depositions, newspaper reports and contemporary accounts. Dornberg's work has the virtue of being both carefully researched and vividly written. Perhaps, however, it is a pity that he did not attempt a fuller analysis of the overall significance of the putsch.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth RITCHIE OVENDALE

The Goebbels diaries 1939–1941. Translated and edited by Fred Taylor. London: Hamish Hamilton. 1982. 490pp. £9·95.

IN the normal course of events the publication of yet another part of the extensive Goebbels diaries would be an event to be welcomed. Although Goebbels' own position in the Nazi hierarchy and its decision-making processes was often a shadowy and uncertain one, nevertheless the Reich Minister of Propaganda occupied an important public office which he used constantly to project his own inimitable version of Nazi Germany, Adolf Hitler, and Josef Goebbels.

It must be said, however, that even Goebbels deserved better than this present publication. An indication that things are not quite right with this particular edition is given by the fact that no acknowledgement is made to a published German edition of the diaries. Indeed, such an acknowledgement is impossible since there is no published German edition of these parts of the diary. Of greater concern, however, is the fact that neither is there an acknowledgement to a German source for the manuscript. Both Hugh Trevor-Roper (*The Spectator*, 20 November 1982) and more especially Fräulein Elke Fröhlich (*Süddeutsche Zeitung*, 4 March 1983) have dealt with the background history of this English version in such a way as to raise serious questions that cannot be pursued here.

What can and must be pursued, however, is a judgement on what has appeared. Since only half the diaries for 1939–1941 have been published here (according to Fräulein Fröhlich) that immediately reduces the value of this publication. That value will diminish to zero when Fräulein Fröhlich and the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* in Munich eventually publish the full version, which one can expect to be totally and professionally edited. That cannot be said for this present offering which has clearly been rushed into print without any real consideration for historical or editorial standards. It is hard to imagine even the general reader, let alone the historian, enjoying or benefiting from Goebbels' comments when each time the only way to identify individuals mentioned in the text is laboriously to turn to the index at the back of the book instead of having the information in footnotes. But even this departure from normal editing practice and standards is surpassed in sheer awfulness by the fact that in the first thirty-two pages alone the following names and references have been omitted from the index: Fanderl—not, as printed, Fandere (p. 4, 22); Pleyer (p. 6); Hentschke (p. 6); Greven (p. 10, 12); Leichtenstern—not Leichternstern (pp. 12, 26); Fink (p. 15); Dürr (p. 15); Cracow (p. 15); Machiavelli (p. 15, 36); Mündel (p. 16); Vilna (p. 18); Söderbaum, Dam-

mann, van Dongen (p. 18); Lithuania (p. 18); Finland (p. 19); Reichsbahn (p. 20); Duprel—not Du Pre (p. 26); Schmidt (p. 31); Kuntz (p. 32), and so on. And since the list of omissions is by no means complete for the volume as a whole one can only stand appalled. There has been no attempt to identify in the text or index the less well-known names which have been included. The name of the German military commander in Norway was Falkenhorst, not 'Falckenhorst'. The omission of any reference to Jews in the index in anything dealing with the rabidly antisemitic Goebbels is nothing short of ludicrous.

Beyond these observations, however, is an even more critical point: of what possible use can such political diaries be to any reader, certainly for the general reader if not for some historians, if explanations (however brief) are not given of particular developments or events referred to in the diaries? Any more examples from this rather shabby production would mean the reviewer doing the job of the editor. All in all, then, an appalling publication whose demise at the hands of the future publication from the *Institut für Zeitgeschichte* is only to be welcomed.

JOHN P. FOX

Exile politics during the Second World War: the German Social Democrats in Britain. By Anthony Glees. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1982. 263pp. Index. £17·50.

'WE are not represented by any exile government . . . fighting for national liberation from foreign invaders. Rather we are the representatives of the German people whom Hitler has forced to fight with Britain'. This was the way that Hans Vogel, chairman of the *Parteivorstand*, described the dilemma of the small group of SPD exiles in London. They existed on the political equivalent of a life-support machine. While the British distinguished between 'Nazis' and 'Germans', the Labour Party and the Foreign Office found a minor use for them. When, from 1941–2, the dichotomy was deemed to lose any political value, the British turned down the dials almost to zero.

The SPD just survived what Vogel called the 'emptiness of exile'. It was not a 'normal' political party. 'We in exile do not replace the party back home', Erich Ollenhauer wrote, 'we simply represent its ideas and act as its trustees'. They kept the faith, passed resolutions and prepared programmes, which nobody else read or discussed. But they were on record, to be judged by a later audience, the voters of post-Hitler Germany. They no longer knew what the Germans in the Reich thought, and they could not claim to speak for a silent but democratic majority. They could only assert that the views of the SPD were those that the German people *ought* to hold. After the war, the surviving leaders returned to Germany to test this assumption and take up many key positions under Kurt Schumacher. They had achieved their 'highest aim', Ollenhauer said, 'namely, to make ourselves superfluous'.

Dr Glees's book is a detailed chronicle and generally careful analysis of these events. His study of the SPD's internal developments and its relations with British political bodies and the KPD emigrés in London is an important contribution to our knowledge. It is, with one caveat, excellently researched and clearly presented. Dr Glees also dabbles spasmodically in the fruitless process of 'iffing'. Such unhistorical monuments to conjecture are usually but irritants. However there is one example with which I feel it is necessary to take issue, at the risk of being misunderstood as a latter-day Vansittart, Foreign Office apologist or Stalinist—if not all three.

If the Foreign Office had supported the SPD's 'article of faith' of anti-communism, Dr Glees argues, then 'half Germany might have been spared communist dictatorship'. The Foreign Office did not pursue this presumably 'correct' policy for three apparent reasons: ignorance of the SPD's postwar significance; an unwillingness to alienate the USSR; and the 'treachery' of a number of its officials who were Soviet agents.

The possible 'outcome' of the 'correct' policy is historically unprovable. The first reason for pursuing an 'incorrect' policy rests largely on hindsight. The second seems indisputable and fully justified. Like their chief allies, the British abandoned the dichotomy of 'good Germans' and 'bad Nazis' in favour of the total military defeat of Germany. I have yet to be convinced that there was any other way of attaining the laudable objective of extirpating the Nazi regime. The SPD could offer nothing to assist this policy. The Foreign Office fully understood that its consequence would be to extend Soviet power into the centre of Europe.

There was nothing treasonable about it. The 'evidence' which Dr Glees offers to substantiate his third reason is no evidence at all.

University of Dundee TONY SHARP

Poland's place in Europe: General Sikorski and the origins of the Oder–Neisse Line 1939–1943. By Sarah Meiklejohn Terry. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. 394pp. Index. £23·00. Pb.: £11·20.

THERE are those of us, like this reviewer, who have been acquainted at first hand with Polish affairs since the Polish troops were required to leave the Soviet Union and come to Palestine during the Second World War and who have wondered whether in fact the revelation of the Katyn murders and the death of General Sikorski in July 1943 were material to the decline in the relations of the Polish government-in-exile with the USSR. This is in no doubt in the view of this author: 'Sikorski's policy lay in ruins well before the first German announcement of their grisly discovery [the Katyn graves] . . . from the perspective of the general's futile two-year search for a solution to the problem of Poland's place in Europe, it is hard to view these two events as much more than an anticlimax, marking the end of an era, but not themselves the cause of that end' (p. 334). Certainly the general had a hard struggle within the government-in-exile. Raczkiewicz, Sosnkowski and Zaleski were not well disposed to an accommodation with the USSR. There were even Poles who thought in terms of Poland becoming a great power from the Baltic to the Black Sea. The Czech government-in-exile, while theoretically in favour of a confederation with Poland, was from the outset clearly not prepared to antagonize the Soviet Union, because after the experience of 1938 it was intent upon basing its country's course upon Soviet support. The British government would not guarantee the Polish frontiers of 1939, an essential requirement of Polish leaders in exile, for fear of annoying the USSR in the course of a desperate struggle with Germany. The USA, adhering to the principles of the Atlantic Charter, might make sympathetic statements, but deferred positive decisions. Stalin merely bided his time, standing firm on the frontiers of 1941. Sikorski was without substantial political support either at home or abroad and therefore had to act with extreme caution.

One criticism of the author's work may be that its subtitle is misleading. She is concerned with far more than the Oder–Neisse line. She deals also with Poland's eastern frontier with the Soviet Union, which was an integral aspect of the problem. This work is therefore of far wider significance than its title might suggest. The author writes in her bibliographical note that she could not gain access to the papers of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but she has seen documents in the British Public Record Office. Her work makes use of a wide variety of sources and is very useful for those who do not read Polish. Dr Terry's work will serve to provide diplomatic historians with much useful information and offer an insight into an unhappy episode in modern European history.

R. F. LESLIE

The civilian population and the Warsaw uprising of 1944. By Joanna M. K. Hanson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1982. 345pp. Index.

THOSE of us who saw Warsaw immediately after the Second World War were shocked by the extent of destruction. Warsaw had suffered severely in 1939. The area of the Ghetto was a scene of desolation after the uprising of April 1943. The uprising of 1 August 1944 extended this devastation to the Old City and other parts of the capital. The merit of this book is that it accurately portrays the misery imposed upon its inhabitants by the Nazi occupation. Wages were kept static in spite of rises in prices. The ration allowances for Poles provided for only 20–25 per cent of the calorific value needed to sustain life with a consequent rise of a black market. Street round-ups of men and women and their transportation to concentration or labour camps added to the perils of everyday life. Today memorials have been placed on the sites of street executions.

Nazi repression, however, did not break the Polish spirit, but rather served to create a greater sense of unity among Poles. The author deals adequately with the general political background at home and abroad and the organization of the underground movement on the eve of the uprising in 1944. The general plan had not originally been for an insurrection in

the capital, but it was at length decided to stage it there in order to forestall the assumption of power by the Communist Polish Committee of National Liberation. The author's view is that 'the uprising broke out in a city which was totally unprepared psychologically and materially for the type of fighting which took place' (p. 67). Nevertheless, General Bór-Komorowski could report an enthusiastic response to the call for a rising on 1 August. Unfortunately the insurgents were unable to seize bridgeheads over the Vistula and the major centres of communication. The general expectation among Poles was that the rising would be of short duration, but as it went on 'out of the euphoria and chaos of the first days the civilian population developed an organized way of life . . . it was they who by their actions enabled the Uprising to continue' (p. 83). The immediate Nazi response was an attempt to destroy the entire population, men, women and children, and to raze the city to the ground; however, the German commander, General von dem Bach-Zalewski, modified his orders to permit the evacuation of civilians, though men, even non-combatants, continued to be shot at random. The author suggests that there was an increase in support for the Polish communists as a result of dissatisfaction with the authorities of the Home Army (AK) (p. 171), but this is a factor difficult to assess. There can be no doubt about the price paid by the Poles. Nearly 250,000 people died. Whether or not the Soviet army could have relieved the city is open to question. Certainly it was experiencing grave difficulties at the beginning of August 1944 and the uprising had not been coordinated with the Soviet commanders, but failure to assist it left behind the impression that Soviet policy for political reasons was to allow the insurrection to peter out.

Dr Hanson's book is extremely useful and should be read in conjunction with J. M. Ciechanowski's *The Warsaw Rising of 1944*, which deals with the political background. The episode is one of the ugliest in the Second World War and the price paid was high.

R. F. Leslie

Conscience, government and war: conscientious objection in Great Britain 1939–45. By Rachel Barker. London, Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1982. 174pp. Index. Pb.: £6·95.

The most fascinating book about conscientious objectors in the Second World War is *The objectors* (edited by Clifford Simmons, Isle of Man, 1965) in which several articulate and interesting conchies recount their ideas and experiences. The most detailed and comprehensive history of the subject has long been Denis Hayes's *Challenge of conscience* (London, 1949), based largely on the records of the Central Board of Conscientious Objectors. Rachel Barker's new book, deriving from a Cambridge dissertation, aims to provide a more objective and dispassionate study, drawing upon official papers which have been released only recently. The question which most interests her is whether the government learnt the lessons of 1914–18 and enacted conscription in the Second World War in such a way as to avoid the notorious abuses and injustices suffered in the First. Her answer is well-documented but not very surprising. The involvement of the military authorities in handling the cases of COs in the First World War had been a primary ground for complaint and in the Second War this was avoided by the appointment of wholly civilian tribunals. The cat-and-mouse scandal of imprisonment, release, re-conscription and re-imprisonment of the earlier war was prohibited in the later. Public opinion hardened against the objectors in 1940, but government held firm to the prewar humanitarian sentiment in their favour. The tribunals were accorded much discretion and some were plainly unfair to at least some of the applicants. But, Rachel Barker argues, the sparsity of complaints by the CO organizations, and the fact that these were focussed on a few tribunals and individuals, indicates that the system worked in the fair way that was intended.

Any book about conchies is likely to contain some diverting tales. My favourite here concerns the captured German officer's explanation of why his first military encounter with an Englishman persuaded him that we are mad. He spotted a paratrooper and fired at him twice. The shots missed and the Englishman dodged behind a tree. Instead of firing back, he called out in German, 'Tell me Herr Officer, have you any blankets I can borrow? . . . Our blankets dropped in the marsh and we've got some wounded men—a couple of Germans among them—in a cottage up the road and I'm looking for something to keep them warm. Can you help me?' He was one of the conchy medical orderlies whose exploits gave the lie to accusations that the objectors were really cowards. Ms Barker does not tell us whether he got the blankets.

Philosophically, the book is disappointing. She does not address the question of whether there is a right as distinct from a privilege of conscientious objection, and her definition of a CO is such as to exclude Franz Jägerstätter, the brave pastor executed for refusing to serve under Hitler and the subject of a deeply interesting film, *The refusal*, by Axel Corti. But if her book is a bit too narrowly historical for some tastes, the stories of the objectors are ample compensation.

King's College, London BARRIE PASKINS

Pre-invasion bombing strategy: General Eisenhower's decision of March 25, 1944. By W. W. Rostow. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 166pp. Index. £9·50. Pb.: £4·95.

The division of Europe after World War II: 1946. By W. W. Rostow. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 212pp. Index. £10·50. Pb.: £5·95.

THESE are the first two books in a series of monographs under the general title of 'Ideas and action', in which Rostow seeks to explore the relationship between 'abstract concepts in the minds of public officials and advisers' and a number of crucial decisions. The author draws on his own experience and observation of such decision-making to do so. The two issues are of a widely different kind. The first is a military decision made by a commander enjoying theoretically absolute powers, on the basis of the best expert advice available to him. In this case discussion resulted in what was apparently a firm decision between two clear-cut alternatives: to attack German marshalling-yards and railway centres, or to concentrate on German oil-production with the indirect purpose of forcing large-scale fighter combat and the weakening of German fighter strength. The question was which of these two policies would most assist the initial success and build-up of 'Overlord'. It was, then, essentially a short-term decision.

The second is a diplomatic decision of a more far-reaching kind: whether the US State Department in 1946 should have confronted President Truman with a clear-cut choice between a policy designed to arrest the rapidly developing division of Europe into two hostile camps; and what might have happened if this had been done. The decision of Secretary Byrnes in this second case, unlike that of General Eisenhower in the first case, was a negative one. Eisenhower made the choice between the two alternatives put before him. Byrnes refused to make a clear choice.

What Professor Rostow's research appears to show is that even in such a case as the first, major decisions are rarely made simply on the basis of the best available evidence. The personalities and personal weight of those advising the decision-maker will always be as important—sometimes more important—than the objective facts. Eisenhower's advisers included four of the best Allied brains on the Air War: Portal, Tedder, Spaatz and Harris. Of these, Tedder seems to have drawn the wrong conclusions from his Mediterranean experience and consequently to have had overmuch faith in the effects of attacking railway *centres* (as opposed to bridges and other vital communication points); Spaatz thought it his job simply to present the case for the 'oil plan' versus the 'transport plan'; and Harris wanted to continue his strategic bombing policy against German cities and objected to his strategic bombers being used in support of a specific military operation. There were in fact three main alternatives, viz.: (1) transport, tactical, i.e. attacks on bridges and dumps; (2) transport, strategic, i.e. attacks on railway centres and marshalling yards; and (3) oil targets and fighter attrition. (No one seriously thought that area attacks on cities could make a sizeable short-run contribution to 'Overlord'.) The right decision may well have been a combination of all three, with the emphasis on (1) and (3). In fact Eisenhower was not faced with these three clear alternatives, and opted for the second choice, which was probably the wrong one.

However, Professor Rostow also shows, in this example, that few such decisions are conclusive and final. As time went on, fresh evidence of the value of alternative targets produced a steady adulteration of the original decision. So that in the end, that is, just before and after D-Day, something approximating to the right policy was probably being put into operation.

The second volume in the series is perhaps less satisfactory as a case study, since it ranges widely over the background to US foreign policy between 1945 and 1948 rather than

focussing on the specific manner and rationale of Byrnes' decision-making in April 1946. Nonetheless this is the more interesting and thought-provoking of the two, since it deals with a far larger and more fundamental long-range issue. The question Rostow poses is this: if the State Department had formulated a comprehensive programme for all-European security and economic recovery in the spring of 1946, designed to reverse the growing division of Europe into two blocs, would such a plan (a) have been accepted by Truman; (b) won the support of the American people; and (c) substantially altered the course of Soviet policy in Eastern Europe and Germany? Essential ingredients in such a plan, Rostow argues, would have been (1) immediate focussing on the central problem of Germany rather than a piecemeal approach to the problems of Eastern Europe, where the United States was on much weaker ground; (2) an American offer of generous economic aid to Europe and the Soviet Union; and (3) a clear indication that a substantial US presence in Europe would be indefinitely maintained. Rostow believes that if a policy based on the Acheson-Clayton proposals had been put to Truman he would have accepted them and won public support for them.

The answer to the third question must be, as Rostow concedes, even more speculative. But though he concedes that 'Stalin might still have opted for a split' (p. 84), Rostow points out that the situation in Germany and Eastern Europe was more fluid in 1946 than in 1947–8, and the USSR less 'locked in' to specific policies at that time. It is not impossible, though quite unprovable, that Stalin might have chosen a different road if he had been more certain of US intentions at an early stage. Finally, Rostow points to the crucial importance of the year 1946 (as opposed to 1947) in the development of the cold war; and associates himself with the growing number of scholars who have come, over the past decade or so, to regard both the 'traditionalist' and 'revisionist' interpretations of the cold war as over-simplified and misleading; and to believe that 'the confrontation resulted less from any conscious design on either side than from incremental increases in tension caused by miscalculation and misunderstanding' (p. 197).

University of Reading KEITH SAINSBURY

Palestine and the Great Powers 1945–1948. By Michael J. Cohen. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1982. 417pp. Index. £26·00.

IN this work Cohen continues the story he started in *Palestine: retreat from the mandate. The making of British policy, 1936–45* (London, 1978). He argues that at the end of the Second World War Britain was concerned with its 'wider' interests, rather than 'any sense of obligation to either community in Palestine itself'. According to Cohen, Palestine was not vital for Britain, and its principal impact was on Anglo-American relations (pp. 16–7) at a time when Ernest Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, appreciated the 'need to cooperate with the Americans against the Soviets' threats to the Middle East' (p. 37). This was difficult as American policy was in the hands of President Truman, who was 'hypersensitive to the anticipated effect on the many Jewish voters of his policy regarding the Jewish refugees' (p. 45). Indeed, Cohen could possibly have examined this aspect more fully, against the background of antisemitism in the United States, and the almost unbreakable alliance that emerged between the Roman Catholics concerned that Jewish refugees could use up immigration quotas available to Roman Catholics, white Anglo-Saxon Protestants, and American Zionists who wanted, in the words of James F. Byrnes, 'a country to call their own'. But then Cohen has not used the Wagner papers. His explanation of Truman's recognition of the state of Israel—one offered by the President himself—that it was motivated primarily by a desire 'to forestall the Soviets' (p. 395) seems inadequate in the light of both published documentation and archival material in the Marshall Library, not consulted by Cohen, which suggests Truman's obsessions with his electoral prospects. Before the 'callous murder' of the two British sergeants by Menachim Begin's Irgun in the middle of 1947 Bevin said that he had felt that the situation in Palestine could be held. Cohen's account of this incident (pp. 242–50) perhaps lacks an important dimension. The American consul in Jerusalem commented: 'During the time of the Nazis it was a commonplace to hear the opinion that Hitler and his followers were deluded to the point where their sanity was questionable. If such generalizations are permissible, it may be well to question whether the Zionists, in their present emotional state, can be dealt with as rational human beings.' Indeed

Cohen's treatment of British policy is not always convincing. For instance he appears to attribute Bevin's disillusionment with negotiations early in 1947 to the Arabs not giving 'an inch' (p. 392); possibly Ben Gurion's insistence on 1,200,000 Jewish immigrants was more significant.

This is only a partial account of the end of the Palestine mandate. The book appears to be based on the premise that the 'Jews had a historical and moral claim to a state of their own in a part of Palestine' (p. 389). Perhaps it is a pity that in the writing this piece there is so much documentation, particularly American—the London Embassy Files being one important instance—that Cohen has not consulted.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth RITCHIE OVENDALE

Western Europe

European political cooperation. Edited by David Allen, Reinhardt Rummel and Wolfgang Wessels. London: Butterworth. 1982. 184pp. Index. £15·00.

THIS is the English translation of a book originally published in German in 1978. This immediately points to a major weakness of the book, namely that it is dated. The short postscript written by one of the editors is by its nature only a partial solution to the problem.

Two of the book's authors see European Political Cooperation 'as procedure as a substitute for policy'. If this is true, then I fear that most of the authors fall in the trap set by the policy itself. There is too much emphasis on procedures and decision-making mechanisms and precious little discussion of wider and more substantive issues such as the position and role of Western European countries in a rapidly changing international environment, the desirability or feasibility of a common foreign policy, the importance of defence and security issues, etc. It is probably a bit too 'pragmatic' and 'institutional' for my taste.

The book is an Anglo-German product with a small Italian input added to it. Since academic analysis of foreign policy has not, at least as yet, become completely divorced from national sensitivities, I think that the book would have benefited from a more diverse composition of contributors.

Having said all that, I think it is only fair to add that the book does constitute a useful addition to the EC bibliography in English. Political cooperation has become a growth area in recent years and various proposals have been put forward aiming at a further strengthening of the existing mechanism and the incorporation of security issues. This is most likely to lead to the publication of more books and articles on this important subject.

St Antony's College, Oxford LOUKAS TSOUKALIS

The making of the European Monetary System. By Peter Ludlow. London: Butterworth. 1982. 309pp. Index. £22·00.

European monetary union. Edited by M. T. Sumner and G. Zis. London: Macmillan. 1982. 266pp. Index. £20·00.

EUROPEAN monetary integration has attracted a great deal of attention from both academics and practitioners during the last fifteen years or so. Developments inside the European Community, starting from the early plans for an economic and monetary union which slowly trickled down to the 'snake in the tunnel' and later the European Monetary System, and the anarchic situation prevailing in the international system, certainly justify this attention.

Ludlow's book gives a fascinating account of the negotiations leading to the setting up of the EMS in March 1979 followed by a short concluding chapter dealing with the functioning of the system during its first three years of existence. It is a book which I strongly recommend to all students of contemporary Europe. It is written in very good and lively prose, and thus the story flows even when the author deals with such technical issues as the 'parity grid' and the 'divergence indicator'. The book also provides an excellent case study of the EC decision-making system and European politics in the second half of the 1970s. Here is a good example of the process of 'engrenage' among monetary officials in the EC countries, the 'special relationship' which had developed in those years between France and West Germany, and Britain's decision to exclude itself from the club of privileged members.

The book is a successful exercise in contemporary history; and the task was certainly not an easy one in view of the technical nature of monetary relations. I would have preferred a shorter book and thus would have left out some of the details of the technical discussions which may deter the non-specialist reader. However, it should be emphasized that it is virtually impossible to have a good understanding of EC developments during the 1970s without paying sufficient attention to the monetary factor.

The book edited by Sumner and Zis contains a collection of papers presented at a conference held at Salford University in 1980 on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Werner plan (the plan, if you remember, that was supposed to lead to a complete economic and monetary union by 1980). The book suffers from a weakness inherent in the nature of the whole project which led to its publication. It deals with a subject which now seems to be only of historical interest; monetary union is not on the agenda of the EC Council of Ministers and is very unlikely to appear there in the foreseeable future. The setting up of the EMS was in itself the result of the realization by European political leaders that the Werner approach was based on a strategy which had proved to be both politically and economically unfeasible. Although some of the papers in the book deal with the EMS, they are inevitably dated since they are based on the experience of the first eighteen months.

Nevertheless, the book provides good background reading tor those interested in European monetary integration. It covers a wide range of issues which are dealt with very competently by some of the leading experts in the field.

St Antony's College, Oxford LOUKAS TSOUKALIS

The role of interest groups in the European Community. By Emil Kirchner and Konrad Schwaiger. Aldershot, Hants.: Gower. 1981. 178pp. £11·50.

THIS volume joins the Saxon House series of books covering the Economic and Social Committee and Advisory Groups to provide more useful source material on interest group organization in the framework of the European Community. The Kirchner and Schwaiger study confines itself to mapping the channels and framework used by the so-called 'umbrella' of European-wide interest groups to exert influence on EC policy-making. A further volume is promised tracing the links between these umbrella groups and their frequently more important national constituent bodies. This book is primarily a work to consult, especially for its information on links between interest groups and the Commission, European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee. The ground has now surely been cleared for studies of interest group involvement in policy-making which takes the reader into the smoke-filled rooms as well as the outer corridors of lobbying in the European Community.

University of Manchester Institute of Science and Technology CAROLE WEBB

Building Europe: Britain's partners in the EEC. Edited by Carol and Kenneth J. Twitchett. London: Europa. 1981. 254pp. £16·00.

THIS is exactly the sort of book it is useful to have on one's shelves, to draw on from time to time without necessarily ever reading through from beginning to end. All observers of European cooperation—and most governments—suffer from inadequate information and understanding about the domestic context within which their partner governments formulate their policies, and implement Community policies once agreed.

This book is consciously designed as a text for the student market. As such, it is well provided with bibliographies as a basis for further reading, with figures and footnotes. Each chapter begins with a survey of the historical dimension of that country's approach to the European Community, moves on to examine its policy-making machinery and its effectiveness, and takes on board the range of popular and party attitudes, focussing particularly on the first direct elections to the European Parliament of 1979. Most of the illustrative material is taken from national and Community developments in the mid and late 1970s. A final chapter foreshadows Greek entry, and speculates on Spanish and Portuguese preparedness for accession. The chapter on France usefully includes a postscript on the change of administration in mid-1981 and its potential implications.

The prevailing view which comes across from such a 'bottom-up' view of European cooperation is of the superficiality and self-centredness of each national debate, and of the absence of commitment—beyond the repetition of conventional rhetoric—to closer collaboration. Chapter after chapter notes the contradictions between European rhetoric and the pursuit of national interests through Community bargaining. Chapter after chapter notes the absence of public interest in the Community as such, leaving the field open for particular interests to occupy. Only Luxembourg, with a quarter of its population now drawn from outside the country, is fully committed; while in Belgium the positive attitudes of the regional parties are linked to their antipathy to the Belgian state.

I found the chapters on the smaller states most valuable and informative. It is odd that the longest, and most theoretical, chapter is on Italy, the shortest on Germany; while the sad death of William Pickles, commissioned to provide a contribution on Britain, has left only a skimpy ten pages within the introductory chapter. The introductory section on political cooperation contains a number of inaccuracies, suggesting for example (p. 18) that COREPER plays 'a key liaison role' in links between the Commission and the political cooperation machinery. But, despite these minor blemishes, it remains an extremely useful book.

Chatham House WILLIAM WALLACE

The European challenge: Europe's new role in Latin America. London: Latin America Bureau. 1982. 243pp. Pb.: £3·95.

The European Community and Latin America: a case study in global role expansion. By A. Glenn Mower, Jr. Westport, Conn., London: Greenwood. 1982. 180pp. £21·95.

ON contemporary United States–Latin American relations volumes abound; on contemporary West European–Latin American relations they are rare indeed. It is therefore something of a treat to have two volumes appearing on Latin America and Europe in the same year; and it is doubly fortunate that they should be available at a time when the interest and involvement of Europe in Latin America, hitherto not regarded as of much moment, should receive a sudden prominence in international affairs with the conflict in the South Atlantic and the international debt 'crisis' sparked off by Mexico's 'insolvency'.

The two books are very different in purpose and design. That published by the Latin America Bureau reproduces a number of papers given at a conference in London last year and consciously seeks to stimulate a political intervention by organizations and individuals in Europe concerned to secure a more just society in Latin America. To this end the contributions are balanced to provide introduction as well as detail; value judgements as well as fact. This is no easy task and requires competent and efficient editing which in this instance the Latin America Bureau has achieved. The volume therefore finally emerges as more than the sum of its parts, standing as an original contribution to the field as well as a reliable guide to recent developments. Outstanding in this respect is the contribution by Evers on 'European Social Democracy in Latin America'. This carefully documents and convincingly explains the upsurge of interest in Latin America by the Socialist International from 1976 on. It also draws attention to the developing role of West Germany in Latin American affairs which a number of other contributors also specify as of particular importance but which has gone largely unremarked. Other contributions of note are those by Roddick and O'Brien on the political economy of Europe in Latin America; Grabendorff on changes in the international political system occasioned by an emerging West European–Latin American subsystem; and Wionczek on West European–Latin American economic relations. The volume concludes with a useful statistical appendix by Muniz detailing trade, investment and debt in respect of Europe and Latin America. This supplements the many tables scattered throughout the work as a whole covering a variety of subjects, notably European transnational activity in Latin America and the growing European arms trade with the region, all of which are presumably meant to supply, and amply do so, ammunition for the lobbyists.

The scope of the other volume, as its title suggests, is far narrower. It seeks to demonstrate to a predominently American audience that the European Community is an emerging world actor (a pre-federal state) which necessarily will develop a significant relationship with Latin America. Mower seeks to extrapolate from current trends what this is likely to be and assesses the extent to which it may be beneficial to both sides. He does so by means of a statistical blitzkrieg: marshalling figures in support of argument until the reader is over-

whelmed by force of numbers. To those ignorant of the subject this may have some merit; but to those familiar with the issues it is likely to be irksome, especially when they may reach conclusions radically different to that of Mower himself. For Mower, adhering closely to arguments current within the European Community, interdependence is the defining characteristic of today's world with mutuality of interest and reciprocity of advantage the only rational response. For the contributors to the Latin America Bureau volume, dependence characterizes Latin America's relations with the outside world and policies should be framed accordingly.

While there are marked differences of approach there is, however, substantive agreement on one point: that relations between Europe and Latin America now and in the immediate future will remain dependent on the evolution of the international system as a whole. Mower thus demonstrates that while there are 'affinities' between Europe and Latin America they are by no means compelling ones and alternative scenarios exist for both regions. Similarly, several contributors to the Latin America Bureau volume make the point that while the elements of a new international subsystem (Western Europe–Latin America) are in the making this can be considered at best only tentative on current trends. There is thus nothing inevitable about the development of European–Latin American relations. To a considerable degree a dynamic will have to be infused in the process and this will necessarily be political. The Latin America Bureau gives a better sense of the imperative of this than the volume by Mower. It also considers that the relationship will be essentially competitive with the United States whereas Mower considers it may be complementary. No doubt time will show there to have been aspects of both elements. For the moment, however, and in helping the reader to make his own judgement, both volumes may be recommended as adding substantial information to a relatively neglected dimension of current international affairs, with the competitive pricing of the Latin America Bureau volume providing particularly good value for money.

University of Hull PAUL SUTTON

The European Community and New Zealand. By Juliet Lodge. London: Pinter. 1982. 249pp. Index. £15·00.

THIS book is concerned with the way in which New Zealand maintained its special access to the British market for dairy and lamb exports after Britain's accession to the European Community. This case study will be of general interest to those concerned with the external relations of the EC and could also be of particular interest to those concerned with relations between the EC and small developing countries which have to rely on the good offices of a member state when negotiating terms of preferential access to a protected Community market.

The first two chapters detail relations between New Zealand, Britain and the EC up to 1972 and the negotiation of Protocol 18 of Britain's Treaty of Accession. Subsequent chapters discuss, in considerable detail, the political forces at work and the strategy adopted by New Zealand in subsequent reviews of the terms of access, quantities and prices obtained for exports, and their fight to maintain access for dairy products and lamb after Britain's transitional period had expired. Given that the rationale for protecting European farmers is almost wholly political, the author is quite correct in emphasizing that New Zealand's case had to be made on political and not economic grounds. Indeed, as the author illustrates, France, Ireland, and Denmark repeatedly stressed that the Community was self-sufficient in butter, did not need imports from comparatively rich New Zealand farmers and pressed for a rapid reduction in New Zealand's quota. New Zealand could not plead its case directly with the EC and had to rely on Britain to carry out this difficult task. Britain however, was clearly primarily concerned with its own objectives; what, therefore, explained the British commitment to maintain New Zealand's access, without which the latter would have been unable to realize its aims? The author explains this support in terms of the 'inspired' way in which New Zealand capitalized on its economic vulnerability, dependence on the British market and public sympathy. However, it would have been useful to have seen a rather more detailed analysis of New Zealand's crucial relations with Britain during this period. Also, while the author is concerned with 'outputs' (i.e. New Zealand's diplomatic strategy) rather than 'inputs' which formed the basis of its case, it would have been helpful in assessing the

importance of the issues to New Zealand, if the book had included an assessment of the relative importance of exports to the EEC of dairy products and lamb both to New Zealand's agriculture and its economy, the likely consequence of current trends in EC policy, and a quantitative assessment of the effects of the tariff quotas and levies.

On balance Juliet Lodge presents a convincing case that given the limitations imposed by the CAP and the protectionist interests of particular member states, the EC has not been unsympathetic to New Zealand difficulties. However it is unlikely that there are many lessons to be learnt from this study which are of relevance to developing countries. One only needs to contrast the treatment of New Zealand with the meagre preferences granted by the Community for agricultural products exported by developing countries under the Generalized System of Preferences.

University of Reading M. MCQUEEN

Politics, policy and the European recession. Edited by Andrew Cox. London: Macmillan. 1982. 267pp. Index. £20·00.

ANDREW COX has assembled a collection of essays on the policy responses of a cross section of West European states to the oil-induced recession of the 1970s. The states covered, with the authors' names in brackets, are West Germany (Kenneth Dyson), Sweden (Neil Elder), The Netherlands (Bram Peper), France (Jack Hayward), Britain (David Coates), Italy (Paul Furlong) and Spain (Joseph Harrison). There is also a chapter on the response of the European Community as an organization (Emil Kirchner). The editor himself contributes a chapter on the world recession, setting the context for the essays on individual states.

Not surprisingly the picture which appears is one of a wide variety of responses to recession, based on differences in national cultures and economic and social structures. Yet Andrew Cox believes that a theme does emerge, 'that those nations which have developed incorporatist approaches to the recession have fared much better than those nations in which fundamental political cleavages remain to be resolved' (p. 29). He goes on to recommend that policy-makers aim to adopt such incorporatist responses as their best hope for the 1980s. What he does not do is explain to policy-makers how they can construct successful incorporatist institutions in the absence of social consensus; and it is clear from the individual chapters that social consensus has been one of the main casualties of the recession.

An alternative analysis is offered by David Coates in his chapter on Britain. For him incorporatist approaches offer one strategy for governments faced with a conflict between capital and labour, but they are unlikely to succeed because the two interests are 'not so much similar as incompatible' (p. 154). The attempt will always tend to end in confrontation with the unions. Although he applies this analysis only to Britain, there is plenty of evidence in the other chapters to support its application to all of the states. It is an indication of the value of the book that this is so, as none of the other authors takes an approach which centres so explicitly on the resolution of class conflict as the basis of economic policy-making.

This last point does raise a doubt, though, about the appropriateness of asking David Coates to write the chapter on Britain in this book. His analysis is acute and penetrating, but it does sit rather uneasily alongside the other contributions. No other author takes such an overtly political line (although Jack Hayward has some fun at the expense of Raymond Barre); and the balance of interpretation and information leans more decidedly to the empirical in other chapters. But more pertinently, no other contribution adopts a Marxist framework of analysis. A book of Marxist essays on governments and economic policy in Western Europe would be very rewarding, especially if the standard were as high as that set by David Coates, but it would almost certainly not contain one individual chapter written from a non-Marxist social democratic perspective, and rightly so. On the same basis it would have made for more consistency had Andrew Cox invited another social democrat to contribute the chapter on Britain for this book: there is no shortage of candidates.

University of Sheffield STEPHEN GEORGE

GDR foreign policy. Edited by Eberhard Schulz *et al.* Armonk, NY, London: Sharpe. 1982. 348pp. Index. $35.00.

THIS is an abridged English translation of *Drei Jahrzehnte Aussenpolitik der DDR*, compiled at the Research Institute of the German Society for Foreign Affairs in Bonn, and published in 1979. It was the joint work of twenty-eight West German and four American scholars and is a massive but first class compendium. For the purposes of the present book ten of the thirty-two chapters have been translated and a foreword by Arthur A. Stahnke and a preface by the editors have been added.

Several things have happened since the original German edition appeared and even since the English translation went to press. Leonid Brezhnev and his chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov have departed the scene, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt has been replaced by Chancellor Helmut Kohl and the latter has been confirmed in office by the West German electorate. Whereas Schmidt and the social democrats were magnanimous in their approach to the GDR, especially on the economic front, Kohl and the Christian democrats may not be. Since the strength of this study is its historical perspective, however, it is not weakened very much by these changes.

In selecting the chapters for the English language edition the editors opted for nine West Germans and one American scholar, the lone American being Melvin Croan. This underlines the West German-oriented view of GDR foreign policy which the book provides. Besides chapters on general aspects of GDR foreign policy the editors have selected case studies of East Berlin's relations with the USSR and the Federal Republic. This reviewer would have welcomed at least a chapter on the GDR and the Third World, especially on Africa.

This translation will become the standard West German analysis of GDR foreign policy for those unable to read German.

School of Slavonic and East European Studies, London MARTIN MCCAULEY

Foreign policies of Northern Europe. Edited by Bengt Sundelius. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Bowker, Epping.) 239pp. Index. £5·50.

THIS collection of essays, all but one by Swedish authors, and three by the editor himself, constitute an attempt to bring the theories—notably the 'pre-theory'—of James Rosenau to bear on the five Nordic countries, as a case-study of that school's 'most similar systems design'.

After a general consideration by Krister Wahlbäck of the region in the context of twentieth century politics, Ib Faurby (Denmark) analyses the structures of foreign policy-making, with emphasis on the inseparability of external and domestic factors in critical decisions. 'Changing strategic perspectives in Northern Europe' receive sound, if not particularly novel, treatment from Nils Andren. The same applies to Carl-Einar Stålvant's chapter on international economic cooperation. Lars Rudebeck's account of Nordic policies towards the Third World concludes (p. 171) that these illustrate 'the importance of trying to combine structural and political action-oriented approaches to explain politics. The relevant structural factors [of] economic strength and international autonomy . . . in turn determine the space available to internal political actors for shaping Third World policies through open confrontation of ideologies and interests'.

This prompts perhaps a general comment on the book (and not least its editor's contributions) that Swedish-American academic language may not always be the best vehicle for enlightenment. Criticism could also attach to the sheer duplication and repetition which its form entails: the same things are frequently being said, in the same way, throughout the eight chapters. Nor does the factual content evince significant originality. It may not indeed be intended to do so, inasmuch as the focus is on comparative treatment rather than the production of fresh historical insights. Nevertheless, the lack of historical depth is a shortcoming; for example, the declaration of Norway's first foreign minister that 'we want no foreign policy' might have been mentioned for the light it throws on his country's evolution this century. A further criticism that suggests itself at any rate in this case is that a student of the modern history of even a single Nordic country is hardly likely to be unfamiliar with the essential features of its neighbours', and to have made already some of his own comparisons. None of which is of course to imply that the enterprise is not

worthwhile; only that it calls for a more penetrating synoptic effort than on the whole we have here.

Within these limits, there is a useful bibliography.

MICHAEL CULLIS

The consensual democracies?: the government and politics of the Scandinavian states. By N. Elder, A. H. Thomas and D. Arter. Oxford: Martin Robertson. 1982. 244pp. Index. £22·00.

Nordic democracy: ideas, issues, and institutions in politics, economy, education, social and cultural affairs of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden. Edited by Folmer Wisti. Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab. 1981. 780pp. Index. D.kr. 200.00.

BOTH these books are aimed primarily at students of Nordic politics. When one considers the seminal contribution to the practice and study of politics made by the Nordic countries, the rich market they represent for Britain and, increasingly, their strategic importance, the number of British students and institutions studying the Nordic region is paltry. Clearly such publications also have to attract the more general student of political science. These two volumes have something for both specialist and generalist alike.

In Elder, Thomas and Arter's book, three criteria are used to evaluate the Nordic states as 'consensual democracies': the framework of political conflict-resolution, 'the nature of conflicts arising within that framework' (p. 9) and the manner of conflict resolution. Not surprisingly, the consensus displayed in the Nordic countries is high. The authors give a good historical grounding to the area's politics, accounting for the rise of parliamentarianism and universal suffrage, the emergence of mass-based parties and the 'basic five-party Scandinavian model' (p. 29). They then cover 'social cleavages and partisan conflict after the Second World War' (chapter three), describing the relative freezing of the postwar system until the mid-1950s (with interesting exceptions) and the seeming threat to the consensus from the 1970s onward. The apparent fragmentation of Nordic politics seems to have receded, though the pattern of social democrat dominance in the three core Scandinavian countries has not completely returned—1982 saw conservative governments in Norway and Denmark with a move back to Social Democrat rule in Sweden.

The three British authors examine the Nordic political structures, covering the five states' constitutions, executives, parliaments, administrative controls, electoral systems and political recruitment. They assess the extent to which each state has settled for 'the politics of compromise', which all seem to have done to a noticeable degree. The chapter on regional cooperation and international roles examines cooperation between the Nordic states and the role of the Nordic group as an international actor.

Elder and his colleagues generally succeed in producing a wide-ranging yet detailed appreciation of the Nordic political systems. Perhaps the international chapter is the weakest part of the book—the space could have been better spent on examining the political effects of the cross-Nordic network of political and interest groups than dealing with fairly undefined topics such as the Nordic Balance.

The Board of the Nordic Cultural Fund is behind the making of *Nordic democracy*, a book which itself is an act of Nordic cooperation with thirty-two authors drawn from the five Nordic countries. The aim of the book is 'to offer a comprehensive and balanced presentation of the Nordic countries, their political history, organization, social structure and cultural development' (p. 12). It thus covers a wider remit than that of the Elder book though it is more selective in its treatment, focussing on topics relevant to the growth of democratic thought and practice.

The first section covers much the same ground as its British counterparts' first two chapters. However, it employs six leading Nordic political scientists, an economist and a lawyer for this task. The gem in this collection is an essay on 'The growth and structuring of mass politics' by the late Stein Rokkan, demonstrating an ability to encompass the continent of Europe over a period of a half millennium and still say something novel and interesting.

The second section on governmental structure and functions covers much of the material in chapter four of Elder. It is pleasing to see a chapter devoted in the Nordic book to

regional autonomy, outlining the systems of government in the Aaland Islands, the Faroe Islands and Greenland, areas which are given only a passing mention in the British book.

The central sections of *Nordic democracy* are devoted to economic and social affairs (part three); education, culture and the mass media (part four); and groups and organizations (part five). The individual chapters are interesting and informative. The authors are by no means uncritical of their native region. Walter Korpi, in his contribution on 'Labour movements and industrial relations' is less than sanguine in his conclusions and Olav Knudsen's piece on 'Multinational corporations in the Nordic countries' comes to the somewhat surprising conclusion that, of the five states, Norway has been penetrated most strongly by the MNCs. This is despite a traditionally hostile Norwegian attitude towards foreign ownership of their resources. One small complaint: Niels Thomsen, writing on 'Politics and the development of mass communications' does not mention, even in otherwise exhaustive lists, the fascinating and innovative Danish daily paper *Information*.

The book's last section on inter-Nordic and international relations is more substantial than its equivalent in Elder *et al.* The authors—Franz Wendt on Nordic cooperation, Nils Andrén and Gylfi Gislason on Nordic relations with the rest of the world, and Folmer Wisti on Nordic cultural cooperation in a global context—are all recognized experts in their fields.

The British book has an epilogue updating political events to early 1982 though the Nordic volume has a better index and a more extensive bibliography. Both books are helpful to the Scandinavianist. Elder and colleagues have an attractive theme for the political scientist whilst Wisti has arranged a *smörgåsbord* for the social scientist.

University of Aberdeen CLIVE ARCHER

Through the looking-glass: British foreign policy in the age of illusions. By Anthony Verrier. London: Cape. 1983. 385pp. Index. £12·50.

THIS is a story of some dramatic episodes in Britain's foreign relations during the present century. The Suez fiasco of 1956, the intervention in Kuwait of 1961, the Penkovsky affair and the Nigerian Civil War receive detailed treatment. Britain's relationship with the United States is an undercurrent, but links with the European Economic Community and NATO are largely ignored. This reflects both the book's emphasis on the role of the Secret Intelligence Service and a deliberate choice of those episodes best suited to reveal British foreign policy as illusion encountering the harsh realities of impotence.

The outcome is a stimulating and readable book, containing many novel assertions and offering much fresh interpretation. Attempted subversion in Albania, for instance, provides a particularly notable chapter. The style, at once easy and engaged, commands attention. *Through the looking-glass* is worth the notice, not merely of specialists concerned with the specific episodes described, but of anyone interested in popular attitudes towards foreign policy.

The book's value as history is debatable. Its weakness in this respect is not that the author has selected episodes to illustrate a predetermined theme, but rather that the theme is never articulated with sufficient precision either to test the particular arguments or to justify the inclusion of some examples and the exclusion of others. For instance, the author argues that the Attlee government 'had not dispelled imperial illusions, had failed to tackle four problems which were directly relevant to the tasks which faced their successors. Britain's progressive loss of power had been ignored; no satisfactory relationship had been established with America; the strategic purpose of a nuclear weapons programme had not been defined; the crucial role of intelligence in a nation still aspiring to an international role had been overlooked' (p. 92).

These are plausible criticisms, yet necessarily insubstantial for want of any statement of an alternative policy. Moreover, if Suez can be analysed to support them, why should the contrasting example of Confrontation with Indonesia—the most enduringly successful limited war anyone has fought for thirty-seven years—be ignored?

A second weakness is the absence of evidence to support some of the more startling assertions. On page 151, for instance, the author states that Lord Normanbrook, Secretary to the Cabinet, 'used SIS liaison with CIA as a means of telling the President what was really at stake' (in October 1956). The implication is that this distinguished civil servant deliberately betrayed his Prime Minister's secrets to a foreign power, but no source is quoted. No doubt

the reader is intended to attribute this and other striking revelations to one of the 152 prominent persons listed in the acknowledgments. Of course, unattributable revelations are sometimes accurate as well as easier to obtain, but statements of fact lack evidential value without an answer to the crucial question: 'who first said so and how did he know?'

Anthony Verrier offers a lively polemic and a useful spur to investigation rather than an authoritative contribution to the history of British foreign policy.

JAMES CABLE

The longest war: Northern Ireland and the IRA. By Kevin Kelley. Dingle, Co. Kerry: Brandon; Westport, Conn.: Lawrence Hill; London: Zed. 1982. 366pp. Index. £16·95. Pb.: £6·95.

THE author is an American journalist with a long interest in Irish affairs. He spent a year in Ireland doing the research for this book and the result is a meticulous attention to both detail and accuracy. Of the eight chapters, the first two trace the course of Irish history from the Anglo-Norman Conquest to 1962. The bulk of the book, however, is devoted to the campaign of the Provisional IRA and this is set against the various attempts of the British government to achieve a political settlement within Northern Ireland during the period of direct rule.

The author's sympathies are clearly with the objectives of the IRA and he only expresses concern about their methods when these have a vastly counter-productive effect on public opinion. To be fair, the author lays his cards on the table in the preface: here he tells us that his account 'makes no pretence of being neutral or objective' (p. xv). In the epilogue he makes a clean breast of admitting that he sees no solution except for a united Ireland; and he suggests that Protestants in such a country would be no worse off than whites in Zimbabwe (p. 351). This theme of Northern Ireland as Britain's colony comes through strongly throughout the book: the IRA are referred to as guerrillas, and the effect of their attacks on the British army is picturesquely likened to the buzzing of mosquitoes around a lumbering giant who then 'roared in rage when stung and then thrashed about' (p. 173).

Passing references are made to the conditions of economic deprivation in which the Catholic community exists in Northern Ireland, and these are seen as a 'breeding ground' for armed republicanism. Yet there is little attempt to explain why public opinion is not more supportive of the IRA, and still less how and why that support fluctuates.

The book is the fullest attempt so far to deal with the tactics of the Provos' campaign; and the description of the two recent hunger strikes gives the reader a fair picture of the doubts and hesitations as well as the lasting psychological effects that the strikes produced in the Catholic ghettoes.

Queen's University of Belfast E. MOXON-BROWNE

Federalism and judicial review in West Germany. By Philip M. Blair. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1981. 332pp. Index. £22·50.

THIS PhD thesis, written by an international civil servant with the Council of Europe, attempts to study the influence of the Federal Constitutional Court on the evolution of federalism in West Germany. It is not an easy book to read, but those with some interest in this neglected subject who persevere will be rewarded. It is a well-researched volume based on interviews with federal judges as well as a study of documents and published works.

Perhaps one of the low points in the Court's life was reached in the 1950s when it dismissed objections by Hamburg, Rhineland Palatinate and Baden-Württemberg that the federal law, introduced in pursuance of the obligation under Article 131 of the Basic Law to regulate the legal position of former public employees, could not be held to be binding on the *Länder*. This law obliged public employers, including the *Länder*, to reserve a certain proportion of vacant or new positions for former public servants or to compensate the *Bund* for its efforts in this direction. The three *Länder* based their objection on the lack of federal power to impose such a levy. But in essence many of the politicians involved really objected to the law because it paved the way for the reinstatement of former employees who had been dismissed in 1945 because of their associations with the Nazis. The Court reached the height of its prestige in 1961 when it supported four SPD-ruled *Länder* in their objection that

Chancellor Adenauer, by attempting to set up a new broadcasting authority, was encroaching on their cultural sovereignty. Adenauer did not attempt defiance and, concludes Blair, 'a conflict on the Rooseveltian model is unthinkable in Germany' (p. 251). Less well known is the Federal Waterways Case of the same year. This was 'intrinsically a federal dispute about powers' (p. 56). On this occasion five *Länder*, with governments of different political complexions, disputed federal legislation for the prevention of pollution of the federal waterways. The Court supported the objecting *Länder* with the result that 'its restriction of the federal authorities to regulation of the transport functions of the federal waterways has prevented them ever since from introducing comprehensive measures to solve the problem of water pollution. For it meant that a constitutional amendment would be required to give the Bund the necessary powers' (p. 253).

Between 1962 and 1969 there was 'a remarkable dearth of federal cases from any quarter' (p. 46). This was in part because of the Grand Coalition, 1966–9, and partly because of the 'increasing acceptance on the part of the Länder, in the face of financial and economic realities, of the need to transfer various powers to the federal level and seek a new equilibrium in the federal system' (p. 46). As for the Constitutional Court, it 'has been obliged to swim with the tide, to recognize the reality of co-operative federalism and the forces of unitarization.' It has come to a degree of realism 'and appreciation of the problems facing modern society which would be incompatible with a policy of intransigent defence of Länder positions' (p. 256).

University of Nottingham David Childs

Rules of the Italian political game. By Franco Damaso Marengo. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1981. 134pp. Index. £12·50.

This book is something of a psephologist's dream—or nightmare, according to how it affects him. The author, now at the Centre for Industrial Studies in Bath University, describes postwar Italian politics in terms of a game, with fixed rules understood by the players, i.e. the politicians. Their aim is to secure power through obtaining the leading positions in the state, government and party. Dr Marengo's analysis draws examples from the behaviour of leading politicians in jockeying for position during the main political events between 1948 and 1972: two presidential elections, fourteen government crises and twelve party congresses. During that whole period Italy was governed by coalitions led by Prime Ministers from the Christian Democrat party (the largest party throughout) with allies from the smaller democratic parties including, latterly, the Socialists. The extreme Left and Right parties, the Communists and the Monarchists, were by tacit consent excluded as potential partners in a coalition and therefore do not come into Dr Marengo's calculations except in the case of the presidential elections, where all parties were involved.

Anyone familiar with the complications of the Italian political scene will know that it is extremely rare for a politician to change parties but within the parties themselves there are constant factional shiftings of emphasis. There is thus a fine field for Dr Marengo's 'game' theory to operate. In particular, he points to the difference between the players' 'sublime' code, involving consistency with their party's ideology and programme, and the 'effective' code, which will give them an advantage over rivals.

Out of the forest of data he adduces, one or two special points emerge. One is the player's constant effort to avoid isolation and to ensure an effective following—a consideration, one would think, not especially confined to Italian politicians. A recurrent theme is the player's wish to seem cunning and to avoid appearing naive—'naivete is always regarded as disgraceful and everybody is keenly wary of it' (p. 88). An interesting point for outside observers, accustomed to deplore the shortlived nature of Italian governments (the current one is the forty-third since the war) that, according to Dr Marengo, politicians 'seem to believe that long tenures of power are unlikely, unproductive, and perhaps even representing a threat to democracy'.

This book started out as a PhD thesis for Chicago University in 1976. The author's supervisor for it was Professor Nathan Leites, whose approach to political analysis resembled his own. The English student of Italian politics will need a good deal of previous knowledge, and patience with the occasionally faulty English, to derive much benefit from it.

Muriel Grindrod

The Italian Communist Party 1976–81: on the threshold of government. By James Ruscoe. London: Macmillan. 1982. 293pp. £15·00.

In the mid-seventies, Eurocommunism aroused widespread hopes and fears and provoked a stream of journalistic surveys and academic studies of the phenomenon and the various West European Communist Parties. Not surprisingly, the Italian Communist Party, identified as the leader of the movement as well as the largest of these parties, attracted privileged attention. In so far as the party supplied most of the theoretical substance of the Eurocommunist strategy, this interest was not misplaced. Paradoxically, however, such has been the change in the political climate in the last five years that today interest in Eucommunism and the PCI has virtually evaporated, while the tempo of academic production has meant that books and articles on both continue to roll off the presses. It has to be said, nonetheless, that despite the interest of the mid-1970s, there is still no single study, not even in Italian, of the PCI from its origins to the present day.

Mr Ruscoe's book surveys the party in the crucial years 1976–81, which saw it at the zenith of its power and prestige, following its electoral advance of 1976, and charts the beginning of a decline, sanctioned in the 1979 elections. These were the years of the National Emergency Government and the Moro assassination in which the party attempted to achieve a concrete 'historic compromise' with the ruling Christian Democrats. The endeavour failed, as Mr Ruscoe observes, largely because of the resistance of the Christian Democrats and the PCI leaders' miscalculation of their rivals' commitment to the 'Democratic Solidarity' alliance. So if it is true that the 'Democratic Solidarity' undoubtedly saved Italy from economic and financial catastrophe, it is also true that it was manipulated by the Christian Democrats as a weapon against the PCI. The failure of the historic compromise, moreover, left the PCI bereft of a plausible alternative strategy which is something that has become embarrassingly apparent in the 1980s. It goes a long way to explaining the party's oscillation between radical opposition (an alternative government alliance without the DC) and timid gestures of collaboration (renewal of the historic compromise with the DC).

Mr Ruscoe is a journalist and his survey has the traditional journalistic strengths and weaknesses. It is clear and factual with generally sober judgements expressed in vigorous, if sometimes racy, prose. Indeed, the author goes to some lengths to clarify the often complicated events that are the bread and butter of Italian politics. On the other hand, it contains irritating pithy (sometimes erroneous) personal comments (like 'the anarchist "deviations" of its first leader, Amadeo Bordiga', p. 53) or throwaway lines (like 'the trouble with Gramsci is that he had never read any Marx . . .', p. 54—the more pertinent question is Gramsci's reading of Marx and the reasons for it) which are not really germane to his particular argument or the survey as a whole. Indeed, there is a tendency to interpret party tactics and politics generally too much in terms of personal relations and personality (for example, seeing PCI–PSI relations since 1977 in terms of personal antagonism between Berlinguer and Craxi). Nonetheless, despite these caveats, this is a useful account of the PCI in five critical years which will be particularly valuable for the English reader who wishes not only to follow recent political developments in Italy but above all to understand the reasons for the PCI's recent eclipse.

University of Reading PERCY ALLUM

Unions, change and crisis: French and Italian union strategy and the political economy, 1945–1980. By Peter Lange, George Ross and Maurizio Vannicelli. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 295pp. Index. £20·00.

The first two parts of this book analyse separately the behaviour of the French and Italian unions in the post-war period. In some respects the situation in both countries has developed in a similar manner. Soon after the end of hostilities the cold war began. Later East–West relations improved. In both countries there was a period of union militancy in the late 1960s and both countries were affected by the international economic crisis of the 1970s. There were also similarities in union organization. In both countries the largest confederation was closely linked with the communist party and had uneasy relations with the non-communist

unions. The accounts of events in the two countries, however, show that despite these similarities, union strategies have been very different.

The control of the communist party over the CGT in France meant that union activity was directed primarily towards the achievement of political objectives. Policy was directed towards radical change in the economic system rather than the improvement of members' conditions by action in the labour market. This attitude contributed to the coolness between the CGT and the non-communist unions. It must also be added that the lack of any effective industrial relations system in France would have limited the power of the trade union movement, even if it had been united.

With the easing of cold war tensions, the CGIL in Italy began to acquire a degree of autonomy from the communist party which was never permitted the CGT in France. It was able to develop a degree of cooperation with the non-communist unions and it allowed itself to pursue more limited labour market objectives to improve the living standards of its members. During the late 1960s, union militancy secured important gains for the Italian workers.

The third part of the book attempts to analyse the reasons for the differences between French and Italian unions. The authors reject both Marxist and 'liberal optimist' beliefs 'in the increasing convergence of trade union behaviours across nations due to the technological and economic "logic" of the capitalist and/or industrial mode of production'. The unions have to choose how they will behave in a particular situation. There is no inevitable path they must follow. It is not surprising therefore that, especially in the light of differences in union–communist party relationships and the industrial relations framework, the paths of the Italian and French unions have diverged.

If there is a weakness in this book it is in the fact that the analysis is purely sociological. One would have liked to see a little more attention given to the economic situation. To what extent, for example, did union behaviour itself create economic difficulties? The escalator clauses in Italian wage agreements must have contributed to inflation. Was it realistic for unions to think in terms of maintaining the living standards of their members in the face of the massive increase in oil prices in 1973 and the resulting diversion of wealth to the oil-producing countries? Some relevant information on the extra cost of oil after the 1973 price increase and the share of the national product going to labour would have enabled the reader to make some assessment of the role of the unions.

University of Dundee J. M. JACKSON

Policy and politics in France: living with uncertainty. By Douglas E. Ashford. Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 1982. 345pp. Index. $29.95. Pb.: $12.95.

THIS volume in the series *'Politics and policy in industrial states'* is sister to Professor Ashford's recent volume on the UK, and follows a book on French local government. It aims to show how and why major public policies are elaborated, paying special attention to the institutional framework in which the protagonists (government, administration, parties and interest groups) conduct their bargaining.

Briefly stated, the author's thesis is that France suffers from 'institutional uncertainty' (hence the subtitle). What the author seems to mean by this idea is that France does not enjoy a stable two-party system which allows peaceful change. Therefore (for the second proposition is linked to the first) there are not established institutions with clearly defined and visible rôles where, as in the UK or USA, government and social forces can bargain in an orderly way. But what the French have done is use the *ad hoc* nature of their policy process as a substitute for this institutional vacuum. In so doing they have developed a system which is unique and also, in the author's eyes, more vulnerable to anti-democratic trends than others.

Seductive though the argument is, it fails to stand up. Indeed the author's grasp of his material is usually such that he himself invalidates it. The protagonists, government and citizens, know very well the rules of the game, even if these are not written down in formal institutions. Their sophistication is such that one could say that it was itself an institution. The proof of this is, as the author shows, the elections of 1981, when the French knew that to confirm their wish for change they had to go to the polls not twice but four times—the second pair of outings being necessary to elect a parliamentary majority for Mitterrand. It

could therefore be said that there was considerable institutional *certainty* in France; certainly as much as in the anti-models which are adduced as paradigms of certainty. What is happening for instance to the two-party system in the UK? Does not much policy-bargaining here in any case take place outside formal institutions (*cf*. recent literature on the place of corporatism in economic decision-making)? Perhaps the Anglo-Saxons are as uncertain as the French. Certainly the political singularity of the latter does not seem proven.

One final point must be made about presentation. The spelling is generally cavalier and in places appalling. Many sentences have verbs or other words missing, and there are some bad errors of fact. Thus (pp. 31 and 125) departmental councils are not indirectly elected, but have been designated by universal suffrage since the Third Republic. On p. 111 appears an Albin Marcellin, presumably the product of a union between Raymond Marcellin and Albin Chalandon. One shudders to think what cartoonists of the time might have made of such an unlikely amalgam. Such errors are probably due more to haste than anything else, but they spoil the effect of a book which despite the reservations stated above does bring some food for thought and much information to students and the general reader alike.

University of Reading DAVID HANLEY

The Cyprus triangle. By R. R. Denktash. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin with K. Rustem. 1982. 222pp. Index. £15·00.

WHY 'Triangle'? The president of the so-called 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' deals almost exclusively with events since inter-communal relations broke down in 1963, and the forces shaping the island's history in these years have certainly not just been those that put together the too-clever-by-half 1960 settlement and glibly guaranteed it. A small point; but it illustrates a certain superficial and ready-made quality about Mr Denktash's book. It is, in fact, a statement of the Turkish-Cypriot case. The thirty-three very short chapters constituting the ninety-five pages of text (more than half the book being a useful documentary appendix) rely on assertion much more than argument, and read like a series of embassy hand-outs. Certainly they provide a powerful indictment of the late President Makarios's devious deeds and foolish words between 1960 and 1967; but the implication that the Turkish leadership in Cyprus honestly tried hard to make a success of what is questionably called 'the bi-national state' created in the former year needs taking with quite a lot of salt. Some of Makarios's reported appeals to the undying spirit of *Enosis* need more dependable authentication than the half-hearted notes provide; in one case, the notorious Kykko sermon of 1962, it has been denied that they were ever uttered. Likewise, when Mr Denktash says (pp. 48–9) that in the period 1964–74 'tourists . . . were not allowed to cross into the Turkish sectors or to know what was happening to a quarter of the population' he is asserting something that thousands of potential readers must know, from their own memories, to be quite untrue. An *ex parte* document, then, and with a certain usefulness as such.

University of York J. S. F. PARKER

OECD economic surveys: Turkey. Paris: OECD. 1982. 67pp. Pb.

Turkey in crisis. By Berch Berberoglu. London: Zed. 1982. 149pp. Index. £11·95.

THE single most significant figure in the OECD report is the jump of 60 per cent in Turkish exports from 1980 to 1981. This was due partly to a deliberate decision to move from import substitution to export promotion and the consequent grant of fiscal and foreign exchange incentives to exporters, not least in the scaling down of bureaucratic obstacles; partly to internal austerity which made it harder to sell in Turkey; and not least to the enterprise of Turkish manufacturers, exporters and contractors in seeking and finding new outlets in the Middle East and North Africa, thereby also providing new fields for the temporary emigration of Turkish workers whose access to Western Europe has now been greatly restricted.

The other major turn-around in the Turkish economy was the reduction of the inflation rate from 120 per cent (year on year rate on a monthly basis) in March 1980 to 29 per cent in December 1981. The tight monetary and fiscal policies which have brought about this startling change have had their inevitable effects on wages, agricultural support prices and unemployment.

The OECD presents in its report a series of theoretical calculations on the limits of growth of the Turkish economy over the next few years. With all due allowance for uncertainty in a not very sophisticated statistical environment, it is suggested that with a growth rate of GNP above about 5·5 per cent the balance of payments would become intolerably negative, whereas with growth in the region of 4–5·5 per cent the rate of unemployment could become politically dangerous.

The OECD concludes that existing stabilization policies need to be supplemented by greater attention to the quantity and quality of agricultural production; more effective control of the State Economic Enterprises; and a more general strengthening of market forces and competition. Subject to this it believes that Turkey could overcome its protracted economic crisis in the not too distant future. It is a long time since such a forecast could be made, even conditionally. Turkey's return to parliamentary government towards the end of 1983 will be judged not only by its success in restoring democracy but also by its ability to maintain the economic momentum generated by the present regime.

The publishers of *Turkey in crisis* tell us that Dr Berberoglu is a Turkish political economist who teaches at the University of Nevada, Reno, USA. There is no evidence that he has had recent experience of life in Turkey. His picture of it has practically nothing in common with that of the OECD. He seeks to impose Marxist categories on a selection of historical developments in Turkey since the beginning of this century. He criticizes the Kemalist revolution for not having based itself on the rural proletarians of Anatolia but approves its defeat of 'imperialism'. Ataturk's *étatisme* and the marked growth of the State Economic Enterprises in the 1930s do not fit easily in the author's ideological frame of reference. He gets into full flood again with the alleged defeat of state capitalism by the 'compradors' and the multinationals in the 1940s and 1950s (a description that no Turkish or foreign businessman in Turkey would recognize up to the present day). The later chapters deal mainly with the exploitation of the Turkish working classes and their increasingly successful attempts to organize resistance to a neo-colonial and ultimately fascist repression. The author implies that the 2,500 political murders in 1978–9 were carried out exclusively by the extreme right-wing National Action Party of Colonel Türkeş, whose squads were of course 'trained by the CIA', whereas it would more generally be held that the NAP and the extreme Left were about equally responsible for the casualties of this period of anarchy. Dr Berberoglu further gives the impression that the actions of the present military government have been directed wholly against the Left, without mentioning that Colonel Türkeş and a large number of his party and supporters are on trial for the crimes which they are alleged to have committed.

Apart from such political errors and omissions, Dr Berberoglu appears to be under the curious delusion that Turkey is a major oil producer; and that Turkish entry into the EEC would provide the latter with 'direct access to abundant cheap labour', which would read strangely in Germany today as it tries to assimilate or repatriate a million Turkish workers already resident there. In a remarkable throwaway phrase he also argues against Turkish entry into the Community on the grounds that it would provide Turkey with political stability, and in the concluding phrase of the book he appears on the contrary to look forward to the 'continuing revolutionary situation which . . . will lead the country toward civil war and social revolution in the period immediately ahead'. An interesting study could be made on the social history of modern Turkey. After reading Dr Berberoglu's book the need for this is even more evident than before.

BERNARD BURROWS

USSR and Eastern Europe

Soviet economic development. 2nd edn. By Raymond Hutchings. Oxford: Blackwell. 1982. 322pp. Index. £18·00. Pb.: £6·95.

The modernization of Soviet industrial management. By William J. Conyngham. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1982. 332pp. Index. £19·50.

THESE books can be regarded as complementary in two respects. Firstly, in terms of their temporal coverage: Hutchings has remarkably little to say about the period since 1965, while Conyngham starts with the 1965 reforms and concentrates on more recent developments.

Secondly, Hutchings seeks to provide a general account of many aspects of Soviet economic development, whereas Conyngham's focus is far narrower. Consequently, his treatment of Soviet management has to presuppose substantial knowledge of the Soviet economy on the part of the reader.

Hutchings' book is the second edition of one that was well received when it first appeared in 1971. Most of it is clear, well written and interesting to read, though in spite of the revisions that have been made it does now feel distinctly dated in places.

The book falls into five parts: the setting; economic development since 1913; organization and planning; levers of development; and growth. The last chapter of part two, 'Since 1945', is the first to seem very dated. It overemphasizes the Khrushchev period and only briefly refers to the Brezhnev/Kosygin period that followed. Similarly, chapter 11 in part three is very detailed on the Sovnarkhozy, the regional bodies that replaced the ministries from 1957 to 1965, but thin on more recent changes in the industrial structure. Chapter 12 on planning manages not to mention Gossnab, the State Committee for Materials Supply, while chapter 13 on finance is simply too brief and sketchy to be very useful.

Chapters 15–17 on investment, location and foreign trade are good from the point of view of raising important issues and explaining Soviet practices but are once again not as up-to-date as they should be.

Chapter 18 is a new one on technology imports and innovation. Surprisingly, it fails to mention any of the important work on this area published by researchers at CREES in the University of Birmingham, though it is still a useful addition to the book. The remaining chapters in the book (part five, chapters 19–22) differentiate it from other works. Soviet statistics are not usually discussed very fully in introductory accounts of the Soviet economy, so Hutchings' analysis is to be welcomed, as are his comments on the causes of Soviet growth. Overall then, this is still a useful book, though probably somewhat less so than the first edition.

Conyngham's book is concerned with the impact of the 1965 reforms, and subsequent developments, on industrial organization and management in the Soviet Union. Chapter 1, 'The context', sets the scene by viewing planning as the integrator of management activity, while stressing that 'conflicts of interest thwart a purely technical approach to planning' (p. 28). The management environment at enterprise level is characterized by unbalanced plans, poor coordination and inadequate regulation, with a virtual institutionalization of crisis management.

There is a clear need for a theory of management in the Soviet economy. Although ideology has inhibited such a development, there have been important advances in cybernetics, ideas related to SOFE (system of optimal functioning of the economy), and, with greater practical effect, ASU (automated system of management). On the technical side, developments like this require progress in model-building and computing, as discussed in chapter 3. However, some of the analysis here is too brief for anyone not already quite familiar with the techniques in question to learn very much. Nevertheless, Conyngham is right to note the limitations of an optimizing approach in economic management.

Chapters 5 and 6 deal with the management structure, first at enterprise and then at the ministerial level of the planning hierarchy. It appears that the 1965 reforms were remarkably unclear about the redistribution of authority and functions both within and above enterprises. This is one factor that must have encouraged other approaches, such as those based on computerization, during the 1970s. Despite various proposals, the whole issue of the selection, promotion and evaluation of managers remains unsettled even now.

Thus Conyngham presents us with a picture of a highly complex economy containing diverse interest groups, in which a purely technical approach to economic management is absurdly simplistic. The management function is substantially neglected or ignored altogether in most works on the Soviet economy, so it is refreshingly welcome to be reminded of its importance, as well as its apparent intractability. There are no easy solutions, even in a planned economy.

University of Stirling P. G. HARE

Soviet perceptions of US foreign policy. By John Lenczowski. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1982. 318pp. Index. £18·75. $32.50.

ANALYSING how the United States analyses the Soviet Union's analyses of the United States is almost as bewildering as this sentence. John Lenczowski has leapt into the debate with much gusto and despite the reviewer's initial inclination to dismiss this work as a right-wing polemic, there is much to recommend a serious reading. Lenczowski asks: 'Are the Soviets guided by the Marxist–Leninist ideology, or do they behave like the rulers of any other great power? Is the Soviet Union a totalitarian system or is it characterized by political competition among diverse interest groups? Are there "hawks" and "doves" within the Kremlin leadership?' (p. 9). The answers provided are frequently skewed, but rarely unworthy of some attention.

Lenczowski largely suggests that the notion of 'hawks' and 'doves' in the Soviet decision-making process is a result of Soviet disinformation. Before the reader rejects this absurd return to the view of the Soviet Union as a totalitarian state, some attention should be paid to Lenczowski's point. He does argue that there exist 'traditionalist' and 'realist' schools of thought in the Soviet Union which may not differ on whether capitalism should be defeated, although they do have important differences on how it should be done. Unfortunately, Lenczowski continues to maintain that such differences do not produce debates and certainly give no scope for Western policy to be tailored towards the less hardline factions (pp. 19–20). It seems that only US reconnaissance photos of blood on the Kremlin floor will suffice as evidence of important debates. Similarly, Lenczowski rejects as almost entirely useless the theory that interest groups based on specific institutions have an important impact on policy (p. 245). But he then goes on to argue more persuasively that discussions are between cross-cutting cleavages of opinion which help to encourage consensus politics. Once again, he provides the clear evidence of different opinions in the Soviet Union but refuses to suggest they are of anything but academic importance. This persistent refusal to accept the grey areas of issues is deplorable in any analysis, but especially lamentable in an explicitly policy-relevant study. Since completing the manuscript, Lenczowski joined the Reagan administration and thus the misperceptions become a cause not just of lament but of deep concern.

University of Leicester GERALD SEGAL

The Islamic threat to the Soviet state. By Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 170pp. Index. £12·95.

THIS is a frustrating and, ultimately, an unsatisfactory book. It contains occasional insights of great value and a perceptive set of conclusions. But these latter seem to me to have almost no connection with the main body of the text.

Professor Bennigsen and his co-author have attempted in this volume to review the history of relations between Slavs (or rather Russians) and Muslims almost since the Arab incursions into Central Asia in the seventh century. They believe that this historical overview can add to our understanding of the attitudes that both groups bring to their present relationships. In principle I share this assumption, but with only 170 pages at their disposal the authors have been forced to treat the history of Slav–Muslim (or Russian–Turkic) relations in such a schematic way that it becomes meaningless if not misleading. The Russian drive into the Pontic Steppe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for example, is discussed without reference to Russo–Austrian, Austro–Ottoman and Russo–Ottoman relations; nor is there any discussion of the role of material culture (weapons or industrial technologies) in Russian expansion into Kazakhstan and Central Asia.

This neglect of the economic and social side of things vitiates the book's analysis of more recent periods too. Bennigsen and Broxup identify two strands in Russian (and Soviet) Muslim society and culture; one of these we may call *jadid* after the liberal educational reformers of the late nineteenth century. *Jadidchilar* believe in the possibility of constructing a modern industrial society in Central Asia and hence in the desirability of maintaining links with Russia. The other strand, conservative, xenophobic and unenlightened, we may call *taqlid*—after that attribute of Muslim theology which enjoins blind obedience to traditional authority. *Taqlidchilar* believe in the necessity of re-establishing Muslim independence and of returning, perhaps, to the purity of the early Islamic state. This strand in Muslim opinion

fascinates and, I believe, attracts the authors; much of the book is written in a tone which suggests that principled and total opposition to Soviet power on religious grounds—and consequently a return to pre-existing authoritarian social relations—is the only defensible position a Muslim can adopt. But what I have called the *jadid* and the *taqlid* are not unknown in other Muslim societies: similar conflicts between reformists and fundamentalists can be seen in Pakistan, in Iran, in Turkey. It is possible to argue that they reflect an intellectual response to social and economic development. Bennigsen and Broxup, however, ignore this dimension—and this leads them into error.

Similarly, the failure to consider social and economic factors leads to a misleading assessment of the probabilities to be attached to alternative courses of development between now and the end of the century. Still, *The Islamic threat to the Soviet state* is thought-provoking and lucidly written. But at more than seven and a half pence a page, the book is grossly over-priced.

University of Essex ALASTAIR MCAULEY

Moscow's Muslim challenge. By Michael Rywkin. London: Hurst. 1982. 184pp. £10·50.

IN this short and popular book Michael Rywkin argues that '. . . Soviet Central Asia is bound to become [Moscow's] number one internal preoccupation by the last decade of our century' (p. 153). He foretells this outcome because, first, Moscow's policies have failed to penetrate and break up the web of allegiances that create the Muslim identity and second, because demographic evolution will bring Muslims into numerical (and hence politico-economic) dominance by the beginning of the next century.

Rywkin attempts to establish his case in the ten short chapters that make up this book—three dealing with a history of Central-Asian–Russian relations, six dealing with various aspects of the socio-political environment in the post-Stalin period and a conclusion. Each of these is clearly written but too frequently the author resorts to assertion rather than providing evidence for the propositions he wishes to prove. Also, there is too little reference to other studies (Western, Russian or Central Asian) that deal with his thesis. These shortcomings are probably due to space limitations or to the author's desire to write a popular book, accessible to a wider reading public. But they are unfortunate since they undermine the validity of his argument (or rather, they make it much less convincing).

The crux of Rywkin's position is that there exists a Central Asian national identity (he calls it Muslim) that is widely, indeed universally shared in Soviet Central Asia. This identity has proved impervious to Moscow's social and economic policies and thus the Soviet government is faced with a growing nationalist threat to its strategic position in the area. But this argument can be criticized on a number of counts. First, and least important, it is misleading in the late twentieth century to talk of a Muslim identity in the USSR. There is very little evidence to suggest that the recrudescence of Islamic fundamentalism, such as we witness in Iran or Pakistan, strikes any resonance in the USSR. Rather, fifty years of Soviet education do appear to have resulted in the widespread acceptance of the tenets of secular rationalism. As Michael Zand has argued, Central Asian culture is no longer Muslim: it is now closer to Moscow's than to that of Teheran or Kabul.

More importantly, one can challenge Rywkin's assertion of Central Asian unity (whether Muslim or not) and his claims about the growth of nationalism. To take the latter point first: Rywkin makes no attempt to specify cross-culturally valid indexes of nationalist feeling or to provide evidence that in *terms of such indicators* nationalism is becoming more rife in Central Asia. I suspect that an equally plausible argument could be mounted to demonstrate the success with which Soviet policy has avoided exacerbating nationalist sentiments. As with Jaruzelski's Poland, Moscow has secured the allegiance of a substantial elite; for its members (and their clients) nationalist symbols and separatist policies are relatively unattractive. Thus, one can scarcely agree that Uzbeks, say, are united in their attitudes to Moscow; also, intra-Asian rivalries and antipathies can be as extreme as Asian resentment of Great Russian chauvinism. One can even take issue with Rywkin's demographic prognosis. The picture is at once more complex and less 'gloomy' than depicted by Rywkin. This is a pity, since there is scope for a new, popular, and more open-minded reassessment of the Soviet position in Central Asia.

University of Essex ALASTAIR MCAULEY

Afghanistan under Soviet domination 1964–81. By Anthony Hyman. London: Macmillan. 1982. 223pp. Index. £20·00.

AFGHANISTAN was a far-off country of which many laymen knew little or nothing before the Soviet invasion of Christmas 1979. To this extent, the need for a variety of easily assimilable books about the country, complete with background information for the non-specialist, has since then been self-evident; several such works have in fact appeared.

Anthony Hyman offers us here a journalist's-eye view of events in Afghanistan since the Saur Revolution of April, 1978. However he delves back to 1964, and in a more general sense beyond, in order to place recent events into a proper historical perspective. In fact part one (almost a third of the work) consists of four informative background chapters which introduce the reader to the geography and socio-political history of this rugged, quintessentially border territory with its heterogeneous ethnic composition—a pawn for so long in the 'Great Game' of Empire, a land 'rich only in rocks and stones', and 'an elastic substance placed between the unyielding fabric of colonial sovereignties, [which] could bend and bounce in a way that the defined boundaries of colonies could not' (p. 39). The six remaining chapters which constitute part two describe the Saur Revolution and its effects and examine in greater detail the changes which Nur M. Taraki was able to make before being displaced by the more feared and hated Hafizullah Amin. The story continues through to the Soviet invasion and concludes with a postscript, taking us virtually as far as its second anniversary.

This is a book essentially about Afghanistan rather than about its 'Great Northern Neighbour', as some members of the Khalq faction were wont to term the Soviet Union. Its strength lies in its successful delineation of tribal and political factions, whose diversity and complexity render analysis of Afghan politics so difficult; also in the author's ability to disentangle Marxists, Maoists and Muslims, Pathans and Pushtuns; and most importantly perhaps to provide the necessary historical clues which can help towards an understanding of the differences dividing the two Marxist factions, Khalq and Parcham. Inevitably the book seems less satisfactory as the exposition and explanation of Soviet domination that is suggested, perhaps, in the title. We see Kabul swarming with Soviet advisers; we read about the Soviet Ambassador, Puzanov, playing a somewhat imprecise role as a power behind Taraki's throne and in the conflict between the two factions within the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan; and we are told of Moscow's spiriting away of Babrak Karmal and his senior associates before their reinstatement following the invasion/invitation. These developments, however, are not themselves treated in great depth.

What does emerge, however, is a picture of a fragmented and anarchistic land moving more quickly than before towards political unity and national awareness through the one force long considered capable of bringing Afghanistan's diverse elements together: foreign invasion. Hyman's concluding verdict on the Soviet adventure suggests that the Karmal regime has failed to win acceptance in the country as a whole and that Soviet officials are now resigned, more or less stoically, to shouldering 'the marxist version of the "White Man's Burden"' (p. 199).

University of Hull M. C. CHAPMAN

The Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula: Soviet policy towards the Persian Gulf and Arabia. By Areyeh Yodfat. London, Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St Martin's. 1983. 191pp. Index. £13·95.

A STUDY of the Soviet Union and the Arabian Peninsula raises two main difficulties. In the first place, even with the extensive use of Soviet, Arab and Iranian sources made by Areyeh Yodfat, is it really possible to come up with anything very new either in terms of material, or even interpretation? The Arabian peninsula after all has not been a primary area of Soviet involvement, even when Iraq is taken into account, and few public sources are very illuminating. Secondly, given the very disparate nature of Soviet relations with the various states—close with South Yemen, virtually non-existent with Qatar or Oman, how does one provide an element of intellectual coherence to what often seems a patchwork of bilateral relationships and non-relationships?

Areyeh Yodfat's book doesn't really succeed in solving either of these problems. It is useful for finding out the state of Soviet relations with any particular country at one time and in chronicling Soviet analyses of the prospects of what Western writers would call 'stability'

in Saudi Arabia. But the underlying themes remain largely implicit. This is a pity, because Mr Yodfat has a good sense of perspective about a subject which sometimes attracts uncritical alarmism, particularly in the United States. He brings out the long-term perspective of Soviet policy in trying to break down the resistance of the five Gulf states which still stubbornly refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with Moscow: Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Soviet strategy remains to try to establish formal links with governments today while never foreclosing the option of more indirect support for those movements which oppose the existing order which will, on a Soviet assessment, eventually give away to more radical anti-Western government in the region. 'For the time being' Mr Yodfat writes, 'the Soviets are interested in having a presence in the Gulf region or somewhere nearby, and as broad as possible a diplomatic representation. They are trying to create a situation that will enable them to influence developments in their favour at a time of dramatic internal changes which, they believe, will come within the next few years' (p. 158). But if these dramatic changes do come there is little reason to believe from the past record that the Soviet Union will gain anywhere near as much as the West might lose. There is, as Mr Yodfat suggests, a certain element of wishful thinking in Soviet policy. As he notes on page 157: 'The Soviets apparently believe that by signing long-term friendship treaties with Middle Eastern countries they can ensure their permanent friendship. That is not the real situation; nothing is permanent in the Middle East. Former allies become enemies and former enemies become friends.'

PETER MANGOLD

The USSR and Africa: foreign policy under Khrushchev. By Dan C. Heldman. New York: Praeger. 1981. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 187pp. Index. £20·00.

DAN HELDMAN begins by surveying eight explanations offered by specialists as the key to understanding Soviet foreign policy. The eight have four common factors: ideology, institutions, events and personalities. Mr Heldman suggests that an examination of these factors would facilitate an assessment of their operational mix in particular policies. He does not suggest what the mix is in Khrushchev's African policy.

The focus then shifts to the Third World. The author analyses Tsarist views of and relations with the countries of Africa, their place in the writings of Marx, Engels and Lenin, and Soviet relations with the colonial countries prior to the death of Stalin. The doctrinal revisions of the 20th Party Congress necessitated the construction of the concept of 'states of national democracy' to describe those states of the 'third camp' which were being courted by the Soviet Union. However, developments within those countries, particularly the treatment of progressive political parties, soon made the theory irrelevant. Soviet writers began to use the term *slozhnost'* (complexity) to denote that developments in the Third World were not following the expected course. Recognition of complications also reflected the fact that information and experience were enabling a more sophisticated assessment of the Third World.

In investigating Soviet policy towards African states, Heldman finds that it was directed towards encouraging anti-Western neutrality, offering a model of development and aiding in the struggle against neo-colonialism. He concentrates on aid and trade agreements and the extent to which they were considered successful, finding that North African states were more important than those of sub-Saharan Africa and providing a succinct analysis of the strategic situation which made North Africa an obvious target of Soviet policy. Mr Heldman employs a variety of statistical methods on available data to test his hypotheses that Soviet policy towards African states was based on various assessments of their foreign and domestic policies and that Soviet economic relations were rewarded by African support for Soviet international positions. He points out that although many Stalinist ideological precepts were abandoned in the Khrushchev era, the concept of 'socialism in one country' which implies the priority of Soviet state interests, 'appears clearly to be a continuing policy operant' (p. 114). Moreover, while Soviet policy has become more pragmatic and realistic, the fundamental notion of *partiinost'* has not been affected. In that sense Soviet policy continues to be ideological.

It is a pity that this book is too expensive for most students. It is a model of excellent scholarship. Carefully documented and lucidly written, it also contains an extensive bibli-

ography. As far as English language sources are concerned, the bibliography is almost exhaustive in terms of American publications. British publications figure less prominently (neither Dawisha, nor Adomeit's Adelphi paper are mentioned, for example). The author is strangely selective of Russian language publications. His claim that the serious Soviet journals he mentions 'are not readily available outside the Soviet orbit' (p. 146) would not withstand the kind of empirical investigation he so laudably employs.

University of Surrey MARGOT LIGHT

Soviet policy in East Asia. Edited by Donald S. Zagoria. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1983. 360pp. Index. £21·00.

THE Soviet Union is a power in East Asia, but not an East Asian power. This, and other dilemmas of Soviet policy in the area are crucial to a broad understanding of the Kremlin's strategy in East Asia. It is therefore especially disappointing that when the United States Council on Foreign Relations gathers together a bevy of experts to study Soviet Far Eastern policy, it proves unable to get to the heart of these predicaments of Soviet power.

Instead, the editor and contributors focus on three main themes, all with a more or less serious US-centered bias. First, they are concerned with the expansion of the 'Soviet threat' in East Asia. As few of the chapters actually conclude that this threat is real or imminent, it seems in fact to have been a red herring question. Secondly, they are convinced of the underlying strength of the Sino-American relationship and its enduring importance for dealing with the 'Soviet threat'. The continuing evidence of deep Sino-American differences over a variety of issues makes this second theme distinctly hollow. Thirdly, the contributors seem obsessed with the relevance of Soviet policy for the formulation of United States policy. Thus there is a related tendency to dismiss opportunities for change in Sino-Soviet relations. This unfortunate line, coupled with equally unfortunate timing of the book's publication in the wake of renewed Sino-Soviet negotiations, makes the book look dated just as it is published.

Despite these serious flaws, there are some sparkling gems lurking in the dense type. John Stephan on the Soviet conception of Asia is often fascinating for setting Soviet policy in an overall context. Ed Hewett and Herbert Levine take us through the especially dense problems of Soviet economic relations with the region, but do provide easily understood conclusions. Similarly, Robert Campbell's chapter on the prospects for Siberian development makes the very important point that Siberia is neither a quagmire nor a bonanza for Soviet development. Indeed the best chapters all have in common a concentration on the domestic side of Soviet policy, and one that allows the authors to drift away from the American-centered perspective. Thus it seems plain that the main problem with this book lies in its overall conception. It is difficult to tell whether this ethnocentric analysis is an unavoidable problem for American analysts, or just a temporary product of the recent Reagan-induced change in foreign policy. Whatever the case, it is a vivid example of the gap separating the perceptions of the United States from those of its key allies.

University of Leicester GERALD SEGAL

Stalinism: its impact on Russia and the world. Edited by G. R. Urban. London: Temple Smith. 1982. 454pp. Index. £15·00.

G. R. URBAN has acquired a considerable reputation as an interviewer on all matters relating to communism. Several of his series of extended interviews in this area have now been published, among them *Detente* (1976), *Eurocommunism* (1978) and *Communist reformation* (1979). The volume under review is, like them, the product of a series of dialogues originally broadcast by Radio Free Europe, edited and occasionally amplified for publication in book form. It is the first of Mr Urban's series of interviews to deal directly with the Soviet experience, but in a sense all the interviews have been about the same subject, despite their different titles: about Marxism, and its relationship to the socialist movement in Russia and the West, and to wider themes of democracy and liberty. *Stalinism* contains ten extended interviews upon these matters, as well as an introduction by the editor and a concluding discussion by Leonard Schapiro; it is an interesting book but one which, taken as a whole,

reveals both the limitations as well as the advantages of conducting scholarly investigations in such a manner.

Several of the contributors to the volume, for instance, such as Adam Ulam and Leszek Kolakowski, have already written about the subject more fully elsewhere in works which will be well known to most readers. Others, such as Boris Bazhanov and Averell Harriman, have interesting things to say about Stalin based upon their personal experiences, but the interview as distinct from the book or article provides no opportunity for the documentation and reference to sources which is essential to the serious student of such matters. Inevitably, perhaps, in such a series, there is also a good deal of repetition, as interview after interview returns to the questions which most preoccupy Mr Urban, such as the relationship between Marxism and Russia's historical past. The contributions, moreover, are rather heterogeneous, at least if 'Stalinism' is not to be interpreted intolerably widely. Only about half of the contributions relate directly to the USSR, for instance; the others deal with China (Roderick MacFarquhar and Bao Rui-wang), the Austrian Communist Party (Theodor Prager) and other more or less peripheral matters.

On the other hand the extended interview format does allow a skilled practitioner such as Urban to probe insistently at certain key questions, adding evidence and arguments of his own whenever this is helpful to the discussion, and in some cases at least the result can be more illuminating than a more conventional academic treatment. I thought this was particularly the case in the interview with Robert C. Tucker, entitled 'A choice of Lenins?', in which Tucker explores the relationship between Bolshevism and the Russian past and then puts forward his own thesis, that there is indeed a 'fundamental continuity between the Russian past and the Soviet present' but that the relationship should be seen as one of reversion rather than of continuity. Tucker has not, to my knowledge, discussed these matters as extensively elsewhere; taken in conjunction with Urban's comments and Schapiro's concluding reflections it represents an important contribution to the continuing debate upon this question, and more than justifies the decision to make these interviews available in a more permanent and accessible form.

University of Glasgow STEPHEN WHITE

Policy and politics in contemporary Poland: reform, failure and crisis. Edited by Jean Woodall. London: Pinter. 1982.

FOR eighteen months Lech Walesa and Solidarity held the West's attention as the standard bearers of reform in Poland. Yet it was the steady collapse of an earlier reform movement, whose grandiose schemes were so wildly out of step with material reality, that provided the breeding ground for the ferment that gripped the country, and, from mid-1980 onwards, thrust Solidarity to the centre of the stage. The nine chapters in this volume aim to explain how the failure of Gierek's reforms created the circumstances that gave birth to Solidarity, rather than to describe the rise of Solidarity itself. Thus they trace the disintegration of the economy, the weakening of the party's hold on affairs, the disappointed expectations. They demonstrate how the very measures introduced by Gomulka's successors gradually worked against the realization of the hopes that his departure had aroused. There was the over-ambitious attempt to modernize the economy which had involved a devolution of power to individual enterprises, and an unprecedented level of investment. It was Poland's misfortune that this should have been financed by hard currency loans which linked its economy firmly to that of the West, which was itself about to plunge into debilitating recession. George Blazyca describes the incoherent and ill-judged dash for growth that could not be sustained, and Paul Lewis explains how the economy simply ran amok amidst disequilibria that were beyond the Communist Party's competence to control. It is weaknesses in the Party itself that emerge as the other, perhaps greater, culprit, since despite the many crises of the postwar years, the Party remained rigidly unable to cope. George Kolankiewicz shows a bureaucratic party elite, the typical New Class, reluctant to respond to pressures from below lest it lose the material privileges that accompanied its political position. In the vacuum left by the Party's loss of authority, Solidarity came to the fore.

The common theme running through the book is that the disparity between the vision and the reality of the Gierek years threw Poland into confusion and uncertainty yet again. All the chapters were written in the summer of 1981 and so precede the crushing of Solidarity

by the introduction of martial law in December of that year. Furthermore, the eight contributors were essentially concerned to interpret events between summer 1980 and 1981 in terms of the immediate past, rather than to foretell the future. Given this remit, it would perhaps be unfair to criticize them for failing to warn of impending army rule, but throughout they display an optimism and confidence in Solidarity's future which events were soon to prove unjustified.

ELIZABETH BALSOM

Middle East

Faith and power: the politics of Islam. By Edward Mortimer. London: Faber. 1982. 432pp. Index. £10·50. Pb.: £5·95.

Recognizing Islam: an anthropologist's introduction. By Michael Gilsenan. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 287pp. Index. £13·95. Pb.: £6·95.

BOTH these books are about the political and social significance of Islam today, but they are different in character and treat different aspects of this important subject. Mortimer's writing has the clarity and readability of good journalism. He evidently does not have access to untranslated material in Islamic languages, but, besides his own personal observations and contacts, he uses carefully the best secondary sources, including Hourani, Rodinson and Niyazi Berkes. The book is divided into two: 'Historical background' and 'Islam, state and nation: six case studies'. The latter comprises chapters on Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, 'Arab Nationalism and Muslim Brotherhood', Iran, and the Soviet Union. He is aware that neither reform nor revival in Islam originated, as is so often assumed, with Napoleon's invasion of Egypt, and it is an unusual pleasure to find in a book like this mention of the theological activity in seventeenth century Iran. His sensible conclusion is that 'Western notions about "Islam" as a geopolitical force . . . are fundamentally misplaced. I believe it is more useful, in politics at any rate, to think about Muslims than to think about Islam . . . Islam is a political culture: it often provides the form and the vocabulary of political action. It can greatly strengthen personal commitment to a cause. But it is not in itself a sufficient explanation for the commitment, or a sufficient content for the cause' (pp. 406–7). The book has been pleasantly produced and printed with what is now unusual accuracy.

So serviceable a work is likely to be used for some time and it is therefore worth while mentioning a few minor errors and omissions for correction in another edition. The entry 'Imam' in the glossary does not mention that the title is given to some Sunni divines like Ghazali and to the jurists after whom the legal schools are called. Again, the definition of 'Ikhwan' refers only to the Ikhwan of Najd; nowadays a reader is more likely to find the word referring to the organization founded by Hasan al-Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood. Turkish is by no means the only Muslim language not written in the Arabic script (p. 25): Bengali and Divehi (Maldivian) have distinctive scripts; Malay, Indonesian and Swahili, among others, are written in Latin, and Soviet Central Asian languages in modified versions of Cyrillic, script. The Ibadi community in East Africa did not survive the Zanzibar revolution of 1964 (p. 42). The Mamluk victory at Goliath's Well in 1260 did not save Europe from Mongol devastation (p. 82); it saved Egypt. The Ilkhans, who were defeated, were tentatively allied with Christian rulers, who would have welcomed a Mongol victory. Any threat to Europe came from the Golden Horde, which was often at war with the Ilkhans. It is misleading to state that 'when the Turkish Republic adopted Latin script, Stalin made Soviet Muslims switch to the Russian Cyrillic alphabet' (p. 384). Atatürk imposed the Latin script in 1928. About the same time the Soviet government imposed a unified Latin alphabet for what they regarded as six distinct languages in Central Asia. Modified versions of Cyrillic were not introduced for them till 1940.

Gilsenan's writing is commendably free from technical jargon, but is somewhat whimsical and can be obscure. What is a 'global universe' (p. 216) or 'total language' (p. 225)? 'The Holy Book had to take its definitive and final organized structure' (p. 27); presumably this merely means that a definitive text of the Qur'an was needed. Sentences like the following occur: 'As the Salafiya had its impact at a particular global juncture of the world capitalist system . . . so the implications of this accusation resonate through the same space at a

different stage of the relations of these societies to the dominant powers in that system and originating from a different social level' (p. 156). However, the pertinacious reader will not go unrewarded. The author is concerned with 'class opposition, groups and individuals using the same signs and codes but seeing events in quite different ways, concealed significances in social life, complex relations to wider historical changes in power relations and the economy' (p. 11). He has something to say about Morocco, where he relies on other anthropologists, and a Shi'i village in south Lebanon, but is at his best when writing about the subjects of his own field-work, a Sufi order in Egypt and a village in north Lebanon. He is a patient, careful, modest and sympathetic observer and a cautious analyst. He 'draws attention to the danger of stereotypical images of another society and another religion' (p. 11). His book thus complements Mortimer's, which deals rather with Islam in national and international politics.

The Kathiri sultans of 'Seyyun' (Saiwun) were not, by the way, 'a British-appointed family' (p. 9); they were ruling parts of Hadhramaut centuries before the British arrived.

C. F. BECKINGHAM

The Middle East problem in the 1980s. By Harold H. Saunders. Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 83pp. $4.75.

Violence and peace-building in the Middle East. Edited by Mari'on Mushkat. (Proceedings of a symposium held by the Israeli Institute for the Study of International Affairs.) Munich, London: Saur. 1982. 194pp. £12·50.

WHY, and for whom, one is bound to ask, are such books written? Neither of these two works makes a serious contribution to the wide problematic suggested by their titles; neither, even at the time of publication, could be regarded as either up to date or original, and neither contains information or ideas which would enlighten the general reader or stimulate the specialist. Saunders has written an essay outlining American policy options in the Middle East in a series of sententious generalizations which raise awkward questions about the naiveté of the American diplomatic service, while Mushkat has collected together some twenty short essays—only two are more than ten pages long—on violence and peace-keeping seen almost entirely from a right-of-centre Israeli perspective, or by non-Israeli supporters of such a perspective. The general tone of the two books—the good Americans, the bad Russians, the civilized Israelis with their democratic government, the uncivilized Arabs with their military dictatorships—reveals a singularly simple-minded as well as fundamentally misleading approach to the area.

A former State Department official, Saunders approaches the Middle East 'problem' exclusively from the viewpoint of American interests. The countries of the region are thus simply pawns, to be manipulated, for their own good, by the United States in order to counter Soviet influence. Saunders is concerned, however, to urge that this should be done properly:

> Given the increasing strength of local nationalism during the last two decades of this century, a first line of defense against further Soviet expansion will be to strengthen and cooperate with moderate national forces (p. 4);
>
> Sometimes, regrettably, we are simply insensitive to the aspirations and problems of other peoples (p. 17);
>
> We need to acknowledge honestly that the degree of our concern for stability is partly determined by a government's political leaning (p. 20).

Saunders' overall conclusions may be summarized as follows: the United States should adopt 'a forward-looking posture towards change' in developing countries; it should develop a 'comprehensive diplomatic–military–economic strategy toward the whole [Middle Eastern] area'; US diplomacy should be 'active . . . in reducing the causes of conflict and moving the conflict toward resolution'; the United States should 'broaden the field of cooperation with [the oil producing states]'; arms control measures 'can become a realistic part of the international system that is emerging provided that they are built in to the emerging relationships between states', and finally 'the principles of international conduct recorded in the United Nations Charter will deserve renewed attention.' (pp. 81–2) Well.

As already indicated, most of Mushkat's contributors do not provide anything more enlightening. Apart from a useful summary of one of the more pragmatic Palestinian

positions by Elias Tuma of the University of California at Davis, the interest of the volume lies largely in the doublethink the authors apply to Jews/Israelis on one side and Arabs/ Palestinians on the other. Examples can be picked out almost at random:

> After all, the Palestinian Arabs already have their own sovereign state, although for the time being it is ruled by the Hashemite dynasty (Mushkat's introduction, p. 5);
> It is impossible to deny completely the Jewish history of the last 2000 years and its impact on the history of the Middle East . . . but it is also impossible to deny the hundred years [sic] of Arab presence in the region. (Mushkat's essay, p. 134—even if this is a misprint for 'hundreds of years' it is still pretty extraordinary).

In fairness to Mushkat, it must be noted that the collection is taken from the proceedings of a conference held in 1979 or 1980 (the introduction is dated April 1980), and thus precedes both the assassination of President Sadat and the invasion of Lebanon. The statement that 'Almost all participants . . . strongly criticised the contention of many "orientalists" that there are few (if any) prospects for the implementation of the Camp David agreements' (p. 9) and the general optimism surrounding the Egyptian–Israeli peace process shows how quickly dated such studies can become. The collection is more informative of a particular school of thought among Israeli politicians and academics than of the realities of the contemporary Middle East.

University of Durham PETER SLUGLETT

Arab oil policies in the 1970s: opportunity and responsibility. By Yusif A. Sayigh. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1982. 271pp. Index. £11·95.

DR SAYIGH promises his reader an objective and balanced account of his subject, based on the theme that the 1970s presented the Arab oil-exporting countries with both opportunity and responsibility. He carefully defines the range of policies in terms of acquiring control, upstream and downstream operations, pricing, development use of oil revenues, regional and international relations. He asserts that the benefits of Arab governments taking control 'were not restricted to the oil-exporting countries, but were world-wide in scope, including in their reach the fields of energy as a whole, the industrial consuming countries, and the Third World' (p. 32). The author then claims that his book is devoted to proving this assertion.

His arguments are too familiar. Before the oil exporters acquired control, oil was grossly and unfairly underpriced; control enabled these countries to 'introduce substantial corrections in the price of oil'. It is in the interest of all that oil should fetch a 'fair price', which rewards the producers for the depletion of their main natural resource and encourages conservation as well as development of alternative sources, etc. To the author, the proof that oil was underpriced before 1970 lies in '. . . the fact that to-day, about one decade after the initiation of substantial price correction in the autumn and winter of 1973, the demand for oil is still greater than for any other source of energy' (pp. 178–9). Throughout the book Dr Sayigh makes heavy weather of the theme of interdependence. All parties concerned have interdependent and complementary interests; therefore they must all cooperate. The industrial countries are interested in the 'security of supply'. The volume of supply is to be determined simply by first deducting (from what?) the needs of the Arab countries as a whole: 'The residue will be available for export, and it will have to be apportioned between the Third World and the OECD countries . . .' (p. 253). But security of supply must be matched by what the author calls 'security of demand'; the OECD countries do not qualify for a reciprocal privilege of treating Arab oil as residual. 'OPEC (and OAPEC) oil must not be a residual supply, nor should demand for it remain a residual demand, if interdependence is to be genuine not merely a play on words' (p. 239). Evidently, markets have no place in Dr Sayigh's scheme of things. In addition, the industrial countries have a responsibility to enable the Arab oil exporters to acquire industrial technology and to industrialize.

Reviewing the Arabs' record, the author is inclined to believe that they have 'acted with an excessive sense of international responsibility' (p. 247) towards the OECD countries and 'have not betrayed the trust of the Third World' or the cause of striving for the New International Economic Order. The Arabs' own development record has not been without problems, but the author is hopeful: 'Given the innate intelligence and dynamism that the Arabs have shown to possess since their early history, it is reasonable to expect that they will not be very slow in displaying the ability to correct the errors that have beset the course, the

structure, and the content of development so far pursued' (p. 230). All in all, the Arabs have done the world a world of good which the world has not yet appreciated. Does it add up to cloud-cuckoo-land, an Arab view of the real world, or simply an Arab writer blowing his own trumpet? The book is the more astounding for being written by a seasoned professor of economics and published at a time when the world is still struggling to cope with the aftermath of the 1970s oil crises, even though it is beginning to get round OPEC's oil, which is increasingly playing less of a crucial and more of a residual role. If Arab decision-makers hold views similar to Dr Sayigh's, then markets still have a great deal of realism to teach.

School of Oriental & African Studies, London A. K. SELBY

Palestine and the Gulf: proceedings of an international seminar held at the Institute for Palestine Studies. Edited by R. Khalidi and C. Mansour. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies. 1982. 347pp.

THIS book is a relatively easy read on the subject of the Gulf. The reason for this perhaps lies in the fact that the twelve studies which make up this volume were papers delivered at the Institute for Palestine Studies in Beirut in November 1981 and their style is verbal and communicative. The authors are drawn from, among others, the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, the Institute of Oriental Studies, Moscow, and *Le Monde*. The papers are categorized into three sections. Part one deals with the general concerns which affect the Gulf—world economy, oil consumption and production, international trade links and global and regional military considerations. Part two examines the attitudes and behaviour of Western Europe, the NATO alliance, the United States and the Soviet Union towards the Gulf, and part three concentrates on the local and regional factors of influence, among them the PLO and Israel. The Palestine question is a constant theme, but not a dominating one as the title of the book may suggest. Its influence on Gulf policies and its affect on regional and international attitudes towards the Gulf are dealt with in parts two and three comprehensively and fairly. The importance of a Palestinian state to the stability of the region is a point well made but not laboured. There has been no attempt by the editors in any way to arrange or standardize the papers in favour of any view or theory. The papers are refreshingly individual and contradict each other at times on points of emphasis or interpretation. They are, however, all in agreement that the Gulf not only is and will remain for some time the vulnerable centre of regional politics but will continue to have a significant role in global strategy. What *Palestine and the Gulf* lacks in heavy detail it makes up for in reliable shortcuts to understanding the nature of the region, its increasing importance and its dangerous vulnerability to instability, making it a good general introduction to the area for the student.

KATE E. MAGUIRE

Security in the Gulf. By Shahram Chubin, Robert Litwak and Avi Plascov. Aldershot, Hants: Gower for International Institute for Strategic Studies. 580pp. Index. £20·00.

THIS is a collection of four studies by the three authors amounting to just under 600 pages of thorough research into and contextualized analyses of just about anything which affects or potentially affects the Gulf and its security. It examines these influences and interferences which in turn can send repercussions throughout the Middle East and the rest of the world.

The four papers, entitled 'Domestic political factors', 'Sources of inter-state conflict', 'Modernization, political development and stability' and 'The role of outside powers' were originally researched, written and published for the International Institute for Strategic Studies. Shahram Chubin, contributor of two of the studies, one as editor and the other as sole author, is well recognized for his expertise in Gulf studies. He does, however, make statements and conclusions, particularly in his introductions, with such authority that they can be mistaken for 'facts'. One can be diverted by Mr Chubin's obvious experience of the area from questioning more closely the bases of these statements. His strong analytical approach to the Middle East leads him to categorize the behaviour of the region in neat, convincing black and white, which is an admirable feat in itself but can at times submerge the shades. But Mr Chubin's work on the Gulf is invaluable and always worth reading. Robert Litwak and Avi Plascov's contributions maintain the high standard and Mr Plascov, who

spent some time at the Institute researching the problems of Israel and the occupied territories, proves himself no less a scholar on the Gulf.

My reservations about this volume are practical rather than academic. First, there is no general introduction to the work and it appears that a title page has been missed out. Secondly, I am not entirely convinced that the IISS policy of volume-binding published studies is a good one. Serious students of the area are likely to have one if not all of the studies already and from a reference point of view, single 'Adelphi' style studies are easier to consult. But it looks impressive on the bookshelf—and it does have an index!

KATE E. MAGUIRE

Between battles and ballots: Israeli military in politics. By Yoram Peri. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983. 344pp. Index. £19·50.

THIS is an ambitious book and a first-rate one. While making useful contributions to the political sociology of the military in modern times, the book tells a great deal that students of Israeli politics and society need to know. Peri brings to light material normally protected from scrutiny by military censorship or shrouded in the shadow of mythology, and brilliantly deploys it to cast light on Israeli politics.

With mastery no doubt derived from his experience outside academia, Peri shows conclusively that the Israeli army was never far removed from party politics. Ben-Gurion assiduously projected an image of the 'instrumental' army controlled by the civilian government and geared to implementing its policies with blind professionalism. In the very elaboration of this myth Ben-Gurion actively politicized the military to the advantage of his own party. The 'old man' left a legacy of blurred and permeable boundaries between the civil and military arenas to suit his own personal temperament and serve his own dominance.

The weakness of the constitutional fabric of civil-military relations was exposed in the crisis of the Sharett government of 1954, when Ben-Gurion went into temporary retirement. For the first time the premiership was separated from the defence ministry and the two incumbents, Sharett and Lavon, were not only at loggerheads with each other but in bitter contention with Dayan, the chief of staff. The blurring of boundaries and roles thirty years ago was reflected in the ease with which the chief of staff carried out his own policies in the field while deliberately undermining the civilian government. Peri provides rich detail on the interactions of military and civilian values and institutions during the major wars and crises since that time. He shows that the pattern of civilian control over the military is merely nominal: in practice there is mutual civil-military involvement in all decisions of importance. Rather than a subordinate military arm of government he sees a civilian-military copartnership shaping policy at all levels, and so acting out all the political conflicts of the system, including party conflicts, and especially those among different segments of the Labour hierarchy. Peri demonstrates that in conditions of crisis the political leadership typically 'relegated to marginal significance the deterioration in political-military relations and concentrated on trying to solve the central political problem' (p. 260) in which military decisions were enmeshed.

Peri sees the history of civil-military relations in Israel lurching from crisis to crisis in a downward spiral of deterioration so far as political stability is concerned. The role of the army as an army of occupation after 1967 ties the military into the ideological and political schisms that the occupation has generated within the polity at large. The military is thus highly politicized while the civilian polity is militarized. Generals increasingly rule, whether in uniform or in shirt-sleeves.

It is impossible in a short review to do justice to Peri's work. It is full of good questions, good insights and suggestive answers for which all students of Israeli politics will be indebted.

University of Sheffield NOAH LUCAS

Iraq: the contemporary state. Edited by Tim Niblock. London, Canberra: Croom Helm for Centre for Arab Gulf Studies, Exeter. 1982. 283pp. Index. £14·95.

THIS is a collection of papers from a conference held in 1981 by the Centre for Arab Gulf Studies of the University of Exeter. Like all conference collections the contributions are

uneven in quality but intentionally or unintentionally they give a good sense of social, economic and political development in Iraq.

The papers divide roughly into four general areas. The strongest and most informative set of papers deals with economic development. These examine the results of agricultural, industrial and manpower development and assess the performance of the Ba'thist regime.

Articles on social development deal with the changing role of women and the illiteracy campaign. Amal al-Sharqi sees emancipation under the Ba'th while Amal Rassam argues that although there have been some reforms in legislation the regime has not really attempted to deal with basic social institutions and values and has moved with 'caution and extreme moderation'. The article by Alya Sousa on the eradication of illiteracy reads like a Ba'thist tract and is uninformative and unconvincing.

The chapters which cover politics are rather varied in quality and scope. Joe Stork provides a useful overview of the relationship between class structure and state power, but the scope of the article is too ambitious for the space and results in oversimplification; also, the language at times is laboured ('the state represented a striking condensation of the balance of existing social forces' p. 28), crude ('The State as boss' p. 41) and oddly facetious ('Will the Iraqi ruling class please stand up' p. 44). He concludes that the 'locus of control of political and economic power around a handful of individuals is a point of weakness in the development of Iraq's production relations' (p. 45). This is made much more concrete in John Townsend's article on industrial development. Peter Mansfield examines the pragmatic style of leadership of the Iraqi president in an article entitled 'Saddam Husain's political thinking: the comparison with Nasser'. The title is misleading as to the depth of the Iraqi president's speeches and writings and his political stature. Sa'ad Jawad's 'Recent developments in the Kurdish issue' is interesting for what it does not contain. It clearly analyses the breakdown of Kurdish–Ba'thist relations over the autonomy agreement and the consequent war but says nothing about the consequences of the imposition of the autonomy agreement in the Kurdish areas.

The fourth area of concern is Iraq's foreign relations. H. G. Balfour-Paul provides an account of Iraq and Fertile Crescent unity schemes between 1920 and 1948. Tim Niblock analyses policy towards the Arab Gulf states between 1958 and 1981 and Naomi Sakr concentrates on post-1975 economic relations with the Gulf States. Although not treated at any length the Islamic revolution and the Iraqi–Iranian war cast their shadows over both articles. The Sakr article begins with some detail of Arab Gulf finance for the Iraqi war effort and it is in these few pages that Iraq's lack of independence after fourteen years of development under the Ba'th is made so clear.

University of Manchester DAVID POOL

The Omanis: sentinels of the Gulf. By Liesl Graz. London: Longman. 1982. 202pp. £12·00.

BOOKS on remote places fall as a rule into one of two categories, being written either by scholars without much local experience or by the locally experienced without much scholarship.

Liesl Graz is a serious and observant journalist who has the distinction, rare among journalists, of loving the people she is writing about. She has the further distinction—even rarer among journalists writing from the inside of a remote and masculine society—of being a woman and therefore (for such is Omani tolerance) admitted to the company of both sexes in it. This privilege she enjoyed for long enough to scratch well below the surface. She had consequently a good book to write, and has in part produced one.

Where she sticks to her stated aim of 'introducing the reader to a people and a way of life' she is refreshingly successful. Armed with a wealth of first-hand observations, she could have written a 'popular' book without rival in a still sparse field, even if her enthusiasms sometimes run away with her. (Her assurances that 'the ancient Greeks had exactly the same sense of proportion' as the Omanis (p. 27); that the Omanis share with the Yemenis a 'sense of national conscience' unique in the Arabian peninsula (p. 141); that corruption in high places is modest and can perhaps be laid to the account of expatriate advisers (p. 144); and that the few Omanis disenchanted with the system of government, which 'seems to be working remarkably well', need and do cause no concern (p. 152)—such assurances will not be universally endorsed.)

However, where the book ventures into more complex contemporary issues and seeks a more 'scholarly' image, it risks repelling scholars who would otherwise profit from its local insights. And is there any good reason for tabulating in a book of this kind, even in annexes, the value of 'US military sales agreements by fiscal years in millions of dollars', statistics of development allocations to twenty-seven civil ministries and chunks of Congressional hearings (pp. 176–94)? For different reasons both ordinary reader and expert may be frightened away.

As for the future, the chapter promisingly entitled 'The options' turns out to be largely concerned with educational and public health expansion, neither of them conspicuously 'optional'. And the 'Perspectives' for post-oil prosperity based on agriculture and fishing are surely overoptimistic.

The headings of illustrations are misplaced. Eccentric English (presumably the original was Englished by the author herself), eccentric Arabic, and transliterations that are sometimes not so much pragmatic as wrong could well have been amended, as could the 'official (population) figure of £1·5 million'. But despite such defects of style and printing, we are indebted to Miss Graz for writing—and to Longman for publishing—a book which is unusual, entertaining, instructive and currently relevant.

University of Exeter GLEN BALFOUR-PAUL

Asia

The economies of the ASEAN countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. By Brian Wawn. London: Macmillan. 1982. 188pp. Index. £25·00.

IN the 1970s ASEAN—the Association of South East Asian Nations—was one of the fastest growing groups of countries in the world, and it is a net exporter of energy and a region generating almost as large an import demand as the whole of Latin America. Wawn's book provides a summary of information of about 10,000 words on each member's economy, using a standard format of headings: the role of government, macroeconomic policy, balance of payments, foreign investment, industry, agriculture, mining, energy, finance and labour. The volume is priced beyond the means of most people in the educational world, and most sales will probably be to companies. Viewed in this light, the lack of more detailed information on foreign investment regulations may be a drawback. Nevertheless, and even though it is based on a rather narrow range of sources, an evening's reading of any one of the ten individual chapters would provide a businessman with quite a sound introduction to a particular economy. It is also very up to date, and on Malaysia for instance there is a good deal of information on the Fourth Malaysia Plan and a discussion of the recent emergence of bottlenecks in the labour market. Users with an academic interest in further reading, however, will be very disappointed at the thinness of the bibliography—taking Malaysia again as an example, it manages to omit the recent major studies on industrialization (Hoffmann and Tan), income distribution (Snodgrass), asset ownership (Lim Mah Hui) and rubber (Barlow).

Although much of the information is factual, a certain amount of useful critical comment has been included on performance and policies. Wawn is sceptical about claims made for free trade zones, noting their lack of linkage with the rest of the economy and their low net foreign exchange contribution. The structures of effective protection come under criticism, not only in the Philippines where the bias against exports is probably greatest, but also in Thailand and Malaysia. Generally he is no lover of economic controls, and the highest praise awarded is given to Singapore's free market economy. But Singapore has grown with a good deal of judicious government intervention too, including a battery of recommendations on wage rates. Interestingly, Singapore is opting for a high wage policy as part of an attempt to move upmarket in its manufactured exports. For other ASEAN countries, particularly Indonesia, relocations of more labour intensive activities from Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong and similar countries offer some hopes of movement into export manufacturing, though protectionist measures in the West during recession may hinder this.

University of East Anglia JOHN THOBURN

Understanding ASEAN. Edited by Alison Broinowski. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1982. 323pp. Index. £15·00. Pb.: £5·95.

Regional organization and order in South-east Asia. By Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan. 1982. 278pp. Index. £20·00.

The ASEAN states and regional security. By Sheldon W. Simon. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1982. 161pp. Index. Pb.: $10.95.

THESE three volumes are useful additions to the recent rapidly growing literature on the South-east Asian region in general and ASEAN (the Association of South East Asian Nations) in particular. Although ASEAN celebrated fifteen years of existence in August 1982, it only gained international prominence towards the end of the 1970s (notably over the Kampuchean and 'boat people' issues); events in Indochina in 1975 acted as a catalyst to an organization which until then, in the eyes of some observers, seemed to have accomplished little more than survival, though that in itself, given the lack of durability characterizing other post-colonial attempts at regional cooperation in South-east Asia (dealt with the most fully amongst these volumes by Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl), was noteworthy. All three volumes do take ASEAN as their focal point, though Sheldon Simon concentrates almost exclusively on the post-1975 developments.

The book edited by Alison Broinowski is, despite its rather simplistic title, the most comprehensive, with a team of ten officials, academics and journalists (mostly Australia-based) covering the historical, political and economic aspects of ASEAN, without that excessive overlap common to many multi-author volumes. Two competent chapters cover the history and evolution of ASEAN, with a particularly clear account of the complex organizational machinery that will be of benefit even to the specialist, while three chapters cover ASEAN's external relations, with a specific focus on Australia and Japan. As the authors demonstrate, the ASEAN states have often found it easier to deal, both politically and economically, with collectively identified external problems, whether in dialogues with the West and Japan or in conflict with Vietnam and the major communist powers, than with internal and intra-ASEAN problems, though this has not precluded differences amongst the ASEAN states as to which power, Vietnam or China, poses the greater threat in the long term. As Allan Gyngell notes in his chapter, although the foundations have been laid ASEAN is still some way from a common ASEAN foreign policy; indeed the five governments 'find it unnecessary, and possibly counterproductive, to develop identifiable ASEAN positions' on issues which are not perceived as 'impinging directly or indirectly on the Southeast Asian region' (p. 142).

Michael Richardson's perceptive chapter devoted to the impact of the sudden influx of Indochinese refugees, which were seen by some ASEAN governments as potentially destabilizing and which became a source of friction on inter-communal (such as inside Malaysia), intra-ASEAN (such as between Singapore and Indonesia) and international (between ASEAN and the West) levels, is more satisfactory than the brief surveys in the other two books, which fail to draw out these very real tensions which existed despite the apparent commonality exhibited through the hardening in the ASEAN attitude towards Vietnam.

The constrained pace of economic cooperation has been a major criticism of ASEAN, and the chapter by Amado Castro, formerly Director of the Economic Bureau of the ASEAN Secretariat, tends to be rather defensive about the 'slow but steady' progress made to date; the tone of this chapter as, indeed, of the volume in general is one of 'measured optimism'. Neither of the other books covers the economic aspects in detail; Jorgensen-Dahl takes a more sober view of ASEAN economic cooperation, pointing out that it 'will proceed only as far as the slowest—Indonesia—will permit', while Simon concentrates on the linkages between economic development and political stability (though more could be made of this point).

The Broinowski volume ends with two wide-ranging chapters drawing together in comparative form some of the common characteristics and problems of the five ASEAN countries and looking at ASEAN in the wider global context. These are informative surveys of the issues involved, although Ho Kwon Ping's chapter on the five countries could benefit from separating the five country profiles (surely a little more on Singapore?) from the other analysis. The volume is well served by clear diagrams, an appendix containing the texts of the major ASEAN agreements and statistical tables, and a well-selected bibliography.

Jorgensen-Dahl's book, which suffers rather from the lapse in time between the completion of the text and its appearance in print, is the most ambitious, in that he attempts, not completely successfully, to examine the South-east Asian situation in relation to more general theories of regional cooperation and integration. He concentrates on ASEAN and its immediate antecedent, ASA (the Association of Southeast Asia), but does show how other regional states, Burma and the Indochinese countries, reacted to these developments in regional organization. He devotes chapters to the security aspects of ASEAN (militarization and neutralization), the propensity for conflict (the Sabah dispute and the ethnic minorities), and regional economic questions, but the most stimulating chapter is that on the patterns of diplomacy, examining the consequences of the elitist and exclusive nature of foreign policy making in South-east Asian countries—not least a dependence on the personal qualities of 'a few persons at the top in each country'—on which the slow growth of the ASEAN Secretariat will have little impact in the short run. He has an interesting section comparing the Western European and South-east Asian situations, but no comparisons with other developing countries' regional groupings, though he may well be correct in concluding that, to a degree not found elsewhere in the world, exogenous factors are determinants of South-east Asian regional cooperation and integration.

Simon, principally concerned with politico-security aspects, covers intra-ASEAN conflicts, the refugee issues, the limited military capabilities of the ASEAN forces, and, in more detail than the other two books, the problems of insurgencies and ethnic minorities. There tends to be a certain amount of repetitiveness in the sections dealing with the Vietnam–Kampuchea problem, but he does bring out well the confluence between the Sino-Soviet, the Sino-Vietnamese and, increasingly, the Soviet-American dimensions of regional conflict. As Simon writes, for all the bilateral security collaboration (the list of maritime security cooperation agreements is especially useful) between the five governments, 'the prospect of the Association's becoming a formal military alliance remains remote' (p. 132). On the bilateral level, the lack of a Malaysian-Filipino link is the most glaring—this is not only because of Filipino suspicions of past Malaysian assistance to the Moro rebellion (p. 91), but also, and more importantly, because the Malaysians are still suspicious that the Filipinos have not completely buried their claim to Sabah. He also examines the roles that the United States and Japan might play as guarantors of security in the region. A possible Japanese military presence has provoked the most controversy amongst ASEAN nations, and the cautiously welcoming comments of Filipino Foreign Ministry officials quoted about a Japanese maritime military presence in South-east Asia (p. 124) do not seem to be in line with President Marcos's public pronouncements. When considering external guarantees, some examination of the likely effectiveness of the Five Power Defence Arrangement, which, since 1980, Australia has been trying to revamp (even if Britain is not so interested), would be welcome. His prescription is that, as the 'security situation on Southeast Asian land borders appears reasonably stable or at worst controllable', America's concerns in the next few years should centre on the 'maintenance of open sea-lanes' in the region.

While all three studies are informative examinations of aspects of ASEAN's position in the region, the sound and easily readable volume edited by Broinowski is likely to prove the most valuable as a reference work for the non-specialist.

Brian Bridges

Chatham House

Foreign trade and economic controls in development: the case of United Pakistan. By Nurul Islam. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1982. 271pp. Index. £22·75.

This study covers the years 1950–70, a period from shortly after partition to immediately before the secession of East Pakistan to become Bangladesh. The author uses this split as a reason not to continue his research to the present day, but a brief epilogue, at least, would have been preferable simply to leaving readers in the air about subsequent events. Also, readers interested in the operation of economic controls but unfamiliar with the country would have welcomed a longer and better introductory chapter on Pakistan's economy and society. Nevertheless, the book is a very useful addition to the Yale Economic Growth Center's well-known series of country studies.

Pakistan inherited a system of economic controls from the country's British administration during the Second World War. Civil servants were familiar with control mechanisms and

frequently felt themselves better qualified to run the country than traders and industrialists. Many controls were seen as temporary devices to iron out supply and demand imbalances, but tended to persist. Controls in one economic area spawned controls in others, and an elaborate network of restrictions over imports and exports, foreign exchange allocation, investment decisions, domestic prices, and so on, developed. One striking conclusion, in a system which paid at least lip service to income redistribution, is how little favourable effect controls had in this direction in the absence of any prior redistribution of assets. In West Pakistan, considerable food production increases were brought about by Green Revolution technology, but Islam records that these benefits were shared out highly unevenly. An exchange rate overvalued with regard to agricultural products did tend to favour food crops against export agriculture, but also encouraged imports of labour-saving equipment.

Although recognizing the importance of domestic controls, Islam spends much of the book looking at trade regulation. In the context of an exchange rate overvalued for most of his period, though significantly less so after the 1955 devaluation, a *de facto* system of multiple exchange rates emerged as a result of the manipulation of a complex of important export duties and quantitative restrictions. In this, one of the more successful elements was the encouragement of export manufacturing by a relatively favourable exchange rate in relation to traditional agricultural exports. Since these manufactures were predominantly industries processing local materials (the three most important were cotton textiles, jute textiles and leather manufacture) this appears an appropriate method of industrialization, but as between *particular* export commodities the structure of incentives was haphazard and little correlated with performance. Indeed haphazardness is the predominant impression conveyed of the Pakistani control structure, and though sense can be made of some broad structures, little logic (and much potential corruption) is contained in the detail. Also, some of the country's most successful performance (e.g. in the early 1960s) was associated with attempts at liberalization, though this in turn depended somewhat on foreign aid.

University of East Anglia JOHN THOBURN

Chinese politics and the succession to Mao. By John Gardner. London: Macmillan. 1982. 217pp. Index. £14·00. Pb.: £4·95.

MACMILLAN'S *China in Focus* series is rapidly and rightly gaining a reputation for the publication of informed, scholarly, and well-produced textbooks. This volume is the latest in the series and is no exception. Whatever its other qualities, John Gardner has written an excellent introductory textbook which scores highly in two important respects. The first is that it is not only an account of the political history of the People's Republic of China since the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s, but also an extremely useful—and, more to the point, different—introduction to the study of Chinese politics. The second is that it is eminently readable. Gardner's style is chatty and direct while at the same time remaining scholarly and informative. Both these functions are necessary to any such introduction to Chinese politics. The author of this one achieves his aims with considerable panache.

Gardner's focus is the succession to Mao, and more significantly the search for an orderly and, to some considerable extent, 'legitimate' succession before Mao actually died. As the author himself indicates, the role of the 'top leader', and hence the problem of succession, are particularly important in communist party states because political life tends to be less institutionalized. In the People's Republic of China Mao was paradoxically not only aware of the need to make provisions for his own succession, but also, as Gardner amply demonstrates, the key figure obstructing the development of an orderly succession. As a result the question of succession—in terms of both policy and personality—tended to become the predominant obsession in Chinese politics after the mid-1960s.

The consequent conflict and the playing out of that obsession is carefully chronicled in terms of the debates about China's future strategy for development, intra-elite tensions, and the interactions between the political system and its wider environment. Each chapter concentrates on one of what may be described as the 'key events' in Chinese politics since 1966: the removal of Liu Shaoqi in the Cultural Revolution; the Lin Biao affair of 1971; the repeated rise and fall (to and from the leadership) of Deng Xiaoping; Hua Guofeng's emergence as Mao's immediate successor; and the post-1978 total rejection of the politics of the Cultural Revolution.

Considerations of succession apart, it is this concentration on 'key events' which makes this work of particular value to undergraduate students of Chinese politics. There is an almost stereotyped introduction to the subject which exists under many different titles. It contains sections on the evolution of the Chinese Communist Party from 1921, the institutions of the political system after 1949 (despite many and frequent changes) and an attempt to provide a near-comprehensive account of the history of the People's Republic. That stereotype is, of course, an exaggeration. However, that approach to the introduction of the study of Chinese politics is prevalent, and seldom questioned. Though the information such introductions provide is necessary, it is perhaps more useful for first-time students to be recommended a textbook which is less dry and more concerned with politics as an activity. *Chinese politics and the succession to Mao* provides just such an introduction in an exciting manner.

University of Newcastle DAVID S. G. GOODMAN

The Chinese economic reforms. Edited by Stephan Feuchtwang and Athar Hussain. London, Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St Martin's. 1982. 373pp. Index. £15·95.

Chinese industrial society after Mao. By Rosalie L. Tung. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1982. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot.) 357pp. Index. £19·50.

FEW would deny that the programme of 'economic readjustment' under way in China since 1978 constitutes one of the major watersheds of China's post-revolutionary history. There is a popular view that these events signify a *volte face* in economic thinking. To argue thus is to go too far, as current pronouncements about the pivotal issues (centralized control versus decentralized decision-making; planning versus market regulation) show. Nevertheless, that there has been a reorientation of economic policies and objectives *is* undeniable. Where the reforms will lead, it is too early to say; but sufficient information is now available to make a tentative analysis of their significance and impact worthwhile.

The volume edited by Feuchtwang and Hussain attempts such an analysis. It brings together papers which set the recent changes in both an historical and comparative perspective and examine their impact within China. Happily, the general theme is one which is amenable to this sort of collective exercise and the outcome is an interesting interim assessment of the period of readjustment. The inferences of the authors do not always coincide and given the still experimental basis on which many of the reforms have as yet been extended, the collection can be regarded as only a tentative—perhaps ephemeral—statement of heterogeneous views. By the same token, it is inevitable that it should raise as many questions as it seeks to answer.

Only a cursory and selective resumé of some of the papers can be given here. An introduction by the editors provides an overview of economic debates and changing policy since 1949. Subsequent chapters take up this theme, but within a narrower and more immediately relevant focus, by considering the demise of the so-called 'Shanghai school' and analysing public economic debates since the death of Mao Zedong.

The comparative perspective emerges in the contributions of Athar Hussain and Craig Littler. Hussain's examination of economic reforms in Eastern Europe reveals some striking similarities with China's own experience; it also offers views on their possible significance for China. In *his* analysis of Japan's modernization experience (particularly in industrial organization), Littler too finds some similarities. However, he warns against accepting any 'A[illegible]n convergence theory', arguing that differences in attitudes towards work organization must also be taken into account and emphasizing the constraints on China's ability to absorb, wholesale, Japanese technology.

The remaining papers look in some detail at China's recent economic reforms 'in practice'. Jack Gray focusses on the production responsibility systems, which are still evolving in the countryside. Despite his reference to 'China's new agricultural revolution', he is at pains to deny that recent policy developments are a repudiation either of collective agriculture or of the 'Maoist inheritance' (a view in which he would be supported by official statements). Gray also provides a useful taxonomy of the responsibility systems that have so far emerged. Paul Hare's discussion of changes in industrial planning leads him to a similar conclusion: the recent changes will facilitate greater flexibility, but not a 'fundamental change'. Other

papers consider the reforms as they have affected enterprise management, urban employment and labour allocation policies, and foreign economic relations.

Such a brief and necessarily selective overview can only hint at the content of the papers collected here. There is, however, one final qualification: it is that to a large extent, the authors have relied for their information on materials collected during visits to China and on English-language translations of Chinese material. Notwithstanding the value of first-hand observations, research within China remains subject to many constraints; and even such excellent sources as the BBC monitoring reports can only suggest what is available in the original. With such a rich literature again readily accessible, it is to be hoped that the relative ease of physical access to China will not entirely eliminate more traditional forms of scholarship, based on documentary and textual analysis.

The same can be said of Rosalie Tung's book, based mainly on information obtained during two brief visits to China during 1979 and 1980. Her bibliography does list *Renmin ribao* and *Guangming ribao*, and one or two Chinese sources, but her text indicates that references have been drawn mainly from *Beijing Review* (hardly a primary source). Her study of China's 'industrial society' is an ambitious one, with political, ideological and legal, as well as purely economic, dimensions. Despite the wealth of up-to-date information, admirably presented, within the book, an emphasis on description rather than analysis serves to dilute its impact. As such, it is likely to be most useful to businessmen, involved in trade with China, rather than to those whose interest in the issues is more academic.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London R. F. ASH

Changing qualities of Chinese life. By Dennis Duncanson. London: Macmillan. 1982. 120pp. Index. £17·50.

THIS book might best be compared with the valedictory despatches of members of the diplomatic corps which summarize their impressions and thoughts before taking up new duties or retiring from the services. These papers, often printed for wide circulation among foreign and home departments, are rarely written as briefs for successors, but rather as general background for the boys in the backrooms of power, who themselves might one day get into the position where they record their reflections for the benefit of posterity.

Some of the best of these reminiscences have emanated in the course of time from the often maligned colonial service, in which officials usually spent a lifetime rather than the conventional few years of the ever-changing diplomats. Historians could do worse than draw on the sometimes brilliant reports of district commissioners who have sent them from the outposts of Empire.

Dennis Duncanson was one of those who spent a large part of their professional lives in the colonial service. Later, during a particularly critical period, he joined the diplomatic service in Indochina before finally helping to found (in 1969) the Southeast Asian Studies Centre in Canterbury. He started his career as an orientalist and he remained faithful to his chosen subject until his recent retirement. In good service tradition, his reminiscences on the changing qualities in the lives of the Chinese on both sides of the bamboo curtain are written primarily for the generalist, but in looking for some unorthodox observations the sinologist will not be disappointed.

The author travelled in China long before it became a favoured target for foreign tourists. He saw it again, as one of them, before he recorded his observations and thoughts for a series of broadcasts, of which this book is an extended version. In the interval he gathered a vast amount of experience in the Chinese communities of South-east Asia and the Far East. Thus change and continuity have been the daily occurrences of his working life. In his own words, the book is 'one man's view'—'eclectic, discursive, impressionistic' (p. 1). It is thus unlike many of the theoretical and analytical books of professional sinologists written when China was inaccessible except to the few, highly selected, admirers of Mao and his thoughts.

Unlike many contemporary writers, the author rejects—rightly—the notion that China had been a feudal society before the CCP took power. In a similarly unorthodox manner, he records 'many coincidences of thought between Confucianism and Marxism–Leninism' (p. 57). Whilst he is no friend of the present regime in the People's Republic of China, he does not accept without questioning the system which governs Taiwan. In fact, he regards the KMT (GMT) as structurally like a communist party, since its constitution was drafted

by the bolsheviks before it was adopted by Sun Yat-sen. On the whole, the author's preference lies with the countries of the economic miracle, though in Hong Kong, in deference to Beijing, there is 'no whiff of parliamentary democracy'. By contrast, the author observes on the mainland 'contra-dictatorship' (p. 78), i.e. government by mass-campaign.

St Antony's College, Oxford W. KLATT

Conflict in modern Japanese history: the neglected tradition. Edited by Tetsuo Najita and J. Victor Koschmann. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1982. 456pp. Index. £31·70. Pb.: £11·20.

ARGUING that the standard chronological approach to history has reinforced the view of Japanese society as essentially consensual, this volume uses a 'synchronous' perspective to bring together essays concerning the conflicts and tensions in Japanese society which, while always present, became especially prominent during two 'moments' in modern Japanese history—the Bakumatsu (1850s–1860s) and the period 1900–1930. The first section of the book contains papers on Tokugawa ideology, the Tengu insurrection, the Shōgitai, the *shishi* ('men of high purpose'), peasant uprisings, *yonaoshi* ('world renewal') and millenarian movements in the late Tokugawa period, as well as on Bakufu policy during these years. The second half embraces studies on the 1905 Hibiya riots, tenant unions in the 1920s, the labour market, the bureaucracy and its conflicts with the educational and scientific worlds, liberal intellectuals, and the intergenerational conflict provoked by the growth in individualism. This is a broad range of subject matter, and Tetsuo Najita's lengthy introduction rightly recognizes the impossibility of dealing with conflicts in every aspect of Japanese society at a given moment of time. Nevertheless, the absence in this volume of any consideration of the 1918 rice riots, perhaps the most open manifestation of conflict in Japan this century, does seem somewhat curious. The essays are briefly summed up in an epilogue by J. Victor Koschmann.

The shared synchronous perspective elaborated on in the introduction has obviously been significant in bringing the articles together and forming their analyses. The introduction itself raises questions of approach and methodology which too often go unconsidered by historians, and raises hopes of at least tentative steps in the direction of a radically new historical approach, but unfortunately few readers are going to have the time and energy to read this lengthy volume right through and consider its contribution in the light of the ideas set out in the introduction. The essays it contains are wide-ranging in their subject matter, and in some cases highly specialist in terms both of topic and of treatment. Some show clearly the growing emphasis now being placed on theoretical structuring, while others fall clearly within the framework of more traditional history writing.

In the final analysis, therefore, each paper will stand or fall on its own individual merits. As might be expected from their contributors, the papers are in general of a high standard, and to select any of them for special mention is in danger of suggesting little more than the subjective inclinations of the reader. However, the papers in the second section include several which are particularly worthy of note. Bernard Silberman's study of the conflict between authority and legitimacy in the bureaucratic state is an admirable example of how a theoretical framework can be made to assist, rather than obscure, understanding. Peter Duus' discussion of liberal intellectuals' analysis of popular discontent in the Taishō period, using a framework of two alternative models of society—consensual/integrative and coercion/conflict—is equally clear and informative. The papers by Oka Yoshitake and Okamoto Shumpei, on intergenerational frictions and the Hibiya riots respectively, are quite outstanding. Finally, going some way towards rectifying the lack of attention paid in the West to the history of science in Japan, there is James Bartholomew's fascinating study of the life of the microbiologist, Kitasato Shibasaburō, and his fights with the Japanese bureaucracy.

London School of Economics JANET HUNTER

Vietnamese communism 1925–1945. By Huynh Kim Khanh. Ithaca, London: Cornell University Press. 1982. 379pp. Index. £18·75. $32.50.

WHAT is the reviewer to say about a history of the first twenty years of Vietnamese communism, written by an academic and published by a major university press, which makes

no mention of Hoang Van Hoan? This is akin to a history of Soviet communism from which the name Leon Trotsky is absent. Denigrated, denounced, and even condemned to death by today's leaders in Hanoi, Hoang Van Hoan was one of Ho Chi Minh's closest friends and collaborators in the 1920s, a founder member of the party, for many years a major figure in its politburo, Vietnam's first ambassador to China, and much more besides, yet he does not rate even a mention in the index. During the final months of Ho Chi Minh's life it was Hoan who daily sat for hours at his bedside.

Yet this astonishing omission is not an isolated aberration; it accords with the book's uncritical acceptance of Hanoi's views as these are expressed in its recent publications. The reliability of these documents as historical source material can be illustrated by citing the official version of the 1975 communist victory, which states that there was a spontaneous uprising of the popular masses of South Vietnam. Any 'boat person' refugee will tell what really happened. Similarly, surviving witnesses of the communist-imposed Nghe-Tinh soviets in 1930 tell of a legacy of bitterness and hatred so great that Ho Chi Minh never dared to visit the region again, though it was his own birthplace, and which inspired a peasant revolt against the enforced land collectivization in 1956. Dr Khanh prefers the Hanoi version, which tells of spontaneous enthusiasm, banner waving, political discussions, 'overthrowing tyrants', and the rest. Indeed, the source quoted more frequently than any other—he features in roughly 60 footnotes—is Tran Huy Lieu, former journalist and communist Minister of Propaganda.

The author has indeed consulted a large number of sources, including Vietnamese language sources probably unfamiliar to most Western readers, yet parts of the book remain under-researched. Official government papers covering the years of the Second World War have been accessible to scholars for some time in public record offices, but the final third of the book, which deals with the events of 1944 and 1945, makes no use of this material. The large and authoritative work *Why Vietnam?* by Archimedes Patti, though present in the bibliography, would seem to have been ignored. Consequently the sections describing the activities of the communists and the British troops in Cochinchina during 1945, and of the OSS in southern China and Tonking, are uninformative and repeat numbers of errors perpetrated by earlier writers.

The very real need for an objective and authoritative history of Vietnamese communism has not been satisfied by this book. But the writer of such a work will have to contend with the secretiveness and suspicion that are innate features of all communist regimes. State and party papers are never made freely available for study, only the officially approved histories, which are themselves subject to fundamental changes in successive editions. Though the undertaking would pose great difficulties, it should not prove impossible of achievement. The official papers of non-communist states are easily accessible and many participants in, and witnesses of, the events are still alive to be interviewed. Both these sources would yield sufficient information to permit a critical study of the available communist material.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London P. J. HONEY

North America

American foreign policy: the lost consensus. By George H. Quester. New York: Praeger. 1982. 276pp. Index. $27.95. Pb.: $12.95.

THE lost consensus of Professor Quester's title is not essentially a consensus about policy, for on that Americans have differed since the early days of the Republic. Rather it is a consensus about the motives of American policy (which were generally thought to be good) and so about its consequences (which would also be good if Americans held to their principles or, if need was, returned to them). Against that consensus he now identifies three lines of interpretation which war for allegiance among Americans. The first is the *realpolitik* view which holds that nation states, or at any rate powers, are all much alike, so that the United States is a power like other powers. The second is the radical critique which holds that American policy is bad by reason of the defects of American capitalism. The third is the old 'consensus' view, which still has supporters, Professor Quester among them, though he is more disposed than earlier exponents to charge Americans with racialism. There are other

interpretations which Professor Quester neglects, such as that of students of system. He is probably wise, for that line of analysis has not yet produced much, and his chosen three surely engage among them the large majority of students; but he might have brought out more clearly how unprecedented the postwar situation was—two great powers only, each the spokesman for one of two sharply opposed ideologies. That constituted a 'system' such as no previous era had witnessed, and one which is only slowly changing.

To follow his analytical chapters, Professor Quester provides a narrative of twentieth century events, sensible enough if rather pedestrian, and useful in emphasizing how difficult it is to establish any one interpretation with precision or certainty, and how much all analysts draw on prejudice. Perhaps, however, the real explanation of the 'lost consensus' lies elsewhere. At some point in the period covered by this book the United States ceased to be, in international affairs, a radical society such as it had been at its foundation, and became a highly conservative one. Domestically most Americans are not yet conservative, and the contrast is sufficient cause for tension and unease. But apart from that, a radical analysis of international politics is hopeful and so simple, a conservative analysis is gloomy and so complex. Professor Quester still believes in his countrymen's goodness of heart. He may be right, but they no longer have a view of where the world is going. The uncertainty in analysis reflects uncertainty about the future.

University of Birmingham A. E. CAMPBELL

Minding America's business: the decline and rise of the American economy. By Ira C. Magaziner and Robert B. Reich. London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. 1982. $25.00.

IRA MAGAZINER has been in the forefront of attempts to apply modern concepts in business strategy to problems in government industrial policies. As a business consultant, he has become famous for his work developing industrial strategy for countries as diverse as Sweden and Ireland. His collaborator on this book, Robert Reich, is a teacher at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and was previously active in the federal government.

This book, like many others over the past few years, is an outcome of the near-panic that affects American policy-makers at the state of the US economy. Political conservatives have thus far outpaced US liberals in the volume of their output. The continuing haemorrhage of American industrial competitiveness in the face of today's conservative economic policies will now prompt a greater volume of writing from more left-wing American academics. Magaziner and Reich's book is a forerunner of this trend. Their ideology is that targeted government intervention can be successful. This intervention should pull labour and resources away from dying industries and place them in those complex and growing businesses where the United States has a competitive advantage over its international rivals. Their argument with current US policy is thus similar to the characteristic analysis of British industrial strategy which runs as follows: 'The state reacts only to serious crises in individual companies. It acts only to prop up geriatric firms, rather than restructuring the industry or enhancing the speed of its decline by pulling labour into other sectors. No government attempt is made to plan the decline of doomed industries. The government remains reluctant even to suggest that evolution is inevitable, and indeed beneficial.'

Not surprisingly, Magaziner and Reich invest effort in describing how industrial policies in the United States are inferior to those of Japan, Germany, and France. This analysis is somewhat tame. We have seen too many incomplete eulogies of MITI to be easily impressed. But at least this book continuously acknowledges that planning systems and types of government action are not directly transferable from country to country. Government ability to manage the performance of economies depends critically upon the degree to which social consensus is already being built up around the need for a particular change. The United States cannot transplant ideas from other countries: policy has to evolve organically from an understanding inside US society that constructive intervention is possible and, most importantly, that the interests of one economic group will not be sacrificed in favour of another. Only in more homogeneous societies than the United States can government industrial policy be easily used to shift resources. At present, far too many powerful institutions see their livelihoods threatened. This book's suggestions as to the precise form that US government industrial policy should take are weak and unsatisfying.

Despite the authors' attempt to make it so, *Minding America's business* is not really about government industrial policy at all. Its theme is actually that American business is destroying

itself by lack of attention to the pursuit of long-term advantages over the competition. American corporations are 'milking' their businesses and depriving them of the right sort of investment. This point is a strong one, and it is made exceedingly well. When talking about business decay, Magaziner and Reich are crisp and compelling. It is when they argue for particular forms of government intervention that they are unconvincing.

If we were to assume, as Magaziner stresses, that consensus is needed for a successful national industrial policy, corporations have first to be persuaded of the need radically to alter existing business practices. Until this change is achieved, the mild dirigisme that the book suggests will be imposed upon a business system that is presently dedicated to a series of objectives that are inconsistent with regeneration.

The real argument is thus whether induced recessions (as in the United Kingdom and the United States at present) help or hinder the adaption to the new rigours of international competition. The evidence from the United Kingdom, which is very slight, suggests that recession improves business attention to good international competitive strategy. If the same is true in the States, then Magaziner's views may be more appropriate in ten years than they are today. At the moment, he should probably stick to business strategy rather than venturing into international industrial policy.

CHRIS GOODALL

Economic issues and political conflict: US–Latin American relations. Edited by Jorge I. Domínguez. London, Boston: Butterworths. 1982. 246pp. Index. £22·00.

THIS book is the collective product of a group of scholars, some of whom are specialists in Latin America and some in other aspects of US foreign policy. The research on which it is based was funded by the Office of Long Range Assignments and Research of the US Department of State and supported by the Center for International Affairs of Harvard University. The editor argues that, contrary to many popular assumptions, US–Latin American relations have been relatively successful. It is, he suggests, this very success that creates problems: 'Because so many disputes have been successfully settled, scholars or public officials may minimise or neglect the policies and mechanisms that made such settlements possible' (p. 4). Thus, as he further shows, national business interests may have very different attitudes towards foreign investment according to the areas of the economy most affected, and business nationalism, which has played a major role in the loosening of transnational ties in Latin America between 1940 and 1970, is likely to stay well short of advocating the nationalization of all foreign owned interests in any one country. The case studies of Mexico (Merilee S. Grindle) and Venezuela (Janet Kelly Escobar) support this contention and offer interesting new evidence on the provision of accommodation involved. In the former case, issues arising from the possession of a common frontier make the relationship inevitably ambiguous, but in the latter, the author concludes, 'the United States has a great deal to gain and very little to lose' (p. 135). John S. Odell's study of Latin American industrial exports and trade negotiations with the United States suggest on the other hand that the dominant power is open to influence from internal economic allies in a way that ensures that it frequently fails to secure its initial objectives in bilateral bargaining with the Latin American states. In technological transfer, Debra Lynn Miller suggests grounds for conflict are also already on the decline. Hence Robert Paarlberg, in the concluding chapter, argues firmly against special priority for Latin America in US policy-making. Routine or low priority treatment he demonstrates to have many blessings which the current administration course with Central America is failing to realize. This tightly argued case against areas of special treatment in foreign policy has much wider implications, and should be read carefully by policy-makers in all areas, not just those concerned with the main area of this interesting and useful book.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

Big story: how the American press and television reported and interpreted the crisis of Tet 1968 in Vietnam and Washington. Abridged edn. By Peter Braestrup. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1983. 613pp. Index. £21·00. Pb.: £7·95.

THIS book has a considerable history, first appearing as a two volume work under the imprint of Westview Press, in cooperation with Freedom House, in 1977. An abridged

paperback was published by Anchor Books the following year. This abridged Yale edition is updated, and intended for the student and the general reader. It includes three maps, but none of the photographs and other apparatus of the original edition remain except for seventy-one pages of notes. Braestrup sets out to do exactly what is described by his title. His period is from the beginning of the Tet offensive at the end of January 1968 to President Johnson's nationwide television address of 31 March in which he announced a partial bombing halt, his willingness to negotiate with Hanoi, and his decision not to seek re-election. It was a time of crisis, for it was immediately preceded by the North Korean seizure of the USS *Pueblo*, and domestic politics were intensified by Senator Eugene McCarthy's bid for the Democratic presidential nomination and by the challenge to the administration that was thrown down by Senator Robert Kennedy.

Braestrup agrees with the general historical verdict that the Tet offensive was a military set-back, not a victory, for the North Vietnamese, and confronts the puzzle of the contemporary American media portrayal of it as a disaster for the United States and its allies. He finds this distortion of reality to be not the result of ideological bias by the news media but 'the impact of a rare combination of circumstances on the various habits, incentives, economic constraints, and managerial and manpower limitations peculiar to each of the major US news organizations' (p. xi). The effects were compounded by President Johnson's earlier and repeated public optimism about the conduct of the war, and by his failure to seize the initiative when Tet broke. Braestrup recognizes that his interpretation of what was going on in Washington is not based on direct experience, but as the *Washington Post's* Saigon bureau chief he knew the situation on the ground in South-east Asia as well, or as badly, as anyone. He has made a detailed analysis of the major news stories, both the reports from Vietnam and the domestic editorial treatment. His conclusions have been disputatious, but clearly if what others have called 'televisual anguish' about the war had decisively exercised public opinion, LBJ's successor, Richard Nixon, would have found it even more difficult to pursue the war to its ultimate and unhappy conclusion. It is useful to be reminded that 'truth' is relative, that despite modern technology machines merely project the uncertain choices of human beings, and that public opinion is more likely to be manipulated by the imperfections of newsgathering than by conspiratorial intent.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

Diplomatic passport: more undiplomatic diaries, 1946–1962. By Charles Ritchie. London, Toronto: Macmillan. 1983. 200pp. Pb.: £4·95.

DIPLOMATS and diplomacy are fair game, particularly for diplomats who keep diaries and then select the meatiest bits for their memoirs. This literary sport has been taken up by many, and the *belles lettres* of the fraternity have grown as the generations pass. Nova Scotian born Charles Ritchie is one of the latest contributors and likely one of the best, particularly because of the new and perceptive candour and viewpoint he brings. Certainly in Canada, either as a public servant or a writer, he is exceptional. This book follows his *Siren years* and *Lust for life* and it embraces his postings to the Canadian delegation at the Paris peace conference at the end of the Second World War, through senior postings in Ottawa, then as ambassador in Bonn, then to head the delegation at the United Nations, including a stint as President of the Security Council, and it ends as he was off to be ambassador in Washington. At no time did he suffer either fools or foolishness gladly. He wrote each day wryly and wittily, seemingly having much in mind the remark of a Canadian journalist friend: 'There no shirt too young to be stuffed.'

These diaries deserve a wide audience not only within the diplomatic community, which he calls an all-enveloping caste, tenacious of its privileges and maintaining an almost eighteenth century enclave in the modern world; they should bring enlightenment to national and international bureaucracies, and among politicians claiming to influence foreign policies. His comments are spiced with case histories and vignettes of people, catching the ambience of time and place, and of things that might have been managed differently.

Behind the refreshment and entertainment of these memoirs lie salutory reminders of some of the major gaffes of foreign policy in the period in question, of the rudeness and ineptitude of individuals in the diplomatic system who should have known better, and of the survival of evils in attitude that did the cultures they spoke for no good at all. Coming from a gifted

and widely experienced Canadian source the book throws light on many points deserving of continued attention not only in a Canadian context, but also in Britain and among European and Commonwealth readers. This relatively slim book is a credit to the author and should encourage him to run the risks and stay the course he has set himself. We hope there is much more to come.

BRIAN MEREDITH

Latin America and Caribbean

Oil and politics in Latin America: nationalist movements and state companies. By George Philip. London, New York: Cambridge University Press. 1982. 577pp. Index. £37·50.

THIS is a very fine book which will certainly become the standard work on the subject for English language readers. George Philip has traced the development of the oil and gas industries of Latin America from the nineteenth century to the present day with painstaking detail and, so rarely for works of this kind, has struck just the right balance between factual coverage and analysis, such that we have a goldmine of information on subjects such as taxation and pricing, but are also able to examine systemic trends across the region.

In a world where the locus of oil production resides in the Middle East, it is easy to forget that Latin America played an important part in shaping the present day world. The role of countries such as Venezuela in the formation of OPEC, and the nationalization of the oil companies in Mexico in 1938, set regional and global examples from which other countries learned. The book is divided into three sections dealing with: Latin America in the context of developments in the world oil environment; the major expropriations; and the progress of state oil companies.

The author analyses government–company relations by looking at what the host government was hoping to achieve and the political pressures on the government to expropriate the private sector. He finds that '. . . only those [nationalizations] carried out in Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and possibly Venezuela were motivated by a desire to increase returned value from oil. Conversely those of Bolivia, Mexico, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina . . . and Cuba were deliberately designed to foster political objectives even at the price of some short term loss of national income' (p. 313). In the midst of this there are some surprising episodes, such as Gulf Oil demanding its own nationalization in Bolivia.

In terms of a class analysis of forces leading to pressure for nationalization, there are rather disparate elements of evidence but, '. . . the hypothesis which appears to work best is one which connects oil nationalist policies to an urban class alliance with a strong middle class component (sometimes called a populist alliance) and to government policies making for domestic industrialisation' (p. 315). Rather surprisingly, the author finds that, '. . . there is little genuine working class or peasant support for the policies of oil nationalism' (p. 321). The strong conclusion from this is that, 'State oil companies are a powerful means by which middle class professionals can exert control over a Latin American economy and their creation is likely to command support from those who are professionals and those who aspire to professional status. This does not mean that middle class support for policies of oil nationalism is inevitable or that it will always be decisive. Even so, it is an important element in oil politics' (p. 316).

The chapters on state oil companies chronicle mixed success stories, with Pemex and Petroven—the giants of Latin America—faring rather better than, for example, PetroPeru which, with a mixture of bad luck and bad management, suffered a fiasco in its Amazon development and the construction of the Andean pipeline. It would be interesting to have the author's thoughts on the current outlook for both Mexico and Venezuela, both with chronic financial problems, caused mainly by the collapsing world oil demand and price, and cutting back substantially on domestic hydrocarbon development, of which the suspension of the Venezuelan Orinoco heavy oil project is the saddest example.

One looks forward to a second edition to deal with these new developments. In that volume it would be useful to have some supplementary maps showing oil and gas fields, pipelines and other major installations and their relationship to the geography of the region. This will avoid the necessity for those less familiar with the region of reading this book with

the help of an atlas. However, these are small quibbles in an otherwise superb survey which is quite essential material for both Latin American area specialists and students of energy policy.

Chatham House JONATHAN P. STERN

Soldiers of Peron: Argentina's Montoneros. By Richard Gillespie. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1982. 310pp. £19·50.

THOUGH about internal Argentine politics, this book is essential reading for students of current Argentine attitudes to international politics. The Montoneros were an expression and a symptom of Argentine politics during the second Peronist period; and their war on the Argentine establishment, and the response of the armed forces, was an important formative experience for the military government which came to power in 1976 and which followed its successful 'dirty war' against the Montoneros with the Falklands *débâcle* in 1982.

The Montoneros were a self-styled army of the working class, run very largely by members of the urban intelligentsia whose military activities (often involving spectacular 'executions' of the 'enemies of the people'), soon became an end in themselves. The Montoneros took the name, and laid claim to the political tradition, of the provincial, anti-centralist and anti-metropolitan *Montón* of the early nineteenth century, and sprang from old currents of violent Hispanophile, Catholic right-wing nationalism. But in the Montoneros these influences merged with contemporary theories of guerrilla warfare, particularly in their Cuban and Guevarist manifestations, and the movement, particularly towards the end, increasingly adopted the language and style of the typical Third World liberation movement. But it never had a working-class base, seems never to have understood the difference between rural societies and essentially urban Argentina, and was authoritarian in structure and militaristic in outlook, preferring spectacular military attacks to political work cultivating a popular following. Its fascist origins were brought out in its extraordinary faith in Perón. It misjudged Perón, and, crucially and with tragic effects, it misjudged the brutality with which the armed forces, once freed from any restraint imposed by the conventions of civil society, would go about the 'dirty war' after the military coup of 1976.

The victory of the intelligence services, at the end of the seventies, helped to restore the prestige and self-esteem of the armed forces, which had suffered numerous blows in the early seventies under Peronist rule, including Montonero hit-and-run raids on military installations and the release, by civilian politicians, of Montonero sympathizers held by the security forces. But it is important to note the nature of the 'dirty war' which gave the armed forces their victory. It was this experience which led inexorably to the Galtieri regime of 1982 as Argentine counter-subversive experts were deployed in Central America and the disastrous Falklands invasion was launched—the quick internal victory of 1979 being followed by the shambolic defeat at the hands of a foreign power in 1982.

Gillespie's account of the origins and actions of the Montoneros is painstaking and carefully constructed and he leads us through the tragic story with subtlety and skill. The underlying theme is the politics of national frustration; but the story is about an armed opposition movement which adopted death as its main political weapon. The demise of that opposition, and the victory of the official armed forces—whose 'dirty war' against the subversives was their first professional engagement for a hundred years—are crucial events in explaining the posture of the contemporary Argentine regime.

Chatham House DAVID STEPHEN

The CIA in Guatemala: the foreign policy of intervention. By Richard C. Immerman. Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press. 1982. 291pp. Index. £17·00.

THIS is an important book, but it starts badly. Like much (most?) of what is published in English about Central America, it contains few native voices. The author has examined twenty-four US archives, and has interviewed as many surviving US protagonists as he can find, but there is no evidence that he has been to Guatemala or interviewed a single Guatemalan. This makes the second chapter, 'Underdevelopment, repression and revolution', predictably half-baked: 'Agrarian reform in an undeveloped nation is mandatory in order to raise the standard of living and the purchasing power of the populace, to free a sufficient

number of rural labourers so that they can form the basis of an industrial work force, and to produce enough food to sustain growing urban centers. In short, agrarian reform is a pre-requisite for industrialisation.' So now you know. 'Long accustomed to their privileged position, upper and upper-middle-class Guatemalans resented any change.' How different from us.

Mercifully it is easy to separate this part of the book from its core, which is exhaustively researched and altogether more sophisticated. This is the best documented account of the American overthrow of the Arbenz government of Guatemala in 1954 available, and it is unlikely to be superseded. It ought to be read by anyone interested in the history and in the present dilemmas of US policy in Central America, matters not of merely local concern.

One merit of Dr Immerman's work is to revise the common view of the Guatemalan intervention as determined by the needs of the United Fruit Company. Certainly Dulles and others involved had United Fruit connections, but the affair of Guatemala falls on a cold war line running from Greece through Iran beyond Guatemala to the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the *fracaso* less than a decade later that resulted from a simple-minded and half-hearted attempt to repeat the Guatemalan success. Dr Immerman argues with care and subtlety that there was more in the 1954 episode than a mere 'extension of Taft's dollar diplomacy'. Truman, Eisenhower and Dulles all wanted to 'push the Russians back', and the United States was impatient with European governments that were hesitant to support action against the alleged communist threat in Guatemala.

The CIA in Guatemala shows how this small operation, largely psychological, prepared the way for larger covert operations elsewhere later on. It shows the US government's propensity to consume its own propaganda, and how few 'fact-finding missions', of either pressmen or politicians, find or intend to find any facts. Three hundred half-trained troops and agents, never called on to fight, and a few American-piloted planes induced Arbenz's officers to desert him. According to Eisenhower, 'the people of Guatemala, in a magnificent effort . . . liberated themselves from the shackles of international communist direction'. Dulles tried to get it all written up as 'a sort of historical novel', with an 'Uncle Tom's Cabin or Ida Tarbell touch'. In this part of Central America the farce comes before the tragedy; there were not enough Marxists about then.

St Antony's College, Oxford MALCOLM DEAS

Bibliography and reference

China facts & figures annual. Vol. 5, 1982. Edited by John L. Scherer. Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic International Press. 1982. $47.00.

As before, the Annual contains a great deal of miscellaneous information on current economic, political, and social developments, extracted from Chinese and foreign sources. Useful chronologies and a few legal texts are included. Some readers may find the 'opinion poll of Chinese youth, 1980' the most intriguing item in the volume.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

A dictionary of the European Communities. 2nd edn. By John Paxton. London: Macmillan, 1982. 282pp. £20·00.

THIS very useful work contains information on institutions, initials, people and economic expressions; the scope is wider than the title might suggest. Some idea of its range may be given by citing a few entries: 'Charles V', 'Snake', 'European Community Youth Orchestra', 'Continental Can Company', 'Berlaymont'. Overseas countries are included, with reference to their relations with the Communities.

The dictionary is untypically rounded off by a bibliography.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

Documents on British foreign policy. 1919–1939. 2nd series. Vol. XIX. Edited by William Norton Medlicott. London: HMSO. 1982. £65·00.

THIS, the latest published volume in the second series, covers the period July 1937–August 1938 and contains the text of 667 Foreign Office documents chronicling the British government's continuing search for a comprehensive settlement of differences with Germany and Italy, in order to achieve an orderly and peaceful international system. Chapter summaries provide the researcher with a chronological list of numbered documents, together with the name of the originator, the title and the main subject of each text.

Chatham House Library N. G.

European yearbook. Vol. 28. The Hague, London: Nijhoff for the Council of Europe. 1982. 683pp. DFl 250·00.

THE bulk of the Yearbook deals, as usual, with developments in the inter-European bodies and the OECD; some basic texts are included. Special articles cover the European Council (by Leo Tindemans), non-governmental organizations, Count Coudenhove-Kalergi and criminology. A lengthy bibliography rounds off the volume.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

International organization and integration. 2nd edn. Edited by P. J. G. Kapteyn *et al.* Vol. IB, Organizations related to the United Nations; Vol. IIA, European Communities. The Hague, London: Nijhoff for the Cornelis van Vollenhoven foundation and the Foundation European Institute, 1982. DFl. 240·00, 235·00.

THE scope of this work is defined by the subtitle: 'Annotated basic documents and descriptive directory of international organizations and arrangements'. Texts, which are otherwise widely scattered, are brought together in compact and handsome volumes. It should be noted that neither the United Nations nor the European Communities have themselves produced comparable collections. Volume 1B comprehends, besides the specialized agencies, GATT, the International Atomic Energy Agency and the World Tourism Organization. The 'directories' cover history, structure and activities, and include bibliographies. The volume on 'The United Nations Organization' has already appeared; more are in preparation.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

International relations dictionary. 3rd edn. By Jack C. Plano and Roy Olton. Oxford, Clio. 1982. 488pp. £13·25.

THE preface to the third edition of this reference work concedes the unusual format. Entries relating to concepts, theories, facts and phenomena in the field of international relations are grouped in twelve A to Z sequences devoted to subjects such as 'Nature and role of foreign policy', 'International economics', 'International organizations: the United Nations and regional organizations', 'National political systems'. Entries consist of a brief definition, followed by a paragraph entitled 'Significance' which provides a commentary. Cross references between entries are provided.

There is a curiously built index with, for example, entries under both EFTA and European Free Trade Association without reference from the acronym to the full name of the organization, as well as a separate country index sub-divided by subjects.

This volume is a tool for the student of politics and international affairs to use with text and other books, rather than a dictionary for the Library reference shelf.

Chatham House Library N. G.

Lloyd's nautical year book 1983. Colchester: Lloyd's of London Press. £10·95.

IN the wake of UNCLOS this hardy annual among reference books on the sea deserves a wider readership. After years of political gestation a new generation of scholars, bureaucrats and politicians has become immersed in maritime politics, and this publication would remind them of the nuts and bolts of the shipping industry. It aims to update their agents around the world and their clients afloat, and for several years a member of Chatham House has

prepared a chapter in it on the politics of the sea, defining and reporting briefly on the many global agencies involved in its affairs. It provides facts and figures, the details of the Safety of Life at Sea and Pollution conventions, sections on salvage and cargo carriage, and of course much about the services provided by the Lloyd's fraternity.

BRIAN MEREDITH

An overview of fisheries in the Commonwealth. By Robert Hart. London: Commonwealth Secretariat. 1982. 142pp.

THIS work aims to meet the requests of the Commonwealth developing countries for a study of their fisheries problems to aid policy-makers. It is a free publication, reflecting in the context of the UN Conference of the Law of the Sea treaty the difficulties of any small state in maintaining surveillance or in policing and enforcing respect for their new Exclusive Economic Zones, unless they are members of a regional or sub-regional grouping. The issue involves not only the Commonwealth states but also about ninety small islands or archipelagoes which are additionally associated members, dependencies or with special status not generally recognized. These are listed, but it is said that there are more, and that their problems are considerable and complex. FAO sources are heavily quoted and facts, figures and tables of information are lavishly provided. It is in every way a practical paper, well researched, and put out at the right time.

BRIAN MEREDITH

Statesman's yearbook 1982–1983. London: Macmillan. 1982. 1692pp. £16·95.

THE subtitle of the *Statesman's Yearbook*, 'Statistical and historical annual of the states of the world' describes accurately the coverage of this reference work in its 119th year of publication under the current editorship of John Paxton.

Comparative statistical tables of staple cereals, sugar, and crude oil production worldwide, as well as energy consumption precede Part I which is devoted to International Organizations. Long established bodies such as the United Nations and its agencies, NATO and COMECON, as well as less structured groupings such as ASEAN and CARICOM, are listed together with their history, membership, objectives and achievements, organs and current officials. A concise bibliography includes each body's own major publications and a selection of works relating to it.

The bulk of the volume covers, in Part II, the countries of the world from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe. Each entry, necessarily succinct, includes, for each country (and for each component unit in the case of federated states) information on the history, area and population, constitution and government, defence and international relations. The economy is briefly reviewed. Industry and trade statistics for four or more recent years are provided. Communications, justice, education and welfare systems are outlined. There is a list of the diplomatic representatives currently exchanged with Great Britain and the USA. A fifty-three page place and International Organizations index is provided.

The colour maps on the endpapers of this edition of the yearbook—'The international belt of Japan' and 'World hunger and nutrition' reflect the current preoccupation with international trade and North–South relations problems.

A compact volume indispensable to the reference shelves.

Chatham House Library

N. G.

Who's who in Poland. 1st edn. Warsaw: Interpress; Zurich: Who's Who AG., 1982. DM240·00.

ONE of the latest volumes in the '*Who's who international red series*', compiled and edited in Warsaw, printed in Italy, published under licence of Who's Who AG, Zurich. The preface states that the list of 4,000 or so names has been compiled following consultation with various [illegible] the majority of cases the individuals listed furnished their own [illegible] lishers' materials. One of the prerequi- [illegible] ever there seems to be an [illegible] to the

detriment of political figures and government officials. Part I lists biographies alphabetically. Part II, curiously entitled Index, lists the main state, political and administrative institutions, consulates and embassies, cultural associations, academic institutions, religious associations, libraries, major newspapers and periodicals. A useful if expensive volume.

Chatham House Library N. G.

The world of learning 1982–83. 33rd edn. London: Europa. 1982. 2 vols. £58·00.

THIS directory has a well earned reputation for being accurate, comprehensive and up-to-date and this latest edition is a welcome addition to the reference shelves. The standard pattern of the layout of the contents makes it an excellent tool for the research worker and the occasional browser alike.

Volume I covers more than 400 international educational, scientific and cultural organizations, as well as country entries from Afghanistan to Qatar. Volume II covers the countries from Romania to Zimbabwe. There is a full index of the institutions described in both volumes at the end of volume II.

Chatham House Library N. G.

The yearbook of world affairs. Vol. 37, 1983. London: Stevens for the London Institute of World Affairs. 1983. 312pp.

STILL edited by George Keeton and Georg Schwarzenberger, who himself contributes a paper, the Yearbook contains articles on international politics, economics, security and law. Among the more specific topics are Afghanistan, Indochina, Kurt Waldheim, whales and the United Nations University. 'Multinationals at work, an inside assessment, by XX' is less sensational than the pseudonym might suggest.

Chatham House Library D. H. J.

Other books received

Defence and disarmament

CHIVIAN, Eric *et al.*, eds: *The medical dimensions of nuclear war.* (International physicians for the prevention of nuclear war.) San Francisco, Oxford: W. H. Freeman. 1982. 338pp. Index. £7·40.

GODSON, Roy, ed.: *Intelligence requirements for the 1980s. Vol. 5: clandestine collection.* New York: National Strategy Information Center. (Distrib. by Transaction, New Brunswick, London.) 1982. 232pp. Pb.: £8·50.

MINNION, John and BOLSOVER, Philip: *The CND story: the first 25 years of CND in the words of the people involved.* London: Allison & Busby. 1983. 158pp. £5·95. Pb.: £1·95.

PRINS, Gwyn, ed.: *Defended to death: a study of the nuclear arms race.* (From the Cambridge University Disarmament Seminar.) Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin. 1983. 387pp. Index. Pb.: £3·50.

TILL, Geoffrey: *Maritime strategy and the nuclear age.* London: Macmillan. 1982. 274pp. Index. £20·00.

WILSON, G. K., compiler: *A global peace: study guide.* London: Housmans for School of Peace Studies, Bradford. 1982. 101pp. Pb.: £2·75; $7.00.

Politics, economics and social

ANJARIA, S. J. *et al*: *Development in international trade policy.* Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 1982. 124pp. $5.00.

BLAKE, David H. and WALTERS, Robert S.: *The politics of global economic relations.* 2nd edn. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 1982. 246pp. Index. £11·95.

CASLEY, Dennis J. and LURY, Denis A.: *Monitoring and evaluation of agriculture and rural development projects.* Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for The World Bank. 1982. 145pp.

DESMOND, Robert W.: *Crisis and conflict: world news reporting between two World Wars 1920–1940.* Iowa City: University of Iowa Press. 1982. 518pp. Index. $30.00.

DIAMOND, William and RAGHAVAN, V. S., eds: *Aspects of development bank management.* Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for The World Bank. 1982. 298pp. £9·75; $16.85.

EFFROS, Robert C., ed.: *Emerging financial centers: legal and institutional framework.* Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 1982. 1149pp.

FAKJRY, Majid: *A history of Islamic philosophy. 2nd edn.* London: Longman; New York: Columbia University Press. 1983. 394pp. Index. £16·95.

FLAVIN, Christopher: *Electricity from sunlight: the future of photovoltaics.* Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute. 1982. 63pp. Pb.: $2.00.

FRANTZICH, Stephen E.: *Computers in Congress: the politics of information.* Beverly Hills, London: Sage. 1982. 285pp. Index. (Vol. 4 in Managing Information: a series of books in organization studies and decision-making.) £18·95.

KILLICK, Tony, ed.: *Adjustment and financing in the developing world: the role of the International Monetary Fund.* Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund for the Overseas Development Institute. 1982. 232pp. £6·75. Pb.: £4·50.

KRAVIS, *et al.*: *World product and income: international comparisons of real gross product.* Produced by the Statistical Office of the United Nations and The World Bank. UN International Comparison Project Phase III. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for The World Bank. 1982. 388pp. Index. £26·25; $45.50.

MEIRING, Desmond: *Fire of Islam.* London: Wildwood House. 1982. 255pp. £3·75.

MILES, Richard J.: *Consciousness and civilization.* Hayling Is., Hants: Richard Miles. 1983. 47pp. Pb.: £0·95.

NICHOLSON, Michael: *The scientific analysis of social behaviour: a defence of empiricism in social science.* London: Pinter. 1983. 252pp. Index.

PERRATON, Hilary, ed.: *Alternative routes to formal education: distance teaching for school equivalency.* Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for The World Bank. 1983. 329pp. £28·00. $45.50.

PERRY, Charles: *The West, Japan and Cape route imports: the oil and non-fuel mineral trades.* Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis. 1982. 88pp.

SCHREGIE, Johannes: *Negotiating development: labour relations in southern Asia.* Geneva: International Labour Office. 1982. 186pp. Pb.: SwFrs 30·00; £8·55.

SINGER, Hans W.: *Terms of trade controversy and the evolution of soft financing: early years in the UN: 1947–51.* A discussion paper. Brighton: Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex. 1982. 42pp. Pb.

WHYNES, David K.: *Comparative economic development.* Sevenoaks, Kent: Butterworths. 1982. 336pp. Index. (Butterworths Advanced Economic Texts.) £30·00.

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ALEXANDERSON, Gunnar: *International Straits of the World 6: The Baltic Straits.* The Hague, London: Nijhoff. 1982. 132pp. Index. DFl 75·00. $32.50.

LAPIDOTH-ESCHELBACHER, Ruth: *International Straits of the World 5: The Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.* The Hague, London: Nijhoff. 1982.

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FREYMOND, Jacques, GRAF-JUNOD, Isabelle and BROWNING, Alison, eds: *Documents diplomatiques suisses 1848–1945. Vol. 6 (1914–1918): 29 juin 1914–11 novembre 1918.* Berne: Benteli. 1981. 902pp. Index.

GREVE, Tim: *Haakon VII of Norway: founder of a new monarchy.* Trans., ed. by T. K. Derry. London: Hurst. 1983. 202pp. Index. £12·50.

KOESTLER, Arthur: *Dialogue with death*. Trans. by Trevor and Phyllis Blewett. London: Macmillan. 1983. 206pp. Pb.: £3·95.
PITT, Barrie: *The crucible of war: year of Alamein 1942*. London: Cape. 1982. 478pp. Index. £12·95.
ROBBINS, Keith: *The eclipse of a great power: modern Britain 1870–1975*. London, New York: Longman. 1983. 408pp. Index. (Foundations of Modern Britain Series.) Pb.: £7·50.
SANDERS, A. L. and TAYLOR, Philip M.: *British propaganda during the First World War, 1914–18*. London: Macmillan. 1983. 320pp. Index. £25·00.
SMITH, Tony: *The pattern of imperialism: the United States, Great Britain and the late industrializing world since 1815*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1982. 308pp. Index. £20·00. Pb.: £6·95.

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ANWAR, S. A.: *The European Community and Indo-British trade relations*. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1983. 156pp. Index. £13·50.
CARR, Raymond: *Spain 1808–1975. 2nd edn*. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1982. 856pp. Index. £19·50. Pb.: £9·95.
DREW, John: *Doing business in the European Community. 2nd edn*. London: Butterworths. 1982. 293pp. Index. £17·50.

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DEVLIN, John F.: *Syria: modern state in an ancient land*. Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1983. 140pp. Index. £12·95.
LEGUM, Colin, ed.: *Crisis and conflict in the Middle East*. New York, London: Holmes & Meier. 1981. 159pp. £10·95.

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ADICK, Christel, GROSSE-OETRINGHAUS, Hans-Martin and NESTVOGEL, Renate: *Bildungsprobleme Afrikas zwischen Kolonialismus und Emanzipation*. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde. 1982. 154pp. Pb.: DM18·00.
CARREIRA, Antonio: *The people of the Cape Verde Islands: exploitation and emigration*. Trans., ed. by Christopher Fyfe. London: Hurst; Hamden, Conn.: Archon. 1983. 224pp. Index. £13·50.
GIFFORD, Prosser and LOUIS, Wm Roger, eds: *The transfer of power in Africa: decolonization 1940–1960*. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1982. 654pp. Index. £25·00.
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Bewässerungsgebiet. Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde/Stiftung Deutsches Übersee-Institut. 1982. 205pp. Pb.: DM22·00.

POST, Ulrich and SANDVOSS, Frank: *Die Afrikapolitik der DDR* (Arbeiten aus dem Institut für Afrika-Kunde 43.) Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde. 1982. 158pp. Pb.

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BELL, Clive, HAZELL, Peter and SLADE, Roger: *Project evaluation in regional perspective: a study of an irrigation project in northwest Malaysia.* Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for The World Bank. 1982. 326pp. Index. £24·00. $39.00.

Asian Security 1982. Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security. 1982. 183pp. $23.00.

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JOHNSON, D. Gale: *Progress of economic reform in the People's Republic of China: a study in contemporary economic problems, 1982.* Washington, London: American Enterprise Institute. 1982. 43pp. Pb.

KOTHARI, Rajni: *Politics in India.* New Delhi: Orient Longman. 1982 (reprint). 461pp. Index. £4·95. (First publ. in India 1970.)

LEWIS, D. K.: *The prospects for Hong Kong.* London: Institute for the Study of Conflict. 1983. 26pp. Pb.: £3·50.

MEHTA, Ved: *A family affair: India under three Prime Ministers.* New York; Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1983. 166pp. Index. £12·50.

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North America

LEES, John D.: *The political system of the United States. 3rd edn.* London: Faber. 1983. 406pp. Index. Pb.: £5·95.

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Books reviewed, Summer 1983

Correspondence

From Professor F. S. Northedge

Dear Sir,

I must protest against the notice of a book I co-authored entitled *Britain and Soviet communism* which was written by Jonathan Haslam and published in your Winter 1982/83 issue (pp. 118–19). In a long career I do not think I have seen a review in any serious journal which so misrepresented the book it was supposed to deal with.

Mr Haslam begins by disparaging 'the authors' repeated sermons' on British ignorance of the USSR and gives two references from the same section of the book to prove it. Why should drawing attention twice to an important fact about Anglo-Soviet relations be sneered at as 'sermonizing'? He then points out that neither my co-author nor myself read Russian or use Russian sources, but only 'a somewhat arbitrary selection' of English language sources. I see nothing 'arbitrary' in the extensive bibliography at the end of the book. More importantly, the book is about *British* attitudes to the USSR and, as Mr Haslam would have realized had he read the sub-title, the impact of Soviet communism on *Britain*. Mr Haslam concedes that the book focusses 'purely on the British side of the relationship', but adds that the 'excuse' we offer for choosing that focus is 'specious'. One does not need any 'excuse' for writing about the British view of Russia. It is an important subject which is its own justification.

Haslam then criticizes us for saying that if the West had cooperated with Russia during industrialization, it might have had some influence on that country's political development. 'The whole point' (he writes) about industrialization 'was that Western hostility precipitated it'. That may be so, but how is it inconsistent with our argument? This argument Haslam dismisses as 'absurd', and on the same level of 'absurdity' as our 'odd treatment' of June 1941, or rather the whole period of Russia's neutrality (September 1939 to June 1941), of which we write that 'it requires some imagination to accuse Stalin, of all people, of blindness to Russia's interests'. Mr Haslam comments that 'one would have thought it requires an outstanding piece of fiction to demonstrate otherwise'. He seems not to understand (such is his manner of reading the book) that in this passage we are *not* referring to June 1941, but to Stalin's decision to sign the Nazi–Soviet pact in 1939 and to remain neutral for twenty-two months thereafter. The final section of chapter III of the book is a close analysis of Stalin's position in 1939, reaching the conclusion, admittedly controversial (as all such conclusions are bound to be), but surely not 'an outstanding piece of fiction', that signing the pact in 1939 *was* in Russia's national interest. We quote Churchill, not usually deemed a peddler in absurdities: 'the Russians gained time, and when their hour of trial struck on June 22, 1941, they were far stronger than Hitler imagined'. Is Churchill's judgement 'an outstanding piece of fiction'?

Finally, Mr Haslam refers to our discussion of E. H. Carr's views on Russia as expressed in his *The Soviet impact on the Western world*. He describes this passage as a 'smear', an 'attempt to denigrate' Carr, which 'distorts the evidence wretchedly'. He singles out our reference to Carr's justification of Russia's cavalier treatment of small countries as being 'the way of progress'. He writes that Carr 'nowhere says this'. On page 83 of *The Soviet impact* Carr writes: 'Soviet influence has consistently supported the view that there can be no political equality between great and small Powers and that a system based on the pretence of an equality which does not exist is necessarily a sham'. He then goes on (a passage we quote on page 154 of our book, to which Mr Haslam does not refer): 'The smaller nations can no longer remain, as they remained in the 19th century, neutral and remote from the decisive currents of international affairs. Sooner or later they *will* [my italics] be drawn into the orbit of one or other of the Great Powers'. Haslam writes that, in this citation, we have 'deliberately' quoted Carr 'out of context'. How? Haslam asks if we have read Carr's attacks on Stalin's purges of the 1930s, 'written at the time'. Has *he* read on page 19 of *The Soviet impact*, written in 1946, the following words: 'The Soviet Union has never ignored the human element, or underestimated the extent to which the execution of any policy depends

on the enthusiasm and initiative of the individual citizen; and it has shown itself as well aware as the Western world of what Sir Ernest Barker has described as the main function of democracy—to "enlist the effective thought of the whole community in the operation of discussion"'?

I admit, and thank Mr Haslam for pointing out, three factual errors in the book, one example of which is our statement that Roosevelt recognized Soviet Russia in March 1933, whereas the actual date was November. But I do not believe that any fair-minded person could fail to regard the review as a whole as falling far below Chatham House standards of accuracy and responsibility.

London School of Economics

From Mr Jonathan Haslam

Dear Sir,

I am not the only reviewer to attack the authors of *Britain and Soviet communism* for their curious approach to the subject they write about. But since my review has aroused a protest, let me deal with Professor Northedge's points one by one:

1. On his first point, the Professor is being disingenuous. Throughout the book the authors repeatedly bemoan our lack of knowledge of the USSR's foreign relations and I consider that if they are serious about this, they should have made the effort to learn Russian in order to read the vast quantity of Soviet sources available, particularly when they narrate sections of Russian history (1939–41 for example). As is often the case, the title, or in this case the sub-title, of the book is not the best summary of what the authors actually write about.

2. The Professor is right on his second main point: I hastily assumed he was talking about 1941, instead of the period 1939–41; however, I do think he is unnecessarily apologetic about the short-sighted policy Stalin (with Molotov at his side) pursued during that period. Poor old Litvinov must be turning in his grave.

3. What I found most objectionable were the authors' sneers at Carr. Coming from academics who have not devoted nearly half of their lives to a detailed study of Soviet history their attack on Carr seems misplaced. Northedge's first quote from Carr proves nothing: 'Soviet influence' is the subject of the sentence, not E. H. Carr. The second quote is surely borne out by the reality of the cold war: small nations *have* been drawn into the orbit of the Great Powers. Carr successfully predicted what would happen and like many messengers is being blamed for delivering the bad news. Thirdly, there is Carr's statement on page 19 of *The Soviet impact*: 'The broad lines of Soviet policy may be dictated from the centre. But the Soviet Union has never ignored the human element, or underestimated the extent to which the execution of any policy depends on the enthusiasm and initiative of the individual citizen . . .' etc. This is surely true. Carr is not saying the USSR is a representative democracy—that is clear from his comments on pages 18–19—but he is alluding to a curious paradox of the Soviet system, apparent even during the 1930s under Stalin: the Stakhanovist movement was one good example. A regime does not stay in power in a country undergoing industrialization at a fast pace purely through the exercise of terror. Northedge's other quotations from Carr were similarly selected to show Carr as foolishly credulous rather than from a desire to be fair-minded in an appreciation of his work.

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The place of British and French nuclear weapons in arms control

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The title of this article carries an implicit presumption that British and French nuclear weapons *ought* to have a place in arms control. Due to the way in which arms control negotiations have evolved—especially with the distinctly artificial separation of 'strategic' weapons from 'intermediate' weapons at Geneva—it is not obvious where that place should be. This is a proper subject for debate. But what the British and French governments cannot any longer do without laying themselves open to charges of gross inconsistency and obstructionism is to argue that American and Soviet nuclear weapons should be constrained through arms control while British and French weapons of the same general kind are not.

To begin at the conclusion, Britain and France have no grounds, either in equity or in politics, for standing aside from taking proportional reductions if there are reductions in the nuclear weapons of the superpowers. This raises difficult questions for nuclear forces which their owners state (and believe) are 'minimum deterrent forces'. This article will present the argument that these forces seem to be developing to a point well beyond that which was previously regarded as the minimum deterrent level, and that it is not clear why it should be necessary greatly to alter the retributive capacity of 'minimum deterrent forces' simply because the potential opponent increases his forces. There is a very respectable argument in deterrence theology for taking whatever steps are necessary to ensure the *survivability* of these minimum deterrent forces or 'weapons of last resort' in the face of a changing threat, but unacceptable damage remains unacceptable damage, in the absence of effective defences. If this calculus was initially based on the capacity to inflict a certain degree of pain on an opponent in retaliation, why should it now be necessary to increase the destructive potential of the deterrent force? In terms of practical politics, the subject of the planned expansion of the British and French forces could be introduced alongside the bilateral US–Soviet strategic arms negotiations, either by offering force increases lower than those planned if the Soviet Union reduces its forces threatening Britain and France, or, if the new weapons are already deployed here, reducing them back to consistency with earlier definitions of what constituted a minimum. If the time were ever to arrive when both superpowers had reduced so dramatically that reductions *below* the minimum were demanded of Britain and France, it would be a much safer world and they might be able to afford to do so.

It is well known why the essential purpose of British and French nuclear forces differs from the superpowers' strategic or intermediate nuclear forces; yet they share many of the latter's characteristics. They are basically ballistic missiles carried in nuclear-powered submarines—and these are systems generally acknowledged in SALT and START to be 'strategic' regardless of missile range and so 'central' systems for the superpowers. Whatever differences one can point to in technical

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0020–5850/83/4/0569—06$03.00©1983 International Affairs

terms, those differences are not so marked as to constitute an argument for their exclusion from START on technical grounds. Yet they are owned and operated by sovereign West European states in alliance with the United States, with the potential to add to the peripheral threat faced by the USSR. Nor are they, by definition, 'insignificant' if their potential is to damage the USSR to an 'unacceptable' degree. Finally, they are technically unlike almost all other intermediate nuclear weapons which are predominantly land-based—whether missiles or aircraft—and on which the Soviet Union generally relies for peripheral attack missions and target coverage. There is, then, nowhere at the moment where they sit comfortably as a category; nevertheless, this is no reason for leaving them out of all nuclear negotiations.

Arms control has come to be bedevilled by definitional problems. For obvious reasons, baskets of apparently like things have to be assembled and counted so long as there remains an arithmetical basis for arms limitation. There are many different ways of counting—by submarines, launch tubes, warheads, throw-weight, megatonnage and so forth—and a marked degree of thoroughly 'unstrategic' simplification has had to be introduced into arms control negotiations where weapon systems are assigned to missions for counting purposes regardless of reality. To illustrate this point: a Soviet Yankee-class submarine with SS-N-6 missiles is a 'strategic' weapon and it was designed to threaten the continental United States. To do so, it had to go out into the Pacific or the Atlantic. Now the Soviet Union has Delta-class submarines with missiles of such range that they have no need to leave Soviet home waters. It is perfectly reasonable to suppose that some of the Yankees are now assigned to peripheral attack missions against Western Europe. In other words they are no longer 'strategic' weapons although still counted as such. Similarly the Soviet Union has used at least some of its 'strategic' land-based missiles—SS-11 and now SS-19—to cover European targets. This list of ambiguities could be continued and would include, for example, the Backfire. On the US side it is generally believed that SACEUR has call on US strategic warheads based on submarines for European or regional purposes.

The point here is that arms control compels the making of simplifying and distorting assumptions that few are comfortable with and which have little if anything to do with operational realities. Certainly a basket could be designed in which to place British and French submarines and certain types of Soviet submarines—but what about China? Moreover, this would be the worst kind of simplifying assumption. Britain and France are not only threatened by some Soviet submarines. They are threatened by Soviet aircraft and land-based missiles of many different types.

To return to the political realities: the arithmetic of an intermediate nuclear force balance has been skilfully manipulated since 1979 by the Soviet Union in various offers that they have made, and central to their presentations has been the assumption that British and French nuclear forces should be weighed in the INF balance. If one accepts that position in principle, almost all permutations—whether of missiles or of warheads—leave the United States no room to deploy new weapons in Western Europe to counter what is seen as the growing threat to Europe from Soviet aircraft and missiles. Indeed, by some Soviet calculations, the United States would even have to remove what is already here in terms of aircraft. So it is necessary to restate the problem. The West Europeans are increasingly anxious that the United States might no longer be able to extend its deterrent umbrella to Western Europe; might, in the jargon, become decoupled. Strategic parity and

mutual vulnerability are perceived to operate against the use of US central nuclear power to protect Western Europe against regional nuclear threats. To recouple, it is argued that it is necessary to have *American* nuclear weapons in Europe capable of retaliating *on behalf of Western Europe* should Western Europe be threatened by Soviet nuclear weapons. That is to do violence to an intricate argument, but one can put this starkly by asking the question: What is it that protects Germany from nuclear threat? It is not British or French weapons, or at least not in any direct sense. It can only (for most Germans) be American nuclear weapons on German soil (granted that the presence of American weapons in Germany may not be *enough* to give the Germans all the reassurance that they seek). Given the nature of the Western Alliance and residual doubts about an American willingness to retaliate on behalf of Germany, that reassurance can never be complete; but it is certain that most Germans would feel frighteningly exposed to Soviet blackmail—and so could behave very unpredictably—if they were not confronted by some sense and practical demonstration of American nuclear commitment. What follows from this is that, so long as the threat to Germany exists, the Alliance should never agree to negotiate and formalize by treaty a regional nuclear balance in Europe which prevented the United States from deploying some nuclear weapons in Europe. This established, one can turn then to figures—how many and of what type—but it is essential that the right of the United States to protect Germany is preserved. This is, in a very real sense, the bargain which Germany struck in undertaking to remain a non-nuclear state. The Soviet Union, in seeking unilaterally to overturn that bargain, is treading on very dangerous ground with unpredictable consequences. It is probably very well aware of this but it is playing for very high stakes indeed in the INF talks: nothing less than the exclusion of American nuclear power from Europe. They have seen the opportunity to do this by manipulating the issue of British and French nuclear forces in arms control. They may now have a vision of a Western Europe substantially neutralized by forcing the withdrawal of American nuclear patronage; for it is inconceivable that any President could leave conventional forces in Europe without nuclear support.

A further question follows: is the Soviet manipulation of British and French nuclear numbers tactical? Or is it a matter of fundamental concern? If tactical, they would not press the issue to the point where it got in the way of an agreement that they would regard as beneficial. If fundamental one is faced with the probability that there will be no agreement in the absence of a major concession by Britain, France, and the United States. A valid assumption to proceed from is that the Soviet Union is serious to this extent: that the exclusion of British and French nuclear forces from *all* arms control negotiations is now unacceptable. In other words, it might be prepared to make a concession on their continued exclusion from INF if it was assured that they would be counted and limited somehow and somewhere—and, in the absence of some unimaginable, undesirable and artificial British–Soviet and Franco–Soviet bilateral negotiations, that has to mean in or around START. How is that to be done?

The two governments must go much further than they have done so far to demonstrate an arms control policy that makes sense to their publics, to the rest of Europe, to the United States and to the Soviet Union. If they do not, they will come to be seen as one of the obstacles to agreement and thus come under great political pressure from all sides. This is not to deny that there are other obstacles, great ones, to the conclusion of START and INF negotiations; and there is a

temptation for both governments to take no position until forced to do so when other obstacles might have been overcome. There is also a temptation to believe that they were successfully kept out of SALT I and SALT II and that they might be kept out again. Many things, however, have changed since then: public opinion, US bargaining leverage, Soviet attitudes and the balance of power to name only some. The French and British nuclear forces must now be taken somehow into account. Moreover, if both governments wish to see, as they profess to wish to see, a successful outcome to INF negotiations, it would be political folly not to do what they can to help the negotiations along, subject always to the overriding principle that the outcome of the INF talks must permit the deployment of some US weapons in Europe so long as Europe is under a Soviet unclear threat. Not to do so would isolate Britain and France. They must not be seen as the primary obstacle to an acceptable INF agreement. That is the price which Britain and France should be prepared to pay to preserve intact the structure of Western security.

How, then, is this to be done? There are obvious and probably insuperable difficulties in entering the START process directly. These, like INF, are essentially—and rightly—bilateral US-Soviet negotiations. Moreover, the US administration labours under the constraint of the Jackson Amendment which insists on equal ceilings and rights as between the two superpowers, principles recently restated by President Reagan. Juridically, any strategic arms agreement cannot, therefore, make allowances for British and French forces, nor would the US instinct be to make such allowances, small though they might be. They would not do so in SALT I. To do so would be to accept Soviet claims for 'equal security'. So a way has to be found of including them around the edges of START without seeming to include them. Also to be dealt with is the very real difficulty that, under the policies currently being pursued by both governments, British and French forces are set to grow in the next decade—the British quite dramatically in terms of separately targetable warheads, the French steadily—to the point where they will together constitute a not inconsiderable fraction of the Western warhead total, especially if, in START, superpower warheads are reduced: up to 20 per cent if each superpower reduces to 5,000. If this happens, the argument hitherto used, that increases have been made merely to keep pace with Soviet growth, simply cannot be sustained.

The least move that would be acceptable—to the British and French publics and to the other Western allies—would seem to be to agree to make *proportional* reductions in 'strategic' forces as the superpowers reduce their force levels in START. The first step would be an undertaking to hold strategic forces at a specific number of separately deliverable warheads, *if* the Soviet Union signs a treaty of strategic limitation. To agree to *no* modernization would be unacceptable, because that would lead in the long term to obsolescence. The need to build new boats or buy new missiles should be able to be met within the national ceiling. It does not seem sensible even to begin to try to establish those ceilings as a specific fraction of Soviet nuclear power, for that would destroy the logic of minimum deterrence. Rather, the necessary minimum deterrent level should be defined by Britain and France themselves and adhered to, with the assumption that modernization will mean having something in excess of that.

What form this undertaking could legally assume is not immediately obvious. It must be possible to find some way of convincing the Soviet Union that this undertaking is legally binding and that Britain and France could escape from it only

at the risk of legitimating compensatory increases in Soviet forces. That would hardly please the United States who, in theory at least, would be forced either to accede to inequality in numbers or to abrogate their treaty with the USSR. Given Britain's dependence on the US for nuclear viability, the United States could easily find ways to prevent Britain increasing its strategic forces; and with some combination of threats and rewards could probably also persuade the French not to do so.

In a curious way the Soviet Union is helping Britain because it seems, contrary to the position taken in SALT I, to be arguing that in Britain's case Chevaline is not an MRV—thus counting as one warhead—but as an MIRV and thus as six. On this basis Britain could say that its permitted ceiling is now 4 × 16 × 6 = 384 and that it will not go beyond that warhead total—even with Trident—and would then reduce, by further downloading Trident submarines, if the Soviet Union reduces. Here it must be admitted that one arms control counting rule will get seriously in the way of this proposal—D-5 Trident, like all MIRVed missiles, will be assumed to carry the maximum number of warheads with which it will have been tested (probably fourteen). How can that kind of downloading be verified? Perhaps by taking missiles out of the submarines rather than warheads, ballasting the empty tubes and permitting inspection that the tubes are sealed. There must be a way of doing it. A number can also be legitimately claimed for the now defunct V-bomber force—say 56. It was once 200 strong.

To restate, then, the main points of the argument:

1. Britain and France should *not* seek a place at the negotiating tables in Geneva, either INF or START. They would probably not be welcome in any case at what must remain bilateral superpower negotiations.
2. They neither can nor should permit the United States to negotiate on their behalf, nor would the latter wish to do so.
3. They should not permit their forces to be used to 'balance' Soviet INF in INF negotiations, nor should they admit Soviet claims to 'equal security' against a worst possible combination of adversaries.
4. They should now—quickly—evolve an arms control policy with respect to their 'strategic' weapons which includes a willingness to consider imposing a ceiling—perhaps 400 each—on deliverable warheads if the United States and the USSR can negotiate ceilings on their warheads. They should then make a binding commitment to reduce deliverable warheads *pro rata* if the superpowers reduce their ceilings.

That is, after all, the logic of the Soviet Union's position in SALT I and it should be reminded of the position it then took. By making on 17 May 1972 a unilateral statement to the effect that the USSR 'will have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines' if 'US allies in NATO increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of the signature of the agreement' it effectively established a precedent. This was rejected by the United States but that does not alter the fact that the British and French forces were then considered to be strategic and that increases in Soviet forces were thought to be legitimated by increases in British and French forces. It therefore seems reasonable to suppose that it should be satisfied by proportional reductions in British and French forces if the USSR were itself to reduce this category of arms. As this article has tried to indicate, the failure to adopt what is generally seen as a reasonable position in arms control with respect to the weapons they have or intend to procure will expose

both governments increasingly to internal and allied criticism which will not be easy to withstand in the longer term. Both governments need an arms control strategy that they do not yet appear to have. It is not enough to say that their strategic forces are 'non-negotiable'.

Two further points are worth making briefly: they concern the non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and a comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT).

The NPT was a bargain between the nuclear 'haves' and the nuclear 'have-nots'. The latter undertook to remain without, so long as the former under Article VI undertook 'to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament'. One would not want to see the bargain collapse. Given the mutterings during the 1980 Review Conference, it seems likely that the nuclear states will come under attack in the next Review Conference, and it will be no easy task to defend the British (or the French) record. It would surely be good politics to have a policy of contingent proportional reductions.

With respect to CTBT, this does not seem likely to have much impact on the Trident programme, which will disappoint those who regard the CTBT as an important arms control measure. This is so because the warhead design and proof testing has either been done—and there are several appropriate designs—or will have been done before signature seems likely. The impact of a CTBT of indefinite duration would be different. It would tend to diminish confidence that things would work as intended. Whether one regards this as a good thing or a bad thing depends on one's position on nuclear deterrence. One must weigh political good against harm to stability. It could help to impede proliferation and act as a sign of seriousness on the part of the nuclear powers that they wish at least to ease the pace of nuclear competition. It seems much more likely, however, that, if a CTBT does emerge, it will be of limited duration, perhaps with a number of tests for proof permitted on its expiry and before renewal for a further period. None of that would in practice do much to stifle the nuclear competition, but the essentially symbolic nature of such a treaty would not be without merit and the British government would do well to continue to work towards it.

In summary, then, this article is a plea for the British and French governments to match their policies to their rhetoric. It seems inescapable that Britain's nuclear capability is set to reach a level that cannot be ignored in the East–West nuclear balance. When added to that of the French, it is only to be expected that the Soviet Union will baulk at their total exclusion from arms control negotiations. That seems in turn to mean that both Britain and France must make clear through dialogue how they intend to enter their weapons into the arms control process and on what basis. And that means having a policy.

On 20 June 1983 *Time* magazine carried an interview with Mrs Thatcher conducted by Bonnie Angelo. One reply contained the following statement:

> If, between the two big powers, the numbers went down massively and enormously and we moved into a totally different world—a far greater reduction than I can foresee certainly within the next five years—then there may be circumstances when ours will have to be counted [in arms negotiations]. But I cannot foresee that at the moment.

The burden of this article is that this does not amount to a policy adequate to encourage the forward movement of nuclear arms control.

Argentina: the departure of the military—end of a political cycle or just another episode?

ALAIN ROUQUIÉ*

Anyone who has followed the political development of Argentina over the last year has feelings divided between astonishment at its exceptional character and a strong impression of *déjà vu*. Rarely, no doubt, has a 'strong' regime managed so well to bring about its own demise. Perhaps never before has Argentine society reached such a level of entropy or come so close to disintegration and loss of its identity. But at the same time, the familiar sequence of political developments is again taking place, with unrelieved monotony. 'History repeating itself' is not just a trite figure of speech. The ending of the present military interlude, notwithstanding its terrorist phase, the tragic adventure of the South Atlantic, the near-collapse of the economy and the settling of scores between the three services, is following step by step a well-trodden path. Like their predecessors of the period 1966–73, the messianic but not over-humble leaders of the 'process of national reorganization' found themselves, after promising not to return power to the civilians until all the country's problems had been 'put right', obliged to embark hurriedly upon the phase of institutional normalization. Disagreements within the military authorities and the sombre toll of six years of absolute power had made inevitable an inglorious retreat by the 'saviours of the motherland'. Dialogue with parties gripped, after years of ostracism, by a sudden electoral frenzy, the efforts of the military to impose conditions and safeguards on the functioning of a re-established democracy: these are just so many recurrent features of a cyclical political history.

However, these seven years (1976–83) do not resemble their counterpart of the preceding decade (1966–73) and one may wonder about the lasting after-effects which they may have on society and the State. The political shock treatment, the violence of the authorities, has no precedent in recent Argentine history and has gone hand in hand with an economic shock treatment. And the country is still affected by these remedies of which one may reasonably think that they were much worse than the ills which they were supposed to cure. But it would be surprising if such shocks to the system had not modified political attitudes and behaviour. How could the underlying nature and the socio-political structures of a system heavily influenced by the military[1] not have been brought into question in any way nor have undergone the slightest change? When one considers all that the regime is answerable for, and its social cost, it is doubtful whether the apparent repetition of the political rituals can bring back the same expectations as in the past. Are not the isolation of the government today and its inability to mobilize the civilian backing indispensable for its survival clear proof that calling in the military has lost its attraction? The barely tolerated appearance of an antimilitarism which is as new as it is uncontrollable leads one to think that, according to the traditional phrase,

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1. On the functioning of military power in Argentina and the mechanics of the 'praetorian inversion', see, among others, A. Rouquié *et al.*, *Pouvoir militaire et société politique*, (Paris: 1978), chapter I; also Rouquié *et al.*, *Argentina hoy* (Mexico City: 1982).

0020–5850/83/4/0575—12$03.00©1983 International Affairs

nothing will ever be the same again. Going further, one can even state that never since 1930 has Argentina had such an opportunity to rid itself for good of the dominance of the military. Who can believe, in effect, that the military institutions still constitute the 'moral reserve of the country' and the final arbiter to which it can have ultimate recourse? Could the days of military ascendancy, the 'praetorian inversion', be numbered?

The crushing toll of the military regime

Once more in 1976 the Argentine armed forces took power in order to re-establish the authority of the state, national security and the values of Christian morality.[2] To fight against subversion and corruption were their two main objectives. In the economic field, the programme of their principal executant, Sr Martinez de Hoz, who was chosen because of his international prestige and to whom the army gave total and unstinted support for nearly five years, consisted of 'replacing an economy based on speculation with an economy based on production'.

What happened in the field of the struggle against subversion is well known. The military junta's recent document, intended, according to its authors, to bring to a conclusion the tragic question of the 'disappearances' and to determine the responsibility of the armed forces in the 'dirty war' against subversion, does not manage to hide beneath grandiloquent historical allusions the massive scale of the terrorism conducted by the state.[3] The disproportion between the numbers of those who died as a result of the repression and those who were victims of the guerrilla war appears in this document with glaring clarity. The horror of the disappearances with all that they hide (clandestine detention camps, torture, etc.) and the explanations, as crass as they are derisory, of a widespread phenomenon (7,300 disappearances according to the Brazilian bishops, 30,000 according to the 'Mothers of the *Plaza de Mayo*') as arising only from guerrillas changing their names and the hazards of living in clandestinity, have produced indignation in every chancellery and incredulity among the Argentine public. It is difficult to see how the abductions of children as part of reprisals against the families of suspects can be fitted into this simplistic picture. And the spectre of an Argentine Nuremberg which is haunting the barracks will not be removed by statements which in no way create the conditions indispensable for national reconciliation or by the promulgation of a law which the military are praying for and which would draw a veil over their wrongdoings. Wavering between admission of unfortunate mistakes and pride in duty performed at the 'outposts of the third world war', the Argentine military justify themselves as if they were not in power and as if one could govern without due regard for the law and expect to get away with it. But martial arrogance has today become out of place. And the statement of the commander-in-chief of the army, General Nicolaides, to the effect that the victors in a war (even against subversion) are not accountable to anyone[4] can only be for internal consumption. Few, in fact, are those who do not hesitate to present as an epic (*esta gesta*) one of the saddest periods in the country's history. And if the blood spilt by the repression in no way justifies the irresponsible adventurism of the guerrilla leaders who drew a whole lost generation into violence,

2. According to the text of *Acta fijando el propósito y los objectivos básicos para el proceso de reorganización nacional.*
3. *Documento final sobre la lucha antisuvversiva*, 28 April 1983, in *La Nación*, 2 May 1983.
4. 'Habló Nicolaides de la actualidad', *La Nación*, 21 Feb. 1983.

one can nonetheless not put on the same level the power of the state, the duty of its representatives and the aberrations of protest movements. The armed forces admit, moreover, that as long ago as 1976, when they seized power, the terrorists, routed in conventional military engagements, were reduced as a result to individual action and selective violence.[5] In other words, the decentralized and compartmentalized repression, the illegal acts by clandestine and paramilitary commando groups, the 'night and fog'[6] concentration camps—in a word, the 'killing machine'—had in these conditions hardly any proper military justification.

The authorities' recent efforts at normalization, forbidding 'bad treatment' in the prisons or insisting that police vehicles carry registration plates, give further weight to accusations which they have many times rejected. Tongues are gradually loosening, rumours which used to circulate in private are making their appearance in a press freed from fear or are even mentioned by courts in which, because of the imminence of a change of regime, there is now a revival of activity. Certain confessions by repentant members of the police or angry officers[7] help to conjure up the climate of moral decay and judicial anarchy into which the country had sunk. From the looting of the homes of suspects to the private settling of scores, the impunity with which the fight against subversion was conducted seems to have made violence commonplace and profitable.[8] The various factions did not hesitate to make use of 'disappearances' as a way of confronting each other. And the political ambitions of certain military leaders do not seem to have shrunk from alliances with 'the enemy' or the elimination of embarrassing witnesses, as is shown by the murder of the Press Attaché of the Argentine Embassy in Paris and the suicide, in suspicious circumstances in October 1982, of the brother of one of her colleagues, who also knew too much about the contacts of a member of the Junta with the 'subversives'.[9]

Certainly, what the Argentine military have christened 'war' belongs to the past, and disappearances or executions have been rare since 1980. But there still exist the 'uncontrolled groups' about which those in charge of anti-subversion operations like General Camps, former chief of police of Buenos Aires province, recall that they have always been under the direct orders of the military command. The re-establishment of civilian control over these 'death squads' and, consequently, the restoration of a state based on the rule of law do not, therefore, promise to be easy.

Apart from the deaths and the disappearances, the crusading spirit which impelled the forces of repression brought about a concerted and suicidal offensive against the country's intellectual potential. Believing that subversion is also 'cultural and psychological', the military measured freedom of thought by the yardstick of their own vision of the world. They considered contrary to the 'Argentine way of life' which they had set themselves the task of defining and defending, everything which

5. Some observers had been pointing this out as early as 1977; see 'Argentine 1977, anarchie militaire ou État terroriste', *Les Etudes*, Oct. 1977.

6. 'Night and fog': the allusion is to the Nazi concentration camps, the phrase having gained prominence from the title of the film *Nuit et brouillard* directed by Alain Resnais. The title of this film dealing with the Nazi camps is itself a translation of the German phrase *Nacht und Nebel*.

7. See in particular the confessions of the inspector of police Rodolfo Fernández to the assistant of General Harguíndegvu in Madrid, *Cambio 16*, 4 April 1983.

8. The elimination of economic competitors would have been common in the climate of the period 1976–81, during which racketeering, political rivalries and counter-revolutionary war got on well together. The links which certain senior officers had with politico-financial organizations as suspect as the Italian lodge P2 are well known.

9. The reference is to the execution of Héléna Holmberg and of the brother of Gregorio Dupont.

departed, however slightly, from a narrow moralism and a conformist religiosity. In a society of immigrants without a past, these cold war crusaders could be seen defending the values of 'tradition'; in the cosmopolitan metropolis, one of the capitals of the world's artistic *avant-garde*, the military regime used 'fire and the sword' to compel the preservation of a 'national essence' considered as identical to its own rhetoric. In this way, not only was all opposition considered criminal, but also the most recent products of Western culture: non-figurative art, psychoanalysis, sociology and modern mathematics were officially banned. The mass exodus of teachers, doctors, research workers, technicians and artists driven out by terror appears to have been deliberately instigated in order to 'purge' society.

But the exacting moral preoccupations of these incorruptible 'rebuilders' of Argentina have not always withstood the temptations of power. The newspapers and the courts have been repeating since July 1982 stories of the fraudulent enrichment of military leaders; so much so that a 'hardline' document, put out by retired officers in reply to the daily attacks against a government inspired by 'the purest ideals' shows concern nonetheless at errors which appear 'to concern the ethical sphere' and demands an enquiry.[10] The newspapers are calling for the retention of the anti-corruption commission created by the triumvirate of March 1976 to deal with misappropriations of funds by the Peronist leaders. Does one have to recall that the 'purifying' *coup d'état* had been brought about by patriotic officers weary of 'watching over the feast of the corrupt'? The civilian associates of the military government are not sheltered from accusations of irregularities in the management of the public finances. The courts have had referred to them several *dossiers* implicating colleagues of Sr Martinez de Hoz. And the one which has aroused the greatest interest, and which relates to an international credit of $5m for the state-owned oil company (YPF), all trace of which is said to have been lost, is alleged to involve directly the responsibility of the former superminister of the economy.

People have all along wondered about the real aims of the liberal and monetarist policy of the Martinez de Hoz team. A return to an agrarian Argentina? A means of disciplining relations between the social classes and bringing the lower classes to heel? An attempt to restructure industry and reshape the ruling class?[11] One thing alone is certain. One cannot think that its ultimate objective was the improvement and development of the national economy. After six years of a strategy of ultra-liberal financial reform and opening up of the economy, all the economic indicators point in fact to a situation of bankruptcy. GDP has declined by more than 10 per cent in the two years from the end of 1980 to the beginning of 1983. Inflation, which by its runaway nature in 1976 played a decisive role in the fall of Isabel Perón, has not been quelled. It reached more than 200 per cent in 1982. The highest level ever recorded (411 per cent in 1976) could even be surpassed in 1983. In 1982 *per capita* production was 15 per cent lower than that of 1975. Industrial production fell by 25 per cent between 1976 and 1980 and the labour force by 26 per cent, whereas the percentage of people working on their own account rose from 18·5 to

10. 'En una presentación oficiales retirados critican al Gobierno', *La Nación*, 14 Feb. 1983.

11. For the different interpretations, see respectively Aldo Ferrer, 'La economía argentina bajo una estrategia 'preindustrial' 1976–1980' in Rouquié *et al.*, *Argentina hoy*, p. 105; Adolfo Canitrot, 'Ordre social et monétarisme en Argentine', *Problèmes d'Amérique Latine*, No. 66, and A. Rouquié and Ricardo Sidicaro, 'Etats autoritaires et libéralisme économique en Amérique Latine: une approche hétérodoxe', *Tiers Monde*, May–June 1983.

23·5 per cent of the active population. Argentina now produces only half of the motor vehicles which it built in 1975. Many multinational companies have ceased operations (among others, General Motors, Citroën and Olivetti). Industry, hit by the fall in demand, the easier access given to imports, and the rise in interest rates, has undergone a severe and perhaps irreversible cutback which goes well beyond the needs of rigorous economic rationalization. The industrial fabric has become impoverished, the Argentine social structure has been 'thirdworldised'. And this is not an abstract picture: in a country which produces and exports food products, a real mine of proteins, the soup kitchens of the charity organizations have made their appearance and are frequented by an unprecedented number of people.

The paradox of the situation lies in the fact that a strong accumulation of capital resulting from the freezing of salaries has been accompanied by a serious recession against the background of an enormous growth of external debt. The average salary in real terms went from 150 in 1975 to 77 in 1978, that is to say, a reduction of nearly 50 per cent. The fall in purchasing power led to a lowering of demand but the reduction in wage costs was counterbalanced by the rise in financial costs: not only did investments mark time but bankruptcies increased. The total amount of liabilities doubled from 1979 to 1980.

The level of external debt, which reached $40bn in 1982 as against $7bn in 1975, is one of the most remarkable results of the monetarist policy. In contrast to Brazil or Mexico, it is not connected with a phase of boom conditions and heavy investment or with spending on infrastructure. Certainly purchases of military equipment which are difficult to calculate represent a part of this, but they do not account for its sharp acceleration in 1978–9 after the bringing in of the financial reform. In fact, the growing indebtedness is the result of a policy which encouraged speculation.

The measures adopted to fight inflation consisted of keeping the peso overvalued in relation to the dollar and keeping interest rates high. Although imports received a fillip from such a policy, it was above all currency which came flooding in, attracted by the domestic interest rates, while economic agents borrowed on the international markets at lower rates and private individuals bought dollars. The cheap dollar encouraged people to travel abroad and engage in unproductive expenditure, as in the *belle époque* of Argentine prosperity; it contributed greatly to making the regime acceptable to the middle classes. But the speculative capital, the borrowings (real or fictitious) of the private sector on the international market and, in short, financial speculation in all its forms, were at the root of an increasing indebtedness which was as artificial as it was unnecessary.

While the exorbitant interest rates and competition from imported products discouraged all productive effort, Argentina became the world paradise for speculation. Buying foreign currency, banking it in pesos, then reconverting it into dollars became the national sport. It can be said that Sr Martinez de Hoz helped to popularize a traditional mode of behaviour of the Argentine establishment which draws its strength from its capacity for mobilizing its financial resources quickly.[12] Thus the 'militarism of the market' gave to the people the expectations of the oligarchy. But at the same time as it was liquidating part of the nation's industry, it was demoralizing producers and citizens. Very-short-term investments and speculation on the differentials between government bonds, credits and currencies

12. See Rouquié, 'Hegemonía militar, estado y dominación social', in Rouquié *et al.*, *Argentina hoy*.

encouraged every kind of speculative behaviour: from generalized delays in payment to the most subtle frauds. Immense fortunes were made overnight, financial empires were built up in a few years only to collapse in 1980 when the situation became untenable in view of the new international economic situation.

This economic and moral bankruptcy, brought about by a team which proposed to restore Argentine industry to health, is certainly cause for surprise. One does not know whether to attribute it to the headstrong incompetence of dogmatic sorcerers' apprentices or to the intrinsic perversity of a group linked to the traditional establishment and profiting from the 'divine surprise' of 24 March to fashion an Argentina to suit its interests alone. No doubt the answer is to be found half-way between these two hypotheses. But it is undeniable that, just as Argentina experienced a 'dirty war', so it also had a 'dirty economy'.[13]

If the military can always attribute to others the responsibility for a disastrous economic record, they cannot do the same in their own strict sphere of competence, that of war. Launched with the enthusiasm normally shown for a sporting competition by a government which had run out of steam, the 'reconquest' of the Falkland Islands from the British ended in ignominious defeat. No doubt if, as was expected in Buenos Aires, the British had not reacted, this patriotic feat would have enabled the army's fortunes to be boosted at little cost, would have brought about a *de facto* amnesty for its past actions and exactions and would have reconciled the military with society. The manipulation of opinion, moreover, was conducted in a masterly way: from 2 April to 13 June, helped on by nationalist fervour, the Argentine forces were supposed to go from triumph to triumph. On 14 June, General Menendez surrendered at Port Stanley.

The explanations given by the military for this *débâcle* are hardly convincing and rather are damning for their authors, in that they underline the improvised nature of the undertaking. The 'treachery' of the United States, unthinkable for General Galtieri who considered himself 'the spoilt child of the Americans' (*sic*),[14] or the 'inordinate reaction of the English', even the ferocity of their troops or the quality of their weapons, are just so many rather unmilitary excuses. From the testimony of soldiers or officers, one can extract several elements which are worth more serious attention. To begin with, this experience has confirmed that a political army loses its ability to provide defence, and that one cannot at the same time carry out the functions of a party and of a military machine. In fact, for non-operational reasons, there were three Falklands wars, conducted without coordination by each of the three branches of the armed forces. The way in which the three forces tried to outbid each other prevented even the government from grasping possibilities of avoiding confrontation by diplomatic means. But in the eyes of the public it is the incompetence of numerous army officers, their corruption, which caused the most indignation, for they put at risk the lives of the conscripts. From ex-servicemen who fought in the Falklands, military chaplains and journalists have come numerous reports which bring out the incompetence, even the cowardice, of certain senior officers—in contrast with the heroism of the air force—and the lack of preparedness of soldiers who were ill-equipped or ill-nourished as a result of the trafficking in equipment or rations. The arrogance of the general staff cannot conceal the anger

13. As Jorge Schvarzer says very rightly in one of the best studies published on the economic policy of the military regime: *Martinez de Hoz: la lógica de la política económica* (Buenos Aires: Ensayos y Tesis CISEA, 1983), p. 126.

14. According to General Galtieri in an interview given to *Clarín*, 2 April 1983.

of many young officers. Once more, as in the 'dirty war', 'operational' and 'political' officers opposed each other, and the army was torn further apart. The saviours of the motherland were not capable of defending the 'national territory' or of conducting a real war against a conventional army. That cuts down to size their victory over civilians in the fight against subversion. It also argues both for the demilitarization of government and the rebuilding of an army able to carry out its task of national defence.

The chances of demilitarization

The Falklands fiasco not only hastened the course of events but also opened the eyes of many sections of Argentine society. In view of the divisions in the armed forces both between the three services (at first members of the air force and navy refused after 14 June to participate in the governing junta) and between generations and ranks, the first priority was to recreate institutional unity. How better to handle the *débâcle* and prepare an orderly if not honourable retreat than by calling on the political parties to take charge of the inheritance?

The isolation of the army, discredited as it is in the political, economic, moral and even defence fields, seems to create the conditions for a transformation of a political system in which the military have for nearly fifty years been almost legitimate partners. The lasting dishonour of the army may lessen, even bring to an end, the 'praetorian inversion' which consists, as far as the civilians are concerned, in knocking on the doors of the barracks while the military men anxious for greater power seek out support from the political parties. The fact that the regime's economic policy has benefited only a very narrow section of society—the large-scale speculators and their set, whom the opposition has sometimes called *la patria financiera*—makes such a reversal of the situation easier.

Furthermore, the clear divorce between the neo-liberal teams who have been managing the economy and the general staffs seems to be complete. Each of the two groups lays at the other's door the responsibility for the disaster. Inspired with nationalist sentiment, the military no longer have anything but scorn for the stateless financiers and their very cosmopolitan national partners. Thus it was that people learned with surprise that two of the three branches of the armed forces had always been opposed to the policy of Martinez de Hoz—which had no doubt been true since 1979—and in the army, certain generals are saying publicly that they consider they were misled by the 'wise man' of the liberal economy. In any case, the military, some of whom today want sanctions to be taken against Sr Martinez de Hoz and his team, are ready to abandon him to public condemnation and, for the moment, to the investigations of the courts. The former Minister, J. Alemann, a colleague of Sr Martinez de Hoz from 1976 to 1981, has however made a speciality of defending the liberal team and attacking those military men who abandon their friends, at the same time disclosing certain unflattering pieces of information about them.

If the managers of the economy are upset by the ingratitude of their partners, the propertied class and even business circles which have not had cause to complain about the last six years, are pondering over the inconsistency of the legions. Certainly democracy is in fashion today in Argentina, even among those who

collaborate regularly or occasionally with the military government. But leaving aside short-lived indignation or studied opportunism, one may think that such an attitude comes from a clearer perception of the risks of an appeal to the military and of the uncontrollable, even irrational, nature of the political behaviour of the armed forces.

The 'reconquest' of the Falklands hardly fired the upper middle class with enthusiasm, irrespective of whether or not it was pro-British. Above all the turnabout in Argentine foreign policy on that occasion frightened it. The incoherence of Argentina's international policy under the military is obvious. This bastion of the free world not only made war on a member of NATO but it received the blessing of the Soviet Union and its allies. Did not a country which was trying to become the privileged ally of the United States and was lending it a hand in Central America ask for support from Cuba, Nicaragua and Libya? Finally, did not General Galtieri's chancellor, after declaring to Brazil at the beginning of March 1982 that Argentina did not belong to the Third World, go to Havana where his *abrazo* (embrace) of Fidel Castro caused a sensation? One can understand that the Argentine conservatives should be disoriented, even alarmed, by the statements of Sr Costa Mendes at the non-aligned meeting of 9 June 1982 according to which 'the struggle for the Falklands is similar to the liberation struggles of Algeria, India, Cuba, Vietnam and the Palestinian people'. These remarks, moreover, were corroborated by those of General Bignone at the non-aligned summit in New Delhi where the representative of an army victorious over 'international terrorism' had a friendly conversation with Mr Yassir Arafat.

Certainly, the prospect of a reversal of alliances is scarcely plausible, but for the edgy Argentine middle class the existence of groups of officers favourable to a *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Third World, and the strength of the anti-Western feelings among certain military men who have gone over to irredentist nationalism are worrying symptoms[15]—or at the very least obstacles to a new defensive alliance against the popular forces. This is especially so since the Soviet Union has today become the leading trading customer of Argentina.

Thus, sections of society which formerly looked to the armed forces to provide a remedy for political difficulties today reject this approach. One may wonder whether circumstances are not favourable for the setting up of a civilian front against a militarism which has proved too costly even for its successive apparent beneficiaries. If sectional interests are at the root of the 'praetorian inversion', why should not the demilitarization of the body politic now suit those same interests? If the success of an alliance with the military is problematic for all, does not the future belong to civilians and democracy?

Tactical withdrawal and continuity: the assets of the militarized system

Demilitarization of the system will, however, not be a simple matter, especially since never before has the militarization of society and of the state been so deep-rooted. The colonization of the state apparatus and of the economy by officers is a new factor arising from this last six-year period of military rule. Just replacing military men by civilians will not suffice to normalize the situation. We are looking

15. 'Grupo de oficiales argentinos solicita estrechar lazos con paises socialistas', *Uno más Uno*, Mexico City, 21 July 1982, and also 'El plan secreto de los militares', *La Semana*, 24 June 1982.

at an imperative task of reconstruction which the country must undertake as if it had suffered not one but several wars, and which will necessitate rebuilding of the country's productive capacity, of a state based on the rule of law, of coexistence between the classes and, lastly, of the army. One may wonder with some anxiety about the resources the country has for carrying through such an enterprise, given that, when the problems are 'more complex, it has in fact less ability to resolve them'[16]: fewer technicians (part of the diaspora has gone into exile without hope that it will return), a lower level of education and training centres going to rack and ruin, to mention only the intellectual aspect.

The political parties do not appear to be equal to what is at stake either. It was astonishing to see the leaders of the five main parties belonging to the opposition coalition (*la multipartidaria*) falling, with only a few exceptions, into the patriotic trap set by the dictatorship and going abroad to explain the merits of the 'reconquest' of the Falklands or attending the enthronement of governor Menendez at Port Stanley, renamed Puerto Argentino. But then it was no less surprising to see the same men, after the defeat, instead of going on to the attack and demanding the immediate departure of the military (as in Bolivia, to mention only one recent precedent) leave the initiative with them and allow them to restore their weakened authority. Thus it was that the parties hastened to support the tottering President Bignone and to accept dialogue with a *de facto* government, which was as divided as it was discredited, as if nothing had happened over the last six years. The defensive attitude beneath a rhetoric advocating civilian government, and the submission to the demands of the military of this respectful opposition augur ill for its aptitude for rebuilding a solid and demilitarized democracy. Apart from some ritual moves, the parties are avoiding confrontation and base their hopes entirely on the goodwill of the generals.

The conquest of democracy is not something which they have in view. What legitimacy will newly-restored constitutional power have, therefore, if the armed forces are able to help determine who the future holders of that power shall be, on the basis of how much they show compliance with the wishes of the military?

As soon as the ban on parties had been lifted and general elections had been announced, the political class threw itself headlong into reorganizing the parties. Membership campaigns, internal manoeuvring to obtain candidatures; everything is being done according to the rules of the game fixed by the junta. While the country disintegrates and the military prepare their future, Neronian electioneering has taken hold of the politicians. No-one knows what the parties' programmes are: people are expending all their energy on the battle for candidatures. An exasperated and sceptical public, especially the young, has some difficulty in understanding the political leaders' attitude of subordination towards the failed military men. A gulf is opening up between the political class and the electors, as the opinion polls seem to demonstrate.

At the time of the *coup d'état* in 1976, reorganization of the parties was, as always, among the objectives of the instigators of the *putsch*. But the suppression of politics by decree and the suspension of the parties brought about, on the contrary, the obsolescence of the political forces. Party political life was fossilized for five years. The present leaders thus saw their terms of office extended

16. An expression used by Dante Caputo in his article 'Balance provisorio', in Peter Waldmann, Ernesto Garzón Valdes *et al.*, *El poder militar en la Argentina (1976–1981)* (Frankfurt: 1982).

indefinitely, thanks to the freeze imposed by the military and, when the thaw came, it revealed parties which had grown old and were fragile and lifeless. Their leaders are not recognized as such except in so far as the military authorities accord them a certain legitimacy.[17] One can understand both the importance for them of official recognition and the reason for their respectful behaviour. It must be doubted whether, without a serious renewal of the leadership of the parties, political behaviour can change. The proof of this is that since 1976 only one new man has appeared in national political life who has never held a government post: Sr Raul Alfonsin, the leader of the left wing of the Radical Party. The candidates for the supreme office from within the Peronist movement were all Ministers or Vice-Presidents between 1973 and 1976, if they did not hold such a post during the first period of Peronism. They bear a heavy responsibility for the breakdown of the democratic regime of Sra Perón.

But that is not the main point, apart from the fact that, despite the shocks and upheavals of these six years, nothing leads one to expect a break with the politics of the past such as to permit the building of a stable constitutional system. It seems that the Peronism/anti-Peronism dilemma must once again present itself, to the great satisfaction of some of the military. The Peronist movement, without any recognized leader, has not ceased to sing the praises of 'verticalism', and its conception of democracy has not changed; it means nothing other than the possibility of gaining power through elections. Respect for the rights of minorities, including those within the movement itself, and for the victory of an opponent have never been part of the Peronist culture. The second-largest national party, the Radical Civic Union, remains marked, despite some efforts at renewal carried out by Sr Alfonsin, by a history of vote-catching opportunism and inflated idealism. The Peronists identify themselves with the people and with the majority, the Radicals see themselves as the only spokesmen for democracy. Even so, these two parties, which together represent more than 75 per cent of the electorate, should accept a set of common ground rules for the establishment of lasting political coexistence. The present every-man-for-himself approach is not leading in that direction. However, without a clear and public pact between the democratic forces there can be no democracy, and without an agreement on a minimum programme of national reconstruction, political instability remains the most probable prospect.

This prospect is all the more likely since the removal of the armed forces from their pedestal is far from complete. While the conservatives are silent, on the left the 'anti-imperialist war' of the South Atlantic has awakened hopes. The Communist Party, which has more than one iron in the fire, rejects the idea of a 'politically neutral' army[18] and praises the patriotic and 'thirdworldist' military men. The leader of the Popular Left Front, nearer than ever to his 'Nasserite' dream, alludes to a national revolution with the support of the military and proposes nothing less than 'military control of prices'. Attitudes favourable to a militarized society are difficult to root out.

Not having completely lost the initiative, the military government is therefore striving discreetly to influence the election results and is preparing the means by

17. See in particular *El bimestre político y económico*, May–June 1983, *editorial*.
18. See 'Militares versus militarismo', in the review of the PCA [Argentine Communist Party] *Que Pasa*, 29 June 1982, and, in the same review, 'Carcagno, y la doctrina militar necesaria', 26 Jan. 1983.

which the armed forces will be able to participate in politics in the future. The decision to impose a delay of ninety days between the election planned for 30 October 1983 and the handing over of power to the civilians leads one to think that the military want to discuss with the elected authorities certain institutional or personal guarantees. The choice of electoral law is not without ulterior motives either, since it will favour one or other of the two main parties.

For the moment, the general staff of the army in particular appears to be hoping for a victory by the Peronists. The amnesty granted recently to right-wing Peronist leaders, and the fact that the trade unions have had their property returned to them and are again allowed to manage welfare activities, are just so many indications of this. A Peronist victory would doubtless guarantee that no legal action was taken against the military for malpractices committed during the fight against subversion. The last Peronist government and its para-police groups were themselves far from blameless in this connection. The junta's recently published document does not fail to point out, furthermore, that the orders 'to wipe out subversive elements' were legally given to the army in 1975 by the constitutional government. The military would no doubt feel all the more at ease with a return of the Peronists to power in that the left wing of the movement has been broken up and that the military share with the present Peronist leaders a good many political values: authoritarianism, nationalism and anti-communism, among others.

The persistent rumour about a pact between the army and the old guard of the Peronist trade unions who have nothing to gain either from a return to the constitution or *a fortiori* from a democratization of their own organizations, shows well enough that the militarization of political life is still entrenched and that the military do not intend to disappear from the political scene. Even if this corporative pact really existed, it would probably not prevent the holding of elections, as other branches of the armed forces, the navy for one, are violently opposed to a resurrection of the trade union bureaucracy as a political force. But it could have a very important influence upon the result of the election and upon the future role of the military, especially since a constitutional government which has accepted their humiliating conditions will be vulnerable to the attacks of the opposition exactly *because* of the concessions which it will have made to the heirless dictatorship. But it will also have to reckon with the existence of two destabilizing problems which constitute, as it were, two time-bombs placed by the armed forces in the *Casa Rosada* (presidential palace) and which leave the door open for their possible return to power: the question of the disappearances and the problem of the Falklands.

The future government will be caught between defence of the armed forces as an institution and the protests of a public which refuses to forget: in the absence of a negotiated solution, of a satisfactory investigation before the handover of power, the question of the disappearances inherited by the civilian government will be explosive. But the wish of the military today to prevent the 'defalklandization' of political life is equally so. In fact, the claim to Argentine sovereignty over the archipelago will provide a permanent opportunity for the army to call the civilians to account and to rehabilitate itself through patriotic campaigns. The military again tomorrow? Let us content ourselves with the thought that the unblocking of political life is only just beginning. The new generations—there are four million new electors—will not accept the short-sighted 'realism' of their elders and will

demand their place in the sun and make their voices heard. They are taking up the call for democracy, a call which alone can enable an anguished nation to be itself again and to find its bearings.

Acknowledgement: The author and editor are most grateful to Rodney Balcomb for translation of this article from the French.

Nuclear status and policies of the Middle East countries*

ROGER F. PAJAK†

The proliferation of nuclear weapons technology among Third World states looms as a critical security concern for the entire civilized world. Observers in the field grimly predict that, unless the diffusion of nuclear technology is arrested, a world of possibly twenty or more nuclear weapon states may emerge by the year 2000.

Nowhere are the prospects for world peace and security more precarious than in the Middle East, already perhaps the most volatile region in the world. The increased political and military destabilization, confrontation, and potential for catastrophe resulting from a nuclearized Middle East are starkly apparent. In contrast to the US–Soviet political–military environment in which policy, rhetoric, and technology provide important elements in a common 'code of conduct' for nuclear behaviour between the superpowers, nothing resembling such a code of behaviour exists in the Arab–Israeli milieu, in addition to which the post-Second World War history of the area is replete with hostilities, terrorism, and reprisals. At the same time, increasingly persuasive evidence indicates that a nuclear weapons capability may already exist in the region. The possibility thus looms of a nuclear scenario in any renewed large-scale conflict in the Middle East, with the consequent implications for both catastrophe in the area and confrontation between the superpowers.

The importance of civilian cover for military research programmes

While a civilian cover for a military research programme, especially a nuclear research operation, is unnecessary for the Western powers, such cover would be highly useful for countries in the Middle East. Israel serves as a dramatic example. An overt Israeli nuclear weapons programme would stimulate comparable efforts on the Arab side and add to political problems with the United States, perhaps leading to a decrease in material and political support, and also to augmented Soviet military backing. Some observers have advocated a publicly-declared Israeli reliance on a nuclear deterrent, but this view has not been espoused by the Israeli government.[1]

On the Arab side, too, cogent arguments exist for secretiveness and ambiguity. The Arabs, to begin with, have a long way to go in acquiring a nuclear capability. A dearth of trained scientific and technical experts necessitates a lengthy training

* This article is adapted and revised from a longer study on nuclear proliferation completed by the author while a Research Fellow at the National Defense University Research Directorate in Washington, DC. The views expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United States government or of any of its agencies or departments.

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1. Joseph A. Yager, ed.: *Nonproliferation and US foreign policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 204–9.

0020–5850/83/4/0587—21$03.00©1983 International Affairs

programme and other long-term preparations. The continuing tendency of the Arab states to political contentiousness will also tend to slow technological progress. A publicly-announced nuclear development programme, followed by years of little apparent progress, would lack credibility. Some Arab governments might also fear sanctions or other pressures on the part of Western countries, which would complicate their access to Western technology and equipment.[2]

Nuclear overview of the Middle East

As Table I indicates, by the mid to late 1980s, a number of Middle East countries could possess some degree of nuclear capability. Nuclear reactor construction plans of various Middle East states are indicated in Table 2.

Table 1

Potential nuclear capabilities of Middle East states

	1975	1980	1985
1. Assimilation of basic theoretical knowledge of fission	Egypt; Libya; Saudi Arabia	Libya; Syria	—
2. Nuclear power plants under construction or planned	Iran; Iraq; Kuwait	Egypt; Iraq; Kuwait; Saudi Arabia	Egypt; Libya; Syria
3. Operation of nuclear power plant(s) and start of nascent nuclear infrastructure	—	—	Kuwait; Saudi Arabia
4. Effective access to significant quantities of divertible fissile material from civilian nuclear fuel cycle	—	—	Iran
5. Capability to build small plutonium production reactor (2 bombs/year)	—	—	Egypt; Iraq; Libya(?); Syria(?) Saudi Arabia(?)
6. Capability to build larger plutonium production reactor (20 bombs/year)	Israel	Israel	Iraq(?); Israel
7. Demonstrated uranium enrichment capability	Israel(?)	Israel	Israel

Source: Cited in Lewis Dunn, ed., *US defense planning for a more proliferated world* (Croton-on-Hudson, NY: Hudson Institute, 1979), p. 69. Reprinted with permission.

2. Simha Flapan, 'Nuclear power in the Middle East', *New Outlook* (Israel), July 1974, p. 47.

Table 2

Status of nuclear reactor construction (1980)

Egypt	*Research reactor*: WWR-C-Cario; 2MWe; 1961; 10% enriched uranium. *Power reactor*: two 600MWe reactors have been under negotiation for several years with Westinghouse (letter of intent signed for one). Deal delayed by lack of Congressional approval. First scheduled for completion in 1985.
Iraq	*Research reactors*: (i) 2MWe; in operation; 10% enriched uranium; (ii) Osiris type; under construction by France with Italian participation; 70MWe; 93% enriched uranium. *Power reactor*: 600MWe; apparently under negotiation with France; PWR; late 1980s; 3% enriched uranium.
Israel	*Research reactors*: (i) IRR-1; 5MWt; 1960; 90% enriched uranium; (ii) IRR-2; 26MWt; 1964; natural uranium. *Power reactor*: none on order. 950MWe light water reactor for completion in mid 1980s under negotiation with various supplier states. If unable to import under conditions it deems acceptable, officials assert Israel may build one of its own design.
Kuwait	*Research reactor*: none. *Power reactor*: none. Government expressed interest in 4–6 600MWe dual purpose units by 2000, starting in late 1980s.
Libya	*Research reactor*: none. *Power reactors*: (i) 300MWe negotiated with USSR; dual purpose, power and desalination; (ii) 600MWe under discussion with France; PWR
Syria	*Research reactor*: none. *Power reactor*: none planned. Contemplating feasibility study for 600MWe nuclear power plant.

Note: MWe = megawatt (electric); MWt = megawatt (thermal); PWR = pressurized water reactor.

Source: Joseph Yager, ed., *Nonproliferation and US foreign policy* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1980), pp. 206–8. Reprinted with permission.

There are no open indications that any Middle East country currently plans the construction of chemical separation plants for the production of highly enriched uranium. Israel, however, is reported to be engaged in basic research on laser isotope separation. Moreover, new uranium enrichment centrifuges are under development in the United States, Europe and Japan. Not only can centrifuge enrichment technology be utilized efficiently on a small scale, but it can readily be switched from the production of low-enriched uranium fuel to weapons-grade material. All in all, Israel's technological lead gives it a substantial edge over the Arab states in this area.

Israel

The Israelis' nuclear development programme is in a class by itself among Middle East states. Israel's interest in the nuclear field dates back to the founding of the state in 1948, when Israeli nuclear scientists began extracting low-grade uranium from phosphate deposits in the Negev Desert. With the encouragement of President Chaim Weizmann, they reportedly perfected a technique for producing heavy

water. In exchange for information on this process, France in 1953 permitted the Israelis to study its own nuclear research programme. The French subsequently invited Israeli scientists to participate as observers in their nuclear weapons testing in the Sahara Desert.[3]

Throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s Israel and France maintained a close cooperative relationship, fostered by the sharing of a common enemy in Nasser's Egypt and France's desire for Israeli expertise in nuclear physics. Most significantly, France in 1957 provided the Israelis with their first nuclear reactor—a 26 megawatt unit at Dimona in the Negev—and assisted in designing the research facilities associated with the reactor. By the time the reactor went critical in 1964 a heated policy debate was under way in the Israeli government on the direction to be taken in nuclear weapons development.

The Israeli decision itself to build the Dimona reactor was actually taken in 1957 in the aftermath of the Suez War of October 1956, when, despite their spectacular military success, the Israelis saw themselves isolated and faced with a US arms embargo while the Arabs were engaged in a rapid military build-up, supplied by Moscow.[4] Israel was left with France as its sole provider of military assistance. The Israelis were also aware that their victories to date were due partly to Arab deficiencies, and were conscious that in time the Arab world would gradually increase its military potential and narrow the technological gap.

In this context, two schools of strategic thought emerged in Israel. The first argued that, to survive, Israel must periodically give a convincing show of strength; the second, that the question of peace should be kept in constant focus, with retaliation for acts of sabotage curbed to avoid escalation of the conflict.[5] The first triumphed and determined Israeli policy until 1963, and within it evolved a concept of 'interceptive war', or deterrence.

In 1957, at the recommendation of Prime Minister Ben Gurion, the Israeli cabinet approved the construction of the Dimona reactor. The existence of this facility did not become publicly known until disclosed by Ben Gurion in December 1960 in response to a US request to clarify rumours that Israel was building a reactor capable of nuclear weapons production.[6] Israel and France eventually admitted that they were engaged in a cooperative nuclear programme, including the construction of a natural uranium reactor. Ben Gurion emphatically denied allegations that Israel was producing a nuclear weapon, but such reassurances did little to calm widespread international anxiety. Concern in Israel itself intensified when news was leaked that six of the seven members of the Israeli Atomic Energy Commission, nominated by the Minister of Defence in 1952, had resigned in disagreement over policy, leaving only the chairman, Dr D. E. Bergman. Then, at the end of 1961, a Committee for the Denuclearization of the Israeli–Arab conflict was formed by prominent scholars and scientists, and demanded that Israel seek the denuclearization of the Middle East. These objectives met with considerable sympathy from among the public and some leading politicians.

Considerable debate ensued in the Knesset. The Israeli government rejected plans for a nuclear-free Middle East and stated:

3. 'Israel's nuclear weapons', *The Middle East*, June 1976, No. 20, p. 26.
4. Flapan, 'Nuclear power in the Middle East', pp. 47–8.
5. Flapan, 'Nuclear power in the Middle East', p. 49.
6. Flapan, 'Nuclear power in the Middle East', p. 50.

> There are no nuclear weapons in the Middle East and Israel will never be first to introduce them. But Israel can be destroyed by conventional weapons and therefore the stress should be laid on conventional disarmament in the world and in the region.[7]

This official position was to be often repeated.

Ben Gurion's 'nuclear option' policy placed increasing strain both on internal political relations and on Israel's relations with the United States. In June 1963 Ben Gurion resigned and was succeeded by Levi Eshkol, who, while declining to endorse a plan for a nuclear-free Middle East, did move—under US and domestic pressure—farther from Ben Gurion's and his own original position. Assured of maintaining Israeli arms levels by direct supply from the United States, Eshkol agreed to limit operations at Dimona to a specified level, while retaining the right to reexamine the situation and hold open the nuclear option should the conventional arms balance change adversely *vis-à-vis* Israel.

Arab reaction: from anxiety to reassurance

While initial Arab reaction to Israeli nuclear activities was an intensification of the conventional arms race, the problem continually dominated discussions within and among the Arab governments. Did Israel really have the capability to manufacture such a weapon? Would such a capability force the Arabs to come to terms with Israel? How could the Arab countries respond?

The Arab press vacillated, at times disparaging Israeli capabilities, sometimes underscoring Arab retaliatory capacity, or grandiloquently exaggerating ostensible Arab nuclear programmes. Egypt, clearly the leading Arab power, appeared to conclude that it could do little immediately in its own right to develop its own nuclear option. President Nasser thereupon sought a political response, calling for sustained political pressure against Israel and the consolidation of Arab unity. The absence of a military reaction was immediately criticized by other Arab leaders, but in this respect Nasser had little choice but to adhere to his non-military response.

In August 1965, the influential Egyptian journalist Hassinein Heykal wrote in *Al-Ahram:* 'Israel is close to the capacity to explode an atomic device, and will in two or three years be close to the capacity to produce atomic weapons'. He went on to hint: 'There is one reason why Egypt must be prepared to introduce nuclear arms: her will to live'.[8]

Former Deputy Defence Minister Shimon Peres expressed some satisfaction over Heykal's concerns in a *Jerusalem Post* article on 26 August 1965. Adhering to his belief in a 'psychological deterrent', Peres did not attempt to allay Hekyal's suspicions but instead proposed a 'demilitarization of hatred based on the status quo'.

Despite Peres's lack of reassurance, the Arab political mood did become less hysterical on this score. Nasser is reported to have stated that, if Israel proceeded with an atomic bomb, the only answer would be a preventive war. As no visible war preparations followed, Cairo did not seem to believe Israel was producing such a weapon. Syria and the PLO, furthermore, maintained that nuclear weapons were useless against guerrilla operations. Arab behaviour at this time may indicate a belief

7. Flapan, 'Nuclear power in the Middle East', p. 51.

8. Simha Flapan, 'Nuclear power in the Middle East: the critical years', *New Outlook*, October 1974, pp. 38–9.

that Israel would refrain from exercising her nuclear option, probably reinforced by the change in policy of the Eshkol administration.[9]

Incentives and disincentives towards a nuclear posture

Prior to 1967, antinuclear circles in Israel advanced several key arguments against the acquisition of a nuclear capability, including fears of a preventive war by the Arab states; the possibility that an Israeli bomb would impel the Soviet Union or even the Chinese to furnish some Arab states with nuclear weapons, which might tempt the latter to strike Israel pre-emptively; or, conversely, the possibility that Israeli possession of a bomb might cause the superpowers or the United States alone to pressurize Israel to renounce nuclear weapons and submit to international inspection; and concern that a nuclear deterrent would be useless against limited frontier clashes or terrorist activities.[10]

The Six-Day War of June 1967 and its aftermath, however, weakened these disincentives. The failure of such a conclusive victory to persuade the Arabs to negotiate suggested that a long haul was in store for Israel. The withdrawal of French material support also underscored the danger of depending on outside powers. These developments gave weight to the arguments of the proponents of the nuclear option that conventional Israeli military superiority did not preclude the outbreak of another war; that both sides were now receiving practically the latest types of conventional military equipment and approaching a qualitative ceiling, with the implication that the arms race may continue mainly on a quantitative basis to the eventual detriment of Israel; that opting for nuclear status might be the best way to decrease dependence on the United States as Israel's sole major arms supplier; that no Arab state was likely to produce or acquire nuclear weapons of its own for several years; and that, even if one did, the presence of a large Arab population within Israel would inhibit a surprise nuclear attack. A regional nuclear balance would probably result, after some period of increased tensions, in a renunciation of war as a policy alternative because of the realization of the awesome destructive power of nuclear weapons; and the introduction of nuclear weapons in the region would probably bring forth superpower guarantees to stabilize the status quo and prevent proliferation.

The history of Israel's nuclear development becomes even less clear after the 1967 war. By some accounts, Prime Minister Eshkol, Golda Meir and former Foreign Minister Allon had curtailed plans for a nuclear weapon in 1968, but Defence Minister Moshe Dayan had secretly ordered the project to continue, without higher government approval; when faced with the project half completed in 1969, the cabinet supposedly approved its continuation. While not necessarily resulting in the actual construction of bombs, this process at least provided Israeli scientists with shortened production techniques.[11]

In any case, the facilities at Dimona have remained totally unsafeguarded. Several US officials and scientists were reported to have visited the installation in the early 1960s, without reporting any evidence of weapons development, but this was about the time the reactor went critical. No Americans have been permitted to inspect the reactor fully since 1969.

9. Flapan, 'The critical years', p. 40.
10. Paul Jabber, 'Israel's nuclear options', *Journal of Palestine Studies*, 1971, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 23–4.
11. 'Israel's nuclear weapons', *The Middle East*, June 1976, No. 20, p. 27.

There is little doubt that the Israelis have had both the necessary technical expertise to build a nuclear weapon and some supplies of natural uranium. However, conflicting or unconfirmed reports concerning supplies of uranium and the existence of the necessary separation facilities make it difficult to arrive at a clear-cut impression of the capability of the Israeli nuclear programme, and even US government requests to Israel for clarification of the nuclear issue have not got far. The question remains: does the Middle East stand on the brink of a renewed conflict with one or both sides possessing a nuclear capability? Nearly all accounts dealing with the issue maintain that Israel, despite continued official denials and known technical problems, already possesses nuclear weapons or can quickly take the final steps in their fabrication, the reports that claim such an Israeli capability emanating from such diverse sources as President Sadat, Yassir Arafat, the Soviet newspaper *Moskovskii Komsomoletz*, *Time* magazine and the Central Intelligence Agency. In Israel itself, a March 1976 poll indicated that 62 per cent of the population believed that their country already possessed nuclear weapons, with only 4 per cent thinking it did not. Moreover, 77 per cent of the people thought that Israel *should* possess such weapons.[12]

In the meantime, the Israeli position on the question of nuclear weapons in the Middle East has not changed appreciably over the years. In 1968, Eshkol admitted that Israel possessed the technical knowledge of how to produce nuclear arms, but that she remained a long way from applying it. In December 1974, Israeli President Katzir stated that:

> It has been our intention to provide the potential for nuclear development. We now have that potential. We will defend this country with all possible means at hand. We have to develop more powerful and new arms to protect ourselves.[13]

When Prime Minister Rabin was interviewed on British television for amplification of Katzer's comments, Rabin denied that Israel was a 'nuclear power'. Although he reiterated that Israel would not be the first to introduce atomic weapons into the area, he added that 'we can't afford to be the second either'.[14] This was echoed by Moshe Dayan in July 1980: 'We never said we won't use atomic weapons; we only said we wouldn't be the first to use them'.[15]

Rabin's and Dayan's remarks reflect the basic fear, omnipresent with Israeli policymakers, that, unlike the Arab states, Israel cannot afford to lose a war and still remain a viable nation. Hence their constant concern for security, and their basic aversion to foreclosing the nuclear option. In this context, even hints of a nuclear capability have immense utility. The more credible such hints become, the more they serve to provide many of the political advantages of an actual capability, with few of the attendant liabilities.

The question of credibility of a perceived nuclear option could obviously best be solved by an actual Israeli nuclear test. However, this would definitively categorize Israel as a nuclear power and might result in more negative ramifications for Israel than positive.

12. *Egyptian Gazette*, 27 March 1976, as cited in Steven J. Rosen, 'A stable system of mutual nuclear deterrence in the Arab–Israeli conflict'. *American Political Science Review*, December 1977, p. 1368.
13. Brian Beckett, 'Israel's nuclear options', *Middle East International*, November 1976, p. 12.
14. Lawrence Freedman, 'Israel's nuclear policy', *Survival*, May 1975, pp. 115–6.
15. *Christian Science Monitor*, 18 August 1980.

On 22 September 1979, a US Vela surveillance satellite passing over an area of ocean between South Africa and Antarctica detected an intense burst of light in the atmosphere. After a month of study, the United States initially announced that a 'low-yield nuclear explosion' had occurred.[16] First South Africa, then Israel with South African collaboration, were suspected of having carried out a nuclear test. Both countries denied such allegations, and a US State Department official refused to confirm that the occurrence was a nuclear test.

On 15 July 1980, a panel of scientists appointed by the White House reported, after extensive deliberations, that the mysterious flash of light was 'probably not' a nuclear explosion, and that the flash detected by the satellite was most likely a reflection from debris after the satellite itself had been hit by a small meteorite or piece of space debris. The controversy did not end here. Only the day prior to the announcement of the panel's conclusions, Department of Defense sources stated that the Defense Intelligence Agency had reached exactly the opposite conclusion, as did the US Naval Research Laboratory—that the flash probably resulted from a clandestine nuclear explosion.[17]

The scientific evidence from the September event was certainly mixed. While the satellite's readings matched the usual pattern of a low-yield nuclear blast, other corroborating evidence was absent or ambiguous. Military analysts conceded this fact but maintained that similar results were also true of certain French and Chinese tests, and that the perpetrators of the possible test carefully chose site and time for maximum camouflage.[18]

Speculation continued to centre on Israel as the nation testing the suspected nuclear device, possibly with South African assistance, because of the close relationship of the two countries over some years. Some observers have claimed that the two nations have had even more compelling reasons for closer relations recently as they have both become more isolated as 'pariah states' on the world scene.[19] However, the possibility of an Israeli test having occurred in September 1979 remains no more than that. Nevertheless, the Israelis may feel an increasing proclivity to move more closely to the nuclear line of no return, reasons to the contrary notwithstanding. And, in the words of former Israeli President Katzir in the nuclear context: 'The world should worry'.[20]

Egypt

Egypt's sole nuclear reactor is a small two-megawatt device built with Soviet assistance at Incheass, near Cairo. It went critical in 1961.[21] The reactor is not subject to IAEA safeguards, but the Soviet Union had controlled the disposal of the spent fuel produced, and it is not capable of producing sufficient weapons-grade material for a bomb.

Egypt attempted, with little success, to develop further her nuclear research capabilities in the 1960s. Some technical assistance was received from India; but

16. *Time*, 3 March 1980, p. 47.

17. 'Navy lab concludes that Vela saw a bomb', *Washington Post*, 15 July 1980; *Science*, 29 August 1980, p. 7.

18. *Wall Street Journal*, 16 July 1980.

19. See, for example, Richard Betts, 'A diplomatic bomb for South Africa?', *International Security*, Fall 1979, p. 103.

20. 'Nuclear weapons in the Middle East', *Bulletin of the Peace Proposals*, No. 4., 1976, p. 372.

21. Yai Evron, 'The Arab position in the nuclear field: a study of policies up to 1967', *Cooperation and Conflict*, 1973, No. 1, p. 20.

reported attempts to acquire a reactor first from France, then other European states, the United States, and China later in the decade, failed. The difficulties facing Egypt were the lack of a technological infrastructure and of scientific manpower, the high costs involved and disagreements over control of the plutonium to be produced.[22] It was no more successful in attempts to acquire nuclear weapons themselves, from Moscow and then from China. Egypt now ranks as one of the scientifically most advanced states in the Arab world, but while it has the technological potential to become a nuclear power, it lacks the equipment and resources to implement a sustained nuclear programme.

Although press reports and rumours of an Israeli nuclear capability had become fairly widespread during the 1960s, the Egyptian efforts at galvanizing some joint Arab reaction met with little response from other Arab governments. It was even suggested that Israel itself was spreading such rumours to frighten the Arab states. When the subject of an Israeli nuclear capability was initially placed on the agendas of meetings of the Arab League and of the Arab chiefs of staff in the early 1960s, the topic was apparently far from uppermost in the minds of Arab decision-makers.[23]

Egypt's ambiguous response to Israel's nuclear potential was reflected for a time in its equivocal position on the non-proliferation treaty, which it had signed, but not ratified, thus preserving its nuclear option. It had maintained that the accord did not assure adequate security assistance for nations threatened by nuclear states. In early 1981 Egypt finally announced its intention to ratify, thus hoping to intensify international pressure on Israel to forsake its nuclear option, while creating an image of Egyptian reasonableness and restraint.[24]

In 1972 Egypt accepted an American offer to open negotiations on the sale of a 600 megawatt power reactor to both Egypt and Israel. As a condition of this sale, the United States required acceptance of international safeguards over all future nuclear acquisitions, not merely the usual right of inspection over its own supplies. Egypt proposed that in addition it and Israel should submit all existing facilities to safeguards—a clear reference to Dimona. Israel, suspicious of pro-Arab leanings in the IAEA, demurred. In mid-1975 the United States and Egypt agreed in principle to a nuclear cooperation accord, involving sale of two reactors, to be subject to stringent US–IAEA–Egypt safeguards. On 5 August 1976 a draft purchase agreement was initialled; an identical one with Israel followed a day later. A lull ensued until autumn 1979, when the United States, claiming that the Egypt–Israel peace treaty had altered the circumstances, departed from its usual simultaneous approach to the two countries and resumed active negotiations with Egypt alone.

While little movement transpired on the US–Egyptian accord after late 1979, President Sadat in February 1981 signed a nuclear cooperation protocol with France. The agreement, valued at $2 billion, embraced two 900 megawatt pressurized water reactors, to be built with French technical assistance, and was probably facilitated by Egypt's decision to ratify the NPT. These reactors were to become part of a system of eight nuclear power stations planned by Egypt by the end of the century.[25]

22. Evron, 'The Arab position', pp. 20–1.
23. Evron, 'The Arab position', p. 21.
24. *New York Times*, 28 February 1981.
25. *World Business Weekly* (London), 2 March 1981, p. 18.

With the conclusion of the Egyptian–Israeli peace treaty, the immediacy of an Israeli nuclear threat to Egypt has been effectively removed. Nevertheless, in the absence of a comprehensive settlement, Israel is still regarded as a threat.

Iraq

Although Iraq has signed and ratified the NPT, Baghdad's interest in nuclear research dates back for some years. In the mid-1970s, Soviet assistance made possible the modification and upgrading of Iraq's research reactors.[26] Iraq then negotiated an agreement with France in late 1976 for the purchase of an advanced 70 megawatt Osiris reactor, designed to use weapons-grade uranium.[27] The United States was not entirely happy with French assurances that the Iraqi agreement conformed to Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines,[28] and, moreover, loosened Iraqi ties with the Soviet Union.[29] Israel saw in Iraqi nuclear power, on top of Soviet-built Scud missiles, a potential threat unequalled by any Arab state, and put intense pressure on Paris and Washington to abrogate the 1976 agreement. To counter these pressures, Iraq linked guarantees on the reactor and new arms purchases to oil supplies in its summer 1979 negotiations with France.

A few months previously, in April 1979, the Iraqi nuclear development programme had been set back an estimated two years with the sabotage, in France, of the Osiris reactor core and other components. Nevertheless, the Iraqis continued negotiations with the French to keep the original reactor agreement and fuel supply contract in force.

After concluding the 1976 nuclear contract, France had become more sensitive to proliferation concerns and had hoped to substitute low enriched uranium for the originally agreed highly enriched variety. However, after an unsuccessful three-year effort to convince the Iraqis, in early 1980 the French government agreed, possibly under threat of withdrawal of oil supplies, to provide weapons-grade uranium for the Iraqi reactor.

French officials were somewhat vexed over US criticism of their decision, noting that the United States was the prime supplier of highly enriched uranium for research reactors in various developing countries and claiming that France was leading the way in reducing the enrichment level of uranium fuel used in research reactors. Nevertheless, it was clear that several proliferation dangers stemmed from French nuclear cooperation with Iraq. One was the possibility of Iraq's acquisition of highly enriched uranium by diversion or abrogation of the NPT, and another was the use of Osiris to produce plutonium. Meanwhile, Iraq was not averse to using its oil supply leverage to obtain additional nuclear technology from Brazil, with whom, in autumn 1979, it signed a 'protocol' for nuclear cooperation, covering Brazilian assistance for uranium exploration and the training of Iraqi technicians in Brazil.[30] It also managed to arrange for the acquisition of additional nuclear technology from Italy.

The uranium finally sold by France to Baghdad was enriched to 93 per cent purity, considered sufficient for producing a weapon. Electric power reactors normally require uranium enriched to only 3 per cent, but the French maintained

26. Arturo Cairo, 'Europe and the Middle East', *IAEA Bulletin*, August 1975, p. 45.
27. *Nucleonics Week*, 18 November 1976, p. 3.
28. *Nucleonics Week*, 19 January 1978, p. 10.
29. *Washington Post*, 27 February 1978.
30. *Nucleonics Week*, 15 November 1979, p. 1.

that the reactors sold to Iraq were for training and experimentation and thus required a much richer mixture.[31] In the ensuing debate, the French argued that existing international controls would prevent Iraq from using the material for military purposes. While the French contract was for a reported 75 kilograms of uranium—theoretically sufficient for five or six weapons—the French explained that the reactor used only 15 kilograms of the material and indicated that they would ship only that amount of uranium at a time to preclude any unauthorized diversion of the material. Moreover, the French pointed out that Iraq is a signatory of the NPT and that the nuclear programme in that country would be supervised by the IAEA as well as by the hundred or so French technicians present in Iraq.

The French decision to supply enriched uranium to Iraq outraged the Israeli government, particularly as it regards Iraq as one of its most aggressive enemies. In a speech on 17 July 1980, the Israeli deputy Defence Minister suggested that an Israeli response could include more than diplomatic representations to France and the United States. Some observers raised the possibility of an Israeli air strike to put the Iraqi reactor out of commission. Israeli officials scoffed at French assurances that international supervision would ensure the peaceful use of Iraqi reactors. Professor Yuval Neeman, one of Israel's most prominent nuclear physicists, stated that Iraq was to receive about 72 kilograms of weapons-grade uranium, sufficient for at least half a dozen bombs, but that it could also use the fissile material as fuel for its reactor to irradiate natural uranium acquired in Africa and produce plutonium. He concluded: 'They can put a bomb together faster with the enriched uranium, but the plutonium will give them more bombs'. The Israelis claimed that France was providing nuclear assistance to Iraq in exchange for a guaranteed supply of oil. They also alluded to French weapons contracts with Iraq for the sale of Mirage aircraft and other military equipment.[32]

France reacted sharply against Israeli and other foreign charges that it had acted irresponsibly in its dealings with Iraq and maintained that the uranium it was shipping to Iraq was strictly limited to the requirements of the research reactors. French sources reportedly stated that if the Iraqis attempted to divert the fissile material they obtained from France, Paris would immediately terminate the deal. This was the first public reference by France to the nature of the restrictions placed on French uranium deliveries to Iraq.[33]

US sources reportedly stated that they were worried less about the effectiveness of French controls over the reactors or the material supplied for them than about disposal of the spent fuel and the consequences of enhanced Iraqi technical competence, should Iraq obtain additional fissile materials by other means. Moreover, diplomatic sources reportedly indicated that France had not given any official assurances concerning controls to US government officials nor made public the implementing contracts comprising the 1975 nuclear assistance agreement with Iraq.[34] Iraq reacted to the international furore by brazenly insisting that the agreement be executed as originally constituted.

In September 1980, war broke out between Iraq and Iran. On 30 September, an air raid, presumably executed by Iranian aircraft, was conducted against the Iraqi nuclear centre of Tuwaitha. Several bombs reportedly damaged an auxiliary building

31. *Christian Science Monitor*, 31 July 1980.
32. *Los Angeles Times*, 17 July 1980.
33. *Washington Post*, 20 July 1980.
34. *Washington Post*, 30 July 1980.

and forced the evacuation of French technicians assigned to the facility but damaged neither the reactors nor the nuclear fuel supply.[35] Immediately speculation occurred over the perpetrators of the raid. Although Iran appeared to be the most plausible culprit, some suspicion obviously fell on Israel; two days before the attack, the Israeli chief of military intelligence had appeared on Israeli television wondering why the Iranians had not bombed the Iraqi nuclear installation. Israel denied any involvement; Iranian President Abol Hassan Bani Sadr subsequently admitted that the attackers were Iranian, but he stated the attack was intended for another target nearby.[36]

Following the raid, France temporarily suspended shipment of additional nuclear fuel and withdrew most of its technicians because of war danger. This resulted in a further troubling consequence—the unknown disposition of the enriched uranium already delivered to the Iraqis. Moreover, more general uncertainties arose over the effectiveness of international safeguards over fissile material in a war zone, crystallized on 6 November 1980 when Iraq informed the IAEA that its periodic safeguards inspections would be 'unsafe' during the current conflict and must be 'temporarily' halted, until 'as soon as prevailing conditions have ended and the security of inspectors can be guaranteed.' An IAEA spokesman reported that there were 'no big safeguards concerns' but that 'if the war goes on a year, then it will be serious'.[37] In February 1981, however, the IAEA cryptically announced that a 'routine inspection' of the Osirak reactor in January indicated that all of the nuclear fuel had been 'satisfactorily accounted for'. This announcement contradicted widespread reports, particularly in France, that some of the reactor's fuel rods had disappeared.[38]

On 7 June 1981, Israeli aircraft, in a surgically precise operation, attacked and destroyed the Osirak reactor at Tuwaitha. French technicians at the scene confirmed that the facility was 'completely destroyed' and estimated that it would take three years to rebuild.[39] At a 16 June press conference, Begin presented a humanitarian justification for the raid. He stated that the reactor was scheduled to go 'hot' and begin processing highly radioactive materials either in July or September. Once that happened, Begin claimed, any successful bombing attack would have unleashed 'a horrifying wave of radioactivity' in which 'hundreds of thousands of innocent citizens would have been hurt'. Begin continued that he 'would never have made a proposal under such circumstances to send our raid force and bomb the reactor'.[40] On the other hand, French technicians in Baghdad were quoted in press accounts as stating that the reactor was scheduled to begin operating only at the end of the year. Israeli opposition Labour Party leader Shimon Peres also posited a connection with the Israeli elections, scheduled for 30 June 1981, in which Begin was narrowly reelected.[41]

Concerned over the potentially serious consequences of the Israeli raid on regional stability, the United States on 8 June strongly condemned the attack, which involved the use of American-made aircraft. A US Department of State spokesman said the United States would investigate whether Israel had violated US

35. Eliot Marshall, 'Iraqi nuclear program halted by bombing', *Science*, 31 October 1980, p. 12.
36. *Washington Post*, 7 November 1980.
37. *Nucleonics Week*, 13 November 1980, p. 6.
38. *New York Times*, 28 February 1981.
39. *New York Times*, 19 June 1981.
40. *Time*, 22 June 1981, p, 30.
41. *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 June 1981.

laws governing the use of American-built weapons sold abroad. In the meantime, the United States temporarily suspended the delivery of additional aircraft to Israel.[42] Although Washington had formerly protested at the construction of the Tuwaitha reactor, the State Department spokesman maintained that the United States did not share Israel's sense of present threat. He observed that Iraq was a signatory to the NPT and had agreed to international safeguards. Among others, the new Mitterrand government in France also condemned the Israeli raid. Baghdad accused Israel of colluding with Iraq's military opponent, Iran, claiming that 'the Zionist enemy has on more than one occasion taken the side of Iran against Iraq' but did not threaten retaliation, probably because its military was bogged down in the war with Iran.

Israel's rationale for the raid was the strategic contention that Israel, unlike the United States, could not survive a nuclear attack and deliver a counterstrike—all Israeli air bases, for example, could be taken out in a single strike—and that no Israeli government could ever accept the risk that an enemy possessing nuclear weapons would not use them.[43] By thus invoking an argument sometimes referred to by legal scholars as 'anticipatory self-defence', the Israelis were entering a murky area of international law. The UN Charter, while prohibiting aggression, also recognizes the legitimate right of self-defence, which has been broadened on occasion to include preemptive attack in the face of overwhelming evidence of an imminent hostile act by a would-be aggressor. So much, then, centred on the critical questions: was the Iraqi nuclear programme capable now, or in the near future, of producing a bomb, and did the Iraqis intend to do so? On these points experts differ and the evidence is mixed.

The quickest and easiest route to atomic bomb manufacture is via enriched uranium. On 16 June 1981 Professor Yuval Neeman stated that Iraq would have been able to produce sufficient uranium for two Hiroshima-type bombs immediately after its Osirak reactor became operational in September.[44]

The French, however, reportedly had taken two precautions to prevent such diversion of uranium. First, they had decided to stagger shipments to prevent stockpiling—and they contended that an Iraqi diversion of material would have been discovered by the French technical staff at the facility; secondly, pre-irradiation of the uranium had made it hazardous to handle.[45] Israel questioned the efficiency of both measures.

The second major route to bomb acquisition, through the use of plutonium, would have been somewhat more complicated. The Osirak reactor was not suited for large-scale production of such material, but, according to Professor Neeman, could have been modified in about six weeks. The plutonium produced could then be separated from the irradiated fuel in the Italian-built 'hot cell' laboratory, and used to manufacture one to three bombs a year.[46] A report by IAEA Director General Dr Sigvard Eklund, issued after the raid in June, claimed that undetected diversion of any enriched uranium fuel or the production of plutonium was highly improbable; his agency had last inspected the reactor the previous January and had accounted for the entire first shipment of fuel. Had the Iraqis decided to divert the

42. *Wall Street Journal*, 9 June 1981.
43. *Time*, 22 June 1981, p. 37.
44. *New York Times*, 19 June 1981.
45. *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 June 1981.
46. *Washington Post*, 17 June 1981, *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 June 1981.

uranium, they would have had to remove it from French supervision and abrogate their treaty commitments. No signatory of the NPT had yet done so.[47] Professor Neeman acknowledged that any inspection team would have observed changes in the Iraqi reactor. 'But what could they have done?' he asked.

Israel strongly contended that Iraq had been using NPT membership as camouflage, while it amassed the necessary ingredients for a weapons capability. That done, it would have abrogated its treaty commitments and produced a weapon. However, these arguments rest less on substantive evidence than on conjecture about Iraqi intentions and circumstantial evidence. US Under Secretary of State Walter J. Stoessel, Jr, stated that US intelligence had not concluded that Iraq was planning to build a weapon. Meanwhile, the divining of Iraq's intentions remains, of course, an individualistic and arbitrary endeavour; Israel insists on its right to make such a determination itself, as the party under threat of annihilation.

As the verbal fallout continued after the Israeli raid, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein in a speech on 23 June called on 'all peace-loving nations of the world' to help the Arabs acquire atomic weapons to balance what he called 'Israel's nuclear capability'.[48] Israeli officials, who were earlier embarrassed over a misquote by Begin regarding Iraq's nuclear intentions, cited Hussein's speech as proof of their contention that the Iraqis were seeking to produce a nuclear weapon for use against Israel.

Despite Israeli threats to bomb the reactor again if any attempt were made to rebuild it, Iraqi President Hussein reaffirmed plans to do so. Saudi Arabia offered to finance reconstruction of the facility, which had been built at an original cost of approximately $250 million.[49] President Mitterrand expressed French readiness in principle to rebuild the facility after two days talks in Paris in mid-August 1981 with Iraqi Vice-Premier Tarek Aziz. The French President reportedly took the position that no grounds existed on which France could refuse to provide Iraq with equipment or technology available to other countries, according to French officials. Nevertheless, President Mitterrand had stated on 17 June 1981 that France would consider reconstruction of the facility only if Iraq would agree first to the same safeguards against military use that Paris would apply to all future nuclear technology sales,[50] a position reiterated by Cheysson in August.[51] It remains to be seen whether France will participate in rebuilding the facility.

Libya

In the most pessimistic predictions concerning nuclear proliferation in unstable Third World countries, Libya is often used as a worst-case example. The Libyan leader, Colonel Qadhafi, is sufficiently unpredictable to pursue his dreams of Islamic unity and Libyan national goals by means of atomic weapons, if they could be obtained.[52]

In May 1975 Libya ratified the NPT. The following month Qadhafi signed an agreement with the Soviet Union for a two-megawatt research reactor, capable of

47. *New York Times*, 19 June 1981.
48. *Christian Science Monitor*, 24 June 1981.
49. *Washington Post*, 17 July 1981.
50. *Washington Post*, 18 June 1981.
51. *Financial Times*, 8 August 1981.
52. Richard Falk, *Nuclear policy and world order: why denuclearization* (New York: Institute for World Order, 1979), p. 4.

being upgraded to ten megawatts. US concern at the time was mild, the reactor being too small to produce weapon-size quantities of plutonium. Of more acute concern to Western officials was a preliminary agreement in March 1976 for a 600-megawatt nuclear power plant from France, which, however, subsequently withdrew from the deal. In December 1977 the Soviet Union reportedly concluded another contract with Libya for construction of a 300-megawatt reactor and a nuclear research centre. It is uncertain whether the Soviets will provide the reactor, which, under normal Soviet practice, would be strictly safeguarded to prevent production of weapons-grade material.[53]

In the meantime, with Libya probably at least seven or eight years away fron establishing even the nucleus of a research establishment,[54] Qadhafi has been continuing his efforts to purchase an atomic weapon from any interested party, having in 1970 apparently tried, unsuccessfully, to buy one from China. Speculation is also rife that Libya has provided financing for Pakistan's development programme, with the intention of eventually obtaining an 'Islamic bomb'. Both countries have officially denied all such allegations. It was also reported in late 1979 that Niger had sold quantities of 70 per cent pure uranium ore (yellowcake) to both Libya and Pakistan, though figures differ on the amounts involved. While claiming to be adhering to IAEA requirements, Niger has reportedly sold uranium to Libya as part of a tacit 1974 agreement with Qadhafi not to make any territorial incursions on the adjoining state.[55]

In January 1980, the French Atomic Energy Commission denied press allegations of involvement in the sale of uranium mined in Niger to Libya and Pakistan and confirmed that the sale of 258 tons of yellowcake to Libya and 110 tons to Pakistan over the past three years was in conformity with IAEA regulations.[56] More recently, Niger's President, Colonel Seyni Kountche, stated that his country had sold 450 tons of uranium ore to Libya and, such was his need of funds, may sell more. Experts maintain that Libya's small research reactor would be incapable of using all the uranium ore in question. It is possible that some has been transferred to Pakistan,[57] but there is no evidence of this.

Libya has reportedly used its oil supplies to put pressure on India for increased cooperation in the atomic field, but without success. India would evidently welcome the failure of any Libyan–Pakistani cooperation, and accordingly future discreet Indian–Libyan technical cooperation cannot be ruled out. An agreement of 1978 had provided for limited Indian nuclear training of Libyan technicians. However, India refused subsequent Libyan pressure to upgrade this assistance, whereupon Libya abruptly suspended contracts for oil supplies to India. New Delhi rejected the idea of a *quid pro quo* and recalled its ambassador.

Prospects for Arab nuclear cooperation

Given the dearth of trained scientific and skilled manpower and technical infrastructure in each Arab state some sort of nuclear cooperation would appear potentially attractive. However, several factors militate against this. First is the instability of inter-Arab relations. Cooperation in opposing Israel has been generally

53. *Washington Post*, 23 December 1980.
54. *Nuclear Engineering International*, November 1979, p. 8.
55. *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 December 1979.
56. *Washington Star*, 4 January 1980.
57. *Christian Science Monitor*, 19 December 1979.

brief and of limited effectiveness. It reached a high point during and after the 1973 war, but thereafter declined rapidly.

Other constraints are the limited promise of immediate return from a combined effort, given the nearly complete absence of experience and facilities, and despite possible benefits from pooling resources; the cost of a combined venture is another factor. Moreover, unless mutual trust between the Arab regimes increases, any nuclear facilities would be unlikely to be concentrated in one country. Dispersion of facilities would mean either costly duplication or mutual dependence and thus vulnerability.

On the other hand, the most obvious Arab asset is the availability of capital. The oil-producing Arab states in the past have provided substantial amounts of financial support to their economically hard pressed but more militarily capable neighbours, particularly Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, and have attracted skilled manpower. One of the most highly educated Arab groups, the Palestinians, for example, fill many of the skilled technical jobs in the Gulf states; also, despite fluctuations in Egyptian–Libyan relations, large numbers of Egyptian technicians continue to hold jobs in the Libyan economy.

Another manifestation of inter-Arab cooperation has been the Arab Organization for Industrialization (AOI), combining Egyptian manpower and factories with cash from Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates. From 1975 until its dissolution after the Egyptian–Israeli peace, the AOI was more successful in planning than in production. Nevertheless, contracts had been signed and preparations were under way for joint European–Arab production of military equipment. Such industrial cooperation could be extended to embrace nuclear activities, perhaps resulting not in the production of nuclear weapons *per se*, but of nuclear explosive materials, with the final stages of weapons development and fabrication left in the hands of individual states.

Another variation of an Arab nuclear programme could involve the joint training of scientists and technicians. In addition, foreign supplier assistance might make available materials or equipment as with the French Osiris-type reactor supplied to Iraq.

It is likely that safeguards against weapons use would be attached to any equipment or materials supplied to the Arabs. The price a country might be willing to pay in violating a safeguards agreement would depend on the urgency of requirements, likely sanctions to be faced, and the time required to construct and deploy a weapon. Any use of sanctions against an Arab state would have to take account of the possibility of retaliatory oil sanctions.

Iran

In the 1970s, Iran's interest in becoming a nuclear power was widely seen in terms of prestige. While the fundamentalist forces which overthrew the Shah have vehemently repudiated his modernization and development programmes, it is not inevitable that Iranian foreign policy will always run counter to his proclivities. In fact, the courses which may have attracted the Shah in terms of potential grandeur could appeal to his successors as a means towards independence from both East and West.

For the meantime, however, Iran seems to have ceased pursuit of extensive nuclear development; in early 1980 the new Iranian government reportedly halted

the deposed Shah's grandiose nuclear power programme. Given Iran's superior conventional forces, developed under the Shah's personal tutelage, many of Iran's policy goals can still be pursued, without nuclear weapons. Iran would seem to have more to lose—by arousing regional rivalry and Soviet nervousness—than gain, should it introduce nuclear weapons. However, should Teheran feel that a nuclear deterrent would be useful against the Soviet Union or another regional power, the nuclear option could gain attractiveness. The repudiation of Iran's formerly close ties with the United States automatically eliminates those defensive options backed by US military force. A reactionary regime lacking allies may be instinctively antinuclear.[58] Nevertheless, the vagaries of Persian Gulf politics and regional developments make the future course of Iranian policy *vis-à-vis* the nuclear option uncertain.

Pakistan and the 'Islamic bomb'

Although not a Middle East actor, Pakistan, with its existing political, military and religious ties with some Arab states, serves as a possible source of nuclear-related technical assistance. Its interest in acquiring a nuclear reprocessing facility of its own is well known, and its pursuit of the technology has continued since the French termination, in mid-1978, of a 1976 reprocessing plant contract. At that point, Pakistan had received most of the plant's blueprints but little of its sensitive equipment.

Under the agreement with France, a loophole existed in the safeguards applied to the Pakistan plant. Islamabad was free to transfer plutonium or reprocessing technology to any party it wished, so long as the subject materials or technology were placed under safeguards. Consequently, Pakistan could possibly have shipped 'safeguarded' plutonium to any Arab state, even one which had begun an overt nuclear weapons programme.

In economic terms, Arab blandishments of hard cash to impoverished Pakistan could prove decisively tempting. Indeed, indications of Arab funding offers appeared immediately after initial French efforts to delay the Pakistani nuclear agreement by holding up guarantees of export credits, reportedly following warnings by Pakistani President Ali Bhutto to the Arab world of the threat posed to it by an Israeli nuclear capability. Bhutto was accordingly quoted as follows:

> We know that Israel and South Africa have full nuclear capability. The Christian, Jewish and Hindu civilizations have this capability. The Communist powers also possess it. Only the Islamic civilization was without it, but that position was about to change.[59]

After the 1974 Indian explosion, Pakistan successfully prevailed upon the United States to lift its embargo against the subcontinent. Just before the embargo was lifted, Bhutto stated that 'Pakistan has no intention at this point of developing nuclear weapons, but the country may be forced into a military nuclear programme if its back is to the wall',[60] adding that the country's nuclear policy remained under

58. Richard K. Betts, 'Incentives for nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, Iran', *Asian Survey*, November 1979, p. 1065.
59. Yager, *Nonproliferation and US foreign policy*, p. 222–3.
60. *The Chandigarh Tribune*, 22 December 1974, quoted in Zalmay Khalilzad, 'Pakistan: the making of a nuclear power', *Asian Survey*, June 1976, pp. 590–1.

review, with much depending on whether the United States provided Pakistan with sufficient conventional arms.

Many observers believe that Pakistan is most likely to become the first Muslim country to acquire an atomic weapons capability. Such a development would somewhat offset the Indian military threat, enormously augment the prestige and influence of Pakistan in the Islamic world, and undermine the conventional military capability of other neighbours, such as Iran. Such considerations undoubtedly serve to make the nuclear option perhaps overpoweringly attractive to Islamabad. Like India, Pakistan has not signed the NPT. Unlike India, however, Pakistan has offered to place its nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards and has made some overtures for nuclear arms restraint in the area. The modest Pakistani research programme was upgraded after the 1974 Indian nuclear test. A 1975 IAEA study reported Pakistan's critical need for additional energy and the likelihood of increasing future reliance on nuclear power. Possessing one small nuclear reactor in 1976, Pakistan planned to build 24 medium-sized power plants by the year 2000.

In summer 1978, a British Labour MP raised a question in the House of Commons concerning the alleged Pakistani purchase of specialized electrical equipment called 'inverters' which could be used in the operation of a gas centrifuge system for the enrichment of uranium. An elaborate investigation by US and other foreign intelligence agencies ensued, which reportedly concluded that the Pakistanis were surreptitiously and systematically purchasing components for construction of such a centrifuge plant. This startling development apparently caught the nuclear supplier states by surprise. Despite the cancellation of the Franco–Pakistani contract, it appeared as if the Pakistanis, by late 1978, were fairly advanced in assembling equipment for a centrifuge facility.[61] The United States in April 1979 thereupon suspended all military and economic assistance to Pakistan under the terms of a 1976 anti-proliferation law.[62] Behind the disclosure in parliament was the discovery by British authorities that Islamabad had purchased thirty such high-speed inverters in 1977 through a West German contractor and was attempting to buy 100 more. Their ostensible destination was a textile mill in Pakistan, but British investigation established that they were not of the type suitable for use in textiles, but rather of that used in British nuclear installations, capable of the high-speed operation necessary to separate the fissionable isotope, U–235, from ordinary uranium. In September 1978, the British government ordered the company involved, Emerson Electric, to halt production of the second order of inverters and terminate the sale.[63] Further investigation by US, British, West German and Dutch intelligence agencies apparently discovered that the Pakistanis had been shopping for essential equipment for some time, often using 'front' organizations as purchasing agents. US officials reportedly acknowledged that Pakistan had eluded the elaborate controls of the IAEA, as well as those of the London Nuclear Supplier Group, in progressing as far as it had in its nuclear development programme.

The efforts and pressure of the nuclear supplier nations notwithstanding, the Pakistanis continued to procure nuclear-related technology where they could. In September 1980, reports in the *Washington Post* revealed that the United States had tried to prevent Swiss sales to Pakistan of gas centrifuge components for use in

61. *New York Times*, 29 April 1979.
62. *Washington Post*, 6 August 1979.
63. *New York Times*, 29 April 1979.

producing enriched uranium. The Swiss government maintained that the transaction had violated no international agreements. US officials nevertheless were reported to believe that Switzerland had violated the spirit, if not necessarily the letter, of the NPT, as well as the Nuclear Supplier Group agreement restricting the transfer of sensitive technology with potential nuclear weapon application.[64]

Also in 1980, Pakistan was reported to have received some US-made sensitive electronics equipment with nuclear application, illegally shipped via Canada. Disclosure of the incident was particularly embarrassing to the Canadian government inasmuch as a Canadian-built (CANDU) reactor was used in the production of the nuclear device detonated in India in 1974.[65]

Pakistan, then, appears to be facing three choices in its nuclear development: (1) adhering to a strictly non-military use of the atom, (2) developing the capability for producing nuclear weapons, but refraining from so doing, or (3) embarking on a crash project to produce a weapon. The signs are that it is working on the second or third option, combining an ambitious nuclear power programme with the acquisition of facilities for a complete fuel cycle, which will enable them to produce the plutonium essential for a nuclear test. The direction and intensity of the Pakistani nuclear programme will depend on several factors, including the nature and pace of India's nuclear programme and overall regional security developments.[66]

Given Pakistan's poor economic position, the question of financing an expensive nuclear programme remains critical, and raises the possibility of Pakistan selling enriched uranium or sharing its nuclear technology with foreign buyers to capitalize on its investment. Direct financial assistance to Pakistan from Arab donors, practically non-existent before 1973, has recently grown to substantial proportions. From 1974 to 1976 five Arab countries provided Pakistan with approximately $1 billion in credits and loans, or nearly one-third of the total foreign financial assistance received by Islamabad in the period. Along with Egypt (prior to 1978) and Syria, Pakistan had become one of the largest recipients of assistance from the OPEC countries, largely on favourable financial terms.[67] Indirect support, such as joint industrial investment in and substantial imports from Pakistan, remittance from Pakistani expatriates in Arab states and assured oil supplies, is also significant. The benefits are mutual: Pakistanis provide both unskilled labour and badly needed skilled and professional services in the Middle East. In addition, Pakistan offers highly capable military advisory and training facilities. While indications of Arab financial support for the Pakistani nuclear programme remain unsubstantiated,[68] Libya, Iraq and the United Arab Emirates[69] are reported to have offered lavish aid to induce Islamabad to share its nuclear technology and produce an 'Islamic bomb'. One of Qadhafi's principal aides, Major Abdul Jalloud, was reported to have visited Pakistan in October 1978 expressly to renew Libyan offers of financial assistance

64. *Washington Post*, 21, 22 September 1980.
65. *Washington Star*, 7 December 1980.
66. Ernst LeFever, *Nuclear arms in the Third World* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1979), p. 44.
67. M. G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, 'Pakistan enters the Middle East', *Orbis*, Fall 1978, pp. 602–4.
68. Pakistan, at the same time, has been involved in various mutual defence agreements with various Arab countries. For instance, Abu Dhabi's 32 Mirage fighter aircraft are operated and maintained by Pakistanis. The sheikdom's government has reportedly promised to place these aircraft at Pakistan's disposal in the event of an emergency (see Khalilzad, p. 590).
69. 'Pakistan: facts on national defense', *Military Technology*, September–October 1979, p. 134.

for Pakistan's nuclear programme.[70] Pakistan has continued to deny both intentions of building nuclear weapons and Arab financing of a uranium enrichment facility, insisting that research on uranium enrichment is intended only for badly needed nuclear power reactor fuel.[71]

Pakistan's public denials of a nuclear weapons programme have been given less than full credence by Western officials. Photographs of the closely guarded uranium enrichment plant construction site at Kahuta are said to leave no doubt as to the purpose of the facility.[72] Even more ominous were the first press reports, in September 1980, that Pakistan was secretly building a small plutonium reprocessing plant near Rawalpindi. Western specialists reportedly believed the small facility capable of processing enough fissile material for a nuclear test perhaps before the end of 1981, whereas the plant under construction at Kahuta was unlikely to produce weapons-grade uranium before 1983, or even 1985.[73] They had believed that work on the small reprocessing facility was abandoned when the Pakistanis contracted for the French plant, which was ten times as large. When the French cancelled this contract, work apparently was clandestinely resumed on the original facility. Press sources reported that by the time the United States learned of the facility and informed European governments, the Pakistanis had already acquired the critical equipment necessary to build it from various French firms. Experts believed the plant was designed to produce enough plutonium annually for 'one or two—at the most three' nuclear weapons a year. This sobering discovery also focussed attention on the country's only nuclear power plant, a Canadian-built heavy water reactor which, in some eight years of operation, has produced spent fuel containing theoretically enough plutonium for perhaps fifteen bombs; some of this, despite safeguards procedures, could have been diverted for use in the reprocessing facility. Moreover, in September 1980 Pakistan announced that it is now fabricating its own nuclear fuel elements for the Canadian reactor, using natural uranium from Niger. US specialists stated that Pakistan could, with little difficulty, irradiate its own fuel elements in the reactor and then ship them to the plant for reprocessing for weapons use. Their estimates of the time needed to produce enough enriched uranium for a weapon—assuming availability of natural uranium—ranged from two to five years, before the reprocessing facility was discovered.

The Pakistanis were also reported to be limping along alone on the facility abandoned by France (where about six to ten years is thought to be needed to produce weapons-grade uranium), and to have in operation a pilot 'hot cell' reprocessing facility at the Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology in Islamabad. Small amounts of enriched uranium could be produced relatively quickly at the latter if the necessary materials were available.

The United States has for some years been attempting to stop Pakistan developing a nuclear device, by means ranging from offers of additional conventional weaponry to the imposition of more severe economic sanctions.[74] US and other Western officials are convinced that Pakistani nuclear capability would serve to revitalize India's nuclear weapons programme and further destabilize the political situation in

70. *New York Times*, 29 April 1979.
71. *Time*, 9 July 1979, p. 41.
72. *Washington Post*, 29 August 1979.
73. *The Economist*, 27 September 1980, p. 20; *Washington Post*, 23 September 1980.
74. *New York Times*, 12 August 1979.

the subcontinent. Despite such pressure, General Zia has stated candidly that no Pakistani government could compromise on the nuclear issue under threat of US or any other country's sanctions. Western diplomats in Pakistan are reported to agree with Zia that no government could do so and survive in Pakistan, where, as in a number of other developing states approaching the atomic threshold, the nuclear development programme has gone too far and has become too ingrained with national honour and prestige for practically any government to reverse course.

The December 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan further complicated US plans to curb Pakistan's nuclear development. US officials have attempted to convince Islamabad that a minor nuclear weapons capability would do little to deter the Soviet Union, would probably cause Congress to ban all military shipments to Pakistan, and could impel India to move militarily against Pakistan before the latter achieves a fully fledged nuclear capability. In this respect, the United States has been discussing with Pakistan the provision of substantial conventional military assistance, to satisfy some of Islamabad's security concerns.[75]

With the imminence of renewed US arms transfers to Pakistan, reports have emanated from New Delhi that France would reconsider its cancelled sale of a reprocessing plant. However, a French government spokesman denied this categorically. Pakistan, meanwhile, has yet to be convinced of the efficacy of relinquishing its nuclear development programme. It continues to deny that it intends to acquire nuclear weapons, but declines to disavow plans for building a 'peaceful nuclear device', as India described the device it exploded in 1974.[76] The ambiguous Pakistani position on nuclear testing, with indications that progress is continuing on the uranium enrichment plant, continue to be viewed by Washington with concern. While the United States has played down its concern with Pakistani nuclear plans since the invasion of Afghanistan, it has attempted to demonstrate its firm opposition to any proliferation. In the US view, a Pakistani nuclear test would not only create new tensions in the subcontinent and induce India to revive its own nuclear weapons programme, but would make it nearly impossible to achieve any regional cooperation designed to resist further Soviet encroachments in the area.

75. *Boston Globe*, 18 January 1980.
76. *New York Times*, 28 February 1980.

The attitudes of the superpowers towards the Gulf War

M. S. El Azhary*

For almost three years now the United States and the Soviet Union have found themselves sitting on the sidelines of the war between Iraq and Iran. It is this lack of the leverage necessary to influence the course of the war which best characterizes, and, to a very large extent, as I will show in the following pages, has shaped the attitudes of the superpowers towards the conflict. In analysing these attitudes one cannot exclude from the discussion such wider issues as American and Soviet interests in the Gulf and the Middle East as a whole. One also has to take into consideration bilateral relations between each superpower and particular regimes in the area, such as the US 'special' relationship with Saudi Arabia and Oman, and regional factors such as inter-Arab politics, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the Arab–Israeli conflict. Nevertheless, at the risk of over-simplifying matters, attention in this article will be centred on US and Soviet relations with both Iraq and Iran and the impact of these relations on the course of the fighting. These issues will be examined in the context of the superpowers' stakes in the war, their military and diplomatic actions in attempting to influence the course (and the outcome) of the conflict, and their gains and losses in terms of influence with the combatants and in the region in general.

The Carter administration

When the Gulf War broke out on 22 September 1980, it created difficulties and potential dangers for the United States which remain very real. These stem basically from the overriding strategic fact that 60 per cent of the world's oil trade comes from the Gulf region. With the Iranian and Iraqi shipments already disrupted, the Carter administration feared that a spread of violence in the region might result in a severe petroleum shortage that would undermine Western economic strength and political cohesion. President Carter underscored this concern when he declared that, while the West was in a position to cope with an interruption of Iranian and Iraqi supplies, it was nevertheless 'imperative that there be no infringement' of the ability of other suppliers to ship oil out of the Gulf.[1]

While substantial Western interests were involved, however, the Carter administration was virtually powerless to influence the course of the fighting on Shatt al-Arab. Consequently it adopted a neutral posture, ruling out direct US military intervention; only in the event of an attempted Iranian blockade of the Strait of Hormuz would American warships and aircraft have been called upon. The United States already had a naval task force in place nearby, which had been stationed in

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1. *New York Times*, 25 September 1980.

0020–5850/83/4/0609—12$03.00©1983 International Affairs

the Arabian Sea since the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan a year earlier.[2] As is so often the case in the Middle East, however, events seemed to shape decisions rather than the reverse; within twenty-four hours of the Carter administration's declaration of neutrality the leaders of Saudi Arabia requested US military assistance against possible Iranian attack. The Carter administration's response was to send four AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) reconnaissance planes with their ground support systems to the Kingdom, as had been done once before, in March 1979 during the border war between North and South Yemen. In this instance it proved an ideal means by which the United States could demonstrate its concern for the security of Saudi Arabia without provoking the Soviet Union by introducing new 'offensive' military systems.[3]

The dispatch of the AWACS was considered consistent with the 'Carter doctrine' that the United States was prepared to use military force to protect Gulf oil supplies from external threats. By responding to Saudi Arabia in this way, however, the Carter administration appeared to have extended the US commitment, raising the possibility of introducing American military power into internal regional conflicts in order to ensure a continued flow of oil. In addition, inspired by Saudi Arabia's request for military protection, the United States embarked on a cooperative military effort with its Western allies to increase their collective naval presence in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean area. In less than three weeks, the number of allied warships was increased from thirty to sixty, including ships from France, Britain and Australia, as well as from the United States.[4] This action was taken in great haste in the belief that, following the dispatch of the AWACS to Saudi Arabia, action on a multinational basis was likely to be more politically acceptable to the Gulf states than unilateral American action.

In contrast to the publicity that accompanied the dispatch of the AWACS—intended perhaps as a psychological deterrent to Iran—the increase in allied naval presence in the area was executed with minimum publicity. There were no formal declarations or high visibility crisis management meetings among the allies, who were apparently trying to avoid the appearance of overreaction to the Gulf crisis and, at the same time, to avoid needless provocation of the Soviet Union. In the meantime, the United States hurriedly launched an effort to strengthen its quick-reaction Rapid Deployment Force (RDF), still then in the early stages of its development.

During the early weeks of the war, the worst, from the US standpoint, did not happen; indeed, as a by-product, the crisis may even have strengthened America's defence posture in the region. By positioning more planes and ships within striking distance of the fighting, the Carter administration was able to exercise a deterrent effect against a widening of the war. It was thought at the time that Iraq was planning to launch attacks against Iran from Oman and Saudi Arabia[5]; if this was the case, the Carter administration was in a position to discourage those two countries from becoming militarily involved, and so to contain the conflict. At the

2. The US naval task force included a total of eighteen combat ships and thirteen support ships headed by the aircraft carriers *Midway* and *Eisenhower*. Each can launch about 170 aircraft. France also had a task force of fourteen vessels as part of the West's presence in the area. *Washington Post*, 3 October 1980.

3. *New York Times*, 30 September 1980.

4. *Washington Post*, 20 October 1980.

5. *New York Times*, 12 October 1980.

same time, Iran and Iraq were reminded that the United States was determined to prevent the war between them from shutting off the flow of oil to the rest of the world.

To express their appreciation of the Western stand, the Saudis reciprocated by a prompt action of their own to ease the strain on oil supplies caused by the war. A few days after the dispatch of the AWACS, Saudi Arabia decided to increase its oil production and organized similar efforts with other major producers, including Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. This action had the effect of insulating the international petroleum market against the effects of the war.[6] It should be pointed out, however, that prior to the Saudi decision to raise oil production, the Carter administration had successfully defused some of the tension generated by the crisis by announcing that 'oil inventories of the world's major oil-consuming nations were at an all-time high'.[7]

In requesting military assistance from the United States and supporting its effort to strengthen its military presence in the area, the Saudi leaders appeared less wary of such direct military collaboration than they had been in the past. Although the Carter administration, at this early stage, was not focussing directly on a long-term strategy for building up American forces in the Gulf area, it did see the crisis as a crucial first step in a future relationship of closer military cooperation with Saudi Arabia. Commenting with satisfaction on the United States–Saudi military collaboration, an administration official was quoted as contending that the United States was 'in a much better position to move ahead on building a security framework for Southwest Asia'.[8] Nevertheless, once it seemed that the war would not spill over into the neighbouring countries, and the United States had achieved its immediate objective of maintaining the flow of oil out of the Gulf region, administration policy was expressed in words rather than deeds, reflecting its lack of leverage with the combatants.

The Carter administration was concerned that the Soviet Union had much more diplomatic latitude in the crisis than the United States. Not only did Moscow have functioning relations with both belligerents, but it had also been the principal military supplier of the Iraqis. It was, therefore, in a position to reap diplomatic advantages. One fear was that, as in the 1971 war between India and Pakistan, the Soviet Union might offer itself as mediator in peace talks between Teheran and Baghdad. Should that happen, Moscow might also acquire new political influence in the region as a whole—a development the United States had long sought to prevent.

With this in mind, former US Secretary of State Edmund Muskie enunciated two key 'principles' in a proposal to end the Gulf War:

> We believe this conflict can and must be resolved through respect for international law—that territory must not be seized by force of arms, that disputes should be resolved by practical means. And let us also affirm another principle that will be essential to a peaceful resolution of this conflict. It is the principle that neither side should seek to interfere in the affairs of the other.[9]

6. *New York Times*, 4 October 1980.
7. *New York Times*, 25 September 1980. The United States' oil reserves were estimated at 100 days (*Washington Post*, 28 September 1980).
8. *New York Times*, 12 October 1980.
9. *New York Times*, 21 October 1980.

The first point was directed at Iraq which, as noted below, had aroused concern in Washington by what was seen as an effort to separate the oil-producing province of Khuzistan from the rest of Iran. The point concerning non-interference referred to Iran. Iraq's complaint that Iran was attempting to export its brand of revolution to the Shi'ite Muslim population of Iraq was considered by the Carter administration to be valid. More important, perhaps, is that by stating these principles the Carter administration was trying to prevent any intervention by the Soviet Union.

Another cause of anxiety to the Carter administration was the possibility of a definitive Iraqi victory that would result in what President Carter called the 'dismemberment' of Iran. In expressing this concern, Carter said that the Iraqi forces had exceeded the war goal, which was to take control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway and 'no Iranian territory . . . the carving out of a part of Iran to be separated from the rest would not be in our interest'.[10] It was thought that in such an eventuality Iran would be plunged into civil war and the Soviet Union would intervene, either directly or indirectly. With these possibilities in mind, the Carter administration was increasingly tempted to abandon strict neutrality and supply Iran with the spare parts it desperately needed to operate its American-made military equipment. There were those among Carter's advisers (including Zbigniew Brzezinski) who argued that, since Iraq was receiving spare parts for her Soviet-made equipment, the United States should correct the imbalance by supplying the needed spare parts to Iran, which action, it was to be hoped, would prevent the collapse of Iran. They believed the Khomeini regime to be anti-Soviet as well as anti-American.[11]

In addition, Carter administration officials perceived that the Iranian leaders were considering the current American presidential election campaign as a factor in setting the conditions for releasing the American hostages held in Teheran. An offer of spare parts, therefore, in exchange for the hostages' release, looked like a very tempting way of enhancing Carter's chances of re-election. 'If the hostages are released safely we would make delivery of those items which Iran owns—which they have bought and paid for.' The President was referring to an estimated $240 million worth of military equipment already purchased but not received by Iran, and which had been frozen with Iran's other assets when the hostages were seized. The United States would maintain its neutrality by refraining from selling 'additional' military equipment to Iran.[12]

The terms of the agreement that finally led to the hostages' release did not include a specific mention of military spare parts. Despite the fluctuations in the progress of the negotiations over the hostages, the Iranians clearly wanted to reach an agreement before having to deal with the Reagan administration. In the event, the hostages were being freed as President Reagan's inauguration was in progress. At that point, the Gulf War had reached a stalemate and Iran appeared to be in less danger than at an earlier stage.

The Reagan administration

The Reagan administration maintained the neutral stance and followed the policies towards Iraq and Iran established by the preceding administration. It continued to

10. *New York Times*, 19 October 1980.
11. *New York Times*, 22 October 1980.
12. *Washington Post*, 29 October 1980.

strengthen the US presence in the area by concluding an access agreement to use air and naval facilities with Pakistan.[13] (With its coast on the Arabian Sea, Pakistan is considered an integral part of the Gulf region.) Strides were also made in building up RDF military units which became operational as demonstrated in the US–organized military exercises which took place in several Arab and African countries (including Oman) in 1981 and 1982.

All of this seemed to advance further US capabilities for military intervention in the Gulf. Moreover, the Reagan administration cemented US–Saudi military cooperation by selling them the AWACS, thus reassuring Saudi leaders that the US administration, despite its closeness to Israel, was firmly committed to continuing a policy of supporting Saudi Arabia and defending the Gulf region.

With regard to Iran, however, the Reagan administration tried to put some distance between itself and the preceding administration by an indirect rebuke for making the hostages deal. They would not have negotiated with the Iranians to obtain their release, they said.[14] The Carter administration's promise of $240 million in military spare parts was cancelled. According to Secretary of State Alexander Haig, there would be 'no military equipment provided to the Government of Iran either under earlier obligations and contractual arrangements or as yet unstated requests'.[15] Iran continued to request military spare parts from the United States, particularly for the American-built fleet of eighty F–14 fighter planes inherited from the time of the late Shah. The last such request was made in December 1981. On that occasion, as on all others, the Reagan administration held fast to its policy of prohibiting the export of military equipment and high technology items to Iran.[16]

In contrast to this stern attitude towards Iran, the Reagan administration wanted to improve relations with Iraq. Early in 1981, Secretary of State Haig, explaining the administration's plan to develop a strategic 'consensus' to counter Soviet expansion, held out the possibility of improved US–Iraqi relations. Washington, he said, had noted 'some shift' in Iraqi policy caused in part by 'a greater sense of concern about the behavior of Soviet imperialism in the middle Eastern area'.[17] Haig was referring to what the United States viewed as a pattern of change in Iraqi diplomacy from a more radical to a moderate stance. That change encompassed close ties with Jordan, a *rapprochement* with Saudi Arabia, and a decline in Soviet–Iraqi relations, which will be discussed further below.

More important, perhaps, is that the United States was—and remains—hopeful (barring, of course, a change of regime under the present circumstances) that Iraq might take a more favourable view of the US role in Gulf security and a centrist position on the Arab–Israeli conflict. The Reagan administration has consistently

13. The use of the Pakistani naval base at Gwandar and the air base at Peshawar; see *New York Times*, 5 March 1981.

14. *New York Times*, 19 February 1981. During the 1980 Presidential campaign, however, Ronald Reagan did support the negotiations based on Ayatollah Khomeini's four points and did not criticize the Carter administration tactics once the negotiations began.

15. Haig also urged American companies to exercise 'careful caution' before resuming trade with Iran (*Washington Post*, 29 January 1981). However, Iran's non-military imports from the USA continued to come through companies set up in Dubai, Amsterdam and Singapore. There are also reports that the US government bought Iranian crude oil for its strategic reserves at a discount price (*The Times*, 5 June 1983).

16. *New York Times*, 13 December 1981.

17. *New York Times*, 20 March 1981. Haig followed this by sending Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Morris Draper to Baghdad to brief Iraq on Haig's tour of other Middle East capitals and to clarify the administration's views towards the region.

refused to sell arms to Iran and has pursued its policy of remaining neutral in the Gulf War. Indeed, in recent years, the situation seemed so ripe for such a shift by Iraq that one analyst was prompted to call it 'the West's opportunity'.[18]

US–Iraqi relations continued to improve despite the bombing by the Israelis of a nuclear reactor near Baghdad in June 1981. The Reagan administration condemned the Israeli attack and censured Israel in a United Nations Security Council vote. The text of the resolution was agreed upon by both the United States and Iraq and was considered the harshest censure of Israel ever endorsed by the United States at the UN.[19] The stage was then set for further progress in relations between the two countries.

On several occasions in the past three years President Saddam Hussein has expressed his interest in expanding diplomatic contacts with the United States.[20] The Reagan administration has responded in kind. Iraq was removed from the list of countries accused of aiding and abetting terrorism, thus lifting US restrictions against exports to Iraq.[21] US trade with Iraq is estimated at $1 billion a year, and although the United States does not supply arms to Iraq, it has consistently supported France's policy of supplying military equipment to that country, which has now grown to account for a third of Iraq's needs. The remainder comes from the Soviet Union, a point discussed further below.

As already noted, all of Iran's numerous requests for military equipment and spare parts were rejected out of hand by the Reagan administration. To circumvent this embargo, Iran has turned to a number of countries in both Eastern and Western Europe as well as to Israel, Syria, Libya and North Korea. One estimate puts the figure for arms, spare parts and ammunition delivered to Iran from Western Europe in the first eighteen months of the war at between $100 million and $200 million. Approximately half of this amount was supplied or arranged by Israel, the remainder by merchants on the international market, some of whom also may have connections with the Israelis. This variety in sources for arms is not new; Iran under the Shah had already begun to diversify its suppliers by purchasing arms from the Soviet Union.[22] Judging from the size of the Iranian armed forces, however, Iran could not have sustained her war effort, much less hoped to turn the tide against the Iraqis, by depending on the international arms market. It seems likely that Iran solved its military spare parts problem by discovering its own stock. Apparently the Iranian armed forces, after a chaotic year or more of combat, gradually managed to put their house in order and use the massive amounts of ammunition and spare parts stockpiled during the time of the Shah. In the view of several observers, it was this solution to the spare parts problem, and not Islamic fervour, which broke the long deadlock in the war and routed the entrenched Iraqi troops from Iranian territory.[23]

18. See Adeed Dawisha, 'Iraq: the West's opportunity', *Foreign Policy*, Winter 1981/82, pp. 134–153.

19. *Washington Post*, 19 June 1981. The United States also temporarily suspended the delivery of four F–16 fighter bombers to Israel.

20. *ABC News*, 'Issues and Answers', 28 June 1981; *Time*, 19 July 1982.

21. This cleared the way for the US Department of State to approve export licences for the sale of six civilian versions of C130 Hercules transport planes to Iraq despite strong congressional opposition. *The Times*, 28 May 1982.

22. The Soviet Union sold the Shah military equipment costing more than $1bn. The arms bought from Moscow and now supplied by Eastern Europe, and other Soviet allies, include Katyusha rocket artillery, surface-to-air missiles, anti-aircraft guns, armoured personnel carriers, small arms and antitank missiles. By 1978, the Shah's government was operating a factory to produce the RPG–7 antitank missile, and this factory was functioning last March. *New York Times*, 8 March 1982.

23. It is estimated that the air force storage areas alone contained 20 to 30 million aircraft or helicopter spare parts. These large amounts of spare parts and ammunition were theoretically 'lost' when the pre-revolutionary computer storage system in Iran ceased to function. Evidently the Iranians succeeded in mapping out the storage areas and putting the spare parts to use. *Washington Post*, 8 April 1982.

Another reason for Iran's reversal of fortunes in the war was that since the beginning of 1982 revolutionary turmoil had subsided within her borders and a gradual cohesion had begun to evolve. This came as a welcome development to the United States because, with a pro-Soviet regime next door to Iran in Afghanistan, a strong anti-communist Iran was considered an important barrier to the extension of Soviet influence in the Gulf region. But Iran's revolutionary zeal continued, and as before, this has been viewed with alarm by its more conservative Arab neighbours as destabilizing to their regimes. Moreover, the Reagan administration has been under pressure from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states and Jordan to shore up Iraq's resistance to Iran. In response, the Reagan administration reiterated the US commitment to its friends in the area. In a comprehensive speech outlining the administration's Middle East policy, the then Secretary of State Alexander Haig affirmed US neutrality and added:

> Neutrality, however, does not mean that we are indifferent to the outcome. We have friends and interests that are endangered by the continuation of hostilities. We are committed to defending our vital interests in the area. These interests and the interests of the world are served by the territorial integrity and political independence of all countries in the Persian Gulf.[24]

This declaration was joined with an announcement by Haig that the United States would become more active in seeking a peaceful solution to the Gulf War. Although it is unlikely that the present Iranian regime would accept a peace initiative emanating either directly or indirectly from Washington, Haig's statement seemed to signal to Iran that the United States wished for better relations with that country in the future.

With regard to Iraq, just before Haig's statement the Reagan administration disclosed that it had been in contact with Islamic mediating states with the aim of preventing Iranian forces from pushing ahead into Iraq, further demonstrating the United States' own lack of independent leverage with the combatants.[25] Iran paid no heed to advice, and invaded Iraq in July 1982 with the objective not only of bringing down the government of Saddam Hussein but also of establishing an Islamic republic in Iraq, and ultimately spreading Islamic revolution to the other Gulf states. But the Iranian invasion failed, and again the war reached a stalemate. Since then Iraq has successfully repulsed several other offensives and for the time being America's worst fears have not been realized.

The Soviet Union

The Soviet Union, like the United States, was caught unawares when the Gulf War broke out, despite its close military ties with Iraq. Unlike the United States, however, the Soviet Union is not threatened by the loss of access to Gulf oil because it is self-sufficient in energy. However, the war found the USSR in a mass of crosscurrents regarding its interests and vulnerabilities. It saw this as a war between two neighbouring states, both of which maintain important, multifaceted relations with the USSR. On the one hand, Iraq is an official ally linked to Moscow since 1972 by a treaty of friendship and cooperation; on the other, the anti-Americanism of the revolutionary regime in Iran had brought important gains to the Soviet Union. At the same time, the USSR has been embroiled in a guerrilla war in

24. US Department of State, Press Release No. 177, 26 May 1982.
25. *Washington Post*, 27 May 1982.

Afghanistan, adding to what the Soviet leaders must have perceived as chaos along their southern reaches.

Very early in the war, Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, affirmed the neutral posture of the Soviet government.[26] Then followed the late President Brezhnev's call for leaders on both sides to go to the negotiating table. He warned that the war might provide the United States with an excuse to move into Iran militarily and control Gulf oil under the pretext of freeing the American hostages.[27] The Soviet media also condemned the Carter administration's despatch of AWACS planes to Saudi Arabia and the increase in the Western naval task force in the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Not mentioned, however, was the presence of the Soviet fleet, including twelve combat vessels and seventeen support ships in the area.[28]

In order to counterbalance the growing US military presence, and reflecting Soviet concern about the growing acceptability of that presence (caused in part by the Gulf War), Brezhnev invited the United States and other world powers to join the Soviet Union in a formal pact to forswear military intervention in the Gulf, and to guarantee the flow of oil to the rest of the world. On 23 February 1981, the Soviet leader repeated that proposal to the new Reagan administration.[29]

With regard to the combatants in the Gulf War, the Soviet Union maintained an attitude of aloofness towards Iraq. In a joint communiqué issued at the end of the talks between Brezhnev and Syrian President Hafiz Assad in Moscow, there was no mention of the Gulf War, which was in its second week; instead, there was praise for the Iranian revolution. The communiqué made a clear attempt to restrain Iraq by declaring that Moscow and Damascus 'support the inalienable right of Iran to decide its destiny independently without any interference from outside'.[30]

Perhaps this was not totally unexpected; Soviet–Iraqi relations had been strained since the late 1970s. The Soviet leaders were particularly vexed when, in 1978, the Iraqi government ordered the execution of twenty-one communists for attempting to subvert the army. In spite of intervention by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria and East Germany on behalf of the doomed communists, the executions proceeded. Iraq then reduced the number of Iraqis to receive military training in the Soviet Union as an expression of its concern about Marxist indoctrination. There have also on occasions been disagreements concerning economic and military cooperation, as Baghdad began to look more and more to the West for trade, technology, and military equipment.[31]

Another indication of further deterioration in Soviet–Iraqi relations came during the twenty-sixth CPSU Congress, when the head of the Iraqi Communist Party, Aziz Mohammad—presumably with the Kremlin's approval—condemned the war against Iran and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Iran. In contrast to the previous Congress in 1976, the Iraqi Baath Party did not send representatives.[32]

26. *New York Times*, 26 September 1980.
27. In a Kremlin speech in honour of President Reddy of India (*New York Times*, 1 October 1980).
28. *Washington Post*, 28 September 1980.
29. First proposed in a speech to the Indian parliament (*New York Times*, 11 December 1980). The same proposal was repeated in a speech to the twenty-sixth CPSU Congress (*New York Times*, 24 February 1981).
30. *Washington Post*, 11 October 1980.
31. *New York Times*, 3 February 1980 and 28 September 1980.
32. *Washington Post*, 3 March 1981.

In contrast to these uneasy relations with Iraq, the Soviet leaders and the press expressed on numerous occasions their support for the revolution in Iran. In his report to the twenty-sixth CPSU Congress, President Brezhnev seemed far more cordial to Iran than to Iraq, praising the Iranian revolution as 'a major event on the international scene in recent years, [which] is of a specific nature. However complex and contradictory, it is essentially an anti-imperialist revolution, though reaction at home and abroad is seeking to change this feature'. Brezhnev wished the Iranians success in their revolution and offered to 'develop good relations with Iran on the principles of equality and reciprocity'.[33] Brezhnev's words also seem to reflect that the Soviet leadership is no longer apprehensive, at least in the short term, about the power of example of Iran's Islamic revolution and its possible effects in inspiring religious revivalism or disaffection among the Muslim population in the central Asian republics of the USSR.

Up to this point, the Gulf War and the hostages crisis overlapped and Iran was in almost total isolation from the West. The Soviet leaders hoped that these circumstances would induce Iran to turn to them for help. They believed, moreover, that the release of the American hostages might lead towards a *rapprochement* between the United States and Iran, particularly in view of Iran's need for military spare parts to continue the war with Iraq. To forestall such an eventuality, Moscow was prepared to supply Iran with Soviet arms, but evidently Iran rejected the offer.[34]

Despite these efforts to court Iran, Moscow was unable to capitalize on the highly strained US–Iranian relations and was making no headway in improving its own position in Iran. There were occasions on which Iran's Islamic rulers vowed to view the United States and the Soviet Union with an equally critical eye as long as Moscow refused to abandon its neutral position in the Gulf War in the face of 'flagrant Iraqi aggression against Iran'; such was the message conveyed by the late Iranian Prime Minister, Mohammad Ali Rajai, to Soviet Ambassador Vladimir Vinogradov, and made public by the government of Iran. Another matter of contention mentioned by Rajai was the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, in spite of Soviet efforts to link the CIA with resistance movements in both Iran and Afghanistan.[35] Soviet broadcasts making that assertion were repeated throughout 1981.[36]

The Iranian demand for renegotiation of the price of natural gas shipped to the Soviet Union through the Iranian Natural Gas Trunkline (IGAT) is a further unresolved issue between the two countries. Even before the Gulf War, the flow of Iranian natural gas dropped off as a result of a decrease in oil production. There was a complete cut-off in March 1980 when Moscow rejected Iranian demands for a five-fold increase to bring the price to world market levels.[37]

The Soviet Union's unrewarded courtship of Iran was clearly causing frustration in the Kremlin, which complained about a number of Iranian policies, including

33. *Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the immediate tasks of the Party in home and foreign policy, 23 February 1981* (Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1981) p. 23.

34. *The Times*, 6 October 1980.

35. *Washington Post*, 16 February 1981.

36. For examples on this theme, see *Foreign Broadcast Information Service/USSR International Affairs*, 1 July 1981, H3, and 11 September 1981, H1–H2.

37. Alvin Z. Rubinstein, 'The Soviet Union and Iran under Khomeini', *International Affairs*, Autumn 1981, pp. 612–613.

frequent anti-Soviet comments by Iranian leaders. In March 1982, Pravda expressed its displeasure with Iran in a commentary on the status of Soviet–Iranian relations. In less than enthusiastic terms, it noted that Soviet trade with Iran amounted to R800m in 1981 compared with R700m in 1978, the last year of the Shah's reign. Pravda rated it as 'not bad'. It complained, however, that 'unfortunately such a claim cannot be made about other areas of Soviet–Iranian relations, which have been harmed in the past two or three years'. Pravda listed the reduction in Soviet diplomatic presence in Teheran, the closing of the Soviet consulate in Rasht, the closing of the Soviet–Iranian Cultural Relations Society, the closing of the Iran–Soviet Bank, the ban on Soviet reporters, and the closing of several other joint enterprises as examples.

Pravda was particularly vexed that Iran had continued to speak of the USSR as one of 'two threats'—that from the north, that from the south being the United States. The paper said that 'equating Soviet and US policies only adversely portrays the policies of our nation and ignores the reality of international events'. It reminded Iran that the Soviet Union had granted Iran transit rights through Soviet territory after the United States had ordered a blockade of the alternative route through the Gulf during the hostage crisis. Although the blockade is no longer in force, the Soviet Union extended these rights to Iran during the war with Iraq. It is perhaps worth noting that this commentary by Pravda, like all other Soviet press and broadcast commentaries, avoided criticism of Ayatollah Khomeini and suggested instead that Iranian anti-Soviet attitudes were encouraged by 'right-wing' groups. The idea to be conveyed here is that these groups create 'obstacles to the expansion of Soviet–Iranian relations' and are doing harm to 'the Iranian economy and Iran's ability to fight imperialist pressures'.[38]

Furthermore, since the Islamic revolution seized power in Iran the Khomeini regime has held the communist Tudeh party on a short leash, tolerating it yet preventing it from increasing its membership and influence. The party has remained under suspicion as indicated by Prime Minister Hussein Moussavi's declaration that Tudeh members would face execution if, upon joining the revolutionary guards or other regime organizations, they failed to state their party affiliation. This uneasy liaison came to an end in February 1983 when about seventy Tudeh members were arrested and accused of spying for the Russians. Two months later the Iranian government announced the dissolution of the Tudeh party, and on the same day ordered eight Soviet diplomats to leave the country. Although exasperated, no doubt, the Soviets so far have reacted relatively mildly by confining themselves to protesting at the expulsion of the diplomats.[39]

In the light of the Soviet failure to establish a closer link with Iran, Moscow has also kept its options open towards Iraq and decided early on to repair its deteriorating relations with Baghdad in the hope of preserving influence in the Iraqi capital after the war as well as keeping intact the friendship treaty between the two countries. In April 1981, a little more than a month after the twenty-sixth CPSU Congress, the Soviet Union and Iraq celebrated the ninth anniversary of their treaty as though nothing had changed. An Iraqi delegation visited Moscow for the occasion, and the Iraqi President, Saddam Hussein, and his Soviet counterpart,

38. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service/USSR International Affairs*, 10 March 1982, H1–H2.
39. *New York Times*, 21 December 1981. *The Times*, 5 May 1983.

Leonid Brezhnev, exchanged messages expressing their desire to strengthen ties 'based on mutual cooperation'. Brezhnev stated, 'We are convinced that the treaty can serve well the basic interests of the people of the Soviet Union and Iraq in the struggle against imperialist intrigues and form a just and durable peace in the Middle East'.[40] For its part, Iraq found it agreeable to continue the treaty, largely because it has been obtaining Soviet-made weapons and spare parts from Eastern Europe (thus preserving the official neutrality proclaimed by the Soviet Union). It is highly unlikely that the Soviet Union's allies would provide such arms without prior Soviet approval. According to Iraqi Deputy Premier Tariq Aziz, this indirect solution for providing arms to Iraq did help Iraq and the Soviet Union to avoid a major impasse. 'If we had failed [to get Soviet arms] we might have become irritated, very hostile, very hysterical against the Soviet Union', which, he said, would have been a mistake. He added, 'Now we can behave serenely with the Soviet Union without being hostile to them'.[41]

About two-thirds of the Iraqi military equipment is Soviet-made (down from ninety-five per cent in 1972 when the treaty was signed); the remainder comes from France and, to a lesser extent, Britain and Italy. Iraq has signed contracts with both Eastern and Western European countries for military equipment amounting to billions of dollars since the onset of the war.[42]

The Soviet Union is continuing its indirect flow of military supplies to the Iraqi armed forces and has given valuable assistance to Iraq in the repair of war-damaged, Soviet-built industrial plants. In addition, the two countries have signed a number of commercial and technological agreements, but not on a scale exceeding any agreement made since 1972. Much of Iraq's trade now is with Japan, West Germany, France, and the United States. In 1980 the Soviet Union ranked fourteenth among Iraqi trade partners. There is a strong possibility, however, that, in a postwar reconstruction effort, Soviet–Iraqi economic ties will be strengthened considerably.[43]

In any case, the Soviet Union seems to have been able to maintain its links with Iraq, while simultaneously trying to court Iran and thereby straddle the dispute. Lacking leverage with both combatants, the USSR has succeeded, by the use of caution and restraint, in avoiding irreparable damage to its relations with either side. Whether or not it will be able to continue this policy will depend upon what Iraq and Iran achieve on the battlefield. As already noted, Iraq has so far succeeded in repulsing Iranian attacks on her territory, and the two sides appear locked in an inconclusive war.[44] Since the situation on the battlefield has reverted to a stalemate, as has been the situation over most of the last three years, the Soviet Union has no choice but to continue its policy of courting both countries in order to prevent a total shift by either one to the United States. But should Iraq suffer a severe and definitive defeat and the Baathist regime of President Saddam Hussein be overthrown and replaced by a pro-Khomeini regime, with all that would imply in terms of incalculable ramifications for the rest of the Gulf region and the entire Middle East,

40. *Washington Post*, 5 May 1981.
41. *Washington Post*, 19 April 1981.
42. *Washington Post*, 5 May 1981, 4 November 1980.
43. *Washington Post*, 11 October 1980. See also *Middle East Economic Digest*, 16–22 October 1981.
44. Press reports indicate that loss of life on both sides has been high. One estimate puts the losses of the first twenty-six months of fighting at 200,000 soldiers dead from both sides and 70,000 more taken prisoner (*Time*, 11 October 1982).

that eventuality would not necessarily serve the interests of the Soviet Union. It would, however, bring important gains to the USSR in terms of anti-American and anti-Western actions which would probably damage existing Western interests and relations in the region.

Thirty-six years later: the mixed legacies of Mountbatten's transfer of power

W. H. Morris-Jones*

Legacies are unavoidable in the histories of states, as in the history of families or of our bodies. Always we make our futures in the presence of our pasts.

Legacies are peculiarly substantial and durable in those states which emerge from partitions. In this respect the subcontinent of South Asia is not a case on its own; the partitions of Palestine, of Ireland, of Germany are also events which seem never to die, nor even smoothly to fade away. Partitions bear witness, often with acute poignancy, to the element of tragedy in human affairs: solutions, however genuine, to one set of pressing problems simply set the scene for the next set.

The purpose of this essay is to try to disentangle the elements, positive and negative, of the British contribution to the legacies of 1947 as transmitted to the subcontinent. The task has been made practicable by the opening up to public inspection of the records a few years ago. What is more extraordinary is that in principle the task can be undertaken even by those who have not the time nor the patience nor the practical possibility of burrowing into the heaps of files. For this we have to thank the Harold Wilson government which took the bold decision to publish a vast selection of the papers which record the process of Britain's first and largest decolonization operation. We have also to thank Professor Nicholas Mansergh and his staff who undertook with exquisite care and judgment the giant task of editing the twelve massive volumes of the *Transfer of power* series.

I propose to identify six facets of the 1947 Mountbatten operation. With simplification, I shall present each of the six as having primarily either a positive or negative set of consequences for the future. For the sake of readers who do not enjoy suspense, let me say that I shall find three of each kind. In football parlance this is a draw, three goals for and three against. But whereas in football all goals bear equal weight in scoring, in politics some goals are more important than others.

The largest issue is that of the partition decision itself. Was it wise; was it necessary? But since that matter arose only in the context of a British determination to transfer power somehow, there is a prior question to be disposed of: was 1947 the right time for Britain to have arrived at that determination? To this, a brief answer will suffice: yes—in the sense that while it could have been earlier, it could certainly not have been later if quite appalling consequences were to be avoided. The Labour government was not only the first government in London that *willed* to discontinue the attempt to exercise outside control over the subcontinent; it was also the first that was without the *capacity*—in terms of resources, above all in terms of support at home and in the world—effectively to succeed even if it had wished to try. That will was not a mere derivation from the lack of capacity, though the latter helped to consolidate the resolve. There was thus a double recognition of

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0020-5850/83/4/0621—08$03.00

the danger of responsibility without power. That was just as well, for such is a recipe for chaos, which brings suffering.

But was partition a necessary route to decolonization—meaning by that a peaceful and orderly transfer of power, as distinct from a disorder indistinguishable from civil war? The answer to that question varies according to the period to which it refers. My own view is that by March 1947, when Mountbatten arrived to take over from Wavell, partition was the only solution on which it was possible to secure the agreement or at least the acquiescence of both Congress and League. The League's assault on Punjab was already in progress and would be unstoppable. The tone and tempo of the new Viceroyalty were set at its commencement: Mountbatten flew in on Saturday, 22 March, had the handing-over meeting with Wavell at 10.30 p.m. and Wavell was off on Sunday morning. Within a month of talks with the leaders, Mountbatten had no doubts that some kind of partition was unavoidable. It could be said, in other words, that the ever-narrowing funnel of historical causation had reached its virtual tip of inevitability.

To be sure, the funnel had been broader—that is, there had been other options open—at earlier stages. Only just a dozen years earlier, in 1935, other options were ample and partition was on no relevant agenda. But the Act of that year was no more than another exercise in the rearrangement of the elements of Indian collaboration in the continuation of British rule. Even five years earlier, in 1942, other options existed. For although the League at Lahore had passed what came, later, to be called the 'Pakistan resolution', it was a groping, ambiguous affair which, if it pointed anywhere in particular, pointed not to Pakistan but to a Pakistan and a Bangladesh. However, in retrospect it can be seen as the landmark which indicated the transition from Muslim separate*ness* to Muslim separat*ism*. But in any case the Cripps Mission of 1942 was doomed by the predilections of the three men in charge, predilections which prevented them from being able to do an accurate cost-benefit analysis even in the cause of British interests. Churchill was unable to contemplate even modifications in empire, let alone its abandonment; in any case, as Wavell said, he simply hated India. Linlithgow, possessed of the sharpest mind of the three, had turned himself with the outbreak of war into an impregnable rock of determination, so wedded to the status quo that one can almost say that even if the war had not existed he would have been tempted to invent it. Amery, ingenious ideas-man but politically ineffectual, was reduced to advising the Viceroy to 'make much of the Untouchables' for the reason that it would be good to have *two* 'substantial minorities to whom consideration has to be paid'. (This bit of naked Machiavellianism may look like confirmation of 'divide and rule'. But it is best seen as a pathetic terminal form of the long-standing, and indeed almost inevitable, British policy of securing economy and minimum force in imperial affairs by enlisting appropriate local collaborators.) The sad irony of the backward-looking fervour of this trio is that by 'making much' of obstacles to independence, especially the League, they worked against British interests as these would be perceived only a few years later; for once independence was envisaged it began to be understood that British interests by no means necessarily required a partition, indeed might be better served by a united India.

The narrowing funnel was still fairly broad in 1943 when Wavell, to my mind the most noble and most appealing of the three Viceroys of the 1940s, had a vision of a way forward—only to have it crushed by a 'menacing and unpleasant' Churchill. By 1946 the Cabinet Mission could try to set its face against Pakistan but it was

obliged to recognize that by that time the only united India that was now feasible was an ambiguous, probably tenuous, affair of three tiers. By that time, too, the Wavell of bold visions had been reduced by the weariness of frustrations—at the hands of Congress, League and London—to an inability to envisage any better outcome than a military-style withdrawal province by province. Attlee was right in thinking that only a new man could find a new way.

So, on this first and large issue, we must allow that Mountbatten scored a brilliant goal. After a brief probing period with the Mission's plan in his hand, he made a fresh appreciation, accepted a kind of partition and steered his own plan towards the announcement of 4 June. The plan's two key features were probably vital to its success: first, it was not an award, let alone a constitution, it was an *agreed* mechanism for ascertaining representative preferences in areas of doubt—Punjab, Bengal and the Frontier; second, while it was the way to the end of united India, it was not Jinnah's one-time claim of six provinces but the 'moth-eaten' Pakistan of three provinces and two halves.

The second issue takes the form of a question of timing: if partition had become the only alternative to civil war, was the road towards it traversed too quickly? It has been argued that the million deaths and the twelve million refugees could have been averted if Mountbatten had not insisted on speeding up the timetable. For such a speeding-up there certainly was. When Attlee made his announcement of the new Viceroy in February, this was coupled with the declaration of June 1948 as the deadline for British withdrawal. (One has to remember, however, that this relatively leisurely timetable was influenced by the residue of the Mission plan: there was still a vague assumption that the Viceroy would preside over an 'interim' period of constitution-making.) During the preparation of the June plan this period was envisaged as being shortened, but no date was given. Only after its announcement did 15 August 1947 suddenly emerge. Why?

There can be little doubt that not one but several considerations pointed in the same direction. It may be conceded for a start that from Mountbatten's own personal standpoint it was quite appealing to maintain the established image of a dashing figure, to press on to glory in the history books of the future by achieving a fast handover of formal power. It must be added, however, that Britain's own credit—in India certainly, but, no less important in London's eyes, also internationally—depended on her showing not the slightest inclination to delay and on her securing a clean and total extrication from all executive involvement. Moreover, any extension of the partition process increased the risks that the indispensable agreement of the parties might come unstuck. But above all the central fact of government on the ground in the subcontinent was that its capacity to control was fast diminishing: in the critical Punjab, it was simply unable to enforce, to take a crucial instance, its own ban on the use of uniformed guards by the League. Delay could be legitimately seen as destroying structures of authority without permitting the creation of new ones; if power were not transferred soon, there would be none left to transfer, none to inherit effectively. (Soviet historians of India like to believe that the speed-up was designed to prevent Indian leadership from passing through red revolution to the communists. But not only is there not a scrap of evidence to support this view; there is additionally every reason to suppose that by that time the only beneficiaries of delay would have been fanatical communalists on both sides, with the consequence of an even greater number of killings.)

I thus conclude on this point that increased speed was warranted and caused not more but less suffering than would have resulted by a slower process. But there is a major qualification to be added: in the great rush of events, some matters were indubitably neglected and at some significant cost. There can of course be no guarantee that a slower process would have secured attention to them. It is to these neglected affairs that I now turn.

The first and most obvious of these is the matter of the Princely States. In some respects it must appear strange that the Princes were neglected as a problem area. After all they were, long before the Muslims were perceived as candidates for the role, the reliable, loyal collaborators of the Raj. For nearly a century they had been afforded protection in exchange for helpful behaviour in a relationship of tutelage, called paramountcy, which was veiled by routines of respect and embodied in treaties with the Crown, not the Government of India. This relationship was watched over by the Princes' friends in the Conservative Party and by specialists in States matters at the India Office. Its day-to-day management was the responsibility of the Political Department and the Political Service, operating not as part of the Government of British India but directly under the Viceroy in his capacity as Crown Representative.

There was accordingly little ground for wonder that the Princes in the period 1935–9 were to be no more than gently coaxed into playing their supportive, conservative role as an integral part of the envisaged federation of the 1935 Act—which role they coyly declined. There is rather more ground for wonder that in the negotiations of the 1940s the British focussed their attention so exclusively on the Congress–League struggle for the succession in British India that they seemed to imply that the problem of the Princes would somehow solve itself. The Cabinet Mission virtually said just that: paramountcy would simply 'lapse' because the treaty relations could not be transferred to any successor; the 'void', which they admitted would be created, would have to be filled either by a federal relationship or by 'particular political arrangements' with the successor government or governments. It is just possible to excuse this studied ambiguity by recalling that the Mission was at work before there was any talk of deadlines for independence; they were envisaging a substantial, indeed indefinite, period of constitution-making with the Viceroy still in ultimate control and therefore in a position to oversee the tying-up of the princely loose ends. It is, however, astonishing in retrospect to realise that neither in February 1947 nor even—and this is the most extraordinary thing—in the June announcement was anything further said. Even that is not all: as late as 11 July, when there were only four weeks to the final transfer, Mountbatten, a man not normally given to making confessions of shortcomings, privately made the startling admission: 'I have not been able to grip the States problem before.' This was surely a case of culpable negligence.

For what was the result? I find that what I perceived at the time, soon after my arrival in Delhi to take up my junior position on Mountbatten's staff, stands up undiminished in the light of the full official record. For in fact several of the important States began not merely to dream dreams of grandeur but actually to plot with their British friends a path towards their own independence—even with the bonus of separate Dominion-style links to the United Kingdom. It will suffice to mention a couple of the extreme, indeed scandalous, instances. Sir Walter Monckton, Mountbatten's self-styled 'dear friend', at that time Constitutional Adviser to the Nizam of Hyderabad, managed to involve Lord Templewood in a conspiracy

to persuade the Portuguese government to cooperate in supplying a rail link to the sea at Goa for the use of Hyderabad. Again, Monckton was able to involve none other than General Ismay, Mountbatten's second-in-command, in an attempt to 'plant' a question in the House of Commons through Butler that was designed to keep open the way towards direct relations between London and the Princes after the independence of British India. On the matter of princely plots even the Labour government was at least very timid: Secretary of State Lord Listowel advised Mountbatten in June that he should avoid giving any impression of 'pressing' the States. It would be an excuse, albeit inadequate, to say that the Labour leaders were terrified that the Tories, if not lulled into compliance, could through the House of Lords upset the speedy passage of the India Independence Bill; but even that will not explain Listowel telling Mountbatten, as late as early August, that the government had not yet reached any conclusion as to what it would do if those Princes who had seaports went for separate independence and placed orders for arms in the UK!

In the face of such incidents, who can blame Nehru for being driven to distraction by the States problem in those last two months, for being forced into overt, angry distrust of the operations of the Political Department? What was needed (and what I proposed in June) was a clear, early declaration that after independence the Princes would be able to relate to the UK only through, and in so far as they were integral parts of, the new Dominion governments.

Mercifully, Mountbatten did take the crucial decision to overrule Corfield of the Political Department and to allow Patel to set up the States Ministry to secure the Princes' accession to India. In that sense Mountbatten did, very late but before the end, at last 'grip the problem'. But the lateness incurred heavy costs, two in particular. First, the issue of Hyderabad was left unresolved at 15 August, an unnecessary and severe headache for the new Dominion, and one which it felt obliged to solve by force—for which it was then blamed by much world opinion, including that of those very circles in Britain which had perpetuated the problem. Secondly, Kashmir, which is with us still. This was preeminently a case for the same referendum treatment that the Frontier received. It would surely have been a carefully considered option—if only the States problem had been where it should have been in June, high on the Mountbatten agenda. Even the bewildered Maharajah had contemplated a referendum. Mountbatten himself thought of it—in October. That was too late, not only because of the preparations already under way among the tribesmen, but because by that time Mountbatten was no longer Viceroy. and so no longer in a position to see it through as an integral part of the partition operation. In respect of the Princely States problem, the subcontinent had a less than happy start.

Thus far then, the Mountbatten Viceroyalty scores two goals 'for', one 'against'. My fourth issue leads to another goal 'against'. I shall refer to it briefly because my direct knowledge of the matter in question was limited. However, Indian readers will not need to be told that, like the problem of Kashmir, it has far from vanished: it is the problem of the Sikhs in the Punjab. Admittedly it was a difficult one; here was a small but proud and highly self-conscious community equipped with its own socio-religious organizations, located at the Punjab meeting-place of the two major communities; its leadership was understandably divided in the crisis which partition presented; its character as a community was adequately understood by neither Jinnah nor the Congress leaders, it had no powerful friends at Mountbatten's court

or in London; above all, the Sikhs even in the Punjab constituted a majority in not one of the provinces' districts, so the case for a special further partition, a Sikhistan, was inherently weak. Nor can I claim personally on this matter that I have now in retrospect, any more than I had at the time, a confident alternative policy to propose.

However, difficult as this problem was, there could be no denying its importance; quite apart from its proved persistence over subsequent decades (which perhaps could not have been foreseen), it was absolutely central to the scale of the Punjab slaughter in 1947 (which was foreseen by many). Yet it was another of the problems that failed to obtain measured consideration at the highest level. Mountbatten himself did eventually come to appreciate that the community was set on a desperation course, but his own response was far from measured. Indeed on occasion he gave way to outbursts of petulant impatience, as when he envisaged aerial bombardment and machine-gunning as justified 'if we can blot out 10,000 fanatics in the first round'. It is difficult to believe that if the Sikhs had been placed higher on the agenda of problems, their desperation could not have been met by something better than answering desperation. Since it is very probable that the Sikhs could not have found a permanently secure place within Pakistan—though some explorations on those lines did take place—it follows that the main realistic future was within India. It is in that context that one is bound to ask whether Mountbatten, alerted earlier and in a measured mood, might not have been able to use in June and July his still immense standing and influence to secure from all leaders support and systematic aid for a safe exchange of populations and from Nehru a promise of special consideration at an early stage after independence for what came only two decades later: namely, a Sikh-majority state in the Indian Union. This might not have worked, but it would have been very much worth trying; it might just have defused the desperation that killed and continued to poison. Other historical referees may disagree but this, for me, is a second negative outcome from the Mountbatten Viceroyalty.

I turn now to the last of the three 'positive' goals: the Commonwealth question. Significantly, this matter was high on Mountbatten's list of priorities from the very start. One might even say before the start; for it was Mountbatten, in company with Ismay, who insisted before coming out to take up the Viceroyalty that Attlee should include in his letter of guidance to the new Viceroy a paragraph expressing the hope that India would after independence remain a member of the Commonwealth. Once Mountbatten 'gripped' a matter, he did not let it go. He was inclined in his own mind, as were the Chiefs of Staff in London, to see this as closely tied up with Britain's imperial defence needs. At the same time he appreciated the matter's political sensitivity and relished the challenge. He saw clearly, as Machiavelli would have said, that this was the time for the fox. He revelled in what he called 'the delicate manoeuvre' of steering Nehru and Patel towards membership by ensuring that they would hear, not from him but from others, how India would be the gainer, in particular how India would be unpleasantly disadvantaged if it should happen that India stayed outside while Pakistan was inside the Commonwealth.

It was not an easy game. Not only was there determination on the part of Congress that after the interim period of Dominion status India would become a Republic. (In mid-July of 1947 Mountbatten already put me on to the job of working towards a solution to that little difficulty; the final solution of course came with the 1949 formula.) There was also deep scepticism in certain British circles,

amounting in some cases to outright hostility to India's remaining in the Commonwealth. The argument was to the effect that while India could only gain, the move would not be in British interests: Britain would incur heavy obligations—in defence but also in other forms of support—while India, lacking 'fundamental kinship' with the other (at that time, white) members, would prove as troublesome as Ireland in dodging her reciprocal obligations. My own view is that both countries have gained and neither has lost in the continuing relationship. In the context of this article, however, the point is that Mountbatten scored a success and that he did so because this matter was one which he personally cherished, and therefore did not for a moment neglect.

Finally, I come to the last of the points on the negative side, which concerns the post-independence relations of India and Pakistan. I have already suggested how the Kashmir problem, subsequently the largest single cause of distrust and tension between the two countries, might have been resolved peacefully before partition if only there had been more British attention to the whole position of Princely States and fewer British ideological 'hang-ups' on that subject. But that is not the sole black mark in respect of the British role; there was a further culpable neglect which contributed heavily to a legacy of subcontinent dissension.

The reason I found myself briefly on Mountbatten's staff in 1947 was that Cripps had in the month of May felt a nagging anxiety on one matter of policy. He was by then able reluctantly to accept the unavoidability of partition. But he believed strongly—almost one could say that he had a vision—that Britain could, in the very process of partition itself, build bridges that would link the two new sovereign states and minimize conflict. He did not underrate the difficulties in the way of such a project; one had only to think of the established relations of bitterness between Congress and League. But as he spoke to me I came to feel that this was a challenge; not simply exciting but also morally very appealing. What was at stake, it seemed to me, was nothing less momentous than the salvaging of the harmony of the subcontinent from the rupture of partition.

Accordingly, as soon as I arrived in Delhi I began preparing memoranda and seeking opportunities to put forward my ideas as to how the damage caused by partition could be at least moderated. All this proved to be of no avail. Perhaps I was too junior a person for such a task; certainly mid-June was rather late to be starting the job. But essentially the difficulty I encountered was that everyone, as it seemed, except me, was wholly absorbed in attending to the partition agonies and battles. This was true of the Viceroy's staff, of Congress and League leaders. The only exception I could find was Mountbatten himself. He may have accepted Cripps's man reluctantly—the rest of his staff from London was hand-picked by him—but at least he was willing to try to look ahead from immediate problems to those of the future. There my hopes therefore rested, for I also knew that his influence was enormous. He was very aware of Congress–League distrust and he would have done nothing to imperil the smooth course of partition machinery, but at least he encouraged my thinking and showed some sympathy with my ideas. Unfortunately, there were two serious limitations to his vision and to his commitment to the building of bridges. The first of these was that the subject which most compelled his attention when he thought of the future of Indo-Pakistan relations was defence, and when he thought of the future defence of the subcontinent he saw a Joint Defence Council (with himself in the chair). In my view, as I tried to explain, to focus on defence was to start at the wrong end; it was absurd to stake

everything on what was bound to be the most difficult of all subjects for newly sovereign states. Instead of plunging into the most unpropitious field and the most highly sensitive subject, I urged that the focus should be on problems of economic development. In this area, Mountbatten should propose to both embryo governments that joint authorities should be set up, with equal representation from India and Pakistan on their governing councils and decisions made only by agreed consensus. But above all each authority would consist of a small bureau of permanent, technocratic officials appointed by each country. I envisaged that, equipped initially for modest tasks of research, for example in problems of agricultural productivity, such men would gradually build up a genuinely joint *esprit de corps* from their devotion to their subject and from working cooperatively together. I specifically mentioned also river valley development studies and shared undertakings as another promising area for progress towards 'bridges' between the new states.

The second limitation in Mountbatten's vision of the 'bridges' was that right through June he had one persistent notion in mind as regards 15 August: never indifferent to personal status, he saw that date as the moment when, having completed the triumph of bringing two states to independence, he would at once proceed to the second triumph of being 'crowned' as the common Governor-General of both. When Jinnah, after long consideration, told him in July that the first Governor-General of Pakistan would be Jinnah himself, the hope of a common formal head of state was blasted—and Mountbatten took it as a shattering blow to his own pride. As far as I can see from the records, that was the only moment in all the months of frustrating negotiations when the Viceroy lost his temper; on his own account he exploded in fury at Jinnah and stormed out of the room. Whatever little lingering hope there may have been for joint authorities was lost that day. Instead of using his influence to build initially modest institutions while he had the capacity to be somewhat insistent, he preferred to stake everything on his continuing to preside at the top. Through that weakness he ensured that his personal loss became the more serious loss of the subcontinent.

During the last few years regular meetings of officials of South Asian countries have been taking place and they have now reached the point of setting up joint working parties on a number of matters of common, practical interest. They are struggling now to build structures which could have been established over three decades ago, if only the last Viceroyalty had not failed in this respect.

My tale of the three successes and three failures is told. It is presented in the hope that it will challenge the supremacy of the two contrary versions of the Mountbatten Viceroyalty which have hitherto held the stage: one, that it was a disaster because it produced partition and a consequent avoidable blood-bath; two, that it was a perfect demonstration of political and administrative skill from start to finish. The truth, I suggest, is that its achievements were great but the performance was flawed in certain, sadly most important, respects.

Anglo–Malaysian relations: old roles versus new rules

ROGER KERSHAW*

The withdrawal of the 'buy British last' directive for Malaysian government departments on 2 April this year marked the conclusion of a painful and salutary eighteen-month episode in the traditionally untroubled relationship between Britain and a former protectorate. That Dr Mahathir felt able to go to his Cabinet on his return from London and persuade it that the essential objects of the boycott had been achieved, speaks not only of a degree of magnanimity in the Malaysian Premier's personal make-up, but also of the capacity of British government and business to examine their past performance and attitudes, and accept the need for change. Dr Mahathir has said that Britain must continue to demonstrate that the changes of attitude are genuine and permanent, but there seems little likelihood of British complacency after this trauma. The present paper is offered as a modest contribution to the process of analysis which is clearly already well established in relevant circles.

Mahathir Mohamed, MD, was called to the Premiership of Malaysia on 16 July 1981. He has the unusual distinction of being an intellectual whose greatest impact on the socio-political structure of his country can be said (at least at the time of writing) to have occurred ten years before his accession to supreme power. Indeed, Malaysia's semi-revolutionary scheme of socio-economic restructuring (the New Economic Policy) was designed and set on foot under emergency rule between May 1969 and January 1971, while Dr Mahathir himself was expelled from the United Malays National Organization (UMNO). But parliamentary rule was subsequently re-established, and it was as the leader of a highly institutionalized political party in a highly institutionalized constitutional monarchy that Dr Mahathir took office as Malaysia's fourth Prime Minister. If the policies for which he fought in his 'radical youth' had long been adopted—and succession to the Premiership fell to Dr Mahathir in distinctly institutionalized fashion after fully five years as Deputy Prime Minister—would it not be a natural expectation, in Asia as in the West, that this former 'ultra' would now emerge as a model of moderation and statemanship? Stereotypes of the careers of political radicals aside, Dr Mahathir is a man of profoundly humane feelings, combined with humour and a self-critical rationality. His public speeches communicate all this—perhaps to an extent even more endearing to non-Malays than to his own race. Besides, it would essentially miss the point of the thoughts of Dr Mahathir, so influential in 1970, to characterize them as 'extremist'. The explicit rationale of his first book was to seek to bring about genuine harmony by exposing the official pretence of harmony as a sham in the light of chronic socio-economic imbalance between the races of Malaysia.[1]

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1. Mahathir Mohamed, *The Malay dilemma* (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1970), p. 5. The book is

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However, two points about *The Malay dilemma* are especially germane to the way Dr Mahathir defines his responsibility as Premier. The first is that socio-economic restructuring in the name of racial harmony is not seen as an instant solution to a problem having deep historical and sociological roots. The second point relates to these same historical roots: the presence of Chinese and Indian Malaysians amounting to nearly 50 per cent of the West Malaysian population, and their economic superiority, are the legacy of colonialism—British colonialism. Thus there was a basis in Dr Mahathir's early thinking for a long-term commitment to the policies already ten years old when he became Prime Minister, if not a more rigorous and rationalistic implementation thereof; as well as a degree of sensitivity about the contemporary British role in Malaysia if it appeared to obstruct the objectives of the New Economic Policy or in any other manner served to alert Malay nationalism to 'uncompleted tasks'. To phrase the matter in precisely this way does, admittedly, reflect an element of hindsight, after the experience of the recent crisis. But no foresight was necessary to see that the only ethnic group towards which *The Malay dilemma* was unmistakably hostile was the British.

Mahathir's dilemmas

Apart from its caustic critique of half-hearted or self-serving measures to 'protect the Malays', the book is outspoken about inequalities of status and power within colonial and post-colonial Malay society itself. Mahathir refers not only to the new political elite, the chief, and often selfish beneficiaries of Independence,[2] but also to the hereditary rulers (the Sultans of the Malay states). In relation to the latter—the indispensable symbolic guardians of the special position of the Malays so long as Malay economic backwardness persists—Mahathir's attitude is not without some implied reservations.[3] He is careful in his choice of words, but it is one of the most fascinating paradoxes of Malay politics that the Sultanates on the one hand constitute an arguable obstacle to the new thinking that Malay society seems to need, and yet cannot be dispensed with as custodians of the Malay interest until new thinking has taken root and had its effect. This is an agonizing contradiction, which Dr Mahathir has occasion to feel more acutely as Prime Minister than when he was still a middle-rank politician excluded from the charmed circle. There is also a potential subjective contradiction in being the leader of a political party on whose inspired leadership above all the 'redemption' of the Malays depends, yet the longevity of which as a ruling party has turned it into a magnet for and vehicle of all manner of opportunists and careerists—no less so in the 1980s than in the 1960s. It might be merely banal to suggest that the sensitive nature of all these contradictions

based partly on discussion papers circulated among Malay political activists prior to, or shortly after, the 13 May 1969 riots. It has excited comment as much for its pseudo-scientific speculation on Malay heredity as anything else. But a careful and sympathetic reading reveals that what Dr Mahathir is mainly arguing is that negative traits which appear 'hereditary' in a group may be the product of cumulative environmental conditioning over a few centuries; as such, they would be susceptible to replacement through social engineering and reform of values. (Articulated, or rationalized, in this form, Mahathir's ideas seem to have something in common with some recent formulations of H. J. Eysenck.) The 'dilemma' of the Malays, as argued by Mahathir, is partly that special privileges may foster lethargy and decline as much as they protect the race (p. 31); partly that economic dynamism, while 'saving' the Malays, may destroy the basis of their identity (p. 61). However, it is confusing that the word 'dilemma' is more often used as a synonym for 'chronic crisis' or 'poverty trap'. (The book was banned from sale in Malaysia until Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister, but is now widely available as a paperback.)

2. Mahathir, *Dilemma*, p. 31.

3. Mahathir, *Dilemma*, pp. 170–1.

necessarily or unconsciously propels a conscientious leader to seek alternative, more vulnerable scapegoats for 'Malay backwardness'. Besides, Dr Mahathir is extraordinarily outspoken in criticizing his own party today.[4] Also, he is probably quite uninterested in attacking anyone unless it has some didactic effect for the Malays and changes their values in a constructive direction. But if in any sense the old symbiosis between British power and Malay royalty were found to have a modern counterpart—say in the commercial field between British company directors and Malay administrators from a high social class—the contemporary British role could attract some critical attention by mental association. Talking about an ill-fated British scheme to help the Malays, the Rural and Industrial Development Authority of the early 1950s, Dr Mahathir wrote in 1970:

> But by and large RIDA did not fulfil the promise that the British made. Having allotted the money and chosen the Malays to administer this economic panacea, the British backed out completely. Now they were free once again to swill their whiskies in their clubs and give more contracts to British firms. If the Malays showed little improvement with RIDA, well it was their fault. In any case, what the British wanted through RIDA was not Malay economic rehabilitation, but something else entirely. And this the British got when the Malays agreed to cooperate with the Chinese and facilitate the prosecution of the Emergency.[5]

This is strong stuff. Still, we are now twenty-six years on from Malayan independence; and thirteen years on from the publication of *The Malay dilemma*. To cite a set of observations on colonial rule which Dr Mahathir set down during his political climb or political exile as the whole key to his present outlook and sensitivities, may seem somewhat contrived and incomplete, even if there are continuities in the Anglo-Malaysian relationship since (and in spite of) independence. There is, in fact, another source, which bridges the gap between 1970 and 1981, but which, being in Malay, appears to have escaped the attention of the British press.[6] Visually the most striking aspect of *Menghadapi Cabaran* is that four out of its fourteen chapters, being devoted to religious themes, are replete with Koranic quotations in Arabic. *The Malay dilemma*, six years previously, was cast wholly and unapologetically in the mould of the prevailing, secular Malay nationalism. The newer book opens with a preface by a Malay Muslim luminary who associates Dr Mahathir with a number of eminent Indonesian Muslim modernists in his mission to persuade Malays that secular education and science are compatible with Islam. In chapter 2 Mahathir deals at length with Malay anxieties about secular education, blaming them on the historic conditions in which education came to Malaya, including the

4. See, for example, Mahathir Mohamed, *Negara yang Bermaruah (A self-respecting nation)*, Presidential Address to the 33rd General Assembly of UMNO, 10 September 1982 (Kuala Lumpur: Ibu Pejabat UMNO, 1982), pp. 18–26.

5. Mahathir, *Dilemma*, p. 41.

6. Mahathir Mohamed, *Menghadapi Cabaran (Facing the challenge*: Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1976). More explicitly than *The Malay dilemma*, and without any attempt at continuity, this book brings together a number of essays and talks, dating in this case from the early-to-middle 1970s. Mahathir's foreword is dated June 1976. He had been appointed Deputy Prime Minister on 5 March 1976 by Datuk Hussein Onn, Tun Razak's successor (and former Deputy). In appointing Mahathir as his Deputy (and almost certain successor) Hussein Onn was conscious of the originality and profound repercussions of his choice. Some of the contents of *Cabaran* are much more radical than those of *Dilemma* but the rationale of the new book (see p. xiv), as for the old, is that imbalance in development is a formula for strife and thus against the interests of all races.

separation of religious from secular education fostered by the British. The context to which the religious chapters seems to be responding is the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in Malaysia, in particular those currents of the revival which reject not only materialism but all material development as the work of the devil.

It is no doubt ironic that development should come under attack from among the beneficiaries of a restructured higher education system—the would-be shock troops of Malay development under the New Economic Policy (NEP). But this was no throwback to the values of traditional village society. The new ideology owed much to the political sponsorship and moral inspiration of the Arab world, Iran, and Muslim parts of the Indian subcontinent. This being so, anti-developmental ideas could not, in practical politics, be refuted except with Islamic arguments; but if the values of material development are to be found compatible with Islam, it must strengthen the argument if they can also be shown to be important in the defence of Islam against non-Islamic imperialism and other influences, as in the following paragraph:

> The importance of education in preparing people for key roles in an Islamic society is quite clear. For instance, if an Islamic society were under threat or attack from anti-Muslims, that society would certainly be at fault if the people who should be defending it were not prepared, and not given appropriate training. It would be likewise if, as a result of deliberately not providing training for medical personnel, an Islamic society were attacked and weakened by various diseases: that society would indeed have committed a wrong in not fulfilling this obligation.[7]

It is perhaps even more gratifying to discover that the religion of the Islamic community or *umat* (whose integrity is now increasingly a synonym for the survival of the Malays) offers a basis of sure defence against the evil of material development for its own sake, and that Islam is superior, precisely in this respect, to Christianity:

> Whether our spirituality can survive or not depends on the state of consciousness among Muslims today. What has happened to the Christians was due to the fact that they did not face the era of materialism with consciousness and open eyes. They were exposed to the sudden onslaught of secular values, which are more easily understood and accepted. With the division between church and state, the capacity of Christianity to defend its position against the menace of secularism declined and so it was easy for the materialist values of philosophers and political scientists to take the place of any elements of spirituality in Christian religion.[8]

7. Mahathir, *Cabaran*, p. 19 (trans. R. Kershaw). This theme was developed with greater force in a discussion meeting between Dr Mahathir and Malay students in London in 1980: 'The Islamic community, he said, must have competence in various types of knowledge, besides possessing the wealth to make the weapons which can be used to defend the Islamic community itself. All this requires money.' See Dato' Haji Mohamed Nasir, *Dailog YAB Timbalan Perdana Menteri Dato' Seri Dr Mahathir Mohamed dengan Penuntut-penuntut di London* (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1980), pp. 11–12 (trans. R. Kershaw). The date of this discussion may have been 16 February 1980 (see *Straits Times*, Singapore, 18 February 1980, on the same or a similar discussion, covering a much larger range of topics than appears in Mohamed Nasir's pamphlet; on this occasion Dr Mahathir reportedly rejected a student demand for economic sanctions against the British government for its university fees policy).

8. Mahathir, *Cabaran*, p. 59 (trans. R. Kershaw).

One will search the writings of Dr Mahathir at length and probably in vain for any reference to *jihad*—holy war, carried into the infidel camp—and an essay entitled 'The West and the East' lacks any reference to Islam at all.[9] However, it does assimilate the struggle of Malay nationalism, in a quasi-transcendental fashion, to a purported struggle of the 'oppressed East' for emancipation from the 'imperialist West'. This perspective on world history is certainly compatible with a notion of Islamic superiority (even if its immediate intellectual forerunners are early twentieth-century Asian nationalism and late twentieth-century neo-Marxism) and the full extent of this compatibility in Dr Mahathir's thinking becomes clear from the passages in which he attributes the outbreak of long hair in the West to a decline of social discipline (at first he treats Western decadence as a reflection of, or adjustment to, the loss of empire, but as the argument progresses, it becomes a *cause* of Western political decline).

However, the author encounters a logical difficulty over the fact that despite the West's loss of conventional political power in the East, and its moral decline, Malaysia still lags behind the West's level of development. The key to this puzzle is then sought in two areas: the copying of decadent Western values alongside the higher values of discipline, etc., which first enabled 'the East' to grasp its independence; and 'the West's' resort to sundry forms of deviousness in order to claw back, or cling on to, some of the power to which through decadence it had forfeited its moral claim. The list of 'dirty tricks' is instructive in relation to the recent Anglo–Malaysian tensions: the formation of the EEC in order to dominate world markets; the more efficient use of machines, to maintain an 'inflated standard of living'; attempts to export trade unionism in order to destroy the East's advantage in labour costs; control of world media in order to cultivate an inferiority complex among Asians and make them judge themselves by Western standards; and the use of bodies such as Amnesty International to discredit non-democratic regimes in the eyes of their peoples (disregarding the fact that democracy is non-indigenous to the East and incompatible with Eastern conditions). The solution to the East's predicament as thus analysed— the Doctor's necessary and sufficient prescription to fight the malignancy—is consciousness and mental independence. For the West it remains to accept its own decline as an ineluctable destiny; the determined pursuit of national self-interest in present conditions is not justified by political decline (as Western governments might calculate) but merely confirms the West's moral bankruptcy.

Dr Mahathir's reflections on East–West relations may or may not have been drafted during his period as Minister of Education, September 1974–January 1978, but his tenure of that position was particularly poignant in terms of his relations with radical Malay youth. In 1970 he was their idol, their prophet; in 1975 he imposed rigorous political control on the universities, following student riots in late 1974 over peasant poverty. Yet he would have preferred the continued support of the educated youth. In a sense it was indispensable to the success of the NEP that all the beneficiaries of higher education should accept the government's perspectives and goals. One way in which that support could be secured was to cultivate an 'intellectual' style of national leadership and address, in a philosophical idiom merging with the sociological, as befits an era of national development. This comes naturally to Dr Mahathir, but the particular message, or messages, that emerge

9. Mahathir, *Cabaran*, pp. 27–37.

from *Menghadapi Cabaran* reflect a sensitivity to the modes of thought already agitating the youthful Malay intelligentsia and drawing them away from the mainstream of Malay nationalist ideology. He tries to pre-empt these new modes, as a prop for established power. He also tries to divert the young from the more destructive forms of new thinking (such as the extremes of Islamic spirituality and Western materialist decadence) by emphasizing the elements of a political and spiritual mean. But the result is necessarily a kind of 'compromise package' in which anti-Western themes still predominate because they not only satisfy a diffuse Islamic sentiment but provide a basis for the sense of vulnerability, the urgency, and the competitiveness which the Malays' development—and increasingly, by projection, Malaysia's development—seem to require. True Islam, as understood by Dr Mahathir, will thus actually motivate the Malays to achieve modern goals (ironically, the goals laid down but not yet achieved by Malay secular nationalism), while at the same time protecting them from the destructive moral side-effects of modernization. The last chapter of *Menghadapi Cabaran* bears the title 'Whither Malaysia?' and betrays, in more secular vein, the author's anxiety lest the younger generation become complacent about independence, having never known the pain of living under foreign rule; or lest (alternatively) they make unrealistic demands, having failed to understand the extent of the problems bequeathed to the independent government by the retreating colonial rulers eighteen years before.[10]

The British economic stake

It is suggested, then, that an important stimulus to Dr Mahathir's 'Third World consciousness' may have been the changing intellectual orientations and conflicting currents among educated Malay youth. It seems natural that in certain contexts, such as Independence Day celebrations, the former colonial rulers of Malaysia should be seen as the tangible personification of 'the West'; and of course there is no contradiction between the new-style (anti-Western) Malay nationalism and the old-style (anti-British) Malay nationalism. But after he was appointed Minister of Trade and Industry in January 1978, Dr Mahathir was exposed to the new stimuli of international trading relations and the 'North–South debate'. It still does not seem inevitable that he should have been led back towards the specifically anti-British posture of his earlier political career unless specifically British actions confirmed current prejudice about 'the West'. On the other hand, trade and industry being the 'front line' of the NEP, the elements of continuity in the British stake in Malaysia since independence potentially placed a high premium (for the British) on sensitivity to the nuances of Malay nationalism and Malaysian economic nationalism as the old-style, Anglophile Malay leaders finally made their exit.[11]

10. Mahathir, *Cabaran*, pp. 139–43. Dr Mahathir's sponsorship of the entry of the fundamentalist, but strictly 'modernist', Islamic youth leader Anwar Ibrahim into the highest echelons of UMNO politics during 1982 should be understood similarly as a two-pronged strategy simultaneously to motivate and restrain Malay youth. The bitter memory of British colonialism and the contrast with Malaysia's achievements since independence were repeatedly invoked, for the whole Malaysian public, in a series of television spots, comprising interviews with middle-aged Malaysians, in the weeks preceding the twenty-fifth anniversary of independence in August 1982. The negative aspects of the contemporary Western model were emphasized in Dr Mahathir's radio and television address to the nation on 30 August 1982, the eve of Independence Day. See full text in *Watan*, 3 September 1982.

11. It may be relevant, too, that Mahathir's lightning rise as the protégé of Tun Razak and Hussein Onn had stored up much resentment against him among the UMNO 'Old Guard'. Problems of party management at the point of takeover virtually demanded some demonstration of nationalist worth. For the British, there had been no lack of warning signals: see, for example, Mahathir's attack on the British press for taunts about 'back-door nationalization', at a business seminar organized by the City of London in Kuala Lumpur (*Straits Times*, Singapore, 6 February 1979).

It scarcely requires mention—but this obvious point is the 'structural' crux of the recent difficulties—that the British have enjoyed complete sanctity of their vast investments in Malaysia since power was handed over to a conservative multiracial elite partly fostered as their political heirs by the British themselves. In the early years after independence in 1957 Britain made a significant contribution to Malaya's security by helping in the last stages of the campaign to crush the communist rebellion (1948–60). A new, active commitment arose as a result of the merger of the Federation of Malaya with Sarawak and Sabah (and Singapore) in 1963, and until Indonesia abandoned Confrontation in 1966. But to all practical purposes Britain's military involvement was at an end by 1970, as Britain abandoned most of its 'east of Suez' role, Malaysia receiving a quantity of development aid as a compensatory *douceur*. At the same time, the sanctity of foreign investments, old and new, was upheld. Of course, Malaysia would not have attracted much private capital for its 'development decade' of the 1970s if this had not been so. However, even at the point at which future investors had to be given optimum reassurance, existing foreign productive assets were coming up for consideration as the only feasible source for the creation of a '30 per cent Malay stake' in the economy by 1990, as promised by the NEP. In 1971, ownership of share capital in limited companies by Malays or Malay interests was only 1·5 per cent; given the political impossibility of dispossessing the Chinese and Indians (whose ownership anyway only amounted to 22·8 per cent) recourse to massive transfers from the foreign sector (62·1 per cent) was inevitable. Considering that the non-Malays were allocated a 40 per cent stake, even in the conditions of Malaysia's dynamic growth rates it seems quite improbable that the Malays' 30 per cent target could be met while allowing the absolute level of foreign capital to remain static. On top of these considerations, it takes no extremes of nationalism for nations to wish to control their own vital resources and key areas of decision-making affecting national economic strategy.

Nevertheless, the legal sanctity of investment has been maintained throughout. The buoyant oil revenues of the 1970s brought the foreign assets within the financial means of the Malaysian state. The huge process of repatriation of control which marked the five or six years up to 1981 was therefore achieved entirely through stock-market purchase by government-funded agencies or government-controlled conglomerates, or through the expansion and restructuring of corporate equity through negotiation: truly a crowning glory of Malaysian political economy. Dr Mahathir and his colleagues in Bank Negara and the Finance Ministry were riled by British press comment about 'back-door nationalization'. There is no 'threat' in any conventional sense to foreign investment, and even 'takeover' means only that the Malaysian government becomes the majority shareholder, not sole owner. But it cannot be denied that the Malaysian government has taken on a massive role in the Malaysian economy, seemingly at odds with its formal free enterprise commitments. Dr Mahathir himself is on record as an opponent of the nationalization of foreign assets. The original justification for what has been undertaken was simply that Malay private enterprise is not capable of fulfilling the 30 per cent target by 1990: the government thus acts 'in trust' for the Malays. But to dwell on the embryonic nature of the true Malay private sector strikes at another point of Malay sensitivity, at the very heart, in fact, of the problem which the Malaysian government is trying

to solve. Government intervention is a policy of the lesser evil, and should be appreciated, indeed praised, as such.[12]

Meanwhile, at the start of the great saga of repatriation, British firms accounted (for historical reasons) for the largest foreign holding of share capital. Thus their contribution to the transfer of ownership would have to be the biggest of all foreign contributions in absolute terms, and any lack of flexibility would create a negative impression of 'British policy' simply because this section was so large.[13] At the core, or foundation, of the British holdings lay the great rubber estates of Guthrie Corporation, Harrisons and Crosfield, Dunlop, etc. The Malaysian takeover of Sime Darby, the trading-house, a few years back, aroused a defensively patriotic spirit in the old Board of Directors and in the British press. In the year before the celebrated 'dawn raid' on Guthrie's shares (7 September 1981) the Guthrie directors had fought stubbornly to avert takeover, and again the British press wrote up the affair like a heroic, last-ditch struggle for the honour of the Empire. British financial reporting delights in the gladiatorial aspects of its chosen field no less than other sections of journalism. It is harmlessly entertaining for British readers, but irritating for Malaysian officials, for the repatriation of foreign assets really can be a matter of life and death when the success of a semi-revolutionary economic strategy is at stake. (Moreover, the bitter resistance of some old British companies in face of their approaching 'demise' was not an invention of the press.)[14] More recent investors, such as the Japanese, only gain investment licences on condition of full collaboration with the NEP in the first place. In the matter of the structure of ownership they can only come in under joint venture arrangements. This might create a more positive impression of their 'attitudes', even though the conditions are imposed by the government, and might cast long-established British enterprise in an unfavourable light.

12. One obvious advantage for Malaysia in not nationalizing in the conventional sense is that foreign capital—and a good deal of expertise—remain in Malaysia but under Malaysian control, precisely as under the joint venture arrangements for new investment. An important post-1971 piece of redefinition of NEP objectives stipulates a maximum residual level of foreign corporate ownership by 1990 of 30 per cent. Surprisingly, Dr Mahathir maintained in a mid-1982 interview (quoted in *Bulletin of the Malaysia–Singapore Commercial Association*, August 1982, p. 7) that there need be no absolute shrinkage of the foreign sector. In the *Second Malaysia Plan* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1971), p. 91, all the emphasis was on attracting foreign investment; repatriation was not mentioned at all, let alone a percentage target. 30 per cent was first stipulated in *Mid-Term Review* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1973), p. 85.

13. Breakdowns of foreign ownership by nationality are not, unfortunately, published in the usual Malaysian public sources. Undoubtedly the percentage British stake had declined since the Second World War, as non-British investment rose and unprofitable estates were sold off, but the size of individual companies alone must have created the impression that little had changed. An unofficial CBI estimate put the British stake as high as 65 per cent of all foreign capital in 1970: Junid Saham, *British industrial investment in Malaysia 1963–1971* (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 14. British investments in Malaysia have been estimated to represent 75 per cent of British investments in South-east Asia and to yield an annual return of £200m. (*Financial Times*, 27 May 1981). On ambivalent official attitudes to the foreign sector, especially old British companies, see Hugh Peyman, 'These bogies with an important role to play', *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 22 August 1980.

14. For example, note Dunlop's strategy of partnership with one set of Malaysian interests to fend off a 'larger fish', with tacit sympathy from the British government (*The Times*, 2 September 1980); or Guthrie's diversification outside the Far East (*Standard*, 7 September 1981; *Financial Times*, 8 September 1981) and appeals to shareholder loyalty (see Chairman's statement, *The Times*, 5 June 1981—though one City source told the author that Guthrie's pugnacity was directed against the original predator, Sime, an ancient rival, not Permodalan). The sale of subsidiaries to Malaysian but non-*bumiputra* interests by both Dunlop and Guthrie has been identified by Dr Mahathir as a major affront to NEP principles: see interview, *Far East Economic Review*, 30 October 1981.

Apart from any nostalgic reluctance to surrender majority control into Malaysian hands, the old British companies may have had a built-in disadvantage regarding another stipulation of the New Economic Policy: the balanced ethnic composition of their work-forces and, above all, management structure. Responsible British managers may have been reluctant to fire loyal workers or frustrate the legitimate hopes of competent management cadre in order to 'correct racial imbalance' in their firms. Others plead that the competition of the public sector for qualified *bumiputras* simply makes it impossible to conform to NEP requirements. Be this as it may, an official Malaysian source has maintained that the established British firms showed a reluctance to train Malay cadre, and had tended to 'honour' the New Economic Policy largely by appointing retired civil servants of good birth to places on their boards. Their conscious function was to ensure that the firm enjoyed optimum access to government. Perhaps this category was partly responsible for the preferential treatment which British firms reputedly enjoyed in tendering goods and services to government departments up until October 1981. Presumably, too, conservative Malays holding such directorships may have tended to confirm the ethnic and political prejudices of their British colleagues who appointed them, about the 'unnatural' social engineering and creeping nationalization of the NEP, which, prejudice apart, must cause a loss of efficiency in the early stages. If such a symbiotic relationship between Malay and English gentlemen did still exist, one cannot but recall the caustic observation of Dr Mahathir in *The Malay dilemma* about contracts made over whiskies at the club.[15]

Sadly, even if it could be shown that this stereotype of British business was far from the objective reality, it was a stereotype that enjoyed credibility at the highest level of Malaysian government and had come to colour the interpretation of many British actions undertaken in good faith. To a mind of the philosophical cast of Dr Mahathir's, alert to stages of history, the slightest remnants of a colonial relationship on Malaysian soil taunted the new era with its incompleteness. Besides, the heaviest burden bequeathed by the British to the Malays—the huge and dominant Chinese presence—could never ever be cast off; but maximum sympathetic assistance was expected from the British in coming to terms with the long-term consequences of British rule, though the NEP.

Decline of a patron

'Colonial remnants' might have been more tolerable if the British—that is, the British government as opposed to British business—were still fulfilling the obligations of an international patron. But it has been a constant theme of Dr Mahathir's criticism of Britain that it abandoned its obligations as leader of the Commonwealth by taking refuge in a protectionist EEC.[16] As for aid, British direct aid to Malaysia

15. Mahathir, *Dilemma*, p. 41; see also pp. 48–49 on British commercial access to Malayan colonial government generally. The lingering prestige of old British companies is suggested by a fascinating dispatch from Bernama, the Malaysian official news agency, 28 December 1981, about old-established British firms being asked to arbitrate in disputes between Malaysian companies.

16. For example, Dr Mahathir was absent from the Commonwealth Conference at Melbourne in September 1981. On the limitations of EEC concessions to ASEAN, even under the 'historic pact' of March 1980, see *Le Monde*, 22 March 1980; *Straits Times*, Singapore, 29 November 1980. Other issues that have soured Dr Mahathir's view include the initially indifferent attitude of the Thatcher government to the boat-people crisis, 1979, and an alleged failure by Britain to request permission for Concorde to use Malaysian airspace.

may look generous, on one presentation of the statistics,[17] but the gross expenditure of £10,547,000 in 1980 included £8,068,000 in loans, while the net transfer after amortization and receipt of interest payments was only £5,363,000. In fact, Malaysia now looks to international institutions for the bulk of its development-related borrowing from non-market sources. But direct aid in merely 'symbolic' quantities may as easily symbolize British indifference as concern, in Malaysian eyes. Nor is it certain that Malaysia would automatically attract more support under the present British administration's aid strategy which plays down the palliation of inequality in the poorest countries, in favour of 'aid for trade' (likely to seek newly industrializing states).[18] Where British aid serves foreign-policy as well as commercial objectives, it is easy to see that politically stable, firmly pro-Western Malaysia may seem less eligible than some politically uncertain, but potentially winnable, states of, say, Latin America. It is possible for such distribution patterns to suggest to a disfavoured claimant that that country no longer enjoys a 'significant' rating in Britain's calculation of its national interest. On the contrary, a country like Malaysia may be highly significant in that respect, and the relative modesty of British support may reflect a positive and complimentary judgement on its achievements and reliability. But suspicions of British complacency verging on indifference, if not hypocrisy, are easily aroused. If trade is the professed object behind British aid, yet Malaysia were to be excluded from increased benefits because its healthy trade had already made it stable, let Britain at least not acquiesce in the protectionist measures of the EEC![19] To some more suspecting Malay intellectuals it may sometimes have appeared that Britain could not afford to see Malaysia become rich and strong!

Certainly our relationship has been dogged by some fundamental divergence of mutual perception. Viewed from Whitehall, Malaysia is a rising economic force and regional power, already standing on its own feet, while Britain is a power in deep recession and relative decline, seeking to adjust its international role to its reduced circumstances. As generally viewed from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia is a former colonial territory still beset with towering problems of national integration and economic construction, while Britain is a powerful industrialized country enjoying high standards of living and still packing military and diplomatic muscle. It does not help matters—on the contrary it complicates them in high degree—that Dr Mahathir himself simultaneously asserts that 'the East' is in the ascendant, 'the West' in irrevocable decline. Various British actions (or lack of them) may now be condemned from two totally contradictory moral standpoints: both as 'insufficiently helpful to younger brother in need' (powerful Britain neglects its obligations) and as 'insufficiently cognizant of Malaysia's new status' (powerless Britain ignores new realities).[20]

17. In 1980 Britain's gross bilateral aid to Malaysia, *per capita*, was at the rate of £0·79, to India only £0·13, although India received total sums of £86,080,000. See ODA, *British Aid Statistics 1976–1980*, 1981 edn (London: HMSO, 1982), section 15.

18. On the issue whether the pursuit of equality and British self-interest are mutually exclusive, see 'The future direction of British overseas aid', *Asian Affairs*, October 1977, Vol. 64, No. 3, pp. 295–8. (Note: 'equality' is subject to a misprint in line 10, middle para., p. 296.)

19. See 'Cut out the cant' (Editorial), *Observer*, 22 November 1981. Bilateral Anglo-Malaysian trade has been showing an imbalance in Britain's favour of £224m/£187m (*Financial Times*, 27 May 1981). This has been cited by Malaysia as a matter for correction.

20. Like Britain, Malaysia sometimes strikes a diplomatic pose slightly larger than 'real life' in pursuing regional objectives which it cannot realize with its present objective means, or which do not meet with concurrence from ASEAN, the very organization which has given Malaysia a foot up on to the world

On Britain's behalf it could be argued that the apparent casualness common to both these postures would more justly be characterized as businesslike pragmatism—the attitude which ideally typifies Britain's relations with all states, and a healthy sign of Britain's complete emancipation from the colonial relationship with Malaysia. It might be argued that it is the Malaysians who are still in the throes of a mental emancipation process, unable to come to terms with the changing world as quickly as the British have done. (Yet in the British cultural book super-sensitivity to another man's complexes implies pity, not respect.) At all events, the withdrawal of the British subsidy from Commonwealth students in British universities was felt as the most painful and intolerable of all Britain's 'pragmatic actions' because British higher education has played an important part, albeit unconsciously, in the socio-economic restructuring process of Malaysia, both as a means to restructuring and as as safety-valve for some of the tensions arising from restructuring.

In the first place, the Malaysian government has looked to Britain to provide some substantial part of the scientific and other training which will produce a Malay scientific and managerial elite in the course of a generation. The government has been reluctant to advertise the extent of its dependence on Britain—including dependence on British sixth-form colleges, technical colleges and private boarding schools to prepare young rural Malays for university entrance via 'A' Levels—because it runs emotionally counter to the abolition of English as a language of instruction at all levels of education in Malaysia itself, and seems incompatible with Islamic sentiment, besides highlighting the inadequacies of Malaysia's own training facilities in relation to government objectives. In the second place, entry to sixth-form and higher education in Malaysia has been restructured to favour Malay students out of proportion to the percentage of Malays in the West Malaysian population. For this reason alone many middle-class Chinese and Indians are bound to look abroad for higher education opportunities for their children, even had the conversion to Malay in Malaysian higher education not simultaneously reduced the future international mobility and access to further learning abroad of all local graduates. For their part, the Malays in Malaysian government may have seen reason to welcome the existence of alternative higher education facilities abroad which help to alleviate non-Malay anxiety and alienation. Resentment at the increase in British fees was felt among the middle class of all three races and the government used it as a unifying issue—notwithstanding strong Malay ambivalence about non-Malays 'side-stepping' national education policy by obtaining not only higher education, but higher education in English, in the United Kingdom.[21]

stage. Whereas membership of ASEAN has enhanced Malaysia's subjective importance with slight objective justification, Britain's membership of the EEC is seen quite often, from South-east Asia, as a symptom of British decline (although some objective indicators still identify Britain as a 'powerful industrialized state', from which Malaysia expects assistance). Perhaps the essence of the problem of mutual misperception is that both states are in transition but have not yet passed each other on their 'way up' and 'way down' respectively. The resulting ambiguities seem to typify the broader North-South confrontation. In Anglo-Malaysian relations the ambiguities are most acute over investment (see note 33, below: Malaysia proudly repatriates British ownership while pleading for new investment), and over the withdrawal of Britain's subsidy to overseas students (Malaysia can simultaneously resent its dependence on British higher education and demand it as a right of a former colonial territory—see following para.), but also over the infrequency of ministerial visits to Malaysia, or lack of ministerial attentiveness to Malaysian visitors to London, even when they come on vacation, but pay a courtesy call (resentment at a failure of *noblesse oblige* may be rationalized as anger at not being treated as international equals).

21. Implicit in this ambivalence is the possibility that the abolition of the subsidy need not be wholly

The Anglo-Malaysian crisis

On to this sensitive and tangled scene was superimposed, in March 1981, a new British High Commissioner to Malaysia, William Bentley. At his first press conference he was quizzed intensively about Britain's fees policy. In consolation he reportedly pointed out that Britain was setting up a modest scholarship fund to alleviate hardship among Malaysian students; that British degrees offered better value for money than, say, North American degrees; and that Britain had spent large sums of money and 'not only money but lives and blood on Malaysia in ensuring that this country enjoys its independence in peace and stability and is on a firm foundation.'[22] What Mr Bentley appeared to be doing was affirming a special link between the two countries on the grounds of historical actions of the colonial power, at a moment when the withdrawal of the educational subsidy had made vivid the emptiness (or one-sidedness, Malaysians might say) of that relationship. Local historians were not slow to criticize Mr Bentley's altruistic version of British colonial history.[23] Three weeks later, at a seminar of the Public Affairs Centre, Europe, Deputy Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamed launched a searing attack on Britain for its 'outlandish views of Malaysia' in general and the 'negative' posture of its businessmen in particular. There was an almost explicit invitation to other European states to fill the gap left by an unsympathetic ex-colonial power.[24]

One month and a day after this speech Dr Mahathir became Prime Minister. There seems little reason to doubt that Anglo–Malaysian relations were already high on his list for revisionist action and that the alteration in the takeover rules of the London Stock Exchange after the successful 'dawn raid' on Guthrie by Permodalan Nasional Berhad was not even a 'last straw', merely a pretext. But the

unwelcome—and obviously the British government needs no convincing that Malaysia has no claim on British resources to mitigate the effects of Malaysian education policy! But what is often felt as an affront to Malaysia is the way in which policies are made apparently without any account being taken of Malaysia's existence. In the case of university fees, Malaysia had by far the largest student contingent, at 15,470 (*The Times*, 16 October 1981). If, on the contrary, account *was* taken (and assuming that the British government was not actually aiming at the time to destroy any British university), then the measure was bound to be understood as the presentation of a bill for future services to a country whose circumstances seemed to guarantee inelastic demand. It was also painful to Malaysia that the subsidy was maintained for EEC students.

22. *New Straits Times*, Malaysia, 27 May 1981.

23. *New Straits Times*, Malaysia, 28 May 1981.

24. *The Star*, Malaysia, 16 June 1981. One Malay journalist, by no means unsympathetic towards Britain, has suggested that the High Commissioner's period of service in Kuala Lumpur in the late 1960s had proved to be less than an asset because Malaysia has changed so much. Alternatively, recent attachment to the Marcos 'court' in Manila may have implanted a false impression of the kind of style that goes down well in South-east Asia as a whole today. Just after Mahathir's attack, Bentley took extended leave (it was due to him, but the coincidence with Mahathir's accession was misunderstood). For critical British commercial comment on the unfortunate High Commissioner, see the letter by Algy Cluff, *The Times*, 10 November 1981; also letters in *Financial Times* during November 1981 (various dates). In fact, Dr Mahathir singled out British business for his strictures on 15 June no less than the British diplomatic service, alleging failure to sponsor a Malaysian investment mission on its visit to Britain, and failure to contribute to a fund to help students hit by the higher fees. However, a possible element of disingenuity has to be pointed out in this respect. A Foreign Ministry cable to all Malaysian missions dated 15 December 1981 gives the impression that the M$1·5m trust fund administered by the Malaysian High Commission was a Malaysian government idea which British business in Malaysia only decided to finance after Dr Mahathir's boycott began; yet *Straits Times*, Singapore, 8 July 1980, quoting a *New Straits Times*, Malaysia, dispatch, states: 'Fifty British companies are keen on setting up an Anglo–Malaysian foundation to aid Malaysian students studying in Britain' in response to an initiative of the vice-chancellor of the University of Malaya. Perhaps the British–Malaysian Industry and Trade Association needs to look to its PR rather than its conscience! Unfortunately, BMITA's decision-making is seriously slowed down by its position as a member organization.

pretext was so well tailored to Dr Mahathir's purpose that it could be invoked as a substantive case of 'British arrogance' in its own right, alongside British commercial attitudes, the fees issue, and the High Commissioner's *faux pas*. Fortunately, Dr Mahathir is too intelligent a man not to have appreciated before long that the new Stock Exchange rules were unlikely to stand in the way of further repatriations, because there was no outstanding company so large or obdurate as to need to be 'raided'. He will also have come to understand that the City Takeover Panel is a self-regulatory body of the Stock Exchange, not under government control, for the takeover rules of the Malaysian Stock Exchange are also administered by the securities industry, albeit within the framework of an Act of Parliament. Nor will it have been difficult to empathize with the concern of the London Stock Exchange to give the British capitalist share market an acceptable, legitimate face by looking to the interests of small investors. Dr Mahathir himself is intensively involved in strategies to give Malay state capitalism an acceptable face. The absence of any demand for a withdrawal of the new Stock Exchange rules does suggest that there was no illusion in Kuala Lumpur that the British government was competent to do anything about it, or indeed had anything to do with it—even though the notion that Guthries might have had some influence in the matter would have been less easy to dispel.[25]

In fact there was an almost complete lack of specificity about any conditions whatever that Britain or its subjects might need to fulfil in order to make the Malaysian government withdraw its limited boycott of British firms tendering for government contracts.[26] This was worrying for British interests. British export firms seeking *business* in Malaysia may have felt that they had been singled out to expiate a decade—or a century—of the unspecified 'sins' of British *investment* (especially if most of the Malaysian-based firms themselves had by now restruc-

25. Briefly, the new rules stipulate that purchases of voting rights may only proceed by 5 per cent jumps at seven-day intervals after an initial deal securing 15 per cent. The decision to change the rules was influenced not only by the Guthrie case but also by two other recent cases with no international dimension. But whether new rules were really necessary to protect the small investor (who was already guaranteed the same price as that paid to large investors in a 'raid') is queried in 'Institutions and the price of power' (Financial editorial), *The Times*, 14 September 1981. And there is no indication in an extended report and an Editorial ('New curbs on share raids'), *Financial Times*, 28 September 1981, to support the British government's subsequent claim that the change in the rules had been under consideration for eighteen months previously. *The Times*, 10 October 1981 ('A misplaced suspicion', Editorial), appears to admit that the Guthrie takeover was the precipitating cause ('final alarm bell'), although this had simply 'misled' Malaysia. The same editorial assured Malaysia that future takeovers were not foreclosed; but the point was by now becoming academic—the Malaysian government decided to pursue the largest outstanding British rubber giant, Harrisons and Crosfield, through a tightening of the Companies Act (*The Times*, 19 October 1981). Most City reporting of the Guthrie coup itself evinced grudging admiration of the Malaysians and their London agents, N. M. Rothschild, but the offending words 'backdoor nationalization' do appear in 'The sun sets on Guthries' (The Lex Column), *Financial Times*, 8 September 1981. It was the same 'voice of City opinion' (as Dr Mahathir clearly sees the *Financial Times*) which on 1 October 1981, in an editorial on Malaysian economic nationalism ('Malaysia puts on the heat'), warned Dr Mahathir not to overplay his hand and ruin the investment climate in the country. Coincidentally, the Malaysian boycott was revealed by the Malaysian *Business Times* of the same date.

26. The boycott was not described as a 'boycott', either by the Prime Minister or the Foreign Minister (*Financial Times*, 12 October 1981) but took the form of a directive that all British tenders to government departments and statutory bodies (within days State Governments were included) were to be referred to the Prime Minister for clearance, with an alternative, non-British tender. Only where a British bid was exceptionally competitive would it be accepted, Dr Mahathir explained (*Financial Times*, 20 October 1981), but British firms manufacturing in Malaysia were said to be exempt (and investment was still welcome). In due course the degree of competitiveness that would have to be achieved was defined as 'something over 5 per cent' (Dr Mahathir's interview, *Financial Times*, 19 August 1982).

tured!).[27] To set up a manufacturing operation in Malaysia to gain individual exemption from the boycott would take time, and in many cases might be commercially meaningless. Such British-based firms may have wondered whether Dr Mahathir initiated the confrontation for emotional reasons and was continuing it for the emotional and symbolic satisfaction that it yielded. In August 1982 Dr Mahathir told a British newspaper that a clear indication of a British 'change of attitude' would likely be reciprocated, but his pragmatic idiom did not extend as far as sketching the actual terms of a bargain, even with regard to the level of new investment that was sought.[28]

Moreover, pragmatic considerations, so far as such were in play after the first year of confrontation, seemed to be pointing to the value of continuing it for a number of domestic reasons; and from this it would have followed that no priority need be attached to giving the British explicit guidance about how to make amends. The boycott was an admirable instrument for shaking the civil service out of pro-British attitudes and, by association, Dr Mahathir will have hoped, some attitudes towards work, towards the role of the bureaucracy in society and towards social engineering, which have seemed to stand in the way of change and which Dr Mahathir attributes to the British tradition. A further advantage derived from the fact that in the sensitive multiracial context of Malaysia it is safer to teach the Malays to find their new, self-respecting and more aggressive identity in confrontations with the alien and now powerless British than with the locally domiciled Chinese and Indians. On the other hand it is relevant and helpful that Britain *was* once the colonial master: much government or government-inspired propaganda around the twenty-fifth anniversary of independence (31 August 1982) showed that Dr Mahathir aimed to inculcate in all Malaysians a sense that becoming independent from Britain was one of the most significant and noble things Malaysians ever did.[29] Confrontation with Britain was an excellent, tangible example to all Malaysians of how to be independent in spirit in their future dealings with the world; and in the process, a Malay psychosis could become a shared attribute of all Malaysians, so that Chinese and Indian aggression was diverted towards the white alien, in the same way as Malay aggression.

Again, Britain's economic decline, attributed in part to its unsalutary model of industrial management, gave the boycott a sort of logical compatibility with Dr Mahathir's 'look east' campaign—the search for new forms of industrial management and an appropriate work ethic for a newly industrializing power. Also, although no Islamic fundamentalist would be deceived, the rejection of British administrative and managerial paradigms and other links with Britain could seem, in the eyes of many Malay voters, to respond to the diffuse Islamic demand for 'rejection of the

27. Bernama reported, on 21 November 1981, criticism by a Cardiff Chamber of Commerce Trade Mission against unnamed 'other' British companies based in Malaysia. Old Malayan hands, however, maintain that it is the visiting businessmen, insensitive to Malaysian nuances, who have given the British their arrogant image.

28. *Financial Times*, 19 August 1982. Apart from Dr Mahathir's fury at Britain's changing the stock market rules 'as soon as we [Malaysians] had mastered them', Malaysian sources recount that Dr Mahathir had strong feelings about an incident at the British Department of Trade, when, as Minister of Trade and Industry (and Deputy Prime Minister), he was subjected to an unscheduled interrogation by a panel of civil servants, and other painful experiences across the years. The change in the Stock Exchange rules were clearly felt as one of a kind with previous slights to himself and the Malaysian state.

29. At about the same time the Malay translation of *The Malay dilemma* began to appear on the bookstalls. Mahathir Mohamed, *Dilema Melayu* (trans. Ibrahim Saad; Petaling Jaya, Federal Publications, 1982). On media activity see note 10 above.

West', thereby pre-empting the Islamic revival to some extent, and enabling UMNO to pursue its more secular and materialist version of the City of God, or *Dar-ul-Islam*, for a further decade or so. Furthermore, although the government had insisted that it was not 'discriminating' against Britain, merely trying to restore balance and parity in its contracting, it did seem relevant that under Malaysian principles of *social* engineering, imbalance is not overcome at the moment when precise statistical equality is achieved in measurable things; for imbalance is understood as a deeply-rooted sociological condition which may take generations of positive discrimination to redeem. This kind of thinking seemed capable of colouring Malaysian perceptions of 'balance' in contracting, where, after all, the previous imbalance was a product of the long colonial past, just like the backwardness of the Malays. Lastly, it was of course immensely helpful that there were ample alternative sources of supply: Malaysia appeared to suffer little from its boycott in the first year and was actively diversifying its trading relations.[30]

The British response

If the British High Commission in Kuala Lumpur analysed the situation in terms at all similar to those sketched above, it will have seen reason for the most urgent action before British exports incurred further loss through lapse of time or even a tightened boycott.[31] Certainly it was noticed that the practice of seeking out alternatives when a British firm tendered was pretty well institutionalized at all levels of Malaysian government, including the states: a growing circle of government personnel was becoming in some sense committed to the policy and would want to see some tangible gain. The same applied to the intelligentsia generally—at least those who were absorbing any part of the substantial output of 'analytical journalism' explaining and supporting the boycott.[32] The price that Britain would have to pay to satisfy these sections of Malay opinion was potentially rising with each passing month, whatever the signs that the intitial motive was not at all to create a deep rift or break in relations.

In the event, the official Malaysian side has been favourably impressed by the way the British High Commission set about explaining and indeed projecting the aims of the NEP on Malaysia's behalf to British business. Nor do British businessmen making inquiry at the Department of Trade in London appear to have

30. On a French approach to Malaysia, see *The Times*, 15 December 1982. Above all, even if Britain did not invest more, or buy more, in Malaysia (or—virtually inconceivable—actually responded with its own boycott in both areas), Dr Mahathir may have calculated that Malaysia could turn to other countries for both investment and markets. If Malaysia was 'punishing' Britain for its declining interest, the relative unimportance of British economic activity for Malaysia as a result of that decline ensured that the price of such psychological indulgence on Malaysia's part would not be too high.

31. No precise estimate of losses is obtainable, not least because there is no way of determining whether the boycott or some other, normal factor, caused the failure of individual tenders. Sir Anthony Kershaw, speaking to the UMNO Club, London, at the tail-end of the crisis, estimated not less than £20m, perhaps as much as £50m, for the whole period. *Star*, 4 March 1983.

32. This ranged from the lucid and balanced Mohamed Abu Bakar, 'A step which has been wrongly understood' (in Malay), *Utusan Malaysia*, 28 August 1982, justifying Malaysia's withdrawal from the 'special relationship' in the light of Britain's own withdrawal across the years, to the xenophobic and mendacious Azran Rahman, 'Malaysia and Britain: words don't convey any meaning these days' (in Malay), *Dewan Masyarakat*, 15 March 1982, saying that the British government had passed an Act of Parliament forbidding share purchases by foreign countries; and of great interest, somewhere in between, the anonymous 'We don't seem to be quite made for each other' (in Malay), *Utusan Malaysia*, 28 August 1982, suggesting that Malaysia felt high regard for Britain but that these feelings were not reciprocated.

wanted for thorough and sympathetic briefing on Malaysia's requirements regarding local equity participation. There is rather less evidence of any attempt at the London end to promote British investment directly—even though the Malaysian government had made it relatively clear that Britain's decline into third place behind Japan and Singapore was taken as one symptom of a 'negative attitude'.[33] But the absence of such official activity (if proven) will have been partly justified by the fact that pure exporting companies cannot be expected to take up overnight the role of Malaysian-based manufacturers. Higher rates of investment were more likely to be achieved through the action of companies already partly based in Malaysia, and these companies clearly did 'get the message' about new investment—either from the High Commission or from the Malaysian Ministry of Trade and Industry—judging by the fact that in 1982 Britain returned to second place in the new investment league. Even if the Malaysian-based companies and subsidiaries were only encouraged to restructure their equity, more pro-Malaysian investment policies would follow naturally from the shift in ownership. It was perhaps fortunate for British-based, pure exporting companies, which were impotent to do much on their own behalf to retrieve the situation (except try harder than ever before to sell their products), that the investment giants are also often suppliers to Malaysian government on a big scale. The latter category thus had ample motive to work for an improved climate.[34]

Meanwhile, Whitehall negotiated in March 1982 a new airline agreement which gave satisfaction to the Malaysian side, not so much for its substantive content as because Dr Mahathir's militant attitude seemed to be producing results not otherwise predictable or explicable.[35] The most significant policy change which it lay within the British government's power to make—and which was directly related to a precipitating cause of the crisis—was the restoration of an educational subsidy, of a strictly defined amount but country-specific and thus indicative of solicitude for Malaysia.[36] There was nothing that the British government could do about the Stock Exchange takeover rules, but no effort was spared to communicate British regard for leading Malaysian personalities and in general to project the sincere desire for a relationship of equality between the two states. A cumulative series of small

33. See remarks of the Malaysian Foreign Minister quoted in *Sunday Times* (Singapore), 11 October 1981. A key point about multinational investment in Malaysia is that it gives Malaysia access to foreign markets. Although the Department of Trade defines its role as 'assisting British business to invest', not as 'promoting investment', Britain has nevertheless now seconded an investment adviser to Malaysia's Industrial Development Authority, through ODA.

34. In addition to BMITA's M$1·5m over three years (approx. £400,000) for Malaysian students studying in Britain (see note 24 above) a favourable impression has been created by the secondment of Malaysian civil servants to British firms to study business practice, and by enthusiastic support for the Malaysian–British trade association, now established with a branch in both capitals, through which the businessmen of both countries will make regular contact. BMITA also lent its voice to the efforts of the Overseas Students Trust to achieve some revision of British government policy on overseas students.

35. Malaysian Airline System's current allowance is 1,240 return passengers per week, on four double flights on the London–Kuala Lumpur route—a figure closely linked to the business which British Airways can generate for itself. MAS maintains that it is having to turn business away. It was believed that Britain would be more generous after MAS relieved BA of two Boeing 747s in mid-1981; now these planes have brought surplus capacity to MAS. However, Britain has made concessions on the Kuala Lumpur–Hong Kong route and has allowed a Kuala Lumpur–London student return fare.

36. The extra £46m over three years, announced in Parliament on 8 February 1983, was earmarked for a number of territories identified as special cases in the influential study directed and written by Peter Williams, *A policy for overseas students* (London: Overseas Students Trust, 1982). The amount attributed to Malaysia may not exceed £5m, but sentiment in Kuala Lumpur recognizes that real political dependency gives rise to strong claims from other places.

symbolic gestures was crowned by the successful meeting of the two Prime Ministers at 10 Downing Street, over a sumptuous meal in 'the presence of assorted nabobs'.[37]

The symbolism of a new relationship

In seeking the optimum mix of governmental response—as between substantive policy change and symbolic gesture—British officials must have had the sensation of navigating in an unfamiliar and uncharted, if not capricious, sea. A dramatic policy retreat in any area would have offended against British dignity without any certainty that Dr Mahathir would respond. If his grudge ran very deep (some may have feared), British concessions might merely lead him or his nationalist entourage to demand more. The absence of any specific demand was puzzling at best. Since a change in 'British attitudes' seemed to be one underlying object of the Malaysian action, various tokens of a correct attitude might prove an appropriate response. But national attitudes, of their nature, do not change in a short time. Would the British side hit on a level of selected symbolism high enough to be an acceptable temporary substitute? And might it then transpire that a leader so pragmatic and forthright, in many ways, as Dr Mahathir, was not prepared to admit to being swayed by emotional or symbolic appeals in any case? Symbolic activity could as easily overshoot the target as fall short of it.

As it turned out, British government did not need to discover the perfectly 'correct' solution to these imponderables because other factors were in play, or entered the scene, to facilitate a settlement. Most importantly, the combination of a depressed exchange rate for sterling and the impact of recession on the Malaysian economy pointed to the possibility that Malaysia's own interests could suffer from the boycott. Moreover, the last of the rubber giants, Harrisons and Crosfield, as well as the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and Standard Chartered Bank, had restructured their Malaysian operations in the course of 1982, making the boycott somewhat redundant as an instrument for advancing the NEP. At the same time, the very coincidence of 'buy British last' with 'look east' helped to some extent to discredit the former by association. Dr Mahathir has met incomprehension, ridicule and resistance from Malay elements which suspect that he is looking to a major infusion of Japanese cultural traits just because Malaysia is geographically of 'the East'.[38] Being 'Eastern' is not a strong concept among Malays but deserting old friends is felt to be 'un-Malay'.[39] Not many Malaysians yet share Dr Mahathir's philosophical leanings and his ideological approach to world history and the

37. 'Peace meal', *Financial Times*, 11 March 1983. 'Mrs Thatcher', the columnist noted, 'makes peace with as much determination as she makes war . . . She was, she said, glad that Malaysia had made Britain change its mind over the policy of phasing out subsidies to foreign students. There was not the slightest show of this *mea culpa* being delivered through clenched teeth.'

38. Hence, in part, the appearance of newspaper articles justifying 'look east' and putting right the 'misapprehensions' of 'certain elements', for example, Tan Sri Datuk Samad Idris, 'Dr Mahathir's forthright manner fills one with wonder' (in Malay), *Berita Harian*, 19 September 1982. There has also been growing scepticism in intellectual circles about the real degree of technology transfer that the Japanese are effecting through such a construction showpiece as the Jayabumi complex in Kuala Lumpur.

39. This writer was able to listen to the bulk of the debates at the UMNO General Assembly, September 1982, and heard no reference to the boycott, or relations with Britain (even from a students' delegate from London, and not even from Dr Mahathir), though the question of Carcosa, the former British Residency and still the British High Commissioner's residence, was raised at the UMNO Women's Congress. Disquiet by public figures about the emerging new orientations features in Tunku Abdul Rahman, 'Important to keep close touch with Commonwealth friends', *The Star*, repr. in *Straits Times* (Singapore), 23 September 1981; and in the anxious questions of Dr Tan Chee Khoon in an interview with Dr Mahathir, *The Star*, 31 August 1982.

problems of world society. Dr Mahathir's confidants may well have felt that too much seriousness about getting Malaysia's place in the world exactly right might begin to look like unhealthy obsession. Can a nation really be strong whose leader is so fearful of lurking danger, or demands high levels of aid from the former colonial power? Regionally (i.e. in ASEAN) Dr Mahathir's pro-Japanese leanings could make him seem out of step with South-east Asian sentiment, even as talk of an Islamic state arouses scepticism about Malaysia's qualifications for regional leadership. The abrasiveness of the anti-British line could also revive unpleasant memories in a certain Islamic Sultanate—Brunei—whose favour Malaysia desires to win as the former approaches independence.

Nonetheless, while factors outside British control obviously did come to Britain's aid, it may be asserted that the particular intensity of symbolic activity adopted by the British government at the very least caused no harm. Symbolic activity was not rejected by Dr Mahathir, either because 'unrepresentative of real attitudes', or because it was contrary to his dignity as a pragmatist to be swayed by such things.[40] Just as Dr Mahathir's pursuit of moral renewal in Malay society is related instrumentally to Malay economic uplift and political survival, so British efforts to project a change of heart are interpreted and welcomed, in part, as 'pragmatic' acknowledgement of a shift in relative international power.[41]

Above all, it may be true to say that Dr Mahathir's profoundly ethical nature made it difficult for him not to respond after British government and commerce had done most of what it was realistically possible to expect in a short space. Although the new 'contract' was unilaterally proposed and never distinguished by the clarity of its terms, British interests had endeavoured to understand and fulfil them. Dr Mahathir has kept his side of this unwritten bargain.

Lessons for Britain

For the British government it remains to reflect on any lack of advance storm warnings from its representatives in South-east Asia, or on its own failure to heed proffered advice, as the case may be. Supposing that the government *was* warned but did not act (and it is no secret that the Foreign Office deprecated the abolition of the student subsidy, not only in general terms), there would be a certain parallel between the Anglo–Malaysian problem and, on one reading of the Franks Report, the Falklands crisis. There is certainly the common feature that the Argentine aggression (overwhelmingly) and Dr Mahathir's protest (partly) were prompted by government spending cuts. The British Prime Minister has rather acted as if Britain could maintain a world role as a military, commercial and cultural actor of modest substance, without some of the normally associated expense. From another point of view, there has been a failure to anticipate the impact of monetarist policy overseas, where groups of people—as in the Falklands and Malaysia—looked to

40. We may never know whether any Ministers felt that Dr Mahathir's largely unheralded change of direction looked like a *volte face* brought on by momentary exposure to Mrs Thatcher's charm. A thread of scepticism runs through A. Samad Idris, 'The anger towards Britain goes back to the time of Tun Hussein Onn' (in Malay), *Utusan Malaysia*, 30 March 1983.

41. In fact, neither A. Samad Idris, 'Anger towards Britain' nor the anonymous writer of 'KL–London: smiles again' (in Malay), *Sarina*, 1 April 1983, is inhibited about saying that Britain has been asked to accept that Malaysia is 'no longer its colonial dependency' and 'is way past the first stage of its independence'. This is the kind of recognition that it may *only* be possible to communicate by symbolic means. Fortunately, in this connection, 'concrete policy changes' too, which feel unsymbolic in London, may well take on a more symbolic significance seen from Kuala Lumpur.

Britain for some kind of succour even if they lacked a vote. It is fortunate that the cost of repairs after a period of neglect has proved much less in the case of Malaysia than in the Falklands. British skill in crisis management is impressive. But crisis avoidance would give a better return on the effort invested.

Meanwhile, official Britain and commercial Britain still seem wary of Dr Mahathir, as if they are not yet confident of having got the measure of this 'mercurial' figure. The idea of an article in *International Affairs* has prompted some dismay in certain quarters because it might upset this or that 'fragile balance'. But Dr Mahathir is not averse to sincere attempts to understand him and his country (nor is it in Britain's interest that attempts should not be made). And the personality which emerges from this study is not unduly complex, though the social and political context of Malaysia may seem relatively so.

It may be most meaningful to see the Malaysian Premier as a man who responds to the inchoate visions of a new Malay intelligentsia as much as he moulds them. This new intelligentsia is moving into positions of power as the NEP advances. The official Malaysian view of its place in the world is assimilating the traits of a radical Malay view—even an Islamic view—of the Malays' position in domestic society. The occurrence of mild confrontations with 'the West' is the least that Britain can hope for in the circumstances, and it would be wise to act to make it easier for pro-British sentiments to prevail so long as they survive and the Malaysian public still responds to the imagery of the patron–client relationship. The very intensity of our bilateral misunderstanding seems to confirm the validity of bilateral relations in an age of regionalism and blocs (Britain's membership of the EEC has been one of the points at issue!); but a bilateral relationship can be seen as a microcosm of global confrontation just as much as of global solidarity. It need not be patronising to restore some British 'patronage' if the Malaysian leadership perceives a need for help and protection, but much will depend on the development of a new idiom, on the ability of British officials to communicate (preferably in Malay on occasion, and not in an Oxford accent) a sense that the 'historic link' has created a historic British 'debt', and can only be maintained on terms of two-way advantage. The spirit of exchange could then progressively transform the relationship into one of partnership in which memories of the colonial past were overlaid, and lost their relevance.[42]

Malaysia's leader—it sounds trite but is true—is attempting to define a role for his troubled nation in a troubled world. The 'new rules' for Anglo-Malaysian relations were designed, in part, to alert Malaysians to Britain's final abandonment of the positive side of its former role, not in ceasing to rule but in ceasing to give, while still enjoying tacit commercial and cultural advantages. Dr Mahathir invites Malaysians to correct the resulting imbalance of advantage by abandoning, in turn, their receptivity to British influence. There may yet be time and opportunity for British diplomacy to demonstrate that history is not made up of clear stages and clean breaks, nor needs to be; that a fruitful collaboration can be constructed, or adapted, from the best elements of the past. But to achieve this will take a measure

42. In the matter of 'historic debts' the writer is not in disagreement with David Watt, 'Unto how many generations?' *The Times*, 17 December 1982, nor indeed with Professor P. T. Bauer, 'Why should the West feel guilty?', *Daily Telegraph*, 23 May 1977. But then, Dr Mahathir did not demand 'expiation', only equality and understanding (and the boycott instrument was wielded with a finely calculated delicacy). On these terms there is obviously much that Britain can offer consistent with its own conception of dignity. A move to return Carcosa would yield untold value.

of empathy with emergent Malaysia and a special understanding of the mind of Dr Mahathir, a man who is philosophical rather than simply emotional, but conceals both traits behind a pragmatic and businesslike exterior. It mainly needs to be grasped that 'an age of action' by 'men of action' is predicted and prescribed by Dr Mahathir's philosophical design itself.

The United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries: the relevance of conference diplomacy in Paris for international negotiations*

THOMAS G. WEISS†

The United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, held in Paris from 1 to 14 September 1981, was generally agreed to have been successful, a rarity these days in international cooperation when 'What is noticeable is that all these conferences ended in conflicts and there were virtually no successful negotiations'.[1] In the mid-1970s, the situation appeared different. Developing countries expected that the special sessions of the General Assembly that had led initially to the framework of the New International Economic Order would lead in time to negotiations about the redistribution of the benefits of global economic growth. These optimistic expectations have been disappointed. Encouraged by the initial strength and euphoria of the Southern states of OPEC, the Group of 77 took up a common position of confrontation, which was fed in its turn by the confusion and defensiveness of the West. As global economic growth changed to stagnation, however, the resistance of many important states of the North (in particular the United States, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan) to serious discussions has increased.

The fact that a complex web of multi-sectoral problems was under discussion almost guaranteed stalemate, even in an expanding world economy; but in a period of crisis, across-the-board negotiations meant certain failure. The so-called 'North–South dialogue', launched with so much heraldry through the Conference on International Economic Cooperation, quickly became bogged down. By the beginning of the Third United Nations Development Decade, 'global negotiations' were essentially dead—or at least moribund.

In Paris, however, an apparent aberration occurred in September 1981 when a wide-ranging package of special measures, designed to reverse the unacceptable position of least developed countries[2] on the extreme periphery of the world economy, was adopted without dissent. The 'Substantial New Programme of Action

* The present article is based on material contributed by the author to a more detailed discussion of this conference and of the meaning of the group of countries which were to benefit from it. See Thomas G. Weiss and Anthony Jennings, *More for the least? prospects for poorest countries in the eighties* (Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1983). It should be noted that the opinions set forth are his sole responsibility and not those of the international secretariat for which he works.

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1. Ferdinand van Dam, 'North–South Negotiations', *Development and Change*, October 1981, Vol. 12, No. 4, p. 481.

2. While a lengthy technical debate by the Committee for Development Planning (CDP) surrounded

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for the 1980s for the least developed countries' (SNPA)[3] was intended to bring about nothing less than the transformation, over the ensuing decade, of all their economies with their common afflictions of extreme poverty, minimal industrialization and limited supply of skilled human resources. Whether the decade of efforts that led to the negotiation of the SNPA was worth the effort necessarily depends upon the position of the observer: the results were either half-successful or half-disappointing, a compromise text that is either a half-full or half-empty glass.

While the agenda was varied, this conference essentially dealt with the mobilization of more financial resources for development. According to calculations made by the least developed countries themselves, the volume of external assistance was required almost to double in real terms by 1985 for the Paris programme of action to succeed. Originally the litmus test of the conference's success, this figure was not acceptable to donor countries, who were in the midst of a collective economic crisis and generally unwilling to undertake long-term commitments. Depending on assumptions about economic growth in donor countries, the increase in assistance flows in real terms by 1985 could be between 25 and 75 per cent. Thus, under the optimistic assumption that the world economy recovers and disbursements follow commitments, least developed countries can only hope to receive less than they themselves have calculated would be required for noticeable improvements in their development prospects.

At the same time, the conference focussed the attention of the international community on the plight of some 270 million of the globe's most desperately poor people and adopted an action programme more concrete than those emerging from previous UN conferences. Among the most important elements was the commitment of most donor countries to devote 0·15 per cent of their gross national products to overseas development assistance for the least developed countries during the 1980s, and of others to double their assistance to these countries. The willingness of the international community to support the establishment of consultative arrangements for discussions with aid partners in thirty-one countries was also notable.

One must of course distinguish between an agreement to act and action itself. The diplomatic success of the Substantial New Programme of Action is insufficient

their categorization, these countries are poor in every way: income per head (*per capita* gross domestic product of less than $100 in 1968 dollars) indicates unacceptably low levels of development and widespread poverty; the relatively small share of manufacturing in GDP (less than 10%) indicates the lack of evidence for any structural transformations that are usually thought to be the bases for a modern economy; and low adult literacy (less than 20% for the age group 15 and over) indicates the relatively poorly developed potential of human resources. These countries are located mainly in sub-Saharan Africa and in the core of Asia: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana, Burundi, Cape-Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Laos, Lesotho, Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Samoa, Yemen (Arab Republic) and Yemen (People's Democratic Republic). Sikkim, one of the original members of the list, ceased to be considered an independent political entity after the CDP's initial recommendations.

At its eighteenth session in April 1982, the CDP recommended that Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Sao Tome and Principe, Sierra Leone and Togo should be added to the list of least developed countries (see additional statistical information in EC/AC. 54/1982/3). Following past practice, ECOSOC agreed to increase the official list to 36 countries at its July 1982 session, and the General Assembly concurred during its 37th session. As they did not participate in the Paris Conference, the present discussion will concentrate on the list as it existed in 1981. The addition of these five countries does not alter the generalizations in the present analysis, and they will benefit from the provisions of the Substantial New Programme of Action.

3. See 'Report of the United Nations Conference on the least developed countries', A/CONF. 104/22, Rev. 1, pp. 6–39.

to improve the prospects of the least developed countries, but it was the critical first step in an arduous process. Whether or not these countries themselves and the international community respect their contract will not be seen until the end of the present decade. However, that unanimous and even enthusiastic agreement was reached on a comprehensive set of policy measures for thirty-one poor countries must be looked upon as a solid achievement, particularly against a background of the most unpropitious international economic climate in recent memory.

The present article does not speculate about the chances for implementation of the SNPA or about its implications for development in least developed countries[4]; rather it concentrates on the process of the Paris Conference in order to determine the relevance of this diplomatic success story for other global, ad hoc conferences. While conferences have traditionally supplemented diplomacy and been an important means for communication and agreement among states,[5] their subject matter and frequency have been significantly altered recently. Economic, financial and social questions have come to the forefront whereas formerly questions of war and peace dominated agendas. Beginning at Stockholm in 1971 with the environment and including the most recent discussions in 1981 of energy and least developed countries, the international community has also sponsored ad hoc conferences on food, population, children, habitat, women, and several special sessions of the General Assembly to discuss various aspects of economic development.

This increased use of conference diplomacy in order to attempt to comprehend and manage international problems and propose appropriate solutions has not been accorded an appropriate response from analysts. The scattered comments in the literature about global, ad hoc conferences are inadequate to approach the flood of such sessions which is likely to continue in the 1980s.[6] The conference diplomacy involved in these gatherings is different in nature from that employed in the annual sessions of the General Assembly or of the governing bodies of specialized agencies, although observers of international affairs tend to treat all intergovernmental meetings in the same way.

The working hypothesis of the present article is that the successful completion of the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries reflected not only the specificity of the issue under discussion but also the particular bureaucratic and administrative context within which negotiations took place. The following discussion indicates that the exact form of a conference changes the nature of the diplomacy involved, and that more particularly intergovernmental conferences depend for their success on the subject matter and definition of questions to be treated; the nature of logistic and political preparations; the influence of national and international officials; and the character of the negotiations themselves.

Preparations for the conference

In resolution 34/203, the General Assembly entrusted UNCTAD with responsibility for preparing the United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries,

4. This subject has been discussed by the author elsewhere, see Thomas G. Weiss and Anthony Jennings, 'What are the least developed countries and what benefits may result from the Paris Conference?', *World Development*, 1983, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 337–57.

5. For the theoretical and historical discussion, see Johan Kauffmann, *Conference diplomacy* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1970).

6. An exception to this generalization are the analyses of the Law of the Sea Conference. See especially B. Buzan, *Seabed politics* (New York: Praeger, 1976); and Francis T. Christy *et al.*, eds., *Law of the sea: Caracas and beyond* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975). This general problem was also the subject of an earlier investigation by the author; see Thomas G. Weiss and Robert S. Jordan, *The World Food Conference and global problem solving* (New York: Praeger, 1976).

a logical choice given UNCTAD's pioneering role on this issue. The subject figured vaguely even on the agenda of the first session of UNCTAD in 1964; and it had gradually assumed increasing importance in the resolutions of subsequent major sessions of UNCTAD, culminating in resolution 122(V), which called upon the General Assembly to convene a special conference to 'finalize, adopt and support a Substantial New Programme of Action'. The pre-conference period was almost solely an UNCTAD affair. One must clearly distinguish between logistic and substantive preparations, on the one hand, and political preparations, on the other. In terms of the former, the conference secretariat must be complimented, whereas its performance was faulty in terms of political preparations.

Participants generally agreed that the conference itself was meticulously prepared logistically in spite of the extremely tight timetable. Only eighteen months elapsed between the General Assembly's resolution in December 1979 and the proceedings themselves; moreover, the actual final decision was made during the second session of the Preparatory Committee in mid-October 1980, to hold the conference barely ten months later. In fact, in early 1981, no sites for individual review meetings with aid partners had been fixed and exact information about what would turn out to be inadequate funding was not available. During this period, the UNCTAD secretariat was responsible not only for assisting each least developed country to draft and summarize a country presentation, but also for arranging the logistics of four clusters of review meetings.[7] General documentation[8] and logistics for the conference as well as the three sessions of the Preparatory Committee[9] were also arranged.

While the importance of preliminary proceedings of conferences is generally less than participants believe—being quickly overtaken by intensive activities during the actual deliberations of a conference—analysis of pre-Paris events is worthwhile for two reasons. First, they set the stage for the expeditious negotiation of the text of the SNPA. Second, they contained the basis for follow-up, itself an innovation in conference diplomacy.

In these substantive preparations, the UNCTAD secretariat took a vitally important initiative. In comparison with other specialized conferences, the most salient feature of the Paris Conference was that 'the preparations were both global . . . and country specific'.[10] An emphasis was placed upon what might be called a deductive rather than an inductive approach to mobilize international support. Instead of the secretariat's positing general analyses and recommendations to cover the socio-economic situation of all least developed countries and then asking each of them and their development partners to take relevant action, each least developed

7. These documents are found in the series LDC/CP/1 to 31, summaries of which are found in A/CONF. 104/SP/1 to 31. The reports on the consultations by least developed countries with aid partners during the four clusters of meetings held in Vienna, Addis Ababa, The Hague and Geneva are found respectively in A/CONF. 104/3, 4, 5 and 6.

8. For a listing of the entire preconference documentation, see A/CONF. 104/22/Add. 1, pp. 34–41.

9. The first of the three sessions was held from 4 to 16 February 1980, the second from 9 to 17 October 1980 and the third from 29 June to 10 July 1981. For the reports on the first and second sessions see *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-fifth session, Supplement No. 45 (A/35/45)*; for that on the third session see A/CONF. 104/PC/19 and Add. 1–8 (to be issued as *Official Records of the General Assembly, Thirty-sixth session, Supplement No. 45 (A/36/45)*.

10. A. F. Ewing, 'UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries', *Journal of World Trade Law*, Mar–Apr 1982, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 171. A lengthier international legal interpretation of this conference is Alain Brouillet, 'La Conférence des Nations Unies sur les pays les moins avancés', *Annuaire Français de Droit International*, 1981, pp. 587–624.

country formulated its own policy objectives, priorities and assistance requirements, and the sum of these requirements became the generalized call for action.

The secretariat certainly pushed its own conceptions of solutions to the problems of least developed countries, and the actual differences between the deductive and the inductive approaches should not be exaggerated. Nevertheless, the secretariat's global estimates were cross-checks rather than *a priori* bases for policy proposals. Support for action was based on the needs of the least developed countries as estimated by their own planners and constructed sector-by-sector and country-by-country. This partly explains the specificity of the debate, the technical quality of preparations and the consensus that emerged in Paris.

The views of individual countries became the building blocks for the private discussions between each least developed country and its aid partners in the spring of 1981. The UNCTAD secretariat took another crucial initiative for these country reviews in a *note verbale* of 15 December 1980 in which it was proposed that all communications and logistics be centralized in UNCTAD; that countries invite whom they wished based on a list of possible participants suggested by UNCTAD; and that the country reviews be chaired by an eminent official from the United Nations. Critics later said that UNCTAD had taken too many initiatives, but this had a hollow ring. If these reviews were to take place at all for countries whose overriding characteristic was lack of managerial expertise, the UNCTAD secretariat was obliged to act; also, these sessions laid the groundwork for the SNPA's call to institutionalize consultative arrangements for all least developed countries modelled on those of the World Bank.[11]

During interviews, the representatives of both bilateral and multilateral institutions as well as of least developed countries praised such an approach. A preference was expressed for dealing with the specifics of a particular country and its problems rather than with what must necessarily be vague generalities in order to be applicable to thirty-one countries. While least developed countries share certain problems, the group is by no means homogeneous. It encompasses countries with significant differences, be they in terms of territorial or population sizes, resource endowments, geographical situations, or political systems.

While many delegates expressed anguish that better use was not made of the Preparatory Committee's sessions, particularly its third, the conference secretariat should be credited for optimal use of the days immediately preceding the conference. A two-day consultation of senior officials was scheduled for 27 and 28 August 1981. According to the now established practice of the United Nations for special conferences,[12] such consultations are to settle all outstanding 'housekeeping' functions. They are open only to participating member states and are held in order to reach agreement on procedural and organizational matters so that the minimum time is spent in dealing with these issues once a conference is opened. The senior officials meeting on this occasion quickly agreed on most of its work except for the exact composition of the General Committee, an issue that has frequently marred

11. There is a serious vacuum in academic literature about this subject. One early exception is John White, *Pledged to development* (London: Overseas Development Institute, 1967). Brief treatments are found in Edward S. Mason and Robert E. Asher, *The World Bank since Bretton Woods* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1973), passim.

12. See 'Guidelines on the preparation, organization and servicing arrangements of special conferences of the United Nations and their preparatory meetings', annexed to General Assembly resolution 35/10 of 3 November 1981.

the effective beginning of international conferences. To an outside observer, the traditional bickering among countries over the posts of officers appears trivial; yet the composition of the general committee of any conference is always quite important. Not only do the president, chairman of sessional committees and rapporteur often have crucial roles to play in public; but they, along with the other officers, participate in the closed discussions at the end of a conference during which bargains are struck.[13]

By approving almost all decisions of the Preparatory Committee and quickly making their own decisions on the agenda and officers, the senior officials also left time for developing countries to sort out their own internal political problems. For the first time in recent UN history, the Group of 77 was in total agreement about the entirety of a negotiating text before a conference began. Based largely on a secretariat 'non-paper' that had been informally floated in photocopied form before the final session of the Preparatory Committee two months previously, a final text was made available to other delegations on the opening day of the conference,[14] with the advantage that it had actually appeared much earlier, and so governments had already begun to develop positions on the main points of contention.

In what might very well be described as the 'race' to Paris, not all went smoothly. The UN Office in Geneva was overwhelmed by conference preparatory documentation, the quantity and cost of which had been underestimated. There were several administrative inconveniences as well as much early and last-minute confusion; and the agreement with the host government was signed less than one month before the conference opened.[15] The technical quality of country presentations and of discussions during the country review meetings clearly suffered from the haste of preparations. UNCTAD staff were overworked and left much of their normal work undone. Non-governmental organizations had no time to organize themselves properly or raise funds.

While the UNCTAD secretariat deserves praise for its logistic and substantive preparations, the same can not be said for its preliminary political spade-work. The extremely tight calendar may have been partially responsible, but the passive stance of the conference secretariat was in distinct contrast with that of more active secretariats for other UN conferences. UNCTAD exerted too little effort to secure advance agreement on a package of priority items that the least developed countries

13. The four main officers were: France (president), Bangladesh and Cape-Verde (chairmen of the working committees) and Hungary (rapporteur). The remainder of the general committee consisted of the following vice-presidents: Canada, Japan, Norway, the United Kingdom and the United States from Group B; Algeria, Bolivia, Brazil, Ethiopia, Haiti, Iraq and Nepal from the Group of 77; Bulgaria and the USSR from Group D; and China.

A first indication of the erosion of the group system and of the ability of the French to manoeuvre occurred during these discussions. Prior to the senior officials meeting, it was assumed that another Group B country (Sweden) would chair the second working committee. It had been assumed that it was justified, if not in terms of numerical balance, then in that Group B provided over three-quarters of the overseas assistance to least developed countries. When the Group of 77 argued that least developed countries themselves should chair both committees, Group B was unable to insist because the French refused to support a common stance. While a face-saving device was found—both committees got co-chairmen from Group B—it was clear that the French would not allow procedural bickering, however important, to mar the beginning of the conference. It is also relevant that the predominant French role might have been diminished by another effective actor from a Nordic country taking a leading role in negotiations.

14. A/CONF. 104/L.2.

15. The agreement between the UN and France was signed on 31 July 1981; it is published in JORF *Lois et Décrets*, 22 October 1981, pp. 2878–84.

would have considered meaningful, but which the important developed donor countries would also have found negotiable. In particular, consultations were not held with major Western donors about future pledging or the desirability of follow-up. This hesitancy can largely be explained by UNCTAD's unwillingness to risk offending members of the Group of 77 outside the least-developed group by either taking initiatives on behalf of one part of the Group or by becoming too involved with donors, particularly the—in UNCTAD parlance—'adversaries' of Group B.

No outsider would have permitted himself to head a secretariat which was so passive towards political preparations. In addition, had the conference secretariat been headed by someone with better access to the donor community, more headway could probably have been made concerning feasible objectives to be negotiated as well as a specific schedule for commitment of funds shortly after the conference. In this respect, a neutral national from a sympathetic Nordic country might have been able to galvanize more support in the donor community—or at least allay their apprehensions—than was the case. Preparations for the Paris Conference were indicative of UNCTAD's more general difficulties in becoming a viable forum for international economic negotiations. As long as its executive head and staff appear so sensitive to the reactions of the Group of 77 and as long as prejudices towards this coalition remain so evident, UNCTAD cannot play the necessarily objective role of mediator.

Observers often underestimate the role of international secretariats in determining the outcome of intergovernmental meetings. While in annual sessions of the General Assembly or governing bodies of specialized agencies the room for manoeuvre is extremely circumscribed, the same is not true for global, ad hoc conferences. With their focus on a specific issue and high visibility during a concentrated period of time, they provide an unusual opportunity for international secretariats to influence national government policies.

In almost all previous conferences, ultimate responsibility remained with the General Assembly or ECOSOC, and a highly visible outside political figure was named by the UN Secretary-General to head an autonomous secretariat. It was normally attached to a department of the UN or one of its specialized agencies in order to make maximum use of available technical and logistical expertise; but the secretariat, and more importantly its leadership, was independent. The selection of Gamani Corea and the almost exclusive use of the UNCTAD secretariat to prepare the Paris Conference was an exception to this general rule.[16] Better results would have probably ensued had this not been the case, for three reasons. As stated above, the preliminary political consultations would have been better; background documentation would have been more original; and less bureaucratic in-fighting among UN organizations would have occurred.

An outsider, with a budget permitting the use of independent consultants, could have produced a more original report to the conference. The production process guaranteed that the overall report of the conference's secretary-general would be too 'UNCTADish' in terms of its purely external sector orientation and biases. Outside guidance and stimulus would have facilitated consideration of more non-

16. Only the Buenos Aires Conference in 1978 on technical cooperation among developing countries was similar. The UNDP Administrator, Bradford Morse, and his staff acted as the secretariat. Also, the Executive-Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America, Enriqué V. Iglesias, became the Secretary-General of the 1981 Nairobi Conference on new and renewable sources of energy after the outsider who was originally Secretary-General resigned; in this latter, case, however, the secretariat remained independent.

economic issues in important social and productive sectors, could have better mobilized the potential inputs from other UN organizations and could perhaps also have called into question the conventional wisdom on least developed countries of the preceding ten years.

The desirability of outside stimulus becomes clearer in the light of the responsibilities and organizational ideology of UNCTAD and its secretary-general at the time. Gamani Corea was preoccupied by a number of issues of importance to his organization and North–South negotiations; and he personally spent very little time on preparations before the actual opening of the conference. His nomination as secretary-general of the conference was ironic in the light of his views on the list of least developed countries. As a member of the Committee for Development Planning, he argued against it as a representative of a poor country, Sri Lanka, that was not included; and his views have not changed during his tenure as secretary-general of UNCTAD, during which he has tirelessly insisted upon the solidarity and non-divisibility of all developing countries.[17]

The gap in pre-conference leadership was partially filled by the arrival of Jan Pronk as deputy secretary-general of UNCTAD in August 1980. Many argued that, given his extremely active role in chairing country reviews as well as heading the task force that drafted the main report, he was effectively the secretary-general of the conference. However, it would have been far better to have nominated someone who was not identified with UNCTAD and whose reputation and future were to be based exclusively on the outcome of the Paris Conference. Divided loyalties are no help in securing optimum benefits from a secretariat; a body headed by outsiders would probably have provoked far less inter-organizational competition and tension within the UN system. No outsider could have seriously put forward a proposal that UNCTAD—poorly equipped at the country level, possessing no financial resources of its own and the target of almost universal hostility from important donors—take the principal responsibility for all national and global follow-up. Rather than making a defensible proposal—for example, a joint approach between UNDP and UNCTAD that might have led to a calendar for pledging—and negotiating with key UN organizations beforehand, the conference secretariat remained basically attached to its own narrow formulation of ideas which had originally put other major UN organizations on the defensive when it appeared in draft form in April 1981.

17. A significant indication of the extent to which LDCs remained a minor issue for UNCTAD even on the eve of the Paris Conference was the *Trade and Development Report, 1981*, TD/B/863, issued late in August 1981. Designed to be an important organizational statement of policy, this comprehensive evaluation of recent world economic developments with proposals for policy options to alter development prospects makes no specific mention of the structural handicaps of the LDCs or of their special needs. Furthermore, calls during the 1970s to strengthen activities within the secretariat on behalf of LDCs received formal rather than effective support from UNCTAD's front-office. As an issue it diluted the demand by all developing countries for across-the-board changes in international economic relations; and more organizational resources allocated to this category of countries might have detracted from the arguments for strengthening other sections of the organization. In fact, this report contradicts Corea's own document to the Paris Conference in which LDCs were analysed as having special problems which required large transfers of financial and technical resources. The *Trade and Development Report, 1981* demonstrates that he had not really become convinced that the LDCs merited special attention. He returned to his familiar position that lumped all developing countries together and prescribed an improvement in their terms of trade as the major solution to their poor performance. The main theme in his report to the Paris Conference was that the LDCs did not possess a productive base and thus needed significant outside support in order to establish an agricultural and manufacturing base before being in a position to benefit from any commercial policy improvements.

Five informal inter-agency consultations were convened by the director-general for development and international economic cooperation during the pre-conference period.[18] In administrative terms, United Nations organizations were kept briefed on the status of preparations for the conference and an effort was made to coordinate the system's inputs to least developed countries in preparing their presentations. In substantive terms, the report of the secretary-general of the conference reflected inputs from the UN system, and documents were prepared by United Nations organizations for submission to the conference giving their analysis of and proposals for the least developed countries.

Given the sensitivity to the expansion of mandates by other members of the so-called 'family', the inter-agency consultations were an important opportunity for UNCTAD partially to assuage the fears of other UN organizations. Briefings concerning the status of activities gave opportunities to place information before representatives from other institutions. While general satisfaction was expressed with UNCTAD's efforts, most organizations would have wished for more attention to their own interests.[19]

In considering the future utility of such consultations, one should underline their informal and generally supportive character. In contrast to the rigid structure of meetings by the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC) on programmes or operations that entail long lead-times as well as formal agenda and reports, the informal consultations required no new machinery and were extremely flexible. Background documents and summary reports were prepared, but meetings were held only as necessary and were often attended by technicians, not the professional 'ACC watchdogs' so often responsible for sterile debates concerning organizational boundary disputes. They were businesslike and no summary proceedings were made.

Nevertheless, no amount of consultations could totally satisfy the disparate members of the UN system. One organization, or at most a few, must take initiatives and accept the consequences. UNCTAD played this role for the administration and substance of the Paris Conference. Better consultations would not have pleased major institutions jealous of UNCTAD's role; and what is more, involving UN organizations in drafting and clearing the secretary-general's report would have made a momentous task impossible. While certainly better use of scarce resources could be made with improved inter-agency cooperation on major conferences, inter-organizational competition is a fact of life. UN organizations cooperate when it is in their interest to do so or when their governing bodies order them to

18. The reports of these meetings are found in ACC/1980/OPPG/3, ACC/1980/44, ACC/1981/3 and ACC/1981/18. One previous session had been held in November 1977 (Coordination/R.1257) to discuss general problems of coordination on behalf of least developed countries.

19. Considerable disgruntlement arose concerning the processing of the secretary-general's report to the conference. A special session of the inter-agency consultations was held to discuss a very preliminary draft of this paper in April 1981. The conference secretariat had made clear that this document was its exclusive responsibility; and that it would be issued *after* consultations with other UN organizations but not *in* consultation with them. While some important sectoral contributions—particularly for agriculture and industry—were taken directly from agency submissions, many organizations were dissatisfied that not enough of their own views were included. The general distribution of submissions from UN organizations was designed to mitigate this dissatisfaction. The decision to reproduce and distribute such a large quantity of sometimes useless documentation was made as a result of the experience of the secretariat for the Conference of Rural Development and Agrarian Reform. The secretariat for this meeting had sought to minimize documentation and published a synthetic document, prepared by independent consultants, on the potential contribution of the UN system. Almost without exception, UN organizations complained.

do so. No amount of urging can make up for a lack of direction and authority at the centre of the UN system.

The process of the Paris Conference

The deliberations of the Paris Conference took place in plenary sessions and in two working committees. The general debate, which was opened on 2 September and concluded on 10 September 1981, occurred in the plenary. Over 130 governments attended the conference, which was addressed by four heads of state (from Kenya, Cape Verde, Rwanda and Nepal) and heads of delegations from 106 countries as well as the executive heads or other senior representatives of most of the specialized agencies and other United Nations bodies; representatives from a few intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations also addressed the plenary. Plenary sessions in Paris fulfilled the ceremonial purpose of allowing heads of delegations to make statements—not infrequently to an empty hall—that could be reported with enthusiasm in national newspapers but which generally did not advance the work of the conference.[20]

As had been obvious from the beginning of conference preparations, the two central issues were: (1) the nature of the international partnership based on the *quid pro quo* of an increased volume and improved quality of external assistance from the 'haves' and a commitment to domestic policy changes from the 'have nots'; and (2) the form of the institutional follow-up to the conference. These two issues constituted the main agenda items for committees one and two respectively, although lip service was also paid to several traditional themes in North–South discussions (preferences, economic cooperation among developing countries, transfer of technology, and so on).

While plenary sessions provide interesting commentary for journalists, the heart of conferences occurs not in the plenary but during the negotiations in sessional committees. In Paris, the text of the Substantial New Programme of Action was negotiated in the two working committees and finalized in the president's contact group before being rubber-stamped by the plenary.

During global conferences, both international and national officials can influence negotiations. In previous conferences, executive heads have sometimes played critical roles, for example, Maurice Strong at the Conference on the Human Environment and Sayad Marei at the World Food Conference. Normally speaking, however, international officials cede their places to national decision-makers once an intergovernmental conference opens. The Paris Conference was unusual in that in the exercise of leadership not only the conference secretariat but also all other national officials were almost totally eclipsed by France.[21] In contrast with previous conferences, the UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries was hosted by

20. The plenary was also the vehicle for the standard complaints about unrelated issues: Iraq and Iran as well as Afghanistan and Pakistan exchanged insults: Vietnam and the representative of the Khmer Rouges debated the validity of Cambodia's credentials; South Africa and Israel were the objects of customary abuse; and the socialist countries discussed at some length disarmament and the neutron bomb as well as the evils of multinational corporations. These familiar refrains did not, however, impede the work of the conference.

21. Conferences in New York, Geneva or Vienna do not attract similar attention, tending to be seen as yet another in a continuing series of talk-fests. A special meeting in another capital tends to win greater local and international attention as journalists are sent from outside, and their reporting tends to get more coverage because of the unfamiliar dateline.

During the first half of 1980, the UNCTAD secretariat attempted to find a major donor to sponsor the conference. Such a sponsor, it felt, would ensure success by pressurizing other members of the

an important geopolitical power whose visibility, particularly in support of the Third World, had been dramatically increased by the accession to power of the socialists in May and June 1981.[22] In addition to wanting the conference on its soil to be seen as a success—a desire common to all host governments—France was also in an ideal position to exert influence. It possessed a leverage that would have been available neither to less important geopolitical actors nor to important ones with perspectives that were less pro-Third-World.

In terms of the French public policy positions that influenced the SNPA, the most important related to aid (volume and quality) and to commercial policy. Beginning with the inaugural address by François Mitterrand and continuing in the opening remarks by the president of the conference, Jean-Pierre Cot, as well as in the plenary presentation by the Minister of Finance, Jacques Delors, the French position emerged clearly.[23] It was an even more positive stance than that normally taken by the Nordic countries in their traditional pro-Third-World leadership role within the OECD: France would reach the aid volume target of 0·15 per cent of GNP to least developed countries by 1985 (a doubling in real terms); it would approach the modalities of aid with the greatest flexibility; it wished to see the European Community's system of commodity stabilization (Stabex) applied to all least developed countries and for other non-European developed countries to consider similar kinds of liberal commercial policy measures.

The French also insisted that deliberations in Paris were not isolated from overall North–South issues, more particularly that they were a first step in global negotiations; this rhetoric was useful in establishing French credibility. No link was made between the actual content of discussions in Paris and unsuccessful negotiations in Cancún, New York and elsewhere, and the focus of the Paris negotiations remained limited. However, by publicly taking such a popular line early in the conference, France told the Group of 77 what it wished to hear and became the leader of the Western bloc, seen as a positive voice for change by the developing countries.[24] France was credibly able to exert pressure on developing countries as well as on other member states of OECD to support, or at least not actively get in the way of, the negotiated compromises of the Paris programme of action. The host government took on the task of compensating for shortcomings in preliminary political preparations, and this monopolized the orchestration of the conference

donor community. In addition, if the sponsor also had the capacity to do much more for the LDCs, pressure could be exerted by way of example if a significant host-country gesture was forthcoming. After unsuccessful contacts with both Japan and West Germany, the secretariat was surprised by the offer of the French foreign minister to the General Assembly in New York while the second session of the Preparatory Committee was deliberating in Geneva. France has always been very active in international organizations, and more recently has taken visible initiatives in the development field. Building on these trends and on the long-standing desire—most strikingly personified by Charles de Gaulle—to be seen as a major source of foreign policy initiatives for developing countries, particularly in Africa, the French offer to host the conference appears as a logical step in the historical process.

22. The new pro-Third-World position of the French government, which became clearer still at Ottawa in August and Cancún in October, was already clear in an address made by the new Minister for Cooperation and Development, M. Cot, to the Conseil économique et social français on 9 June 1981. See 'La nouvelle politique française de coopération pour le développement', reproduced in *IFDA Dossier 25*, Sept./Oct. 1981.

23. These remarks are reproduced in *Le Monde*, 2, 3, and 5 September 1981.

24. As one journalist aptly summarized: '. . . la conférence a été un incontestable succès pour la diplomatie française, qui a joué un rôle moteur. La France apparaît maintenant aux yeux du tiers monde comme son plus ardent défenseur parmi les pays industrialisés'. See 'La conférence des Nations Unies sur les pays les moins avancés, un demi-succès', *Europe-Outremer*, No. 618, p.4.

negotiating process. The decisive power of the French to act ultimately determined the relative strength of competing negotiating alignments.

Jean-Pierre Cot had made it clear from the opening of the conference that he was an activist. He abandoned his honorary seat at the centre of the podium and gave it to his nineteen vice-presidents, thereby liberating himself to work behind the scenes and to consult with delegations. Four days before the end of the conference, Cot formed his presidential contact group. Such a group is always the responsibility of the president of a conference, who normally consults with important parties as to its composition; but these 'friends' of the president normally meet unofficially outside the conference's formal structure. Cot, however, simply announced in business-like fashion that the official general committee of elected officers was adequately representative and would thus serve as a base for constituting a *de facto* negotiating group. He added in an ad hoc manner certain key participants from governments (the spokesmen for the various groups, the vice-chairman from Sweden, Saudi Arabia, and various French officials) and from international organizations (the secretary-general of the conference, members of his staff, and the director-general for development and international economic cooperation). He also ignored the usual practice of allowing working committees to drag on, intervening only at the eleventh hour. Working committees can only agree on largely uncontroversial portions of draft resolutions, employing the time-honoured technique of square brackets around alternative wordings for controversial sections. As resolving such controversies necessitates high-level politicial 'horse-trading', Cot saw no reason to wait; he decided that square-bracketed texts should be discussed as early as possible by the contact group during marathon bargaining sessions. The calendar of the conference—beginning on Tuesday 1 September and ending on Monday 14—permitted Cot to spend the final days and weekend extracting agreement on compromise texts from the politically representative contact group. In this task, he was assisted by the French Ambassador in Geneva, Stéphane Hessel, who was fully familiar not only with the issues but also with the process of UN meetings. Together they were able to put together alternative wordings of compromise texts that greatly facilitated bargaining and the attainment of formal approval by the final session of the plenary.

While the texts remitted by the chairmen of the two committees were tighter and more logically structured than earlier drafts, the same basic problems remained at the end of these committees' deliberations as at the beginning: targets for external assistance; and UNCTAD's role in country and global follow-up, the mechanism for monitoring at the inter-governmental level and the language concerning additional resources for international secretariats. Within a matter of two hours, the general committee resolved the latter issues that had been under discussion in Committee Two; and the weekend was necessary for the particularly difficult issues surrounding international support that had been the mandate of Committee One.

The most salient feature about the process of work in Committee Two was the inability of the conference secretariat to retreat from its original proposals. Even when it became clear the developed donor countries, the principal United Nations organizations (IBRD and UNDP), and even the majority of least developed countries themselves were not supporting the idea of an expanded role for UNCTAD at the country level, the secretariat continued to lobby for its leadership role. The deliberations and negotiations of this committee would have proceeded more quickly and the United Nations avoided unnecessary negative publicity for its

already tarnished image,[25] had the conference secretariat's vision been less grandiose. The hopes of least developed countries for immediately-convened commitment and pledging sessions were threatened by the predictable, but nonetheless unrealistic and lamentable, desire of an international secretariat to enlarge its own turf.[26]

It was relatively easy for the contact group to dispose of the controversy on follow-up, because almost all political support for UNCTAD's positions, reflected in the original text of the Group of 77, had evaporated. However, abandoning these demands required the context of the contact group, where concessions by the Group of 77 on these secondary issues could be compensated by movement in the position of developed countries on the more important issues under discussion in Committee One. While appropriate formulae had to be found, it was obvious that the UNDP and the IBRD would be the lead-agencies for national follow-up and that UNCTAD's role was to monitor progress at the global level. Moreover, the host of intergovernmental meetings originally called for gave way to an appropriate mid-term review of the SNPA in 1985 at which time consideration could be given to reconvening the UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries at the end of the 1980s. The original *carte blanche* language calling for whatever organizational resources were necessary was toned down by the donor community; the UN secretary-general was to make a presentation to the General Assembly, which meant that those countries called upon to finance personnel expansion would be able to scrutinize any proposals beforehand in the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.

While the contact group quickly disposed of the question of follow-up, considerably more time was needed to finalize texts for domestic policy measures and international financial support. The inclusion of domestic measures was an important earlier concession by the developing countries, but the measures called for were unspecific enough for appropriate language to be found by the contact group once agreement was reached on international financial targets. Until then, the least developed countries retained square brackets on their part of the contract as their principal bargaining chip.

From the tactical point of view, the least developed countries had laid their negotiating position on the table at the start of the conference. Indeed, the crucial issue of additional aid from donors had clearly been presented at the final session

25. For example, during the last session of the Preparatory Committee, the efforts by UNCTAD to move into the organizational territory of the IBRD and UNDP were described as a 'putsch institutionnel' (Antoine Bosshard, 'Aide aux pays les plus démunis: les soucis des pays riches', *Journal de Genève*, 10 July 1981). The military metaphors continued in Paris where the battle was described—somewhat more accurately given the diminished bargaining strength of UNCTAD—as 'la bataille—à fleuret moucheté' (Gérard Viratelle, 'M. Jean-Pierre Cot exhorte la CEE à prendre ses responsibilités, *Le Monde*, 9 September 1981).

26. One critic characterized the secretary-general's proposals and the behaviour of the secretariat in Paris as 'Les revendications de la CNUCED . . . pour la CNUCED'. See André Champarin, 'Les PMA dans les négotiations internationales: la tentation du néocolonialisme multilatéral' in G. Mignot with P. Jacquet and J. Loup, eds, *Les pays les plus pauvres: quelle coopération pour quel développement?* (Paris: Institut français des relations internationales, 1981), p. 209. UNCTAD's behaviour was certainly not unusual in terms of organizational reactions. UNDP's initial response to the Paris Conference, in spite of a joint UNCTAD/UNDP *note verbale* on 13 November 1981 that was designed finally to ensure a cooperative rather than competitive approach in national follow-up, was to pursue its own 'go-it-alone' stance in Africa. This equally predictable response, that of an offended bureaucracy, was an attempt to organize by themselves as many country reviews as possible without making any specific reference to the Paris programme of action or to UNCTAD. In both cases, it was more the perceived interests of the respective organizations than the potential benefits to the LDCs that counted.

of the Preparatory Committee in July in the Group of 77 redraft of the secretariat's 'non-paper'. The Group B response had simply been to change the title of the section with no further comment or commitment; Group D also made no response.

At the start of the Paris Conference, donors were still not forthcoming. It was apparent that the developed market economy donors were split as to the size and timing of commitments to additional assistance for the least developed countries. For many member states of the European Community and the Scandinavians, accepting a 0.15 per cent of GNP target for aid posed little problem. Other countries, for example Japan and the United States, could not accept such a target which would have entailed unacceptable increases in aid flows; for these a commitment to doubling aid was more politically feasible than the percentage target. Furthermore, many donors had traditionally been against targets and were unwilling to agree on fixed time schedules for reaching whatever aid volume targets were fixed in the action programme. With the developed market economies in disarray, it was not surprising that no initiative came from Group D, which promised nothing more than sympathy; and the Group of 77 were simply sitting back and waiting for Group B to sort out their own internal positions.

OECD countries were in continuous session, with separate and often parallel meetings for the member states of the EEC, the Scandinavians, the North Americans and Japan. The UK delegation had a peculiar difficulty in that the British government was opposed to tying itself to any form of aid target although its performance was already close to meeting that proposed for least developed countries. However, as president of the European Commission at the time, the United Kingdom was spokesman for the EEC; and hence it was under intense pressure to support the text, pressure which included a visit by M. Mitterrand to Mrs Thatcher during the conference's deliberations.

Time was working in Cot's favour, and he was able to manoeuvre in the contact group. Developed market economies had to make an offer to the least developed countries or be accused of sabotaging the conference. A compromise draft was finally agreed by the industrialized countries covering the key issue of additional assistance late on Saturday afternoon. The least developed countries, and the Group of 77, had very little time. Regional meetings were held, where disquiet was expressed particularly by the African group. The conference was saved from failure when the Group of 77 essentially accepted the *fait accompli* put forward by Group B. The least developed countries had made significant concessions to obtain an action programme which all parties could support without reservation. In fact, the bargaining included the agreement extracted from the Group of 77 by Group B that no derogatory remarks would be made during the final plenary session that might have spoiled the impression of a satisfied consensus. An optimistic interpretation was that the donors were to be congratulated for rallying together at the last minute; a more cynical one was that they had negotiated superbly.

The process of the plenary and committees of the Paris Conference illustrates aptly certain aspects of conference behaviour that have been emerging for some time within the United Nations. First, it called into doubt the practice of producing lengthy documentation. As the Tanzanian Minister of Finance and member of the Brandt Commission, Amir H. Jamal, stated at a meeting organized by the Commonwealth Secretariat: 'We are being buried under a mountain of paper.' Whatever the value to organizations and governments in the long run of research and analysis, the vast majority of the actual documents prepared for UN conferences

are not read or used. This generalization was particularly applicable to Paris, where the checklist of documents took up eight pages. Any one delegate could not have been expected to carry, let alone read, the thirty country presentations (one set of which weighed over twenty kilogrammes) or even the thirty-two submissions from UN organizations.

While the utility of continuing to produce such quantities of paper for future conferences is doubtful, a main policy statement is imperative and useful. The main substantive document for the Paris Conference, the four-part report from the secretary-general of UNCTAD,[27] was criticized by many as technocratic. These critics were correct in that a trade organization was not ideally qualified to call into question the *problématique* of a group of countries whose development bottlenecks cover all economic and social fields; nevertheless, the document provided facts and justifications for central elements of the action programme that were discussed by the two working committees and finalized by the contact group. Such a policy statement was necessary to set out the main issues, even if its proposals were not followed.[28]

The second salient fact emerging from the process of the Paris Conference is that technical expertise and substantive arguments are of relatively little consequence for a political gathering. Opening statements in Committee One put forward the politically reasonable, if logically absurd, point that there was so much to be done on the SNPA that no time should be wasted in discussions about sectoral components but that drafting should start immediately.

It was perhaps the process in Committee Two that illustrates most clearly the dominance of politics to the exclusion of substance. Interventions during the public and restricted sessions were mere statements of preferences—for or against UNCTAD's role in country follow-up, for or against multiple sessions of the monitoring committee, for or against significantly increased resources. While such superficial argumentation might very well have been expected, one could also have reasonably expected at least some discussion of the merits of various types of consultative arrangements. Instead, following the dictum of Marshall McLuhan that the 'medium is the message', it was assumed that country reviews with donors were a positive force for accelerated development in least developed countries, and that each country should have its own consultative arrangement. References were frequently made to past groups convened by the IBRD and the UNDP—as well as, less frequently, those of the OECD, the OAS and the conference secretariat—with no attention paid to their significant substantive, logistical and cost differences. The

27. A/CONF. 104/2 and Add. 1–3. One particularly critical observer wrote: 'Là où des nationaux, des experts concentrant leurs efforts sur un pays donné et vivant sur place, formés à la planification et aux opérations de développement concret n'ont pas réussi, faute d'approcher les réalités d'assez près, que peut-on attendre d'une organisation internationale spécialisée dans la négotiation des relations d'échange au niveau mondial et n'ayant approché de façon concrète que quelques secteurs extrêmement limités? Très exactement rien, en dehors de ces secteurs, et certainement pas une vision globale et réaliste du développement et de ses conditions'. See Mignot *et al.*, eds, *Les pays des plus pauvres*, p. 199. This collection is an excellent source of information on least developed countries. See also an earlier interdisciplinary account of the possibilities and limitations of various attempts by these countries to overcome their underdevelopment, Leonard Berry and Robert W. Kates, eds, *Making the most of the least: alternative ways to development* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1980).

28. Even on the issue of additional financing, this generalization was widely agreed to have applied: 'The Secretary-General's Report also proposed a number of "new mechanisms" for increased financial transfers, none of them particularly new, which were not seriously considered by the Conference' (Ewing, 'UN Conference', p. 171).

lack of discussion of these issues led to a situation in which the value and interest of past review meetings, as well as the potential of future ones organized by the conference secretariat, were dismissed on *ad hominem* grounds, that is, donors and major UN organizations did not want UNCTAD involved.

A third important element of the conference process was its theatrical nature. Conferences have their own dynamics. The plenary hears statements, and committees must meet during all allotted time in order to identify problems in a negotiating text. The latter must also go through the ceremony of general readings and breaking up into small drafting groups in order to give states and UN organizations the impression of active participation. However, a committee can normally only agree on largely uncontroversial sections of draft resolutions, placing square brackets around alternative wordings for contested parts. Overcoming controversy requires compromise and trade-offs at the highest political level among representatives of various groups. Committees deliberate endlessly, endeavouring to reach compromise when none is really possible. As mentioned above, this pattern was not followed in Paris.

The adoption of the final report also ran counter to form in that it entailed a minimal expenditure of time by participants. The recommendations by the Preparatory Committee and the senior officials—to have a brief report consisting only of an action programme and a small procedural section—were not fully respected; but while much information will be made available for posterity in printed form,[29] delegates spent most of their time in Paris discussing the content of the SNPA rather than any subtleties in the language used to describe the debate.

The 'friends of the rapporteur' were far less important than in most conferences because they were only responsible for an uncontested report of ten pages in which each group drafted its own text. A problem initially arose because the rapporteur did not agree to the proposal that no summary of proceedings was necessary and mobilized members of his group to insist upon a reversal of the recommendation to this effect from the senior officials. The conference secretariat was appalled; it had made no provisions for writing or processing a major report. After considerable shuffling and all-night sessions, dissatisfaction with the secretariat's initial drafts was emanating from every group. Subsequently, an ingenious solution was found: as texts were meant to reflect each group's interventions in the debate in a favourable light, why not ask each to draft its own summary? Having established limits (two pages for the Group of 77 spokesman, two pages for the rest of the Group of 77, one page for China, two pages for OECD countries and two pages for the socialist countries), it was unnecessary for any time whatsoever to be spent by the plenary in digesting what were agreed to be the legitimate prerogatives of groups.

In Paris, non-governmental organizations were notable for their low profile. At previous UN conferences, NGOs have normally fulfilled three important functions: exerting pressure upon the governmental delegations of Western countries to change their public policy stances; raising a variety of issues not popular with or feasible

29. The proceedings will eventually contain the complete texts of statements from heads of state, the secretary-general, the secretary-general of the conference, greetings from heads of state, closing statement by the president, etc. From the point of view of the conference itself, however, this material was to be published perhaps as much as two years later. Thus, available time and facilities were employed for discussions of substance so that the essence of the report could be made available rapidly in all languages in order to be processed in Paris and also quickly by the Second Committee of the General Assembly, which was to consider the conference in the month following the completion of deliberations in Paris (see General Assembly Resolution 36/194).

for governments and intergovernmental organizations through a parallel (or 'counter') conference; and providing alternative and usually numerous views and interpretations of in-conference developments through a daily newspaper.[30]

After an initial meeting organized in Geneva by the UNCTAD secretariat in February 1981, a steering committee was formed, but this actually did very little to orchestrate the NGO presence in Paris. The NGOs blamed the conference secretariat for having accorded them low priority; but in other conferences, they were themselves responsible for the pushing and shoving that made them integral. In Paris, NGO activities were essentially limited to a two-day press encounter held on 30–31 August; a colloquium held at the *Fondation nationale des sciences politiques* on 5–6 September; and a low-key mimeographed journal, *Commentaries*, published four times during the conference by the eighty or so NGOs present.

A more plausible explanation for the low profile of NGOs than mere lack of time and funds was the issue itself. Overall development in poor countries cuts across the mandates of almost all NGOs whether involved in development education, political lobbying or the delivery of assistance. For other conferences, the subject matter under discussion lent itself more readily to being digested by a discrete part of the NGO community that was already mobilized—for example, conservation groups for the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment; family planning groups for the 1974 World Population Conference in Bucharest; and grain companies and specialists in the 'green revolution' for the 1974 World Food Conference in Rome.

The behaviour of coalitions during negotiations

Perhaps the most important analytical insights from the Paris Conference relate to the behaviour of various groups during bargaining. *Effective* United Nations decisions on economic and social affairs must be *negotiated.* The emphases are intended to distinguish what happened in Paris from the earliest years of the UN's existence in which decisions may have been effective because they were imposed as a result of the lack of universal membership, as well as more recent times when decisions have been less than effective as a result of sterile confrontations between the numerically superior South and the powerful but numerically inferior North. If states are to make policy internationally through global conferences, a new framework needs to evolve, one based on a process of give and take. Three conditions characterized bargaining in Paris which will be equally necessary for successful negotiations in other instances: political good will on the specific issue; flexible coalitions based on interests rather than ideology; and a willingness to compromise.

Prior to Paris, the problems of least developed countries had become an acceptable part of the debate between developed and developing countries. Humanitarian concerns and parliamentary directives had made this issue an unassailable priority, and shifts in policy had already occurred. While still receiving less *per capita* than other developing countries, assistance flows to least developed countries in the 1970s increased three times faster than those to other developing countries. The

30. For an analysis of the essential roles of NGOs at one recent conference, see Thomas G. Weiss and Robert S. Jordan, 'The role of NGOs in the World Food Conference', *International Associations*, Vol. XXVII, No. 5, pp. 268–72. For a discussion of NGO frustrations in Paris, see Gérard Viratelle, 'Comment répondre aux aspirations des plus pauvres ou le rôle des organisations non-gouvernementales', *Le Monde*, 10 September 1981.

conditions governing such assistance had also improved: close to 90 per cent was provided on a grant basis, and 80 per cent of the countries benefiting from debt relief and cancellation were least developed. Commercial policy advantages had also been accorded, the most notable being the special treatment by the European Community accorded in the Second Lomé Convention. Furthermore, other developing countries had selectively begun to recognize the need to help out their particularly hard-pressed neighbours through such measures as the compensation clause for least developed member states in the Economic Community of West African States and the OPEC contribution to the Common Fund for least developed countries.

The existence of flexible coalitions at the Paris Conference was also a significant departure from recent practice. The principle of universality in UN membership has come close to actualization, and elaborate procedures have evolved for sorting out common governmental positions in what would otherwise be a cacophony of voices. Since the first session of UNCTAD at Geneva in 1964, a group system has been developed which now applies to almost all intergovernmental meetings.[31] The groups are defined according to a combination of geographic, economic and ideological considerations. The original building blocks were Group A (developing countries of Africa and Asia), Group B (the developed market economies of the Western world, essentially the membership of the OECD),[32] Group C (developing countries of Latin America) and Group D (the socialist countries of Eastern Europe).[33] A pooling of Groups A and C originally totalled seventy-seven developing countries; the separate 'A' and 'C' labels have gradually disappeared (although the three regions meet separately prior to full meetings) and some 120 developing countries are now members of the 'Group of 77'.[34] Since the entry of the People's Republic of China into the UN, it has been considered a 'group' by itself.[35]

The purpose of the system is to allow all perspectives to be brought forth behind closed doors, and then for a spokesman of the group to defend a common denominator and negotiate it with adversaries or allies. In setting up working committees or groups of officers for meetings, the commonly accepted principle is

31. A recent discussion of these developments, as well as the overall context of UNCTAD where group politics has been perfected, can be found in Robert L. Rothstein, *Global bargaining: UNCTAD and the quest for a New International Economic Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979). For a discussion of the internal and external politics surrounding UNCTAD's foundation and its group system as an alternative to the domination by the North in other international organizations, see Branislov Gosivic, *UNCTAD: compromise and conflict* (Leiden: Sijthoff, 1972), Diego Cordovez, *UNCTAD and development diplomacy: from confrontation to strategy* (London: *Journal of World Trade Law*, 1970), and Kamal Hagras, *United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: a case study in UN diplomacy* (New York: Praeger, 1965).

32. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, West Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States and Switzerland, which is a member of OECD but not of the United Nations.

33. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania and the USSR, including the Byelorussian SSR and the Ukrainian SSR.

34. The lists of countries for groups A, B, C and D still exist in UNCTAD's rules of procedure. They were originally designed not only for caucusing but also for representation on standing committees and selection of officers according to the principle of revolving participation. The most difficult situations arose from the inclusion of international renegades such as South Africa and Israel on the lists of developing countries as well as the overwhelming role of China. These lists are now not important as the Group of 77 selects its own members, and UNCTAD committees are open to all states.

35. For purposes of the present analysis, China and Group D will be ignored. China always supports the positions taken by the Group of 77. As the main clashes occur between West and South, Group D plays a relatively minor role in bargaining.

to have multiples of a 3–2–1 ratio (Group of 77–Group B–Group D). Splitting down into smaller groupings is workable because the larger group system provides a natural communications network with those delegates who are not members of more selective groupings, the latter being briefed and also having the opportunity to make known their own governments' views.

At a minimum, members of groups meet to exchange information concerning one another's positions, but ideally they go further and attempt to frame a common position that all participating states in a group can adopt. Only Eastern Europe succeeds in achieving total uniformity in positions and voting among its member states. Group B positions vary depending on issues, and on development problems voting patterns have varied, reflecting positions basically either in sympathy with or hostile towards those of the Group of 77. Even before the group was formed, those who were to be its members tended to articulate similar positions within the General Assembly, particularly on development issues; and their collective stance has become more tightly knit over time.[36]

During the 1970s voting, in the General Assembly as well as elsewhere in the UN system, gave way to consensus. The group system created in UNCTAD began to play an ever more important role in determining state behaviour during international deliberations, especially since the mid-1970s when the industrialized North was suddenly made aware of the bargaining power of the South as a result of the collective assertiveness of OPEC. The coalition of developing countries was strengthened by OPEC's actions, and the process of negotiating a new international order was initiated. However, while the group system was perfected as an effective manner to organize discussions and negotiations, its rigidity has become counter-productive. As one participant of long standing has noted, '. . . the whole situation is becoming increasingly complex: North and South no longer represent two internally homogeneous camps on opposite sides of the spectrum which can negotiate with each other on the basis of clearly defined positions'.[37] Differences in views within groups in Paris may have been as great as differences among them. The existence of two major factions in Group B indicated that the traditionally more pro-development partners (in particular the Scandinavians and Dutch, joined for this meeting by the French and Canadians) were no longer willing to be associated with the lowest common denominator that necessarily resulted from compromising with the most conservative members of Group B (the United States, the United Kingdom, Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany); the latter also were not in a position to support proposals by their more pro-Third-World partners.

According to several representatives of Western countries, Group B had agreed not to act as a caucus or an officially constituted group specifically so that those members wanting to do more for the least developed would not be constrained by the minimalist dynamics of the group system. The long-standing disgruntlement of many Western countries with the rigidity of group caucusing became a firm decision to abandon it with the French desire to play a dominant role in making 'their'

36. See Harold K. Jacobson, *Networks of interdependence* (New York: Knopf 1979), especially his discussion of voting patterns of the Group of 77 in the General Assembly on pp. 117–20.

37. Van Dam, 'North–South negotiations', p. 481. He has pointed out that the original basis for unity among developing countries was the need to establish a homogeneous position with decolonization, non-alignment in the East–West struggle and promotion of common economic interests in mind. Over time, these uniting factors have become considerably less influential; see van Dam, pp. 488–90.

conference a success. The opening statement by Canada to the senior officials' meeting specified that there was no longer a Group B, only 'members of OECD' which shared certain common views but which would act individually. This refusal to accept UNCTAD terminology and operating procedures for a UN conference was more than semantic gymnastics because it allowed the French delegation to play its pivotal leadership role.

While the industrialized West was divided into two, the Group of 77 had its own divisions, albeit less visible ones. The least developed countries themselves formed a unit seeking maximum benefits for itself. However, its allies in bargaining came as much from the pro-development faction of the West as from more traditional negotiating partners. The wealthiest members of the Group of 77 wished not to be identified as 'donors' or to be specifically called upon to do more for the least developed. The middle-level developing countries feared that more for the least developed would mean less for them, particularly with foreign assistance budgets being eroded in real terms by inflation. Mass-poverty countries and other poor developing countries that are not least developed but not economically very far ahead of those that are so classified, were concerned to emphasize their own plight.

Convening the Paris Conference for a discrete part of the group of developing countries was itself a terminological breakthrough. Clearly there are different stages of development; and those countries on the bottom are by definition 'least developed'. During much of the 1960s and 1970s, however, such a technically sound concept and obvious fact looked like political manoeuvring to disrupt the common stance of developing countries; and the Third World collectively looked askance upon the creation of any sub-categories. Gradually, however, the poorest members of the Group of 77 began to realize the potential benefits that might be gained from an emphasis on their own problems. The Paris Conference ended a decade of efforts by the least developed countries to differentiate themselves from other developing countries, to force the Group of 77 publicly to abandon the fiction that all of its members were equally affected by global economic problems. As one critic observed: 'The Paris Conference set the political seal on the notion of a "least developed country" and put an end, for the time being at least, to the long-standing debate about creating a special sub-category of underdevelopment'.[38] Unease with the group system surfaced in Paris because poorer nations no longer uniformly believed that the 'oil weapon' was the only lever for improving their lot. The cumulative damages from successive price increases forced least developed countries to reevaluate their traditionally supportive and sympathetic view of OPEC, and indirectly the shibboleth of Group of 77 solidarity.

An obvious question is over what period of time one could reasonably expect such a large, amorphous and tenuous amalgam as the Group of 77 to remain intact. With its abundance of economic, ideological and cultural differences, one might realistically expect this coalition to have broken up sooner. The amount of time spent patching up differences in order to present the image of a united front has been disproportionate with the time devoted to creative thinking about future policy stances and possibilities for concrete agreements. Furthermore, the necessity for unquestioned loyalty has forced potentially supportive allies in the North to

38. M.-C. Smouts, 'The story of a controversial concept', *The Courier*, Mar.–Apr. 1982, No. 72, p. 49. See pp. 48–79 for further discussions of least developed countries with particular reference to the 22 which are the beneficiaries of EEC ACP measures.

remain in their own group although its views have frequently clashed with their convictions in favour of certain Southern causes.

One could argue that Groups B and D are each actually more tightly knit than the Group of 77. While there are differences in their political and economic systems and their views towards the Third World, industrialized countries in the West possess many of the same cultural roots and share a commitment to continuing market economies. The socialist countries of Eastern Europe are linked together under Soviet direction that now goes back almost four decades. Each of these groups has a tradition of working through an institutional setting: the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance in Moscow. The efforts of developing countries in the Group of 77 have been more publicized; but the solidarity and organizational effectiveness of the industrialized status quo in the capitalist and socialist North have not been any less striking.

Negotiations about a more equitable global order would not have begun without the UNCTAD group system; and Group of 77 solidarity has unquestionably been a significant and positive force for change in the United Nations and the world. Yet the erosion of uniformity in fora such as the UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries is not a negative development. A plausible explanation for the lack of progress in international economic negotiations must include not only the insensitivity of developed nations to the need for change, but also the inflexibility of the common-denominator approach of the group system, including the Group of 77's internal difficulties and the time-consuming process of reaching compromises.

Developing countries have long feared that any official recognition of a special status for OPEC or newly-industrializing developing countries or the least developed countries would give rise to disunity within the Group of 77 that would permit the West to divide and conquer.[39] The Paris Conference demonstrated not only that the least developed countries could successfully differentiate themselves from other developing countries, but also that Group B could be divided to the benefit of the LDCs. Paris presented new possibilities for negotiations because the 'haves' were no longer obliged to take up a common minimalist position confronting the maximalist stance of the 'have-nots'.

Negotiations in Paris were also characterized by the readiness of the principal parties to talk seriously and to compromise. More particularly, the internal structural problems of the least developed countries were brought openly into the overall debate, thereby making serious negotiations possible. North–South discussions have frequently reached an impasse because the adversary roles assumed automatically by the rich and the poor have halted discussions prematurely and prevented valuable compromises. UNCTAD can be held partially responsible for the inertia that has characterized recent international negotiations; the secretariat

39. For a theoretical discussion, see 'Clivages Sud–Sud et géopolitique de l'énergie', pp. 144–7 in A. Bressand and P. Jacquet, 'Les PMA dans les relations internationales: quels enjeux pour quelle politique?' in Mignot *et al.*, eds, *Les pays les plus pauvres*. It should be noted that the concept of legal inequality in international economic relations is a fundamental element of the new international economic order. This principle of positive discrimination is not confined to relations between developed and developing countries but also includes those among poor and better-off developing countries. See Wil D. Verwey, 'The principle of preferential treatment for developing countries and particularly needy sub-groups among them in the practice of states and intergovernmental organizations', a report to UNITAR to be submitted to the General Assembly, mimeographed version July 1982.

has been criticized for a lack of initiative in trying to overcome the reluctance of the Third World to tackle domestic problems. This recalcitrance, combined with expectations of rapid and systemic changes, have made it difficult to find compromises and thus to negotiate.

One very positive development at the Paris Conference was that it 'clearly highlighted the co-responsibility of the [least developed countries'] authorities and the members of the international community as regards implementing the action programme'.[40] In contrast, previous discussions within the United Nations avoided direct consideration of the responsibility of developing countries for their own plight. A convenient villain was found in the behaviour of developed countries. 'Respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of every country' (paragraph 13 of the International Development Strategy) had become synonymous with an uncritical acceptance of the internal status quo in developing countries.

The theme of domestic policy reforms was introduced gradually into conference preparations. While the language is appropriately cautious, an entire chapter of the secretary-general's report was devoted to this subject.[41] The contribution from the Economic Commission for Africa, whose member states include two-thirds of the least developed countries, stressed the necessity of alterations in internal policies in no uncertain terms.[42] Throughout the sessions of the Preparatory Committee, and particularly during the third, Group B also underlined the importance of this theme.[43] The annual report of the World Bank, issued a few weeks before the conference, devoted a chapter to the issue, concentrating on sub-Saharan Africa where most countries are least developed and which had been the subject of another highly critical report.[44]

The inclusion of this topic on the Paris agenda as well as on those for future review meetings demonstrated a maturation process and was thus an important turning point. The least developed countries did not attempt to prevent discussions of these issues as had been the case in other UN fora.[45] The need for domestic changes in policy as a vehicle for growth and as a prerequisite for attracting increased financial transfers had long been an underlying theme in IBRD and IMF analyses and recommendations, and these Washington-based institutions had earned a reputation for imposing their views. In Paris, the issue of domestic priorities and policies had become so obviously essential that it could no longer be ignored. More adequate external support would need to be complemented by more suitable frameworks of internal policies in order to realize the development potential of least developed countries.

40. A. Champmarin, 'What did the Paris conference achieve?', *The Courrier*, Mar.–Apr. 1982, No. 72, p. 58.

41. A/CONF. 104/2/Add. 1, 'Chapter II: sectoral performance, domestic policies and prospects for the 1980s'.

42. A/CONF. 104/7/Add. 1, Part II, 'Domestic problems and economic policies in African least developed countries'.

43. A/CONF. 104/PC/19/Add. 7 contains proposals, particularly in Chapter II, 'Priorities and policies for structural change at the national level'.

44. *World development report 1981* (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 1981), Chapter 6; *Accelerated development in sub-Saharan Africa: an agenda for action*, Report 3358 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, August 1981).

45. There were some dissenting voices among the LDCs. In spite of the agreement to include this item by the Preparatory Committee at its third session after considerable negotiations, one LDC delegate sought unsuccessfully to reopen the issue. He proposed during preliminary meetings in Geneva a few days before the senior officials met that the inclusion of this item amounted to interference in the internal affairs of his country.

A major emphasis in the debate of Committee One was placed on 'objectives, priorities and policies at the national level', or what least developed countries must do for themselves. The result was a *quid pro quo* bargaining session in which developed countries agreed to make a special effort to increase financial and technical transfers to the least developed countries on the condition that the latter be willing to consider a range of internal reforms to mobilize domestic resources and put to better use increased external resources.

Interviews with delegates from OECD countries indicated the importance of this evolution in illustrating the perceived seriousness of least developed countries during negotiations. It is worth citing the final report on this issue, the lengthy text of which was deliberately included by representatives from OECD countries in its specific allotment of pages:

> . . . Representatives of several developed market-economy countries drew attention to the role of inappropriate domestic policies as a partial cause of the low level of development of the least developed countries. Among the factors inhibiting development, several mentioned insufficient attention to the mobilization and utilization of national and domestic financial resources and to the development of human resources, as well as inappropriate exchange rate and other policies that tended to over-protect industry and hold back agriculture. In their view, internal policy reform and improved management by least developed countries were essential elements without which concessional aid would be ineffective in promoting development. The importance of correct priorities in food and agriculture, small-scale industry, population policies, health, nutrition, education and energy development in least developed countries was also underlined.[46]

These delegates pointed out that in successful consultative arrangements—be they organized by the World Bank, a bilateral donor or other intergovernmental organizations such as the Organization of American States—donor commitments rather than rhetoric resulted when a scrutiny of domestic efforts by the recipient country was an integral part of the agenda. While developing countries might prefer to ignore the subject, and they can prevent its discussion in the United Nations, it cannot be avoided if serious discussion is to ensue. The United States statement of interpretation upon the adoption of the Substantial New Programme of Action underlined the importance of a balanced discussion of aid. 'The complementarity among domestic and international measures' had contributed to the positive atmosphere of negotiations that meant the US delegation 'was pleased to join in the consensus' on a text that many had earlier felt was going to present insuperable problems for the Reagan administration.[47]

Conclusions

The foregoing analysis has highlighted certain aspects of the successful process of the Paris Conference; the author is not unaware of explanations other than those already discussed. The first implies collusion among developed countries to disrupt the common front heretofore presented by the Group of 77. While plausible (a number of delegates from developed countries somewhat gleefully recognized the potential for division in the issue), it is inadequate. Developed and developing

46. A/CONF. 104/22, para. 39.
47. A/CONF. 104/22, pp. 40–1.

countries were both divided in Paris; the legitimate and laudable humanitarian concern to emphasize the plight of least developed countries cannot be so easily dismissed.

The most cynical explanation for the positive results from Paris is that this conference should be seen as part of the 'old' international economic order in which wealthy donors support poor recipients in a one-way relationship of dependency. To be sure, the conference was about aid. In spite of a growing awareness of shortcomings, it was nonetheless clear that larger and more suitable flows of assistance to least developed countries were necessary, if not sufficient, for accelerated economic development. There would be an acute need to expand import capacities in order to overcome the past record of decline and stagnation as well as to improve basic living conditions. Related to its somewhat 'old-fashioned' emphasis on external aid is a critical view of the Paris Conference as a convenient and inexpensive way for developed countries to give the impression of action in order to forestall fundamental change. The problems of the least developed countries are relatively manageable. Their population is limited—only one-eighth of the population of developing countries—and thus accelerated development could occur at relatively low cost.

These explanations contain elements of truth; yet one must not denigrate the fact that something happened during this conference. This conference must be distinctly contrasted with a host of other recent North–South gatherings in which no progress was made because of confrontational tactics and an over-ambitious goal: nothing short of a complete alteration in the global balance of power and redistribution of the benefits of economic growth. The multiplicity of sectors and interests thereby involved provided a complex and mystifying web of problems, which in fact served as an all too convenient excuse for doing nothing. The paralysis of global negotiations can, to a great extent, be explained by not only a lack of political will but also the lack of objective research and serious dialogue on discrete parts of international economic affairs among the most concerned partners.

One analyst, after having examined the Law of the Sea Conference, concluded that 'those in search of means to radical reform of the international system should conduct their search elsewhere than in the corridors of the United Nations'.[48] The above analysis would qualify this common view. It has not presented evidence to dispute the fact that the United Nations is subject to the obvious constraints of national interests which circumscribe its ability to transform international relations. If one regards international conferences as a lens through which to observe the evolution of international relations and to reveal the details of political forces engaged, then such negotiations can be used to accelerate and institutionalize changes that have already begun to occur in the international system rather than to institute changes. The real challenge of international organization is to make the most of a given situation rather than be frustrated by the inability to alter radically the international system.

The discussion of the Paris Conference suggests that analysts must distinguish clearly between long-term objectives, which may include reform of the international system, and short-term means. A global, ad hoc conference is a means. The UN Conference on the Least Developed Countries was successful because it sought limited, immediate results; or in the words of one critical observer, 'The Conference

48. Buzan, *Seabed politics*, p. 298.

arrived at modest but practical conclusions, in marked contrast to others of its kind'.[49] The possible applications of the knowledge emerging from analysis of the process of successful conference diplomacy in Paris merit the attention of both scholars and practitioners and are briefly discussed below.

Location

The leadership of the host government is crucial, but it is not something over which the United Nations has much control. Nevertheless, the experience of Paris certainly indicates that it would be preferable for key geopolitical states to sponsor such meetings. The host government in any event should attempt to follow the Paris pattern by pre-empting procedural problems and closely respecting deadlines. Further, as the US, UK and German acceptance of French pressure suggests, a host government in many cases can stretch conventional conceptions of decorum and exert forward-looking leadership that will be tolerated, if not embraced, by recalcitrant partners.

Planning time

Preparations for this conference call into question the widely held belief that adequate planning time for successful conferences is about three years. There are always problems in preparations, and those for Paris do not appear worse than those for other UN conferences. Given limited resources, a permanent secretariat—here UNCTAD—as well as the document reproduction machinery, should set aside normal business. The relationship between the results of global, ad hoc conferences and the time necessary for their preparation needs further examination; but the present case suggests that more preparatory time would not have led to significantly better results.[50] Future UN conferences can be prepared quickly, particularly if documentation, which is largely irrelevant for negotiations, is severely limited.

Secretariat

While the conference secretariat should be given credit for its efforts, the experience of Paris suggests that the standard operating procedures for most previous global conferences should have been followed. Outsiders should be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to head an independent secretariat, although the latter should clearly make maximum use of knowledgeable services or secretariats within the system. UNCTAD's self-protectiveness inhibited the extent of its thought and involvement; the brevity of the preparatory time allowed it to structure the content of debate around its own substantive competence and biases and to ignore necessary political spade-work.

49. Ewing, 'UN Conference', p. 173.

50. A different type of analysis would have to be used for protracted conferences for which the variable of time plays a crucial, but different, role. Buzan has argued that the extended debate concerning the Law of the Sea permitted technological, political and economic developments as well as feedback from the national to the international level that influenced the character of negotiations. In addition, the passage of time permitted the enthusiasm of delegations to dwindle and allowed states to act unilaterally. See Buzan, *Seabed politics*, pp. 269–300.

Conference calendar

No more than two weeks are necessary for such meetings. Normally, whatever time allocated (frequently a month), plus an extension of a day or two, has been fully used. In Paris, two weeks provided enough time for the ritual of plenary speeches and simultaneous negotiations by working committees on the basis of an agreed Group of 77 text. Satisfactory trade-offs and language can be found provided that the conference leadership presses states to accept the urgency of an issue and the necessity to work behind closed doors early.

Non-governmental organizations

While the results of the conference may not have been altered by a higher NGO profile, the organizations themselves missed an opportunity to raise alternative views on least development and also to publicize their own potential contributions. Future conferences would do well to follow the practices of conferences other than Paris during which NGOs were more involved and visible.

Dynamics of negotiations

Perhaps the biggest challenge for future conferences is posed by developments in Paris relating to bargaining between coalitions. The first characteristic was a modicum of political goodwill—*on the specific issue discussed.* The problems of least developed countries had gradually become acceptable to the Group of 77 by the time of the 1979 UNCTAD Conference in Manila after earlier haggling at UNCTAD sessions in Delhi, Santiago and Nairobi. Humanitarian concerns and parliamentary directives had also made this issue a priority for donors. While the international community may not be in a position to avoid controversy, it should be clearly understood that discussions in a relatively non-controversial field such as this have a far higher likelihood of success. Given limited resources, consideration should be given to their utilization where there is a high probability of pay-off. In a related way, the emphasis on country specifics as the basis for global negotiations permitted policy proposals to be more concrete and direct than in conferences where generalities applicable to all developing countries necessarily blurred valid negotiating points.

The second characteristic related to the existence of *flexible coalitions* based on interests rather than ideology. The erosion of traditional bargaining coalitions at the Paris Conference may prove to be an important harbinger. The Group of 77's overwhelming numerical majority is not sufficient in itself to bring about meaningful negotiations and significant concessions by the rich to the poor. Negotiations demand the existence of shifting coalitions based on interests and not rigid divisions based on preconceived notions of solidarity. International propositions and rhetoric in the early and mid-1970s resulted from a unified stance by the Group of 77, which was maintained by formulating programmes that incorporated the demands, sometimes conflicting, of all developing countries. The indivisibility of solutions to all problems was stressed, thereby setting up proposals that were impossible to discuss in their entirety. These operating rules have also not permitted those members of the OECD coalition favourable to certain positions of developing

countries to play a proper balancing role.[51] The problem of the least developed countries is not unique as one which permits penetration of the sacrosanct borders of groups. Commodity agreements or special funding measures must reflect the natural alliances of interest between producing and consuming countries or wealthy and poor countries, be they developed or developing. Rather than clinging desperately to a group system whose utility has been increasingly called into question by events and the pitiful results of negotiations, international organizations, and UNCTAD in particular,[52] should critically examine the potential of alternative coalitions for future international bargaining.

The third characteristic was the *demonstrated willingness of the principal parties to compromise* in Paris. This may seem an obvious requirement, but the lacklustre results of other conferences suggests that the need for give-and-take on both sides is easily overlooked. The global economic crisis has strengthened the resolve of developed countries not to sit back politely and defensively accepting exclusive responsibility for poverty in developing countries. Enlarging debate to include the necessity for domestic reform permitted serious discussions in Paris. However embarrassing or sensitive, it was no longer possible to deny that a major portion of responsibility for extreme underdevelopment lay with the least developed countries themselves. Their governments did not try to deny that widespread social reform would be necessary if increased international support was to benefit the vast majority of citizens in them. Such an admission was an important element in enticing recalcitrant donors to negotiate and eventually support specific targets for increased financial and technical support in the SNPA.

In short, this conference was in many ways the opposite of other global, ad hoc conferences because it focussed on a manageable problem for which political goodwill already existed. It was extremely well prepared logistically by the UNCTAD secretariat which also was responsible for the innovatory use of country specifics for a global discussion. The secretariat's lack of preliminary, political preparations was compensated for by French leadership during the conference. There was a serious will to negotiate, demonstrated by concessions from both donors and the least developed countries. The borders of traditional bargaining coalitions were porous enough to make serious negotiations possible. In spite of the unpropitious global context, the adoption of the Substantial New Programme of Action, and perhaps its implementation, demonstrated that one need not await the resolution of all the complex problems that colour the dialogue between developed and developing countries before initiating worthwhile action. The international community has made a start for the least developed countries, which may then turn out to be part of a wider, longer-term process altering overall international economic relations.

51. One participant in international negotiations has written that 'it would appear that negotiations concerning all aspects of the North–South question simultaneously and attempts to arrive at package agreements are doomed to failure' (van Dam, p. 501).

52. Rothstein has commented that 'negotiations' may be too strong a term to describe UNCTAD's activities: 'In sum, one of the most illuminating aspects of the bargaining process at UNCTAD is how little bargaining actually goes on' (*Global bargaining*, p. 203). Mr Corea noted in his closing statement in Paris that the 'Conference had helped to enrich UNCTAD as an organization'. This lesson may have been the most critical one to emerge for the secretariat.

Functionalism revisited: the UN family in the 1980s

EVAN LUARD*

At the time when the UN was being founded, it was held by exponents of 'functionalist' theory, such as David Mitrany, that the main hope for the development of international organizations was not in the political field, where disagreements among states were most acute, and the resistance to international authority was greatest, but in the various functional areas where international cooperation was then beginning to develop and where the political antagonisms were likely to be least. If nations could acquire the habit of cooperating for commonly accepted purposes—to improve world health, to develop world agriculture, to promote cooperation in the field of education and science, to create an effective infrastructure for world posts and telecommunications, and so on—this habit would eventually spill over into the political arena. So a 'working peace system' would be established, and a more harmonious international order would slowly come into being.

There were always weaknesses in this theory. Was it true that the new specialized agencies to perform these various practical tasks would be free of political disputes? Even if cooperation in these functional areas could be effectively established, would there be a spill-over into the more contentious political arena? Was it not possible that a movement in the opposite direction might take place: that violent political and ideological conflicts, expressed first in political bodies, would eventually also spill over into the specialized agencies and would damage the effort to establish effective cooperative arrangements there?

Despite doubts of this kind, many people probably felt when the UN family was established that the system of specialized agencies, now far more numerous than before and integrated more closely within the UN framework, was one of the most hopeful features of the postwar international scene. And today it would still be widely judged that the development of these activities has been perhaps the most positive achievement of the UN system.

In the field of peace and security the performance of the UN is viewed by many with disappointment (admittedly partly because of unrealistic expectations about what it could be expected to bring about without a transfer of power such as no nation was prepared to concede). International conflict has been widespread. The UN has appeared to be able to do little to prevent wars from erupting, still less to bring them to an end after they have broken out. Expenditure on armaments is higher than ever before in peace time, among poor and weak countries as much as among the most powerful. The only area of UN activity which has, to some extent, prospered and grown is that undertaken by the specialized agencies and other

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0020–5850/83/4/0677—16$03.00©1983 International Affairs

functional bodies within the system, which operate today on a far bigger scale than most people envisaged thirty-odd years ago.

This expansion can be measured partially simply in terms of the growth of the budgets of the various agencies concerned. The regular budgets of the specialized agencies themselves, for example, grew from about $40m in 1950 to $80m in 1960, over $300m in 1970 and well over $1bn today. Expenditure over and above that, financed by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and other voluntary funds (including spending within the UN itself), has grown even faster, from $8m in 1950, to $150m in 1960, $400m in 1970 and around $2bn today. The number of agencies has grown steadily, from five or so when the Second World War ended to fifteeen today. The number of employees of the system has grown from a few thousand to over fifty thousand.

More significantly, the range of problems tackled by the UN family has increased steadily during this period. Substantial programmes are now undertaken in such fields as the environment, the care of refugees, population, disaster relief, and many others, scarcely thought of when the UN began. The development assistance side of each agency's work has multiplied many times: all are now involved, on a larger scale than ever, in field work within developing countries all over the world. Even the UN itself has become increasingly engaged in such practical work on the ground, as well as organizing a huge variety of discussions, including large-scale international conferences which have focussed world attention in turn on such matters as the environment, population, women, habitation, science and technology, and many others.

The fact that there has been so much activity of this kind is no guarantee that it has been effective: that is, 'functional'. There is fairly general agreement that many of the agencies are overmanned, bureaucratic, and sometimes inefficient. They have certainly not escaped political controversy, sometimes of a petty and irrelevant kind. And they inevitably suffer problems inherent in multinational, multilingual organizations, with staffs from widely varying cultural and political backgrounds, and ultimately run by assemblies of a hundred and fifty-odd nations, each with different conceptions of the primary purposes of the organization in question. These are partly difficulties that all international bodies must encounter. But the question arises: could the tasks be better performed in the future?

General problems of the system

Let us first look at the main problems that have been encountered by these various organizations over the past thirty-five years. This may help us to reach some judgements about the prospects for their development over the coming decade.

First, the idea that organizations with limited functional objectives would be free of political conflict quickly proved itself unfounded. Throughout their history, but especially during the first decade or two of their existence, East–West conflicts have frequently erupted within them. At the beginning of the 1950s, at the height of the cold war, the Soviet Union left most of the agencies altogether for two or three years. Delegates from individual groups frequently raise within them extraneous political issues which are only barely related to the main purposes of the organization concerned.

Secondly there have been, even more often, conflicts of a North–South character (which quite often push the Soviet Union and the United States into the same

camp). The most widespread and the most fundamental of these disputes has concerned the level of expenditure to be undertaken by each agency. Because a substantial proportion of expenditure in all of them in recent years has been for development-related purposes, bringing special benefits to poor countries, and because a major part of the revenues is provided by rich countries, it is inevitable that the former are more enthusiastic supporters of large-scale programmes than the latter. Every year or two (according to the periodicity of the budget cycle) there takes place a major battle within each agency on this question, concerning not the fact of budgetary increase but the pace. Usually a compromise is reached which is closer to the view of the developing countries than that of the rich states (since the former have the votes and the latter no veto on this question). Though the richer Western countries confer together regularly (in the so-called Geneva Group) about these problems, and usually seek to contain budget increases, they have no ultimate power (short of leaving the organizations altogether) to prevent them. They can only hope to persuade the executive heads and the rest of the membership of the need to show moderation. The Western powers have even sometimes acted in concert with the Soviet Union on such matters, especially within the UN itself, in making private representations to the senior officials. This is a battle that will inevitably continue over the next decade because it relates to one of the most fundamental questions in any political system: the volume of redistribution that will be undertaken through the public spending system (the same issue that has been so bitterly debated, in California and many other states, in the United States in the past few years and was a major issue in the recent general elections in Britain). The problem is inherent in the structure of the agencies and there is no built-in formula for resolving it.

Another type of political conflict which has afflicted these organizations concerns the bilateral issues between individual members which are so often injected into their proceedings. The most persistent and the most acute is the Arab–Israeli dispute, which has been expressed, in one form or another, in almost all the agencies, and has caused serious crises in one or two, for example UNESCO and the ILO. Quite often a grievance of this kind is of such overriding and passionate concern to one or more member states that they cannot resist the temptation to bring it to the surface at every available opportunity. Usually such a member will have little difficulty in finding some aspect of the political problem which is related to the concern of the agency concerned: the Arabs raise Israeli excavations in east Jerusalem in UNESCO or labour practices in the occupied territories in the ILO. What those who indulge in this practice often forget is that, whatever justification may be found under the letter of the organization's constitution for raising such a question, they will usually forfeit rather than win support by doing so (as the injection of East–West issues by either side has often done) since most members resent the intrusion of essentially irrelevant issues. Western powers will certainly continue to deplore and discourage the raising of extraneous issues of this sort.

A fourth problem from which all the agencies have suffered (though it is the system as a whole which has suffered rather than the individual agencies) is the lack of an effective system of coordination. In theory the agencies belong to a common 'family' or system, within which they enjoy a considerable degree of autonomy. In practice the autonomy is far more evident than the family relationship. Three of the specialized agencies were in existence before the UN was founded (the International Telecommunication Union, the Universal Postal Union, and the ILO) and have

always resented being placed under even theoretical 'coordination' by the UN. The newer agencies are equally strongly committed to preserving their own independence of action. A vast mechanism for coordination has been established to try to create a semblance of order among this teeming swarm of children: the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), which is the main intergovernmental body responsible, the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC), the committee established by ECOSOC for the purpose, and the Administrative Committee on Coordination (ACC), the official body composed of the executive heads under the Secretary-General's chairmanship, as well as other bodies.[1] Though this effort has succeeded in reducing somewhat the problems of duplication and overlapping jurisdiction which previously existed and in establishing certain common services and institutions, it has done little to create a genuinely coordinated programme for the system as a whole. Each agency for the most part goes its own sweet way and takes as little notice as possible of the various exhortations made upon it to comply with the policy decisions made elsewhere, for example in ECOSOC or in the General Assembly.

If the functional operations of the UN family are to be made more effective in the next decade than they have been in the past, there is a need for progress to be made in resolving all four of these general difficulties: reductions in East–West rivalry, in North–South disputes, and in extraneous political controversies, and an increase in effective UN coordination. It would, however, be wishful thinking to expect substantial progress in any of these areas. The hope of the functionalists that political controversy could be excluded from the agencies was always a somewhat forlorn one and although it is reasonable to try to minimize the difficulties and to concentrate on the main purposes of each organization, it is likely that political conflicts will continue to make themselves felt, possibly in new forms. Some of the decisions to be reached in the agencies are essentially political and it is idle to hope that politics can be generally banned. Continuing attempts to establish a more effective coordination are undoubtedly required, but the built-in tendency towards decentralization of decision-making in the system (which has merits as well as disadvantages) will not be altogether overcome.

These are only some of the more general problems of the system. If the purposes they fulfil are to be better accomplished in the next decade, it will be necessary to look more closely at the problems of the agencies and the changes that will be needed to improve their effectiveness.

The functions of the future

Which are the primary functions the agencies will be called on to exercise in the coming years? Over the past three and a half decades, all the agencies have grown rapidly, in terms of both their budgets and the tasks they are called upon to perform. Differences lie only in the speed of expansion. In general the smaller and more technical agencies (such as UPU and ITU) have grown more slowly while the larger and more development-oriented, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNESCO, and WHO, have grown fastest. Perhaps the biggest single change—and one that has affected all the agencies in the time since their

1. For a more detailed discussion of the problems of coordination within the UN family, see Evan Luard, *International agencies: the emerging framework of interdependence* (London: Macmillan, 1978), chapter 17.

foundation—has been the huge increase in the amount of their work devoted to development. The influx of new members into the UN has brought strong pressures from a large part of the membership of each agency for expansion in this field. The rich countries have not seriously resisted this change, although they may have had reservations about the scale of it. What the latter have often sought to do is to ensure that these programmes are financed by voluntary funds rather than by the regular budget. In this way, the developed countries felt they could retain greater control over the speed of growth. They have not entirely succeeded. A considerable part of the development assistance side of the agencies' work is today financed by voluntary funds: the UNDP or occasionally other funds. But all the agencies now devote a part of their regular budgets to technical assistance and other development activities.

This trend will continue. In many cases assistance to less advanced countries is vital to the main purposes of the organization. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) cannot fulfil its main role of securing efficient and safe navigation facilities for aircraft throughout the world unless it helps poorer countries to improve the standards of their equipment and services, since most of the problems in this respect inevitably occur in the developing world. The World Meteorological Organization (WMO) cannot provide an efficient world weather service unless it ensures that poorer members (sometimes situated in areas that are especially crucial for information about weather patterns) have the facilities and equipment for providing the information needed. But even where development assistance is not so *immediately* necessary for fulfilling an agency's purpose, it may still in the long run be essential in achieving its goals. If WHO is to improve health standards all over the world it must help to improve health standards (especially sanitation and water supply) in the poor countries of the world where they are at present most inadequate. If UNESCO is to improve world educational standards it must assist education in the poorest countries where most help is required. And so on.

For these reasons the pressure for more assistance work by the agencies and for more funds to carry it out is certain to be maintained in the years to come. Western countries will no doubt demand efficient and economical use of the funds provided for this purpose and there will continue to be controversy about the precise rate of growth. But given the scale of the needs to be met it seems likely that the development side of the agencies' activities will grow rapidly in the next decade. Accordingly, the role of the agencies specifically concerned with development will probably grow fastest.

The World Bank is in a different position from most of the other agencies in that, so far as its traditional hard lending is concerned, it can raise the funds it requires in the market, and is not therefore dependent on the decisions of governments for securing resources (its underlying capital base has recently been doubled to assist this). Its lending ('commitments') in recent years has risen in a spectacular fashion, having grown from about $½bn in 1960 to $2bn in 1970 and over $12bn today. Since the calls on its funds will continue, and since its capacity to raise money in the markets remains high, this rate of growth may continue, though its normal operations may only be attractive to middle income countries that can afford the interest charges. The Bank's soft loans affiliate, the International Development Authority (IDA), will grow considerably more slowly since in this case 'replenishment' does depend on the decisions of governments (and therefore of the US

Congress, which has shown itself increasingly reluctant to approve such appropriations recently). But the World Bank family as a whole is likely to be lending nearly $20bn a year by 1988.

It seems probable that there will also be a significant strengthening of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the years to come. This has been called for by many in the West, as much as among developing countries. The interests of rich countries and poor in a stronger IMF are rather different, but in each case powerful. Influential figures within the developed countries are increasingly thinking in terms of giving a stronger role to the IMF in securing 'adjustment' by poor countries and in supervising debt-rescheduling agreements. The increasing balance of payments and debt problems being experienced by developing countries have recently brought increasing resort to the IMF. This has already caused adjustments to the IMF system: increasing use of 'facilities', rather longer-term credit, increasing regard for the supply side in the adjustments demanded. The growing caution of the international banking system and increasing indebtedness means that the IMF's role will continue to grow. This will intensify the calls, already widely made, for an easing of 'conditionality' and a wider sharing of decision-making in the IMF, so that voting rights in the Executive Board are not so highly concentrated among rich countries as is the case today (the developed countries now have 60 per cent of the votes, oil-producers 10 per cent and poor countries 30 per cent). Pressures will thus grow for a non-proportional increase in quotas so that voting rights are more evenly shared between rich countries and poor: the effect of this would be that neither side need feel it is being excessively dominated by the other.

In the field of trade there have been recent proposals for more rationalization of the present untidy structure. Some would like to see the establishment of something like the old International Trade Organization (ITO) that was envisaged in the Havana Charter of 1947 but was eventually rejected by the US Congress. It seems somewhat doubtful if any such change will come about, however. The existing dichotomy between the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)—the one devoted to a series of businesslike trade negotiations on very specific issues which have brought benefits mainly to the rich states, the other devoted to a collective dialogue between rich countries and poor in which the poor have the louder voice—unsatisfactory though it may seem, reflects a real need. In the former, there are down-to-earth-negotiations for binding trade agreements and, in the latter, much more political confrontation, in which poor countries can use the weight of their numbers to exert pressure for more radical change. A change in the structure would not alter this reality, and both kinds of body, or at least both kinds of activity, would continue to be required. Even the existing subsidiary bodies—such as the UNCTAD committees on shipping, insurance, commodities, preferences and so on—would probably need to be re-established. The most that is therefore likely to occur in practice is a further tidying up of the remaining duplication and overlap, together with the establishment of closer links between the two bodies, perhaps under some common umbrella.

But in addition to these traditional functions there may well be calls for new roles to be performed by UN agencies. For example, one task for which UN action is likely to be increasingly demanded is monitoring the activities of transnational corporations (TNCs). Although the rapid growth in the share of these companies in world economic activity may have slowed somewhat, it remains phenomenal,

especially in the field of banking. The concern of many developing countries at the power these companies wield and at their ability to inhibit governmental decision-making, remains acute. So far the main role of the UN's Commission on Transnational Corporations has been essentially of a fact-finding character. But its most immediate task, as it acknowledges, is the negotiation of a set of guidelines for the activities of the corporations which will receive widespread recognition by the governments of rich states and poor alike and will also, it is to be hoped, be accepted by the corporations themselves. If it succeeds in that task, it may then have a role in supervising the way the guidelines are implemented by individual corporations. What is certain is that, given the increasing economic power of these corporations and their ability to slip between the network of the sovereignty of individual states, there will continue to be concern about their activities and calls for international measures to govern their activities.

The conclusion of the negotiations for a treaty governing the seabed could also lead to institutional changes if a new international organization wielding substantial authority should now come into being. The new International Seabed Authority will be empowered to negotiate and approve contracts for exploitation; it will help to establish an international enterprise which would itself be responsible for developing half the exploitable area; it will supervise and enforce the observance of environmental, safety and other regulations to safeguard the area: and it will formulate and administer a general depletion policy for the minerals of the region. For the first time, therefore, an international agency will be disposing of international resources—resources of very great value—and using the revenues for the benefit of mankind as a whole. The system will also, as is widely recognized, require an effective disputes procedure, since there will be ample scope for conflict both between individual nations and between nations and the authority. Whatever the details, the system will represent a wholly new development within international society: the establishment of a considerable degree of international control over resources, generally regarded as the common property of mankind, and a measure of international authority over a substantial section of the earth's surface. The way that authority is operated will become a source of great controversy in international relations.

Another functional area that is now receiving increasing international attention is that of energy. In the eyes of many it is extraordinary and anomalous that, despite the importance of energy problems within the world economy today, no international body with this responsibility yet exists. The only UN agency at present active in this field is the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[2] But its responsibilities are highly specialized and it clearly cannot become the forum for the general discussion of energy problems. The only other bodies which have been active in this field have been international interest groups, such as the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) representing the oil producers, and the International Energy Agency (IEA) representing most of the industrial consumers. There has recently been considerable discussion of what type of institution is required for this purpose. Then UN Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim proposed a UN 'energy institute' several years ago which was to have mainly a research and fact-finding role; but as yet this has not been adopted.

2. In recent years, UNDP and the World Bank have both greatly increased their funding of energy activities, but do not organize general discussions of energy policy.

The main reason that no such international energy body exists at present is the implacable hostility of the oil-producing countries. They have opposed the establishment of any international organization with effective authority in this field since they are fearful that such a body, whatever the formal position, would inevitably exercise an indirect influence on price negotiations. Until recently these countries, despite their obviously self-interested position, were able to exercise a remarkable degree of influence on other developing countries whose true interest was in fact far otherwise. This position has however shifted a little since the 1979 UNCTAD meetings. There was then an increasing recognition that the questions of the availability of energy supplies, energy saving, and the development of alternative energy sources are crucial for the international community as a whole, especially many energy-poor developing countries, and require systematic international discussion and debate. This process was begun at the 1981 UN Conference on New and Renewable Sources of Energy held in Nairobi, Kenya. It is now increasingly accepted (and demanded by rich countries) that energy must be one of the major themes of the North–South debate in the years to come.

It is possible that at some future date a new specialized agency will be established which will assume responsibility in this field, provided agreement can be reached on its precise terms of reference. More likely perhaps, in the first place, is the establishment of a 'centre' within the UN Secretariat, or even a semi-autonomous body within the UN on the lines of UNCTAD. Such a body could still at some time in the future develop into a full-scale, autonomous specialized agency. Meanwhile the World Bank, in response to strong opposition from the present US administration, has suspended its attempts to set up an energy affiliate to help poor countries explore and develop their own energy sources. What is certain is that the many problems which will arise in this area, especially concerning the prospective global energy balance, will with increasing urgency require systematic discussions on an international basis and thus an appropriate forum in which to undertake these discussions.

It is possible that a broader concern about the world's rapidly decreasing resources will also be expressed within the UN system over the coming years. There is an increasing consciousness in many countries today of the threat to mankind's future that could result from the rapid and often wasteful running down of the earth's finite stock of minerals and other resources. Although this is most visible, and most widely deplored, in the case of the non-renewable fuels, such as oil, gas and uranium, the same position exists (and may be less easily remedied by alternative sources) in the case of other minerals, as the Club of Rome and many environmental groups have constantly warned. Effective policies for the management of these resources can only be satisfactorily devised and implemented at the international level because the problem itself is an international one. There are likely therefore to be increasingly forceful demands from the general public, from environmental bodies, and from concerned governments, for the convening of an international conference to consider this problem and the establishment of a body which could take responsibility in this area (the existing Committee on Natural Resources established under ECOSOC, which is concerned mainly with assistance for natural resources development, is neither qualified or inclined to do this). A new International Resources Commission, or something of the type, is required to keep the question under permanent review.

There is another 'functional' need of wider importance, one that perhaps requires global management even more urgently than those discussed above. There is a demand for some body that would keep under review the needs of the international economy as a whole. The lack of any body equipped to undertake this function has been widely recognized and deplored. Neither the IMF nor the World Bank is well equipped to undertake this responsibility despite the fact that their joint annual meeting does provide the opportunity for some exchange of views between finance ministers from all over the world. On the other hand, the so-called economic summits which are very much concerned with the problem are confined to the heads of state of a few advanced Western countries. So far they have taken little interest in the economic problems of the other five-sixths of the world.

One way to approach the matter would be to set up a body of experts, comparable to the present Committee on Development Planning (or, at the national level, to the Committee of Economic Advisers to the US President), whose function it would be to consider the present state of the world economy, to issue periodic reports, and to tender advice to governments and to relevant UN bodies. A more ambitious move, which might have to wait several years after the first had been accomplished, would be to organize periodic meetings under UN auspices of a small but well-balanced body of finance ministers or even heads of government in order to exchange views on policy requirements and to issue an agreed statement of recommendations. The IMF–World Bank Development Committee, composed of finance ministers, could conceivably provide the nucleus for this. The main benefit of this procedure, as in other areas of UN activity, would be not so much the 'decisions' themselves, which will probably have only a marginal influence on governments, but establishing the habit of considering such questions on an international basis, so as to make all governments more aware of the international implications of any national policy options they may have in mind.

One further area of functional responsibility might also develop significantly in the coming decade. This is the protection of human rights. When the UN was founded this was regarded by many as one of the most important of the new responsibilities accorded to the organization and there was a hope that the UN would thereby be enabled to prevent any repetition of the atrocities committed against the Jewish population of Nazi Germany. Until recently the performance of the UN in this field has probably been regarded with disappointment by most people. The UN has devoted huge amounts of time and energy to the formulation of various declarations, covenants, conventions, and other documents expressing the concern of the international community on the subject and setting out the obligations governments were expected to fulfil on the question (sometimes with procedures to supervise implementation). But it has done very little about, and in some cases did not even consider, specific cases in which human rights were being violated in particular parts of the world. This situation is slowly changing and both the Human Rights Commission and its Sub-Commission have now begun to examine individual situations where there is evidence of a systematic pattern of gross violations of human rights. The procedure is slow and laborious, and confidential. But it is at least a beginning: for example, at least a start had been made in considering the appalling atrocities in Cambodia and Uganda before the regimes in both countries fell early in 1979. Today, something like ten cases a year are usually considered in this way. The number is unlikely to fall in coming years,

and there may be demands for more vigorous and more effective action when convincing evidence of systematic violations is produced.

Some changes in procedure will certainly be required if the process is to be made more effective. First, it is important that the enormously laborious and protracted process should be speeded up. It is to be hoped that both the Commission and the Sub-Commission will decide to meet more frequently, at least twice a year; that they may more often ask to send delegations of inquiry to examine the situation complained of (as occurs under the Inter-American Convention on Human Rights); that a new convention on torture, such as is now being discussed, will soon be signed and ratified and that this will include effective implementation procedures; and that new regional commissions will be established (either within or outside the UN framework) in Africa and Asia, to complement those existing in Europe and Latin America. Another major step forward, one perhaps less likely to be accomplished, would be the appointment of a UN High Commissioner for Human Rights who could be called on to examine individual complaints of human rights violations. Less spectacular, but more likely to be accomplished, would be a greater willingness by the bodies concerned to call on the Secretary-General to examine complaints of serious violations (as happened in the case of Uganda).

The United Nations: problems of growth and management

Though the most important, the foregoing are not the only developments likely to affect the UN subsidiary bodies over the coming years. There will also no doubt be a continued *expansion* in areas in which the UN family has already become involved. It seems, unhappily, only too likely, for example, that there may be a need for a further increase in the role which the UN plays in the care of refugees, already a vast and rapidly growing responsibility for the organization. In the past few years alone events in South-east Asia, Afghanistan and Central America have hugely added to this work-load and it would be optimistic to assume that such crises will not continue to recur with great regularity in the coming decade. The work of the High Commissioner suffers seriously at present from precariousness of sources of finance. Though it will no doubt continue to depend on voluntary pledges, the work of UNHCR would be enormously assisted if governments pledged for two or three years at a time, and for the general budget rather than for specific groups of refugees. Similarly, given the continued growth of the drug problem all over the world and the international ramifications of the drug trade, there will almost certainly be need for a further intensification of the activities of the UN Fund for Drug Abuse Control and for more resources to be devoted by member governments to this work. The work of the UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), likewise financed by voluntary contributions, is also likely to expand, and the UNFPA will require far larger resources than it has available today if it is to be in a position to respond effectively to the continuing crisis that high birth rates create for the poorest countries in the world. Because rapid population growth cannot easily be matched by increases in food resources, the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), which has a special responsibility for helping raise food production in the poorest countries, may also need additional resources to fulfil its tasks. These are only a few of the more obvious growth points. The demands on the system will certainly increase, and the pressure for larger

budgets and programmes in all the agencies of the UN system is unlikely to decline perceptibly in the years to come.

If the growth of expenditure in all these activities is to be matched by a corresponding growth in effectiveness, however, there will be a need for a new concern to improve the administrative efficiency of each agency and of the system as a whole. So far as the efficiency within each agency is concerned, probably the major need is for changes in the way staff are initially recruited. All the secretariats are inevitably under strong pressure to achieve some kind of geographical balance in the composition of their staffs. But the countries that bring this pressure are not always willing or able to offer recruits of the necessary qualifications. It will never be possible to escape the pressures for geographical balance. Organizations that claim to be international must have international staffs (and developed countries which complain about pressures for 'equitable geographical distribution' themselves bring very strong influence to bear when senior appointments in a secretariat are at issue). What can, however, be demanded is that, while the attempt is made to secure a reasonable balance, standards of entry should not be lowered.

A second requirement if greater efficiency is to be achieved is to allow greater scope and authority to the UN's Joint Inspection Unit, whose purpose it is to bring about improvements in this sphere. The Unit has over the past fifteen years produced a series of first-class reports on the administrative failings of the system, both on the general problems affecting all the agencies and on defects relating to individual operations and units. A large proportion of the reports, however, have scarcely been noticed: the agencies continue to resent any criticism of their operations that emanates from outside bodies. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), which has undertaken detailed examination of most of the agencies in addition to its normal budgetary scrutiny, has also been to a large extent ignored.

At root, the difficulty lies in the bureaucratic resistance to change that is so often encountered in large-scale organizations. What is probably required is the establishment *within* each agency of some unit, preferably inter-governmental in character, to take responsibility for considering all such matters, including JIU reports, and for recommending action on them. For this, as for everything else within international organizations, the fundamental responsibility lies with member governments. If enough of them consistently devote sufficient attention to the problem, clamour loud enough for reform and mobilize the right kind of Third World support, something will be done. And if the Geneva Group of developed countries were to devote itself more systematically to trying to bring about changes of this kind, instead of dedicating itself to systematic budget-cutting, it would be more likely to achieve something useful.

Finally, and quite as important as either of these tasks if the UN system is to be made more responsive, a much more effective system of coordination must be established. There is no subject that has been so much discussed and disputed within the UN system as this. From the very first years of its existence the question has caused problems. Innumerable institutional changes have been made since that time in an attempt to improve the situation. A succession of new coordinating bodies has been set up. The root of the problem, however, lies in the highly autonomous role given to the specialized agencies at the time when the system was established. Though that decision has often been criticized, mainly because of the very problem of divided authority which it has produced, it is not the case that a

more centralized system would necessarily have worked better. It might indeed have merely produced a still larger and more unwieldy bureaucracy, and more uncertain lines of command than exist today. The agencies are in general performing relatively specialized tasks in specialized fields; these would not always be performed better if they had even more eyes peering over their shoulders or more layers of supervision placed above them.

A more feasible alternative to the present structure might have been one in which the *funds* for each agency came from a single source, or at least a single budgetary decision, but, once granted, could be spent by the agencies as they chose. In that case a minimal but essential power of coordination—the power of the purse, the ability of a central body to determine the volume of *total* spending as well as the balance *between* agencies—could have been combined with a substantial executive independence for each subsidiary body. It is unlikely, however, that a change of this magnitude could be implemented now. An alternative reform is required.

It is arguable in any case that coordination between the different parts of the system as a whole, though clearly a problem, is a less acute one than coordination within the UN itself, with its proliferation of Assembly Committees, subsidiary bodies, 'programmes' and 'centres' (some of them financed, wholly or in part, from voluntary funds) which virtually decide their own programmes and levels of expenditure. In theory, the Assembly is not supposed to vote on a new programme without an indication of the financial implications, and if possible, the comments of the ACABQ. But in practice, once an individual Assembly Committee has reached a decision to expand or add a programme, there is little disposition among the delegations to query that decision. The secretariat must then proceed to make provision for it in the forthcoming budget, new staff must be hired, new accommodation provided, new equipment acquired. So a programme is launched which then acquires a momentum of its own and may continue indefinitely. In practice, once a programme has been started, a vested interest in its continuation grows up and it becomes difficult to halt. Thus new programmes are added piecemeal at each General Assembly on the recommendation of one or another subsidiary committee, with little regard for what has been done before or what is being done elsewhere in one of the other agencies. The first need, therefore, is for a reform of the Assembly's budgetary procedure. What is essential is that the opportunity is provided, as is not the case today, for an overall view to be taken so that at some stage—before, not after, the essential programme-creating decision is reached—a genuine assessment is made of the resources available, the needs to be met, and the requirement for the programme to be endorsed.

Coordination within the UN family as a whole is a wider and more difficult problem. The avoidance of overlap and duplication is gradually being achieved, through the operation of the ACC and its subordinate bodies, though new problems constantly recur. Since it is very difficult to induce any agency to withdraw altogether from a programme on which it has embarked, this process normally must be confined to ensuring that each agency tackles only that aspect of the disputed area (say water resources, agricultural education, community development) which is strictly relevant to its own concerns. Sometimes a new programme covering the field in question can be used to provide coordination: so the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) is able (in theory at least) to ensure some division of labour between the various agencies concerned with environmental problems. But what is not effectively achieved today (although it has been many times

discussed) is a wider coordination: a system for keeping the programmes of the entire system under review, with the aim of seeking to adjust the balance between the parts or to reconsider priorities. At present the balance is the chance result of the decisions reached *within* each agency about its own spending programme. This effectively precludes coordination in the full sense, such as any national government invariably secures in relation to the spending of individual ministries; no such government would think of allowing each ministry to make its own decision about expenditures in its own field without any control from above. In theory ECOSOC, which has been named as the main coordinating body for the system, should perform this role. But in practice ECOSOC has neither the ability nor the opportunity to do so. Above all, it has not the stature to do it, being attended by relatively low-level delegations whose normal concern is almost exclusively with the UN itself.

What is really needed, therefore, if the functional activities of the UN system are to be made more effective, is a new coordinating body that will be the intergovernmental equivalent of the ACC. It would need to be balanced in composition not only between regions in the normal way, but between the UN and the agencies, so that the latter could feel they were represented in it and had a chance to influence its decisions. And its members would need to be sufficiently high-powered (possibly ministers within their own governments) for the decisions to carry the weight required. There would have to be an effective follow-up procedure to ensure that once reached, decisions were effectively implemented. This is a major change which would no doubt encounter strong resistance. But unless some such initiative is taken, it is likely that inter-agency coordination will be as feeble as in the coming decade as it has so far shown itself to be in the past.

In 1975 the UN Secretary-General set up a Committee of Experts to consider the 'restructuring' of all the economic and social activities of the UN family. Unfortunately most of the recommendations of that report (which were unanimous despite the fact that all geographical regions were represented) remain to be implemented. It would certainly mark a big step forward if ECOSOC were, for example, as then recommended, to devote some sessions to a detailed examination of a *single* subject, with the participation of high-powered specialists from the member states, instead of continually addressing itself to the same vast but scrappy agenda, covering a huge variety of different subjects, attended by second and third secretaries from Geneva missions. Another proposed reform was better integration of the many voluntary funds, some quite small, which at present operate on separate budgets from the UN itself. Another was for the use of new procedures to try to achieve a consensus on contentious North–South issues. None of this has been done. The only significant outcome of the report so far is the appointment of a Director-General for Economic Affairs, with a rank above the Under-Secretary-Generals, to take a special responsibility for development and North–South questions. And even in this case it remains to be seen whether the Director-General will be able to acquire the authority necessary to make the appointment a success (which may be still harder to achieve now that a 'Northerner', a Frenchman, has been appointed to the post).

In the next decade there will be many new problems to be faced which can only be overcome through improved international institutions: the problems of regulating the international monetary system, developing the world's energy resources, maintaining stable commodity prices, regulating the uses of the seabed, organizing

disaster relief and providing for refugees, to name only a few of the more obvious. Institutions which bring together rich countries alone—such as the OECD, the IEA and the economic 'summits'—will be inadequate to meet those challenges. In most cases, bodies within the UN system, representative of the world community as a whole, will be required. New institutional arrangements will need to be made, or old ones modified, if those challenges are to be met effectively. There will no doubt be resistance in some quarters to some of the changes that will be required, and especially to the creation of wholly new institutions (the World Bank's proposed energy affiliate was the first victim of this resistance).

What is certain is that, if it is to survive, the UN system must show itself capable of responding to new problems and evolving with the international environment. Western efforts are likely to be more effective if they do not seek to deny the need for any change at all. The creation of institutions appropriate to the demands placed on them is a joint task to which Western countries should, in their own interests, be willing to devote constructive energies.

Conclusions

The functional tasks of the UN family, then, are likely to grow further in the years ahead. There may be wholly new fields of activity—the allocation of world liquidity, the supervision of international energy resources, the monitoring of transnational corporations, even perhaps the management of the world economy—in which the UN system will be increasingly involved. There will no doubt be occasional proposals, as from time to time in the past, that new bodies should be set up outside the UN framework for that purpose. The aim of such proposals is usually to get away from 'Third-World dominated' bodies, beset by 'conflict' and 'inefficiency', to the comfort and convenience of bodies in which the Western states would play a dominant part (occasionally the Soviet Union is also accorded a place) and in which, it is believed, a more businesslike and constructive atmosphere would prevail. Such ideas, though understandable, ignore the essential reality that on almost every issue the views and aspirations of Third World countries are an important factor; whether we like it or not, they must therefore be involved in discussing and arriving at decisions. Organizations dominated by the West may have a role to play for limited purposes: the IEA can discuss the policies *Western* nations should pursue in the energy field, but not those required in the world as a whole; the OECD can propose economic policies for *Western* states, but not for the Third World or the Eastern bloc.

Where the problems to be confronted are international—and usually today they are international—genuinely global bodies are required, which means in practice UN bodies. An attempt can be made within these to ensure that decision-making power is based on the size, population and importance of each state, rather than simply on a one nation:one vote basis. Probably this can best be done by seeking to ensure that (as is already the case in most of the agencies today) the Council or Board of the agency concerned is weighted in favour of larger countries; and that the Council enjoys broad executive powers and is partly independent of its Assembly. But taking an organization out of the UN family altogether does not assist in this respect. It only complicates relations with other international bodies with which it will almost certainly have to deal. And it will be bitterly resented by most Third World countries which attach importance to the UN link.

Another problem that will recur will be how to ensure that the many valuable, and mainly non-controversial, activities within these organizations are not disrupted by political conflicts. As we have seen, political controversy cannot be avoided in any international organization; and it is not realistic for Western states to threaten sanctions or even withdrawal whenever such issues arise. What is reasonable, however, is to seek to demonstrate, as often and as emphatically as possible, the dangers of repeated emphasis on extraneous political issues, and the likelihood that raising them in inappropriate places will rarely contribute anything to the solution of the underlying problem but may well antagonize possible sympathizers. There should also be an attempt to win support for the general principle that functional organizations of this sort should aim at universality; and that their work may ultimately be made worthless if attempts are made to expel unpopular nations—whether Israel, South Africa, Cambodia or Afghanistan—on political grounds.

The issue which will above all remain in the forefront of discussion in all international organizations is the fundamental question: how much should be spent? As we have seen, this is already a highly contentious issue in most of them, with the poor countries calling for more money for more programmes and the richer states of both East and West opposing such calls. There is no objective or universally acceptable answer to this question, and it cannot fail to remain a cause of conflict, in international as in national government. It would be a huge advance if it were possible to arrive at some kind of consensus about the magnitude of increases in expenditure that are generally tolerable *before* decisions on programmes are undertaken. Then the coat, representing the sum total of programmes to be undertaken, would have to be cut according to the total cloth available. Even if such a system could be everywhere established, however, and in the case of the UN itself and some of the agencies at least this is not perhaps very likely unless on a very informal basis—contentious decisions would still need to be taken about the total volume of expenditure to be allocated for each programme.

Many Western governments continually oppose increases in these budgets. There is, however, a case for saying that money devoted to this purpose is a good investment in international cooperation and development and so in goodwill. Budgetary contributions could be regarded as an element in overall aid programmes (of which they are only a small part).[3] They are probably little less cost-effective than other parts of aid programmes. Part of the money goes in pursuit of aims which benefit the West as much as the Third World (for example better world meteorological services, safer shipping, safer aviation or better telecommunications). Most of the rest is devoted to types of development which almost everybody recognizes to be badly needed: for example the improvement of world health standards, family planning, or the reduction of illiteracy. It is more logical to try to ensure the money allocated is spent in the most cost-effective and productive way than to appear stubbornly opposed to any increase in spending at all.

It is thus important (politically, if for no better reason) that Western countries should not always present themselves in the purely negative role of budget-cutter. Here as elsewhere in the UN system, they must be seen to play an active and positive part in maximizing the contribution which international organizations can

3. Because so much is development-related a fair portion of the sums contributed can reasonably be included in assessments of programme towards the UN's aid target of 0·7 per cent of national income to be allocated to official aid.

make to the task of world development. In other words, the question to be asked should not be (as so often in discussions of the UN in the West): 'What can the UN do for my country? Does it favour our interests or theirs?' The question should be: 'What can my country do for the UN and its agencies? How can we ensure that they play as valuable and effective a role as possible in performing the many important functions which, in an ever more interdependent world, are necessarily entrusted to them?'

Reflecting upon a decade of disasters: the evolving response of the international community*

Randolph C. Kent†

Between 1967 and 1970, the Nigerian civil war resulted in at least one million deaths and affected a further four-and-a-half million people. In 1970, a cyclone ripped across the flat deltic plains of East Pakistan, leaving 300,000 dead in a matter of eight hours and disrupting the lives of 3,648,000. To escape the horrors of civil war, ten million East Pakistanis sought refuge between March and November 1971 in the impoverished border states of India. Late in the evening of 8 July 1971, an earthquake lasting for over three minutes killed eighty-five people and left a further 2,348,522 homeless in central Chile.[1]

What all these incidents had in common was that they were regarded as 'disasters'. Each, in other words, reflected a condition in which the lives and very pattern of existence of a group or community were directly threatened by at least one of three types of 'disaster agents': natural (such as earthquakes, floods, droughts); man-made (such as civil strife); or technological (such as chemical poisonings, plutonium leaks).[2] Each, by definition, resulted in 'loss or suffering on a scale sufficient to warrant an extraordinary response from outside the affected area or community'.[3]

What these four disasters also had in common was the way the international community responded to the plight of the afflicted. Governments, international governmental and non-governmental organizations provided over $533,079,909 worth of aid to the four stricken countries.[4] And yet, despite this volume of seeming generosity, the overall response was random, ad hoc and only too often inappropriate to meet the needs of the disaster victims. What this vast outpouring lacked was some form of systematic response, providing not only predictability but appropriate types and levels of aid.

The emergence of a system

In too many instances, disaster victims continue to be dependent upon an international response that bears all the hallmarks of the early 1970s. However, this

* This general overview of international disaster relief is drawn from research for a project on 'Disasters, disaster relief and the international system'. Funds for this project have been provided by the Social Science Research Council.

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1. Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, Summary Tables, FY1964–FY1982, *Disaster relief assistance and related data*, March 1983. Prepared by Evaluation Technologies, Inc.

2. Morris Davis has commented that 'no one definition is able to capture the full range of phenomena that have been traditionally included under the rubric of "disaster". The overall meaning involves the idea that some agent produces a change in the environment by creating possible physical and social impacts'. M. Davis, 'A few comments on the political dimensions of disaster assistance' in Ian Davis, ed., *Disasters and the small dwelling* (Oxford: Pergamon, 1981). For a good description of 'disaster agents' see Turner's comments on Western's 'Etiologic classification of disasters' in B. A. Turner, *Man made disasters* (London: Wykeham, 1978), pp.8–14.

3. B. Brown, *Disaster preparedness and the United Nations; advance planning for disaster relief* (Oxford: Pergamon for UNITAR, 1979), p. 5.

4. *Disaster relief assistance and related data*, March 1983.

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impression has to be tempered by the fact that significant changes have occurred over the past decade in the manner in which the international community is able to respond to disasters. Indeed, to the extent that both donor and recipient governments, international governmental and non-governmental organizations have developed more sophisticated methodologies, institutions and coordinating mechanisms for dealing with disasters, one can point to an emerging 'international disaster relief system'. Certainly this is so if one accepts that the term 'system' implies the potential to respond effectively and efficiently in a coordinated and predictable manner to disaster mitigation and relief.

Nevertheless, the emergence of such a system is best understood in the perspective of what did *not* exist a decade before rather than solely in terms of what exists now. For despite the very positive developments to which one can point, there remain profound structural constraints upon the functioning of an effective international disaster relief system. The very nature of disaster phenomena, as well as organizational and bureaucratic imperatives and political dynamics, mean that the emerging system even now cannot guarantee that random, ad hoc and inappropriate responses will not greet the pleas of the afflicted. As this article will conclude, these constraints are too fundamental to succumb to the more obvious and direct solutions which have been proffered to date. To some extent, however, they can be circumvented by a more concerted effort at pre-disaster planning, more sensitivity to the institutional framework of the affected state, continued functional expansion of the international agencies and the creation of what will be called 'regional policy coordinators'.

... in a relative sense

When the earthquake rocked Chile and the cyclone ripped through the flat delta of East Pakistan, when the Western press was filled with pictures of dying Biafran children and the squalor of refugee camps in West Bengal, not one single international governmental organization had within it a permanent body that dealt with disasters or disaster preparedness. As the Davidson report on *Special economic, humanitarian and disaster assistance* rightly points out, there had been growing concern from 1968 onwards that the United Nations should establish a more permanent focal point for dealing with disaster relief, but even as late as October 1970 it was noted that disaster relief was not a function with which the United Nations had 'been entrusted by the community of nations'.[5]

Before 1971, voluntary agencies (with few exceptions) maintained little contact during disaster relief operations, and certainly did not seek to coordinate funding arrangements or logistic facilities either prior to or during relief work.[6] The League of Red Cross Societies did provide information on disasters to the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, a general 'clearing house' for voluntary agencies,

5. G. F. Davidson, *International efforts to meet humanitarian needs in emergency situations: summary report* (E/1981/16) (Geneva: United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1981). While agencies in the UN system have clearly been heavily engaged in disaster relief work—indeed, some were initially conceived to deal with disasters (e.g. UNRRA, UNHCR, UNRWA, UNICEF)—the general trend was to move into the direction of what Davidson calls 'longer term planning'. Davidson points to the fact that UNHCR actually sought the abolition of its Emergency Fund in the early 1960s (p.14).

6. There are certainly a few important exceptions to this rule, one being the Disasters Emergency Committee which meets at the headquarters of the British Red Cross Society. To a lesser extent the US American Council of Voluntary Agencies for Foreign Service also attempts to bring some cohesion into its members' responses. However, its main purpose is to lobby Congress on behalf of the charities.

but neither had units that dealt with disasters *per se*.[7] On the governmental level, potential donors—except in very rare instances[8]—had no offices which dealt on a permanent basis with the complexities of overseas disasters; and links between non-governmental donors and governments were generally casual if not non-existent. Recipient governments—and certainly those of the particularly 'disaster prone' states[9]—could rarely boast of disaster or emergency plans, let alone 'disaster units' within the government that could deal with the present or prepare for the next inevitable disaster. And if there was any single feature that symbolized the relatively random and unpredictable approach to disasters, it was the paucity of manuals and specialized literature on the actual running of relief operations or refugee camps.

To a certain extent this generally unstructured and unsystematic approach to disaster relief was sustained by three prevalent and interrelated assumptions. The first of these is the long-standing tendency to regard disasters—man-made or natural—as fundamentally unpredictable and short-term phenomena; hence, difficult to prepare for or control. This assumption was often sustained by a sense of fatalism or cultural or religious beliefs[10] and, according to Barry Turner, even disaster researchers have remained 'preoccupied with a "bolt-from-the-blue" hypothesis about the emergence of disasters . . . Amongst the studies available, very few indeed offer any degree of assistance to the study of the nature, origins and pre-conditions of disaster. . .'[11] This 'bolt-from-the-blue' hypothesis, as well as various cultural factors, inhibited attempts to study the phenomena, let alone to establish institutions to deal with what was regarded as essentially unpredictable and of short duration. Secondly, if there was any single assumption which reflected a general ignorance about the nature of disasters, it was the prevailing attitude towards the needs of victims, namely that anything which could be eaten, anything which could provide warmth and shelter would be utilized (with gratitude) by the afflicted. No matter where the disaster occurred, survival would determine usage no matter what culture, religion or experience might previously have determined.

The final assumption concerned the supposed inherent resilience of the afflicted nation-state, and rested upon a fundamental distinction between disaster relief and development aid. Generally speaking, it was recognized that the cost of development was an expense which many developing countries could not bear on their own. Disaster relief, however, did not entail the high costs of fundamental social or structural change; its objective was at best to restore a portion of the population to its pre-disaster situation, a burden far less onerous, it was assumed, than the popular capital-intensive projects of the 1950s and 1960s. Nation-states were supposed to have the social resilience to reabsorb the afflicted. Furthermore, it was the responsibility of the government of the stricken state to deal with the victims of

7. Traditionally, the League of Red Cross Societies would inform its members about the emergency needs requested by a Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in an afflicted state. However, there was no particular unit that advised member societies specifically on disaster measures *per se*.

8. The most important exception is the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance within the US Department of State.

9. In using the term 'recipient government', the reader should bear in mind that what the term does not properly reflect is the fact that normally governments of the disaster-stricken states provide the major contribution to relief activities in their countries. The term is used here only to indicate the focus of the international community's assistance. 'Disaster-prone' states are significantly also the least developed countries.

10. Brown, *Disaster preparedness and the United Nations*, p. 33.

11. Turner, *Man made disasters*, pp.33–4.

disasters. Members of the international community, as one commentator noted after the Japanese earthquake of 1923, would compete with each other to provide demonstrations of goodwill and concern, but 'it seemed quite natural that, after receiving due messages of sympathy or even gifts on a more or less generous scale, all the afflicted country had to do was to repair the loss and devastation by its own unaided efforts'.[12]

Increasingly these assumptions collided with the reality of the late 1960s in a variety of ways. Certainly science and technology opened the way towards not only predicting but preparing for natural disasters, remote sensing from space satellites being but one example.[13] The emerging challenge to the 'bolt-from-the-blue' hypothesis is reflected in the Intergovernmental Typhoon Committee's 1968 declaration of objectives: 'to mobilize scientists and resources to discover ways of mitigating the harmful effects of these storms and of removing or minimizing their destructive potential'.[14] However, other challenges to traditional assumptions about disasters were less positive. It became more and more obvious both that disasters were not necessarily short-term and that disaster agents were not readily divisible into man-made and natural phenomena. Disasters had a much longer incubation period than had been assumed, and they were often generated by forces far more complicated than had been previously realized. The too often interrelated factors of poverty, population growth and political instability were generating what eventually came to be called 'complex disasters'. Examples of this cruel interrelationship abound. Increased agricultural needs lead to deforestation which in turn increases the likelihood of floods. Famine in a country governed by an unstable regime leads to civil disturbances which in turn provoke a man-made disaster; or a man-made disaster triggers off a flood of refugees, leaving the country without farmers willing to plant and harvest, which in turn threatens the onset of a famine. (Specific examples of this type of disaster are given below.)

The ethnocentric assumption that survival needs were universally similar was also increasingly challenged as stockpiles of culturally unacceptable goods, sent with the best of intentions, went unused in relief operations. The C-130s filled with tins of tuna fish and fur-lined coats for rice-eating Bengalis, the 'standard universal shelters', the mobile hospital units; all reflected what donors were willing to offer but not necessarily what the victims required. Also becoming more evident was a clear correlation between poverty and disaster impact. The experiences of the late 1960s showed plainly that the nations most affected by disasters were only too often the poorest;[15] and this brought into question the above-mentioned assumption that nation-states had the inherent resilience and ultimate responsibility for dealing with disaster relief. While the government might have the ultimate responsibility,

12. Camille Gorgé, *The International Relief Union: its origins, aims, means, and future* (Geneva: International Relief Union, 1938), p. 13.

13. Ironically, satellite warnings were issued before the cyclone struck East Pakistan in 1970. The problem of getting this information to the agricultural workers in the outlying delta areas, however, meant that the warning was less than useful.

14. The Typhoon Committee was organized by the World Meteorological Organization and the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific in 1968.

15. 'Although two-thirds of the world's populations live in developing countries, it has been estimated that 95 per cent of the disaster-related deaths occur in these countries'. Brown, *Disaster preparedness and the United Nations*, p. 10. See also L. Sheehan and K. Hewitt, *A pilot survey of global natural disasters of the past twenty years*, (Natural Hazard Research Working Paper No. 11) (Boulder, Col.: University of Colorado, 1969).

all too often the financial cost of dealing with a serious disaster could wreak havoc on the entire annual budget of a developing country.[16]

The challenges to these assumptions gained particular momentum as the international community faced the implications of a series of large-scale disasters as well as a real increase in the numbers of disasters between 1968 and 1971.[17] This spate of extremely severe disasters made only too apparent how totally unsophisticated and unprepared were the responses of the components of the international community.

By 1971 intense pressure was being felt by donor governments from domestic interest groups and the media to devise more systematic means of dealing with foreign disasters. Criticism was rife over the supposed politicization of relief, the 'junk closet' approach to donations, the lack of domestic coordination, and the slowness of governmental responses.[18] Recipient governments, too, actively sought improvements in the ways disasters were handled, both domestically and from outside. They looked for means of receiving aid without having to contend with the disjointed disgorging of international relief that too often overwhelmed their administrations and clogged their countries' infrastructures. They wanted means to neutralize, through international governmental organizations, some of the less acceptable implications of bilateral assistance.

The momentum towards a more effective approach to disaster relief also affected the voluntary agencies. As one of the doyens of emergency relief operations later remarked, the activity on all fronts in 1971 'obliged us [the voluntary agencies] to get our own houses in order'.[19]

At the heart of many proposals to improve the international community's response to disaster relief was the United Nations system. The UN generally and the Secretary-General more particularly had been the butt of frequent criticism for failing to mobilize the offices and prestige of the UN family to provide an umbrella under which more organized approaches to disasters could be developed.[20] However, those more familiar with the internal workings of the system knew only too well how constrained the UN was, not only by the restrictions of Article 2, paragraph 7,[21] but also by the fact—as the Soviet Union never failed to remind U Thant during the East Pakistan emergency of 1971—that there was no authority which allowed the Secretary-General to mobilize or coordinate the resources of the UN family or those even of willing member states to deal with disaster relief

16. Interview with Ghulam Ishaq Khan, in 1971 Chief Secretary to the Cabinet, Government of Pakistan, concerning his role in the November 1970 cyclone relief operation in East Pakistan; 25 April 1983.

17. Stephen Green, *International disaster relief: towards a more responsive system* (New York: McGraw-Hill for 1980s Project/Council on Foreign Relations, 1977), pp. 15–21.

18. In Dole, France, more than a hundred people marched through the town every night for a week to protest about the small amount the French government was providing to the East Pakistan relief operation! 'Rally in French town: cyclone', *Dawn*, 27 November 1970.

19. Interview with Stanley Mitton, Director for Emergency Response, Church World Service of the National Council of Churches, 15 December 1981.

20. Those who worked close to U Thant during this period knew how sensitive the Secretary-General was about these criticisms, and how he sought means to mobilize the system without violating his relatively conservative interpretation of the Charter. Based on interviews with Diego Cordovez, UN Under-Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, and Ismat Kittani, in 1971 Assistant Secretary-General for Inter-Agency Affairs of the UN.

21. Article 2 paragraph 7 of the UN Charter prohibits UN intervention in matters essentially within the jurisdiction of a state.

operations.[22] By 1972, however, the UN's role and authority in disaster relief work had changed. New institutions, new machinery for coordination, new approaches to the mitigation and control of disasters were all under way, as part of a general trend affecting many areas of concern to the international community.

Institutions, coordination, preparedness and prevention

Between May and August 1980, floods in China's Hubei province destroyed millions of tons of crops and left thousands homeless. The Beijing government, through the offices of the Residential Representative of the United Nations Development Programme, contacted the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization in Geneva for assistance. A joint UN inter-agency assessment team inspected the area and determined the types of requirements the international community could usefully provide. An international appeal was subsequently launched, coordinated by UNDRO.[23]

On 10 October 1980 tremors reaching 7.3 on the Richter scale in the area of El Asnam in Algeria were first reported to UNDRO's Giles Whitcombe by the Swedish Seismological Institute. A Special Unit for Disaster Relief of the Swedish Stand-by Force was sent to assist an UNDRO-led UN coordinating team and the Algerian government. UNDRO's first situation report was issued on Saturday, 11 October. Although the scale of the disaster was extensive (11,000 killed or injured, 300,000 homeless), many observers were impressed with the speed with which the Algerian government was able to determine what it required in the way of assistance from abroad.[24]

At the end of March 1982, the influx of refugees from Guatemala and El Salvador into Honduras greatly increased just at the time when the Honduran refugee coordinating agency, for internal reasons, had broken up. At the request of the Honduran government, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees took the unusual step of acting as its own operating agency and temporarily coordinating its own assistance programmes. These programmes ranged from appointing 'roving officers' responsible for protecting the refugees near border areas to assisting a group of voluntary agencies to purchase land for the use of refugees.[25]

When compared to the responses of the international community a decade before, these cases suggest a real potential for a more organized and systematic approach to disaster relief. National and international institutions have been created to deal specifically with the management of disasters; increased coordination amongst these new institutions has reduced much of the duplication and haphazardness of bilateralism; and certainly levels of expertise in fields of preparedness and prevention have greatly increased since the beginning of the 1970s. From 1972 onwards there was a concerted attempt by many international governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as by many donor and recipient states to create focal points

22. The Soviet reaction concerning the authority of the UN as relief coordinator before the creation of the UNDRO is illustrated in T. W. Oliver, *The United Nations in Bangladesh* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978), p. 46.

23. Information concerning this case is based on interviews conducted by Charles L. Kent with representatives of the UNDP, Beijing, and Mme Jia Lusheng of the Ministry of Economic Relations with Foreign Countries (Wai Jing Bu).

24. Information concerning this case comes from the BBC broadcast by Ted Harrison, *A friend in need*, and from UNDRO *News*, January 1981.

25. Information concerning this case comes from *Refugees Magazine*, September 1982, pp. 11–13 and 'Salvador refugees prefer danger of border to new camp', *New York Times*, 5 March 1982.

for disaster relief. While the functions and effectiveness of such 'emergency units', 'disaster agencies', or 'relief cells' spanned a broad spectrum, the overall institutional development has provided several benefits to victims as well as to donors.

In the first place these disaster institutions are obviously designed to regard disaster work as a primary consideration, and not merely a tertiary concern in a general home affairs or development portfolio. Secondly, they are often mandated to initiate relief work and need not necessarily await authorization from officials outside the unit's own hierarchy. Related to this, they generally have emergency funds with which at least to launch a relief operation. Lastly, but equally important, these institutions provide a focal point for the receipt, assessment and coordination of relief assistance.

Since 1972 not only the United Nations but most of the major international agencies in the UN family have instituted departments or offices that deal solely with disaster relief, preparedness and prevention.[26] Of these the single most important development has been the creation of the United Nations Disaster Relief Organization in December 1971 'to mobilize, direct and coordinate the relief activities of the United Nations system and to coordinate the assistance with that given by other inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations'.[27] The importance of UNDRO should not necessarily be judged at this stage by its achievements to date but more by the evolution of its mandate; for it is the latter which best demonstrates the degree of growing commitment to a more coherent international approach to disaster assistance. From a relatively undernourished start, UNDRO has fought a running battle to gain not only adequate manpower and resources, but also clarification of what had been an intentionally vague mandate. This vagueness reflected the ambivalence in the early years of the member governments towards such an overall disaster organization as well as a weak compromise with other already well-established UN agencies. The looseness of the mandate frequently meant that UNDRO found itself at loggerheads with many of its more established sister organizations. What was meant by 'to direct'? Did UNDRO's responsibilities include man-made disasters normally handled by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees? Would UNDRO's appeals clash with those of agencies such as UNICEF? Was UNDRO intended to have an 'operational role', that is, to get involved in the actual running of relief work, or merely a non-operational, coordinating role?

By 1976 UNDRO had been strengthened by a special trust fund; but it was not until it was made the subject of a highly critical evaluation in October 1980 that the international community had to decide what to do with this floundering experiment in disaster relief organization.[28] A UN resolution of December 1982 at least officially resolved the ambiguity, when it was decided that UNDRO would, on behalf of the Secretary-General, be the central coordinator to develop concerted

26. For example, emergency units over the past decade have been instituted in UNICEF, FAO, WFP, UNHCR, WHO and PAHO.

27. United Nations General Assembly, 14 December 1971 (A/Res/2816).

28. United Nations General Assembly, 29 November 1974, (A/Res/3243), provided UNDRO with a special trust fund that went into operation by 1976. The importance attested by key donor states to a single UN coordinating body for relief can be seen in, for example, 'Need for an international disaster relief agency' (Washington, DC: Comptroller General of the United States, 5 May 1976). Nevertheless, the hopes of UNDRO remained unfulfilled as the Joint Inspection Unit, 'Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator' (Geneva: United Nations, October 1980) made only too clear.

relief programmes as a basis for united appeals for funds which UNDRO, in turn, would also be responsible for coordinating.[29] Even without this important clarification, UNDRO had over the past ten years become increasingly recognized as an important focal point for the collection and dissemination of international disaster information. Its coordination centre in Geneva maintains contacts with over ninety potential donors, warns of disasters, informs about relief requirements and monitors, as far as possible, the flows of assistance being provided through bilateral and multilateral sources. UNDRO is also the recognized focal point for organizing joint inter-agency missions to evaluate the needs of the disaster-stricken, and has undertaken a major role in the past few years in organizing disaster preparedness programmes.[30]

In addition to UNDRO, the United Nations has also established an Office of the Coordinator for Special Economic Assistance Programmes, created for the purpose of assessing the most urgent requirements of a country facing economic disaster and arranging as far as possible the contribution by donor countries of the resources required to stave off economic collapse.[31] In a recent report on such special economic assistance, the Secretary-General was able to state that at least seventeen African nations were provided aid to fend off disaster of one sort or another.[32]

Many governments have also institutionalized the manner in which they either distribute assistance to others or deal with disasters within their own countries. Potential donor governments such as those of Sweden, West Germany and the United Kingdom have established 'disaster units' to deal with foreign disaster assistance; and the EEC has established three separate funds to deal specifically with disasters.[33] An increasing number of governments of disaster-prone countries have established organizations to deal with disaster relief operations. In a recent count of seventy-seven developing nations which have to deal with serious recurrent disasters, forty have national disaster organizations, the majority of which have been established over the past decade.[34] Non-governmental organizations have also followed the pattern of establishing more permanent focal points for disaster relief operations. Several of the big charitable organizations have established their own emergency units, including the League of Red Cross Societies;[35] but perhaps the most striking institutional development in the voluntary sector has been the creation of the Voluntary Agency Steering Committee, which seeks to pool information from both voluntary organizations and inter-governmental organizations.

The Voluntary Agency Steering Committee is as much a reflection of an increased willingness to coordinate as it is an example of institution building. Coordination

29. United Nations General Assembly, 17 December 1982 (A/37/144); for important background to this resolution, see (A/36/225).

30. See, for further examples, Reports of the Secretary-General A/36/259, 22 June 1981; A/35/228, 16 May 1980; A/34/190, 26 April 1979.

31. Davidson, *International efforts to meet humanitarian needs*, p. 14.

32. *Special economic and disaster relief assistance: special programmes of economic assistance*, 28 October 1982 (A/37/140).

33. There are at present three separate disaster relief funds in the EEC: aid to Africa, Caribbean and Pacific countries associated with the Community under the Lomé Convention; aid to developing countries that are not associated in this way; and aid to EEC member states.

34. These statistics are derived from material produced by Brown (see *Disaster preparedness and the United Nations*, pp. 113–20) and the US Office for Foreign Disaster Assistance in 1982, 'Disaster preparedness in developing countries', unpublished.

35. Francis Parakatil of the League of Red Cross Societies, Geneva, stated that 'most of the major voluntary agencies markedly increased their involvement in disaster relief over the past ten years, since 1972'.

both at headquarters and operational levels is a critical component of any relief effort. When, for example, the Indian border states found themselves inundated with refugees from East Pakistan in 1971, over a nine-month period sixty-seven countries provided assistance directly, over 600 non-governmental organizations became directly or indirectly involved, and nine major UN agencies undertook significant relief roles. All this did not include the sizeable contributions made to the relief operation of the Indian Central Authorities as well as the individual states of India. The magnitude of the operation was eventually understood and a relatively effective coordination structure was imposed. However, this was by no means typical of the attitude towards coordination prevalent at the time. Both machinery for coordination and the willingness to share information have developed over the past ten years—horizontally (between similar actors such as IGOs) and vertically (between different types of actors such as IGOs and NGOs). On the level of UN coordination, there has been a series of important understandings defining the rôles of the respective organizations during relief operations and also regulating procedures for coordinating activities. Such memoranda of understanding have been signed, for example, between UNDRO and all the principal agencies dealing with relief, including UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP and WHO; and in 1979 the United Nations Development Programme agreed that the Resident Representative in countries where the UNDP had an office would act *ex officio* as UNDRO representative during natural disaster operations. Other agencies have followed suit, such as WHO and UNICEF, in agreeing 'to their respective roles in meeting the needs of children and other vulnerable groups in times of disaster'.[36]

UNDRO and the Office of the Coordinator for Special Economic Assistance Programmes rely increasingly upon 'joint inter-agency assessment missions' in which one or the other leads a team of experts from the operational agencies to evaluate disaster preparedness or relief requirements. In cases of large, complex disasters, it has now been generally accepted that the operational aspects of disaster relief will be handled either by a special representative appointed by the Secretary-General or by a 'lead agency' appointed by the Secretary-General. In either case, the underlying principle is to project a 'one voice' approach to disaster relief operations.[37]

Instruments for coordination between voluntary agencies and international organizations have also increased as evidenced by the above-mentioned Voluntary Agency Steering Committee. In more and more instances, the IGOs are also showing an inclination to use the 'grass roots' knowledge of the voluntary agencies through joint arrangements, for example between CARE and UNICEF, UNDRO and League of Red Cross Societies. Governments, too, have tended to involve voluntary agencies more and more in the planning of relief assistance activities; and Green has noted a trend by several governments to promote greater coordination amongst the voluntary agencies themselves.[38]

Expertise: pre-disaster planning and prevention

The planning and organizing of relief operations, like so many aspects of disaster work, have seen many changes of attitude and many challenges to conventional

36. Davidson, *International efforts to meet humanitarian needs*, p. 27.
37. Interview with Sir Robert Jackson, Special Representative for the Secretary-General in the Kampuchean relief operation, 21 November 1980.
38. Green, *International disaster relief*, p. 39.

assumptions. As one commentator noted after the Guatemala earthquake in 1976, 'Victims are not always starving, naked or in need of blankets. Disasters rarely destroy food stocks, most victims usually have sufficient clothing and the experts have not been able to trace a single recorded death from exposure after a disaster—even in extremely cold conditions'.[39] While this commentator exaggerated the resilience of the afflicted, he did point to an increasingly accepted view that all aspects of relief work, even the criteria for determining malnutrition and the value of importing temporary shelters, needed to be re-evaluated.[40]

The recent development of a more professional approach to disaster relief has taken a variety of forms. A body of practical literature and manuals is emerging which provides guidance on a wide variety of disaster issues such as setting up a refugee camp, assessment procedures and food distribution techniques.[41] Conferences and seminars organized by intergovernmental organizations, voluntary agencies and universities are more readily available to enable discussion of new techniques and methods of planning and preventing disasters.[42] Governments have tended to call much more frequently upon relevant UN agencies to review natural disaster plans and to help set up disaster units; and over the past few years meetings have been organized in South Asia, Latin America and South-east Asia to establish bases for coordinating work in cases of regional disasters.[43]

Stockpiling, or pre-positioning supplies, has also increased. A good example is the International Emergency Food Reserve, established in 1976 as a supplement to the World Food Programme's own emergency food resources. UNICEF's Packing and Assembly Centre (UNIPAC) in Copenhagen is a further example. There, surgical supplies, cooking and shelter materials are made available at short notice for relief operations throughout the world. Early warning systems are increasingly available, as are systems such as *Landsat*, which technically have the capability to 'sense' droughts, floods, great storms and fires and to assess and monitor their impact.[44] There is no doubt that as yet few developing countries can utilize the data fully, since weak infrastructure and poor communication facilities too often mean that the information cannot be readily transmitted or interpreted in the areas where particular disasters might break. Nevertheless, increased availability means at least that the potential for the use of early warning systems, space satellites, and enhanced communication facilities is much greater.

Disaster prevention, too, has increasingly occupied the attention of governments, IGOs and NGOs. One example is earthquake risk reduction techniques which are

39. Philip Knightley, 'Disasters: how the helpers make things worse', *Sunday Times*, 25 June 1978.

40. For examples, see Ian Davis, 'Emergency shelter' in National Research Council, *The role of technology in international disaster assistance* (Washington, DC: National Academy of Sciences, 1978) and M. S. Lowenstein, 'The cyclone: nutritional assessment with the QUAC stick' in Lincoln Chen, ed., *Disaster in Bangladesh: health crises in a developing nation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).

41. For example, *The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees handbook for emergencies* was first issued in December 1982.

42. For example, from 6–10 March 1982 an international seminar on disaster preparedness and relief was held in Islamabad, and attended by representatives of seven south Asian countries, the LORCS, UNDRO and several other UN organizations.

43. For example, in November 1978, representatives of UNDRO, the government of Sweden, the LORCS and Pan American Health Authority met representatives of the governments of Guatemala, Costa Rica and Peru to discuss the use of the Swedish Stand-by-Force under UN auspices in the case of disaster striking those countries. (A/34/190, 26 April 1976).

44. David S. Simonett, 'Possible uses of space satellites for disaster warning, monitoring and damage assessment' in National Research Council, *Technology in international disaster assistance*.

being applied with increasing regularity to land-use planning and building codes and regulations.[45] Anti-pollution and conservation measures also fall into this category.

If one looks at the development of institutions, mechanisms for coordination, even the improved expertise in preparedness and operations, the signs of an enhanced responsive potential are hard to deny. There is indeed more than a glimmer of a systematic and predictable approach to disaster relief. Yet all these developments must be weighed against another kind of reality, that of structural constraints which affect, in one way or another, all the components of the international community.

Structural constraints on the system

The exact number of refugees that fled from the Ogaden to Somalia between 1979 and 1980 was difficult to determine; nevertheless there is general agreement that the number had been well over a million. The thirty camps were squalid, and supplies to them were complicated by the inadequacy of the port facilities. UNHCR had been severely criticized as essentially ineffectual in its role as 'lead agency', but at the same time it was recognized by many observers that it lacked the status to coordinate the work of more substantial agencies on the scene. Examples of insufficient coordination were legion: 'The leader of a volunteer medical team from one donor country said that he was prevented initially from setting up a needed health service at a refugee camp because another donor country regarded that camp as within the purview of its volunteer groups—even though no medical team from the latter country was on hand.'[46]

The 4 February 1976 earthquake in south-east Guatemala that left 24,000 dead and 200,000 without homes was the 'start signal for another Great Disaster Relief Race'.[47] In the four days it took for international assistance to arrive, the local authorities had already organized emergency camps, slit trench latrines, and landing strips out of disused roads. The amount and type of aid which was sent by the international community was difficult for UNDRO to coordinate, since much critical liaison was short-circuited by direct government-to-government contact. Whether or not UNDRO's coordinating efforts would have made much difference in this case is open to speculation for, as one observer noted, several of the agencies even refused to accept directions from Guatemalan officials. One official from a major voluntary agency remarked that 'we can take advantage of the earthquake to make an indentation into the lives of these people'.[48]

To what extent the Ethiopian government in 1973 consciously ignored the impending famine which eventually cost the lives of approximately 100,000 people is a question which remains unresolved.[49] Nevertheless, few had any doubts that the government was more than a little insensitive to the possible repercussions that

45. UNDRO was invited by UNDP, UNESCO and Habitat to coordinate the assistance required to carry out risk analyses for the reconstruction of Montenegro in 1979 (A/35/228, 16 May 1980).

46. Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, *Reports on refugee aid* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1981) served as basic source of material for this case.

47. Paul Harrison, 'Disaster relief: relief or disaster?', *New Society*, 10 July 1980.

48. Knightley, 'Disasters'.

49. For the case against the Ethiopian government, see Jack Shepherd, *The politics of starvation* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1975). However, experts who know the area extremely well, such as John Seaman of Save the Children Fund, tend to discount conscious malevolence in the Ethiopian attitude towards the impending famine.

a famine might have upon the country's already precarious stability. The Ethiopian government's reaction to assistance from outside had much in common with that of many governments affected by the Sahel drought: namely, that links with traditional bilateral donors were more often preferred by the receiving governments to an overall coordinated operation.[50] Also, UN attempts to raise sufficient funds from member governments were proving disappointing.[51]

Despite the significant steps towards a more systematic approach to disaster control and mitigation, then, structural constraints—factors deeply engrained both in the problem itself and in the institutions which seek to deal with it—too often thwart the potential response. These can be grouped under four headings: (1) the nature of disasters and disaster relief; (2) organizational imperatives; (3) bureaucratic imperatives; and (4) political dynamics.

The nature of disasters and disaster relief

If any consistent theme has emerged from the efforts to understand disasters, it is the correlation between poverty and disaster impact. As F. C. Cuny succinctly put it, 'Disasters are disasters because the countries are underdeveloped.'[52] Vulnerability to these events, as the statistical analysis of Sheehan and Hewitt also makes clear, arises out of a lack of sound infrastructure, proper housing and technological know-how.[53] All these issues bring one to the more politically sensitive and financially more costly issue of development aid; and, only too clearly, it is this artificial divide between development aid and disaster assistance which the international community is generally too reluctant to cross. Effective solutions need to be put into action either before disaster strikes, or during a rehabilitation period after the impact. To deal with the 'middle portion', the portion with which the newspapers are normally obsessed, is, as has been said so often, applying sticking plasters to problems that require surgery. This obvious point aside, the correlation with poverty also explains why certain types of disasters, for example famines, are frequently allowed to develop before any resolute action is taken either by home governments or by outsiders. A disaster has to be seen, a distinction between normality and threatened affliction has to be recognized. A disaster in a severely underdeveloped country can pose a perceptual problem: for example, at what point does subsistence at the margin become starvation in the eyes of authorities accustomed to poverty?[54]

Forecasting certain types of natural disasters poses a particular problem. Cyclones, hurricanes and typhoons, for example, can change course relatively quickly. A government might have already warned of the impending hazard by the time that hazard has shifted direction. For people accustomed to such false warnings complacency may replace anxiety, until eventually they are caught out. Poverty,

50. Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, US Senate, *World hunger, health and refugee problems: Part IV: Famine in Africa* (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 62.
51. *World hunger*, p. 48.
52. F. C. Cuny, 'Conference keynote address' in Davis, ed., *Disasters and the small dwelling*, p. 9.
53. Sheehan and Hewitt, *A pilot survey*.
54. It is interesting to note that despite the seriousness and prevalence of famines throughout man's history, only recently have sophisticated techniques for forecasting famines been developed. See, for example, Conference Report on Famine and Food Emergencies, 5–16 July 1982 in *Disasters—the international journal of disaster studies and practice*, 1982, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 159–62.

again, enters the calculation, for too often the development of warnings cannot be monitored for lack of communications equipment.[55]

While stockpiling has been undertaken in many disaster-prone areas to provide instant relief once a disaster strikes, in too many instances severity of impact is a function of socio-economic conditions involving inadequate infrastructure. The usefulness of stockpiles is limited where, as is often the case, roads, local landing facilities and the like are inadequate to carry the traffic; and delays in assistance and increased casualties are frequent results.

Even disaster relief itself, as it is presently distinguished from development aid, can undermine the effectiveness of international attempts to assist and, ironically, can perpetuate disasters and even generate new ones. Under the present 'sticking-plaster' approach to relief, where goods flood in to an afflicted area, local economies can be severely threatened. Many are the times that international food aid has driven down the local price of produce to such low levels that recovery has been delayed by one or two years. Alternatively, disaster relief can also create the danger of local short-term economic booms which are dependent upon the temporary and artificial requirements of relief operations. Once the relief workers and the overall operation are disbanded, the boom collapses and economic stagnation sets in at a level far worse that even the economic activity immediately following the disaster.[56]

The organizational imperative

'You can't make a career out of disasters', remarked an official from the United States Agency for International Development.[57] This sort of attitude epitomizes the constraints that organizational imperatives place upon the effectiveness of the international community's response to disaster relief. Simply put, the imperatives of the organization are principally survival and growth,[58] mandates are limited or expanded, offices are created or disbanded to ensure that resources are available to fulfil these fundamental objectives. Bearing this in mind, one might well understand, for example, the World Food Programme's supposed reluctance to be seen as a relief agency, since the idea of a development agency has a 'higher standing than the former in the international bureaucracy league table'.[59]

Organizational imperatives constrain the international community's relief potential in a variety of ways. In the first place, disasters are generally regarded as a 'no growth' area for institutional and personal advancement. More often than not, according to senior officials within the United Nations, the surge of disaster units within the major UN agencies was due far more to a need not to fall behind the others than a real commitment to disaster work.[60] The fact of the matter is that even disaster relief in its widest perspective (planning and prevention as well as

55. Simonett, 'Possible uses of space satellites', pp. 79–80.

56. See, for example, Stephen Dudasik, 'Unanticipated repercussions of international disaster relief', *Disasters*, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 31–37.

57. Interview with an official from US AID, Washington, DC, 18 November 1980.

58. There is an ever-increasing body of literature that views political resultants from the perspective of organizational dynamics. The view that organizations are principally concerned with their own survival and growth rather than any 'goal maximizing' objectives is consistent with the main thrust of that literature. See for example J. D. Steinbruner, *The cybernetic theory of decision* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1974).

59. John Cathie, *The political economy of food aid* (Aldershot, Hants: Gower, 1982), p. 93.

60. Suggestions of this type were made to this author by senior officials within the United Nations on the understanding that their names would not be identified with these points.

relief operations) pales when it comes to the more lucrative organizational benefits derived from dealing with development projects.

While the reactions of organizations to their missions depend upon their operating environment, in many relief situations the 'power of the purse' becomes the criterion of cooperation. On the international organizational level, officials who have attempted to pool the energies and resources of the agencies for disaster relief work have often found that they could get nowhere until the money was on the table. In the United States, government departments involved in a relief operation do so on the basis of strict accounting and reimbursement; this approach certainly applies to many if not all governments of disaster-prone countries. In certain instances, departments will not act without first being assured of reimbursement.

Organizational 'image' is a further impediment to effective international responses. Jorgen Lissner has pointed to the unfortunate but realistic view that voluntary agencies depend upon projecting their individual images to raise funds and thus to enable them to pursue their relief work.[61] This home truth, however, is not applicable solely to NGOs. The organizational imperative too often dictates that IGOs, for example UNICEF, or donor governments, as in the case of US AID, act bilaterally so as to promote their presence and their efforts in order to draw attention to their own institutional worth. Allied to the question of image is one of organizational response. The goods, supplies, personnel which an organization sends to a disaster operation often reflect what that organization can do rather than what is required. This stems in part from a 'standard operating procedure' approach to relief work. If cholera vaccines are always provided for a flood disaster, then the organization might well send such vaccines for floods, even when it has been informed that there are no incidents of cholera. Another contributory cause is a determination to show the organization in its best light. Hence, even if a hospital may not be required in a particular situation, mobile hospital units might be sent, merely to dramatize the presence of the organization.

Beyond matters of image and technical competence is the factor of orientation. An organization, be it a voluntary agency or an intergovernmental body, is often oriented towards objectives for which relief operations are but the first step. Religious groups might see an opportunity to promote their message; a UN agency might create an opening for more extensive development work. Such motives do, however, make it difficult to harmonize efforts into a single coherent operation.

Lastly, a major disaster requiring some form of international assistance occurs approximately once a week. Such frequency means that a particular institution oriented towards relief finds itself dramatically overextended or able to pick and choose the disaster in which it can best project itself. This is yet another unpredictable factor in the responsive capability of the international system.

The bureaucratic imperative

On all levels the international community's efforts to provide relief also has to contend with the bureaucratic imperative—that clash of contending interests and procedural norms which tend to add uncertainty and delay to any attempt at concerted action. These can be divided into three types; symbolic struggles; territorial fights; and institutional procedures.

61. Jorgen Lissner, *The politics of altruism: a study of the political behaviour of voluntary development agencies* (Geneva: Lutheran World Federation, 1977).

Symbolic fights are those in which one portion of a government or organization uses one issue as a means to lever concessions on what it perceives as a more important issue from another portion of government or organization. 'It is not unknown', says one US AID official with experience in Ethiopia, Bangladesh and Washington, DC, 'for the release of relief aid to be delayed by one or other member of the Inter-Agency Staff Committee until a not related "matter of principle" is sorted out.'[62] Even more relevant than symbolic struggles are territorial fights which always loom near the surface of any relief operation. Territorial fights are those in which contending groups—be they governments, IGOs or NGOs—seek to promote or preserve their 'turf' at the expense of others. The fact that one reporter could suggest that 'Oxfam did not do much to discourage perceptions' that the Red Cross-UNICEF mission to Kampuchea was 'a heartless, bureaucratic stooge of the US government'[63] gives some indication of the heat of these battles. The report of the Joint Inspection Unit concerning UNDRO also provides a clear insight into the intensity of territorial combat. If UNDRO were to take on technical specialists to deal with preparedness and prevention measures, warned the inspection team, these steps might be regarded as duplicating 'skills already available in the specialized agencies and may lead to an "operational" UNDRO which causes frictions.'[64] On the ground examples of clashes are frequent. As one member of a joint CARE-UNICEF team in Bangladesh stated: 'My loyalty is not to any concept of a UN system; it is to the particular CARE-UNICEF operation in the province.'[65] And, as another expert explained: 'The first ten days of a relief operation are frequently spent staking out claims. After that, all the feuding settles down.'[66]

The bureaucratic imperative also entails institutional procedures in which one organization seeks to protect itself from the criticisms of others, or one component of an organization from others within that organization. These procedures again cause delays and inhibit overall effectiveness. They encompass factors from accounting procedures to landing rights, from visas for UN and NGO officials to customs declarations for relief materials.[67] Signatures, paperwork and queues too often tend to replace speed and concern.

62. Interview with US AID official, Dacca, 21 November 1982.

63. William Shawcross, 'A shattered Cambodia facing new trials by hunger', *International Herald Tribune*, 3 April 1980.

64. Joint Inspection Unit, 'Evaluation of the Office of the United Nations Disaster Relief Coordinator' (Geneva: United Nations, 1980). The report goes on to say that 'the major organizations in the UN system involved in disasters are much larger and better funded, have been functioning longer. . .and have their own programmes, clienteles and interests' (p. 28).

65. Interview with Dan Roth, CARE, 17 December 1981, based on experience in East Pakistan and Bangladesh, 1971–2.

66. Interview with Dr John Seaman, Save the Children Fund, 6 January 1983.

67. Time after time, relief operations are hampered by such basic administrative problems as customs declarations and visas. UNDRO has attempted to make special arrangements with disaster-prone countries and other international agencies to ease such restrictions during times of relief operations. UNDRO, for example, has held discussions with the International Civil Aviation Organization 'resulting in revision and updating of ICAO instructions to regional and country staff regarding cooperation with UNDRO and assistance to be rendered in disaster preparedness and disaster relief' (A/36/259, 22 June 1981). However, UNDRO has reported no fundamental change from its 1980 assessment that 'on the other hand, 50 per cent of potential recipients still require normal commercial documentation for relief consignments. . . 57 per cent require visas for United Nations personnel coming to assist in relief work, and 65 per cent require them for other relief workers' (A/35/228, 16 May 1980). The frustration which this causes has more recently been reflected in M. El Baradei *et al.*, *Model rules for disaster relief operations* (New York: UNITAR, 1982). However, the reasons why administrators in developing countries cling to such rigid procedures are exemplified by the fact that even at the time of writing, court proceedings for alleged corruption are

In a different vein, institutional procedures also constrain the system when, for instance, the procedures of one bureaucracy do not effectively mesh with those of another. UNHCR, for example, is often faced with significant time lags between receiving member governments' funding pledges and actually receiving the funds. Governments, on the other hand, are restricted in the speed with which they can carry out their pledges, since sometimes even national legislation is necessary before contributions can be made.

Political dynamics

The political dynamics which affect the international community's disaster system and its approaches to specific events are purportedly not as transparent as are perhaps those which determine bilateral development aid.[68] Indeed, the statements of both practitioners and academic observers would suggest that there may be a great deal of truth in Maurice Williams's reported assertion that 'disaster relief is above politics'.[69] Of course, that depends upon how one defines politics: if one is referring to the process by which one seeks to gain advantages over an adversary or to serve geopolitical interests, then disaster relief is rarely regarded as a political weapon[70]; if, on the other hand, one means the process by which one seeks to reconcile contending interests within governmental and non-governmental domestic institutions, then the term 'politics' provides to some useful insights into the ways in which the international disaster relief system is constrained.

The clearest interplay between political dynamics and disaster relief stems from the blatant disadvantages faced by the governments of the afflicted. Generally, disaster-prone states are those least able to afford effective preventive or preparatory measures; more often than not, most developing nations find that disasters bite into annual budgets and cause economic dislocation when even logistic support for a relief operation demands the redeployment of available lorries and trains. Such governments' inability to act effectively makes them vulnerable to criticism from within, by recognized or unofficial opposition groups, and does little to enhance their regional or international prestige. Since such governments often work at the brink of social as well as economic stability, accusations of insensitivity or ineffectualness can often have widespread political implications that can lead to violence, oppression and ultimately a man-made disaster. It is only too apparent at present how many disaster-prone countries already experience domestic conflict.

The involvement of the international community not only tends to show up the efforts of the indigenous authorities, but also tends to impose foreign influence upon significant portions of domestic decision-making through a process which

continuing against senior officials who ran the 1971 refugee operation on behalf of the Indian Red Cross. One of the defendants claims that his major fault was taking initiatives which by-passed normal procedures for utilizing transport.

68. There is a great deal of literature which points to the dominant political motivation in the provision of development aid. Two examples are: C. R. Frank, Jr and M. Baird, 'Foreign aid; past and future' in C. Fred Bergsten and L. B. Krause, eds, *World politics and international economics* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1975) and T. Hayter, *Aid as imperialism* (Harmondsworth, Middx: Penguin, 1971).

69. Maurice Williams, before becoming the World Food Council's executive director, had been Deputy Administrator for US AID in 1971. His remark was quoted during an interview with Curtis Farrar and D. G. McDonald of US AID on 18 November 1980.

70. This view, frequently expressed by practising diplomats, officials in international organizations and voluntary agencies, has been reiterated by Morris Davis, 'A few comments on the political dimensions of disaster assistance', in Davis, ed., *Disasters and the small dwelling*.

Ronald Libby has called 'external cooptation'.[71] From the perspective of the government of an afflicted country, disaster assistance is too often paid for by uncontrolled access to its society.[72] Furthermore, the recipient government has to contend with the economic consequences of foreign assistance: the post-relief local booms and recessions, for example, which distort an already beleaguered economy. Relief aid can even create a climate of resentment between and amongst local communities in which local poor begin to regard refugees or victims of natural disasters as having benefited too greatly from their plight.[73]

To avoid such pressures and interference, governments of the afflicted can resort to a host of defensive measures. They might underestimate the seriousness of the calamity, or despite the extent of disruption which arises out of a disaster, they might just refuse any proffered assistance at all. They may ignore the multilateral relief route and pick and choose the bilateral offers with which they feel safest. This defensive bilateralism applies not merely to dealings with other governments but also to dealings with voluntary organizations and international agencies. If aid is accepted, recipient governments tend to insert a layer of government administrators over large-scale operations, less to enhance the speed of the operation than to control the conduct of foreign relief workers.

For donor governments, too, dilemmas abound. Certainly Morris Davis captures well the pressure on governments to respond as he depicts them being 'alerted by the press, prodded by interest groups, urged on by phrase-making legislators'.[74] Nevertheless, governments are often wary of the types of obligation which they find themselves taking on in a relief operation. The prospect of enormous financial commitments and of being seen to support a particular regime or its practices often cools the ardour of even the most enthusiastic donor. Faced with this sort of dilemma, aid through multilateral agencies often seems the best option for potential donor governments. Yet, while this may well be the case, a variety of domestic interests might wish to speed up the relief process or stake a claim in the relief operation under their own banner, and hence urge the donor government to move bilaterally.

If the concerns of the potential recipient government and those of the potential donor government are understandable, then to a great extent their potential for distorting any consistent and systematic attempt to mobilize international relief becomes equally apparent. However, these concerns not only affect the way the system operates, they also affect directly the very way certain components of the system, the intergovernmental agencies, are actually structured. Arguments about the disproportionate amount of disaster relief one region gets as opposed to another, calculations of international agency personnel based upon national quotas and not upon expertise, reluctance to allow agency mandates to be expanded—these are more often than not mere extensions of these concerns.

71. 'External cooptation' is the process by which external forces, such as foreign governments and IGOs, 'structure the context' of the decision-making process of a state. See R. T. Libby, 'External cooptation of a less developed country's policy making: the case of Ghana, 1969–1972', *World Politics*, Vol. XXIX, No. 1, October 1976.

72. Richard H. Ullman's introduction to Green, *International disaster relief*, p. 5.

73. See, for example, John Seaman, 'Principles of health care', *Disasters*, 1981, Vol. 5, No. 3, p. 202: 'If the services developed for refugees are of a much higher standard than those available to the non-refugee population, the experience has been that this often breeds resentment between the local villager and the refugee'.

74. Davis, '. . . the political dimensions of disaster assistance', p. 51.

In conclusion

In the final analysis one is left with the difficulty of reconciling the significant steps which have been made to devise a more systematic approach to the international community's response to disasters with the seemingly irresolvable structural constraints which emerge from the components of the international community. Perhaps the explanation of these contradictory factors is perversely simple: disasters, in terms of their rapidly increasing complexity, have continually outstripped the nascent system's capability to cope with them. The more complex the disasters, the more economic deprivation and political instability produce their potent compound, the more the brakes are put on the international community's capacity to respond. There is little to indicate that this situation is improving. Today there are 16 million refugees adrift,[75] and there is little to suggest that continued political strife in Central America, southern Africa or South-east Asia will not add immensely to these figures. There are few signs that, given the priorities of poverty, any significant steps can be taken to stem the growing ecological imbalances which are so often causes of natural disasters.

In a recent meeting of the UN Environment Programme, the executive director, Mostafa Tolba, warned delegates that the world faced an ecological disaster as final as nuclear war within two decades.[76] Even discounting the hyperbole which such gatherings tend to generate, the fact, for example, that 15 million acres of arable or grazing land become desert every year owing to the destruction of forests and soil erosion tells a grim tale.[77] Villagers and slum dwellers cannot afford the option of conservation; renewable resources—wood for fuel, soil, no matter how overworked, for food—are needed now. The direct impact of such ecological imbalances upon human survival is increasingly telling. In Africa food consumption per person is 10 per cent less than it was a decade ago. Food production, owing to political instability as well as to ecological factors, has slipped in the African continent from a 7 per cent decline in the 1960s to a 15 per cent decline in the 1970s, and the decline is continuing in the 1980s. What the world might eventually be facing is not merely more complex disasters but more and more 'megadisasters' in which millions of vulnerable people are exposed to a disaster at any one time. If the past provides any indication of reactions to such future events, the sad conclusion will be that potential recipients will become more defensive in their attitude towards international relief, and donors will become more wary of committing resources in such inherently unstable circumstances. Faced with the alternative of sitting back and awaiting 'the inevitable', one might at least suggest that there are at present means by which the effects of the constraints can be mitigated to some extent.

Greater emphasis must be placed upon preparedness, particularly stockpiling. Despite some obvious criticism of 'Malthusian mentalities', aimed at agencies which have attempted this course of action, particularly in the area of food stockpiling, there is no more effective way to ensure that a degree of relevant supplies will be on hand when disasters strike. Since insufficient development has taken place in

75. Kathleen Newland, *Refugees: the new international politics of displacement* (Washington, DC: Worldwatch Institute, 1981), p. 5.

76. 'UN conference opens with a prediction of ecological catastrophe', *International Herald Tribune*, 11 May 1982.

77. 'UN conference opens . . .'. See also *Common crisis: North–South cooperation for world recovery—the Brandt Commission 1983* (London: Pan, 1983); and *Facing the future: mastering the probable and managing the unpredictable* (Paris: OECD, 1979).

areas of greatest potential for disasters, criteria of 'self-help' really are difficult to apply. Stockpiling also provides at least a basis for relief efforts to be carried out without the over-interference of outsiders, a point that cannot be too strongly emphasized from the perspective of the recipient government.

Prevention, too, has to be increased, but since truly effective prevention measures will never attract the resources that development projects do, prevention should at least be linked where possible to the latter.

Furthermore, despite all the frustrations associated with the creation of international machinery for disaster relief, it still affords, no matter how precariously, a better alternative than the system of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Functionally, the system has, in many instances, as this article has attempted to show, indeed worked. It should be allowed to gain competence by chipping away where possible at certain restrictive practices and by being able to develop further its own responsive expertise.

Finally, in a not dissimilar way to a recent Canadian proposal to establish a special post of 'humanitarian representative' for refugee relief, the international community should consider 'regional policy coordinators' who, because of their acute sensitivity to the political and economic problems of particular regions and their familiarity with the nature of relief requirements, could at least ease the way for a more sensitive involvement of the international community in disaster relief operations.

Chinese defence policy

GERALD SEGAL*

From muskets to missiles: politics and professionalism in the Chinese army, 1945–1981. By Harlan Jencks. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1982. 322pp. Index. £16·25.

The Chinese military system: an organizational study of the Chinese People's Liberation Army. 2nd rev. edn. By Harvey Nelsen. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1982. 285pp. Index. £17·25. Pb.: £10·00.

The dynamics of Chinese politics. By Lucian Pye. Cambridge, Mass.: Oelschlager, Gunn & Hain. 1981. 307 pp. Index. Pb.: £8.00.

China, the Soviet Union and the West: strategic and political dimensions in the 1980s. Edited by Douglas Stuart and William Tow. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1982. 309pp. Index. £18·75. Pb.: £8·25.

Eighth voyage of the dragon: a history of China's quest for seapower. By Bruce Swanson. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press. 1982. 348pp. Index.

China: a political history, 1917–1980. By Richard Thornton. Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1982. 518pp. Index. £21·25. Pb.: £9·75.

WHY does China get such a good press in the West? Compared to the Soviet Union, as well as to other authoritarian states, China deserves a much rougher ride. Like the Soviet Union, China is run by a harsh communist system. China's leaders have executed a far greater number of political opponents than has the Soviet Union in the past twenty years. The famines of the post-Great Leap Forward débâcle, and the great purges of the Cultural Revolution, are now known to have claimed more victims than any similar events in Soviet history.

Yet Western China-watchers have by and large glossed over these nasty events, all too often glibly accepting the official Chinese explanations about the 'necessities of the revolution'. However, in recent years the scales have begun to fall from Western eyes. China is beginning to get a 'bad press' on some issues, and the study of China seems to have entered a new phase. The problems for the present and future are twofold. First, in many areas the cold light of criticism of China still remains too dim. This is especially true in the study of domestic politics. Second, there is a danger of 'over-learning' the lessons of history—of losing a sense of balance in studying China.[1] The trick seems to be to remain positive about the study of China, while unambiguously pointing to its negative aspects.

Western images of China of course have not always been positive. Even a gentle reading of John K. Fairbank's lively memoirs of the recent generational changes in China studies makes this plain.[2] The period after the Second World War and the McCarthy scares are obviously the most painful memories for those who fear that anything but a positive view of China will descend into scaremongering irrationalities. We are rightly cautioned to beware of the McCarthy approach, but perhaps the Sinologists and their students who suffered in this dark time are overly obsessed. More likely, they are too pessimistic in trusting the extent to which times have changed, and academics and journalists have matured. The fears of McCarthyite negativism on China are important, but they should not prevent any justified critical comment about contemporary China.

There are indeed growing signs that the study of China, as with that of the Soviet Union a decade ago, is coming of age. Unfortunately for academics, some of the best signs of this new maturity are to be found with journalists and not scholars. The penetrating analyses by

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1. For a book that tends to go over the top, see Paul Hollander, *Political pilgrims* (New York: Harper & Row, 1983).

2. John K. Fairbank, *Chinabound* (New York: Harper & Row, 1982).

0020–5850/83/4/0713—08$03.00©1983 International Affairs

Fox Butterfield and Richard Bernstein (both Fairbank students), and Phillip Short, stand out as three positive examples of constructive criticism.[3] The lead has therefore been given to academics to carry the new line forward. One of the best, and indeed most crucial, areas for applying this new constructive criticism is in the study of Chinese defence policy, the analysis of which is perhaps unique in bringing together key elements of foreign and domestic policy. It is also the area where the pressures exerted by foreign changes and technological innovation seem greatest. Thus, as change in China's defence policy becomes more likely, it is all the more incumbent upon students of China to track the transformations accurately.

In the study of the Soviet Union, defence policy has long been recognized as a crucial area of analysis. To be sure, there are important failures in Soviet studies, but comparative communist studies, in the internal as well as the much neglected external dimension, by and large reveal greater sophistication on the part of scholars of the Soviet Union. However, this is not a call for simple catching up with Soviet studies, for as with various other convergence theories, they over-simplify more complex realities. For example, the study of Soviet defence policy has been deeply affected by what Ken Booth has called ethnocentrism.[4] He trenchantly warns against perceiving Soviet strategy through Western definitions and perceptions. Ethnocentrism is no doubt a problem in China studies, but Sinologists have a greater tendency to suffer from the opposite complaint—ethnic-chic. Thus, changes in Soviet studies leading towards constructive criticism of Soviet policy come from the opposite starting point to corresponding changes in China studies. Nevertheless, the depressing conclusion remains that many scholars of the Soviet Union seem to have moved farther and faster than their colleagues in the China field.

In order to appreciate more fully the recent changes in China studies, three major areas of defence policy stand out as most deserving of review. Beginning with domestic Chinese politics and Party–Army relations, it will then be useful to consider Chinese defence doctrines and changes in Beijing's foreign policy. The six books under review are naturally of uneven quality, but they do all help illustrate crucial aspects of changes in defence policy.

Party and army

The single most important issue receiving attention from students of China's defence policy is the relationship between the Communist Party and the People's Liberation Army (PLA). As with the study of the Soviet military, it is correctly thought that the 'communist' component in Soviet and Chinese politics is most crucial and that military men in communist states enjoy a special relationship with their Party bosses. Western perceptions of these relations underwent several changes when studying the Soviet Red Army, but study of the PLA has been more static. Scholars of the Soviet Union were at first obsessed by a totalitarian model, and then shifted to a more sophisticated group politics model.[5] This latter theory suggested the primacy of bureaucratic politics where largely separate institutions assumed certain postures depending on their bureaucratic interests. Hence the notion, 'where you stand depends on where you sit'.

The study of the Chinese military establishment seemed to have skipped the totalitarian phase, perhaps because of a basically positive predisposition towards China as already outlined. But China studies did seem to be deeply mired in the institutional phase: seeing Party–Army relations as relatively rigid, with institutions vying with each other for power. To be sure, important subtleties and cross-cutting cleavages were well documented by Ellis Joffe, the doyen of the Party–Army studies.[6] Other scholars, notably William Parrish and

3. Fox Butterfield, *China: alive in the bitter sea* (New York: New York Times Books, 1982); Richard Bernstein, *From the center of the earth* (New York: Little, Brown, 1982); Phillip Short, *The dragon and the bear* (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1982).

4. Ken Booth, *Strategy and ethnocentrism* (London: Croom Helm, 1979).

5. Dale Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, eds, *Civil–military relations in communist systems* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1978); Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds, *Soldiers, peasants and bureaucrats* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982); Gerald Segal, 'The PLA as a group' in David Goodman, ed., *Groups in Chinese politics* (forthcoming, 1984).

6. Ellis Joffe, *Party and army* (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1971), 'The Chinese army after the Cultural Revolution', *China Quarterly*, Jul.-Sept. 1973, No. 55 and, with Gerald Segal, 'The Chinese army and professionalism', *Problems of communism*, Nov.-Dec. 1978, Vol. 27, No. 6

William Whitson, pointed out in great detail other factional alignments within the PLA.[7] John Gittings broke important new ground in providing an overall context for Chinese military policy.[8]

Thus for a long time, certainly throughout the 1960s, the study of Party–Army relations in Chinese studies was well ahead of its counterpart in Soviet studies. Alas, this is no longer the case. In the 1970s the Soviet field moved on from the institutional model to the participatory model. Its leading exponent, Timothy Colton,[9] suggests that Party and Army compete in certain respects, but to a large extent there are issues on which the military establishment is allowed to participate in politics. Therefore, the continuing conflict postulated in the institutional model does not always hold true. What is more, military and Party institutions are far from monolithic and to a great extent cleavages cut across them.

It is sadly apparent that the insights gained from this participatory model have yet to affect the study of the PLA. Obviously not all conclusions from the Soviet field should be automatically applied to China studies, for the Chinese case is special and PLA power is far less strong, for example in foreign policy making.[10] Nevertheless, we are long overdue for a study of the PLA that does at least attempt to use the beneficial qualities of the participation model. Two of the books under review, those by Jencks and Nelsen, promise much in this respect, but only Jencks has any real success.

Harlan Jencks's effort is in many respects truly breathtaking. He has amassed a remarkable amount of data on the PLA and has covered the secondary literature in impressive style. Indeed it is precisely because of the staggering scale of his work that one expects a more comprehensive analysis. Jencks begins with some useful theory on Party–Army relations that owes a great deal to Roman Kolkowicz and the institutional model. It is, however, notable that Jencks is unable to sustain the theory when analysing the practice. It is to his credit that he implicitly undermines the institutional approach by explaining factional politics within the PLA and the Party. Above all, Jencks is to be praised for his exposition on China's 'military–industrial complex'. This is the most innovatory chapter and one that most undermines the notion of a simple Party–Army split.

Jencks argues convincingly that the PLA is evolving in many respects in the direction of the Soviet Red Army. Professionalism grows in the PLA as the military is modernized and, according to Jencks, this leads to inevitable changes in the PLA's role. This is undoubtedly true, and makes it all the more urgent that the participatory model as applied to the Soviet military establishment be used with reference to the PLA.

Jencks has clearly made an important contribution to Chinese defence studies. One can bemoan the fact that he did not do more, but it could be considered unfair to hold such expectations. China studies, like many other fields, require a step-by-step approach. Jencks said he was trying to heed the advice of those such as Jonathan Pollack—one of the high-fliers in US study of Chinese foreign policy—urging more comparative work in Chinese defence studies. Unfortunately, Jencks was not using the most sophisticated of comparisons, but he is still to be highly praised for his efforts. Yet to argue for comparisons for their own sake, and to adopt more flexible comparisons as the cases change, reveals more about the trendy state of academia than it contributes to our knowledge about the PLA.

Unfortunately not all scholars are as careful about their use of analytical frameworks. Harvey Nelsen's *The Chinese military system*, first published in 1977, marked the change from the relatively subtle overall analyses, like that by John Gittings, to a simplistic institutional model. Nelsen's view of the Chinese 'system' was overwhelmingly based on a study of the Cultural Revolution, and while including material usefully updating Gittings it was not convincing in explaining how a systems approach added to our understanding of the PLA.

7. William Parrish, 'Factions in Chinese military politics', *China Quarterly*, Oct.-Dec. 1973, No. 56; William Whitson, *The Chinese High Command* (New York: Praeger, 1973).

8. John Gittings, *The role of the Chinese army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

9. Timothy Colton, *Commissars, commanders and civilian authority* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979); also David Albright, 'A comparative conceptualization of civil–military relations', *World Politics*, July 1980.

10. Gerald Segal, 'The PLA and China's foreign policy decision-making', *International Affairs*, Summer 1981, Vol. 57, No. 3.

Therefore it was with great expectations that one opened the second edition of Nelsen's study, hoping very much not only for an update to cover the first five years after Mao, but also an incorporation of the new ideas in comparative communist defence studies. Although Nelsen says he made more than one hundred pages of changes in the new edition, neither hope is fulfilled. For a book touted as 'a major reference work on the PLA', the author's admitted failure to take into account new concepts in comparative politics is deplorable. Apart from a tacked-on final chapter, and minor factual adjustments, the book shows no sign of having benefitted by a second edition. The original strength of the work remains—preeminently a useful review of PLA organization. But its original weakness—the narrow systems approach—looks all the worse for the passage of time.

Criticism of the failure of analysts of Chinese defence policy to move forward is not necessarily applicable to the China field as a whole. In fact, two other recent books, one of which is under review here, stand out as having made remarkable progress in deepening our understanding of general Chinese politics. Both also have important relevance to defence studies. It is noticeable, though, that neither the work by Lucian Pye, nor that by Harry Harding,[11] owes much to comparative politics. They are both derived from considerable experience in the China field, but they both also reinforce trends of analysis already seen in Soviet studies.

Lucian Pye's effort, written for the Rand Corporation, suggests that Chinese leadership politics is primarily concerned with personality ties: that personal relationships, more than institutional or generational links, explain how power is wielded in China. Factions can be related to policy, but they are not 'opinion groups'. Pye is careful not to suggest that personal relations explain every aspect of policy, for he is quick to grant importance to other theories, but his real contribution is to place special emphasis on these personal ties and their deep roots in Chinese culture. He is especially persuasive in arguing that the pattern of personal ties helps explain the role of language in policy debates and the reason why political enemies tend not to be executed in China. Pye's work so sparkles with flashes of insight that one forgives sometimes glib generalizations. In any case, he has adequately covered his rear by suggesting that in the final analysis only cross-cutting cleavages and no single theory of factions can explain the dynamic of Chinese politics.

It is Pye's persuasive contention that no model, especially that of institutional politics, explains the complexity of Chinese politics. Neither does any explain why China will continue to be unstable. Pye's thesis suggests that factional politics are endemic in China as complex coalitions are constructed and collapse. His assertion that the same fate will befall Deng Xiaoping is amply confirmed by the recent 12th Party Congress's failure to push the Dengist line as far as had been expected.

These brief remarks cannot do justice to the intricacy of the Pye text, nor can justice be done to the often opposing line taken in the equally comprehensive analysis by Harry Harding. But it must be stated that both books mark an important watershed in the study of Chinese politics and encourage confidence that some progress is being made. While Pye argues for more complex analyses of factions, Harding suggests the same for bureaucratic politics. Both represent the very best of China studies in demonstrating just how much the field has overcome the ethnocentrism that still afflicts Soviet studies. (If Pye's book suffers from anything ethnic, it is the opposite problem of ethnic-chic.) But this is more than compensated for by his piercing of some analysts' complacency in accepting the official Chinese line. It is indeed a most welcome breath of fresh air to see Pye denounce Chinese hypocrisy and self-serving statements, an indictment which also applies to those Western analysts who have for too long been willing to accept Chinese statements at face value.

However, Pye is also careful to retain a balance in his judgement of Chinese politics. Unlike the other internal politics book (by Richard Thornton) under review, Pye retains respect for his subject. Thornton's view that 'the Communist period has been a backward step in China's evolutionary experience' (pp.435–6) is honest, but it is not conducive to a full understanding of Chinese politics. His emphasis on continuing conflict in the leadership, as Pye also points out, is natural, but unlike Pye he shows little sympathy for the issues at the heart of the disputes. Thornton claims to offer 'an integrated analytical framework' for the study of China, but he does no such thing. He does provide a mass of useful chronological

11. Harry Harding, *Organizing China* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1981). See also the review of Harding by Pye in *China Quarterly*, Sept. 1982, No. 91, pp. 507–9.

detail on leadership politics, but fails where Pye succeeds, in offering stimulating reflections on what all the details mean.

Because of Thornton's heavy biases, his book cannot even serve as a useful basic text for teaching. It is a particular shame that the effort at constructive criticism should go so awry, for it only reinforces the views of those who say the positive aspects of China must predominate in any analysis; and this makes it more difficult for those seeking a middle path in analysis.

Military doctrine

Ethnic-chic is an especially damaging problem in studying Chinese foreign policy. The glossing over of Chinese hypocrisies resulted in large part from a well-intentioned caution about misunderstanding the value of Chinese political culture. This over-sympathy is most evident in the all too ready adoption at face-value by some Western analysts of China's own simplistic models of defence policy. What is more confusing, at times there are examples of both ethnocentrism and ethnic-chic in analyses of the same Chinese defence policy. Unlike Soviet studies where ethnocentrism has been the main analytical difficulty, in Chinese studies the errors of the opposite type have been more evident. Take for example the central concept of 'people's war'. Most Sinologists have tended to accept that China has a static understanding of the term. They believe in some kind of romantic bandit-like warfare that is able to mobilize the masses to swamp an invading force.[12] Such analysts suggest that China has rarely wavered from its belief in this passive form of defence and that this therefore justifies its essential peasant and untrained, unmodernized military.

It is not merely with hindsight that one is able to point to serious oversimplifications in this Western view. Certainly the practice of Chinese defence policy indicates cases of forward deployment (Korea and India) and indeed aggressive probing (Taiwan 1958 and Xisha 1974). Analysts now make a major point of stressing how China has come to speak of 'people's war under modern conditions' and suggest this is a major change. The fact that this term was attributed to Mao in the height of the Cultural Revolution casts serious doubt on Western analyses. Equally, China may have disparaged nuclear weapons as 'paper tigers', but this did not prevent the development and deployment of such weapons. 'People's war' has always been a more flexible concept than many analysts have been willing to accept. At its most basic, it means little more than war with popular support, hardly a novel concept.[13]

Although the errors of ethnic-chic should have been obvious earlier, they are only now catching the attention of Sinologists. Unfortunately, some have over-compensated for their original error and now assert that people's war is being changed out of all recognition. Once again, the main problem is the failure to recognize that people's war, as with much of Maoist ideology, is flexible enough to incorporate modern changes.[14] Obviously important modernization is now taking place in the PLA, but that does not necessarily constitute a vast change from post-1949 Chinese military doctrine. Errors of ethnocentrism and ethnic-chic compound each other rather than cancel each other out.

There can be greater optimism about the analysis of China's nuclear weapons strategy. In particular, Jonathan Pollack's early survey of Chinese nuclear doctrine stands up fairly well.[15] Most recently, others have taken the field even further. John Wilson Lewis's analysis of military doctrine[16] pointed to China's special definition of deterrence and the inapplicability of western strategic language. Concepts such as minimum deterrence for China are now seen to have been too simplistic, and probably derived from ethnocentrism. Much as in recent

12. Alexander Atkinson, *Social order and the general theory of strategy* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1981).

13. For a general analysis of Chinese defence policy see Gerald Segal and William Tow, eds, *Chinese defence policy* (London: Macmillan, forthcoming 1984).

14. Gerald Segal, 'The Soviet "threat" at China's gates', Conflict Paper No. 143 (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1983).

15. Jonathan Pollack, 'Chinese attitudes towards nuclear weapons, 1964–69', *China Quarterly*, April–June 1972, No. 50.

16. John Wilson Lewis, 'China's military doctrines and force posture' in Thomas Fingar, ed., *China's quest for independence* (Boulder, Col.: Westview, 1980); Gerald Segal, 'China's nuclear posture for the 1980s', *Survival*, Jan.–Feb. 1981, Vol. 23, No. 1.

Soviet studies,[17] great strides have been made in appreciating the important differences in strategic doctrine. The importance of studying Soviet nuclear doctrine is fairly obvious for those concerned about the threat of nuclear war. China's nuclear doctrine is less obviously relevant to global issues, but has assumed special importance for Chinese defence policy studies. It is apparently one of two aspects of China's defence given special emphasis in PLA modernization. The recent advances in ICBM and SLBM technology point to the most obvious results of China's stress on its nuclear capability. The second major area is naval policy, and here there can also be confidence that some Western analysts have kept pace with the changes.

The simplistic 'people's war' theorists give little place to naval warfare, emphasizing China's ground and continental problems. Some analysts, preeminently Bruce Swanson in his book under review, have correctly seen that China's foreign policy horizons are turning more maritimist than simply continental, and thus that the navy is a new growth area for the PLA.[18] Swanson's book is in fact a great pleasure to read. It is not only filled with fascinating historical information, but is also laced with photographs. What is more, it is similar to Harlan Jencks's effort in being comprehensive and thorough. One could quibble with Swanson's at times simplistic dichotomy of maritimist and continentalist viewpoints on naval strategy, but on balance the approach has the advantage of illustrating the recent changes in Chinese naval doctrine. For this insight, still controversial in some circles, we are to be grateful. Swanson, like Lucian Pye, is most successful in offering convincing explanations for current changes in policy. Swanson proffers persuasive explanations as to why the navy has grown, and shows how it is moving into limited maritimist expansion.

None of the books under review other than Swanson's offers new insights into Chinese military doctrine. Thus, while the growth areas of nuclear and naval policy are receiving good treatment, the other areas of defence policy seem neglected.[19] The danger facing students of Chinese defence policy is that they will seek over-arching theoretical models to explain Chinese behaviour. The great and enduring strength of some earlier, more specific analyses such as that by Allen Whiting,[20] is that rigid models are rejected. Whiting spoke of a Chinese 'calculus of deterrence' but it was in reality a series of pragmatic and flexible common-sense principles. Other analysts have tried to stretch this calculus too far,[21] or proffered other general statements as if they somehow constitute a 'logic' or a code of practice.[22] The study of Chinese defence policy still awaits a comprehensive analysis of how and why China uses force in its foreign policy.[23] But it would be surprising if it unearthed any single Chinese code of conduct or any over-arching strategic doctrine.

It is most likely that neither the ethnic-chic analysts who suggest that the Chinese have a single coherent doctrine, nor the ethnocentric analysts who suggest that Chinese doctrine is a variant on Western model-building, have a correct explanation. If there is a Chinese military doctrine, it seems to be one of pragmatism. Clausewitz and Moltke in nineteenth-century Germany are in many ways far removed from modern strategy, but it is crucial to bear in mind their warnings about rigidities in strategic thought. Failure to be pragmatic in war leads to defeat. Thus the luxury of grandiose academic theorizing is one in which Chinese strategists are unlikely to indulge.

17. John Baylis and Gerald Segal, eds, *Soviet strategy* (London: Croom Helm, 1981); Derek Leebaert, ed., *Soviet military thinking* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981).

18. See also Marwyn Samuels, *Contest for the South China Sea* (London: Methuen, 1982).

19. Georges Tang Eng Bok, 'Strategy and doctrine' in Segal and Tow, eds, *Chinese defence policy*.

20. Allen Whiting, *The Chinese calculus of deterrence* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1975).

21. Steve Chan, 'Chinese conflict calculus and behaviour', *World Politics*, April 1978, Vol. 30, No. 3; Davis Bobrow, Steve Chan and John Kringen, *Understanding foreign policy decisions: the Chinese case* (New York; Free Press, 1979); Roger Dial, ed., *Advancing and contending approaches to the study of Chinese foreign policy* (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Centre for Foreign Policy Studies, 1974); Melvin Gurton and Byong-Moo Hwang, *China under threat* (Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980).

22. Jonathan Pollack, *Security, strategy and the logic of Chinese foreign policy*, Research Papers and Policy Studies No. 5 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1981).

23. Perhaps along the lines of Barry Blechman and Stephen Kaplan, *Force without war* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978), and Stephen Kaplan, *Diplomacy of power* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 198[illegible]).

Foreign policy

It was sad to see the less than graceful twisting in the wind which some Sinologists underwent as China radically altered its foreign policy course in the 1970s. For some strange reason there has been an obsession to see coherence and effective strategic planning in what was often an ad hoc and pragmatic Chinese foreign policy. Lucian Pye has persuasively explained why the Chinese need to fool themselves with such supposed coherence, but it remains a mystery why many China-watchers followed suit. The most obvious example of these futile strategic views of foreign policy is of course the 'theory of the Three Worlds'. In its last incarnation, the theory was patently absurd, especially in its suggestion that the 'Second World' (Europe, Canada and Japan) would unite with the 'Third World' against the superpowers. Not only are there vast differences between Japan, the West European nations and Canada, but it was indeed a perverted logic to see these states as anything but allies of the United States, given their present economic and political systems.

Now that China itself has abandoned the theory of the Three Worlds and replaced it with a frankly pragmatic 'seek truth from facts' collection of 'the five principles of peaceful coexistence' mixed in with the rhetoric of 'North–South' conflict and 'South–South' cooperation, perhaps Western analysts will follow suit. It would be more useful if they finally abandoned the need to bend over backward to see things the Chinese way.[24] For example, it has been conventional wisdom until only recently that China's military aid was given largely altruistically and certainly not on a large scale like other superpowers. But as Yitzhak Shichor has trenchantly pointed out, China's massive military aid to the Middle East since 1980 not only destroys this model, but makes a mockery of China's professed neutrality in the Iran–Iraq war.[25] So much for taking the Chinese at their word. A bit more healthy scepticism might make for greater acceptance of the fact that very often the Chinese are as inscrutable to themselves as they are to outsiders. The Chinese also debate and change policy in such a way that by the time Sinologists think they have a new 'logic' of Chinese foreign policy, they are forced back to the drawing board.

In recent years several general foreign policy books have had mixed success in balancing between models and pragmatism. The works of David Armstrong and more recently Joseph Camilleri are positive examples, while others by such as Greg O'Leary seem bogged down in rhetoric or knee-deep in shattered models.[26] The virtue of the book under review edited by Stuart and Tow is its refusal to play the model-building games. To be sure, there is enough to complain about in this book, especially its diffuse nature and over-ambition, but it remains very useful in highlighting the intense complexity of China's great power foreign policy. Unfortunately, not all the contributors were as critical of Chinese foreign policy assumptions as they might have been. Hence, a book completed in 1981 has in parts been proven obsolete eighteen months later. This is not only true of some of the chapters' judgements on domestic policy and developments in strategic weapons, but is most painfully obvious in discussing Sino–Soviet relations. The tendency to take China's word on 'the Soviet threat' at face value, rather than analysing the objective realities of Chinese foreign policy, led many contributors to miss the approaching mild thaw in Sino–Soviet relations. The chapter by Jonathan Pollack is an exception to this trend. Equally successful contributors include Richard Löwenthal on the declining and indeed reversing role of ideology in the split, Jürgen Domes on the problems in Chinese domestic politics, and Lawrence Freedman on the economic dimension of Sino–Soviet relations. Overall, Stuart and Tow are to be congratulated for their pragmatic approach to the great power triangle. Tighter editorial control would have been a great benefit, but even that could not have produced coherence in Chinese policy where little existed in the first place.

The crucial dimensions of Chinese defence policy, Party–Army relations, defence doctrine and foreign policy all share several common factors. In many respects they have all made important strides forward, and of the books under review, those by Pye, Swanson and

24. On the role of ideology, see David Armstrong, *Revolutionary diplomacy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977).

25. Yitzhak Shichor, 'China and the Middle East' in Segal and Tow, eds, *Chinese defence policy*.

26. Armstrong, *Revolutionary diplomacy*; Joseph Camilleri, *Chinese foreign policy* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1980). Some of the more peculiar books on Chinese foreign policy include Greg O'Leary, *The shaping of Chinese foreign policy* (London: Croom Helm, 1980) and E. Ted Gladue Jr, *China's perception of global politics* (Washington: University Press of America, 1982).

Jencks are the best cases in point. These studies make it clear that it is important not to lose the positive approach—that is, a sympathetic understanding of the Chinese predicament. In Soviet studies this positive attitude is all too often absent. But it is equally important to avoid the more prevalent Sinological problem of following the Chinese line too closely. Such ethnic-chic prevents the hard questions being asked about contradictions and problems in Chinese policy. Therefore, in the future it might be useful to pay greater attention to flexibility in Chinese defence doctrine, complexity in Party–Army relations, instability in domestic leadership politics, and mistakes and debates in foreign policy.

In sum, the Chinese themselves seem to be moving increasingly towards a world shaded in the grey areas of debate. Whether it be in greater cooperation and less conflict in Sino–Soviet relations, or more complex Party–Army relations, the simplistic analyses of 'logics' and models seem inappropriate. The least the Sinologists can do is to keep pace with the changing China they are watching.

Book reviews

Chatham House books

World nuclear energy: toward a bargain of confidence. Edited by Ian Smart. Baltimore, London: Johns Hopkins University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1982. 394 pp. Index. £22·00.

IT was not long after the ink had dried on the non-proliferation treaty before it became clear that the non-proliferation regime was in flux again. The Indian explosion, the planned sales by France and West Germany of reprocessing and enrichment technology, and the decline of the United States' control of enriched uranium supply were among the developments which led to unilateral changes in US non-proliferation policy and to the establishment of numerous fora in which to try to resolve some of the new problems.

One such forum was the International Consultative Group on Nuclear Energy (ICGNE). ICGNE was sponsored by the Rockefeller Foundation and Chatham House and existed between 1977 and 1980. Its chairman was Ian Smart and this book is the fruit of its labours.

ICGNE's focus was primarily political, not technical, and its members, though drawn largely from governmental and international organizations, acted in their private capacities and therefore were not bound in quite the way that they would have been if acting officially. Having taken care to assemble a group widely representative of world opinion on the future of nuclear power (within the major premise that it would have a future), Ian Smart notes how the willingness of the members to seek and achieve a delicately balanced set of recommendations in their final report can be seen as an example, at the personal level, of the kind of international compromise that the group singled out as the most important of conditions for a globally acceptable nuclear future. The difficulties of extrapolating from an agreement among key individuals acting privately to the possibilities for agreement among the same individuals acting officially are obvious, but it is comforting to note that the group's central conclusion, that there should be struck a new international 'bargain of confidence' in which guarantees of peaceful purpose would be balanced by firm assurances of access to nuclear technology, is close to the formula reached by a roughly contemporaneous inter-governmental forum, the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation, when it said that assurances of supply and assurances of non-proliferation are complementary.

Apart from an introduction by Smart, the book comprises eight ICGNE working papers and its final report. All the latter were published separately during ICGNE's lifetime and have been only slightly revised. They run from the history of non-proliferation activity through international safeguards and international plutonium storage to nuclear power plant lead times and the viability and future scale of the nuclear industry. They were never conceived as forming a single volume. Nevertheless, and despite the passage of time, they constitute an authoritative and still highly relevant survey of events and possibilities in the nexus between nuclear power and non-proliferation policy. Their publication in one volume makes them both more accessible and an even more convenient reference source than they already were.

University of Manchester PHILIP GUMMETT

Indonesia's foreign policy. By Michael Leifer. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 198 pp. Index. £15·00.

DESPITE Indonesia's international importance, whether measured in terms of population, strategic location, pretensions to play a world role, international model, or previous penchant for living dangerously and 'confronting' the established international order, relatively little scholarly attention has been devoted to its foreign policy. Therefore Michael Leifer's *Indonesia's foreign policy* is a most welcome addition to the literature of contemporary international affairs. In it he carefully outlines and analyses the major factors that have determined Indonesia's changing international attitude since the declaration of independence by Sukarno on 17 August 1945. The analysis, presented within a coherent chronological

framework, describes the interaction of domestic political events with Indonesia's international environment.

The first chapter, 'National revolution and the seeds of foreign policy', cogently argues that during the independence struggle there developed contrasting foreign policy styles, *diplomasi* (negotiation) and *perguangan* (struggle), which were linked to competing domestic constituencies. The latter style provided a diplomatic rhetoric if not the political substance for the tumultuous final years of Sukarno's political power. Before that time, during the period between the Dutch transfer of sovereignty in December 1949, and the creation of the conditions for Sukarno's Guided Democracy in 1958, discussed in the second chapter, foreign policy was very much affected by domestic political competition and rivalry. The relative openness of the political system during those years permitted oscillations of policy seldom found in more stable and less popular political conditions. From the late 1950s onwards, however, foreign policy in Indonesia became the preserve of the core of a small ruling elite. Under Sukarno that meant that increasingly Indonesia's foreign policy was Sukarno's policy. Confrontation with Malaysia, the Peking–Jakarta axis, Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations and spurning of the superpowers were the results.

After the coup of 1965 and the elevation of Suharto and the army to dominance, foreign policy reverted to more cautious and cooperative stances, especially with Indonesia's regional neighbours and the United States and Sukarno's other Old Established Forces in the imperialist West. But while there were significant changes in international stance and domestic political and economic policies after the coup, *Indonesia's foreign policy* demonstrates in the final two substantive chapters that there have been significant continuities in Indonesia's attitude toward international affairs. Dr Leifer shows clearly in his discussion of the problems of East Timor, ASEAN, aid and trade, and Indonesia's ambivalent attitude toward Vietnam and China, a persistence in elite perceptions and a consequent sense of frustration that Indonesia's rulers have felt since independence that they have not been able to work their will more effectively in their own region and beyond.

This book will be of great interest to students, diplomats and businessmen concerned with South-east Asian international politics. It will also be of assistance to scholars of international politics. Not only has Dr Leifer built upon the slim body of existing studies, but he has added significantly to them. Of particular interest to many will be his discussion of the Islamic factor in the formulation of Indonesia's foreign policy, although a further elaboration of this would have been helpful. In the future Indonesia's international importance will doubtless increase even if at present its leaders feel they preside over a frustrated giant. What that future holds will depend upon whether foreign policy making remains the preserve of a closed elite, and, if so, what that elite wants to achieve for itself and its state.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London ROBERT H. TAYLOR

Islam in the political process. Edited by James P. Piscatori. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press for the Royal Institute of International Affairs. 1983. 240 pp. Index. £19·50.

THE aim of this book, which brings together papers delivered at a Chatham House conference last year, is to 'analyse the roles Islam plays in the political process of several countries', namely Egypt, the Sudan, Saudi Arabia, Syria and Iraq, Algeria, Senegal, Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Indonesia. Inevitably this piecemeal approach has certain disadvantages: particularist and local aspects of Islam tend to be emphasized at the expense of its unifying characteristics, while any selection of individual countries must appear somewhat arbitrary. Fortunately the papers are generally of a high standard, while James Piscatori's introduction and Albert Hourani's concluding essay ask the right questions and suggest answers which place the politics of Islam in its broader cultural and sociopolitical context. The result is a valuable contribution to a topic which has only recently become the subject of serious study and informed discussion by Western political analysts.

For the Western observer accustomed to a tradition of politics formed by Roman Christianity, the politics of Islam can seem confusing and paradoxical. As Dr Piscatori neatly puts it (p. 2): 'Unlike Christians who are pilgrims *en route* to the true world, Muslims do not have the luxury of presuming that the validity of their belief lies beyond practical—and political—demonstration.' Traditionally the legitimacy of the Muslim ruler depended on his upholding the Sharia law 'enjoining the good and forbidding the evil'. Political discourse was

thus focussed on the extent to which the ruler was seen to uphold or violate Islamic norms. Western colonial influence and the modernizing programmes of reforming autocrats from the nineteenth century added new urgency to this question by greatly increasing the power of the state *vis-à-vis* the religious institutions. The latter, being relatively loosely-structured and informal, usually succumbed easily to state control, leaving Islamic opposition to be voiced by militant individuals and the movements, whether traditionalist or populist, that accrued around them. The result is a style of politics, both informal and ritualized, in which scriptural rhetoric, religious learning and Islamic symbolism can be invoked and manipulated by both the incumbent regimes and their challengers. The rules of this game of claiming to be 'more Islamic than thou' of course vary considerably.

As Albert Hourani points out, the advocates of Islamic revolution are most likely to take power if the religious institutions are still strong and there exist coherent and recognized groups of religious specialists. Of the countries examined in this book only Iran, where from the sixteenth century Shi'ism has been the state religion with powerful, autonomous institutions capable of resisting government control, appears to fall into this category; although it is possible that Pakistan might do so, which is one reason why General Zia, with his narrow political base, assiduously cultivates a 'fundamentalist' image. Elsewhere the consensus of opinion appears to be that, given the superior patronage, organization and force at its disposal, the state will always win. This does not mean, however, that avowedly secular ideologies such as Marxism or Arab nationalism are likely to make a comeback. There are factors common to many Muslim countries, including increasing Hajj attendance, improved communications by radio, television and cassettes, support for Islamic educational and dawa' (evangelical) activities by conservative oil-producing states, as well as such social changes as the 'ruralization' of cities through massive urban migration, all of which tend to reinforce the view that Muslim politics will become increasingly 'Islamized' during the next decade.

MALISE RUTHVEN

International relations and organizations

The theory and practice of international relations. 6th edn. Edited by William C. Olson, David S. McLellan and Fred A. Sondermann. London: Prentice-Hall. 1982. 401 pp. Pb.: £12·70.

THIS is the sixth edition of a popular teaching book, although the editors point out in their introduction that they do not wish it to be seen as a text. It has been designed to serve as a second book of selected readings. As such it is a very good book. One of its most rewarding features is that much of the material (over four-fifths in fact) is new to this edition. It is rare that one is able to read recent and relevant pieces and the editors deserve congratulation for including such up to date material. It is also most pleasing to note that many of the readings are non-North American.

For the reader, presumably a student on an introductory international relations course, the book is very clearly arranged into major sections, focussing on the participants in the international system, decision-making in international relations, the tools of statecraft, and selected issues in the contemporary world. These sections contain a total of some thirty-eight readings, with a final chapter by William Olson on the state of the art. Each section is introduced by the editors setting out the main issues to be examined and pointing to the ways in which the contributors seek to deal with these. These introductory sections are very clearly written and highlight issues and questions in an uncomplicated and economical manner. Each section also contains a set of discussion questions.

The contributions themselves are generally most suitable and to the point. The editing has been done to good effect, so that in some cases only a part of the original article is reprinted, but a part which summarizes the main arguments of the piece. Many of the papers will be well known to the teachers of the courses at which this book is aimed, but quite a number are drawn from less obvious sources. The end result is a well-balanced mixture of old classics and new pieces.

All in all, this book is an excellent example of a supplementary text. However, there are two problems which usually apply to such volumes. The first concerns the fact that any set

of readings has to aim at a view of *the* introductory course. On this charge, this book comes out very well. Although it may not be suitable for all introductory courses, it will surely be very useful for the majority of them. It is not a narrow or methodologically polemical book. The second problem concerns its use outside the United States, and here again this volume fares better than most. My one very serious reservation is about the price: even the most committed student is unlikely to pay £12·70 for any course book, let alone one in paperback. To be sure, it is a 400-page book, but I am left with the question of what the publishers see as the market at this price. Unfortunately, this factor means that teachers are likely to turn to other sets of readings, such as the Open University's World Society reader at less than half the price of this volume. It is with regret, therefore, that this reviewer must conclude that such a worthwhile and well-organized reader will, in all probability, not be widely used in this country because of its price.

University of East Anglia STEVE SMITH

The power of power politics: a critique. By John A. Vasquez. London: Pinter. 1983. 303 pp. Index. £16·50.

THIS book provides the most conspicuous example to date of that particular form of introspection which characterizes the American scientific fraternity in international studies. John A. Vasquez has turned the full arsenal of behaviouralist methodology on the behaviouralists themselves in an attempt to demonstrate the pervasive influence of what he calls the 'realist paradigm' based on Hans J. Morgenthau's *Politics among nations*, and its sterility in terms of the production of scientific knowledge. The whole enterprise resembles the use of a sledge hammer to crack a nut, but it does counter the usual impression that there is an unbridgeable gulf between the scientific moderns and the traditionalists. As Vasquez puts it: 'The behavioral revolt challenged not the picture of the world that the realists had provided but the realist conception of what constitutes an adequate scientific theory and the procedures used to "verify" that theory' (p. 23). Although realism had deeper historical roots, both approaches were largely a product of the cold war, which for Vasquez had ended by the late 1970s when this book was apparently completed. Now we need new paradigms, he says, such as issue politics, transnationalism, or Marxism, although these are not elaborated by the author in any detail. Despite the methodological excess baggage, Vasquez has usefully surveyed a large amount of literature within an ordered framework; the list of references alone occupies sixty pages.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth M. WRIGHT

The Commonwealth experience. Vol. I: The Durham Report to the Anglo-Irish Treaty. Vol. II: From British to multiracial Commonwealth. By Nicholas Mansergh. London: Macmillan. 1982. 275, 299 pp. Index. Per vol: £20·00; Pb: £8·95. The set: £35·00. (First published in one volume, Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1969.)

WHEN this book first appeared in 1969 it was justly welcomed as a work of mature scholarship and well ripened judgment, the fruit of a scholar whose distinction and many contributions to Commonwealth history were widely recognized and acclaimed. During the course of a distinguished career Nicholas Mansergh had held a Chair in Commonwealth Studies at Chatham House, before becoming the first incumbent of the Smuts Chair in the History of the British Commonwealth in the University of Cambridge. This second edition, now apportioned into two volumes and regrettably shorn of photographs, is expensive, surely even beyond the demands of inflation, and is not substantially much revised except for deft and reasonably extensive bibliographical additions.

In his preface to this edition the author claims that there have been 'significant additions to our knowledge and to our understanding of Commonwealth development and history' since his first edition. He mentions Australian government documents and the British documents on *The transfer of power in India 1942–47* (whilst modestly omitting to mention that he has been the principal editor of this gargantuan and now completed task), as well as two diaries: those of Tom Jones on Cabinet treaty-making with Ireland, and of Mackenzie King in his later years, as being of 'outstanding interest' (p. xi).

Professor Mansergh notes that even 'at this slight vantage point in time' since his first edition, events have added to the Commonwealth experience:

> They include Britain's accession to the Common Market, changes in membership of the Commonwealth, what might be thought of as the climax of the process of decolonisation, the hardly-won resolution of the Rhodesia–Zimbabwe question, with the goal of independent status and international recognition attained by way of prior retreat from a unilaterally declared independence to colonial status—a classic example of the longest road round proving to be the shortest way home and, with echoes of earlier times, an improbable confrontation of Prime Minister with Governor-General in Australia and the 'patriation' of the constitution of the oldest dominion. These and other more general developments, notably the enhanced significance of economic factors, are considered, so far as may be in the longer perspective of history, in the concluding chapters (p. xii).

Even so, it must be said that the additions to the text are for the most part very general and very bland and that the main benefits are bibliographical. Good as it is, this is now a rather expensive general history, purveying a basically liberal-constitutionalist view of the Commonwealth experience, with relatively little about the economic dimension and a rather slight and grudging acknowledgement of the post-1965 Secretariat-centric Commonwealth.

Institute of Commonwealth Studies, London PETER LYON

Defence and disarmament

Defence without the bomb: the Report of the Alternative Defence Commission. London, New York: Taylor & Francis. 1983. 311 pp. Index. Pb.: £4·45.

THE 'Alternative Defence Commission' was set up by the Lansbury House Trust Fund to propose a defence policy for Britain were she to renounce the use of nuclear weapons unilaterally and unconditionally. Its sixteen members include a distinguished physicist, two social scientists, two members of the Labour Party Defence Study Group, a professor, a research fellow and a lecturer in Peace Studies (University of Bradford), a member of parliament (Plaid Cymru), a bishop, a former president of the Liberal Party and the Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. No professional military men or authorities on international affairs or the Soviet union were empanelled: an omission responsible for some obvious defects in the case presented. Seventy-two individuals and groups gave advice or made submissions, ranging from well-known authorities on defence matters (Michael Howard, Lawrence Freedman and Peter Nailor) to the Communist Party of Great Britain, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom and a somewhat unlikely source, the Sikh Cultural Society of Great Britain. These are not identified in the text.

At the risk of over-simplifying a long and closely reasoned argument, the Commission's recommendations can be summarized as withdrawal from NATO, unless it too collectively renounces the use of nuclear weapons and reliance on the United States' strategic deterrent, and a defence force designed solely to protect the territorial integrity of the United Kingdom and its adjacent seas. The basic strategy is to force an aggressor to pay so high a price that he will be deterred from making the attempt to invade. A second line of defence proposed is a web of resistance of the type planned in Britain in 1940–1, and civil disobedience. Guerrilla warfare is rightly rejected.

None of this lacks feasibility except civil disobedience, the success of which depends on the moderation of the occupying power; the weakness of the report lies not so much in the military proposals as in the ideological shackles self-imposed by the members. The principal threat is identified as coming from the Soviet Union, but having admitted this, it is whittled down to such a degree that undercuts the need to have a strong defence force at all. NATO has never had the intention or capability to adopt a pre-emptive 'major offensive against East Europe and the Soviet Union' (p. 151), so it cannot be renounced. Were NATO dissolved, which the Commission believes desirable, the most likely reaction on the part of the United States would be to abandon Europe in favour of armed isolation. To see it as a potential enemy is somewhat far-fetched. The situation in which Europe abandons nuclear weapons but Russia retains them is dealt with somewhat feebly and unconvincingly. Neither soul-

force on the Gandhian model nor some form of ingenious conventional manoeuvre is likely to be effective in restraining the Soviet leaders from aggression. They have never been deflected by adverse world opinion; not in Czechoslovakia, in Hungary nor in Afghanistan.

Having made these criticisms, which could be extended at length, it must be said that this is a timely and valuable document. It may not obtain general agreement but here is the unilateralist case carefully set out in great detail, and it deserves the closest attention.

SHELFORD BIDWELL

Strengthening conventional deterrence in Europe: proposals for the 1980s. Report of the European Security Study (ESECS). London: Macmillan. 1983. 260 pp. Index. £17·50. Pb.: £5·95.

'WE, the Steering Group of the European Security Study, twenty-six of us, civilian and military, on both sides of the Atlantic, have reassessed the relationship of the military posture of NATO to its central purpose'. So this volume commences; the twenty-six—with the conspicuous absence of a French representative—'heavyweights' having been already listed to give clout to such a confident, if grand, opening. And in their conclusions—twenty-three in all, divided between the conventional imbalance of NATO and WTO forces, the Soviet Union's doctrine on conventional forces, the need for enhancing NATO's conventional defensive capability and the means of achieving this need—they clearly spell out the message that the West should (and, they argue, could constructively and without due disruption politically and economically) strengthen conventional forces to 'raise the nuclear threshold' in order to 'prevent a situation in which NATO might be obliged to face a decision on the use of nuclear weapons'. Amen to that.

So what is new? Nothing, really; except that twenty-six eminent scholars, diplomats, captains of commerce and industry, and armed servicemen have lent their collective name to a reaffirmation of what has essentially been a clearly recognized need and policy in NATO since as long ago as the famed Lisbon goals of 1952. How they have, in this volume, done it, however, is systematic and impressive. Each of the three elements of their argument—the Soviet threat in the 1980s, the requirements for NATO conventional defence, and the contributions of advanced technology—has been treated and analysed as a separate part. Each part takes the form of a report from a workshop panel of yet more 'heavyweight' experts, together with a lengthy supporting paper contributed by one of the members. That paper, one must surmise, afforded the point of departure for each workshop to begin its deliberation, and it is a helpful exercise to contrast the paper with the eventual findings of the workshop.

There is much of use in the workshop reports, for all their brevity, and some little-circulated or little-known data are included. But the thrust of the book is more policy-oriented; and one must conclude that its constituency is less the academic community than the political. There is no doubt that the collective influence of the members of the workshops and of the study group will ensure that they are heard and given attention. They can, however, at least be assured that their message will enjoy wide support on all sides of the political spectrum and on both sides of the Atlantic, and maybe their case for the feasibility of conventional defence will further that end. But I cannot help wondering whether the French should not have been included both as participants in the discussions and as part of the content of the analysis (France is not included in the index and references to Pluton and Mirage IV are only in a statistical appendix). Surely, the French government must also be persuaded of the merit of conventional defence; or at least Mr Andropov must be convinced that it concurs with a preferred strategy of conventional war and no first use of nuclear weapons. Horst Menderhausen noted in a RAND paper many years ago that the French independent nuclear capability changes the whole calculation regarding NATO flexible response strategy; it seems unfortunate that his prescient and perceptive message is still ignored.

University of Lancaster

MARTIN EDMONDS

Nuclear power struggles: industrial competition and proliferation control. By William Walker and Måns Lönnroth. London: Allen & Unwin. 1983. 204 pp. Index. £13·95.

The subtitle of this book gives an accurate indication of the ground covered. A better main title would perhaps have been *Pandora's nuclear box*, especially so since the final chapter is entitled 'A new hope?'. The authors begin by explaining how the international nuclear power industry, having begun under superpower bipolarity and US free world hegemony, then undermined, through competitive pressures, the non-proliferation regime which had been put together. They detail the present stressed condition of the nuclear industries in the key supplier countries and they attempt to identify the nature of reactor export markets in the immediate future. They regard Japan as the 'main unknown quantity' and conclude that 'at least half' of potential export markets are in strategically insecure areas. They identify Argentina, India, Israel, Pakistan, South Africa and Brazil as quasi-nuclear weapon states (QNWS), in effect to indicate that these countries are providing themselves with the weapon option, and they add another group, South Korea, Taiwan, Iraq and Libya, which they see as prevented only by special constraints from joining the QNWS. Their analysis leads them to posit a 'dilemma to which there is no obvious solution'—that there is no clearly right nuclear trade policy towards countries outside the NPT. They read the evidence of recent years as indicating a return to the looser regime of the sixties, but they still felt it right when they wrote to regard US policy, even under Reagan, as broadly holding to the tough Carter line, while judging West German attitudes as becoming more relaxed. They found it hardest to assess the direction of French policy, which is the more unfortunate since they regard the future of nuclear relations as hingeing on the behaviour of France more than on that of any other country.

There is a wealth of information in this book and a thorough grasp of the industrial realities is conveyed. Where the authors fail is where one cannot blame them for failing: that is, in respect of future political possibilities. The night is dark and none of us has better than a candle. One is however not reassured to discover that the authors judge the 'one glimmer of hope' to lie in the 'long-overdue questioning of the military and political value of nuclear weaponry'. It is perfectly understandable that Walker and Lönnroth should wish to end a good book on an optimistic note. In reality, however, their analysis points—and firmly—in another direction and to another future. We would do well to prepare for that more comprehensively than we have yet done.

University of Manchester ROGER WILLIAMS

Germany debates defense: the NATO alliance at the crossroads. Edited by Rudolf Steinke and Michel Vale. Armonk, NY, London: Sharpe. 1983. 208 pp. $22·50.

This set of essays is published in collaboration with the Committee for a Nuclear-Free Europe: and its central message, emphasized throughout by a measure of editorial *Gleichschaltung*, is indicated clearly enough in Rudolf Steinke's introduction where he posits a quasi-Gaullist 'Europeanization of Europe', in the shape of a nuclear-free zone from Portugal to Poland (not, however, to the Urals), as bridging the gap between those contributors who accept the division of Europe and those who seek formulae to circumvent it. The 'physical bridge' here is declared to be a 'Peace Movement extending over both blocs', for which are cited in evidence such diverse phenomena as meetings of West and East German authors, the Palme Report, UN disarmament debates—and Solidarity!

But in fact the rationale of a NFZ is nowhere subjected to the rigorous analysis required to establish it as a meaningful policy for Europe. Nor, for example, in his consideration of 'The Rapacki Plan today' does Ulrich Albrecht seem to take account of the obsolescence of proposals made a quarter of a century ago with as their true aim 'to . . . prevent . . . the Federal Republic from acquiring nuclear weapons'. In a simplistic version of postwar history he likewise postulates the 'Finlandisation' of *Eastern* Europe without adducing any reason to suppose the Soviet Union willing to put the clock back in that sense. This tendency to revert to the 1950s is indeed common to quite a few of the contributions, so that the result is largely the mixture as before, updated. Thus, massive retaliation is espoused in opposition both to flexible response and to the NATO modernization programme which is actually the avowed starting-point of the whole book. Similarly, while reunification is admitted to be

impracticable (and opinions diverge over neutralization), a wistful belief nevertheless persists in the possibility of institutional links between the two Germanies.

Other contributors include Egon Bahr (twice); Günter Gaus, ex-Ambassador to the GDR; and General Christian Krause, whose acceptance of the continued need for the present alliance system does not inhibit him from arguing that the West is 'over-secure', and that the Soviet Union is inferior to it in both geostrategic position and the capacity to wage war. On the Warsaw Pact, Stephan Tiedke discusses differences and tensions affecting its northern and southern flanks. In a further article, generally critical (like most others) of the United States, he perceives a common interest, *à rebours*, between Western Europe and the Soviet Union in keeping the Americans intimately engaged on the Continent: in the former case as a means of influencing their policies, and in the latter as a guarantee that they could not themselves escape the impact of nuclear war in Europe.

The concluding section, devoted to 'alternative' security policies, embraces various current notions of 'passive', 'social' and 'non-violent' defence, as well as more realistic approaches to restructuring the alliance. Yet the most substantial chapter here, by Klaus Bloemer, after a not unpromising start, gets lost in generalities and over-reliance on quotations. (It also raises, on pp. 170–1, an intriguing question as to the relationship of 'the former Director of the Stockholm Peace Research Institute, Robert Nield, now a professor at Cambridge' to 'the Swede Neild, currently teaching in England'. This is in connection with defence postures said to be capable of 'stopping the arms race even without negotiation', but which are not elaborated.)

Altogether, such input as the book might have made to a subject in genuine need of rethinking by the Western allies, and not least by Germany itself, is diminished by an unrepresentative political bias which has precluded more balanced and professional treatment. It is, moreover, not helped by frequent turgidity of style, exaggerated language, and imperfect English for which the co-editor Mr Vale ('on the staff of *Critique*, Glasgow, and senior translator of M. E. Sharpe Inc.') must be held responsible.

MICHAEL CULLIS

Allies in a turbulent world: challenges to US and Western European cooperation. Edited by Frans. A. M. Alting von Geusau. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington/Heath. 1983. 174 pp. Index. £18·50.

THE essays gathered together in this collection are very much tracts for the times, prepared by specialists on the basis of an outline supported by specific questions prepared by the staff of the John F. Kennedy Institute in 1981. The first drafts were discussed by their writers at a colloquium at the end of that year; they were then revised and resubmitted the following spring, when events in Poland were adding to the challenges to US and West European cooperation which had been addressed by the respective contributors.

The object of the exercise was straightforward enough: to focus attention on issues which seemed at the time to be pulling the Alliance apart. What is less clear is to whom the essays are addressed. The informed and interested member of the general public would certainly appreciate the overview of David Calleo and the elegantly phrased perceptions of the editor himself; Lawrence Freedman writing on the future of arms control negotiation (the only essay in a rather contrived subsection of the book) seems to have the negotiator or at least the policy analyst in mind; Susan Strange's vigorous prose demands more knowledge of matters economic than possessed by this reviewer. Perhaps the best light in which to view the ensemble is to regard it as a contribution to history. *Haec olim meminisse juvebit*: it will gladden the heart to have some record of those issues which seemed at the beginning of the eighties to imperil Alliance cohesion. For the fact is that the Alliance still hangs together; indeed, in the 1983 Alastair Buchan Memorial Lecture no less percipient an observer than Lord Carrington declared his belief that it is overcoming the uncertainties which beset it at the end of the Brezhnev era. Rumour has it that Lord Carrington may succeed if ever Joseph Luns relinquishes the post of Secretary-General of NATO; it would seem that he accepts the truth of Harold Macmillan's patrician dictum: 'it is a vulgar but illusory belief that sovereign nations which share the same fundamental principles necessarily pursue in practice a common policy in their international relations'.

University of Salford COLIN GORDON

The global politics of arms sales. By Andrew J. Pierre. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press for Council on Foreign Relations. 1982. 352 pp. Index. £14·10. Pb.: £4·20.

ANDREW PIERRE lucidly though rather sketchily describes the priorities of governments selling and purchasing arms, and the prospects of agreements among them on restraint. Pierre's approach is decidedly descriptive, pragmatically policy-oriented, balanced, and in conclusion, refreshingly prescriptive. The book reveals little about the *consequences* of weapons sales, or about the decision-making struggles that precede them. Only the broad outlines of national arms export and import policies are treated.

The author opens with necessary myth-shattering findings from the admittedly murky data on weapons transfers in the 1970s. Indeed, one of the book's strengths is its timeliness, with coverage of both President Reagan's and Mitterrand's reorientations (not total departures) from their predecessors' approaches. Pierre specifies the world market shares enjoyed by the major exporters and importers, the growth of Middle East arms trade, and the trend towards export of more sophisticated systems. The author very ably questions the value of weapons transfers in affording leverage over recipients' foreign or domestic policies, the difficulties of measuring arms balances and preventing arms races, the often over-rated importance of sales for the American and European economies, and the limited but still considerable burden defence purchases represent to the economies of most Third World states. However, no uniform set of evaluative or analytical criteria is applied to individual suppliers' or recipients' policies.

Distinctions among the arms transfer motivations of major (United States, Soviet Union) and lesser (France, United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Brazil) powers are well drawn, with the superpowers' greater quest for political influence duly noted. However, SIPRI's useful classification of sales motivations and supplier types is not pursued, and evidence about individual states' priorities is not uniformly convincing.

From the treatment of regional trends in arms acquisitions, Pierre is able to evaluate three contending approaches to international arms transfer control (i.e. management rather than necessarily reductions): supplier agreements; recipient agreements; and supplier–recipient agreements. He concludes, in perhaps the strongest section of the book, that only the latter are politically realistic. Nascent interest in such arrangements exists even in Moscow, though Pierre argues that moves towards international coordination should begin among the Western allies before embracing both East and West.

There is no clear picture or agreement among analysts as to what the future of global arms sales will look like. Some, like Lawrence Freedman, have forecast a saturated and declining market, for reasons of cost and economic downturn. Pierre does not seem to share this expectation, and predicts a continuing momentum due to: (1) superpower competition short of direct intervention; (2) increases in weapons quantity and quality; and (3) Third World demands for security and prestige.

University of Missouri–St Louis FREDERIC S. PEARSON

The structure of the defence industry: an international survey. Edited by Nicole Ball and Milton Leitenberg. London, Canberra. Croom Helm. 1983. 372 pp. Index. £17·95.

THE stated purpose of this volume warrants quotation in full: 'to examine the role of defence industries in the industrial and economic structure of modern states . . . its aim is to help define the degree to which institutional factors play a role in the armament of states'. In seeking to achieve these objectives, the editors claim that the volume is also a comparative study, in the sense that it attempts to establish 'economic parameters of defence industries in ten different states', asserting *en passant* that it deals with 'a group of considerations which has been almost totally neglected in previous systematic research on weapons acquisition'. It is therefore not of immediate interest to students of international politics but to those of defence, economic and public policy.

Each contributor was, one must assume, invited to write a chapter on a given state using a common structure which focussed on a number of topics which the editors felt 'ought to illuminate the role played by the defence industries in the industrial and economic structure of modern nations'. Fourteen such topics were listed and included: employment; output; capital value; R and D; internal organization; concentration; exports; dependency. And to start the volume, an introductory chapter attempted a definition of the military sector and

the economy, but with particular reference, in the manner of Michael Kidron's earlier volume, *Western capitalism since the War*, to the relationship of military expenditure to inflation, growth, employment levels and budget deficits.

In reviewing this volume, the immediate consideration is to judge whether or not the volume as a whole and, moreover, each of the contributors separately, have fulfilled the stated objectives of the editors. With some qualification to the assertion that this is almost the first systematic study of its kind, which it is not, the stated aims have largely been met by the volume as a whole; and within it there is some useful (though accessible elsewhere) data. With regard to separate contributions, not all stick uniformly to the structure or focus upon the topics listed at the beginning. In some instances the topics are inadequate in that they do not fully encompass the interdependencies that have been established in the defence industry structures of states. Clearly, also, some chapters were short of data (that on China, for example) and stood in marked contrast with those which were overloaded (the USA and Germany). And poor old Britain virtually got left out all together!

Perhaps the critical consideration is whether or not the objectives and the approach are appropriate. The editors clearly have a committed view, and to a degree they have been impressively objective—or their contributors have. But they all appear to work on an assumption that a defence industry not only exists, but has a defined and identifiable structure. Attempts at proving this have met with frustration (the inter-industry models for example) in the past since the defence industry is less a coherent structure (as the volume title implies) and more an eclectic number of private firms, public and mixed institutions, organizations and corporations within a range of industrial and commercial sectors (defined by product, service, function, and even process) who from time to time devote part of their time, energy and resources to defence related activities. This volume puts the problems simply, and as such distorts as much as it helps inform and clarify. But that said, it makes a valuable contribution to an area of enquiry which warrants, and demands, further study.

University of Lancaster MARTIN EDMONDS

Arms deal: the selling of the F-16. By Ingemar Dörfer. New York: Praeger. (Distrib. in UK by Holt-Saunders, Eastbourne.) 1983. 287 pp. Index. £21·95.

THIS book reads like an epic novel—despite the complications, temptations and deviations the hero will win through. The inevitability of the ending means that the interest lies in the means by which the end is achieved. In ten substantive and substantial chapters the author—a very non-SIPRI-type Swede—unravels the motives, the pressures and the incentives behind the behaviour of ten groups concerned with 'the sale of the century'. Four chapters deal with the United States of America, examining the sometimes Byzantine behaviour of, respectively, the US Air Force, the US Navy, Northrop and General Dynamics. Six chapters examine the European element, with the would-be sellers, France and Sweden, and the four purchasing states, Norway, Netherlands, Belgium and Denmark, each being accorded one chapter. Surprisingly, there is no chapter on NATO. The author simply avers that 'the NATO organisation . . . had nothing to do with the affair' (p. 207).

Each chapter tells the same tale—how F-16 won through. But in each chapter the tale is different, though closely related to the others. The result is a close web of detail. Over 200 pages of prodigious detail of plot and counter-plot, ploy and counter-ploy, on a single weapon system sale, is testimony to the industry and dedication of the author. The twenty close-printed pages of notes and references give a high degree of scholarly support to a fascinating narrative.

The book not only illustrates the intricacies of a single arms sale, it also raises many broader issues: the manner in which the US Navy deliberately and knowingly defied the US government and the critical role played by engines and engine manufacturers, to select but two. The volume also points to the total inadequacy of 'democratic decision-making' when faced with a need to make decisions between competing high technology systems—the stress on first cost, rather than whole life costs; the inability or willingness to ask, and press, complex technological questions. The volume also suggests that in the absence of consistent purchasing policies the armed forces will take delivery of new weapon systems almost irrespective of the abilities to fulfil the roles expected of them. For example, the F-16 is not an all-weather fighter which, in Europe, means that it is grounded 40 per cent of the time.

The declining technological position of Europe *vis-à-vis* the United States also emerges from this study. There was no purely European competitor to the F-16. Viggen depended upon a US engine—albeit improved by Volvo—and the Mirage, in order to be competitive, needed to replace the French M53 engine with the Pratt & Whitney F100 engine. This situation will continue to prevail until the Europeans respond in unison and produce a European high technology policy. It is questionable whether the US long-term interest has been served by the support given to this highly successful sales effort. Should the United States have used its undoubted diplomatic skills, and its formidable economic and technological weight if the result was to increase the problems within NATO? The follow-through problems—many of them predictable—have undoubtedly added to the intra-alliance tensions.

With a volume of this calibre it is possible to forgive the total immersion in aerospace jargon and acronyms, and the sometimes strange literary style. The plethora of typographical errors is less forgivable. There is no doubt, however, that as a case study of a single arms deal this volume will set the standard against which all others will now be judged.

Glasgow College of Technology ROGER CAREY

Military theory: concept, structure, problems. By Julian Lider. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1983. 476 pp. Index. (Swedish Studies in International Relations.) £18·00.

Selected readings from *Military Thought* 1963–1973. Vol. 5, part II. Selected and compiled by Joseph D. Douglass and Amoretta M. Hoeber. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 1982. 225 pp.

IF Julian Lider's long and rambling book can be said to have an objective it is the modest one of comparing Western with Marxist-Leninist strategic thought with the chief aim of making an accurate catalogue of each and with the secondary aim of making a beginning to a synthesis of the two.

Although his book could with profit have been cut to a quarter of its present length, it is not lacking in good things. He notes perceptively that the broad uninterest in the internal uses of military force shown by Western thinkers is exactly paralleled in the Soviet Union. He faults the 'scientific' pretensions of Soviet military thought right at the core. If it is founded on the 'laws' of dialectics and these laws can change, sometimes arbitrarily as when Stalin increased the number from three to four whilst at the same time selling short (as was later claimed) the law of 'negation of negation', it is built on sand. But he praises the mental hygiene the Soviet approach encourages and the way it leads to a sharp delineation of what strategic studies should concern itself with, in contrast to the straggling and undisciplined boundaries of the subject as studied in the West. For Mr Lider this is rather important, for he seems to believe that if ever strategic studies were to be put on a properly scientific basis, in general outline the discipline would resemble the current Soviet model more strongly than the Western model.

It seems clear enough that what Soviet military thinkers are engaged upon is a massive job of adaptation. Classical insights about the function and employment of military force—the significance of surprise, concentration of forces, the distinction between offensive and defensive action and so forth—are reformulated in such a way as to apply only *ceteris paribus*. When other things are not equal and one of the combatants is a society organized along Marxist–Leninist principles, all kinds of practical deficiencies are immediately compensated for because history is on its side.

For instance, the 'correlation of military force', a fashionable topic upon which Colonel Tyushkevich is sent out to bat for the Institute of Military History (published in translation in *Selected readings*), is nothing more than a long-winded restatement of Lanchester's laws concerning the importance of numerical superiority amended to include the proviso that whoever is armed with Marxist-Leninist principles is thrice-armed.

What is unclear is whether the adaptors are engaged upon a great work or a trifling one. To read Colonel Tyushkevich, what is going on is about as profound as what a motor manufacturer does when importing foreign cars into the United Kingdom and changing them to right-hand drive before selling them—we can all see why it has to be done but it is a trivial undertaking for all that. On the other hand no one nowadays thinks less of the founding fathers of the Christian Church for their wholesale adaptation of the symbols and festivals of their pagan predecessors. In all probability no great work was ever accomplished that did

not incorporate into its foundations something of what had gone before, and one reason why so much effort is put into understanding Soviet military thought in the West by, amongst others, the US Air Force (which is responsible for *Selected readings*), is the suspicion that we cannot take it for granted that nothing very important is going on.

University of Lancaster IAN BELLANY

The puzzle palace: America's National Security Agency and its special relationship with Britain's GCHQ. By James Bamford. London: Sidgwick and Jackson. 1983. 465 pp. Index. £9·95.

IN 1947 the UKUSA Agreement was signed, bringing together the signals intelligence organizations of the United States, Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. These five nations divided the earth into spheres of cryptologic influence, with each country 'assigned specific targets according to its potential for maximum intercept coverage' (p. 309). The existence of this agreement has never been officially acknowledged. James Bamford, using sources which range from *Penthouse* to the papers of Marshall S. Carter, a former Director of the American National Security Agency (NSA) offers an account of the origins and activities of this agency now situated at Fort George G. Meade between Washington and Baltimore, and its links with the British intercept organization known as Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) at Cheltenham in Gloucestershire. In a foreword, especially written for the British edition, he relates the activities and conviction of Geoffrey Arthur Prime, the first known spy to be successfully prosecuted at GCHQ, and argues that 'weak as security was at GCHQ it was a fortress compared to the NSA'. The popular British myth that 'we have a long way to go before the Americans will really trust us again' was continued 'partly because of American pressure' (p. xxxxiii). The reality, writes Bamford, is rather different. In the mid-1970s a young sergeant working with NSA, using a smuggled tape recorder, blew American cover in a whole area of the world. And that is just one instance. According to a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee the Americans, in the interests of national security, have refused to prosecute between forty and sixty crimes ranging from murder to major espionage. Bamford offers an account of the worst-known scandal of NSA, the interview in Moscow's House of Journalists on 6 September 1960 of defectors Bernon F. Mitchell and William H. Martin. Martin and Mitchell publicly revealed NSA's activities and its secret partnership with Britain's GCHQ. A witchhunt focussing on sexual 'deviancy' followed, and so Moscow's replacement, a 'womanizing, beer-drinking "family man"' escaped notice (p. 149), despite his sudden unexplained affluence.

Bamford detects a gradual shift in power and importance from the Central Intelligence Agency to the NSA. He traces this growth of influence, detailing the intercept stations used by the Americans for eavesdropping, the codebreaking-and-analysis centres, the dish antenna used to intercept microwave signals, the spy planes and satellites—the 'growing space force of orbiting ferrets' (p. 186)—the fleet of spy ships including the *Liberty*, attacked by the Israelis during the Six Day War with the loss of thirty-four American lives, and the *Pueblo* incident of 1968 which apparently led to the decommissioning of the American Signals Intelligence fleet.

Despite being the largest security organization in the United States, the National Security Agency, until the early 1970s, was surrounded by 'a wall of anonymity' (p. 280). This, however, was breached with the publication by the *New York Times* in 1971 of the top secret history of American decision-making during the Vietnam War, dubbed *The Pentagon Papers*. Certain documents in this collection tipped off Russian leaders that their scrambled radio-telephone conversations made while driving around Moscow were being intercepted and sent back to NSA for decoding. Other judicial examinations in the United States in the 1970s further exposed the activities of NSA.

This is an exciting work of investigative writing. Much of the material Bamford uses has been freely available for some time, but it is drawn together to make a fascinating and convincing study.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth RITCHIE OVENDALE

The rise and fall of British naval mastery. By Paul M. Kennedy. London: Macmillan. 1983. 405 pp. Index. Pb.: £6·95.

The true glory: the story of the Royal Navy over a thousand years. By Warren Tute. London, Sydney: Macdonald. 1983. 288 pp. Index. £12·95.

THE first edition of Paul Kennedy's masterly book was published in 1976. This paperback edition has an introductory section that comments thoughtfully on recent developments and issues, including, of course, the Falklands War, which Kennedy reminds us was geographically and historically specific to an unusual degree.

The messages and the value of the main text however stand well enough as they did in 1976. One of the messages is that it is still possible to write good history well; the book is as pleasing to read as it is stimulating to contemplate, and the new edition is well produced. Kennedy's principal contribution is that he puts naval affairs against the background of economic history, and relates the utility of maritime power to an economic context. In the preface, he summarizes what this implies: that the growth and decline of naval power is linked to Britain's economic growth and decline; that the 'Columbian period' when the world was opened up by the more extensive use of the seas, is coming to an end; that Britain's 'natural' bias towards the overseas and maritime world must now be looked at more critically. But this is a summary which does not do justice to the sweep and balance of his analysis; and for once, the publisher has got his blurb right, in saying that this book has to be compared, in its scope and in its importance, to *The influence of sea power upon history*.

What Kennedy is writing about, and the analysis which he has pioneered, is of more than purely academic significance. He is offering an interpretation of the *purposes* of maritime power which, at the level of doctrine, is novel and intriguing, not least because it breaks away from the confines of what one might loosely call the incubus of incremental continuity. This could have quite marked significance at a time when the Royal Navy, like the United States Navy, is having to think rather hard about what its purposes will be, and what its size and shape ought to be, over the next twenty or thirty years—the lifetime of the next generation or two of increasingly expensive hardware. From that point of view one might expect future Treasury critiques of Naval Staff planning documents to be laced with references and footnotes to Kennedy's work. But he is doing a lot more than providing verisimilitudinous detail for instinctive displays of inverted Micawberism—*pace* the old gibe about sitting at the end of Whitehall, waiting for something to turn down. This is a serious, and well supported, analysis which raises important issues that have policy relevance as well as intellectual power.

Warren Tute's book is aimed at a rather different audience and, though it is by no means uncritical, takes a rather more traditional view of the Royal Navy. It, too, is very well produced, with lots of excellent illustrations and useful chronological summaries. There is a number, too, of short briefs on specialist issues, like 'Signalling at sea' or 'The Anglo-German arms race' which are inserted in the text and, to my mind, divert the attention. The final chapter, on 1945 to the present day, ends up a bit breathlessly but, in general, the style is entirely appropriate to a broad-ranging survey, which spans manpower, material and Service culture as well as the ebb and flow of politics and war. It is no denigration of the author to say that he has produced an excellent popular book: for there is scholarship and craft as well as enthusiasm and affection in his work. He knows the Navy for what it is, and seeks to show it fairly.

The two books offer an interesting contrast. Tute tells what the Navy has done, Kennedy seeks to account, in a wider setting, for the purposes and the policies. Both have achieved what they set out to do, in high style: but whereas Tute's book is comforting, what Kennedy conveys is questioning.

Royal Naval College, Greenwich PETER NAILOR

Politics, economics and social

The use of public power. By Andrew Shonfield. Edited by Zuzanna Shonfield. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. 1982. 140 pp. Index. £9·95. $13.35.

IN the midst of the most severe economic recession which the world economy has experienced since the end of the war and growing scepticism about the economic role of governments,

Andrew Shonfield embarked on a major project to examine the evolving balance between public and private power in the world of the 1970s and the 1980s. *The use of public power* contains three completed chapters and some notes on another ten which Shonfield left unfinished on his untimely death in January 1981. The book has been very competently edited by his wife Zuzanna; it also contains an introduction by Sir John Hicks.

Shonfield rejected the so-called 'nemesis' theory which became increasingly popular among academic economists and conservative politicians in the late 1970s. According to this theory, the economic slowdown of recent years was the inevitable consequence (if not punishment) of prodigal living in the past as manifested by excessively high levels of employment and welfare spending. Shonfield recognizes the serious contraints imposed on short-term management by the state which result mainly from growing rigidities in the labour market and the increasing openness of national economies. He does not, however, conclude from this that the only real option is to join the crusade for the rediscovery of 'the magic of the market place'. Instead, Shonfield believes that the state has a major role to play, especially in long-term management. He calls for 'a more interventionist, risk-taking, enterpreneurial state' (p. 88). Unfashionable ideas in the world of Mrs Thatcher and Mr Reagan.

Shonfield also discusses the development of the welfare state, which he sees mainly as the result of mass affluence and the need of the 'average man' for income continuity and security rather than as an attempt to eliminate or simply alleviate poverty from our societies. Shonfield's 'average man' includes the new property-owning members of the working class. Could this help to explain the strong resistance of the welfare state even at times when many Western countries have clearly shifted politically to the right?

Although with the benefit of hindsight the reader may find that Shonfield has probably over-estimated the ability of Western governments to pull their economies out of the deep recession, especially when inflation rates still remained high, his plea for concerted international action has much relevance in the present economic environment. But alas, the recent Williamsburg summit suggests that the leaders of the major Western countries are not as yet ready to accept the consequences for national economic policy arising from a highly interdependent world economy.

It is a great pity that Shonfield's work remained unfinished: this promised to be a highly original book from a very fine mind. His loss is even more deeply felt at a time when Western social democracies are at a turning-point and under heavy attack from political forces which seek to reverse the economic and political developments of more than three decades. Ideas to revitalize the mixed economy through a more dynamic use of public power and new experiments in industrial democracy are in short supply.

St Antony's College, Oxford LOUKAS TSOUKALIS

The future of politics: governance, movements and world order. Edited by William Page. London: Pinter for World Futures Studies Association. 1983. 234pp. Index. £14·50.

THE study of futures is not popular in the United Kingdom. This volume is a selection of twenty papers presented to meetings' 'between experts from all around the world', organized by the World Futures Studies Association. The contributors include twelve Europeans, mainly Scandinavian and Dutch, three representatives of the Third World, two Israelis, two Americans from the University of Hawaii and Professor Richard Falk from Princeton; not one of them is British. It behoves the reviewer to assess the book for readers who are not likely to be familiar with the approach.

The stated purpose of the exercise is 'to look at the present in the light of the future and, simultaneously, to look at the present-day roots of the future'. As usually happens with symposia, the papers are rather heterogeneous and greatly vary in weight. Even the best do not fully succeed in the stated purpose: some conceptualizations are interesting but none significantly illuminates any present problem, let alone provides a real insight into the future. Nevertheless, the adopted angle has a valuable cumulative effect upon the reader which can be described as 'mind-stretching'. The papers are grouped into four sections: the crisis of governance (five papers); the 'grass root' elements of politics—the most interesting section—(nine papers); the use of force (five papers); and the use of communications (two papers).

This is not a collection of abstruse cerebrations about futurology or of ideologically committed contributions to such causes as peace research or ecological studies, but an

attempt to look from the specified angle at a range of problems which concern—or at the very least *should* concern—us today. No solutions are suggested and the volume is pervaded by the pessimism which is now frequently superseding the heady optimism of the waning 'scientific' approaches to politics. All in all, this seems to be a modest but promising approach.

University of Southampton JOSEPH FRANKEL

Nationalism in the contemporary world: political and sociological perspectives. By T. V. Sathyamurthy. London: Pinter; New Jersey: Allanheld, Osmun. 1983. Index. 246 pp.

THE commonly accepted view of Third World nationalism is that it is an ideology, European in origin, through which urban elites, usually with a Westernized outlook or education, are in the process of creating nation-states out of former colonies, and thus bringing them into conformity with the rest of the international system. Developments in Asia and Africa over the past twenty years, however, have made such an interpretation seem increasingly untenable, so that it is an open question whether many of the newly independent states there, far from foreshadowing the future, are not, in fact, but fading echoes of the past, going through a transient 'sub-British' or 'sub-French' period, not unlike the doom-laden 'sub-Roman' phase of the fifth and sixth centuries.

It is for the light it throws on these matters that Dr Sathyamurthy's book is both timely and important. He sees Third World nationalism not so much as a European transplant as an emanation of powerful ethnic responses to the distortions caused by political and economic imperialism, or by the legacy that this has left in the form of post-colonial frontiers and structures. These responses, he holds, are no less important, and often more so, when coming from tribes and rural areas rather than from urbanized elites, and need to be investigated through a variety of disciplines, especially that of social anthropology, which provides a more fruitful approach than does political science. That this understanding and these methods enable us to see more clearly the realities behind many of the Third World's tensions and upheavals is exemplified in the case studies which the author uses to illustrate his thesis. Thus he quotes with approval the observation of an anthropologist that Amin was not 'a bizarre or maverick intrusion upon the Uganda political scene, but deeply and significantly entwined in it' (p. 141).

The analytical sophistication with which the author approaches Third World nationalism (he also tackles Scotland and Yugoslavia) is not, regrettably, maintained in other directions. He continually uses the jargon beloved of the Third World itself—'imperialism', 'neo-colonialism', 'popular masses'—without much attempt at specifying what or who these are, except that the first two seem to be confined to the activities of the capitalist West. He makes the amazing statement (p. 52) that '*in practice*' (my italics) the right of a constituent republic to secede from the Soviet Union depends on three conditions (not one of these being the destruction of Soviet power). He seems also to argue (pp. 70–1) that whereas Third World nationalism derives chiefly from a crisis of 'identity', the separatist nationalisms of the West, of which he gives Welsh nationalism as an example, are essentially about economic deprivation. Had he lived in Aberystwyth as long as this reviewer, he might have realized that 'identity' is as much the leading issue in Welsh as it is in any other nationalism.

Yet despite these complaints, this is an intelligent, stimulating and extremely well-researched book (the text is liberally sprinkled with references and end-notes) and one which raises some profound questions which not only specialists in the field would do well to ponder. All of which makes it a pity that, whereas one sometimes hears of the Catholic Church taking a book off the Index, this is the first example I have encountered of the index being taken off the book (see pp. vii and 247).

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth BRIAN PORTER

Social protest, violence, and terror in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe. Edited by Wolfgang J. Mommsen and Gerhard Hirschfeld. London: Macmillan with Berg for the German Historical Institute, London. 1982. 411 pp. Index. £20·00.

THE twenty-two essays collected in this volume originate from a November 1979 conference in Bad Homburg, arranged by the German Historical Institute. The field of enquiry was

restricted to those groups which openly revolted against an 'effective, though not always sufficiently legitimate, governmental order', and which enjoyed 'marginal or, at best, small' support. In view of these criteria it is rather odd that the editors have included essays on German Nazism, Italian Fascism, and the German KPD: all these movements commanded considerable mass support at various stages. In fact, the essays on these aspects by Peter Merkl, Adrian Lyttleton, and Eve Rosenhaft respectively are among the best in the volume.

Franklin Ford in his opening essay on assassination makes some powerful points in support of his case that 'the recent history of lethal political gestures is dominated by novel characteristics' (p. 3). In addition to the impact of new weaponry, such as high-velocity rifles with telescopic sights, and radio-controlled bombs, and of modern media technology, with its massive potential publicity for 'propaganda of the deed', Ford stresses what he sees as key trends in the twentieth century. He points out that the most ruthless and repressive governments of the post-1918 era, such as the Bolsheviks and the Nazis, were 'born of previous resistance movements that had managed to seize full power in the state' and were schooled on contempt for the 'failures of will, of vigilance, and of ingenuity shown by the regimes they themselves had succeeded in overthrowing'. Ford also emphasizes the striking convergence of the extreme authoritarian Left and Right in their belief in violence and terror as instruments for attaining and holding power. Perhaps the most refreshing feature of Ford's essay is its gutsy liberal-democratic rejection of the fashionable view of violence as an 'unavoidable' or 'inevitable' mode of political behaviour. By contrast Professor Eric Hobsbawm, in a rejoinder to Ford, propounds a totally different concept of violence, seeing it as 'illegal action' and blaming it, in part, on the failings of liberalism.

The major *tour de force* in the volume is Peter Merkl's chapter on 'Political violence and the Stormtroopers, 1925-33' in which he disposes of some of the more resilient myths about this phase of Nazi history. For example, he shows that the vast majority of the stormtroopers and no less than three-fifths of its middle and lower echelon leaders were of the postwar generation (*i.e.* born 1902 or later). Hence, one must search for individual motivations for joining other than the memory of front line service in the First World War. Reinforcing the work of other historians, he suggests that one important focus for research into these sources of motivation should be the generational revolt against all forms of parental and established authority which pervaded the culture of the Weimar Republic.

University of Aberdeen PAUL WILKINSON

Terrorism in Europe. Edited by Yonah Alexander and Kenneth A. Myers. London: Croom Helm for Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. 1982. 216 pp. Index. £12·95.

THERE is a need for more case studies of terrorism in the various regions of the world. Over 30 per cent of annual international terrorist incidents occur in Western Europe. The case for more scholarly investigations of European terrorism is obvious. But it is a pity that in this instance the publishers and editors seem to have agreed on such a constricting format; it is impossible to give adequate coverage even for the major countries and movements in 200 pages of text.

One of the longest essays in the book is Dennis Pluchinsky's clear and informative chronological survey of terrorism in Western Europe since the early 1970s. His typology—indigenous, supra-indigenous, international and state-directed—works fairly well, though the final category misses the important role of certain states in promoting, encouraging and assisting terrorist activities. Thus, although Professor Alexander in his editorial preface heavily emphasizes the Soviet role and motives in promoting terrorism in non-communist Europe, these activities are not mentioned by Pluchinsky. There is an even more glaring discrepancy between the statistics cited by Pluchinsky and those cited by the Editor. Professor Alexander refers to 3,851 domestic and international terrorist actions in Europe between 1970 and 1981, causing 1,464 deaths and wounding 2,834. Dennis Pluchinsky's careful breakdown of the figures on a country basis shows that the incidence of domestic terrorism alone in several high-risk European countries far exceeds the total cited by Alexander. For example, in Turkey between 1977 and 1980 over 5,000 people died from terrorism, and in Italy the police recorded the staggering total of 9,933 terrorist incidents between 1975 and 1980, including hundreds of murders, attempted murders and shooting attacks.

Another valuable item is the chapter on 'The European Community and terrorism' by Juliet Lodge and David Freestone. Together with an up-to-date analysis of the status and problems of the Council of Europe Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, the authors provide a hard-headed and balanced assessment of the possibilities of European Community action in this field, warning that:

> Apart from political factors and difficulties born of the differences between civil law states . . . and common law states . . . it must be realised that the adoption of a common EC 'policy' on terrorism has important implications not simply for the jurisdiction of the member states and the nature of their mutual and reciprocal obligations, but that it would be tantamount to an extension of the EC's competence to a sphere hitherto the prerogative of the member states, and hence imply that EC law in this area would be binding and assume precedence over national law . . . (p. 79).

Finally, one should mention Yosef Nedava's striking case study of Shalom Schwartzbard, a Jewish watchmaker who assassinated Simon Petliura in May 1926 and was acquitted after a dramatic trial in which he claimed that Petliura was responsible for pogroms in the Ukraine. Nedava's essay is the only one in the volume to raise some of the major ethical dilemmas terrorism poses for liberal-democratic theory. But if state terrorism is held to be an adequate moral justification for acts of terrorism by individuals, are we then to let each man be his own executioner? Some would argue that Nedava is creating unnecessary confusion by conflating the relatively rare instances in which the classical doctrine of tyrannicide may be validly invoked today with the very different problem of systematic campaigns of terrorism of the kind that plague certain of our democratic societies. These differences of historical and moral context are of crucial importance.

University of Aberdeen PAUL WILKINSON

The growth of the international economy, 1820–1980: an introductory text. By A. G. Kenwood and A. L. Lougheed. London: Allen & Unwin. 1983. 336 pp. Index. Pb.: £6·95.

THIS book provides an admirably concise, wide-ranging and cogent introduction to the development of the international economy between 1820 and 1980.

Within each of three historical periods—pre-First World War (1820–1913), interwar and post-1945—the discussion is organized into analytically distinct chapters. The first period is discussed in terms of the causes of growth in the international economy, capital movements, migration, commercial policy, foreign trade, the multilateral payments network, the international monetary system, the spread of industrialization, growth and exports, and finally, overall trends and period fluctuations in the level of economic activity.

The interwar years are surveyed in general and then considered in more detail under the headings of the restoration of the gold standard, the later collapse of that arrangement and the disintegration of the international economy, international trade and, lastly, an overview of the Great Depression.

The post-1945 world is discussed in terms of the planning of the postwar system and the initial transition from wartime conditions, the overall international economy between 1950 and 1980, international monetary relations between 1961 and 1980, GATT and commercial policy, the experience of the developed economies and, finally, the experiences of the developing and the centrally planned economies.

Much valuable empirical information is provided in *The growth of the international economy*, along with concise and interesting discussions of the major interpretations of such central developments at the Great Depression of the 1930s (pp. 240–4). Any treatment of such a massive subject as 160 years of the international economy in the space of a mere 336 pages is bound, however, to evidence certain limitations. Thus, the subject matter of the volume is almost entirely limited to the history of the Western based 'capitalist' economy: countries like China, before and after the advent of the communists, receive scant attention, while the experiences of Eastern Europe, and of the socialist bloc generally, are the subject of but passing consideration. There is also no explicit discussion of the fundamentally opposed interpretations of the nature and functioning of the global economy that exist and that hold sway over the minds of decision-makers in various parts of the globe. This, however, is no fatal shortcoming for such perspectives do illuminate, albeit implicitly, the discussions of a number of basic issues and developments.

Overall, then, *The growth of the international economy* provides a concise survey of modern international economic developments which is impressive in its embrace and clarity and which does not suffer seriously from those shortcomings that are dictated by the requirements of space and brevity.

University of Reading R. J. BARRY JONES

The growth of international business. Edited by Mark Casson. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1983. 276 pp. Index. £15·00.

THE papers in this book were presented at a conference at Reading University in 1982, and were subsequently revised in the light of discussion. Consequently, the book displays more unity than is normal in such works and provides a useful insight into the current condition of research in this important field.

Mark Casson's introduction to the volume is the weaker of his two contributions. The usual signposting and summary of the contents of the book is tagged incongruously on to the end of a bold if inconclusive attempt to synthesize modern theory of the firm and organization theory.

Where Casson is synthetic, Peter Buckley is by contrast episodic in his critical survey of recent theory, providing a crisp series of distinctions and warnings which should inform any reading of the remainder of the book. In isolating the surprisingly few characteristics which distinguish multinational corporations from *non*-multinational multi-plant multi-product firms Buckley usefully draws attention to the centrality of state policy in influencing the institutional structure of world production (p. 37).

A second helpful clarification from Buckley concerns internalization. To internalize is, quite simply, to bring within the firm transactions which would otherwise be conducted in the open market. 'At its most general, the concept of internalisation is tautological', Buckley rightly observes; 'firms internalise imperfect markets until the cost of further internalisation outweighs the benefits' (p. 42). But this leaves open the questions of what specific sorts of market imperfections stimulate internalization and what the relative costs of alternative market and non-market solutions to those imperfections look like. These problems loom large in several of the remaining contributions. David J. Teece, for example, provides a general answer to the second question with a simple diagrammatic exposition of how variations of costs as a function of increasing complexity of knowhow and increasing asset specificity may bring about an increasing preference for internal over market solutions, fostering horizontal and vertical integration respectively; and the theoretical part of the book concludes with an essay by Mark Casson and George Norman which examines the oligopolistic behaviour of multinationals and notes the disproportionate benefits accruing to relatively highly developed host countries from oligopolistic competition.

After a magisterial survey of the level and structure of international production over the past century by John H. Dunning, and a study of industrial diversification by Robert D. Pearce, the second, empirical, section of the book concludes with three narrower studies. George Yannopoulos adds to the growing literature applying recent developments in the theory of the firm, originally developed with manufacturing firms in mind, to banking and financial corporations. Similar confrontations of theory and fact are engineered by Robert Read, who studies the evolution of the banana export trade from a rather skimpy secondary literature, and T. A. B. Corley, who provides a taste of his forthcoming full-scale history of Burmah Oil. Here the analytical precision demanded by Buckley is absent, though there is much material of interest.

Criticisms aside, the impression left by the book is of an inventive and curious group of scholars, whom theory-shy business historians and analysts of contemporary international economic relations would do well to meet half-way. Some such meeting of minds would do much to improve the muddled and segmented condition of the modern literature on multinationals.

University of Warwick CHARLES JONES

The political economy of growth. By Dennis C. Mueller. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1983. 285 pp. Index. £19·50.

This collection represents the proceedings of a conference held in 1978 to discuss ideas which were later to provide the core of Mancur Olson's *The rise and decline of nations* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982). In the central paper Olson sets out to explain why some national economies grow faster than others. The early stages of the argument will be very familiar to those who have read Olson's earlier work, *The logic of collective action* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1965). Special interest groups such as trade unions or cartels exist to provide collective goods for their members, yet it is not rational for individual members to contribute their share of the cost. Because a collective good is, by definition, available to every consumer once it has been supplied at all, it makes sense for individuals to hold back payments in the expectation that they may be able to free-ride on those whose prospective private gain is such that they can afford to neglect the external benefits they confer on free-riders when providing the good. In these circumstances collective goods, in so far as they were provided, would be a form of exploitation of the powerful and wealthy by the weak and poor. But the powerful and wealthy have a trick or two up their sleeve. They may overcome the free-rider problem by coercion or by the provision of selective incentives. These are costly devices, it is true, and those collectives function best which are able to dispense with them in part either by the substitution of some relatively costless legitimacy-conferring ideology or because they are so small that their internal negotiating costs are very low and their members linked by strong affective attitudes.

How do collective interest groups influence growth? Olson believes that, though slow to emerge, these groups do not easily disappear, and that in consequence 'developed democratic societies will accumulate more special-interest organizations as time goes on' (p. 17). But in Olson's formulation collective interest groups are themselves members of a second-level group, the nation, which is subject to much the same rules as any other group. So, if the nation includes a multiplicity of small and exclusive interest groups, the state will be beset by free-riders as it attempts to pursue growth. On the other hand, 'if there are only a handful of special-interest groups in society, each with a noticeable percentage of the population and resources, their leaders may find it worthwhile to bargain with one another for the gains that socially efficient policies could bring' (p. 23). The propensity for growth is therefore held to be a function both of the degree of inclusiveness of major interest groups in a given society and of the period during which the process of interest-group formation and consolidation has continued in conditions of fundamental political stability. Other things being equal, Olson implies, economic growth and political stability will tend to be compatible only where the State is strong enough to be able to over-ride special interests, or where interest groups are so inclusive that they tend to pursue the national interest. This he very reasonably finds disturbing.

Olson's simple yet fecund hypothesis is elegantly elaborated in a brief note by John Hicks and subjected to scrutiny by Kwang Choi, Moses Abramovitz and Frederic L. Pryor before the evidence from a small number of West European countries is surveyed in five papers which provide some of the best (Asselain and Morrisson) and weakest (Ursula Hicks) analysis in the book.

The gaps in Olson's theory are numerous. He simply assumes a beneficent state which would 'if not influenced by lobbies, have an incentive to promote [national] efficiency and growth' (p. 23). He assumes that, given equal inclusiveness, one interest group is more or less as obstructive as another, and for this he is taken to task by Samuel Bowles and John Eatwell and by James W. Dean, all of whom argue, though from differing perspectives, that business lobbies have had so much of the action in the past that the supposedly growth-reducing tedency of unions and other popular groupings is very far from being established. And what if, as Asselain and Morrisson maintain in their excellent study of France, special interest groups are as much a response to as a cause of relatively slow growth and economic crisis? Then there is the extreme difficulty of identifying comparable base dates for the process of continuous group-formation: revolutions sometimes happen very quietly; elites sometimes survive cataclysms. Finally, Olson misses an opportunity to carry the analysis one step further, to the international system itself, where the possibility that provision of international public goods by hegemons such as Britain and the United States may have

depressed their growth rates while others received the benefit of a free ride cries out for attention.

Entertaining though the volume is—and it is very entertaining—it fits clearly into that tradition of universal history which a certain kind of economist finds impossible to resist: splendid and vigorous intellectual exercise, but of an order of seriousness a shade below cricket.

University of Warwick CHARLES JONES

The struggle for economic development: readings in problems and policies. Edited by Michael P. Todaro. New York, London: Longman. 1983. 409 pp. Pb.: £9·95.

THIS reader is intended to accompany the editor's text, *Economic development in the Third World*. As a general reader on development economics for undergraduates it has the advantage over some of its competitors of including a good number of quite recent extracts and papers. Of thirty-four readings, nineteen were first published during the five years 1978–82, while only one dates from the 1960s. Use is made of excerpts from official reports, and this mildly establishment tone is reinforced by the strong showing of official economists, amongst them seven with World Bank and three with ILO connections. A group of five readings including Sheila Smith and John Toye's elegant 1979 *tour d'horizon*, 'Three stories about trade and poor economies' cover specifically international questions, but readings in other sections—on North–South relations and dependence, for example—also have strong relevance for the student of purely international aspects of development. There are naturally some weak selections. Passages from Denis Goulet's *The cruel choice* and the first Brandt Report are used in an introductory section to convey the reality of underdevelopment. The pedagogic purpose of shocking Western students into an appreciation of non-Western predicaments and states of consciousness might have been achieved more effectively by resort to fiction: a passage from Gabriel Garcia Marquez's *Cien años de soledad*, perhaps? But this may be thought a quibble, and the strengths of the collection generally outweigh its weaknesses.

University of Warwick CHARLES JONES

Commodity exports and economic development: the commodity problem and policy in developing countries. By F. Gerard Adams and Jere R. Behrman. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington. 1982. 328 pp. Index. £21·00.

THIS book is the fruit of an important project undertaken at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania and financed by the Agency for International Development. The project has already produced several interrelated books on commodity problems, focussing upon the coffee and copper industries in Brazil, El Salvador, Ivory Coast, Chile and Zambia. This, the sixth book, draws upon these works and other work done by the project team.

The research work is of the highest quality. No further serious work on the subject of the relationship between economic development and commodity problems in less developed countries (LDCs) will be complete without reference to the methodology or empirical findings of this Wharton project. The approach is highly original and the authors show a first-rate grasp of the subject-matter and econometric techniques which they have chosen to adopt. The basic method of the analysis is that of integrated econometric models, with separate models worked out at the macroeconometric, micro-commodity producing sector and international commodity market levels. *A priori* economic theory and previous studies are used to suggest the appropriate structure of these models. The complexity of the econometric models is apparent, but reference is made to the earlier studies for the details of the models themselves. One of the main advantages of the econometric approach claimed by Adams and Behrman lies in the fact that often *a priori* reasoning provides little insight into correct functional forms, the size of relevant elasticities or actual time lags in adjustment and expectations formation. Obtaining estimates of these parameters (especially the sign) is interesting enough, but the Wharton School project went on to use their quantitatively defined models to simulate for what would happen if values of certain exogenous variables were changed. In particular the authors simulate for changes in level, trend and degree of variation in coffee and copper prices.

Perhaps the most interesting findings relate to these simulations—Table 10.1 and related text ought to be compulsory reading for all negotiators connected with the question of the international management of primary commodity markets. Commodity prices are shown to relate to five important LDC 'policy objectives': GDP growth, investment, price level, income distribution and agriculture's share in GDP. The richness of the findings is far too great to discuss in any detail here. However, two interesting findings are, first, that more adverse trends in the primary producers' terms of trade will have a negative impact upon GDP and investment, but that the magnitude of the impact among the five LDCs is uneven. Secondly, and most challenging to 'Third World rhetoric' is that the models do not show a significant or important negative relationship between increased commodity price instability and each of the five 'policy objectives'. The value of investing in commodity price stabilization schemes is, therefore, brought into question.

It must be added this book is magnificently well written and is a pleasure to read.

University of Aberdeen PAUL HALLWOOD

Banking on the poor: the World Bank and world poverty. By Robert L. Ayres. Cambridge, Mass., London: MIT Press. 1983. 282 pp. Index. £15·75.

WRITING a book on any international institution is a delicate exercise. One has to try not to bite the hand that feeds one and at the same time avoid the charge of doing a whitewash job. The author of this volume seems to have succeeded on both counts. He apparently had access to a lot of detailed and confidential information and documents which was backed up by interviews with officials. He has not taken advantage of his privileged position to 'spill the beans' (or not all of them). On the other hand, he does not plug any particular ideological line, so there are very few hostages to fortune.

Basically, *Banking on the poor* examines the operations and activities of the World Bank during the thirteen years when Robert McNamara was President. The pre-McNamara years, though covering a longer period of time, are only tangentially touched on in the opening chapter. The period since his departure is the subject of the concluding chapter. By all accounts, the years 1968–81 were very significant for the Bank. Not only did its resources and lending activities increase enormously but the Bank itself developed into the world's largest development agency. In the process it shed much of its earlier conservatism. The emphasis on social overhead capital and pre-investment projects which characterized its early operations gave way first to agriculture and later to education. However, the most significant single development came in 1973 when McNamara announced that henceforth the Bank's activities, resources and operations were to be devoted to eradicating world poverty. In fact, for the rest of his term as President, virtually every major programme and initiative was part of the grand scenario of poverty alleviation.

This book tells the story of his single-minded pursuit of that objective and assesses the results of the Bank's operation in the field of urban and rural development in its attempt to reach the poorest of the poor. Much has undoubtedly been achieved but, as the book makes clear, poverty alleviation is not something one can quantify or set targets for. There are just too many problems, not only within the recipient countries, but more particularly in an institution like the World Bank. Some of these are discussed fully and frankly. There is also a vast array of examples drawn from an equally impressive range of countries, evidence enough of the care and scholarship which the author exercises in order to present a well-rounded critique.

Ayres does not unearth any startling discoveries nor does he condemn the policy outright. One may, therefore, be forgiven for feeling that perhaps it does not terribly matter whether the policy succeeded or not. There are other considerations which are just as important; for example, the developing countries now feel they have a stake in the future of the Bank. His final chapter on the broad policy parameters facing the new President and the scope for radical departure from the McNamara years is worth attention. All in all, a highly readable volume.

University of Glasgow GEORGE C. ABBOTT

Of bread and guns: the world economy in crisis. By Nigel Harris. London: Penguin. 1983. 287 pp. Index. Pb.: £2·95.

RAMSES (Annual Report by the French Institute of International Relations): the state of the world economy. By Albert Bressand (project director). London: Macmillan. 1982. 351 pp. Index. £27·50.

HERE are two books that both examine the world economy from the standpoint that economics without politics is like meat without salt. While the two books share a political economy perspective, however, they differ in almost all other respects. One is a radical paperback permeated by a sense of injustice; the other is a beautifully produced establishment volume concerned very much with threats to stability. If one regards international political economy as a subject which concerns itself with the triple trade-off between equity, efficiency and stability, then these books constitute a balanced pair, since there is a good deal of discussion of the economic imperatives of efficiency and of international competitiveness in each book.

Mr Harris is a founder member of the Socialist Workers' Party and a former editor of *International Socialism*. On page 97 he writes:

> Explanations in society are not simply scientific responses to a problem. They are weapons in a fight, the basis for praise and blame. It is for this reason that social science can contribute least where the social and political significance of the problem is greatest. The study of economies has its 'black holes', but they are not the blindness of economists so much as the blindness of the social order. For blindness serves its function too, protecting a status quo.

It is certainly true that Mr Harris intends his acute vision of the realities to threaten the status quo, but so even-handed is he is his condemnation of all governments that one may very easily draw the conservative conclusion that any change is likely to be for the worse. The trumpet call on page 271 is uncertain. Who will go out to battle at the barricades if, as the author says:

> Too often, the victory proved no more than the prelude to a more fundamental defeat. The workers of Karachi and elsewhere defeated Mr Bhutto, but General Zia inherited power. The mass of Iranians overthrew the Shah, but one section of the Ayatollahs inherited. The mass of Vietnamese battled, but at the end, it was the Party which remained supreme.

As a polemic the book must be judged a failure. It tries to cover too broad a canvas to sustain its early attack. It is also too honest, not only in condemning unsavoury regimes which happen to come to power by violence, but also in its praise for the efficiency and technological virtuosity of capitalism—indeed much of chapter two, 'The Great Boom' is an updated, expanded version of the corresponding section in the Communist Manifesto itself. This is where the author does succeed. He tells us in some detail how the capitalist world economy functions and why it is, in some very important respects, unjust.

RAMSES 1982 takes its name from the French 'Rapport Annuel sur le Système Economique et les Stratégies'. It is centrally concerned with insecurities arising from world economics but the first sentence of chapter one sets the tone by saying: 'International economic security, the major theme of this year's report, cannot be divorced from strategic security. It has therefore become necessary to put economic challenges in the perspective of the overall vulnerability of each nation.' Throughout the book the treatment of economics is always within a political context and uses statistics, block diagrams, short summaries and lists of references with clarity and without mathematical overkill. As a reference book for the world economy in 1982 this work must rank highly. It is well produced, it covers all the important issues and some minor ones as well—such as the demography of the national minorities in the USSR—and M. Bressand has managed to find a not unpleasing intellectual framework for many disparate elements.

There are four parts. The first deals with arms and energy security from a European perspective. This is a very useful section, especially, one suspects, to students hurriedly completing essays. The second section surveys the tense relations among economic powers, dealing with trade and money in the main but with some attention to particular firms and institutions. The third section is an ambitious attempt to assess the performance of market economies and planned economies in the world recession in about fifty pages. The final

section ranges over a number of Third World issues; Africa, China and the Islamic World find some mention, but there is one interesting gap—Central and South America are doubtless regions which would be well covered in an American survey but find no place here.

The price of RAMSES 1982 is high but you do get quite a lot for your money and it will be well used on the reference shelves of libraries. One very important value of this book is identified by Professor Nye in his foreword. It is, as he remarks, very welcome to have an overview of the world situation from a European perspective because it is not only citizens of the United States who see the world entirely through American lenses.

Bristol Polytechnic FRANK GARDNER

Law

The law of international institutions. 4th edn. By D. W. Bowett. London: Stevens for the London Institute of World Affairs. 1982. 431pp. Index. £19·00. Pb.: £12·50.

BOWETT's classical textbook has been republished in a fourth edition. It maintains the original format, with an historical introduction, a short chapter on the League, a very long chapter on the UN, a comparative study of the UN's specialized agencies, separate sections on each of the regional institutions and the judicial institutions and ending with a discussion of some common problems.

Over the three revised editions there has been a substantial amount of updating throughout the text, but unfortunately this has not been systematically or even consistently done. Some of the bodies discussed or mentioned do not exist any longer, such as the Afro-Asian Group at the UN or the East African Community, to mention two of the most prominent. At other points the provisions discussed have been superseded or the citations of practice are incomplete. More surprisingly there are a few factual errors: UN budget contributions are not assessed annually (pp. 53 and 417), UNIDO is not yet a specialized agency (p. 72) and the first Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference was in New Delhi in April 1955, being totally distinct from the Bandung Conference (pp. 235–6).

The last two chapters are the most interesting, as they raise questions which challenge the more restrictive state-centric views of the international system. They discuss the extent to which the institutions have an international legal personality and their impact on the doctrine of the sovereign equality of states. Bowett does not separate the two prongs of the latter question. It is uncontentious that the political equality and even the legal equality of states is a fiction, but many of the points make a more radical challenge to the assumption of the complete sovereignty of states. Majority voting, constitutional amendment by the legislative principle and centralized assessment for budgets all force governments to accept and work with decisions which they originally opposed.

It is very useful that Bowett's work remains in print and it should continue to be strongly recommended to students, provided that they are cautioned to check significant developments since the mid-1960s for themselves.

The City University, London PETER WILLETTS

The international law of human rights. By Paul Sieghart. Oxford: Clarendon (Oxford University Press). 1983. 569pp. £45·00.

THIS is a formidable book which ought to have the most considerable impact upon the protection of human rights or, at least, upon that protection of human rights which is secured by judicial (or similar) process. It is directed to legal practitioners and provides them with a handbook of the jurisprudence of the several international bodies charged with the interpretation of human rights instruments. The book is organized in a way which is well calculated to indicate whether that claim which has failed in domestic tribunals has any chance of success on the international level. It is a 'Halsbury' for international human rights, with the law set out accompanied by copious, if not comprehensive, reference to the case law.

The main difference between this book and a pure practitioners' treatise is Mr Sieghart's introduction of nearly fifty pages which establishes both the provenance and the limits of the

book's subject. He eschews investigation into the political nature and sources of human rights, focussing instead on those international agreements 'under which sovereign states would consent to be bound by the obligations to respect and ensure human rights that are specified within their own territories, for all individuals (including their own citizens) over whom they had jurisdiction'. It is an approach which commends itself most firmly but it is not without its difficulties. Even Mr Sieghart's positivist definition just set out assumes that we know what human rights are—that they have some objective qualities beyond the positive law—but this is far from obvious. What, for instance, is the nature of the obligation which states have undertaken by the European Communities Treaty not to discriminate between individuals on grounds of nationality? In the long list of human rights treaties examined in the book, the Communities Treaty is not included. Nor does he have anything to say about international humanitarian law.

What he does include is an analysis of the provisions of more than forty international and regional human rights agreements and the decisions taken by the bodies charged with their interpretation. The jurisprudence of the European Convention of Human Rights naturally predominates but the recent developments before the Human Rights Committee and under the American Convention are also incorporated. The book deals with economic rights as protected by the International Covenant and the European Social Charter as well as the more traditional political guarantees and there is a short section on 'collective rights' such as self-determination. Also, some indication of the procedural arrangements of the various bodies is set out. Particularly valuable in the list of participants in the agreements is the list of substantive reservations that states have made when becoming parties. There are some useful tables, too, but the bibliography is slight and, most seriously, there is no index (even Halsbury has one, so it cannot be only an academic requirement!).

The effectiveness of human rights instruments does in large measure depend upon a well-informed profession. The developments of the last twenty years have undoubtedly increased the awareness of the legal profession that sometimes a remedy for the violation of an individual's rights may be found at the international level. This book has the important role of providing the next step of translating that general awareness into specific appreciation. It has been done quite as well as any single book possibly could.

University of Durham COLIN WARBRICK

Humanity in warfare: the modern history of the international law of armed conflicts. By Geoffrey Best. London: Methuen. 1983. 408pp. Index. Pb.: £6·95.

PROFESSOR BEST has chosen a tendentious title for his book, and one which neatly encapsulates the contradiction inherent in the law of armed conflict. This contradiction is fully explored in an excellent and stimulating analysis of the history of the ideas of warfare, from the writings of the Enlightenment to the present day, and the many factors that have affected the formulation and practice of *ius in bello*.

Humanitarianism is just one of the threads that he follows in the course of the book, but he convincingly shows its strength and influence in the fabric as a whole. Other themes are evident, however, and these receive their due attention. The most obvious, and the most serious obstacle to the restraint of methods of warfare, is that of military necessity. Once warfare itself is accepted as necessary, the pressure to allow military commanders complete freedom to achieve the objects of the conflict is hard to resist. Again and again, as Professor Best shows, the restraining efforts of humanitarians have been troubled by the problem of possibly prolonging wars which could otherwise be finished quickly, albeit brutally, by the problem of distinguishing between military necessity and military convenience, and by the ultimately insoluble problem of military refusal to accept restrictions which are perceived to be unreasonable. In addition, the author shows how developments have been shaped by social, economic, political and technological factors. The 'nation at war' of the French revolution, and its armies living off the land in enemy territories, the use of irregular partisan fighters such as the original Spanish 'guerrillas', and the accelerating development of technology in the twentieth century have all left their mark in the formulation and state practice of *ius in bello*. Civilians play a large part in the story, primarily, as one would expect, as victims, but Professor Best justifiably points out their own complicity in creating the evil of warfare in which they subsequently suffer.

In this edition, the author has taken the opportunity to add a postscript to cover events since the first publication in 1980. We thus have a brief but intriguing account of the Falkland Islands conflict and the part played in it by the ICRC and the Geneva Conventions.

The size and scope of Professor Best's work does not allow thorough and detailed treatment of the material available, and one is tempted to say that he has attempted too much. Occasionally the generality of style jars a little. Nevertheless, he perfectly catches the flow and ebb, current and cross-current of ideas, ambitions and influences of the times, and acknowledges the unpredictability of circumstances in individual conflicts which will largely dictate the extent to which limitations on warfare are observed or ignored. This is a book which everybody with an interest in the causes, justifications and effects of war should read.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne ILONA C. CHEYNE

History

Carl Schmitt: theorist for the Reich. By Joseph W. Bendersky. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. 320 pp. Index. £20·50.

CARL SCHMITT, ninety-five this year, continues to fascinate as one of the sharpest political and legal minds of the century, whose fatal involvement with the Nazis has a distinctly Faustian aura. The copious literature about Schmitt that has appeared since 1945 has concerned itself principally with his ideas. The present book takes a relatively unpretentious biographical approach. This makes sense, for Schmitt's thought, however much it claimed universal validity, always evolved in relationship to the concrete political situation of his time. It was this desire to influence the intellectual context of current politics, reinforced by personal vanity and the mentality of an *arriviste*, that led Schmitt down the slippery slope towards becoming for a time the *Kronjurist* of the Third Reich. The main thrust of Bendersky's interpretation is, however, to exonerate Schmitt from the charge of having been the most reputable academic to have prepared the way for the Nazis. Bendersky shows that before 1933 Schmitt was looking not to the Nazis, but towards a modification of the Weimar Constitution. Even such a modification should, in Schmitt's view, have been undertaken with caution and by building on the legitimacy still provided by many features of the Weimar structure. This seems a plausible interpretation of Schmitt's *Legalität und Legitimität*, completed just before Papen's Prussian *coup* of 20 July 1932, an act which Schmitt later justified in the witness stand before the *Reichsgerichtshof*. Schmitt's contacts at this time seem mainly to have been with Schleicher, a man who has also received a worse press from historians than he entirely deserves. Nevertheless Bendersky underplays the illiberal nature of Schmitt's ideas; for example, the friend–foe principle, which had first made him widely known in the early twenties. It was hardly surprising that Schmitt was often seen as part of the 'Conservative Revolution'; neither he nor Schleicher had the saving of republican institutions high among their priorities. Once the Nazis came to power Schmitt's record becomes indefensible and Bendersky does not deny it. The note of apologia becomes, however, more evident. No doubt Schmitt, like many others, deluded himself into thinking he could influence the regime in the direction of conservative values and the maintenance of 'established orders'. When this proved illusory, Schmitt slid still more deeply into the Nazi embrace, from sheer vanity, careerism and cowardice. Even after the attack on him in *Das Schwarze Korps* in 1936 as a crypto-conservative who had jumped belatedly on the Nazi bandwagon, he contented himself with a lower profile; there was no inner emigration, let alone resistance. If men of Schmitt's prestige could go so far in accommodation with the regime, what hope was there for lesser men? At this point Schmitt's acceptance of established state power as *ultima ratio* becomes moral nihilism. The present reviewer, whose father was Schmitt's publisher, knew something of the personal poignancy of this situation. If Bendersky is insufficiently forthright in condemning Schmitt where he deserves it, he is nevertheless right in portraying him as a man of great brilliance whose intellectual achievement will endure and has no necessary connection with the rise of Hitler.

University of Southampton E. J. FEUCHTWANGER

The invaders: Hitler occupies the Rhineland. By Eva H. Haraszti. Budapest: Akademiai Kiado. 1983. 264 pp. Index. $24·00.

MOST of the details of the diplomacy surrounding the Rhineland affair of 7 March 1936 are already well known, having been dealt with very thoroughly by J. T. Emmerson in his study, *The Rhineland Crisis 7 March 1936: A study in multilateral diplomacy* (London, Temple Smith, 1977). This work, translated from the Hungarian, is a somewhat shorter account than Dr Emmerson's, the text numbering 141 pages, with the rest of the book made up of appendices of British cabinet memoranda and minutes of cabinet and chiefs of staff meetings during the crisis. The bulk of Dr Haraszti's material is based on British cabinet archives and the private papers of leading British politicians and officials, and also on the published collections of British, French and German diplomatic documents. However, some material from the Hungarian archives has been used and this will be of interest to British students of the period. Other interesting material has also been unearthed, especially the papers of Ralph Wigram of the Central Department of the Foreign Office, who warned his superiors in 1931 that 'only by cooperating with France can peace in Europe be furthered and maintained' (p. 19). It was, however, rare for the British government to offer such cooperation to a country they basically distrusted, and especially not in March 1936. While the publisher's foreword suggests that 'this was one moment when Hitler could still have been stopped', the evidence Dr Haraszti puts forward in the book itself suggests that there was little Britain and France could or would do to expel the German army from the Rhineland. The British regarded the remilitarization of the area as a minor (and to many, justifiable) infraction of the Versailles and Locarno treaties and, in any case, the French lacked the will to take any decisive action and readily responded to repeated British calls for restraint.

The organization of this book leaves something to be desired in that the material is presented in a higgledy-piggledy fashion, and, no doubt as a result of careless translation, there are a number of silly errors; for example, Lord Halifax was not 'British Secretary for War' in 1936 (p. 124).

King's College, London M. L. DOCKRILL

The Jews of Warsaw, 1939–1943: ghetto, underground, revolt. By Yisrael Gutman. Trans. by I. Friedman. Brighton, Sussex: Harvester. 1982. 487 pp. £28·00.

THIS is one of those rare studies which one reads with a total sense of satisfaction at a job well done. Not only is it well written and thoroughly researched, using German, Polish, Hebrew, Yiddish and survivor source material to full effect, but it is written in an objective manner, unlike so much Jewish writing on the Holocaust which ignores the fundamental precept of searching for the historical truth. Professor Gutman's study pursues that search with admirable fortitude, given the quite horrific story he has to tell, and if anything has a far more devastating effect on the reader than if emotionalism and rampant distortion had been allowed to creep in.

The opening sentences of the preface clearly indicate both the contents and the structure of the book: 'The purpose of this work is to examine the character and conduct of the Jewish community of Warsaw in face of the persecutive tactics of the Nazi occupation regime; to throw light on the means that were adopted to cope, both intellectually and psychologically, with the grave problems of the period; and to analyse the development of the armed resistance movement and the armed struggle of the Jews of Warsaw' (p. ix). On all counts there is nothing to disappoint the reader. The background to the establishment of the Jewish ghetto is given within the context of early Nazi, i.e. SS, policy for Poland and more especially towards the Jews. A clear and grim picture emerges of what daily life was like for the ghetto's population; and, more importantly, the detailed story is told of the 'political' organization and life of the ghetto, its relations with the German occupying powers and even with its Polish 'Aryan' neighbours outside the ghetto, as well as the slow awakening to the necessity of armed resistance in the wake of the *Aktionen* of summer 1942 which resulted in some 265,000 Jews being transported to the Treblinka death camp between 22 July and 12 September (p. 197).

Professor Gutman offers many refreshing insights into many aspects of the subject which have elsewhere only been treated with rank emotion. For example, he justly casts doubt on

some interpretations of Heydrich's *Schnellbrief* of 21 September 1939 which indicate that a policy of *Endlösung* had been decided on by then (p. 15), and on the revisionist views of Uwe Dietrich Adam regarding the actual inception of the 'Final Solution' (pp. 158–161). He grasps the nettle of the vexed subject of the Jewish Council, the *Judenrat*, and its controversial leader, Adam Czerniakow, and comments that 'even if we discount the criticism and grumbling as a natural outgrowth of the climate in the ghetto, there still remain a few points of criticism that indicate serious failings' (p. 78). But even when the story of Jewish corruption and oppression *within* the ghetto is told, it must be appreciated that one cannot simply apply terms and categories of a normal society to a ghetto which was 'a deformed society suffering under relentless stress' (p. 108). And while Professor Gutman is critical of Polish attitudes towards the Jews and the ghetto inmates, although this showed a discernible change after the first evidence of Jewish resistance in January 1943, he is also critical of the Jewish police and Jewish traitors who allowed themselves to be used by the Nazis in the oppression of their co-religionists.

One of the most interesting parts of the book is the account of the slow genesis, and then practical execution, of Jewish armed resistance, which found its final expression in the revolt of 19 April to 16 May 1943, with isolated incidents of conflict after the latter date. This too is a story with its villains and traitors on the Jewish side. Nevertheless, the final revolt took the Germans completely by surprise, since their original intention was to clear the ghetto in only three days, and, as Professor Gutman writes, 'it took the Germans longer to quell the Warsaw ghetto uprising than it had taken them to defeat entire countries' (p. 390).

JOHN P. FOX

The British Labour movement and Zionism 1917–1948. By Joseph Gorny. London: Cass. 1983. 251 pp. Index. £17·50.

THIS theme has the odd characteristic of being alternately academic and severely practical: for most of the three decades or so, the relationship between Zionism and the British Labour movement made no essential impression on history. Whatever views the Labour Party developed with regard to Zionism between 1917 and 1929 are historically of no consequence; similarly for the years 1931–45. In other words, this book comes alive only at times when Labour held power, 1929–31 and in the postwar period. As to the former, Professor Gorny's treatment of the White Paper of 1930 and the 'MacDonald letter' episode of 1931 is notable for its cool analysis of the various factions inside the Labour party. He identifies the one group which assumed that the period of significant growth of the Jewish national home would end with the decade, faced by growing Arab opposition and the limited area remaining for settlement (according to the Hope–Simpson report). This group was represented by Lord Passfield himself, Beatrice Webb and left-wing circles such as the Independent Labour Party. The second group (MacDonald, Henderson, Brailsford, Laski) took a more optimistic view of settlement possibilities and the future of Arab–Jewish co-operation. A very similar division characterized the Labour Party in the immediate postwar years, though the picture was confused by three negative decisions: not to continue the Mandate in its original form; not to accept partition because of Arab opposition; and not to impose the 1939 White Paper because of Jewish opposition supported by public opinion in the West. Hence the initial vacillation from which eventually two conflicting policies emerged—that of Attlee and Bevin, signifying a reversion to the hostility of the 1929–31 Labour government, and the policy of the minority, favouring partition, for a variety of reasons. What gives this book its interest is not so much the author's analysis of the various elements in the Labour outlook—which adds little to what is already known—but rather the wealth of material he draws on. Professor Gorny has used the private papers of Labour leaders in Britain and Israel, Cabinet conclusions and a broad selection of Labour-oriented periodicals, and all these sources give his narrative a dimension lacking to his predecessors.

University of Warwick LIONEL KOCHAN

From Hitler to Ulbricht: the communist reconstruction of East Germany 1945–46. By Gregory W. Sandford. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1983. 313 pp. Index. £21·60.

ANY book which talks in its title of the communist 'reconstruction' of East Germany in the years 1945 and 1946 is bound to raise a question mark in the reader's mind. Mr Sandford is

probably less guilty of missing the point about those years in East Germany than of having failed to make it properly. He meticulously documents the KPD's restoration of life of a sort in the eastern zone of Germany: land reform, the foundation of new social and political institutions, the expropriation of the supporters of Germany's old regime. He observes each of the gears of the new People's Democracy as they grind slowly into place. But as a history of the origins of East Germany the book has a lifelessness about it. It could have benefited from fewer footnotes and more perspective.

Of the entire book, barely five or six pages deal with the other side of 'reconstruction'. The Soviet Union is portrayed at greater length as helping 'restore the zone's economy' (p. 39) with one hand, yet spent far more of its time tearing out all its movable parts with the other. Mr Sandford's purpose, obviously, was to look at the German end of the story, and so Soviet actions are only tangentially important. But nobody reading this book would realize how important their impact has been on East Germany's reconstruction. That, surely, must be faulty history-writing.

The picture might have been drawn more clearly had the author availed himself of more of the secondary analysis of his period that is readily available. For example, Martin McCauley in his *Marxism-Leninism in the German Democratic Republic* has covered much of the same early political ground and done it far more succinctly. East German specialists have for too long sought refuge in the apology (or the boast) that not enough secondary analysis has yet been written. The remark is barely half true. The field is now covered with 'first steps'; it is time to move on.

EDWINA MORETON

Occupation diplomacy: Britain, the United States and Japan, 1945–1952. By Roger Buckley. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1982. 294pp. Index. £22·50.

ROGER BUCKLEY provides in this book a useful corrective to the conventional view that the postwar occupation of Japan was solely an American affair. He charts British interest and involvement in the future of Japan from the last days of the Pacific War through to the San Francisco peace conference by making wide use (as his extensive notes testify) of the available British, American, and, to a more limited extent, Japanese archives, though it is unfortunate that the manuscript was completed before the British records covering the last three years of the occupation were opened.

Dr Buckley outlines British wartime planning for a post-surrender Japan—in which Chatham House itself played a particularly active role (see its publication *Japan in defeat*)—and shows how, in the early months after the defeat of Japan, Britain made ambitious but ultimately unsuccessful attempts to assert its right to an equal voice in occupation policies. While the Foreign Office appreciated the necessity of cooperating with the United States, divergences in objectives were not ruled out. Britain was only influential where its objectives coincided with those of the American policy elites in both Washington and Tokyo, such as on the issue of retaining the Emperor. On issues such as Japanese constitutional reform and the political administration (the Far Eastern Commission, etc.) Britain had to defer to American pressure. Dr Buckley covers in some detail the little-known activities of the British Commonwealth forces in Japan (the Foreign Office was dubious of their usefulness), the Tokyo war trials (the British opposed arraigning the Emperor and prominent industrialists), and Japanese economic rehabilitation (the British feared an exclusive American-Japanese economic partnership to the detriment of their own commercial interests). The run-in to the peace treaty suffers slightly from the absence of British documentation but the American documentation does signpost the main lines of British thinking.

While the main burden of the author's study is the triangular relationship of the title, he does throw intriguing sidelights on the Anglo-Australian competition to be the leading non-American voice in Japanese affairs and on the British appraisals of the leading personalities of the occupation period (Prime Minister Yoshida, generally thought to be Anglophile, was described by the senior British representative in Tokyo as 'likeable enough' but 'an intriguer and a trouble maker' (p. 197)).

As the author of this useful survey of an important phase of declining British involvement in East Asia demonstrates, the British government, so heavily involved in the future of a divided Germany, showed 'little systematic interest in Japanese affairs'; the physical and

psychological barriers between Japan and Britain remained (as they still do today) 'unnecessarily formidable' (pp. 198–9). Britain was prepared to leave the politico-strategic dimensions of the newly independent Japan to the United States and concentrate instead on rebuilding trading links with Japan and the region; ironically it was to be the US political decision to exclude Japan (so over-ruling Britain) from the mainland Chinese market that helped to spur the resurgence of Japanese competition in other Asian markets.

Chatham House BRIAN BRIDGES

Documents on New Zealand external relations. Vol. II: the surrender and occupation of Japan. Edited by Robin Kay. (Wellington Historical Publications Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, P. D. Hasselberg, Government Printer. 1982). 2782pp. NZ $75·00.

FOR over thirty years the historiography of occupied Japan has been dominated by American scholars and public servants. However, recently, Roger Buckley has broken new ground with the exploration of British documents. His *Occupation diplomacy* (see review above) shows how Bevin sought to recapture British trade in postwar Japan, and how the Pacific dominions affected the complex process of peace-making. Now Robin Kay's collection of New Zealand documents confirms the value of non-American sources and throws new light on both American and Commonwealth policies. This magnificently produced volume does not confine itself to documents emanating from New Zealand leaders and agencies, but includes previously unpublished materials from British and Australian sources. Each document is annotated with great precision and authority and, from time to time, an entire American document appears within a single footnote. The provision of detailed biographical information concerning half-forgotten American and Commonwealth leaders is also immensely helpful and makes the volume an invaluable work of reference.

At the end of the Pacific War New Zealand occupied an uneasy position in international relations. Traditional loyalty made her reluctant to assert her interests in London. But geography dictated a special interest in the Pacific and close relations with a more assertive dominion, Australia. The embarrassments of New Zealand's position were clear when Britain failed to obtain American permission for her to sign the Japanese surrender document. By way of contrast, the abrasive Australian foreign minister, Evatt, secured MacArthur's consent for all the dominions to participate in the surrender ceremony. However, New Zealand's relative passivity in these exchanges did not typify her attitudes towards occupation policy. She saw the democratization of Japan as a vital interest and despite a manpower shortage contributed troops to the British Commonwealth Occupation force. A New Zealand Judge and Associate Prosecutor served at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East; and Carl Berendsen, New Zealand Minister in Washington, represented Wellington on the Far Eastern Commission. In all these activities New Zealand expressed the democratic egalitarianism of her own society, and in the Far Eastern Commission Berendsen strove manfully to shape the structure of postwar reforms.

This volume contains 800 pages of materials concerning the Commission which vividly describe the details of New Zealand policies. Furthermore, they document the working of the FEC more clearly than any earlier work. George Blakeslee's official history *The Far Eastern Commission* was subtitled 'A study in international cooperation', but Berendsen's reports describe an ill-tempered body. The Commission's ineffectiveness has often been attributed to Soviet obstruction, or pernickety representatives from minor states, but these documents tell a different story. When the Commission visited Tokyo Berendsen was deeply impressed by MacArthur's personality and policies. Unfortunately he was soon disillusioned. MacArthur's promise to cooperate proved hollow and the Commission's American staff were inefficient and obstructive. Messages to MacArthur went astray. His replies were sometimes lost, and he showed utter contempt for the Commission's activities. On one occasion the Supreme Commander refused to send a representative to Washington on the grounds that no-one could 'adequately represent' his personal views of the Japanese constitution. Irrespective of ideology or political standpoint, Berendsen and other members of the Commission were driven to anger by such behaviour. Finally, Assistant Secretary of State Hilldring met the aggrieved diplomats and pleaded for his government to be given 'one more chance' in its dealings with them. Even worse, Major-General McCoy, Chairman of the Commission, had little tact, patience or diplomatic skill. On more than one occasion he fumed and snarled at

Berendsen for no adequate reason. Nothing but total submission to American policy appeared acceptable.

In this sulphurous atmosphere New Zealand battled gamely on. It sought an opportunity for the Japanese to review the MacArthur constitution. It held that food should be more equally shared among Asian peoples. It opposed Japanese whaling. But it was all to no avail. Berendsen was in a world where power alone determined policies and internationalism was a redundant virtue.

Ultimately New Zealand occupation policies were the victims of Soviet–American rivalry. Berendsen could criticize Japan's rehabilitation and its conversion into an American ally but he could achieve nothing. For Washington, Japan was no longer a danger. The new threats came from Moscow and Peking. As British power declined, New Zealand reluctantly turned to the United States for protection. By 1951 the ANZUS pact had replaced the Commonwealth as New Zealand's defence. The emotions and trade of Empire remained, but little else.

University of Sheffield GORDON DANIELS

Documents diplomatiques suisses 1848–1945. Vol. 10: 1.1.1930–31.12.1933. Berlin: Benteli. 1982. 966 pp. Index. Sw Frs 140·00.

VOLUMES 6, 7 and 9 in this series of fifteen have already been published and volume 10 maintains the high scholarly standard of its predecessors. As well as utilizing diplomatic papers the editors have trawled extensively in Federal archives, notably the Federal Council and the departments of Public Economy, Police and Justice and Military. Documents are arranged chronologically and published in their original language. In comparison with the vast multi-volume collections of the great powers the Swiss series has definite advantages. Publication of the projected fifteen volumes will be completed within years rather than decades and the fact that each volume spans a period of several years means that the evolution of policy is easily followed.

The central concern of Swiss policy from 1930 to 1933 was the world economic crisis and the search for recovery. From 1929 to 1932, while the United States, Germany and Britain were completely engulfed by the economic blizzard, Switzerland, like France, was partly sheltered. Industrial production and employment were not hard-hit. Gold reserves and share prices actually rose. But from 1932 the full consequences were felt. Prices and salaries fell, the stock market collapsed, capital fled abroad. To stave off ruin Federal and cantonal authorities in practice abandoned economic liberalism for a deflationary protectionism, giving priority to the defence of the gold standard. The failure of the Geneva, London and Stresa conferences to promote international recovery forced Switzerland to rely on her own diplomatic resources: trade treaty revision; clearing agreements; import quotas; the search for new markets in Latin America, the Middle East and Far East. The overwhelming importance of economic criteria in foreign policy making was reflected in the ascendancy of the trade section of the Public Economy department and the influence of the National Bank as well as in closer ties with industry and commerce and reliance on private economic experts.

Volume 10 contains no startling revelations. However, amid the minutiae of long-forgotten transactions one development stands out—Swiss pessimism towards the League of Nations. At a time when international opinion still cherished large hopes for Geneva Swiss leaders were distancing themselves from the organization. Responses to the Disarmament Conference and the European Union project were cautious and reserved. The Military Department wanted to exclude Switzerland from any future disarmament agreement and refused to give the League details of the military budget and armaments (No. 109). The retreat from Geneva is reflected in the selection of documents. Of the total of 379, only twenty-four relate directly to the League. The League's inability to foster economic recovery and the growing threat from powerful anti-democratic states to the north and south made relations with Germany, Italy and France all important. Despite the serious problems posed by irredentism, Fascism and anti-Fascism, relations with Mussolini's Italy were normalized. Germany was the chief anxiety. The documents make clear that the Swiss minister in Berlin, Dinichert, was not as perceptive in his reporting as once supposed. He overestimated the economic fragility of the new regime and depicted Hitler as a moderate at the side of the extremist Göring and Goebbels. The influx of several thousand Jewish refugees in March–April 1933 highlighted

Switzerland's determination not to offend Nazi Germany. A directive of 31 March 1933 instructed police that although Jews were to be given temporary shelter they were to be discouraged from prolonging their stay (256). The depressing story of caution, compromise and expediency is offset by one heartening document. In August 1933 Motta, head of the Federal Foreign Affairs Department, urged the Police and Justice Department to stop publication of newspapers which were attacking the Nazi regime (313). The chief of the Police and Justice department replied with an appeal for press freedom!

University of Loughborough ANTHONY ADAMTHWAITE

The Spanish Civil War, 1936–39: American hemispheric perspectives. Edited by Mark Falcoff and Fredrick B. Pike. Lincoln, London. University of Nebraska Press. 1982. 357 pp. Index. £14·00.

As the editors of this volume begin by saying, 'the Spanish civil war has come to be recognized as one of the most critical events in the political history of the twentieth century', and one whose memory has a still unfading vitality. Reactions to it of government and public in the United States and in six Spanish-American countries are studied. Each writer has plenty of elbow-room, and each chapter is very fully documented. The first, by Professor Pike, includes a background survey of Spanish events. It was the civil war, he emphasizes, that brought US intellectuals, shaken from old moorings by the recent world slump, firmly on to the side of anti-fascism. Roosevelt, on the other hand, was not inclined to risk political trouble by giving aid to the Republic, and may have overestimated the enthusiasm of Catholic voters for Franco.

Latin Americans looked at the contest differently from the United States and Western Europe, because 'the neuralgic points in their own public life'—clerical and military meddling in politics, feudal landowning—were so similar to Spain's (p. x). Attitudes were broadly determined by class, but with many cross-currents. Dr T. G. Powell finds great diversity of feeling in Mexico, though the majority may not have cared very much one way or the other. As elsewhere, conservatives might favour preservation of Hispanic roots and traditions, but as a bulwark against Americanization as well as against radicalism. President Cárdenas was a staunch friend of the Republic, and gave it some help with arms supplies; Mexico's official course was 'unique and rather lonely' (p. 58).

Professor Hennessey's contribution is one of the most perceptive and informative. He gives prominence to a factor neglected, as he says, by historians: the presence in independent Cuba of a well organized Spanish community, to the fore in the island's economic life. More Cubans than any other Spanish Americans may have sympathized with the Republic; one reason was that the Church, Franco's loudest propagandist, was weak here. As in other regions, many leading writers were enthusiasts for the Republic: Lorca was a strong influence on them, both in his writings and in his death.

In Colombia, Professor Bushnell writes, the government was, after Mexico's, the most persistent supporter of the Republic, but opinion was as bitterly divided here as anywhere. Only a few years before the war the Liberals had at last returned to office, after a half-century of Conservative domination. Professor T. M. Davies remarks that despite many alterations in Peru since the 1930s 'the basic issue has remained the same: how to change everything without really changing anything' in class relations (p. 233)—a neat summing up of all right-wing hankerings for modernization in Latin America, and in Spain. Dr P. W. Drake writes on Chile, with its exceptional political structure, and Dr Falcoff on Argentina, which had a special concern with the war because of the presence of so many Spanish immigrants. The war itself is viewed with objectivity in this collection; but a somewhat one-sided picture emerges from recurrent accounts of men and women seeking asylum in foreign embassies, because these embassies were in Republican territory, where Franco's vastly more numerous victims had no access to them.

V. G. KIERNAN

Dunarea Noastra: Romania, the Great Powers, and the Danube Question 1914–1921. By Richard C. Frucht. Boulder, Col.: East European Monographs. 1982. (Distrib. by Columbia University Press, New York.) 216 pp. Index. $29·50.

BEFORE the First World War, the Danube was an important element in the Eastern Question. At least part of the answer after 1856 was agreed by many European statesmen to be

internationalization of this important waterway, and a European commission attempted from 1856 to 1914 to administer at least the maritime Danube. Romania, within whose frontiers was situated the boundary between the maritime and fluvial sections of the great river, became a member of the commission in 1878 and sought persistently to extend its influence in it.

At the end of the First World War, Romania was presented with a golden opportunity for realizing its aim. The Eastern autocracies that had dominated the Danube for centuries were now overthrown. Moreover, although the old Eastern Question had been definitively solved, a new and equally serious Eastern Question appeared to have arisen with the Russian Revolution of 1917. And so Romania and its neighbour riparian states could appeal to the victorious Allies for favourable consideration so that the blue Danube would not become red.

The peacemakers at Paris revived the European commission to supervise the delta, but also established an international commission to take care of the rest of the waterway. A special Danube conference was convened in Paris in 1920 to formalize the new arrangements, and became the forum for a confrontation between the Great Powers and the individual riparian states. In the short run, Romanian patriots denounced the outcome of the conference as a grievous blow to their concept of *Dunarea Noastra*, 'our Danube'. However, Richard Frucht puts forward the convincing argument that the Romanian concept was indeed upheld between Braila at the beginning of the fluvial Danube and the Iron Gates: furthermore, that the Romanian positions regarding the fluvial Danube became part of accepted international law up to 1939, when Germany took over supervision of the river. Then, in 1948 at the Belgrade Conference, a new commission of riparian states was set up, dominated by the Soviet Union.

Appendices, especially documents of the Danube Conference of 1920, illustrate and support Frucht's principal theses.

University of Aberdeen PAUL DUKES

Churchill 1874–1915. By Ted Morgan. London: Cape. 1983. 571 pp. Index. £12·50.

BIOGRAPHERS of Churchill have a smooth ride. There is no problem about how to allocate space as between his life and his times, since his life was an integral part of his times. Moreover, his life divides into convenient sections and of this Ted Morgan, in arresting his narrative in 1915, has taken advantage. If Churchill had been killed in France, his life up to that date would have had a certain completeness. No doubt his surviving contemporaries would have commented that his career, like that of his father, had already begun to decline after a meteoric start and, even if he had lived, he had little future in politics. So it must have seemed.

Churchill's biographers suffer under the disadvantage that they can hardly hope to be more than small craft following in the wake of the super-tanker navigated by Martin Gilbert, who has monopolized the primary sources. Ted Morgan shows no sign of smarting under this limitation; thus he makes no attempt to astonish us by stretching his evidence to yield an extravagant new hypothesis, and for this we must be thankful. His is a straightforward, well balanced narrative and, whilst Gilbert's Companion Volumes and Churchill's own writings are his staple diet, he supplements it by drawing freely upon contemporary memoirs.

Where Morgan sticks to Churchill's life, we cannot fault him; when he strays into general historical comment, he is less convincing. For example, his statement that Balfour led 'his party to ruin, from which it would take seventeen years and one world war to recover' (p. 145) is much exaggerated. Apart from the question whether it was not Joseph Chamberlain who wrecked the party, the fact remains that by 1910 there were as many Conservatives as Liberals sitting in the Commons. We also come across the strange assertion that it was old men, mourning the loss of their sons in the First World War, who 'would later lead England into appeasement' (p. 379). No evidence is produced for this statement, which in any case greatly over-simplifies the multifarious motives of those who wished to reach a political accommodation with Germany. Such blemishes, however, are not numerous enough to detract seriously from the merits of this book as a popular life of the young Churchill. It does justice to his record as Home Secretary and nails once more the Left's infamous myth that he set the troops against the miners at Tonypandy. The Gallipoli disaster is judiciously handled and, if lack of a map makes the story more difficult to follow, one must presumably

blame not the author, but his cheese-paring publisher. One should surely be entitled to expect that a book sold for £12·50 will be properly presented to the public.

R. Cecil

The illicit adventure: the story of political and military intelligence in the Middle East from 1898 to 1926. By H. V. Winstone. London: Cape. 1982. 528 pp. Index. £16·50.

There is nothing in this book to support its representation by publisher and author as a serious contribution to Middle East history. In brief, the author's story is as confused as it is confusing. As presented the relevance of much of the mass of material to the supposed story is as doubtful as the author's accuracy of presentation—the errors are so frequent that no quoted reference can be accepted without checking the source. Even the Balfour Declaration is misquoted!

The author, whose previous works include popular biographies of Captain Shakespear, Gertrude Bell and Colonel Leachman, makes claims in his preface which are not matched by his text. There is no collateral either in source references or content for his claim to have looked into 'the intelligence and secret political files' of the Turks and Russians. What records of other countries are cited are declassified. The author denies the existence of known records (particularly those of Shakespear's discussions with Ibn Saud in 1919—see p. 102). Mr Winstone makes much of his discovery of private papers of Colonels Parker and Newcombe yet fails to substantiate his assertions. The former 'threw clear light on Anglo-Arab relations and the Arab Revolt' (p. 248) yet little of this record is divulged to the reader: a page reproduced from the diary, a copy of a manuscript translation wrongly attributed to Colonel Parker (p. 253), a misreading of an unpublished letter from Lawrence (p. 264) and a few odd notes from an inconsequential diary entry (p. 450). Nor does the author produce any evidence that Newcombe's loss of papers to the Turks was a ruse similar to that of Meinertzhagen's before the battle of Gaza. Thus the importance or otherwise of this material remains unproven.

The first five chapters (pp. 3–123) are mainly accounts of the travels of Gertrude Bell, Alois Musil, Lawrence, Shakespear and Leachman. The reasons for their travels attributed by their own respective records and history are qualified indiscriminately by Mr Winstone as 'ostensible' and 'supposed'. For him 'it may be assumed' that they in fact had more sinister purposes. Most of the second half of the book is devoted to the Arab Revolt, Allenby's campaign and an excursion to Mesopotamia with the siege of Kut described imaginatively rather than accurately.

Geography, the chronology of his subjects' travels and their own accounts all suffer in this attempt to translate pioneer exploration into espionage undertaken as part of grand designs. The weakness of the general theme of conspiracy is eroded by the many errors in use of original sources. Thus, Mr Winstone implies or alleges a covert purpose behind his subjects' travels. Lawrence's route is 'not easy to follow from here' (p. 45). Indeed it is not, for Mr Winstone goes astray in time and place, not least in his mistaking Kerak in Moab for Kerak des Chevaliers in Syria (p. 45). He has Lawrence and Woolley travelling by rail from Damascus to Ziza in 1914 to meet on 5 January with Bell, who then 'changed her intended path' to Hail (pp. 109–10, 418) yet the record shows that they travelled by sea to Jaffa and were travelling overland from there to Gaza at the time.

The appendices are based on, but not attributed to, Admiralty and other sources of the time. The extensive bibliography and the index have minor errors and omissions. The maps are of poor quality.

H. St. J. B. Armitage

Western Europe

The European connection: implications of EEC membership. By Richard Bailey. Oxford, New York: Pergamon. 1983. 310 pp. Index.

The European Community: past, present and future. Edited by Loukas Tsoukalis. Oxford: Blackwell. 1983. 244 pp. Index. Pb.: £6·50.

Richard Bailey's book is a revised and expanded edition of his book *The European Community and the world,* first published in 1973. Although predominantly concerned with

aspects of the European Community's external relations, this book also outlines internal policies relevant to them (for example, trade policies and the various 'Euro-funds'). In addition, an Anglocentric approach is adopted and the history to the establishment of the European Community and Britain's attitudes towards it are sketched in rapidly. A synoptic view of the problems of generalized preferences and relations with Japan, China, the old Dominions, Latin America, COMECON and the USA is given. The book provides lucid and highly condensed notes on a range of matters, enabling readers to gain a swift idea of some key points about the material tackled. This book is likely to appeal to a general rather than an academic readership since the breadth of the subject matter necessitates a degree of descriptive conciseness that does not permit in-depth analysis of some of the interesting topics covered. There are a few errors (for example, direct elections to the European Parliament are noted as having been in 1978 (p. 89)). Overall, a book for the general reader.

By contrast, the volume edited by Loukas Tsoukalis is likely to appeal to a more academic audience. It arose out of a conference in early 1982 to celebrate the twentieth anniversary of the *Journal of Common Market Studies* and reprints papers given which originally appeared in that journal.

The introductory chapter is by Pieter Dankert, President of the European Parliament, who paints a pessimistic picture of the current state of the European Community and condemns the growth of intergovernmental decision-making not subject to parliamentary supervision at the supranational level. He rightly stresses the need to make the European Community, and especially the European Parliament, visible and relevant to European Community publics, and to overcome apathy, dissociation, unemployment, alienation, social unrest and insecurity. Turning from the European Community's internal problems to its relationships in the international arena, he condemns governments for miscalculating 'the costs of insufficient policy coordination, both as between the branches of government responsible for budgetary, monetary and trade policies, and as between the major regional centres of policymaking in North America, Japan and Europe' (p. 9) and calls for greater constructiveness and cooperation on the part of major industrialized countries and regions. He develops these themes in the threefold challenge to the European Community's emergence as an international entity: the evolution of a European identity, of a political and economic relationship with the Third World, and of a European security concept. The rest of the book is divided into these three themes.

Interestingly, the chapters in each part of the book show the extent of disagreement between British and foreign observers over the future of the European Community. Resignation to intergovernmentalism contrasts with a more positive acceptance and understanding of federalist or quasi-federalist notions about the European Community. Weiler, for example, rightly stresses the federalizing impact of European Community law and the fact that whether or not non-lawyers like it, European Community member state interaction increasingly resembles 'a federal-type structure' (p. 42).

The economic counterpart to legal views is explored in part two. Once again, some well-trodden ground is covered. In part three, international and security issues are explored, with Hedley Bull asking whether the concept of the European Community as a civilian power is not a contradiction in terms, and Wolfgang Hager presenting a lively and informative piece suggesting that in international trade 'the Community may be unconvincing but right, and the OECD convincing but wrong' (pp. 172–3). Hager's chapter deserves to be widely read.

The book should be of interest to European Community specialists and although the security issue remains contested (not least because it confronts the dilemmas of sovereignty and integration in defence), Tsoukalis concludes that in view of growing unemployment and recession, 'the further transfer of economic powers to the centre and a serious progress in terms of joint management of the economic interdependence may be the only effective way of containing the centrifugal forces which could split the Community apart' (pp. 243–4).

University of Hull

JULIET LODGE

The limits of European integration. By Paul Taylor. London, Canberra: Croom Helm. 1983. 325 pp. Index. £14·95.

THIS is a good source book for those interested in academic writing about the European Community in the past ten years. In so far as it is a tract its conclusions are set in a much

older English tradition. Integration would be possible 'if the goal of unification were consciously abandoned in the short-term and if some of its supporting doctrines were discarded' (p. 312). Paul Taylor commends the alternatives exemplified by the procedures of the Council of Europe, the parallel legislation of the Scandinavian countries and, more topically, the protectionism characteristic of emerging states.

However the bulk of the book is not a tract. It is an account of the diminished status of the Commission in consequence of the greater prominence of intergovernmentalism in the procedures and aims of the member states. In particular he asserts and illustrates the thesis that in the last decade the Community has become more an arena for diplomacy led by the Foreign Ministries than a community of shared interests centralized by a functional bureaucracy. As one might expect from Paul Taylor's other writings, the limits set by governments are described in terms derived from functionalist and neo-functionalist theories of community-building.

Theory and practice are more successfully counterpoised in five chapters on policy areas. The main theme is picked up in a very competent chapter on the extent to which the Community has developed into an actor in foreign policy behavioural terms, looking at procedures which do involve the Commission and those which do not. This concentration on the absence of a unified foreign policy procedure seems to neglect the extent to which domestic agreements on agriculture and an enlarged common market have forced third parties to deal with the European Community as a unit.

The liveliest chapter in the book sets out American theories of interdependence as a framework for discussing autonomous monetary and economic policies. Social policy is given a separate chapter because it points up the absence of the positive convergence on welfare issues anticipated by neo-functionalism. The chapter on law is uneven in the quality of its discussion of the constitutional issues posed by the Community even to Common Law countries, and in an exposition of federal and confederal theory which is noticeably slight on European experience.

As a text I found this book very difficult to read. This may be partly due to the author's lack of experience with the word-processor and insufficient redrafting and proofreading. More basic, however, is the attempt to peg an account of limits to a theory which the author himself thinks should be discarded as inappropriate for understanding cooperation between states which does not rest on the integrated population and market of modern America.

University of Keele C. J. Brewin

The European economy: growth and crisis. Edited by Andrea Boltho. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1982. 668 pp. Index. £25·00. Pb.: £9·95.

This collection of twenty-one essays by applied economists, who have had experience both of comparative work and of policy-making, is written with an unassuming and—for economists—uncharacteristic modesty. Most of them have served in either national or international administration and so experience has taught them to avoid the economist's tendency to deduce reality from first principles. Though they have worked on a largely standardized statistical basis, the book's approach is—perhaps inevitably—highly eclectic, presenting a diversity of interpretations.

Part I includes cross-national chapters on growth, a Marxist interpretation of the crisis, inflation, a monetarist interpretation of inflation, competitiveness, the labour market, income distribution, the impact of the EEC and an illuminating comparison of Eastern and Western Europe. Part II deals with economic policies, successively discussing demand management, monetary policy, incomes policy, public expenditure and regional policy. Finally, Part III is devoted to separate studies of France, West Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain, Benelux and Scandinavia.

The judgements tend to be very cautious, with words like 'probably', 'may' and 'impression' occurring frequently. In contrast to the anti-interventionist fashion that has achieved a measure of hegemony in the late 1970s and early 1980s in Britain, the view that predominates in these essays is closer to the earlier Keynesian orthodoxy, which dwells with nostalgia on the decades of growth rather than the recession that succeeded them. The parochial British approach is placed in the context of a European (and Japanese) model characterized by 'close government–business relations, administrative centralization, political

continuity and a powerful bureaucracy' (p. 4). However, the great strength of this book is that it marshals an enormous wealth of statistical and descriptive information in a readable form, without seeking to impose a particular doctrinaire standpoint. The quality of most of the contributions is high and each chapter ends with a brief guide to reading of an authoritative kind. Occasionally the treatment becomes a trifle technical but non-specialists should be able to follow most of the argument without difficulty. As such and thanks to the comprehensiveness of its range, it is a most useful addition to the literature and one hopes that further editions will keep it up to date.

University of Hull J. E. S. HAYWARD

Economic diplomacy between the European Community and Japan, 1959–1981. By Albrecht Rothacher. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1983. 377 pp. Index. £16·50.

DR ROTHACHER has produced a wide-ranging, detailed examination of the economic relationship between the European Community and Japan over the past generation. The work begins with a succinct account of the theory and conceptualization of the interaction between developed countries. The author then proceeds to discuss the institutional basis for policy making in part one, and in part two, constituting the bulk of the study (pp. 83–336), pursues the empirical development in bilateral relations and trade policies. The principal sources comprise newspaper reports, trade statistics, material appearing in specialist works, and interviews with middle-level officials in Tokyo, London, and Brussels. In total the subject area covered extends from the beginnings of Japanese industrial recovery under the American occupation to the acrid disputes over Japanese economic advancement in Western Europe, which gathered momentum in the course of the 1970s.

In part one Dr Rothacher examines the characteristics of the functioning of bureaucracy in Europe and Japan. He begins his third chapter by trenchantly dissenting from Zbigniew Brzezinski's view of Japanese elite behaviour as always anticipating the likely impact of policy initiatives on the United States: 'Nothing could be further from the truth. The Japanese elite views world events with Japanese eyes and in a Japanese perspective only' (p. 49). The subtleties of the process whereby decisions emerge in Japan are clearly established and a brief assessment of each ministry is given. The immense power exercised by Japanese bureaucrats is underlined alongside the concomitant limited significance of politicians.

In part two the chapters are arranged in chronological sequence from 1950 to 1980 with a breakdown of the prevailing issues and controversies during the relevant period. The great achievements of the Japanese economy are depicted together with the price that had to be paid in accelerating tension and argument. Full statistical tables are included and considered. Some fascinating incidental information is transmitted, such as Tanaka's reported admiration for Edward Heath assuming the form of placing the British leader's portrait next to the existing portraits of the Emperor and Empress in his office.

This work is valuable both for anyone desiring a broad survey and for pinpointing Euro-Japanese problems at a particular time. A large quantity of factual information has been assimilated and utilized. The footnoting is scrupulously thorough but in some cases excessive: chapter six, for example, contains 580 footnotes. Valuable as it is, the reader is left with the feeling that the adoption of a more reflective approach would have produced a more stimulating text.

University of Manchester PETER LOWE

Public service unions and the European Community. Edited by Emil Kirchner. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1983. 156 pp. £14·50.

THE growth of the public sector, which now employs about 20 per cent of the labour force across the EC, has brought with it large questions about the objectives and methods of public sector unions. We are searching for an understanding of how the pursuit of union goals can be carried on when it raises political overtones. From this point of view alone a transnational study of the structure, aims and methods of public sector unions is worthwhile. This book imposes its intellectual unity by focussing on the attitude of such unions towards EC affairs. In so far as civil servants find themselves executing new policies, or feel

their jobs are undermined, as a result of membership it is reasonable to expect that they would by now have developed policy positions which could be compared and explored.

This study shows how difficult it is to achieve this aim. The work is based on an investigation into the structure, aims and attitudes to the EC of ten public sector unions, one from each member state, and information about each one is set out in a comparable way relating to size, constitution, aims, channels of influence and European contacts. What stands out from this is the tremendous diversity amongst the unions studied. They range from a membership of 11,000 higher civil servants in DIRSTAT in Italy to 825,000 in the German Civil Service Union closely followed by NALGO. Some unions are affiliated to the ETUC, some to the CIF (International Organization of National and International Public Service Unions) while DIRSTAT is affiliated nowhere and NALGO has several international memberships. Some are federal bodies, some have an individual membership, some represent top civil servants and others a wide range of public employees.

Membership of the EC has not led to much change in the work of these unions or their internal organization. On the whole Community affairs are considered of, at best, spasmodic importance. Unions apparently find the known channels, via their home institutions and governments, serve them adequately and as long as major economic decisions are taken in the national capitals there seems little likelihood of great change. The difficulty is that specific measures may crop up from time to time which affect a particular group of officials and the union may be caught napping, as has apparently happened to NALGO on two occasions. Perhaps each national union movement, as a whole, requires a sifting procedure on the lines of the parliamentary scrutiny.

If EC membership has so far been largely a non-event for the public sector unions of Western Europe this is in itself a fact with important implications. It would be interesting now to take a further step by concentrating on one of the policy areas which the author suggests has been affected everywhere by membership, namely agriculture, employment and training and VAT taxation and investigate how the officials, and their unions, have handled the original policy issues and the consequential changes in the work performed.

University of Leeds DOREEN COLLINS

The politics of territorial identity: studies in European regionalism. Edited by Stein Rokkan and Derek Urwin. Beverly Hills, London: Sage for the European Consortium for Political Research. 1982. 438 pp. Index. £22·95.

THIS book has emerged from papers delivered to a series of workshops organized by the European Consortium for Political Research. The collective findings of the group on the territorial structures of Western Europe are to be presented in a subsequent volume: *Economy, territory, identity*.

This volume is about Norwegians and Finns, Basques and Galicians, Alsatians and Walloons, and the local identities contained within the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom. Like most accounts of nationalism it is primarily and richly historical, supplemented by political science and sociology. Unlike most accounts of nationalism it is concerned with identities that are in tension with the centralizing nation-state. There is no central framework or thesis although all the chapters refer to dichotomies of centre and periphery, town and country, youth and age, local languages and religion versus the ministries of education, transport and social security.

The overall standard of writing is very good. The chapters by Frank Aarebrot on Norway and by Marianne Heiberg on the Basques deserve to be singled out as models of interdisciplinary writing. Co-editor Derek Urwin contributes a major part of the book with lengthy chapters on Germany and the United Kingdom as well as the introduction and conclusion. The book is exceptionally well produced.

University of Keele C. J. BREWIN

The successor generation: international perspectives of postwar Europeans. Edited by Stephen S. Szabo. London, Boston: Butterworths. 1983. 183 pp. Index.

THE editor of this American volume is Professor of National Security Affairs at the National War College; contributors are in the US Information Agency's Research Office, the

Department of State's Foreign Service Institute, Johns Hopkins and Georgetown Universities; only the British contributor, a lecturer in politics at Glasgow University, falls outside the Washington circuit. The theme is set by an opening quotation from President Reagan to the National Press Club in Washington: 'Today a new generation is emerging on both sides of the Atlantic. . . . Many do not fully understand the roots of NATO in defending freedom. . . . Some young people even propose unilateral disarmament'. This, the editor continues, 'reflects a growing concern among policy-makers that a generational changing of the guard will weaken the basis of the Atlantic Alliance, which has provided peace and stability to Western Europe since 1945'.

The volume is composed of case studies of Germany, France, Britain, Italy and Spain which examine the historical experience of postwar generations and use public opinion polls to analyse their views. The first chapter does look at some of the methodological problems, but mainly as regards the concept of generation. The sole justification for looking at generations as a whole, rather than elites, is a quotation from Inglehardt that 'an increasingly large proportion of the public is coming to have sufficient interest in international politics to participate in decision making. . . . Current changes enable them to play an increasingly active role in formulating policy . . .'. No evidence for this is advanced in the book.

The chapter on Britain by Peter Fotherington gives an excellent survey of public opinion in Britain. Unfortunately, it makes something of a nonsense of the book. Referring to the CND and anti-EC movements of recent years, he warns against 'expectations that public opinion may deter the parties, in or out of office, from adopting ostensibly unpopular policies'. He also notes the lack of strong historical discontinuities in Britain compared to continental Europe and concludes: 'The British successor generation looks remarkably like its predecessors. . . . Young Britons, like their parents, are primarily concerned about economic issues and only marginally involved with foreign policy. . . . Young Britons, in spite of disproportionate involvement in the CND, like their parents tend to support the NATO Alliance and the need for defence spending. They are not likely to be more sympathetic to anti-Americanism or neutralism than other Britons'.

The editor's concluding chapter opens: 'The preceding chapters have all examined the question whether generational change *is a significant factor* in the development of the European-American security relations' (my italics). In fact, they simply ignore the influence of the attitudes surveyed on policy-making. It is doubly hard to see how the British chapter allows him to say that 'the US will be faced in the near future with a European public whose *influential components* will be more distrustful of America' (my italics). There is no attempt to isolate, much less concentrate on, such components.

It is not clear what the sponsors of this symposium had in mind. If American policy-makers are worried about the impact of successor generations on their relations with Europe, surely they want to know how present policy-makers react to the new generations and to spot among those generations the likely policy-makers of the next decade. The case studies will be useful to political scientists engaged in other enterprises, but the funding agencies of this enterprise may have wasted their cash.

University of Liverpool F. F. RIDLEY

The political system of the Federal Republic of Germany. By Klaus von Beyme. Aldershot, Hants: Gower. 1983. 209 pp. Index. £15·00.

DESPITE the considerable number of books covering this field, Beyme's book is a useful addition to the literature in English. In fact, it is surprising how much material he has managed to include in this rather slim volume. In his opening chapter on the Basic Law he is at pains to show that 'the hypothesis of an "imposed capitalism" recently put forward by neo-Marxist writers is not easy to prove in the light of the available data' (p. 2). Nevertheless, he believes that the Left could have had more influence had the SPD and the unions been more imaginative in their thinking. He concludes this chapter by expressing his worries which, he feels, stem from Germany's 'legalistic political culture' (p. 15). 'Only Germany has tried to regulate all possible emergency cases, thus creating a political climate of fear and intimidation which is contrary to the "spirit" of the constitution though it claims to fulfil the letter of the Basic Law and its "militant democracy"'. He is even more worried because 'the majority of citizens seem to be ready to accept further limitations of their liberties in order

to fight the terrorist groups more effectively' (p. 15). The chapter which follows, on political culture, is disappointingly brief. Then come useful chapters on elections, the party system and interest groups. Inevitably, there is little on the 'greens'. The chapter on elite recruitment and power structures is to be welcomed, and is followed by further useful contributions on parliament, government and public administration, federalism, and the federal constitutional court.

In his concluding chapter von Beyme voices his fears about West Germany: 'The most dangerous feature of the Federal Republic, however, is the inclination to institutionalisation, legal regulation and streamlining of all social activities . . . it entails the risk that the legal state may commit suicide through the excessive use of its typical instruments'.

The language of the book contains too much jargon, which here and there obscures its meaning. Each chapter ends with a lengthy bibliography of mainly German works; this is very good for the teacher, but less useful for the student and must have contributed to the rather high price of the book.

University of Nottingham DAVID CHILDS

My Germans, 1933–1983. By Terence Prittie. London: Oswald Woolf. 1983. 199 pp. £9·75.

TERENCE PRITTIE has devised an intriguing sort of autobiography; he tells us about episodes in his life by describing twelve characters whom he met in the course of them. All are Germans, since so much of his life has been concerned with Germany. They range from the Lieutenant-Colonel with whom he was sent to stay in Freiburg in 1933 to Willy Brandt and Herbert Sulzbach. He came across four of them before the war and two while he was a prisoner during it. The most remarkable is the Guards colour-sergeant who, when serving in the British Army of Occupation in 1922, married a German girl and settled down in Siegburg near Cologne, managed to remain unmolested during the war and was made Mayor (or rather that British innovation, Town Clerk) after it. The only really unpleasant character is the Nazi Party Member who was Intelligence Officer in one of the camps in which the author was interned—and even he was reluctantly admired for his efficiency.

The twelve concluding pages, 'An Englishman's view of Germany: 1983', are perhaps a mistake—though they contain some excellent stories. For it is impossible to do justice to such a subject in so short a space and the topics selected for discussion inevitably seem haphazard and idiosyncratic. What would have been interesting would have been a comparison between the German society which Terence Prittie entered in 1933 and that which he knows so well now. It has changed enormously but the present reviewer (who also started off in Freiburg, but with a Major and in 1930) finds himself hard put to it to say exactly how and what share was due to Hitler.

There is not much in the book for the historian—but it is so full of human interest that it is a great pleasure to read.

MICHAEL BALFOUR

Portugal: A twentieth-century interpretation. By Tom Gallagher. Manchester: Manchester University Press. 1983. 278 pp. Index. £18·50.

FOLLOWING many cursory books on Portugal since the 1974 revolution, Dr Gallagher, lecturer in Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, now gives us his rapid overview of Portuguese history, focussing on Salazar's *Estado Novo* regime.

Casting doubts on the fascist nature of the regime, Dr Gallagher compares it with the successful Third World dictatorships, citing Sukarno's Indonesia and Nasser's Egypt, pointing to the lack of any mass-based political party, the low levels of social development and virtual economic stagnation. Less violent and more hesitant than its contemporary counterparts in Italy and Germany, Salazar's regime appears almost benign in this account. Although coherence and stability were brought to the authoritarian order, it was soon apparent that Salazar was motivated 'more by the desire for personal power and the wish to remain in office than by corporatist ideology'. The *Estado Novo* was far from being an innovatory political movement and Salazar's more radical Lusitanian Integralist supporters were soon frustrated by his reliance upon traditional nationalist values at the expense of the corporativist programme. Salazar's desire to remain in control led to piecemeal distribution

of monopolist favours and the extension of patronage networks that continue to influence Portuguese politics. Propaganda drives masked the entrenched conservatism of a leader whose aim was to resist modern trends which could undermine traditionalist values.

The political and social ice age between 1926 and 1974 was the result of these retrograde policies, but Dr Gallagher devotes little space to any real analysis of the transition from Salazar to Caetano, or an examination of Caetano's self-proclaimed liberal 'evolution within continuity'. The superficial treatment of Portugal's Colonial Wars from 1961–74 and their impact at home and abroad does little to explain the causes and effects of the 1974 *coup d'état*. High military expenditure, its effects on the national economy, and the increasing discontent at all levels gave rise to what Dr Gallagher labels 'the Age of Aquarius'. The revolutionary experiment lasted barely a year following Spinola's resignation from the presidency in September 1974, but deserves far greater examination and analysis than it has been afforded here. Spinola's departure sharply increased international interest and intervention in Portuguese affairs and a concern in the future of Portuguese democracy which had been strangely absent under Salazar and Caetano.

In his rapid run through the elections and changes in government since 1974, Dr Gallagher forecasts a bleak future for a country in which democratic civilian rule has always been associated with chaos and economic austerity. Although the author provides a general chronology of events and a useful introduction to some of the major issues, the overall result is disappointing. We still await a thorough academic account of events in this neglected area of European and African research.

L. M. DENNY

Renewal: Labour's Britain in the 1980s. Edited by Gerald Kaufman. London: Penguin. 1983. 201 pp. Pb.: £2·50.

THERE are few things in politics so dead as the last election's manifesto. There is an added poignancy in Mr Kaufman's collection of essays: his contributors were those members of the Shadow Front Bench who might reasonably have hoped for the opportunity, in office, to carry out the proposals described here. That hope, as we know, was quickly dashed. That is not to say that the proposals themselves are dead; those over-enthusiastic commentators who believe that the average elector has perceived the crisis of Keynesianism, or wholly accepted Mrs Thatcher's definitions of the role of government in the modern world, read too much into the election results. Many readers brought up in the belief that maintenance of the welfare state, full employment and sustained economic growth are the proper ends of government will find nothing to shock them here: John Smith on energy policy, Albert Booth on transport, Gwyneth Dunwoody and Brynmor John on health and the social services advance programmes of public service and compassion that warm the heart. Roy Hattersley, discussing matters within the Home Secretary's responsibility, says things about freedom of information and democratic policing which excite the mind. But a nagging doubt emerges—have we not been promised freedom of information before, and by Labour governments too? And a second doubt is similarly provoked. The extension of education, health services and welfare have featured in previous Labour programmes, but the growing belief that the country lacks the means adequately to fund such services is largely the cause of present arguments about the right level of public expenditure. There is little in this book about means. The programme, one assumes, is financed by borrowing and by revenue generated through revived economic activity. This was the old recipe, and the measurement of the ingredients deserves more attention now. It is, of course, in the area of economic policy that the problem is most acute; and Peter Shore's careful treatment of the containment of wage claims, as well as Eric Varley's diplomatic discussion of the National Economic Assessment and the power of trade unions, illustrate the point.

The authors are, of course, discreet; Gerald Kaufman refers the reader to the party manifesto [illegible]mpaign document, and even Denis Healey's coded reservations in foreign affairs are most [illegible] phrased. Criticism of this collection relies less on the concealment of the divisions [illegible]st within the party than on the failure to replace some of the inevitable re-affirmations [illegible]emocratic socialism with a more extended and realistic statement of the method by [illegible]dable aims can be achieved with available resources.

[illegible], *Cambridge* GERARD EVANS

The road to Bellapais: the Turkish Cypriot exodus to northern Cyprus. By Pierre Oberling. New York: Columbia University Press for Social Science Monographs, Boulder, Col. 1982. 256 pp. Index. $32·50.

THE ancient Greeks had a word for it—hubris—and made it the central theme of many of their tragedies. Unfortunately in the past 100 years or so their descendants seem to have forgotten, at least in their relations with Turkey, the fate which awaits the overconfident. The result of their invasion of Anatolia after the First World War is fairly well known. Professor Oberling charts the course of their equally blinkered attempt to turn Cyprus into a part of Greece in an orchestrated campaign of pressure, pre-dating the more overtly terrorist EOKA period. The Enosis movement met its fate in the Turkish intervention of 1974 which has to all intents and purposes separated the Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking populations of the island. As one reads Professor Oberling's well-documented account of the systematic abrogation of the minority protection clauses of the London and Zurich Agreements, and of the physical harassment of isolated Turkish communities from 1963 onwards, one can only marvel that this intervention was so long delayed.

The blame cannot be laid solely on the terrorist wing of the Enosis movement. Makarios himself began to undermine the Agreements almost from the beginning, as shown in two of Professor Oberling's quotations: 'The realization of our hopes and aspirations is not complete under the Zurich and London Agreements', from a speech of April 1, 1960, and 'Unless this small Turkish community forming a part of the Turkish race which has been the terrible enemy of Hellenism is expelled, the duty of the heroes of EOKA can never be considered as terminated', in September 1962. With this sort of rhetoric on the record, how can it ever be hoped that a unitary state can be reconstituted? No doubt equally harrowing tales have been and could be compiled of the exodus of Greeks from northern Cyprus during and after the Turkish intervention in 1974. It is one of those many situations in which it is fruitless to attempt to draw up a balance sheet of distress and atrocity. It is more relevant to note that since the physical separation of the two communities in 1974, and in spite of the failure to codify the present situation in a formal agreement, there has been virtually no inter-communal disorder or terrorism such as occurred throughout the previous ten years. Moreover, as Professor Oberling demonstrates, the elements of a settlement are available if only there were not so many memories and preconceptions on either side. At various times the Greek Cypriots seem to have accepted the idea of a loose bi-zonal federation, which would imply freedom of trade throughout the island, and the Turkish Cypriots have offered geographical readjustments in the present inter-zonal boundary. Unfortunately, both sides seem to believe that time is on their side in a waiting game which in fact benefits no one.

Professor Oberling's book provides a welcome corrective to the copious expressions of the Greek point of view on Cyprus which normally dominate the media and should help to establish the more balanced perspective on which any settlement will have to be based.

BERNARD BURROWS

USSR and Eastern Europe

Soviet policy for the 1980s. Edited by Archie Brown and Michael Kaser. London: Macmillan. 1982. 256pp. Index. £20·00. Pb.: £7·95.

THIS is a useful and timely set of studies by a group of authors, each of whom has considerable specialist knowledge of the Soviet Union. Written in the light of the 1981 Party Congress and covering events up to July 1982, it gives a good picture of the principal Soviet policies in the final years of the Brezhnev era, the problems facing the leadership and the options which at that point were open. It was already clear to the authors that a change of leadership could not be far off and the book still reads well.

It is always difficult, with a set of studies of this kind, to secure unity of treatment and to tie the individual contributions into a common theme. There are some excellent and well researched specialist chapters. I enjoyed Ann Hegelson on demographic policy, John Miller

on the party structure and Alastair McAuley on social policy, all of whom did well in wringing the last drops of insight from the limited statistical information available on any of the more sensitive areas of Soviet society. Michael Kaser, Alec Nove and Philip Hanson cover economic policy, agriculture and foreign economic relations respectively with the professionalism which one expects from them. In a sound analysis of foreign and defence policy, David Holloway picks out most of the essentials in a span of only twenty-five pages—the tensions arising from differing Soviet and American concepts of detente, Brezhnev's recognition of the change to a more 'complex and stormy' period in international affairs, the problem created by China's improved relations with the West and with Japan, the attainment of strategic parity, the continued exploitation of openings in the Third World, the crises in Afghanistan and Poland. Mr Holloway sees a contradictory scene of expanding Soviet power and ambition matched by foreign policy setbacks and domestic difficulties, with any major changes of course being left for a new leadership.

The concluding section on leadership succession and policy innovation does not quite live up to its billing as drawing together the major findings and prognoses of other contributors. Archie Brown points out that although 'more of the same' may not be excluded, the preconditions for significant shift of policy do exist, given that there are serious problems to be tackled and that leadership succession and policy innovation can be expected to go together in the Soviet Union. This section is well argued and I would have liked to see it taken further, but much of the chapter is taken up with a good analysis of likely leadership changes in which Andropov's movement into the foreground is noted—an analysis which, for all its merit, now belongs to the past. Perhaps, however, the absence of a strong summing up matters little. The individual contributions point up the major issues facing Andropov, leaving the general reader as well equipped as he can be to form his own judgement about the future course of events and adding some useful extra glimpses for the specialist.

CURTIS KEEBLE

The Soviet Union and the arms race. By David Holloway. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1983. 211pp. Index. £7·95.

Soviet style in war. By Nathan Leites. New York: Crane Russak. 1982. 400pp. Index. $22.50.

'THE Soviet Union is indeed an important actor on the international stage, but it does not devise the plot, write the script, set the scene and direct the play as well' (p. 92). This sentence encapsulates the main merits of David Holloway's valuable book: rational and balanced understanding of international politics, a profound knowledge of the USSR, and a style completely free from the esoteric pretentiousness which too often characterizes Soviet studies. It is impossible to recommend it too strongly to specialists, policy-makers and commentators and those generally interested in international affairs. Would that it could be made compulsory reading for those shriller voices, on both sides of the Atlantic, in the current debate on arms control and the dangers of nuclear war.

Holloway defines his aim as helping people to understand what drives Soviet military policy by examining three topics: the historical role of military power in the formation of the Soviet state; the Soviet views on the use of military power in the nuclear age; and the economic and political institutions which sustain the military effort. His treatment includes examinations of the development of military doctrine and strategy in parallel with advances in nuclear technology, the interaction of military power and foreign policy, and the economic, technological and industrial base on which Soviet military power stands. Running through these particular studies is a consideration of the USSR's view of its relationship with the United States and its attitude to arms control, with particular stress on European theatre nuclear systems. Throughout all this Holloway seeks to explain the Soviet point of view by the use of an impressive array of Russian sources, which are fully cited in his bibliographical notes.

Three guiding principles for understanding Soviet military policy emerge from the study: the primacy of the party leadership in the formation of strategy and the allocation of resources; an unshakeable resolve to accept nothing less than parity with the United States, whatever the social and economic cost; and a clear realization that nuclear war would be

catastrophic, allied with a conviction that the only way to prevent such a war is to have the military capability to fight it.

In conclusion Holloway argues that the 1980s will present opportunities as well as dangers. He urges Western leaders to recognize that the Soviet Union's economic difficulties combined with the possible flexibility of a new leadership (he was writing before Brezhnev's death) might well bring recognition that a forward foreign policy combined with arms procurement which could be perceived by the West as a search for superiority rather than parity, were counter-productive. In such circumstances he believes that a first move towards arms reduction by the West, if it could be made in such a way as to suggest confidence rather than weakness, would be a possible way of avoiding a future arms race. Is it possible to believe that Western hawks and unilateralists could moderate their voices enough to enable our statesmen to make such a move with the backing of a united public opinion?

Nathan Leites describes his work as an attempt 'to contribute to conjectures about how the Soviets—particularly the ground forces—fight' (p. xiii). To achieve this he has assembled, with immense labour, some two thousand quotations from Soviet military journals, books on military thought and commentaries, both Russian and German, on Soviet operational performance in the Great Patriotic War. All these he has skilfully welded together into a readable narrative with the aid of his own analysis and comment.

A selection from the chapter headings gives the flavour of the book: 'Warding off inaction'; 'Warding off slowness': 'Warding off passivity'; 'Enhancing one's cohesion and reducing the enemy's'. These tactical maxims indicate to Leites the apprehensions of the Soviet High Command of the most likely weaknesses of formation and unit commanders in war. It is noteworthy how frequently such failures are seen as having psychological causes, often described as 'mood' and the frequency of writings to correct them emerging from the main political administration's journal, 'Communist of the Armed Forces' and individual political officers. Another chapter, 'Enhancing one's capacity to calculate and degrading the enemy's', emphasizes the High Command's insistence on the necessity of detailed planning, including alternative courses of action, and rejection of reliance on commanders' intuition and experience in the heat of battle. Inevitably there is much discussion of the relative advantages of the offensive and the defensive in both strategy and tactics, which produces from Leites the despairing comment: 'If there is a Soviet inclination to indulge in the offensive to excess, an opposite disposition also seems to exist. (I have been unable to discover what conditions make for the one and which for the other.)' (p. 211). His readers, although they will have enjoyed and been stimulated by the fruits of his labours, will find it difficult to feel that they have achieved any greater certainty on how Soviet operations would be conducted in war. But after all his stated aim is only to contribute to conjecture.

BRYAN RANFT

Prospects for Soviet agriculture in the 1980s. By D. Gale Johnson and Karen McConnell Brooks. Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press for Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. 1983. 214pp. £12·25; $21.88. Pb.: £6·27; $11.19.

MOST observers of the Soviet scene are well aware that agriculture has long been the economy's Achilles heel, suffering from highly variable output and an apparently persistent inability to meet the people's demands, especially for meat. Those without expertise in agriculture are likely to attribute these shortcomings to a combination of poor physical conditions—mainly to do with soil quality, temperature and rainfall—and the fact that Soviet agriculture is predominantly socialized. This book does nothing to support such simplistic hypotheses, resting its explanation of the Soviet Union's persistent problems in agriculture on more fundamental systemic factors. Three principal factors are identified: the overcentralization of economic management, inappropriate pricing policy, and defective incentives. The last of these applies both to workers and managers in agriculture itself, as well as to the enterprises supplying non-agricultural inputs such as tractors or fertilizers. While stressing these factors, however, it is important to keep the problems in perspective by noting that the overall performance of Soviet agriculture is by no means disastrous; but it has been disappointing in view of the massive volumes of inputs devoted to it in recent years.

In part one of the book (the first eight chapters), on policies and performance, Johnson presents an impressively detailed and fascinating account of Soviet agriculture since the

Second World War, including a couple of chapters on prospects for the 1980s. The period 1950–70 appears, in retrospect, to have been a golden age for agriculture, with growth in agricultural output averaging 3·9 per cent annually. Since 1970, despite devoting up to 27 per cent of the country's investment in the agricultural sector, growth has been slower and more variable, with supply lagging behind the steadily expanding demand. Recent plans were underfulfilled in agriculture and it is unlikely that matters can be improved very quickly.

There are many aspects of policy that could be improved. For instance, despite the high priority assigned to livestock production, price policy still, astonishingly, leaves such production unprofitable. Moreover, the incentive system encourages increased herds rather than higher quality animals, with the result that the productivity per animal remains very low. These, and a whole host of other problems, have little to do with natural factors like the weather, though climatic features do mean that substantial losses are incurred when certain key operations are not carried out quickly, and at the right time.

In 1982 a New Food Programme was announced involving continued high rates of investment but fairly modest output goals. It appears from this that retail prices will have to be raised in order to restore equilibrium in retail markets. Moreover, even the modest grain targets appear to be too ambitious, so imports are likely to continue at a high level to enable the meat targets to be approached. The programme emphasizes the need for infrastructural improvements, but proposes little to tackle the major sources of inefficiency.

Part two (chapters 9 and 10) on productivity, written by Brooks, is a good deal more technical. She uses data on various parts of the Soviet Union, the USA, Canada and Finland to estimate agricultural production functions in log-linear (similar to Cobb–Douglas) form. Overall, it transpires that US and Canadian total factor productivity are about double that in the USSR under comparable soil and climatic conditions; the difference in labour productivity is considerably greater than that. Unfortunately, discussion of the results obtained, especially in chapter 10 where a number of detailed inferences about productivity are drawn from the estimated equations, is quite uncritical. Some of the equations, with negative coefficients on major inputs, are surely not to be taken seriously as production functions and it is dangerous to deduce very much from such results. Nevertheless, the approach is an interesting one and even a partially successful attempt to make it work can be welcomed.

From a long term point of view, perhaps the most serious observation on Soviet agriculture was made at the end of chapter 10. This pointed out that deficiencies in the wage and price system, and institutional rigidity, combine to ensure that in many farms there is 'no mechanism whereby a very good farmer can do well in agriculture'. Evidently, there is much that could be improved in Soviet agriculture, but the authors of this useful study are not optimistic that change will come soon.

University of Stirling PAUL HARE

The arc of socialist revolutions: Angola to Afghanistan. By Suzanne J. Katsikas. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman. 1982. 322pp. Index.

Decade of detente: shifting definitions and denouement. By Louisa Sue Hulett. Washington: University Press of America. 193pp. Index. $21·00. Pb.: $9.50.

East–West relations: prospects for the 1980s. Edited by Guiseppe Schiavone. London: Macmillan. 1982. 217pp. Index. £20·00.

BOOKS should be good to have, as well as to read, but if these three are a sign of the times as far as academic publishing is concerned, then the future is depressing indeed for those international relations specialists who also happen to be bibliophiles. Perhaps reflecting the brittleness of its subject matter, the spine of *The arc of socialist revolutions* broke on its first opening. Impressively, this book was published within six months of the completion of the preface, but when one examines its completely useless maps, it is clear how corners were cut. *Decade of detente* does not even look like a book. It merely has the appearance of a well-typed PhD thesis. It does aspire to an index, but only a very poor apology for one. After these disappointments, *East–West relations: prospects for the 1980s* looked to be in a different class. Bound in stylish maroon, with gold lettering and protected by a stiff polythene jacket, this seemed to be a book which was worth holding. The appearance was deceptive. Inside, one found that the book consisted of the proceedings of an academic conference which had

taken place nearly three years earlier, and therefore was somewhat dated. Worse still, the printers seemed determined to deter potential readers by a typographical version of 'dense pack'. It nearly worked. As one targeted one's eyes at the page, one's thought waves tended to commit fratricide before reaching their destination. Fortunately, some got through.

Overall, the authors of these three books deserve a great deal more praise than their publishers. Taken together, they offer their readers a survey of the major international issues concerning the West at the start of the 1980s, namely Soviet-American relations, European security, and the implications of instability in the region Brzezinski called 'the arc of crisis'.

Suzanne Katsikas has produced a useful overview of a complicated area of contemporary international life, for her book examines US-Soviet relations and the Third World, with particular reference to developments since the mid-1970s in Angola, Ethiopia, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, and Afghanistan. The author brings to her study a wealth of knowledge about the regions under consideration, a sophisticated feel for the complexity of causation relating to the regional instabilities involved, and a healthy scepticism regarding the strengths and successes of Soviet policy in the Third World.

The arc of socialist revolutions can be read as a serious liberal critique of US policy in the Third World. In particular, US policy is criticized for its tendency towards interventionism in the Third World and its attitude of 'insensitivity, indifference and sometimes disdain' towards nationalism and events there (p. 1). Too often, political instability and change have been viewed as 'a threat to American institutions, values, and worldwide relationships, and have been analyzed in terms of US-Soviet balance of power' (p. 3). Against this it is argued that the Soviet Union, while certainly not portrayed as a benevolent power, has not achieved the strategic momentum in the Third World which is not an article of faith in some circles.

East–West relations: prospects for the 1980s is the outcome of an international congress which was held in April 1980 by the Institute of European Studies in Rome, within the framework of its programme for the expansion of scientific relations with socialist countries. The result is both unusual and worthwhile: unusual because the book includes contributions by scholars from Bucharest and Prague, as well as London and Paris, and worthwhile because of the way it sets East–West relations in the context of the turbulent world of contemporary international economics.

The topics covered in this book range over the following: the nature and distribution of the benefits and disadvantages of closer interdependence between East and West; the implications of the world economic crisis and changing superpower relations on European developments; the obstacles—administrative and financial, as well as political—in the way of mutually advantageous cooperation between the two halves of Europe; the implications and future of the heightened dependence of the USSR and other European countries on grain imports from the West, and its more recent reliance on outside sources for its non-fuel mineral supplies; the increased dependence of the United States and the EEC on the Soviet Union (and South Africa) as major suppliers of a number of vital minerals; the advantages and limitations to both these parties of the role played by Western countries in Soviet economic development; the particular role of Japan in East–West trade relations; the problems and prospects facing joint cooperation ventures between the two halves of Europe; the role of the UN Economic Commission for Europe; the legal aspects of relations between the EEC and the CMEA, and the possible advantages of an agreement; the problems and prospects of Soviet–Western technological cooperation; and East–West cooperation in the field of environmental policy and law. This book is often heavy going, given its technical nature, but the determined reader will be rewarded by finding an abundance of material on relatively unfamiliar issues for non-economists, and by finding a welcome variety of different national perspectives on East–West relations.

Decade of detente: shifting definitions and denouement is a rather helpful compendium of material concerning that much used and misused word 'detente'. Chapter I consists of a brief discussion of the Soviet origins of peaceful coexistence and detente, making the point that Soviet spokesmen use the former (*mirnoe sosushchestvovaniya*), with its particular baggage of ideological and historical implications, rather than the latter (*razryadka*), which means relaxation. This is followed by a reminder of the original Nixon-Kissinger concept of detente. Having clarified these matters, the author then compares Soviet and American attitudes to negotiations, nuclear war, arms control, and strategic objectives during what she calls 'Detente I and II and SALT I and II'. Chapter IV proceeds to review American scholarly

literature on the subject, in order to distinguish different schools of thought on detente in the 1970s. This is well done, but would have been even better had it been less in-bred; this could have been achieved by drawing more links between this literature and the opinions of policymakers in Washington and the opinions of policymakers and scholars in Western Europe. The final chapter looks at the 'denouement' of the detente process at the turn of the decade. Louisa Sue Hulett welcomes the approach adopted by the Reagan administration, which she says calls for a 'strictly reciprocal detente' as a substitute for the 'premature detente practiced in the 1970s by the US' (p. 187).

Ms Hulett is rightly sceptical about detente as it has been conceived and practised by various US administrations, and her general attitude is well summed up in her concluding words:

> In sum, since the prerequisites for detente have yet to be met in terms of Soviet restraint in the use of force, adherence to obligations such as those stipulated in the Helsinki Final Act and the 1972 Declaration of Principles, and acceptance of balanced and verifiable arms reduction agreements, the US should limit and perhaps defer pursuit of detente. This deferral may alert the Soviets to the dangerous repercussions of an exploitative and selective application of detente (p. 187).

One sympathizes with some aspects of this attitude, but one fears that the author has too much faith in the discovery of a mutually acceptable definition of both the spirit and the letter of a detente relationship. While there is no Russian word which adequately expresses the meaning of detente, it is worth being reminded that *detente* is not an English word. Words have uses rather than meanings, and while books such as this can help to clarify our different usages, in the end word politics may well prove to be just as intractable as world politics.

University of Wales, Aberystwyth KEN BOOTH

Middle East

The battle of Beirut: why Israel invaded Lebanon. By Michael Jansen. London: Zed. 1982. 142pp. £11·95. Pb.: £4·50.

The longest war. By Jacobo Timmerman. London: Chatto & Windus. 1982. 160pp. £7·95. Pb.: Pan. £2·50.

THE fierce passions aroused by Israel's invasion of Lebanon in summer 1982 have produced a great deal of polemical writing but, as yet, little serious analysis of what must clearly be a watershed in Middle Eastern political life. The two books under review are very much of the former type, spur of the moment efforts designed to provide a vehicle for the expression of strong opinions and an even stronger sense of outrage. Their tone reflects the instant response of deeply committed observers, fuelled by the pictures and reports which made this war one of the most public conflicts in recent history.

Michael Jansen's *The Battle of Beirut* is, in her own words, 'an indictment of what the Israeli military juggernaut did to the inhabitants of South Lebanon, Lebanese and Palestinians, as it rolled northwards to Beirut'. Her information is based largely on contemporary newspaper reports, mainly from *The Times, The Sunday Times* and *Time* magazine and is used to provide both a description of the death and destruction and some guide to the numbers of those killed and wounded. The figures are no better than the brave foreign correspondents could come up with at the time. But given the nature of the situation it seems unlikely that anything more measured or impartial will ever be produced. For the rest, there is a simple line of argument: the Israeli attack was unprovoked, it produced more than the usual damage because of Israel's desire to minimize its own casualties, and the initial resistance in Tyre and Sidon was sufficient to persuade the Israelis not to attack Beirut itself. The book ends with brief chapters on the Sabra and Shatila massacres, the first evidence of the direction of Israel's occupation policies in South Lebanon and some simple speculation on the reasons for the invasion and its likely consequences. In so far as the latter is still an open question her conclusion that, on balance, Israel may have done more harm to itself than good may well prove true.

Given the author's limitation of her subject simply to the impact of the invasion it would be gratuitous to list all the topics which are not covered. But, reading between the lines, it is significant that she cites only one reference from an Arabic newspaper, Jerusalem's *al-Quds*, a reminder that not only did the major Arab states make little effort to assist the Palestinians but also that they sent no more than a couple of their own correspondents to observe the final battle.

Jacobo Timmerman provides another sort of witness. A longtime Zionist but only a recent arrival in Israel from the Argentine, his short book contains both a day-to-day account of his own personal anguish during the first two months of the Israeli campaign and a sustained diatribe against what he calls 'the obsession of inept rulers and vain military men who are running a nation created by moralists and dreamers'. In important respects he reflects a central strand in Israeli liberal thinking: the uncomfortable realization that not only did the country possess a mighty military machine but also that those in control planned to use it to intervene repeatedly in the political life of the surrounding Arab states. Timmerman's own bitter, angry response—muddled, contradictory, visionary and apocalyptic by turns—seems to mirror all the twists and shifts of feeling which an intense involvement in such a crisis must bring.

More generally, the book is clearly intended as an intervention in an ongoing debate about the nature of a Jewish or Jewish/Israeli state by contrasting the brute reality of the present with the softer visions of an idealized past. Thus, extracts serialized in the *New Yorker* had already aroused strong controversy even before news of the massacre in the Beirut camps had opened still larger wounds. Readers at some remove from the internal Jewish debate may be more interested in the evidence which he provides of certain major changes of consciousness inside Israel itself which are doing much to polarize some of the special features of the country's civil–military relations and the public attitude to the proper use of armed force. If, on the one hand, there are generals like Eitan who seem to demand the right to behave as badly and brutally as any non-Jewish military 'hawk', on the other there are the moral militant protestors like Timmerman's own son Daniel who has now been sentenced twice for refusing to do his reserve duty in Lebanon. Not the least of Jacobo Timmerman's own virtues is his understanding of the way in which the outcome of the struggle could easily be determined by what, on the basis of his Argentinian experience, he clearly labels as a misuse of democracy: the use by a demagogic leader of a temporary victory at the polls to make fundamental changes in matters which vitally affect the security of all citizens and basic character of the state.

St Antony's College, Oxford ROGER OWEN

The role of the military in politics: a case study of Iraq to 1941. By Mohammad A. Tarbush. London, Boston: Kegan Paul International. 1982. 285pp. Index. £14·50.

THIS is a thorough and perceptive account of the politics of the first nine years of the life of the newly independent state of Iraq, written largely from British archival materials, Arabic memoirs, and interviews with some of the Iraqi survivors from the period. Dr Tarbush's particular focus is the capture of political power by a series of groups within the armed forces between 1936 and 1941.

Although made nominally independent in 1932, Iraq stayed firmly under British tutelage until 1958, except for Rashid Ali's brief and somewhat quixotic attempt to stage a revolt in 1941. In the course of the 1930s, largely as a result of greater opportunities for education and a general growth in political awareness, dissatisfaction with the excessively narrow base and apparent irrelevance of the political system increased. The power vacuum created by the sudden and early death of King Faisal was filled three years later by an army coup, which brought the armed forces to the centre of the political arena. However, although a succession of army commanders managed to acquire influence and supra-military authority for a time, the reality of enduring British control always lay behind the apparent volatility of Iraqi politics; Nuri al-Sa'id's fourteen premierships between 1930 and 1958, and his participation in many of the other cabinets formed over the same period, are eloquent proof of the essential continuity of the British connection, which no amount of coups or counter-coups seemed able to shake.

Dr Tarbush tells a complex story with skill and verve, and his narrative is a pleasure to read. It would have been good to have had more information on a number of points,

particularly on the ideological positions of the 'Golden Square', and their background and contacts, and how far their ideas were shared by that part of the population which was in a position to articulate its political ideas. Again, some of Dr Tarbush's informants might have been able to give him some more profound insights into the personalities of some of the leading figures—such as Yasin al-Hashimi or Ja'far Abu'l-Timman—than those provided by British advisers and officials. However, the book as a whole is informative and well researched, and the chapters actually dealing with the period 1936–41, especially chapter VIII on Rashid Ali, are particularly valuable. Dr Tarbush has made a lively contribution to the historiography of an important period in modern Iraqi history.

University of Durham PETER SLUGLETT

South Yemen—a Marxist republic in Arabia. By Robert Stookey. Boulder, Col.: Westview; London: Croom Helm. 1982. Index. £11·95.

THIS book is short, lucidly written, and very good. It is exemplary as a brief for a general reader who neither needs nor seeks scholarship but benefits greatly when a good scholar boils the essentials down. Admirable selection precludes any sense of over-compression. Facts are correct in a field where they are not easy to establish. The economic and ecological background is well fused with the more striking political and social features. Assessment and judgment are notably well balanced; and the author's rare personal value judgments are impeccably dispassionate.

Dr Stookey was a member of the US Foreign Service when the State Department was less than wholly convinced of the wisdom of British policy in South Yemen before its independence. This reviewer became closely involved in the last years of the chopping and changing which posed as that policy. My tribute to his fairness is that he lets us off more lightly than some of us ourselves might.

Since the only fair critique of the work is to recommend that others interested in the subject read it, I am reduced to looking for what it may lack. The answer lies not with Dr Stookey but in what the People's Republic of South Yemen would deny to any author—the freedom to find out first-hand what the people think and feel. Neither a free press nor free reporting exists. Emigrés grind axes, and Dr Stookey would not rely on them. It becomes marked that his contemporary examination depends almost entirely on public record, and that judgment and analysis have to be confined to the pretty rare examples of independent and impartial judgment such as World Bank and FAO reports.

This may be a loss to the regime, which has done a lot that we would like to know more about. It moved decisively against all opposition; disarmed the tribes and banned tribal organization (only now is an innocuous form of tribal consultative machinery being allowed); and imposed an administrative system of governorates which to some extent, inevitably, followed older sectional distinctions but rigorously avoided any admission of such succession. At the social level, women were allowed and encouraged to work (partly through labour shortage but also on principle); women's equality was established at law, polygamy banned and divorce made two-way. But neither Dr Stookey nor the rest of us can find out whether these deep-reaching social transformations, after only half a generation of countrywide indoctrination in the schools, are going to stick. Many elsewhere in the Arab world hope that they cannot, and claim that millenia of opposing tradition and Islam will tell. Others note however that discrimination was more social than Muslim, that Islam is egalitarian and that Sunni Islam inculcates obedience to the authority of the day; and wonder whether, if the Marxists have the sense to go easy on atheism, these changes may not prove durable. The answers on points like this could prove crucial to the knock-on efficacy of whatever is happening in South Yemen. Dr Stookey seems well equipped to look for them; unfortunately, there is no chance that he will be allowed to.

D. J. MCCARTHY

Africa

State and nation in the Third World: the Western state and African nationalism. By Anthony D. Smith. Brighton, Sussex: Wheatsheaf. 1983. 171pp. £15·95. Pb.: £4·95.

ANTHONY SMITH, a sociologist who has written extensively on nationalism, here attempts a more general survey of 'the nature and role of some key political forces in contemporary

social change in Africa and Asia, and especially in sub-Saharan Africa' (preface), with which he claims to be most familiar. Hence the book's subtitle is a more accurate description of its contents than the title, for his conception of the Third World excludes Latin America (described in the preface as a 'rather different' case) and only tangentially alludes to Asia. Anyone hoping for a systematic exposition of Third World political systems is likely to be disappointed.

Still, one mustn't grumble, for Smith does traverse some familiar ground with a marked aptitude for synthesizing a large amount of material and evidence. He provides a useful counterweight to the various frameworks which have tended to dominate Third World studies, notably those organized around development, modernization, the capitalist world system, economic imperialism, and dependency. Politics in Africa and Asia, in Smith's view, have to be understood in terms of 'a more or less conscious effort to create "territorial nations" within the historical framework of western-imposed bureaucratic states, by a political intelligentsia to whose needs and interests the postcolonial state-nations minister' (preface).

In advancing this thesis Smith is particularly good on the influence of the traditional West European model of the state, the continued relevance of the colonial experience, and the impact of the European, now international, state-system. The inclusion of the last of these will be especially welcome to readers of this journal interested in the interaction of domestic and international politics. Also receiving extended treatment are ethnicity, class, intellectuals and intelligentsia, populism and communism.

As befits a work published under an imprint specializing in textbooks, the individual chapters are clearly organized with frequent enumerations of factors, dimensions, problems, etc. In chapter 3, however, the author and his copy editor have failed to distinguish sufficiently the fifth phase or type of African nationalism promised on page 39, compared to the other four phases or types.

Although containing a bare 135 pages of text, the book suffers occasionally from a certain circularity of argument and repetition. Smith's prose is fairly dense and not entirely free from sociological jargon, e.g. 'the exogenity of nationalism's ultimate causation' (p. 38). There is a useful bibliography, a name index, and a subject index which consists of undifferentiated strings of numbers after the main entries.

University College of Wales, Aberystwyth M. Wright

Political leadership in Africa. By J. Cartwright. London, Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St Martins. 1983. 310pp. £14·95.

'The main argument of this book', John Cartwright writes, is 'that an individual political leader can have a substantial effect in shaping the evolution of almost any African state' (p. 2). This cautious hypothesis is not too difficult to establish. The author, who teaches in the Department of Political Science at the University of Western Ontario and has published two books on Sierra Leone, selects seven African countries and examines their leadership during the years before and after political independence. They cover a rather narrow geographical belt—three francophone (Ivory Coast, Senegal, Guinea), three anglophone (Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda) and Ethiopia. Each is given a brief but discursive essay, based on easily available printed sources, illustrating the part played by its leaders. To his account of what the leaders did Cartwright adds speculations about what, in his opinion, they might have done, and gives his judgments on the results. He also tabulates their respective performances on an evaluative scale which sets out in comparative fashion whether, in their countries, life was or was not reasonably secure, whether the GNP grew, and whether life expectancy improved. But security of life is not easy to assess systematically. And since calculations of GNP (based on World Bank and IMF statistics) don't indicate how it was distributed, they don't reveal very much about a country's well-being. Nor, in a continent where registration of births and deaths (particularly child deaths) is extremely defective, are comparative life expectancy rates a very rewarding variable to use.

The book is written without esoteric vocabulary in a pleasantly unpretentious style which might make it suitable for general readers who want some elementary instruction about what has been happening in Africa over the past thirty years. Inevitably one could pick holes in it: it seems strange, for instance, to write ten pages about Nkrumah without once mentioning

his overriding, obsessive concern with Pan-Africanism. Nevertheless, in the hands of a reasonably well-informed teacher, it could perhaps be a useful guide for a final year modern studies course in secondary schools.

University of Edinburgh CHRISTOPHER FYFE

Amilcar Cabral: revolutionary leadership and people's war. By Patrick Chabal. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983. 272pp. Index. £22·50. Pb.: £9·95.

IN this first scholarly account of the nationalist movement in Guinea-Bissau, Patrick Chabal also presents us with a full-scale political biography of its architect, Amilcar Cabral. Drawing on unpublished sources and extensive interviews with members of Cabral's family, his colleagues and some of his former opponents in the Portuguese armed forces, he presents a valuable analysis of the PAIGC (African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde). Cabral led the PAIGC to the most complete success ever achieved by an African national liberation movement against a colonial power. This success was both political and military, achieved by mobilizing the population into a united force capable of challenging a member state of NATO. Through the reconstruction of the economy and the establishment of alternate social structures inside territory under PAIGC control, Cabral was able to develop his own theories of political unity. The PAIGC's administration was so complete in these areas that by 1972 they could hold their first elections. Cabral's influence among Third World revolutionary regimes continues, although Cabral himself was assassinated, in circumstances which remain mysterious, only months before independence in 1973.

Cabral's analysis of social classes led to the concept of 'nation-class', an alliance of all national forces, placing emphasis on the role of the petite-bourgeoisie and the *déclassés*. This book provides valuable new material on the development of the armed struggle with the Portuguese against the background of national unity within the country. The strength of Cabral's personal control and personality succeeded in uniting a diverse and otherwise widely disparate people into an effective fighting force capable of forcing the Portuguese to withdraw to Bissau. Effective political mobilization at grassroots level, the development of 'people's war', overrode ethnic differences. Cabral's attempt to build a socialist state without recourse to political oppression is examined in some depth, but Dr Chabal is less successful in his analysis of nationalism and Marxism. The book also shamefully ignores the role of women in the PAIGC, and the radical changes in structure to incorporate equality. Cabral's uniqueness rested on the centrality of cultural factors, fusing the skills of the assimilated petite-bourgeoisie with traditional, rural identities to create a greater national unity. This important new book also provides the basis for analysis of other revolutionary regimes, and is to be highly recommended.

L. M. DENNY

Imperialism and fascism in Uganda. By Mahmood Mamdani. London: Heinemann Educational. 1983. 115pp. Index. Pb.: £2·95.

MAMDANI'S book provides us with a short essay giving a Marxist interpretation of Ugandan history. The three parts cover the historical background of colonial rule, the establishment of Amin's regime and the bases for it remaining in office. There is a glaring gap in that only one page is devoted to the politics of the nine years of Obote's first premiership. As Mamdani's thesis is that Amin was 'sponsored' and sustained by the 'imperialists', he needed to explain why it was thought desirable to replace Obote with a military regime. Other alternatives might have been to apply economic pressure to sustain neo-colonialist policies or to instal a regime based on the Baganda and other conservative groups. Inadequate evidence is given for the assertion that 'the coup was engineered by an alliance of foreign imperialism and local reaction' (p. 30).

In part one we have an orthodox Marxist analysis of Ugandan society, comprising the relationships between the bourgeoisie, comprador elements, workers and peasants. In part two the analysis becomes distinctly unorthodox. The standard terms are no longer used and the regime is seen as an alliance of fascists, opportunists, *mufutamingi* ('fat-cats' would be an appropriate translation) and *bayaye* (ruffians), to exploit 'the people', None of these groups is a class in the Marxist sense of the word. For example, special blame is placed upon

'learned opportunists, like the Kibedi–Rugumayo–Nabudere clique', because they collaborated while using a demagogy of revolutionary phrases (pp. 36, 108). Yet clearly the group had a solely political and not an economic base. A central question ought to be 'What is the nature of a fascist regime?' Yet we are not given a class analysis of fascism.

The most powerful argument, backed by the most extensive empirical detail, comes in part three, where there are separate chapters on early British support for the Amin regime, Soviet maintenance of arms supplies, American and British support for the terror machine and the continuation for a disgracefully long time of the economic connections. Mamdani is undoubtedly right that Western emphasis on Libyan, Saudi and PLO support for Amin was hypocritical propaganda in view of the more extensive Western support for Amin which was not so widely reported. However, this does not mean he was a 'client', 'lap-dog' or 'stooge' (pp. 62–3). The hollowness of the assertion that everything is explained by 'imperialism' becomes most evident in the final chapter when Amin's invasion of the Kagera salient, Libya's failure to provide sufficient support and the slow Tanzanian success are all described as an 'imperialist initiative' (p. 107).

It is a form of racism when Westerners regard Amin either as just a comic figure or as a grotesque ogre. It is also an unintended form of inverse racism to deny that Amin's regime had deep roots in Ugandan society or to deny that Africans are independently capable of the same fascist horrors as Europeans in the recent past. Europeans may have profited from and supplied the military equipment to Amin's regime, but in addition Ugandans slaughtered each other. 'Imperialism' may provide a simplistic *ex post facto* description of events but it does not provide an explanation of fascism in Uganda.

The City University, London PETER WILLETTS

Libyan sandstorm. By John K. Cooley. London: Sidgwick & Jackson. 1983. 320pp. Index. £12·95.

AT one point in this book John Cooley correctly states that one of the most exasperating facts of life for Qadhafi has been the apathy with which a large part of the Libyan people has greeted all his posturing. Would that the West had the good sense of the Libyans. Unfortunately, Qadhafi and his exploits have appealed to two strong currents in European and North American popular imagination: the fascination with a hidden world, a stage on which a game of nations is covertly played out, and the confirmation, in an age of post-liberation blues, of old prejudices about the developing world. Qadhafi has brought much of this upon himself by seeking a greater sounding-board for his schemes than that offered by the confines of Libya. This has added to his apparent newsworthiness: the ranter who has the resources of a relatively wealthy state at his absolute disposal, and who claims that the whole world is out of step with him, combines the elements of comedy and danger which capture the headlines. However, good copy does not necessarily make a good book.

This is, indeed, the major flaw in *Libyan sandstorm*. Rather than concentrate on Libya itself, and thus on the only arena in which Qadhafi's physical control is sufficient to matter and the only context in which his policies could be said to be truly interesting, Cooley has devoted most of his book to detailing the many plots, intrigues and counter-plots with which Qadhafi's name has been associated during the past dozen years. Sensationally named though they are—'The Hilton assignment', 'The case of the Black Prince', 'Terror Inc.', 'Operation Eilts', 'Billygate' and so on—there is no disguising the fact that they make for rather tedious reading now. This is not so much the fault of the author's style, since Cooley guides us through the numerous mazes in a lively enough fashion, but of the subject matter itself: it reads like yesterday's papers, which is more or less what it is.

However, something further is needed to make this catalogue of conspiracies interesting, ' it is lacking here. The self-contradictory ephemerae of the 'Green book' will not provide ·. More important would be an assessment of what this penchant for intrigue, and the ' its execution, tell us about Qadhafi and the nature of his rule in Libya. What, for 'e significance of the fact that so many of these supposedly diabolical plots away, others end in fiasco, while many of the curious types whom Qadhafi to 'export the revolution' (a concept which is surely not to be taken at e the money and run? Qadhafi would no doubt emerge as a more re understandably Libyan, with a tribal view of power and its uses, but

shackled both by the limitations of the state he governs and by the isolation of his own autocracy. This makes him perhaps less sinister, and also less sensational, but it would have a better claim to be 'the complete account of Qadhafi's revolution' blazoned across the dust jacket of this book.

CHARLES TRIPP

The struggle over Eritrea: war and revolution in the Horn of Africa. By Haggai Erlich. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1983. 155pp. Index. $9·95.

THIS is the first serious study of Eritrea since G. K. N. Trevaskis's work was written almost twenty-five years ago. It is a detailed account and analysis of the internal political dynamics of the Eritrean national movement, on the one hand, and Ethiopian politics on the other. It is based on a wide range of sources, probably including intelligence, and impressively details the shifting divisions within the Eritrean liberation movement with particular attention to ideological development.

The author examines the development of Eritrean nationalism and the relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea in the period from the end of the Federation until the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, with a subsequent chapter dealing with the relationship between Eritrea and the Arab states in the same period. There is a short chapter analysing the course of the Ethiopian revolution and the centrality of Eritrea to the power struggle. A further chapter deals with the shifting regional politics, the 'Arabization of the Red Sea' and the way in which Arab regional politics favoured the Eritreans; but a subsequent chapter points out that the radicalism of the Eritrean liberation movement alienated these potential supporters.

There are several interlinked arguments. Firstly, he argues that Eritrean nationalism was 'shallow' and Ethiopian nationalism more deeply and historically rooted. Secondly, that in the 1962–74 period 'hardliners' were victorious in the Ethiopian camp and that Ethiopian policy drove Christian Eritreans into the national movement. Thirdly, that the influx of urban educated intelligentsia shifted the fronts from a nationalist and Arab orientated movement to a revolutionary liberation movement. Fourthly, that Eritrean success in 1977 came as a consequence of Ethiopian weakness but that the radicalism of the fronts, particularly the EPLF, prevented the Eritreans from benefiting from the favourable regional circumstances.

Erlich quite rightly concentrates on the problem of divisions between Eritreans and argues that Eritrean nationalism was too weak to accommodate revolutionism and the result was bitter and violent disunity. He argues that whereas the Ethiopian leadership put revolution second to national unity the Eritreans gave revolution higher priority. There is something to this argument but he does not adequately explain the nature of the divisions within the Eritrean field. Furthermore, revolutionary mobilization did actually bring the Eritrean victories of 1977 as much as the weakening of the Ethiopian state in the post-1976 period. If the Eritrean People's Liberation Front is the Eritrean 'hardliner', why is it that they have shifted their negotiating position away from unconditional independence?

One defect of the study is the number of factual errors. It is not clear whether this arises from the difficulties of reconstructing the internal history of a liberation movement or from over-reliance on shaky intelligence reports. At times they undermine his major argument. Just one example: he argued that the Isayas Afework group represented the Eritrean military hardline. He cites as examples their assassination of two Ethiopian judges and their 'carefully executed ambush' of Maj. Gen. Ergetu Tshome (p. 41). Both of these were ELF operations. The death of Tshome was almost accidental. His car, the third in a convoy, was hit by chance and it was only later that those involved knew their victim.

University of Manchester DAVID POOL

Church versus state in South Africa: the case of the Christian Institute. By Peter Walshe. London: Hurst; Maryknoll, NY: Orbis. 1983. 234pp. Index. £12·50.

THE main title of this book could be read to imply that there is a major confrontation of church against state in South Africa. That, according to Peter Walshe, is not the case, and indeed in this study of the Christian Institute he is at pains to underline that with few exceptions the major white churches have not seriously challenged the apartheid state. In th

case of the Dutch Reformed Churches they have given firm backing to the government, while the 'multi-racial' churches like the Methodists and Anglicans have criticized apartheid but have not been prepared to challenge the structure on which it rests.

The book traces the brief history of the Christian Institute from its inception in 1963 to its banning in 1977, and there are excellent sketches of its leading figures, such as Beyers Naude, Theo Kotze and Manas Buthelezi. The origins of the Institute lay in the Cottesloe Consultation which was held in 1960 when various Christian groups came together to try to agree on a broad united stand in the wake of the Sharpeville killings. The consensus reached at Cottesloe proved fragile as attempts at a united Christian stand fell apart, but there were those like Naude who retained the conviction that a new initiative was needed. It was this that led to the formation of the Christian Institute. The aims of the Institute were 'to bring together Christians of all denominations into Christian fellowship to work for greater justice for all citizens of our land', and 'to give more visible expression to the biblical truths of the unity of all Christians' (p. 32).

In its attempts to implement these aims the Institute adopted increasingly radical stands. Its leaders rejected the 'dualist' approach which distinguishes between the Christians' hopes in this life and the Kingdom of Heaven which is set apart, outside history. Instead they increasingly embraced liberation theology. Inevitably the Institute fell foul of the South African government, and after investigation by the Schelbusch Commission (a Commission which the Institute rejected and to which it refused to give evidence) it was banned.

Walshe set out to give an account of the Institute's story. That he has done clearly and with commitment. Yet on putting down the book there is the sense that more should have been achieved, for the Institute's story can be placed in a broader international setting in which the Christian churches are struggling to find their role in societies torn by internal strife. Walshe keeps his focus narrow, introduces little of their broader context and so fails to capture the full scope and complexity of the debate that surrounds liberation theology and the genuineness of the differences that exist among Christians.

University of Durham JAMES BARBER

Volkskapitalisme: class, capital and ideology in the development of Afrikaner nationalism 1934–1948. By Dan O'Meara. Cambridge University Press. 1983. 281pp. Index. £22·50. $44·50.

THIS is a well-researched and well-written book, but for the non-Marxist (like myself) it is based on a misunderstanding of South African society. It is also a finely published book, but expensive at £22·50.

The strength of Dan O'Meara's book lies in his presentation of the economic factors and interests that have played their part in the development of Afrikaner nationalism. Not for him the 'pure' ideology of *volk* unity and a God-given destiny; rather he traces the way in which different groups of Afrikaners with distinctive economic interests were merged together into the National Party. He accuses non-Marxist writers (both the approving and the critical) of presenting Afrikaner nationalism as an undifferentiated entity, and placing the movement in an ahistorical setting in which change is ignored. In offering an alternative analysis O'Meara ranges over the political and economic developments of the 1930s and 1940s.

Various economic interests are identified within Afrikaner nationalism, change is traced, a mechanistic analysis rejected, and the role of ideology recognized. On these grounds the book makes an important contribution to the understanding of Afrikaner nationalism. However, O'Meara, like other Marxists, wants to show that the analysis of South Africa's social formation falls 'squarely within the context of the process of capital accumulation and the class struggle through which it takes place' (p. 2). For non-Marxists like myself such an analysis simply does not explain the development of South African society. O'Meara is caught by his own ideology and forced into contortions as he tries to fit a Marxist framework (developed to try to explain different social conditions at a different time) on to South Africa. O'Meara is never rigid and recognizes that a number of elements are involved in the development of Afrikaner nationalism. He writes of 'a nationalist class alliance' (p. 220), and an 'Afrikaner nationalist alliance' (p. 243). However, for him it is the relationship of production and the resulting class formation and struggle which is 'primary'. He explains the

'Afrikaner' and the 'nationalist' elements as part of an ideology that has been useful in moulding the party together but does not reflect social and economic reality. But why, if the class division is primary, has a predominantly Afrikaner party been successful based on a call to a nation not a class? Why was it the rejection of class divisions and the call for national unity that drew the Afrikaners together? Why have political movements (with minor exceptions like the Communist and Liberal Parties) been built on race and nation and not on class? An analysis of South Africa that relies on the relations of production and the class formation as its primary elements is inadequate. This does not mean that economic interests and the social groupings that are formed around them (which may be identified as 'classes') are not important in South African society. They are, but so are race, and language group, and nation. These different elements are tightly knit together to create a complex but so far resilient social structure in which the most striking characteristic continues to be that the whites are at the top and the blacks at the bottom.

University of Durham JAMES BARBER

Asia

China turned rightside up: revolutionary legitimacy in the peasant world. By Ralph Thaxton. New Haven, London: Yale University Press. 1983. 266pp. Index. £22·50.

NOTWITHSTANDING its awkward title, this book provides the student of revolution in the all-important North China border region with a good deal of information on the misery which the peasants had to endure from the late Qing era to the revolutionary period of the 1940s. The subject has been investigated by others before and the author claims to have done no more than 'a tiny bit of spadework on the understudied topic' (p. xvi). He need not be modest on this score. The story of the unfair tenure and tax systems and of the catastrophic effects of falling world prices in the late 1920s on subsistence cultivators and tenants alike cannot be re-told too often.

Ralph Thaxton is less restrained when it comes to criticizing Western investigations into the relation between revolutions and peasant movements. Here he objects to the view attributed to Western observers that the CCP established the hegemony of its political thought over the peasants. This is indeed the main theme of this treatise. Engels was wrong, in the author's view, in blaming revolutionary failure in the sixteenth century on the backwardness of the German peasantry; and so, the author holds, was Marx, who believed that peasants were incapable of comprehending their own class interests.

Modern scholars hardly fare better. The author is convinced that they tend to 'minimize the impact of peasant initiatives on the course of revolutionary events in the countryside' (p. 98). By contrast, the author tries to prove that in China 'peasants were preparing the ground in which the Communist Party would grow' (p. 61), rather than the other way round. Yet he cannot deny the CCP's hand in preparing the villagers for participation in the anti-Japanese war, thus forcing them to neglect their own farmsteads. The Red Army did by no means act at all times in the interests of the peasants, for example when it levied 'voluntary' grain taxes so as to finance its armed struggle against both the Guomindang and the Japanese invaders. In short, the CCP, and its army, were 'not always able to proceed in perfect congruence with the peasants' goals' (pp. 160–1), let alone further their aspirations.

The reader fails to find among the 800 supporting notes at the end of this volume some of the standard works on the period under review, e.g. Edgar Snow's *Red Star over China* (London: Gollancz, 1937) or Kuo-Chun Chao's *Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party* (London: Asia Publishing House, 1960). In particular, the reader searches in vain for any reference to such early CCP involvement as the Land Programme of 1930, the Land Law of the Chinese Soviet Republic passed in 1931, or the Decisions concerning Agrarian Reform (1933); or indeed Mao's personal contribution to the solution of the agrarian question as expressed in his theory of armed peasant rebellion as a major instrument of communist revolution. In the light of evidence provided by Snow, Chao and others, it seems hardly possible to uphold the author's dictum that 'the CCP derived its legitimacy by dancing to the demanding tunes of the decentralized peasant movements, not by orchestrating its own centrist plan of power' (p. 227).

St Antony's College, Oxford W. KLATT

China on the Western Front: Britain's Chinese work-force in the First World War. By Michael Summerskill. London: Michael Summerskill. 1982. 236pp. Index. £6·95.

Growth and equality in rural China. (Asian employment programme.) By Keith Griffin and Ashwani Saith. Geneva: International Labour Office. 1981. 166pp. Index. Pb.

MICHAEL SUMMERSKILL'S book will be of the greatest interest to all 'old China hands'. Names like Jordan, Ogden, Bourne and the Pratts sprinkle its pages, as it tells the story of the hundred thousand Chinese workers brought to France by the British (and French) in the First World War, mostly from the province of Shantung. We are told that '1,834 Chinese died in France, 279 died at sea on the way home, and 32 could not be traced' (p. 195). Their cemeteries can be seen today at Noyelles-sur-Mer and other places in Northern France.

These Chinese came to help behind the lines in unloading supplies, repairing vehicles and other tasks, mainly in port areas, and they won a general opinion of being the best among the many foreign workers in France. 'Les Alliés . . . out trouvé dans la main d'ouvre chinoise un rendement de travail notablement supérieur à celui que donnèrent les Indous et les Africains. Le Chinois est intelligent, sobre, discipliné' (p. 122). Nor did they cease to be Chinese. They drank tea, not *vin du pays*. One of the most poignant aspects of this story is to see these sons of China in Europe flying kites, playing the flute and celebrating lunar New Year with lanterns and dragons. They were conspicuous in local towns, wearing large floppy hats, and 'on the march, they smile and smoke and shout at officers without observing any distinction of rank . . . they break your bloody heart' (p. 150).

Along the way we not only learn much that is illuminating about this encounter between two civilizations, but we also catch some revealing glimpses of the working of the British War Cabinet and its sometimes sheer ignorance and loose control over events, as when 'Curzon reported that in France there were 55,000 horses . . . Lloyd George was amazed: "Do we need these cavalry? Was there the slightest chance they would be needed for a breakthrough?" ' (pp. 61–2). We find keen inter-ministerial rivalries in Whitehall and sometimes acute conflicts, both departmental and personal, out in China. There is also the familiar tale of the stubborn obstruction of British trade unions and their opposition to the import of foreign labour, unlike their French counterparts, which the Webbs thought 'would almost certainly have led to a Labour revolt against the continuance of the war' (p. 64).

The book by Griffin and Saith is about a very different China and very different concerns. The authors visited China briefly in June 1979 to study income differentials in four carefully selected communes, chosen for them by their Chinese hosts. This took them to Peking and Shanghai, and the provinces of Hopeh and Kwangtung. The difficulty in these cases always is to know how representative the communes were, or how reliable were the statistics dished out to foreign scholars on a fleeting visit and speaking through interpreters. Unsurprisingly, their calculations show that there was a 'bias against the less well-off communes' (p. 10). Much depends on the confidence reposed in these calculations, replete with graphs, models, ratios, variables and indices, that form the meaty middle section of this work. Clearly, this is matter for the agronomist or statistician rather than the Sinologist *per se* or the general reader. In fact, this study is one in a series published under ILO auspices, by the Asian Regional Team for Employment Promotion (ARTEP) in Bangkok, following a project on rural poverty initiated by Professor Griffin himself.

The authors themselves are not lacking in confidence in their own charts and tables, and in the final section cannot resist the temptation to generalize widely on the basis of their limited data. Here we have left the four communes of Wu Gong, Qie Ma, Tang Tang and Evergreen and take not only the rest of China but the globe itself in view. We are told (on p. 128): 'The distribution of income and wealth in rural China is remarkably even. It is broadly comparable to the best that has been achieved in the capitalist countries and is much more equal than in the great majority of Third World countries.' The credit for this is attributed to the commune form of organization, and it is therefore understandable if the authors, who are clearly in favour of equality among Chinese peasants, feel that a departure from this system is a 'danger', a 'reactionary step' and a 'threat' (p. 6). To whom or what is a nice question, and one wonders if they were able to put it to the peasants. Since China has now abandoned the communes, preferring a system based on individual responsibility and enterprise, the 'danger' or 'threat' is presumably not so apparent there. Worse still, simple egalitarianism is characterized as anti-socialist and material incentive encouraged. Nothing daunted, we are cosily reassured that this trend 'is, of course, compatible with the socialist

rules of distribution' (p. 134). It is almost as if, whichever way it is, it must needs be shown consistent with a personal view of Chinese 'socialism'. The statistical sophistication of this study is matched by its political naiveté. If the authors return to China perhaps they will let the statistics speak for themselves.

University of Hull VICTOR FUNNELL

The Korean conflict: search for unification. By M. P. Srivastava. New Delhi: Prentice-Hall of India. 1982. 120pp.

AT a time when the conflict in Indo-China is receiving much notice this work seeks to focus attention on another conflict which, should it escalate, would have far more profound consequences for East Asia and the world. Srivastava's approach is essentially chronological, covering the Korean War and the various unification proposals that have emerged since that time, with a separate chapter devoted to the role and involvement of the major powers in the Korean question.

While the author is to be commended for considering at the beginning the factor of ideology, particularly as it pertains to the conduct of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, he seems to believe, contrary to the view of most observers of that country and to the efforts of Leonid Brezhnev himself in 1956, that external powers have the ability to influence the selection there of leadership personnel. Having failed to take the measure of the independence and ideological fervour of the P'yongyang rulers he then neglects the motivation of the leadership elites of the Republic of Korea. Although since 1961 successive military regimes in Seoul have sought to enhance their legitimacy by sponsoring and masterminding the Korean economic miracle, the *raison d'être* of the southern military establishment stems from their position as guardians of the south against communist subversion as much as the legitimacy of Kim Il Sung's regime derives from his claim to be the 'sun' of the whole nation. Consequently the unification issue has been manipulated for narrower purposes, notably in 1972 when President Park Chung Hee used it as a pretext to overturn the existing constitution. Many other internal developments in both Koreas since 1948 which also militate against unification, from language reform in the north to the development in the south of powerful corporations wedded to the advantages of a private enterprise system, are not mentioned.

This neglect of the situation within the two Korean states is a major weakness of this book which is not improved by an opaque style and a number of factual errors. A thorough and balanced account of this most intractable and potentially dangerous conflict has yet to be written.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne JAMES COTTON

The origins of socialist thought in Japan. By John Crump. London, Canberra: Croom Helm; New York: St Martin's. 1983. 374pp. Index. £15·95.

THE development of socialist thought in Japan has up to now been neglected by Western writers. There are biographies of individual leaders of the socialist movement, and accounts of the movement itself (embracing little discussion of ideology), but this book, which traces the development of socialist thought in Japan up to 1918, has no competitor in the English language. As a background to discussion of ideological developments, the author looks at the Japanese historical environment, the development of capitalism in late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Japan and also the influences from Russia, European and English-speaking countries. A comprehensive knowledge of socialist theory and history in the West—one which the reader is in large part assumed to share—enables a high level of critical appraisal of what were in origin Western ideas. The end-product is a detailed and stimulating account based on meticulous and extensive use of Japanese primary and secondary sources as well as numerous interviews. The book adds considerably to our knowledge of Japan's eclecticism in the adoption of Western ideologies at this time. It is also highly readable.

Dr Crump's theoretical approach lies outside the traditionally accepted confines of both Western and Japanese historiography, and it is essential to read the introduction to get the most out of [illegible] ork is that genuine socialism barely existed in Japan [illegible] list and socialist ideology was virtually

non-existent. Nearly all Japanese who regarded themselves as socialist envisaged the continuation of some form of capitalism, albeit a modified one. Kōtoku Shūsui emerges the least scathed from this critical approach; two of his treatises are translated as appendices to the book. This unwillingness to fall in with the normal loose categorization of words such as 'socialism' and 'capitalism' leads to strong criticism of the normal failure of authors to define the term 'socialism'. The introduction includes a succinct definition of the author's own use of the terms 'socialism' and 'capitalism', and these definitions are rigorously adhered to throughout. The introduction, therefore, is also a personal statement, but it is in no way an apology. Nor should it be. It is only because the theoretical perspective differs from what might be called the 'normally accepted' one, and because it will not be shared by the majority of readers, that the author feels it at all necessary to explain his position. A consistent theoretical approach is not merely wholly legitimate but highly desirable, and those who delude themselves that their writings are totally objective, with no hint of value judgment, are merely trying to deceive both themselves and the reader. The reader may disagree with the author's perspective, but as long as the reader retains an open mind there is a great deal to be gained from this intellectually rigorous and consistent work. The clarity of its analysis is an object lesson to writers with less well-thought-out approaches, and the fact that one may not share the author's ideological perspective scarcely invalidates the considerable academic merits of the book.

London School of Economics JANET HUNTER

Malaysia: economic expansion and national unity. By John Gullick. London: Benn; Boulder, Col.: Westview. 1982. 290pp. Index. £14·95.

THIS book in Benn's 'Nations of the modern world' series is a completely rewritten edition of a 1969 book in the same series by the same author. The 1969 edition was completed before the upheavals in the middle of that year and the suspension of the constitution. This latest edition was completed before Dr Mahathir became the Malaysian Prime Minister and accelerated the processes of reducing the traditional economic and political links with the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth and of emphasizing anew the rights of the Malay community to play the dominant role in Malaysia.

Gullick has known Malaysia intimately since 1945, first as a member of the Malaysian Civil Service and then in the employ and later as a director of a London-based major corporation with commercial and planting interests in the country. His all-round knowledge of the literature pertaining to Malaysia is as wide as anyone's, and he has an excellent broad view of the key issues in the country's history and in its current problems. The first half of the book deals with Malaysian history from 1400 and with the characteristics of its indigenous and immigrant communities, concentrating heavily on the period after the Japanese occupation. The second half deals with the economy, with defence and foreign policy, and with education, culture and language, and with the controversies surrounding official policies on these and other subjects. The whole book is concisely and lucidly written for the non-specialist, who is given ample guidance in the footnotes and bibliography if he wishes to pursue a particular aspect in greater detail.

Gullick is clearly anxious that the Malaysian government is trying to achieve too much too quickly, but he is nevertheless sympathetic to many of the goals which the government has set itself. He deals realistically with the achievements and failures of governments in both the colonial and the post-independence phases. Dealing with the colonial period he is particularly critical of educational policy. Dealing with the post-independence period he stresses the price which is being paid in terms of political stability and technical efficiency in giving preference to Malaya in the educational system, in government jobs and increasingly in certain sectors of the economy.

No other author could have written a better general introduction to the history, problems and politics of Malaysia in less than three hundred pages than Gullick has done here.

T. E. SMITH

The defence of Malaysia and Singapore: the transformation of a security system 1957–1971. By Chin Kin Wah. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1982. 219pp. Index. £25·00.

THE independence of Malaya in 1957 followed by the formation of Malaysia in 1963 did not end Britain's defence commitments in South-east Asia. Unlike most other former colonies in

the region when statehood was achieved, Malaysia insisted that the imperial power stay on to form the core of a security system which also included two other Commonwealth powers, Australia and New Zealand. Chin Kin Wah's political history of the evolution of the treaty that formed the basis of Britain's commitment, known as the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement (AMDA), sets out the details of the system's birth and demise. The politics of the evolution of AMDA involved not only the relations of the 'anchor' power, Britain, with the security recipients, Malaysia and Singapore, and with the antipodean powers, but also the relations between the political elites of Malaysia and Singapore, the strains of which led to the separation of the island city from the peninsular state.

The Defence of Malaysia and Singapore will be the definitive study of the security problems of post-colonial Malaysia and Singapore until the archives of the relevant governments are opened for scholarly examination. In nine carefully documented chapters and a conclusion containing valuable insights the author outlines the background, emergence and transformation of AMDA in the context of Britain's declining power and interests in a changing South-east Asia. If the book has any weaknesses, they lie in an overcautious reluctance to speculate as much as the evidence might allow on the motives of the leaders of the five governments that made up AMDA. If the analysis had been placed in a larger interpretative or historical framework it would have revealed more interesting and lasting patterns of interest and strategy, as the author's conclusion begins to suggest. But Chin Kin Wah's careful reading of the statements and documents of the British government, those of Australia and New Zealand, and of Malaysia and Singapore, makes for instructive reading.

In the light of the recent controversies in the relationship between Britain and Malaysia, Dr Chin's description of the tensions that developed during the 1960s when Britain, which still had a direct and immediate security commitment to Kuala Lumpur, was constantly seeking to lessen its obligations, leads one to wonder why relations did not cool much earlier and more rapidly than they have done. The author eschews such speculations or theorizing about security systems in general or regional politics in particular in favour of a close historical account. But, interestingly, he does note that the evolution of AMDA owed almost nothing to events external to the agreement. It was the decline of Britain's power, the separation of Singapore from Malaysia and the increasing independence and assertiveness of the other member states that caused the demise of AMDA and its replacement by more 'normal' and equal political relations.

School of Oriental and African Studies ROBERT H. TAYLOR

The Indian Ocean: regional and international power politics. By Ashok Kapur. New York: Praeger. 1983. 227pp. Index. $29.95.

South Asian security after Afghanistan. By G. S. Bhargava. Lexington, Mass., Toronto: Lexington/Heath. (Distrib. in UK by Gower, Aldershot). 1983. 198pp. Index. £18·50.

THE proliferation of books about the regional security of the Indian Ocean and South Asia is both a credit to the energy of their mainly Indian authors and a source of puzzlement for European or American readers. This arises primarily because most of what is written has been said many times before and yet appears to have had little or no impact on policy making or the conduct of external affairs.

The implication of impotence is a common feature of the current state of international relations but is peculiarly pointed in the case of India. India at independence was not only potentially the heir to an imperial security role but apparently capable, by reason of size and an indigenous defence industry, of actually fulfilling it. Today, however, the ocean which washes that country's coasts is not only allegedly roamed by alien nuclear submarines but its shores and islands are hosts to still developing foreign bases whose contribution to regional stability is, to say the least, debatable.

Dr Ashok Kapur is a specialist on the subject of nuclear proliferation but manages realistically to put the Indian Ocean into the widest international context. In an important sense his conclusion is a pessimistic one when he asserts on the final page (p. 212) that foreign powers and the relevant UN Committee have 'legitimized the present tendency towards the militarization of the Indian Ocean environment'. The intention to create an Indian Ocean zone of peace has, he argues, been vitiated by the pursuit by the superpowers,

America and Russia, of regional and local interests which do not necessarily divide them but may even cynically draw them on to common ground.

Ashok Kapur is at his best in dealing with the interaction between the East–West and North–South axes. It is nevertheless to be regretted that his treatment of the non-aligned movement is both simplistic and romantic, and at the same time blurred. It may be (p. 129) 'the main purpose of non alignment to project non coercive norms into the international environment' but it is not likely to succeed unless on a regional basis the small countries are prepared to collaborate in peacekeeping and the settlement of disputes. The remark (p. 131) that 'ambiguity is functional' and much that goes with it invites the obvious response. There may be much which the author wishes to express, but, for whatever reason, inhibition and sometimes ambivalence prevail.

G. S. Bhargava, whose IISS Adelphi paper (No. 125) on *India's security in the 1980s* was published in 1976 comes close to falling into the same trap. While describing India and Pakistan as the two rival regional states of South Asia, and India as 'strategically superior' (p. 193), his hope is that they will develop a workable strategic balance. As a conclusion that is decidedly banal, as is the description—it is that rather than an analysis—of American and Soviet spheres of influence in the region from Afghanistan southwards to the Indian Ocean. 'It may seem starry-eyed to visualize a modus vivendi between the superpowers' (p. 192); but that hardly seems worth saying in the context only of pious aspirations.

Coming, as it does, after a realistic discussion of 'The Indian Ocean build up' and 'The nuclear dimension' this is disappointing. The difficulty is that G. S. Bhargava's design is not coherent. He does attempt with some success to relate Afghanistan to the situation in the Indian subcontinent and to describe the April 1978 coup in Kabul. Tantalizingly on page 45 in a brief paragraph he raises the question of relations between the Soviet Union and the Islamic world but makes no projections. His is a more sophisticated approach, expressed in simpler language, than that of Ashok Kapur. The weakness of both writers is that they both have something important to say as experts indigenous to the region, but they do not recognize its limitations. In one case explicit and in the other implied is 'the mutual irreconcilability' (Bhargava, p. 191) of the interests of India and Pakistan. In both cases there is a recognition of the need for regional initiatives to keep the superpowers more or less at bay. In neither book is there a realistic suggestion of how a peace zone might be achieved and even Ashok Kapur says little about the other Indian Ocean littoral states in this context. Between them they cover valuable ground, worthy of attention, but the sense of frustration remains. The limitations are, it must be admitted, more of a political than an academic character.

University of Aston in Birmingham WILLIAM GUTTERIDGE

The states of South Asia: problems of national integration. Essays in honour of W. H. Morris-Jones. Edited by A. Jeyaratnam Wilson and Dennis Dalton. London: Hurst. 1982. 343pp. Index. £16·50.

THIS *Festschrift* in honour of Professor W. H. Morris-Jones, for seventeen years Director of the Institute of Commonwealth Studies in the University of London, is a valiant attempt to link together essays which in their variety and diffuseness resemble the field of Commonwealth studies itself. National integration is the theme. But 'integration' is a term worthy of inclusion in Orwell's 'newspeak'—the language governments use to cover a multitude of sins.

At one extreme, 'integration' was used at the time as a euphemism for independent India's annexation of the princely states. Robin Moore's elegant analysis of that process reveals how Mountbatten outmanoeuvred those who thought that there were still pledges to be honoured by the British. Morris-Jones himself, as Constitutional Adviser to the Viceroy, played his part in that memorable scene. At the other extreme, Lloyd and Suzanne Rudolph trace the Janata government's policy of ideological integration—a clumsy version of what is becoming an all-too-familiar tactic of bringing inconvenient university teachers into line with changes in official policy.

Some scholars—James Manor, Talukder Maniruzzaman and C. R. de Silva—examine the lack of integration between the political elite and the masses in various parts of South Asia. Others—Khalid B. Sayeed, Kingsley de Silva and Hugh Tinker—examine threats to administrative or political unity in a historical context. Paul Brass, Ataur Rahman, M. Rashiduz-

zaman, Leo Rose and Jeyaratnam Wilson analyse regional or geographical obstacles. Some of these essays reveal remnants of paternalism, as if the authors knew what was best for South Asia and deplored the shortcomings of its local politicians. Dennis Dalton, on the other hand, contributes a characteristically admiring account of the ideas of some of India's 'intellectual giants' (his phrase); towards the end of his paper one finds with relief some reference to Morris-Jones's incisive criticisms of such thinking.

The book also contains a bibliography of Morris-Jones's publications and an interesting but exasperating biographical note—interesting for what it says of his Welsh childhood, his Italian marriage and his Indian experiences but exasperating for what it fails to say of the development of his own ideas against this background. Morris remains the genial but enigmatic figure we have known for so long. In view of his special knowledge of South Asia it was perhaps right that a *Festschrift* in his honour should have been devoted to that area, but it is also right to remember that under his guidance the Institute of Commonwealth Studies has concerned itself with other areas as well. There is reason to believe that under his successor its horizons will continue to be as broad as those of the Commonwealth—perhaps broader than those of the present Commonwealth.

School of Oriental and African Studies, London KENNETH BALLHATCHET

Nuclear power in India: a comparative analysis. By David Hart. London: Allen & Unwin. 1983. 159pp. Index. £12·00.

As the easy benefits promised by nuclear power in the industrialized North recede and become riddled with economic and technological difficulties, the prospect of its adaptation to suit the more urgent energy needs of the Third World becomes more pressing and politically uncertain. India was the first non-industrialized nation to embark on a major nuclear power programme, the ramifications of which were forcibly underlined by the 1974 explosion of a nuclear 'device'. Thus, by analysing India's nuclear ambitions David Hart is able to offer a paradigm of the potential of nuclear power as a solution of Third World energy problems within a global context. He achieves this objective with competence and restraint, tentatively extending the implications of his conclusions to several other countries.

India's flirtation with nuclear power began within a year of independence, in 1948, and received considerable impetus under Nehru's political regime. The distinctive features of the programme are the early development of the full range of fuel cycle accessories, the diversification of reactor choices to include the Canadian CANDU as well as the more conventional General Electric boiling water reactor, and the ultimate intention of achieving fuel self-sufficiency on two fronts: by developing fast 'breeders', and by fuelling them with indigenously mined thorium rather than imported uranium.

Not surprisingly these grandiose ambitions have amounted to a heavy concentration of nuclear eggs in a single basket to the detriment of non-nuclear energy sources (p. 65). The consequences are that although 25 per cent of India's research and development spending has gone into nuclear power, only 2–3 per cent of the total national electrical generating capacity is currently supplied from this source (p. 60), and self-reliance is nowhere near to being achieved: 'It is likely that India *can* become self-reliant in the end—the knowledge and capability are there—but at what economic cost?' (p. 94).

Nor is the cost merely economic. The author cites disturbing evidence about the levels of radiation to which workers at the Tarapur power station are exposed (p. 70 ff). One is left with the uneasy feeling that the expansion of nuclear power in the Third World means an inevitable lowering of safety standards below what is currently internationally acceptable.

David Hart convincingly refutes the view that India acquired nuclear power facilities primarily to make nuclear weapons (p. 35), and summarizes the various options currently open to the government for future power production. He concludes by evaluating the position of a number of countries currently contemplating investment in nuclear power in relation to what, in the light of India's experience, he considers to be the most important criteria. These relate to the paucity of non-nuclear fuels, the size and sufficiency of the electrical grid, and the proven existence of ample indigenous uranium reserves (p. 97).

This is an important book which should be consulted by all those who are concerned about future patterns of global energy production and use.

University of Hull DAVID GOSLING

Tribes of India: the struggle for survival. By Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf, with Michael Yorke and Jayaprakash Rao. Los Angeles, London: University of California Press. 1983. 342pp. Index. £24·00. $38.95.

Christoph von Fürer-Haimendorf enjoys a commanding reputation amongst scholars of the Indian subcontinent. His researches in a number of key areas, which date back to the mid-1930s, have illuminated many aspects of Indian life. In this book, which also has contributions from Michael Yorke and Jayaprakash Rao, he has presented the mature conclusions of his long-standing interest in the tribal societies of the Deccan, and, to a lesser degree, of Arunachal Pradesh. His expertise in these two areas extends back to the Second World War when he carried out field-work amongst the tribes of the old Hyderabad State and the north-east frontier area; the conclusions he presents here are the mature fruit of the perceptions gained over this period.

Alas, the tribes are an all-too-easily forgotten element in the Indian population, and yet they number some 40,000,000. The book's subtitle, 'The struggle for survival', indicates the problems they face in coexisting with an overwhelmingly Hindu society which is politically, economically and culturally dominant. Over the centuries the tribes, within their forest environment, lived in a reasonable degree of harmony with a Hindu society which tolerated diversity and eschewed evangelism. But the author exposes in an impressive manner how this traditional relationship has been steadily eroded during the period in which he has had the tribes under investigation. In the pre-independence period, Indian politicians, understandably concerned with maintaining the integrity of the nation, were unhappy at the concept of a distinctive tribal identity. Although that particular phase has now passed, the problem of how to 'integrate' with mainstream India remains, but, as the author is at pains to observe: 'The protagonists of integration usually ignore the fact that there exists no homogeneous Indian society with which tribal groups could merge by adopting a standard cultural pattern'.

But the book is also, perhaps mainly, concerned with the tribes' economic situation and future. Here the author is able to draw a sharp contrast between the hopeful prospects for the tribes of Arunachal Pradesh, who still dominate their ancestral areas, and those of the Deccan, who have had to face the mounting pressure of India's steady population growth. The gloomy prognosis for the Deccan is impressively set out in chapters on 'The fate of tribal land' and 'Forest policy', especially as they relate to the Gonds, the most significant single tribal group.

The book ends with a depressing postscript relating to the fate of a Gond protest meeting in May 1981, when those attempting to assemble were fired on by the police in the manner, as the author reminds us, of the earlier scene at the Jallianwala Bagh. This book is important to any student of modern India, both as a scholarly investigation of the tribal problem and as a plea for the country's essential diversity.

The New University of Ulster, Coleraine T. G. Fraser

Can Pakistan survive? The death of a state. By Tariq Ali. London: Penguin. 1983. 237pp. Index. Pb.: £2·95.

Mr Tariq Ali in the preface describes his small book as 'an attempt to discuss hitherto taboo or undiscussed themes . . . The question which now increasingly haunts the new generations in Pakistan is not simply whether the country can survive, but whether its existence was necessary in the first place.'

Many of those concerned with the negotiations for the independence of India and Pakistan have pondered this theme over the last three decades. Indeed, the break-up of the British Empire after the last war, and for that matter the break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the First World War, left us with fundamental doubts as to what makes a state and whether any flexibility is possible, which would allow territorial and constitutional adjustments to be made to take account of new pressures in this fast changing world. In postwar Europe we have had some success in coming to terms with the facts of interdependence; but we are still in very rough waters. In Africa there must be doubts whether the frontiers so arbitrarily drawn in the nineteenth century can be maintained indefinitely, in the face of tribal and economic realities. But Pakistan remains as the key example of a state based on an idea rather than the facts of geography. Is the idea still potent enough to hold the Pakistan of today together?

Tariq Ali's answer is no; and that 'the old frontiers will have to be abolished one day, the laws of revolution overriding both geography and history. A Federation of South Asian Republics must remain the goal . . .' (p. 197). His political affiliations made it unlikely that he would approach the subject with objectivity. His introductory quotations (from John Lawrence and General Dyer) make it clear from the beginning that this is a partisan book. Indeed, the author appears to approve of nobody at all. He thinks as little of Gandhi as of Jinnah; he likes Zia no more than Bhutto; he disapproves of Britain and America as well as Russia and China. What we are left with then is very little discussion of the main theme, but rather a short history of Pakistan going back to the emergence of the Muslim League. The gobbledygook of the theoretical Marxist obtrudes itself on almost every page, which makes the book difficult to read. There are, however, some nuggets of information and arguments to be mined. For instance, there are some interesting comments on the development of Soviet policy in Afghanistan. The authorities quoted are at times interesting. To support the statement that 'British cultural elitism was coupled with the system of imperial tariffs designed to protect British domestic industry against any competition from India' (p. 23) he turns to G. K. Shirokov for examples, but fails to give any identifiable reference (p. 215). After independence, when Krishna Menon was an actor on the world stage, some Indians were inclined to argue that his pugnacious partisan style was derived from long residence as a student leader in London. This book leaves one with the uneasy feeling that it owes more to the polemics of the militant left in Britain than it does to knowledge about political developments in Pakistan.

CYRIL PICKARD

North America

Congress and the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia. By P. Edward Haley. New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press. 1982. 227pp. Index. $28.50.

THROUGHOUT the last few months of the United States presence in Vietnam and Cambodia, the United States Congress continued to strive to limit American participation and to deny the executive further funds to continue that participation except upon terms designed to bring an end to the commitment as soon as possible. In this important study, Professor Haley, who is professor of political science and director of the international relations program at Claremont McKenna College, examines the legislative role in the fall of South Vietnam and Cambodia. President Ford blamed Congress for failing to support administration policy. Professor Haley places the blame on the development by post-Second World War administrations of the 'politics of acquiescence'. This, which he defines as the belief that 'rulers may assume that in the absence of forceful effective opposition they act with the consent of the governed', he argues was found 'in extreme version' in the Kissinger approach to foreign policy-making. 'It was an approach born of weakness, not evil motives' (p. 26).

The consequence of the 'politics of acquiescence' was to develop in Congress an ineradicable suspicion of administration motives, especially (though not exclusively) in relation to the unpopular war in South-east Asia, while at the same time the Ford administration continued to act under many of its basic assumptions, notably in its secret involvement in Angola. With detailed examination of the events in Congress in the last weeks of the war, Professor Haley shows how the administration even at that late point was unable or unwilling to convey a real sense of crisis. Indeed, the public statements of administration officials other than the President, who was himself not consistent, by understating the extent of the strategic reverses and exuding false confidence, sent misleading signals to Congress right up to the end, when there was nothing left for Congress to do but to vote aid to the refugees. Congress and the President, he argues, were 'partners in collapse' (p. 180).

His study is, however, not merely an historical one, designed to illuminate a dark corner of a crucial period. In a discussion of the implications for the policy-making process, Professor Haley takes up Stanley Hoffman's ideas on a 'new consensus'. How, he asks, is this to be achieved? Two legislative devices have served for reorientating policy in the past: establishment of a select committee, or structural/procedural reform designed to unify congressional sentiment in close links with the views of the executive. Either way, however, it will be for the executive to understand its need 'to depend on support as well as

acquiescence in the making of American foreign policy' (p. 185). The recent course of the Reagan administration's policy in Central America suggests that this is precisely the lesson that has *not* been learnt, and it is not a moment too soon for America's friends and allies to start considering what will happen to them when that policy too ends in catastrophe.

University of Southampton PETER CALVERT

The Vietnam trauma in American foreign policy, 1945–75. By Paul M. Kattenburg. Eastbourne, Sussex: Holt-Saunders. 1981. 354pp. Index. £15·00.

THE United States waged 'limited' war in Vietnam; a relative concept, for three times the total bomb tonnage used by the United States in the whole of the Second World War was dropped into Indo-China. It was the wrong war against the wrong enemies in the wrong place at the wrong time. The war could probably not have been won anyway, but it was lost at home because the American people came to see it 'as wrong in its moral and political aspects' (p. 280). Such is the persuasive thesis of this book.

Paul Kattenburg, who now teaches at the University of South Carolina, was a career Foreign Service officer who served on the Vietnam Desk in the State Department in the early 1950s and was Director of Vietnam Affairs in 1963–4. He became a dissenting voice, and was eventually moved to the Foreign Service Institute before retirement in 1972 at the age of 50. He has written a book primarily for students and those who never knew or have perhaps forgotten Vietnam. He takes the reader through both the narrative story and the analysis, using careful stylistic markers such as "we shall examine . . ." etc. (see, for example, pp. 79, 107) that are not elegant but in his case effective. The footnotes and bibliography are excellent.

He will not please all who should study this book, but those who find distasteful the pleas of politicians to get countries moving again, in the context of oratory that becomes a substitute for analysis, will relish his acerbic comments. Professional diplomats will understand what he means when he refers to 'the degradation of diplomacy by strategy in the US policies of the high cold war' (p. 160). He is in no doubt about the virtues of the Foreign Service when compared with Washington-based bureaucrats and politicians who over-valued the *machismo* of action in crisis management. He does not like intellectual theorists, whom he calls technocrats: efficacy experts who seek to optimize what is, rather than reflect on what ought to be. When he categorizes General Maxwell Taylor as 'highly sophisticated and perhaps over-highly educated' (p. 111) he is not being complimentary.

It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Professor Kattenburg is anti-intellectual. He is highly critical of certain types of intellectual problem-solving because he judges applied theories by their results. Perhaps he is an old fashioned pragmatist imbued with an ethical sense, as classic American pragmatists were. Discussion of the morality of ends and means certainly dominates his forceful concluding chapter on 'Vietnam as lesson of history'. This is a thoughtful book written by a person of evident integrity and impressive common sense. It contributes to our understanding of a horrid war. Some of its judgements are controversial but then historical judgements necessarily are.

University of Keele D. K. ADAMS

Power and principle: memoirs of the National Security Adviser, 1977–81. By Zbigniew Brzezinski. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 1983. 587pp. Index. £15·00.

THIS is an embarrassing book, its title the augury of a pompous disposition revealed throughout in tone and content. The post of National Security Adviser is of course one of considerable power and access, and Dr Kissinger left his mark on the office which his successors naturally wish to sustain. But Dr Brzezinski is not a Kissinger, and he merely points up the difference in the uniquely condescending, often patronizing airs he adopts towards others. Thus on President Carter, the man who invited him to join the administration: 'He was always interested in the arts, and I suspect that to some extent his eagerness . . . reflected his small-town origins' (p. 23). On Secretary of State Cyrus Vance: 'It turned out that Vance, for all his many gifts and personal qualities, was not an effective communicator' (p. 29). 'In my judgement, Cy would have made an extraordinarily successful Secretary of State in a more tranquil age' (p. 43). On Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, who clearly did not

take kindly to Brzezinski's 'tough nosed' (a favourite term) approach to their relationship, 'I tried to get leading Germans to help muzzle the Chancellor, but to no avail' (p. 26). Quite.

This clutch of *de haut en bas* vignettes on Brzezinski's reflections on world leaders comes in his first chapter, entitled 'Relating to key players'. Here, as elsewhere, the account is marred by a good deal of academic jargon, where the author is at pains to demonstrate that he was a 'conceptualizer' having great thoughts on 'geopolitical goals' at the top of the 'decision-making process' (another favourite term). One begins to see why Carter's floundering in foreign policy was only partly due to his folksy simplicities, his Christian earnestness, and his born-again religiosity. Some of the blame may be attached to the enveloping fog of Dr Brzezinski's conceptualizing and his unique brand of solipsism let loose on an untidy world.

Where Dr Brzezinski confines himself to a narrative account, he is interesting and informative. The Camp David Accords, the Panama Treaty, and much of the section on the Teheran crisis take us behind the scenes, and there is valuable material on Carter's approach to crisis management in the fourteen-month saga of negotiation, and the aborted desert mission to release the American hostages. We learn a good deal about Carter's strengths and weaknesses, his flashes of temper, his essential goodwill and trust, and we are able to judge whether these qualities are suited to the awesome power vested in an American President. Here, there is naught to comfort those who argue that unilateral gestures of goodwill can lead to reciprocal gestures in such areas as SALT and START. Dr Brzezinski's account has a value going beyond his obsession with his own relationship to 'key players' in pointing up the distinction between his own 'hard nosed' (a variant of 'tough nosed') approach to negotiations, and what he describes as the 'litigational' style of Cyrus Vance.

The big gap in the literature now is a detailed investigation of the workings of the National Security Council under successive Presidents. Dr Brzezinski supplies a brief annex showing the personnel, under their different functions and geographical clusters, during the Carter Presidency. In the top ten positions of power and influence, only one individual was held over from the previous administration, and elsewhere in the bloated bureaucracy of the NSC the scores are equivalent.

In a concluding chapter Dr Brzezinski looks at the problems facing American foreign policy formulation in the future. Here, detached from personalities and the pecking order in Washington DC, he is thoughtful and cogent on the central problem: that of discontinuity between Presidents, and excessive centralization of the process in too few hands, without genuine accountability. There is, here, a besetting and profoundly worrying problem at the very heart of the American political, and indeed constitutional process. It is to be hoped that our American colleagues will address themselves to it earnestly in the near future.

University of York EDMUND IONS

America in search of itself: the making of the President, 1956–1980. By Theodore White. London: Cape. 1983. 465pp. Index. £10·95.

WHEN Theodore White's *The making of the President 1960* appeared in 1961, specialists in American politics had long been used to two distinctive categories of books on Presidential elections: the hagiographic, neatly timed campaign biography; and the detailed analysis of election results and issues. White's study was of quite a different order. He showed that a detailed account of a Presidential election could be dramatic and readable without resort to facile journalese. His mastery of the infinite detail of the political process was, however, not the whole story. He examined the undercurrents of American demography and saw that the future lay with California and the aspirations of the more mobile sections of the polity, not—despite some enduring influence—with the worn-out political machines of the east coast cities.

In his latest study, White reflects on Presidential elections from 1956 to 1980 to draw up a balance sheet on both the electoral process and the lonely office itself. He finds nothing to comfort us. His apprehension centres on two inextricably linked main themes: the tendencies of domestic politics and American responsibilities abroad in the nuclear era.

In the domestic sphere, White is deeply concerned that the old style politics of persuasion have now been replaced by media politics—the politics of manipulation. He shows just how

and why this is a malign development in US politics, and why he is pessimistic about any efforts to arrest the process. Too great a proportion of valuable capital, institutional and personal, is locked up in the vested interests. Madison Avenue agencies and the three major networks now have far too much to lose in their ruthless contests for ratings as every election approaches. A candidate for office—Presidential, Senatorial or Gubernatorial—who is not prepared to treat with the new moguls of the media, to play the game to their rules, is asking to be defeated before the polls open. The twenty-second commercial at prime time has replaced any dozen or more election addresses from the back of a railroad car as the top device of campaign managers. In politics as in publishing, the 'media hype' is often the key to success. This depresses Theodore White.

By extension, the role of television in projecting the image of the President abroad lends itself to the exposure of those who know how to look good on camera. The clichés of the cold war and the 'eyeball to eyeball' posturing towards the deeper fears, as well as the native patriotism, of middle America are what convince middle America. A Reagan comes over well with this mass audience, as the power brokers of American politics have realized in a self-confirming thesis. An Adlai Stevenson, a George Kennan, a George Ball or an Averell Harriman is less convincing because more articulate. They would tend to treat the complexities of the international situation as they deserve, not to lurch from one shop-worn formula to another in the litany of East versus West, that demeaning polarity beloved of speech writers determined to make their man look good, sound good, then to get him off camera, quickly.

Theodore White was born in 1915, so his perspectives are those of a man who has observed the remarkable capacity of the American Republic to surmount both external and internal crises. At times he shows that his optimism is not entirely quenched, and his readers will be glad to share it. But the reading public in America and Europe will do well to ponder the apprehensions of an eloquent commentator in this honest and timely book.

University of York EDMUND IONS

Arms transfers under Nixon: a policy analysis. By Lewis Sorley. London, Lexington, Kentucky: University of Kentucky Press. 1983. 231pp. Index. £16·50.

THIS study of the role of arms transfers in the period 1968 to 1976 demonstrates how, in the wake of Vietnam, an alternative strategy for retaining American influence in key areas of the world was developed. It was a significant element of the 'Nixon Doctrine', and was implemented skilfully by Kissinger and others in the face of increased attempts by Congress to limit executive discretion. Sorley outlines the political and strategic environment, and suggests that the dispute between Congress and the executive over the application of arms transfer policy represented a fundamental debate over the appropriate goals of American foreign policy. He is overtly critical of congressional attitudes, while demonstrating that arms transfer policies are dictated by circumstances, and as such are an imperfect instrument with uncertain consequences.

While new factors such as the oil crisis were important, the key determinant of policy in this period remained the military and political balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. Sorley indicates the variety of ways in which arms transfer policies can be effected, and how they involve more than simply the sale of weapons. He provides an excellent example with respect to the Middle East, in the attempt to expedite a policy involving a more even-handed approach designed to reduce Soviet influence in the region, diminish Arab–Israeli conflict and establish Saudi Arabia and Iran as military powers, thus providing regional stability and continued access to oil. This meant careful consideration as to the timing, quantities and context of arms transfers. Sorley believes that it did lessen Soviet influence in Egypt and contribute to regional stability. The ultimate failure in Iran is blamed primarily on the change of emphasis by the Carter administration to human rights policies.

The arms transfer policies of the Nixon administration with respect to NATO and Western Europe were less successful. Sorley believes that the United States should have encouraged European countries to produce and sell more arms, allowing them to become self-sufficient with respect to conventional defence, and sharing with them the export market for arms.

The overall analysis could be said to be too sympathetic to arms transfers as a major vehicle of US policy. The switch to arms sales might simply have been an alternative search

for markets abroad in a situation of diminished demand at home and lower public support for defence spending. Some critics might feel that Sorley is naïve in believing that the United States would encourage European countries to increase arms production for sale abroad, or buy from them. His view that it was the increased ability to pay for arms by oil-rich countries, as much as the American desire to sell arms, that changed the balance of arms transfers in the Middle East, is also controversial. Sorley, however, rejects the view that arms transfers should be seen as exceptional or negative policy instruments, though he believes there will be a decline in the volume of such transfers. Not everyone will be persuaded that such policies were successful in the Nixon–Ford years, but Sorley has nonetheless produced a thought-provoking case study of an inadequately understood area of American foreign policy.

University of Keele JOHN D. LEES

The making of United States international economic policy: principles, problems and proposals for reform. 2nd edn. By Stephen D. Cohen. New York: Praeger. 1981. 278pp. Index. $28.95. Pb.: $13.95.

THIS is the second edition of an important and ambitious book which it seems has not been read by those whom it would most benefit. US international economic policy remains characterized by rhetoric rather than substance, by delay rather than anticipation, and by bureaucratic conflict rather than leadership. The US–European agricultural trade negotiations, for instance, began last year with threats and abuse, have continued at the pace of a slow snail, and seem destined to become a classic case of intra-government conflict in Washington. The problem is not unique to the current administration, nor indeed to the United States. Few governments anywhere have mastered the art of developing and then sustaining at both a political and an administrative level policies on the complex and detailed issues of international economic relations, from trade to finance.

Dr Cohen's book, which should be compulsory reading for officials and their political masters, is a record of the failings of successive US governments to confront the need for a bureaucratic mechanism capable, in his words, of developing international economic policy 'first through a full, orderly presentation and understanding of the relevant facts and then a balanced consideration of both domestic and external factors . . . An organization that articulates all options and forces decisions on a quick, well defined, well greased and responsive basis . . . with the foresight to anticipate and not just react defensively'.

That, as the author readily admits, is an optimal, if not a Utopian vision. Yet present and past performance is so poor that there is much progress short of the optimum which can and should be made. Dr Cohen offers some detailed proposals which attempt to meet the administrative and organizational requirements made necessary by economic interdependence and the entrenched divisions of government functions. He argues for a Department of International Commercial Policy, and a Cabinet Committee on international economic matters with responsibility for designating responsibility on specific issues between departments, and for providing the direct link to Presidential authority. The proposals are set out in detail down to the last sub-committee, and it seems to the last official. At every stage the argument is clear, reasonable, and persuasive.

If Dr Cohen neglects anything it is the role of the irrational and the political in making or breaking any administrative system, however well constructed. The lesson of experience is surely that the nature and direction of political leadership has been of critical importance in international economic policy matters where there are few ground rules and fewer precedents on which decisions can be built. Too often political leadership has been an obstacle to progress. Such comments are not intended to detract from the relevance of the author's analysis or his proposals. They deserve the widest discussion, but no one should be under any misapprehension as to just how ambitious they must now be judged to be.

Chatham House NICK BUTLER

Latin America and Caribbean

Underdevelopment and development in Brazil. Vol. I: Economic structure and change, 1822–1947; Vol. II: Reassessing the obstacles to economic development. By Nathaniel H. Leff. London, Boston: Allen & Unwin. 1982. 251, 140pp. Index. £18·50, £12·50; $29.50, $24.00.

THIS book is possibly the most complete work on the subject ever published, and as such it is likely to appeal to both historians and economists. Exceptionally among students of Latin American economic history, the author is able and willing to deal with multiple regressions and other quantitative techniques. He deals in economic analysis rather than economic ideologies, and in this sense goes against the grain. Leff succeeds in demolishing systematically development myths built over a generation, mainly by structuralist and dependency writers: among them, that the contemporary Brazilian economy is prone to failure; that imperialism and dependency, ideological rigidities and other sociocultural factors caused slow growth during the nineteenth century; that the effect of foreign trade has been negative; or that exports and industry were intrinsically conflictive aims. There is an enormous wealth of footnotes and references, and helpful assessment of previous work. Leff confirms A. G. Frank's view that nineteenth century economic agents were 'capitalist' rather than 'feudal', but almost all the other Frankian beliefs are rejected. Many of Furtado's views are confirmed, but some are challenged: for example, on real currency depreciation, or the external causes and income distribution effects of inflation.

There are thoughtful analyses of the income growth pace, the elastic labour supply, international trade, inflation and the inelastic output supply, development acceleration after 1900, industrialization, dependency. the north-east, sociocultural conditions, imperialism, and government. There are so many enjoyable parts and important results, that it is difficult to single out some of them (or to identify shortcomings). Among the quantitative discussions, particularly noteworthy are the very carefully specified econometric model of agricultural exports, which shows them to be highly responsive to prices; the estimation of income growth from currency stocks; or the demonstration of absence of long-term deterioration or short-term instability of export prices. Some other aspects would have benefited from a more careful discussion of the underlying structural models behind the reduced form estimations. For example, should the problems encountered by the monetary approach to the balance of payments really lead to a structuralist conclusion? Or, is considering import duties an important contribution to domestic industrial growth compatible with a significant positive impact of imports on the industrial sector? Were imports competitive with, or essential to domestic industry? A more disaggregated model was required here, and, to bring all the threads together, a simultaneous equation model linking all the key variables should have been included. However, despite these details, Leff's work remains a magnificent achievement.

Both the way in which it punishes true believers, and the use of some sophisticated quantitative techniques, mean that this book is perhaps unlikely ever to become popular or fashionable, in the sense of being selected by teachers as a textbook, or by ideologues as a source of slogans or easy answers; but, on the other hand, if it does not become a classic, in the sense of an indispensable consultation work for many years to come, I'll eat my hat.

University of Liverpool DAVID E. HOJMAN

The agricultural economy of northeast Brazil. By Gary P. Kutcher and Pasquale L. Scandizzo. Baltimore, London: John Hopkins University Press for the World Bank. 1982. 271pp. Index. Pb.: £18·75. $32.50.

NORTH-EAST Brazil is probably the largest pocket of persistent poverty in the Western hemisphere. Previous solutions to the problems of the region have concentrated on the creation of industry, the removal of surplus population or the hydraulic solution of DNOCS. The recent creation of development programmes such as Proterra and Polonordeste reflects a change of direction towards agriculture. The consequent demand for a better data base led to the work reported in this book.

Kutcher and Scandizzo provide a thorough and sophisticated analysis of information gathered in a survey of 8,000 north-eastern farms carried out jointly by the World Bank and SUDENE during 1973 and 1974. The perceived limitations of previous work forced the authors to develop their own classifications of agricultural labour and of farm types, both of which provide very useful frameworks for further detailed studies in the region.

The World Bank–SUDENE survey found both fewer farms and fewer renters of land than were enumerated in the 1972 census. At the same time, Kutcher and Scandizzo felt that both census and survey probably missed a large population of migratory slash-and-burn cultivators. With this proviso, the authors estimate that the agricultural labour force of the nine states of north-east Brazil in 1974 was about six million, of which less than 800,000 owned land, half of the agricultural land being concentrated in the hands of 4 per cent of the landowners. Half of the labour force is underemployed, working for only 50 to 60 days per year with an annual family income of about US$200 (1974 dollars). The product mix itself contributes to the region's stagnation, and the analysis of factor use and productivity on farms of different sizes and types indicates that the large farm sector is not using resources with maximum efficiency for profit generation, especially in relation to labour.

These depressing findings lead into the policy-oriented second part of the study. A linear programming model is used to assess the impact of various methods of improving the performance of north-eastern agriculture. Technological change and price guarantees are shown to have negligible overall effect. Only a radical land reform would have major impact. The authors show that if the 37,000 large estates which meet the requirements of the Land Statute as being suitable for reform were broken up into 790,000 small farms, twice the number of families would be employed and there would be a moderate overall gain in production. Yet even this solution would leave many rural Nordestinos no better off as the resource base is not adequate for the present level of population.

This is a brave but depressing study. Its findings date from a period of high national economic growth rates and optimism in Brazil. Since 1974 the situation in the rural north-east has worsened as many large estates have reduced their labour forces even further to minimize production costs. Technological innovation has led to the expulsion of sharecroppers from land which their families have cultivated in many cases for generations, and the level of violent land disputes has risen sharply. There is little evidence of any political will to implement land reform, although this report provides us with the most detailed and well-supported evidence yet available for the economic and social benefits of such a radical change. A decade after the World Bank–SUDENE survey the plight of the rural poor looks desperate indeed as the International Monetary Fund forces Brazil to reduce minimum wage levels and food subsidies.

University of Newcastle upon Tyne JANET H. MOMSEN

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Yearbook on international communist affairs 1983. Edited by Robert Wesson. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press. 1983. 534pp.

THE 17th edition of the yearbook is similar in scope to its predecessor, but slightly reduced in size. The term 'communist' is used rather generously to cover a great variety of ruling and non-ruling parties, providing much valuable information, although the writers' objectivity may sometimes be doubted. The volume includes a bibliography, and an index to the potted biographies contained in the last five issues.

Chatham House Library D.H.J.

Africa guide 1983. 7th edn. 443pp.
Middle East review 1983. 9th edn. 337pp.
Latin America & Caribbean 1983. 4th edn. 270pp.
Saffron Walden: World of Information. 1983. £17·00 each.

THESE annuals follow a common pattern, in which brief signed articles on regional topics are followed by country studies which provide basic economic, political and touristic informa-

tion. The paper-bound volumes are attractively produced, without an over-obtrusive use of advertisements. In each case the preface claims that 'naïve illusions' have been exposed. They should all be of value to businessmen, travellers and others, and *Latin America & Caribbean* appears to be the only yearbook devoted to the region.

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Books reviewed, Autumn 1983

Correspondence

rom Dr Raymond Hutchings

ear Sir,

I read with much interest the review of my *Soviet economic development* (2nd edition) by . G. Hare, which was published in your Summer 1983 issue (pp.529–30).

In general, I do not think it appropriate for an author to take up points raised in a review, ut in his comments on the new chapter 18, on technology imports and innovation, the :viewer found it surprising that I had not mentioned there 'any of the important work' one by 'CREES in the University of Birmingham'. However, earlier (on p.93) I did point ut that 'great strides have been made in studies at the University of Birmingham (in articular, *The technological level of Soviet industry*, eds R. Amann, J. Cooper and R. W. avies, 1977)'. It was only possible to devote limited space to this topic in a book not rimarily devoted to technology—about which I have written at much greater length in *oviet science, technology, design*, published for Chatham House in 1976—and it did not :em necessary to repeat my allusion in the later chapter. Had I intended to cover the topic ılly in chapter 18, I would have mentioned there, as well as the work of the Birmingham roup, a number of other important studies.

International Affairs

Notes for Contributors

The Editor welcomes suggestions for articles which may be suitable for publication in *International Affairs*; it is advisable to write a preliminary letter before sending a complete manuscript.

Articles should normally be between 6,000 and 8,000 words in length. Three copies should be submitted, at least one on good quality paper, ideally A4. The same size paper should be used throughout; brief additions to the text should be typed or mounted on a full-size sheet. Lines should be double-spaced throughout, including quotations, notes, etc. No extra line space is needed between paragraphs; the first line of each paragraph should be indented. Subheadings should be flush with the left margin, which should be at least 4 cm wide. Quotations, whether in text or notes, should be in single quotation marks, with double marks used for quotations within quotations. Quotations of six or more lines should be indented from both margins with no quotation marks. Dates should be rendered as follows: 9 January 1942; 1970s; nineteenth century; 1942–62 but 1981–2 (i.e. do not repeat decade digit if same).

References and notes should be signalled serially throughout the article by superscript numbers 1, 2, 3, etc. The references and notes themselves should appear *at the foot of the page on which reference to them is made*. For a book (example 1 below) please give: author; title; place, date of publication; publisher; page reference. For an article (example 2): author; title of article; title of journal; year, volume and issue number; page reference. For an article in an edited collection (example 3.): author; article title; editor and title of collection; remaining publishing details as for a book. The information should be presented as follows:

1. John Rex, *Race Relations in Sociological Theory* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1970), p. 161.
2. Lawrence Freedman, 'The Atlantic Crisis', *International Affairs*, Summer 1982, Vol. 58, No. 3, pp. 395–412.
3. Simon Barrow, 'Europe, Latin America and the Arms Trade' in Jenny Pearce, ed.: *The European Challenge: Europe's New Role in Latin America* (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982), pp. 176–216.

Please avoid use of ibid., op. cit., and loc. cit.; use instead short form of title.

Proofs will be supplied to all authors for checking. Corrections should be limited to printer's errors; further substantial alterations may be charged to the author. Twenty offprints will be supplied free of charge on publication; further copies may be ordered on the appropriate form which will accompany the proofs.

International Affairs

Aims and Scope

International Affairs was founded in 1922 as the quarterly journal of the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and *appears in January, April, July and* October each year. Articles published in the journal cover a broad range of topics of international interest in the fields of politics, economics, trade, defence, sociology and law; a balance is preserved between work of a primarily scholarly, historical nature and material of interest to current practitioners in or observers of these fields. Informed and responsible comment and reflection is at all times the keynote of the journal. Each issue contains an extensive book review section, covering normally 70 to 100 new and recent publications on international affairs and organized in fourteen subject and geographical categories.

The Royal Institute of International Affairs

The Royal Institute of International Affairs—Chatham House—is an unofficial body founded in 1920 to encourage and facilitate the scientific study of international questions. The aims and objects of the Institute are set out in its Royal Charter as follows:

> To advance the science of international politics, economics, and jurisprudence, and the study, classification, and development of the literature of these subjects.
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> To provide and maintain means of information upon international questions by means of lectures and discussions and by the preparation and publication of books, records, reports, or other works, or otherwise as may seem desirable.
>
> Generally to encourage and facilitate the study of international questions and to promote the exchange of information, knowledge, and thought on international affairs and the understanding of the circumstances, conditions, and views of nations and peoples, and to do all things necessary or expedient for the proper and effective carrying out of the objects aforesaid.

To these ends the Institute organizes research in international problems by individual scholars and by study groups composed of experts and others representing diverse points of view; publishes books, periodicals and pamphlets; arranges lectures and discussions on matters of current interest; and maintains a specialized library of books and documents on international affairs, together with a collection of classified press cuttings drawn from a wide range of British and foreign newspapers. The Institute is forbidden by its Charter from expressing opinions of its own, and opinions expressed at meetings or in publications of the Institute are the responsibility of those expressing them.

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ISSN 0020–5850

Printed in Great Britain by The Eastern Press Limited, London and Reading